Preliminary Hazard Analysis of EUROCONTROL Concept of Operations 2011 using the FAST method European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation presented.

Preliminary Hazard Analysis of EUROCONTROL Concept of Operations 2011

using the FAST method

presented byAlexander Krastev EUROCONTROL

Safety R & D seminar25 – 27 October, Barcelona

Acknowledgments

Ian Ramsay, EUROCONTROLJacques Beaufays, EUROCONTROL Jose Varela, EUROCONTROLJos Kuijper, EUROCONTROLRandall De Garis, EUROCONTROLBrian Smith, FASTMichel Masson, FASTRudi den Hertog, FAST

Content

Safety assessment of future concepts The FAST and the FAST methodology Eurocontrol Concept of Operations for 2011 ConOps 2011 hazard analysis using FAST methodology Main Findings Safety R & D needs Conclusions

Safety Assessment of Future Concepts Key Questions

New operational concepts developed in response to the forecasted traffic growth

Are the new concepts inherently safe? Do the new concepts bring the required safety

improvement? How do concept changes impact on safety of operations? Will SESAR Operational Concept achieve the safety target

for 2020?

Safety Assessment of Future Concepts Difficulties

Concepts’ descriptions limited to the “ideal” world Level of detail of available description not sufficient Need for “out of box” thinking Complex task that requires:

Integrated view of changes across all aviation domains Due consideration of interactions and interdependencies Suitable methodology

The Future Aviation Safety Team (FAST)

FAST established in 1999 by the JSSI Steering Group Objective: Develop and implement methods and processes to

support the systematic identification and resolution of future hazards in the aviation system

All major aviation stakeholder groups and organisations represented

FAST developed a prognostic method for future hazards identification

The FAST Method

The global Air-Ground-Space system considered as a “system of systems”

Focus on the “prognostic” time domain Augments existing hazard identification techniques Concept of Areas of Change at the core AoC list: 192 entries grouped in 11 categories, e.g.

AC_11 Proliferation of heterogeneous aircraft with widely-varying equipment and capabilities

FAST handbook available at: http://fast.jrc.it/

FA

ST

Cor

e T

eam

R

espo

nsib

ility

Commission Expert Teams

Advocate the FAST Philosophy

Guide FAST Facilitators

Cus

tom

er/

Sta

keho

lder

R

espo

nsib

ility

Exp

ert

Tea

m

Res

pons

ibili

ty

Enhance the FAST Method

3. Assemble an Expert

Team

1.Responsible Party Proposes Change(s) to Global Aviation System; recognizes need for

systematic prediction of hazard(s) associated with

changes and need to design potential hazards out of system or avoid or mitigate hazard(s)

4.Understand Customer

Requirements and Future of Interest

10.Inform FAST &

Customers Regarding results

2.Define Scope of

Expert Team Hazard-

IdentificationStudy

9.Formulate

Recommendations& Identify Watch

Items

8. (optional)Identify Mitigations & Effects of Areas of

Change on Mitigations

7.Enrich Hazards by

Evaluating Interactions with Areas of Change

5. (optional)Identify Intrinsic Hazards Within

Future of Interest

6.Identify Areas of

Change Pertinent to Future of Interest

Enhance and/orModify Planned

Changes

Maintain Futures &

Watch Items

Maintain Areasof ChangeRepository

The FAST Process

Concept of Operations 2011 Description of the ATM System in 2011 - the Main Changes

The ATM Components, OI’s and System Enablers The ATM Operational Model

The Key Enablers – SWIM, the Network Operations Plan and Collaborative Decision Making

The Principles of the Layered Planning ProcessHigh-Level System Capabilities

Business Impact Statements

AnnexesThe Actors – Roles and Responsibilities Operational Scenarios and Use cases

ConOps 2011 Content

Air Traffic Flow &

CapacityManagement

Airspace Organisation &Management

Airspace User

Operations

Airport Operations

Information Management &

Services

Separation Assurance

Synchronisation

ConOps 2011 The Change Directions

The ConOps 2011 defines the main change directions for the evolution of European ATM: Gate to Gate Flight Management Enhanced Flexibility & Efficiency Responsive Capacity Management to meet Demand Collaborative Airspace Management Extended Levels of Automation & Communication System Wide Information Management Collaborative Decision-Making

ConOps 2011 Hazard Analysis Objectives

Establish a comprehensive list of hazards that may be generated by the implementation of ConOps 2011

Identify hazards which may have a critical impact on ATM safety

Validate the applicability of FAST method to assessments of future ATM concepts

ConOps 2011 Hazard Analysis Approach

All FAST process steps covered except “Formulate recommendations and identify Watch Items

Tailored briefing packs for more efficient preparation Two workshops held (6-9 June and 17-20 July 2006) Excellent mix of expertise in the Expert team Hazard identification performed by teams in break-out sessions

lead by facilitators

ConOps 2011 Hazard Analysis WS 1 Focus

Teams analysed ConOps 2011 from three perspectives: AOM / ATFCM ATC and Airport Operations Airspace Users Operations

The three phases of the layered planning process addressed strategic pre-tactical tactical

Nominal (G2G) Operational scenario used to enrich hazard log Output: ConOps/Scenario related hazard log

Network Operations Plan

ConOps 2011 Hazard Analysis WS 2 Focus

Three non-nominal scenarios used for hazard identification

Scenario based team composition Brainstorming session for identification

of potential mitigation means WS output:

Scenario related hazard logs List of safety issues for further study and

analysis

Oh God, please help me see the future!

Main Findings

The main ConOps 2011 concept elements could bring a significant safety benefit

Need of a balanced and safe in terms of frequency and complexity process of dynamic airspace changes

Diversity of aircraft equipment and capabilities is an important safety challenge

Safety aspects of human tasks automation deserve particular attention and efforts

Safety R&D Aspects (1)

Safety issues R & D needs

Design and real time control of complex distributed system with multiple actors

Safety related architecture and functionality, integrity and security requirements and procedures for a G2G information management system for ATM

Dynamic changes to ATM system components and environment of operation

Degree of flexibility that can be safely accommodated by the future ATM system

Diversity of systems and aircraft capabilities and performances

Principles and requirements for safe transition planning

Safety R&D Aspects (2)

Safety issues R & D needs

Automation and Human machine interaction

Human reliability and performance limitations in operation of systems with different degree of automation: ranging from limited system support to automated decision making. Impact of reallocation of safety roles and responsibilities

Assessment methods for advanced Human computer interaction

Safety R&D Aspects (3)

Safety issues R & D needs

Consistency of planned changes, new concepts and supporting technologies

Develop method for integration of safety assessments (safety cases) performed on specific planned changes and concept elements

Proactive safety management in early stages of concept development.Safety afforded highest priority in ATM system planning and development

Develop efficient mechanism for delivery of safety recommendations to concept designers enabling the shift from technology driven to safety driven automation

Safety R&D Aspects (4)

Safety issues R & D needs

Proactive safety management in early stages of concept development

Improved methodologies for safety assessment of future operational concepts

Ensure the achievement of the overall safety target for 2020

Assess innovative SESAR Operational Concept components, e.g. new separation provision techniques

Conclusions Methodology

Objectives largely met - benefits of safety assessment of operational concepts demonstrated

Involvement of all ATM actors is essential: allowing for synergies and shared knowledge

Use of operational scenarios considered essential

FAST method can be used for safety analysis of future concepts; some fine tuning still needed

ConclusionsBenefits/Limitations of Concept Assessments

Anticipate safety issues right from the concept definition phase “Validation” of new concepts from safety perspective Source of recommendations for further analysis and research Enable risk informed decision making in the planning and

development phases

BUT, there are also limitations: Non-linear increase of uncertainties with time New or modified hazards may emerge from specific implementation High level of abstraction

Thank you very much for your attention!

… possibly a safe option for the future