Pitt to the World | The World to Pitt - The Evolution of Soviet … · 2004. 12. 20. · The Evolution of Soviet Perspectives on African Politics AUTHOR : S. Neil MacFarlane DATE

NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN RESEARCH

OCCASIONALPAPER

TITLE:

The Evolution of Sovie tPerspectives on African Politic s

AUTHOR: S . Neil MacFarlan e

DATE :

March 15, 1992

In accordance with Amendment #6 to Grant #1006-555009, this OccasionalPaper by a present or former Council Trustee or contract Awardee has bee nvolunteered to the Council by the author for distribution to the Government .

NCSEER NOTE

This paper consists of Chapter I from Soviet Policy in Africa : from the Old to the New Thinking; George Breslaue rEd. : Published by the Center for Slavic and East European Studies; University of California, Berkeley, for th eBerkeley-Stanford Program in Soviet Studies . Forthcoming Spring, 1992.

SUMMARY 1

This paper describes the transition in the Soviet view of Africa from a forward ,

ideological, aggressively confronfational and optimistic stance in the early 1970's to th e

opposite in the 1980's . In that sense the paper is already dated, and has been overtaken b y

events, in particular by the bitter lessons learned by the Soviet society from the traumas o f

the last few years . The paper's lasting value, however, may lie in its analytic conclusion tha t

the change of view was the product of learning from reality and experience, rather than

a tactic, and therefore might last into a period when Russia may recoup some measure of it s

earlier influence in Africa .

The table of Contents on the following page shows the topics covered by the author ,

and the text reveals the breadth as well as idiosyncracies of Soviet perspectives and thei r

evolution, reversal even, over the period . For the reader it is a brief immersion into an alie n

symbolism and dynamic, familiar to specialists, and unlikely to be quite eradicated for year s

to come. The author's central point (paragraph 1 above) is well captured in his Conclusion s

(Pp. 47 to 49) .

This paper supplements the author's Final Report to the Council, "The Evolution o f

Soviet Perspectives on Third World Security," distributed February 19, 1992 .

1 Prepared by NCSEER staff.

Table of Content s

I . Introduction 1

II . Activism in Theory, 1970's 8a . The Vanguard Party 8b . The Sources of Civil Conflict 1 1c . Liberation in Southern Africa 1 2d . Economic Development 1 4e . Inter-African Conflict 1 6f . Structures of Conflict Limitation 1 6g. The Foreign Policies of African States 1 7h. The Role of External Actors 2 1

III . Modifications 27a. The Vanguard Party & Socialist Orientation 2 8b . The Sources of Civil Conflict 3 1c . The Liberation Struggle in South Africa 32d . Economic Development 34e.

Inter-African Relations 3 8f .

External Actors 39

IV.

Conclusions 47

THE EVOLUTION OF SOVIET PERSPECTIVES ON AFRICAN POLITICS '

S . Neil MacFarlane

I. Introduction

The Soviet-Cuban intervention in the Angolan war in 1974-76 marked the beginnin g

of a period of considerable activism in Soviet policy in Sub-Saharan Africa. The principal

characteristics of this period were :

1. A growing willingness to employ force (indirectly) to enhance the Sovietposition in the region (e .g ., the Angolan and Ethiopian interventions) .

2. A substantial increase in the quantity of arms transferred to the region an din the role of this instrument in policy implementation .

3. A focus on "states of socialist orientation," involving the conclusion o ftreaties of friendship with Angola, Mozambique, and Ethiopia ; theestablishment of institutionalized ties between leading parties in these countrie sand the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) ; and the acceptance bythe USSR and its allies of a substantial role in security assistance .

4. Enthusiastic rhetorical and significant material support for liberatio nmovements in Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), South Africa, and Namibia .

More than ten years have passed since this resurgence of Soviet activism in Africa .

During this period the Soviets have been consistently confronted with the difficulty of

stabilizing vanguard party regimes, not to mention the even greater difficulty of furtherin g

their transition to socialism . Friendly regimes in Ethiopia, Angola, and Mozambique ar e

faced with powerful insurgencies . While these insurgent movements benefit fro m

considerable external support, they also have profound internal roots . Popular support fo r

them -- or, more modestly, public apathy or hostility toward the governments -- stems fro m

ethnic and regional disaffection, economic hardship, and governmental mismanagement .

After a decade of "non-capitalist development," the economies of Soviet clients are a

shambles. The only real development proceeding in sub-Saharan Africa is occurring in state s

of capitalist orientation generally hostile toward the USSR (e .g .,, the Ivory Coast an d

Kenya) .

2

In the meantime, in defiance of optimistic predictions about the weakening of th e

position of imperialism in Africa, and most noticeably since the Shaba incidents of 1977 an d

1978, the Western powers -- particularly, France and the United States -- have demonstrate d

that they are unwilling to withdraw from active participation in the politics and militar y

affairs of the region . Their involvement has occasioned serious difficulties for friends of th e

USSR (viz . French and American actions against Libya and American assistance to UNITA

in Angola) . In economic affairs, the twelve years since the Angolan liberation hav e

demonstrated that African states -- including the states of socialist orientation -- have littl e

choice but to participate in the Western- and Japanese-dominated world economy on term s

dictated by the principal capitalist industrial powers . In short, the Soviets have becom e

rather thoroughly acquainted with the vicissitudes of attempting to stabilize their politica l

position and to implant their political and economic model in the African environment .

The fundamental question of this volume is what, if anything, the Soviets hav e

learned from this experience . The assessment of learning must take into account bot h

theoretical development and policy change . Change in theory is of little relevance in gaugin g

the adaptation of a state's perspective on a specific problem unless the practice of that stat e

reflects the change . Likewise, it is difficult to interpret the historical significance of change

in practice without reference to the intellectual context in which it occurs . Attention to th e

evolution of theory gives us at least a partial view of that context .

This chapter addresses the evolution of published Soviet perspectives on Africa n

politics and international relations since 1975 . It asks whether there exists evidence in thi s

literature of the disillusionment, pessimism, and growing caution that one might expect t o

emerge from the last twelve years of experience with radical clients in the sub-Sahara n

region . The discussion is divided into four sections : Soviet comment on the internal politic s

and policies of African states ; discussion of the struggle for liberation in southern Africa ;

analysis of the process of economic development in Africa ; and comment on the internationa l

relations of the regional subsystem .

The discussion of African domestic politics concentrates on the performance of an d

prospects for vanguard party regimes in the effort to lay the basis for the transition t o

socialism, and on the nature and significance of impediments to this process . It also

3

considers Soviet analysis of the roots and significance of civil conflict in African societies .

The section on national liberation in southern Africa examines Soviet discussion of the rol e

of various social and political forces in the struggle for change in the southern section of the

continent, the role of violence in this struggle, and the prospects for successful change . The

section on economic development addresses Soviet evaluations of the prospects for economi c

progress, the methods of obtaining it, and the impediments encountered in the developmen t

effort .

In the section on Africa's international relations, I address the sources of interstate

conflict, the nature and significance of the roles played by external actors, and the potential

for and methods of crisis management and conflict resolution in the region . Africa's impac t

on relations between the two superpowers is also examined .

In analyzing the evolution of the Soviet discussion of these topics, I have relied on a

survey of major Soviet academic, military and party journals (Mirovaya Ekonomika i

Mezhdunarodnye Otnoshenia, Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn', Narody Azii i Afriki, SShA : Politika ,

Ekonomika, Ideologia, the Voenno-Istoricheskii Zhurnal, Morskoi Sbornik, Kommunis t

Vooruzhennykh Sil, and Kommunist) over the years 1975-87, and on a selection o f

monographs produced by Soviet scholars and party officials in the same period . Where

useful, I have also drawn upon declarations of party doctrine and government policy i n

Pravda and Izvestiia, as well as in the electronic media . I have focused principally o n

articles and statements dealing specifically with Africa, though where particularly useful, I

have employed more general treatments of Third World issues as well .

How one interprets a given Soviet source depends on what one determines its functio n

or functions to be . Three functions seem particularly important : disinformation, the

definition and propagation of doctrine, and the airing of debates among experts . Although

deciding which function is being served in any given case is occasionally problematic, i n

most instances one can make reasonably reliable judgements through attention not only t o

what is said, but also who is saying it, what the institutional affiliation of the author is ,

where the statement appears, at what audience it is being directed, and, finally, the historica l

context informing the statement in question . For the purposes of this discussion, both

4

scholarly analyses and doctrinal statements are relevant . The former suggest trends in th e

thinking of the community of specialists . The latter reflect the degree to which these trend s

have filtered up to the level of policymaking .

There is ample evidence to suggest a plurality of perspectives in the analytical an d

policymaking communities on Third World issues .' Given the space limitations of thi s

chapter, I shall not consider these differences in detail, although I recognize their importance

to the subject as a whole . Instead, I shall focus on the dominant tendencies of articulatio n

and how these have evolved over time in response to the accumulation and analysis of

experience in the region and to the spectrum of other internal and external factors whic h

impinge on Soviet policy in Africa .

In order to give the reader some sense of orientation for an analysis which may

appear somewhat alien, if not bizarre, it is useful at the outset to define the parameters o f

opinion and to associate them with policymaking perspectives . At the risk of

oversimplification, Soviet views on these topics range over time between what can be loosel y

called a revolutionary 3 tendency of articulation and a more realistic or pragmatic one .

The former emphasizes the applicability of orthodox Soviet Marxist thought and th e

Soviet experience of political, social, and economic development in Africa . It stresses th e

importance of the establishment of quasi-Leninist parties, reliance on the working class an d

peasantry, class struggle against exploiting indigenous and foreign groups, and the need to

move beyond traditional patterns of social and economic organization to scientific socialis t

forms in the struggle for development . It accepts the necessity of violence in the struggle fo r

liberation in southern Africa and rejects evidence of reformist tendencies in that region . It

emphasizes the role of imperialism as a cause of conflict and an impediment to progress i n

the region, and plays down the role of indigenous forces in this regard . In this sense, the

question of security and development in Africa is situated within the broader zero-su m

scheme of struggle between capitalism and socialism . The imperialist threat is perceived as a

monolithic one -- led by the United States . Hence, South Africa and France, for example ,

are subordinate players in a unified Western imperialist threat to Africa. Inter-imperialis t

contradictions and the autonomy of individual imperialist states are played down .

The role it posits for the Soviet Union in the struggle for complete liberation is a

5

broad one -- involving the provision of political, economic, and military support t o

progressive states in Africa . The capacity of the USSR and the socialist camp to provide a n

alternative to participation in and dependence on the world capitalist economy is stressed . Its

focus in discussing relations with African states is on the states of socialist orientation .

Capitalist-oriented states are dismissed as instruments of imperialism in the latter's efforts t o

dominate Africa . It places little emphasis on the constraints faced by the USSR in it s

economic relations with its African allies . It plays down, if it recognizes at all, the negativ e

consequences of activism in Africa for the central relationship between the superpowers . It

rejects the notion that cooperation with the West on regional security issues is possible .

Western efforts at conflict management and resolution are dismissed as insincere an d

self-interested .

The "pragmatic" or "realistic" view suggests that the African political experience i s

quite specific in character and that, therefore, important modifications of the Soviet Marxis t

model of development are necessary, if indeed the model is applicable at all . It questions the

significance of class struggle as the dominant political phenomenon in African society an d

politics, stresses the weakness in these societies of the classes (the proletariat and th e

bourgeoisie) which are central to Marxist theory, and emphasizes the importance of factor s

indigenous to Third World society (clan, tribe, religion) as determinants of indigenou s

political outcomes .

In such circumstances, integrative efforts at building national unity are necessary .

Governments should attempt to reconcile conflicting tendencies through broad fronts . Under

these conditions, vanguard parties are not necessarily the way to go . Those that have been

established and which rule face a very difficult and lengthy task in pursuing the path o f

socialist orientation . Reversal is possible on this path . It is questionable whether the parties

established on the vanguard model are equal to the task they face . They lack theoretical

sophistication, perseverance in the controlled mobilization of the fragmented population int o

purposeful directed political activity, are often corrupt, and are often excessively hasty i n

their efforts to make the leap to socialism. The consequences of their efforts to do so are

often economically and politically disastrous. In the underdeveloped conditions facin g

regimes of socialist orientation, the private sector continues to have an important role to play

6

in the provision of essential goods and services and in the accumulation of capital . Since the

state does not have the means to fulfil these functions itself, progressive regimes should not

proceed with hasty, ill-conceived nationalization programs . The African experience suggest s

that development is not only possible, but is often more impressive, in capitalist oriente d

states. In these circumstances where progressive change is so protracted and difficult, it doe s

not make sense for Soviet diplomacy to focus on the socialist-oriented regimes and to neglec t

those of other orientations . Indeed, the latter may have things to offer the Soviet Union i n

relations of mutual benefit .

Just as this view emphasizes the difficulties of socialist construction in Africa n

conditions, so too does it recognize the impediments to successful national liberation i n

southern Africa, given the continuing strength of indigenous forces opposed to the process o f

liberation. As a result, those subscribing to this tendency of articulation counsel caution an d

patience in the liberation struggle and again stress the need for broad fronts in that struggle .

They tend to be skeptical in the prevailing conditions of the utility of violence as a means o f

achieving liberation . The focus in explaining civil and interstate conflict in Africa lies on th e

role of indigenous nationalism, as well as ethnic and religious rivalries . By contrast, the role

of imperialism as a cause of conflict is played down .

Circumspection extends to the discussion of the role of the USSR in the region . This

tendency emphasizes the limited capacity of the USSR and the socialist camp to assist in th e

development process and fails to identify the "international socialist division of labor" as an

alternative to participation of the developing states in the international capitalist economy .

By way of consolation, perhaps, it is admitted that foreign private capital may play a positiv e

role in the development process, as can participation in the capitalist system of international

trade and investment . :Moreover, it also tends to play down the negative role played b y

Western states, the United States in particular, and to emphasize to a greater degree th e

existence of inter-imperialist contradictions . Thus, individual imperialist states are viewed a s

independent actors with agendas of their own . These agendas may or may not coincide with

the agendas of other imperialist states . Finally, this tendency recognizes the possibility o f

limited bilateral or multilateral cooperation with specific imperialist actors, in an effort t o

reduce the dangers of confrontation in the region and limit the damage done to relations

7

between the USSR and the West by disputes over Third World issues.

Both of these tendencies are in a sense ideal types . Few of the sources deal in a

comprehensive fashion with all of the issues raised above . Occasionally, individual authors

will combine aspects of both, evincing quite orthodox positions in some areas an d

unorthodox ones elsewhere, but such mixes are rare . The two paradigms are useful a s

indicators of theoretical perspectives consistent with revolutionary forceful activism on th e

one hand and quiescent moderation, if not withdrawal, on the other .

Moreover, intellectual history is seldom divided into neat and discrete periods .

Reality is, unfortunately, somewhat sloppy . When one moves from a period in which one

perspective is dominant to one in which its rival predominates, there is inevitably a degree o f

overlap between them . The interim likely displays considerable ambiguity and incoherence

in argumentation, both within specific articles and monographs (as authors combine ne w

unconventional perspectives with efforts to touch still pertinent ideological bases) an d

between them, as some individuals and institutions are less resistant to change than ar e

others .

The basic argument of this contribution is that we have moved since 1975 from th e

dominance of perspectives of the first activist tendency to increasing expression of views

consistent with the second . Both official and academic discourse reflect this transition . To

the extent that theory is a predictor of practice, or a reflection of it, this treatment of Sovie t

discussions suggests a retreat from the activism characteristic of the mid- and late 1970s .

This retreat may have resulted from many things : the increasing Soviet preoccupation wit h

domestic political and economic problems, the American military buildup of the early an d

mid-1980s and the associated renewal of American activism in the Third World, and/or th e

withdrawal of China from competition with the USSR over forces of liberation in the region .

But the growing sensitivity to the complexity and immalleability of the African environment

evident in the literature suggests that it resulted also from a growing accumulation o f

experience with the difficulties of pursuing objectives in this region . It is the product, i n

other words, of learning .

8

IL Activism in Theory : The Mid- and Late 1970 s

A Soviet scholar recently noted in conversation with me that as a result of th e

victories in Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, and later Nicaragua, he and his colleagues had

been carried away by a wave of enthusiasm for socialist-oriented states and this had blinde d

them to the great concrete difficulties faced by vanguard party regimes in the transition t o

socialism.' This optimistic assessment provided the theoretical basis for Soviet activism i n

the late 1970s .

A . The Vanguard Party and Socialist Orientatio n

This optimism is evident across the spectrum of issues under consideration here . In

domestic politics, highly positive assessments of emergent vanguard party, socialist-oriente d

regimes predominated . The vanguard party model -- a monopoly of power enjoyed by a

party of elite revolutionaries organized in accordance with the principles of democrati c

centralism and embracing scientific socialism -- was considered necessary to effectuate th e

transition to socialism via the path of socialist orientation . Broad national fronts, b y

contrast, were deemed inadequate to the task . 5 By implication, not only were previou s

efforts to secure objectives through cooperation with more traditional nationalist regime s

(such as those of Nasser's Egypt or Nkrumah's Ghana) less than promising, but it was als o

realistic and feasible to rely on more radical regimes espousing Marxism-Leninism in pursui t

of influence and position in Africa . Scientific socialism was an appropriate political form fo r

Africa. The emergence of vanguard party regimes was considered by many to be a

manifestation of a deeper transformation from the "national-democratic" stage of th e

transition to socialism, characterized by a broad coalition of indigenous forces with varyin g

degrees of commitment to socio-economic change, to the "people's democratic" one, i n

which power was concentrated in the hands of those social forces -- notably the proletaria t

and the peasantry -- more resolutely committed to profound transformation of society and th e

economy in the direction of socialism . ' The expansion in the number of vanguard part y

regimes in Africa (the Congo in 1969, Benin in 1976, Mozambique and then Angola in 1977 ,

and the stated intention of the Ethiopian military regime to do likewise) was considered

9

evidence of a weakening of the position of imperialism in Africa and a strengthening of th e

position of progressive forces on the continent .' Belief that the increasing emergence o f

these regimes reflected the basic trend of African politics was evidenced by Soviet assertion s

that the USSR's foreign policy in Africa was oriented toward, and dominated by, relation s

with the socialist-oriented states .' This optimism concerning the viability of the vanguar d

party model was based in part on a rather sanguine appraisal of the political capacities an d

inclinations of various social forces in Africa . In general, Soviet writers heavily criticized

any propensity to deny the relevance of class in the analysis of African society . Indeed, i t

was commonly argued that in the aftermath of independence, and as the struggle of Africa n

peoples shifted from the phase of national liberation to that of "national democracy," th e

class struggle deepened and became the dominant characteristic of political evolution i n

African society . ' In the analysis of this struggle, the national bourgeoisie (indigenou s

entrepreneurs in the retailing and manufacturing sectors) was on the whole written off as a

revolutionary force in the aftermath of political independence . 10 Meanwhile, comment on the

capacity of the working class to determine political events was mixed . Although many

continued to recognize the proletariat's numerical weakness and questionable level o f

consciousness," the dominant view appeared to be that as development proceeded, th e

political weight of this class was growing, its consciousness of class interest was increasing ,

and it was becoming the determining force in political development . 12 Many Soviet writer s

also evinced considerable enthusiasm about the ability of petit bourgeois and military group s

to overcome the social and political obstacles to the pursuit of the path of socialist orientatio n

in Africa. In the case of the military, numerous writers have pointed to the capacity of th e

Ethiopian officer corps, embodying the concerns and hopes of the majority of the people, t o

guide the process of social and political development in that country . Indeed, some argue d

that in the prevailing circumstances of extreme ethnic and political fragmentation, it was th e

only force capable of so doing . 13 This evaluation often extended to countries without a

socialist orientation as well . For example, when the Nigerian military was praised for it s

domestic and foreign policy initiatives .14 This stress on the potential of the military as a

progressive political force rested on a number of factors, among them the military's status a s

one of the few national institutions in which ethnic groups were integrated, its role as one of

1 0

the few modern and modernizing forces in African society, and its ability, through the office r

corps, to serve as an avenue of upward mobility for people of humble origin .

Arguably more important than the military were the so-called revolutionar y

democrats, comprised principally of radical intellectuals generally of "petit bourgeois" origi n

(the "srednye sloi") . This group was to lead the country along the path of socialis t

orientation -- from national liberation to national democracy (in which the principal task s

were anti-feudal, anti-imperialist, and anti-capitalist transformation), and ultimately to th e

stage of people's democracy . The argument concerning the capacity of this group -- i n

alliance with the working class and peasantry -- to lead the transition to socialism rested upo n

an optimistic belief that in conditions where the base was not in theory sufficiently mature to

stimulate movement in this direction, progress could be made through the manipulation of the

levers of state power by a steadfast, ideologically conscious and committed nonproletaria n

elite . 15 Such a judgment betrays considerable optimism about the capacity to implant stabl e

allied regimes in Africa, despite the underdeveloped character of African politics .

This optimism extends into the discussion of impediments to political development in

the direction of socialism on the continent . The most common perspective of the mid- an d

late 1970s was one in which the indigenous impediments to progress in the construction o f

the vanguard party, socialist-oriented state were played down in comparison to issues of class

and class struggle, the dynamics of which Soviet scholars claimed to understand and to b e

able to predict . One sees for example the argument with regard to Ethiopia that :

It is not without basis that Ethiopia was once called a "museum of peoples . "As a result of the revolution, the process of ethnic integration has received anew impulse and the basic tendency of development has been fully defined - -social factors (i .e ., class) are gaining the upper hand over ethnic and religiou sones . The great power policy of amharicization conducted by the emperor ha scome to an end .1 6

Elsewhere Soviet authors at this time argued that tribal divisions were gradually disappearin g

owing to the growing influence on intertribal social organizations such as trade unions, an d

were being replaced by deepening consciousness of class interests which transcended ethni c

division .

Nationalism, meanwhile, was seen as a dualistic force in African domestic politics .

1 1

During the phase of struggle for independence, it served to unify disparate political an d

social groups . In the aftermath of independence, it could be employed by progressiv e

revolutionary democratic regimes to further the process of national integration . But it often

turned into a chauvinistic extremism directed at other national groups within the state or a t

neighboring states (as in the case of Somalia), when bourgeois groups seeking to enhance

their newfound capacity to exploit their own populations appealed to chauvinistic sentiment s

to broaden their base of popular support . Nationalism in this sense diverted the attention o f

the masses and their leaders from the real character of the problems they faced in the

struggle for progress -- internal class struggle and external interference from imperialism .

Not to worry, however, as the process of social development proceeded, its influence would

gradually disappear, in the face of a growing Pan-African cultura

l consciousness.18. The Sources of Civil Conflict

The dismissal of factors such as ethnicity, religion, and nationalism as causes o f

internal conflicts in Africa leaves Soviet analysts with the necessity of developing an

alternative set of explanations . The dominant mode of accounting for civil conflict in Africa

was to blame it on internal class struggle (the efforts of indigenous feudal, patriarchal an d

bourgeois forces) fomented or fueled by interference on the part of imperialism . Both of

these forces shared the objective of preventing social progress . There was a degree o f

variation in Soviet characterizations of the sources of internal opposition . Some implied tha t

it grew out of indigenous class struggle and that, though it might benefit from external

interference, it was not created by imperialism . 19 Others stressed instead the agency o f

imperialism in creating, and not merely sustaining internal reaction and consequent conflict :

Numerous facts give a solid basis for declaring that the conflict in Angola, andthe worsening of the situation around it are the result of the crude interferenceof imperialist forces in the affairs of the Angolan people . . . It is a matter no tof some internal political or tribal problem, but one of open crude imperialis tinterference . 20

There was clearly a fair amount of heat in this discussion, notably (of all places) i n

Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn', a publication generally viewed as a rather boring and monolithi c

mouthpiece for propaganda directed at the outside world . Viktor Kudryavtsev responded to

1 2

views like that just quoted, by noting that :

It is not necessary to think that absolutely all internal African conflicts ar eassiduously provoked by imperialist policy . To judge them in this fashion i sto deliberately distract the peoples of Africa from attentive examination o fpurely internal sources of such conflict and to carry them all over either to th eplane of inter-imperialist conflict over raw materials or strategic position or, a sthe Maoists would have it, to the plane of the struggle between th esuperpowers for influence . 2 1

Four months later we see another writer in the same journal arguing that the policy of

imperialism and the activity of Peking "splitters" is precisely the reason for armed conflict i n

the Horn of Africa :

Elsewhere, although the enemies (!) of Angola seek to cast the developin gsituation in that country as one of internal civil war, in fact what is takin gplace there is an open imperialist aggression against a sovereign government . 2 7

These disagreements are intriguing and significant as portents for what has com e

since. But it ought to be emphasized that all of those engaged in this discussion -- whethe r

they accounted for the origins of civil conflict by reference to indigenous politics or t o

exogenous factors -- stressed the role of imperialism as a force of critical importance i n

sustaining and deepening processes of civil conflict . Indeed, one gets the impression tha t

Soviet authors in general -- whatever their views on the origins of civil conflict -- accepted

that absent the nefarious influence of imperialism, such disputes would evaporate .

Moreover, those who did emphasize the causal role of internal factors focused primarily o n

class struggle . National/ethnic problems were epiphenomenal manifestations of deeper clas s

conflicts . They were not autonomous factors in their own right .

C. Liberation in Southern Afric a

The issue of internal conflict leads naturally to that of liberation in southern Africa .

Given the temporal limits of this study, I examined comment on Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) ,

Namibia, and South Africa . It bears recalling that the mid-1970's, when this study begins ,

was a period of considerable success in the struggle against the last remnants of the colonia l

empires of Africa . With the fall of Mozambique, the capacity of the Smith regime i n

Rhodesia to hold on in the face of a mounting insurgency was increasingly a matter of

1 3

question . The growth of the Black Consciousness Movement in South Africa and th e

explosion of violence in Soweto in 1976 suggested to some that white rule in South Afric a

itself was weakening . In this historical context, it is not surprising that Soviet comment on

the issue of national liberation again was dominated in the mid- and late 1970s b y

considerable optimism on prospects for the struggle, and by a tendency to project th e

successful experience of armed struggle led by a conscious revolutionary movement i n

Angola onto the very different circumstances of South Africa and Namibia .

Along these lines, Yusuf Dadu of the South African Communist Party, writing in

Kommunist, asserted in 1976 that victories elsewhere in South Africa and notably in Angola

suggested that South Africa's hold on the region was weakening and that its capacity to hol d

the line against change in Namibia and South Africa itself was in question . 23 Change in the

correlation of forces in favor of world socialism, coupled with the quickening of the struggl e

on the subcontinent itself, doomed South Africa to defeat . 24 Events in Soweto merely

confirmed this evaluation . 25 Positive assessments extended to the liberation struggle then

underway in Rhodesia as well : "Neither military provocations, nor diplomatic contrivance s

will save the Rhodesian regime from its unavoidable collapse ."26

With regard to the means of struggle, Soviet writers generally took the view that

violence was a necessary tactic at this stage, given the continuing resistance of the Sout h

Africans and the Rhodesians (until 1979) to enter meaningful negotiations on a transfer of

power to the masses . 27 Compromise short of full dismantlement of the political status quo i n

Rhodesia, Namibia, and South Africa was deemed self-deluding . So too was any hope tha t

these regimes could, as a result of pressure upon them from within and without, embark o n

meaningful reforms . 28 They had to go, lock, stock, and barrel . The means of getting rid of

them was -- in part if not principally -- a revolutionary war of national liberation . The

principal agents of this revolutionary process were the vanguard movements -- SWAPO i n

Namibia, ZAPU in Rhodesia, and the alliance of the ANC and the SACP in South Africa . 29

There was little interest expressed in the construction of broader fronts . Potential allies, such

as the SASO-centered advocates of Black Consciousness, those willing to contemplate a n

internal solution in Namibia, and white moderate critics of the excesses of apartheid in South

Africa, were either ignored or subjected to criticism for ideological and political error . 30

1 4

Indeed, one detects in Soviet writing considerable discomfort with Black Consciousness i n

particular, for both theoretical and practical reasons . 3 1

One gets the impression that the Soviets believed that their chosen clients could

accomplish liberation themselves without the dilution of their revolutionary program tha t

would result from the search for allies among the less resolute . The post-liberation agend a

was the construction of vanguard party, socialist-oriented regimes and the pursuit of the non -

capitalist path of development already beginning in Angola and Mozambique . 32 Scorn of

prospects for negotiated settlement, indifference toward potential allies beyond selecte d

movements, rejection of partial solutions, coupled with skepticism about the capacity of white

regimes in the region to survive translates into revolutionary optimism.

D . Economic Developmen t

The mention of South Africa's post-liberation agenda brings us to the final set of

domestic issues to be considered -- those of economic development . Soviet though t

concerning economic development in Africa was, in the late 1970s, consistent with th e

optimism suggested by their treatment of political development and liberation in southern

Africa. The dominant view appeared to be that backwardness, or the incapacity to develop

fully, was not the result of inherent features of African society or Third World economies i n

general, but was rather the product of the colonial experience and continuing neocolonia l

exploitation . 33 The answer to the problem of development lay primarily in the dissociation o f

African economies from the world capitalist economy .' In this context, one might hav e

expected Soviet authors to claim that the USSR and the socialist camp (the "internationa l

socialist division of labor") could replace the international capital in the external relations o f

developing countries . And indeed, there was much comment stressing the importance to th e

African states of economic ties to the world socialist system . 35 The deepening of such

cooperation, based as it was on mutual benefit and equity rather than hierarchy and

exploitation, facilitated the process of development . 3 6

However, Soviet analysts generally avoided the more extreme claim . This

presumably reflects concern about resource scarcity even during the period of 1970 s

activism . It also explains to some degree the emergence of the discussion of national and

1 5

collective self-reliance examined briefly below . The unwillingness of the USSR t o

underwrite the process of development left open the question of just how these states were to

manage . Self-reliance was one answer. But self-reliance had the trappings of "thir d

pathism," and Third World exclusivity, both of which ran against Soviet political objective s

and ideological needs . Not surprisingly, given the conflicting tensions, the question of th e

role of the socialist camp as a motor for development was not adequately resolved at thi s

stage .

The internal strategy necessary for real development was that of the non-capitalis t

path, with a nationalized state sector taking the lead in investment and capital accumulation ,

and with severe restriction on the roles of both foreign capital and indigenous privat e

enterprise . 37 Economic activity was to be closely planned essentially along Soviet lines . The

Soviet Central Asian and Mongolian examples of non-capitalist development were considere d

applicable to the African situation . In general, prospects for rapid development along thi s

path were judged to be good . Although impediments to development along this path wer e

recognized, they tended to be depreciated at this stage. Moreover, the emphasis i n

discussion of such impediments lay on external (e.g., the structure of th e

imperialist-dominated international economic order) rather than internal (e .g ., traditional

agricultural practices) obstacles to development . 38 Where African traditions of production

were addressed, Soviet writers debated whether what they perceived to have been traditiona l

African communalism was an asset or liability in pursuing non-capitalist development, bu t

one gets little impression that the strength of tradition was seen as a significant problem fo r

states of socialist orientation . 3 9

This vision of the development process was highly bifurcated . The choice lay

between capitalism, dependence, and exploitation within the international capitalist economy -

- resulting in stagnation on the one hand, and non-capitalist policies leading to the transitio n

to socialism, cooperation with the socialist camp, and true development on the other . 40 Third

alternatives (e.g., various forms of "African socialism") were generally viewed with

skepticism . As noted above, Soviet writers were ambivalent about the idea of developmen t

through individual or collective self-reliance . 4 1

In other words, at this stage, Soviet authors tended to view underdevelopment and the

1 6

development process itself as intimately related to the global struggle between capitalism an d

socialism, and the Soviet socialist model to be applicable (indeed necessary) to that process .

They tended to underemphasize local sources of backwardness and impediments to

development . And despite the qualifications above, they appear to have overestimated th e

capacity of the socialist system to compensate for dissociation from international capital .

E. Inter-African Conflict

This brings us to a consideration of Soviet perspectives on the international relation s

of what Rotberg once called the African regional subsystem . In this section, I examine firs t

of all the processes, actors, and structures of inter-African relations . I then turn to the rol e

of external actors and the place of African events in the broader scheme of world politics .

Soviet comment on the sources and nature of conflict between African states at thi s

stage followed closely that concerning civil conflict within African societies . Sovie t

interpretation of the sources of conflict focused on the role of indigenous factors and that of

imperialism . As in the case of civil conflict, there was considerable attention paid to the

indigenous roots of tension . In the Horn, for example, much credit was given to the role o f

Somali national chauvinism in accounting for the conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia, the

principal conflict of the period involving two OAU member states . 42 However, nationalism

as a source of conflict was often attributed to the colonial legacy of artificial division o f

ethnic groups and ancestral homelands among different states creating numerous irredenta . 4 3

Moreover, it was the role of imperialism in fanning the flames of national particularism an d

African irredentism which turned these national contradictions into open conflict . 44 Indeed ,

the most frequently expressed view ignored the possibility that conflicts in Africa might hav e

important indigenous roots and attributed it purely and simply to imperialism . 45

F. Structures of Conflict Limitation -- The OA U

Given the attitudes toward collective self-reliance mentioned in the section on African

economic development, one might have expected Soviet scholars to be hostile to th e

Organization of African Unity as a regional structure inhibiting the establishment of soli d

bonds of influence with individual radical African states . However, Soviet analysts appeared

1 7

to assume that the natural perspective of African post-colonial states was anti-imperialist in

character and that this formed an objective basis for an alliance of a kind between the USS R

and the African community as a whole . The Soviet judgment of the OAU was that i t

embodied in some measure this anti-Western consensus . 46 This was particularly evident o f

the issues of national liberation in southern Africa and apartheid . 4 7

The eruption and perpetuation of conflicts between individual African states impeded

the consolidation and operationalization of this unified anti-imperialist African perspective .

Indeed this was why imperialism instigated and promoted such conflicts . This was also th e

reason for imperialist efforts to destroy the regional organization . 48 As such, despite

acknowledgement of the weakness of the OAU and the occasional ideological deviation s

(e .g ., Africa for the Africans) within it, Soviet analysts tended to view the organization an d

its impact in Africa favorably and to advocate its strengthening . 4 9

G . The Foreign Policies of African State s

Soviet treatment of the foreign policies of African states during the late 1970s was

somewhat at odds with their analysis of the progressive anti-imperialist orientation of th e

African community as a whole . It was clear that the focus of Soviet attention to Africa la y

on the states of socialist orientation -- Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Somalia (prior to

1978), Madagascar, Guinea, Benin, and the Congo . Judging from diplomatic instrument s

such as the treaties of friendship with Angola, Mozambique, and Ethiopia, join t

communiques, and scholarly and journalistic commentary, they were considered to b e

resolutely anti-imperialist, cognizant of the natural alliance between the USSR an d

themselves, and reliable supporters of Soviet policy initiatives elsewhere on issues such a s

disarmament, China, Soviet-American relations, and later Afghanistan, Kampuchea, th e

American arms buildup, and Afghanistan . It was assumed that this positive direction i n

policy stemmed naturally from their status as states of socialist orientation led by vanguard

parties . 50 The tenor of Soviet comment on these states suggests that the USSR expecte d

concrete and significant global benefits from the emergence of this coterie of ideologicall y

kindred states .

By contrast, there was less clarity of perspective in Soviet comment on states of

1 8

"capitalist orientation" (e .g., Nigeria, Zaire, Kenya, and the Ivory Coast) . Their continuing

dependence on the international capitalist economy, the links between the local bourgeoisi e

and international capital, and the antipopular character of their regimes often rendered the m

susceptible to manipulation by the imperialist states . 51 But there was little specific criticis m

of the foreign policies of these states . Indeed, not much was said about their international

behavior at all . One can, of course, take this silence -- when compared to the ample praise

of states of socialist orientation -- as tacit evidence of disapproval . But states with whom th e

USSR had reasonably well-established positive relationships such as Nigeria were sometime s

praised for their international roles . 52 Even in instances of states traditionally closely tied to

the West and hostile to the USSR, positive foreign policies were approvingly noted wher e

present . 5 3

The third category of African states here is that of "national democracy" -- thos e

states which were not capitalist in orientation but which had not bought into the vanguard -

party led, socialist orientation . In general, these states were seeking some kind of third path

in domestic and foreign policy between capitalism and orientation toward the West on th e

one hand and scientific socialism and orientation toward the socialist camp on the other . The

principal examples were Tanzania and Zambia, and, after 1979 and somewhat ambiguously ,

Zimbabwe. The tendency in Soviet writing in the 1970s was to deny the possibility of a

"third path" between capitalism and socialism and between imperialism and the "forces o f

progress" led by the USSR . 54 This was accompanied, as noted earlier, by a certai n

unhappiness with the advocacy by some of these actors of a collective economic self-reliance

of African or Third World states which could detach them from the necessity of choic e

between capitalism and socialism . 5 5

On the other hand, many aspects of the foreign policies of these states (rejection o f

apartheid, support for and sanctuary to national liberation movements struggling agains t

white rule in southern Africa, hostility to Western economic and political penetration o f

Africa) were deemed worthy of praise . 56 And although Soviet writers tended to criticiz e

conceptions of nonalignment conceived as true neutrality in the conflict between blocs, 57 on

the whole they argued that in objective terms nonalignment was a positive anti-imperialis t

force in global politics 'worthy of Soviet support .' This was consistent with a general Soviet

1 9

perspective on the international politics of Africa to the effect that events were leaning ver y

much in a direction favorable to the USSR . Solodovnikov, who -- prior to his ill-fate d

sojourn in Zambia as Soviet Ambassador -- was Gromyko's predecessor as Director of th e

Africa Institute, characterized the current period as one of the full liberation of Africa fro m

colonialism . 59 Others noted that the national liberation movement in the region was growin g

and deepening as it transferred its attention from political to social tasks, that the correlatio n

of forces in the region was moving in the direction of world socialism, and that the prestige

of the USSR in regional affairs was also expanding while the influence of imperialism was i n

decline . 6 0

There was one large fly in this ointment -- South Africa . During the mid- and late

1970s, South Africa was generally portrayed as operating hand in glove with Western

imperialism in the general attempt to maintain imperialist control over Africa, to prevent th e

deepening of the revolutionary process on the continent, and to facilitate capitalist access t o

African resources and markets . Although Soviet writers recognized that South Africa had

specific interests (e .g., the maintenance of a buffer between itself and the rest of Africa) ,

these were not deemed to conflict with the general interests of the West in the region . The

Western powers benefitted from the presence in the region of a powerful actor similarl y

opposed to the expansion of the positions of socialism and national liberation . South Africa

had an interest in close ties between itself and the NATO powers in order to secure th e

protection of the latter and access to Western arms supplies . In such circumstances, Sout h

Africa served as the strike force of imperialism in southern Africa and its major actions i n

foreign policy, such as the invasion of Angola in 1975, were taken on instruction from th e

imperialist powers . 61 Writers in Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn' in particular evinced considerable

fascination for the role of South African-Israeli cooperation in the implementation o f

imperialist designs in Africa :

Using political, military, and economic levers, the leading Western powers ar edoing all they can to postpone the collapse of the last colonial racist bastions i nAfrica, to impose on free Africa a solution of problems in the south in whic hit would be possible to preserve the region their bridgehead and larder for ra wmaterials . Along with the RSA, Israel has recently attempted to play a role a san active force in the realization of these plans . . . The RSA is a bulwark o freaction in the south of Africa . Israel is well known as an ardent opponent of

20

revolutionary-liberation processes in the north of the continent . . . Thecongruence of the basic political and ideological positions of the two regime sis rooted in the commonality of the concepts of zionism and apartheid - -variants of racism . 62

Events in the region, however, were gradually weakening South Africa's position .

This resulted in some change in the policies of South Africa toward neighboring states . Yet

Vorster's purported interest in dialogue and detente in the aftermath of the collapse of th e

Portuguese position in the region were not motivated by any desire for genuine settlement o f

the basic issues dividing South Africa and its neighbors . Instead, South Africa's flirtation

with its neighbors was the diplomatic aspect of a strategy of continued hegemony . This was

complemented by efforts to strengthen the economic dependence of neighboring states, an d

by the increasingly threatening character of the South African military buildup . 63 In other

words, there was little reason to believe that this rogue state could be civilized . It was a

major threat to the independence of African states and only its removal could guarantee th e

full liberation of these states and the security of the movement's gains in Africa . Efforts at

compromise with it were doomed to failure .'

Nevertheless, as noted above, this diversification of South African efforts to sustai n

and strengthen its position was itself a product of the weakening of that position resultin g

from the defeats in Angola, the loss of its buffer, the worsening situation in Rhodesia, an d

the deterioration of the RSA's internal security typified by the Soweto uprising . Thus ,

despite recognition of the continuing danger to the liberation process from the RSA and it s

formidableness as a reactionary force in regional politics, the prognosis was basically

optimistic .

In short, the Soviet assessment of regional international relations was quite positive .

The influence of the Soviet Union was expanding, that of imperialism and local reactio n

contracting . Revolution in southern Africa was drawing toward its logical denouement ,

which would bring further gains to the USSR while strengthening already establishe d

positions .

2 1

H . The Roles of External Actor s

Soviet consideration of the role of external actors in regional politics follows from th e

essentially bifurcated globalist conception of African international relations noted above .

With regard to the Soviet role in the region, the discussion can be divided into three parts :

the Soviet role in the region as a whole, Soviet relations with liberated states, and Sovie t

support of the continuing struggle for national liberation .

In general terms, it was frequently posited that the rise of the world socialist syste m

and the growing strength of the USSR rendered it impossible for imperialism to succeed i n

perpetuating the colonial and neocolonial enslavement of Africa . The USSR impeded the

efforts of the Western states to hold on in Africa while supporting and defending African

interests in international fora, playing a key role, for example, in opposition to apartheid an d

in support of a more equitable international economic order . 65 As was noted earlier, th e

world socialist economic system provided an alternative for African states desiring to reduc e

their dependence on the international capitalist economy . Soviet economic assistance allowe d

African states to reduce their reliance on the imperialist powers for development assistance .

Soviet diplomatic support reduced African vulnerability to pressure from the West . 66 In

other words assistance from the socialist camp and the USSR provided a first line of defense

for Africa in the pursuit of independence and sovereignty . 67 Particular stress in Soviet polic y

was laid on relations with socialist-oriented countries . 68 The Soviet role with regard to these

states was multifaceted, including substantial economic project assistance, training of cadres ,

and the deepening of interparty relations . Soviet writers laid particular stress on the

importance of trading ties with the socialist camp as a substitute for continuing dependenc e

on the West . 69 Soviet economic assistance was crucial to success in the transition to non -

capitalist development . 70 Beyond this, they acknowledged an important Soviet role i n

defending these countries against aggression .71 In their discussions of Soviet treaties o f

friendship with Angola, Mozambique, and Ethiopia, Soviet analysts pointed in particular to

clauses in the treaties calling for mutual consultations in the event of a threat to the securit y

of either party . 7 2

The success of the national liberation revolutions in Angola and Mozambique brought

22

in their wake a series of expansive definitions of Soviet responsibilities with respect t o

revolutionary activity in the region . Soviet writers touted their country's principa l

responsibility for the success in Angola and, indirectly, in Mozambique, not merely for bein g

the major force in the shift in the international correlation of forces in favor of worl d

socialism, but also through direct assistance to the movements concerned . Military journal s

such as the Voenno-Istoricheskii Zhurnal were particularly insistent in this regard . 73

Occasionally they went so far as to recognize a direct Soviet military role in wars of thi s

type :

The influence of world socialism on the outcome of the armed struggle i nfavor of the freedom-loving African peoples is realized in a number of ways :the delivery of weapons, the transmission of the military experience of itsarmies, and, in especially critical circumstances, the direct forestalling of th eaggressor . 7 4

The recognition of the possibility of a direct role for Soviet forces in wars of nationa l

liberation goes well beyond traditional Soviet definitions of their role in conflicts of thi s

type,75 and is indicative of the view of at least some in the USSR that conditions in th e

region in the aftermath of Angola were such that the USSR could act with relative impunity

in furthering the region's revolutionary struggles against imperialism . Interestingly ,

however, Soviet military writers discussing specific regional conflicts where interventio n

might mean direct confrontation with sizable South African units were generally les s

forthcoming in their offers of support . 76 This suggests some awareness of continuin g

constraints on the use of force in regional conflicts . Authors in the civilian literature were

less specific in their discussions of the Soviet military role . 77 But they tended to be unfailin g

in their expressions of Soviet solidarity with the forces of national liberation and in the

articulation of a policy of substantial political and military support for such movements .

They agreed with their military colleagues on the significance of the Soviet role as a

determinant of success in struggles of this type . 78 The general impression one gets is one o f

enthusiasm for active multifaceted support of the national liberation revolution with littl e

direct comment on the dangers and possible costs of such a policy . This is paralleled by an

optimistic appraisal of the Soviet capacity to replace the West in economic relations wit h

African states, particularly those of socialist orientation, and the definition of an ambitious

23

Soviet role in economic development and diplomacy .

Little was said specifically about Soviet objectives in the region . But one can infer

from the incessant advocacy of ejecting imperialist influence from Africa and th e

corresponding concern noted earlier with the expansion of Soviet prestige that one Sovie t

objective in the region was to supplant US and Western European influence in Africa with its

own influence . There was even less indication from this literature of strategic or militar y

objectives in Soviet policy . Soviet interest in bases was of course denied . 79 One can hardly

expect any other perspective on the subject given the disinterested image that the USS R

sought to project . But it is possible that Soviet policymakers and analysts were little

interested in specific military assets such as bases . Much of sub-Saharan Africa was of little

strategic significance to the USSR (the exception presumably being the littoral of the Red Sea

and Bab-el-Mandeb) . And the experience of losing substantial onshore military facilities in

Egypt in 1972 and in Somalia in 1977 did little to encourage such preoccupations . Evidence

of the latter conclusion may be drawn from a 1979 article in Morskoi Sbornik, where the

author noted that :

The use of the world ocean for the organization of a system of mobile basin gof naval units, in the opinion of the US naval command, ensures the defense o fstrategically important regions and will not be vulnerable to "politica linstability" in regions where previous military bases were placed . 8 0

One may reasonably assume that this discussion of US naval policy is a surrogate reference ,

given the historical context in which it occurred.

The objectives of the United States in Africa, by contrast, were hardly disinterested .

The United States and the Western camp that it led were said to be motivated by an effort t o

maintain and strengthen political control of Africa. This was part of a global strategy of

struggle with, and containment of, the socialist camp and the forces of progress . It was also

motivated by a desire to secure stable access on favorable terms to the natural resources of

the African continent . 81 This required efforts to acquire military facilities in Africa, to

ensure the continued dependency of African states through their participation in the worl d

capitalist economy, to destabilize progressive regimes, and to resist the revolutionary proces s

in states dominated by reactionary forces closely allied to imperialism . 82 The instruments

24

available to the United States in this effort to hold back the forces of history included direc t

and indirect (via the World Bank and the IMF) economic pressure ; arms transfers an d

technical advice to regimes and movements sympathetic to Western positions ; intervention

where necessary in their behalf ; and the provocation and manipulation of conflicts stemmin g

from ethnic, religious, and national tensions . 83 These were supplemented by an incessant

anti-Soviet propaganda campaign focusing on a purported Soviet threat to Africa n

independence . Given the character of their interests in the region, there was little prospec t

for constructive American participation in efforts to improve its political and economi c

conditions . Western generated peace initiatives (e .g ., the Anglo-American initiatives o n

Zimbabwe and the Contact Group's efforts on Namibia) were characterized as hypocritica l

efforts to maintain imperialist hegemony at the expense of the true interests of the people s

concerned . 84

Little attention 'was given to the analysis of the autonomous roles of other Western

states (e .g ., France, Britain, Japan, and Israel) in regional affairs or to the potential

contradictions between their policies and interests and those of the United States . They were

considered component parts of a general imperialist strategy defined in large part by th e

United States . 85 As was noted earlier, this was true also of South Africa, which was seen no t

as an independent actor in regional politics, but as a loyal proxy and representative of

imperialist interests in the region .

In other words, the dominant interpretation of external involvement in African

regional affairs during the late 1970s was zero-sum in character, the united forces o f

socialism and national liberation being arrayed against those of internal reaction an d

imperialism. There was little if any structural basis for accommodation between the two .

The latter had to be defeated and rooted out . And defeat for one necessarily translated int o

victory for the other . As was seen earlier, the trend in this struggle was construed to b e

favorable to the forces of progress . There was little reason to expect this to change, give n

the shift in the global correlation of forces . As such, efforts at accommodation between the

two were not only unnecessary, but were pernicious .

This leads to the question of linkage . Clearly, events in Africa were linked to th e

global competition between imperialism and socialism in that they favored one side or the

25

other in the balance of forces between the two camps. However, Soviet writers rejected th e

concept of linkage as it was put forward by many American analysts . They denied tha t

rivalry in Africa impinged directly on the course of superpower relations at the center o f

world politics. Both superpowers had an interest in the pursuit of detente which existe d

independently of competition on the periphery. Both superpowers shared an interest in arm s

control, economic relations, and the stabilization of Europe. These interests were the basi s

of detente. They existed independently of competition on the periphery and persisted despit e

that competition . To put it another way, detente between states had nothing to do wit h

struggle between classes, of which Soviet support for progressive forces in the Third Worl d

was a part .

Efforts to argue, as Brzezinski suggested in his famous remark about detente lying

buried in the sands of the Ogaden, that the fate of detente rested on Soviet behavior i n

regional conflicts in the Third World, were viewed as spurious attempts by those opposed t o

detente to sabotage the process by rendering it hostage to unrelated events . Related efforts to

extend detente to cover revolutionary conflicts in Africa were similarly seen as a crudely

masked justification for counterrevolutionary intervention in African affairs . Indeed, far

from inhibiting revolutionary struggle in the Third World, detente facilitated it by restrainin g

the imperialists from forceful intervention . 86 Likewise, the victory of African struggle s

against racism, reaction, and imperialism strengthened detente by removing potential source s

of tension in world politics . It followed that Soviet support for such forces was not only no t

a violation of detente, but actually furthered the process of detente . Instead, Soviet writer s

maintained the opposite position -- that it was indeed not Soviet activity in Africa, bu t

Western support of reaction and racism which weakened the process of detente, and wa s

inconsistent with it . 87

The denial of the existence of a link between Soviet behavior in Africa and th e

general character of relations between the two superpowers may have reflected the actua l

Soviet world view at the time, or it may have been simply politically instrumental . In either

case, important implications follow from this position . In the former instance, it suggests a

tendency to underestimate the damage to their relations with the US, which might result fro m

forward anti-Western policies in Africa . In the latter, it implies a willingness to bear the

2 6

costs incurred as a consequence of such policies .

Soviet views on the potential for escalation stemming from superpower competition i n

Africa parallel those concerning linkage . There was during the late 1970s almost n o

expression of concern over the possibility of escalation from regional conflict to genera l

superpower confrontation in the literature surveyed . On those occasions where Soviet writers

discussed the question of escalation, it was generally to underline the dangers associated wit h

Western meddling, and not Soviet support for national liberation and social progress i n

Africa. Hence, in a 1978 article on the Horn, V . Grigor'ev noted that :

The activities of imperialism and reaction, arming and pushing Somali agains tEthiopia embrace the danger of internationalization of the conflict in the Hornand of transforming it into a hot spot of international tension . 8 8

The third external actor to receive considerable attention in the literature was China .

Opinion on Chinese motives in their African policy was divided . Some chose to emphasize

independent Chinese desires for "hegemony," for splitting the African countries away fro m

their natural ally, the USSR, or for provoking a confrontation between the United States an d

the USSR . 89 Others chose to view China as a conscious and willing collaborator in th e

imperialist effort to forestall the revolutionary process in Africa and to limit the Soviet rol e

in African affairs . 90 But there was considerable agreement on the objective consequences o f

Chinese activity. These were counterrevolutionary, strengthening the position of reactionar y

and imperialist forces in Africa and weakening that of the forces of progress . Hence, China

was an objective ally of imperialism in the region, a willing collaborator with South Africa ,

an active supporter of counterrevolutionary movements such as the FNLA in Angola, o f

reactionary regimes such as that of Zaire, and of Somali national chauvinism directed agains t

Ethiopia . 91 The vituperative and incessant quality of Soviet comment in this vein on Chin a

suggests that the activities of the PRC were a major preoccupation of Soviet analysts, an d

presumably policymakers, dealing with Africa .

The discussion of external actors leads naturally to that of the United Nations . Given

Soviet comment on the roles of the other four permanent members of the Security Council i n

Africa, one might have expected them to be skeptical if not uncomplimentary of tha t

organization's role in regional affairs at this stage as well . Yet to the limited extent that

27

Soviet commentators did address the role of the United Nations in regional affairs, thei r

evaluation was generally positive . Soviet writers praised the constructive role of the United

Nations in the process of decolonization, its position on apartheid, its efforts to resolve th e

Namibia question, and its support for SWAPO, the ANC, and the Patriotic Front in

Zimbabwe . 92 This presumably reflects the salience of the role of the General Assembly on

these issues, the dominance of the Assembly by Third World states committed to what th e

Soviets construed to be constructive positions on these issues, and the prominent role playe d

by the USSR itself in assembly deliberations on these issues .

To summarize, Soviet analysts viewed the international politics of the region as a

zero-sum game. The imperialist powers, led by the United States, were engaged in a

systematic effort to resist the process of liberation on the continent and to retain thei r

neocolonial hold on Africa . The manipulation of regional conflict was a major instrument i n

this effort to dominate . China joined them in this cause. The most important implication o f

this perspective was that the imperialist powers and their proxies had no interest in genuin e

cooperation in the management and resolution of conflicts . Given the inexorable rise of th e

forces of liberation, moreover, there was no point in such negotiation . The USSR, as th e

leading force in the world revolution, had an obligation to assist the process of liberation ,

rather than to cooperate in stifling it through compromise . Thus, in this realm as well ,

Soviet thinking with respect to politics in Africa was militant and confrontational .

III. Modifications

This activist, optimistic perspective on African politics and international relations wa s

not unanimously endorsed even during its heyday in 1976-77 . As time passed and Soviet

experts became more aware of the difficulties of attaining maximal objectives (socialis t

revolution and substantial durable influence in Africa), increasingly complex, ideologicall y

flexible, skeptical and pessimistic interpretations of African affairs came to compete mor e

strongly with the orthodoxy of the mid-1970s . By the end of the period under consideration ,

many of the more orthodox historicist interpretations of African politics had largel y

disappeared .

2 8

A . The Vanguard Party and Socialist Orientatio n

Several basic propositions identified in the previous section concerning class, socialis t

orientation, and the vanguard party came under increasing fire toward the end of the 1970 s

and in the early 1980s . Soviet writers to an increasing degree recognized the multi -

structured character of African society as well as the continuing strength of traditional socia l

structures and their ideological reflections (e .g., tribalism and, with some qualification ,

religion) . 93 These operated as substantial impediments to progress along the path of socialis t

orientation . 94 This growing stress on the role of traditional factors in African political

development paralleled a larger rediscovery of the significance of ethnic and religiou s

tradition in politics as a whole in the Soviet literature which gathered force throughout th e

1980s . 95 By 1987, Georgii Mirskii was asserting that :

Years passed before the great weight of traditional factors was properlyassessed . Nonclass social institutions and phenomena (such as tribalism an ddeeply rooted divisions of Asian and African societies along ethnic, religious ,cast, and clan lines) in the last analysis take the form of an exceptionall ydurable system of patronage-clientelistic links, concealing or pushing into th ebackground class contradictions . 96

In the limited modern sector, they grew increasingly aware of the strength and vitality

of capitalist as opposed to socialist or protosocialist structures . 97 The weakness of

progressive sectors of the population (e .g., the proletariat and intelligentsia) was underlined ,

as was their vulnerability to distraction by various reactionary ideologies such as tribalis m

and national chauvinism . As Kosukhin and Belikov put it with regard to the working class :

Analyzing the factors impeding the proletariat from realizing their vanguar drole in the current period, communists emphasize the incompleteness of thei rformation as a class, their insufficient weight in the population, the presence ofmany transitional groups, the dispersal of a significant component of the clas sinto small and handicraft industries, their weak political organization, th eisolation from the masses and integration into the ruling regimes' bureaucrati capparatus of parts of the trade union leadership, the influence of peti tbourgeois ideology, social reformist illusions, religion, and "patriarchal "survivals on the workers . 9 8

The tendency of petit bourgeois dominated, revolutionary regimes toward bureaucratizatio n

was also stressed . 99

29

Even quite early in the period under consideration, enthusiasts on the military's rol e

in African politics were criticized for their uncritical optimism and their inattention to th e

group's potentially reactionary and essentially undemocratic character . 100 Much subsequen t

discussion of the military, particularly that in non socialist-oriented states such as Nigeria ,

displayed far greater ambivalence about the role of this group, stressing its contradictory rol e

in domestic politics and the partiality of its commitment to progress . 101 In comment on the

military within states of socialist orientation, Soviet writers emphasized to a greater exten t

the need for firm party control and thoroughgoing penetration of the military, and sustained

political education within its ranks . 102

Reassessment of these obstacles to the implementation of the vanguard party model o f

socialist orientation led to renewed emphasis on mobilization and work among the masses . 103

By implication, vanguard party regimes were criticized for insufficient attention t o

maintaining and strengthening their ties to the masses in the past . Soviet writers increasingly

recognized that the path of socialist orientation was a long, arduous, and reversible one . 104

In circumstances where ties to the masses were weak and the social basis of the vanguar d

party slim, the leaders of states of socialist orientation had to exercise great caution i n

defining the substance and pace of the transition to socialism . Care was necessary to avoid

alienating social and ethnic groups potentially opposed to the process . Efforts to integrate

them into broader national fronts were necessary .105

In this context, Soviet analysts emphasized the dangers of excessive haste and

insufficient attention to the correlation of class forces in the effort to make the transition to

socialism . Revolutionary African regimes that failed to heed these warnings were criticized

for their subjectivism and idealism . 106 Ul'ianovskii noted in 1986, for example, that attempt s

to exclude the national bourgeoisie from participation in the political and economic life of th e

states of socialist orientation were premature . Their strengths should be harnessed to th e

process of non-capitalist development by including them in broad national fronts . 107 The role

of internal conflict in complicating the efforts of regimes such as those of Angola and

Ethiopia to pursue the path of socialist orientation was noted . However, it was stressed tha t

this did not absolve them of responsibility for poor performance, much of which was th e

result of their own errors . Regimes such as that of Zimbabwe which approached the

30

question of the transition to socialism more moderately were praised for their progress .'° "

Indeed, Soviet comment warmed toward the array of revolutionary democratic regimes whic h

had not gone the full vanguard party route, such as those in Tanzania, Guinea, Mali, an d

Ghana . 109

This amounts to a rather thorough critique of the prior dominant tendency o f

articulation in Soviet thought concerning socialist orientation . It implies considerably greate r

pessimism with regard to the prospects for the model . As is evident from the precedin g

notes, it grew in intensity over time and is suggestive of considerable discomfort with the

uncritical optimism of the previous period . Indeed, the commonly articulated view of the

mid- and late 1970s to the effect that the path of socialist orientation was growing in force

throughout Africa largely disappeared by the mid-1980s . Soviet authors increasingl y

criticized previous Soviet wishful thinking and scholarly sloppiness concerning prospects fo r

the transition to socialism in Africa . 110 Some authors went beyond this to question ,

implicitly"' or explicitly, the validity of Marxist analysis in the assessment of Africa n

politics and society :

On the eve of the collapse of the colonial system, it was consideredself-evident that after the liberation of the Asian and African countries eithe rthe power of the proletariat or that of the national bourgeoisie would beestablished . Reasoning involuntarily from a position of "eurocentrism" an dignoring the specifics of backward societies in which neither the proletariat no rthe bourgeoisie were fundamental classes (in contradistinction to the Wester nsociety studied by Marx), our scholars carried over the laws of capitalistdevelopment in Europe to countries with entirely different conditions ." '

By the end of the period under consideration, the critique of socialist orientation as

elaborated by orthodox Soviet scholars of the 1970s, and as practiced by the vanguard part y

regimes in Africa and elsewhere in the Third World had merged with the critique of th e

deformation of socialism within the USSR itself . After noting the "etatist" distortion o f

socialism in both the USSR and the East, its topological relation to "oriental tyranny," an d

its similar roots -- technological backwardness, fragmentation of social structure, th e

persisting influence of precapitalist socio-political structures, the "special role of the state, "

and vestiges of communalism -- in the two locales, two writers concluded as follows :

Total etatism in the Eastern countries, just as in its time in the USSR, in some

3 1

cases boosted their military- economic potential and enabled them to withstan dthe onslaught of imperialism . However, in the epoch of the scientific andtechnological revolution, which is also gradually spreading to part of th edeveloping countries, the inability of the super-bureaucratic systems to regearproduction promptly and flexibly, to bring the "human factor" into full play, t oenter the international division of labor on acceptable terms, and to raise th eliving standards of their peoples is becoming ever more apparent.113

B . The Sources of Civil Conflic t

Questioning of the class model and the focus on lingering nonclass contradictions i n

African society led naturally to revision of Soviet perspectives on civil conflict in Africa n

society. Although some argument attributing the incidence of such conflict primarily t o

external factors and notably imperialism persisted,114 with the passage of time, Soviet

commentary has shifted from its previous stress on the primary causal role of imperialism t o

laying greater emphasis on ethnic and religious animosities . Even in the article on Chad jus t

cited, for example, Iordanskii spends much more time on the elaboration of local factor s

contributing to civil strife than on the examination of the role of external actors . One gets

the impression in reading the article that his real purpose is to inform the reader of th e

profound conflict-inducing internal divisions in Chad, with the comments on external agenc y

serving pro forma as an ideological gloss to ensure publication and avoid criticism .

Elsewhere, one begins to see in the mid-1980s greater attention to the role of the

socialist-oriented governments themselves in inducing and sustaining insurgency . In a 1985

article on Ethiopia, for example, the authors argue that the problem of separatism in tha t

country is in part the result of unwise government policies, of the political and ideological

immaturity of elements of the revolutionary "aktif," and of the noncomprehending an d

sometimes incorrect and mechanical application of Marxist-Leninist concepts to the concret e

conditions o f Ethiopia.115

This revision has profound implications for conflict resolution . If the roots of civi l

conflict are to a significant degree internal, then presumably resolving such conflicts demand s

policies to mollify internal opposition . The growing interest evident in Soviet sources i n

modifying vanguard party rule in the states of socialist orientation with the construction o f

broad national fronts combined with concessions to reconcile internal opponents and, where

32

necessary, deliberate efforts at negotiated political settlement with opposition movement s

suggests some Soviet recognition of this point . The most striking recent example of Sovie t

interest in internal political settlement was the advocacy by leading Soviet foreign ministr y

officials (Petrovsky in March and Adamishin in August of 1988) of talks between the MPL A

and UNITA (including Savimbi) on a political settlement of the insurgency in Angola .116 The

recognition of the significance of internal sources of conflict and of the desirability of

modification of internal policies to deal with opposition also suggests an erosion of earlier

optimism about the ease with which socialist-oriented regimes could be implanted an d

defended .

C. The Liberation Struggle in South Africa

The mention of the roots of civil conflict brings us to change in Soviet perspective s

on the process of national liberation in South Africa and Namibia . Here too a similar tren d

is evident . Soviet analysts have come to take a more jaundiced view of the prospects fo r

liberation in southern Africa, emphasizing the staying power of the white regime and th e

long-term character of the revolutionary process . As Viktor Goncharov noted in 1987, "I n

the end South Africa will become socialist, maybe not in 25 years but in a century . . . I am

an optimist."' This hardly suggests the confidence and enthusiasm which characterize d

Soviet perspectives on southern Africa in the latter half of the 1970s .

In the mid- to late 1980s, although Soviet commentators did not abandon violence as a

tactic in the struggle for liberation altogether (doing so would presumably have create d

unnecessary frictions in the relationship with the ANC), references to violence in the journal s

have grown more rare118 and the focus seems to be shifting toward long-term strategies o f

negotiation and compromise.119 Consequently, the Soviet literature on South Africa now

shows considerably greater interest in the construction of broad fronts of opposition to

apartheid, including such organizations as the United Democratic Front, and the Congress o f

South African Trade Unions, and potentially disaffected elements of the white population . 120

Along these lines, Soviet writers have expressed some hope that the white community i s

gradually losing its internal cohesion and elements of it may be convinced to cooperate in th e

process of settlement . 121 By 1988, some went so far as to imply in this connection that

3 3

reforms thus far suggested some capacity for meaningful change by the ruling elit e itself122

and that the ruling group itself must be brought into the process of evolutionary change . 12 3

The desire to integrate broader sections of the population, including its privileged

strata, requires an effort to reassure these groups . One element of this effort is the shif t

away from emphasis on armed struggle mentioned above and the growing stress on

alternative modes of opposition, such as strikes and boycotts, as well as on rendering mor e

effective international pressure on the South African regime . 124 Another is the consideration

of proposals for constitutional settlement protecting white property rights by postponing fo r

the foreseeable future any movement toward socialist relations of production 125 and securing

the political rights of whites as a group . As Starushenko put it :

Already today the ANC might work out comprehensive guarantees for th ewhite population which could be implemented after the elimination of theregime of apartheid . Such guarantees would suit both the liberals and th epragmatists from the white community neutralizing at the same time th edie-hards . . . The parliament may consist of two chambers : one formed on thebasis of proportional representation and the other, possessing the right of veto ,on the basis of equal representation of four communities .1 26

These changes go well beyond what appears to be acceptable to the mainstream of the

ANC, which still espouses, for example, a unitary state with individual rather than grou p

rights protected in the constitution, and suggest a degree of Soviet impatience with th e

liberation movement . Indeed, Soviet spokesmen have directly criticized the organization fo r

its dogmatic resistance to the realities of the situation in South Africa . Viktor Goncharov ,

the Deputy Director of the Africa Institute is on record criticizing the failure of the ANC t o

reflect new Soviet flexibility on South Africa, taking issue with the organization's continuin g

espousal of "dogmatic formulations," and accusing it of infantile leftism . 127

These innovations have provoked some negative response from the ANC and the

SACP.128 The issue very clearly came up during the mid-1989 clandestine congress of th e

SACP, where the new party program warned against those imperialist and local forces wh o

saw negotiations with the enemy as a means of going beyond the current stage of refor m

without addressing the basic objectives of the people :

They hope to achieve this by pushing the liberation movement into negotiation sbefore it is strong enough to back its basic demands with sufficient power on

3 4

the ground . 12 9

Joe Slovo, the party's General Secretary, wrote elsewhere that some Soviet theoreticians ha d

come close to "prescribing the abandonment or the toning down of conflict in internal clas s

struggles" in the interests of global stability . He adds :

The undifferentiated formula that we must seek a political settlement for ever yinternal struggle can become a slogan which has the effect of preventing o rholding back the ultimate peaceful resolution of an internal struggle . 13 0

In summary, current and recent Soviet commentary on the question of revolution in

South Africa suggests little of the previous optimism concerning its prospects ; awareness of

the improbability of revolutionary change in the near term ; recognition of the need to

broaden the base of the revolution and of the necessity of significant economic, social, an d

political compromise in order to do so ; and a considerable degree of unhappiness with thei r

chosen instrument of revolution in the republic .

D. Economic Developmen t

The shift in Soviet perspectives on prospects for socialism and on strategies for

post-liberation development in South Africa mentioned above grew not only out of thei r

reappraisal of the revolutionary process in that country, but also out of a broader skepticis m

about the applicability of the Soviet experience as a model for development in Africa an d

about the capacity of African societies to make a rapid transition via non-capitalis t

development to socialist relations of production . This brought with it a thorough reappraisa l

of previous attitudes on the development process .

Comment throughout the literature on prospects for non-capitalist development i n

Africa grew considerably more pessimistic with the passage of time . From the beginning of

the period, there was evidence of some skepticism concerning this strategy . By the earl y

1980s, scholarly journals were calling for more thorough and careful study of the problem s

of socialist orientation and non-capitalist development . 131 Growing numbers of Soviet writers

began to stress increasingly the difficulty and slowness of socialist-oriented development i n

such "backward" conditions . 132 As two authors put it in 1985, given the obstacles faced b y

African countries (including states of socialist orientation), the problem was not so much one

35

of growth as it was one of survival . 133 Not only was non-capitalist development far mor e

difficult than anticipated . It was also increasingly judged to b e reversible.134

Although many Soviet writers seemed to continue to blame imperialism to a degre e

for the backwardness of African economies, the treatment of backwardness grew more even -

handed . Growing stress was laid on climatic, geographical, social, and political causes of

underdevelopment which had little to do with imperialist neocolonial exploitation . 135 A

particularly striking example of this was Kovalev and Svanidze's assertion that the mai n

cause of hunger in Africa was the traditional extensive system of agricultural production ."'

Kosukhin and Belikov, in an approving summary of a reassessment by Moroccan communist s

on the causes of economic difficulties, noted :

Thus, while pointing to the extremely negative consequences of the imperialis tpolicy of destabilization, aggression, and sabotage in relations with countriesof socialist orientation, the Moroccan communists note that it would b eincorrect to explain the very serious difficulties experienced by these countrie sonly in such terms . . . Their current problems are connected to a notinconsiderable degree to the following factors : an underestimation of th esignificance of the stage of national democratic revolution, its duration, andthe complexity of the tasks of this stage and the corresponding policy of clas salliances ; the weakness of attempts to apply creatively past experience o feconomic development to specific conditions ; the repetition of prior example sand decisions ; the failure of efforts to achieve a resolution of the agrarianquestion which was to have been assured by simultaneously changing socia lrelations, developing productive forces, and increasing factor productivity . 137

Reassessment of the complexity of the process of non-capitalist development wen t

hand-in-hand with a redefinition of the Soviet role in the development process . This

presumably stemmed from an increasing Soviet awareness of the constraints on its capacity to

serve as an external motor for economic development at a time when its own resources wer e

increasingly constrained . It also resulted from a reappraisal of the capacity of the worl d

socialist system to compensate for dissociation from the international capitalist economy .

Soviet writers, particularly in journals such as Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn', which had larg e

foreign readerships in translation, continued to tout the advantages of economic cooperatio n

with the USSR . 138 However, their claims as to the compensatory strength of such cooperatio n

generally grew more restrained . Indeed, official statements, such as those of Andropov in

3 6

1983, and the identical remark in the new party program emphasized that the principa l

responsibility for and burden in development lay with the developing countries themselves, 13 9

the USSR being capable of assisting only to the extent of its abilities . Comment on the

Soviet economic role in Africa tended to emphasize moral support in the quest for a

restructuring of economic relations along the lines of the new international economic orde r

rather than Soviet willingness to assume significant costs in the development process .

Grigor'yants provides an eloquent example in his lack of specific comment on Sovie t

economic assistance and his emphasis on Soviet moral support to the people of Benin, and

wish for their success in their endeavors . 140 The previous preference for states of socialist

orientation in Soviet economic relations with Africa largely disappeared and was replaced, a s

was the case elsewhere, with an essentially nonideological stress on ties of "mutual benefit "

with all states in the region . 141 The previous focus on large state sector industrial project s

("gigantomania") in Soviet assistance has also come under criticism for handicapping th e

development of the recipient while producing no return to the USSR .1 42

Reassessment of the prospects for development, of the capacity of the world socialis t

system to serve as an alternative to African participation in the international capitalis t

economy, and of the USSR's own role in the African economy necessitated som e

reevaluation of Africa's place in the Western-dominated world economy and of the role o f

private indigenous and foreign capital in Africa, if hope were not to be abandone d

altogether . 143 Many Soviet appraisals of the African role in the international economic order

dominated by the Western capitalist states continued to be critical, particularly in the early

years of Gorbachev's tenure . 144 However, their advocacy of reform of the existing economic

order, rather than departure from it, suggested that they saw little alternative to continuin g

participation in this Western-dominated system . Along these lines, African communis t

parties were recently criticized for their advocacy of economic dissociation from the worl d

capitalist economy in the following vein :

It is thought that the currently growing tendency toward global economi cintegration and a single system of economic relations carries importan tcorrectives to earlier declarations about "economic independence," splitting of ffrom foreign capital, and several other concepts . . . In the future it will hardlybe possible to view the new economic order as a rejection of relations of

37

interdependence, as the creation of some kind of "parallel" world economi csystem ." 14 5

Indeed, examination of the development of the Soviet discussion of the role of foreig n

private capital in the development process suggests an evolving understanding that, i f

properly controlled, these relations were beneficial to the host country, be it capitalist o r

socialist in orientation . 146 This more positive assessment extended to multinational

corporations involved in Africa, with Anatolii Gromyko himself arguing in 1985 that foreig n

private investment could have a positive impact if it were properly controlled by Africa n

governments . 147

The reassessment of the role of foreign private capital in the African economy lead s

naturally to consideration of Soviet discussion of the role of indigenous private capital . Here

too, considerable evolution in Soviet perspectives was evident . Soviet scholars came to

recognize in the first place that capitalism, far from being on the wane in Africa, wa s

growing in strength, or to put it in Starushenko's words, was the "leading uklad ."148 Beyond

this, and more positively, Soviet analysts recognized as early as 1982 that undifferentiate d

hostility to local capital was excessive since it could be anti-imperialist in orientation . 149 This

more positive assessment of capitalism in the developing world extended to Sovie t

discussions of capitalist-oriented states such as Kenya and the Ivory Coast . Blanket rejection

of their capacity to develop disappeared and writers dealing with countries such as the Ivory

Coast praised their economic achievements and attributed them in large part to successfu l

integration of these countries into the world economy .1 50

In summary, Soviet comment on the economic component of socialist orientation grew

considerably more jaundiced and pessimistic with the passage of time, presumably at least i n

part as a result of the distinctly uninspiring economic performance of states in Africa

following this path and, by comparison, the apparent development success of states such a s

the Ivory Coast and Kenya . This was accompanied by a heightened appreciation of th e

significance of indigenous obstacles to non-capitalist development . Soviet assessment of th e

USSR's capacity to help also grew less optimistic with time and was accompanied by a

recognition that African states had no alternative but to participate in the global capitalis t

economy. The weakness of social forces favoring socialist orientation and the paucity of

3 8

resources available for non-capitalist development brought some positive reassessment of th e

private sector, both foreign and domestic, as potential contributors to the process o f

development . The record suggests that ten years of experience of non-capitalist non -

development in states of socialist orientation had raised serious questions in the minds o f

Soviet analysts and policymakers about the feasibility and wisdom of economi c

transformation in the direction of socialism .

E. Inter-African Relation s

The evident disillusionment and growing realism of Soviet perspectives on socialis t

orientation, the internal politics of African states, and economic development extended t o

analysts' consideration of relations among African states as well . The highly optimisti c

assessment of the shift in the regional correlation of forces against imperialism and toward

the forces of progress weakened in the aftermath of the Shaba affairs of 1977-78 . 151 At thi s

stage there was, however, some evidence of disagreement about the trend of regional events ,

with some still holding to the optimistic position of the mid-1970s .1 52

However, circumstances changed further with the advent of the Reaga n

Administration and growing American military ties with Egypt and Somalia ; the rekindling of

American interest in access to military facilities on the African littoral of the Indian Ocean ;

France's efforts to strengthen and broaden its position in the security affairs of the region ;

the success of the Americans and the French in coopting states such as Morocco and Zaire in

their efforts to maintain regional stability ; and South Africa's increasing self-assertion in th e

early 1980s against Angola, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe . This accelerated the trend alluded

to above. By the early 1980s, there was evidence of growing concern over imperialist

reassertiveness in African affairs and uncertainty about how tenable the Soviet position in th e

region was . The reader of the Soviet literature during this period, and even more so fro m

the mid-1980s to the present, saw little evidence of lingering optimism concerning th e

correlation of forces. Indeed, mention of the correlation practically disappeared . 153 Even the

rare assertion that Soviet authority in the region continued to grow had a strongly defensiv e

taste to it.154

Change in the overall assessment of the historical trend of events in Africa was

39

accompanied by shifts in the Soviet analysis of interstate conflict in the region . Although the

previous view that imperialist meddling was an important cause of conflict among African

states persisted, Soviet commentaries increasingly stressed the significance of local factor s

(viz . Andreev's listing of irrationally drawn borders and the small size of African states) a s

sources of disputes among African states . 155 Although the data base is insufficiently large

here for one to draw confident conclusions, Soviet comment seems to have settled into a

pattern whereby local sources or historical legacies of colonialism are considered primar y

causes, whereas the policy of imperialist states is considered supplementary or exacerbatin g

rather than fundamental . 156 Indeed, as time passed, some Soviet analysts were increasingl y

eager to discount the East-West, imperialism-forces of progress dichotomies in accounting for

African conflict . 157 This stemmed presumably from a number of Soviet aims : 1) to

depreciate the global significance of events in Africa at a time when things were not goin g

well there; 2) to legitimize Soviet inaction and the possible defeat of friends of the USSR at a

time when the USSR was loathe to accept deep involvement in African conflict ; and 3 )

specifically to refute American "neoglobalist" claims that US assistance to UNITA was par t

of a global struggle to roll back Soviet gains of the 1970s . In any case, the apparent effort

to dissociate African conflict from the struggle between East and West appears quite

consistent with growing Soviet concern over the trend of events in the region .

Recognition of the depth of indigenous African sources of conflict led in turn to a

more qualified appraisal of the OAU as an embodiment of African unity in the face o f

external intervention and as a mechanism for conflict regulation . Although Sovie t

commentators continued to voice support for OAU security initiatives and, for that matter ,

for OAU economic initiatives such as the Lagos Plan, there was evidence of a more realisti c

appraisal of divisions within the organization which limited its capacity to act effectively t o

resolve the region's economic and security problems .1 5 8

F. External Actor s

Turning specifically to the role of external actors in Africa, and given what has bee n

said above, it is not surprising that there should be evidence of shrinkage in the role tha t

Soviet scholars defined for their own country in regional affairs . The tendency in the Soviet

40

economic development literature to circumscribe the role that the USSR could play in the

development process has already been noted . In the military sphere, Soviet authors

continued to accept for themselves the role of principal defender of the national liberation

movement in the south of the continent well into the 1980s . They stressed the importance o f

cooperation under the terms of the various treaties of friendship and cooperation, and in thi s

context the USSR's willingness to train and assist the military forces of allied states i n

defending themselves against imperialism and apartheid. Stated Soviet military support

continued to extend beyond allied states to movements for national liberation (e .g ., SWAPO

and the ANC) .1 5 9

From Shaba onwards, however, Soviet commentary on military assistance grew les s

specific . Where such roles were acknowledged, they involved a level of activity far short o f

the potential use of force discussed in the mid-1970s . And, in a development comparable to

that in the realm of economic development, Soviet writers noted that the destiny of Africa la y

with the Africans themselves . 160 This suggests a continuing willingness to provide military

support -- and indeed in certain instances to increase it 161 -- accompanied by a recognition o f

clear limits on the Soviet capacity to determine events through military involvement i n

regional affairs . It also suggests some doubt about the efficacy of relying on military

instruments as a basis for Soviet policy in the region, or exclusively on force as a means o f

resolving regional disputes, or, finally, on relations with states of socialist orientation .

Along these lines, Soviet comment on its own role in regional affairs evinces a growin g

interest in diplomatic instruments (e .g ., the support of initiatives for a new internationa l

economic order and on UN efforts to achieve progress in resolving the southern Africa n

conflicts), and in economic relations of mutual benefit . In these efforts, comment on th e

subject suggests a desire to diversify contacts in Africa beyond radical allies to a broade r

array of states . 16 2

Disillusionment with military instruments as a means of resolving regional conflicts ,

coupled with the difficulties of severing ties to beleaguered Third World allies altogether, ha s

produced a growing Soviet commitment -- in word and, to judge from recent events i n

southern Africa, in deed -- to a diplomacy of political settlement of regional disputes . In a

1986 report on a conference dealing with Ethiopia, for example, A . Dmitriev noted that :

4 1

The USSR and the independent countries of Africa are united in the view tha tin current conditions . . . the necessity of collective searches for the settlemen tof troublesome questions by peaceful political means is growing . 163

Elsewhere in this article, the author called for collective efforts in this direction by all

nations . Arguably, one can infer from these and other writings that in conditions where th e

winds of change in the region appear to be shifting against the USSR, the Soviet Union ha s

redefined its own role in regional affairs from one of active promotion of revolutionar y

change to participation in diplomatic efforts to resolve African disputes and stabilize th e

security of the region in such a way as to preserve what it can of previous gains, or to allo w

honorable reduction in existing commitments .

Comment on the United States suggests a number of phases in the evolution of Sovie t

perspectives since the period of the mid- and late 1970s . As noted earlier, events in Shaba ,

combined with the Carter Administration's effort to place its response to that crisis in th e

broader context of forestalling Soviet expansionism in the region, brought an intensely hostile

Soviet response to the effect that imperialism, seeking to recapture its old place in regiona l

affairs, was using the Shaba affair as an excuse for intervention in regional politics .164 In the

aftermath of these events, the Soviet view that imperialism was on the wane in regiona l

politics largely disappeared . The election of the Reagan administration in 1980 and it s

unconcealed hostility to the states of socialist orientation brought even more intens e

condemnation . This criticism focused on close US-South African cooperation and on U S

efforts to use military intervention, both direct and indirect (e .g., using South Africa in th e

southern part of Africa and France and Zaire in the Sahel [Chad]), to reverse the process o f

national and social liberation, and to retain or expand its hold on the natural resources an d

military assets of the region . 165 Constructive engagement was characterized as an unabashed

attempt to shore up the regional position of the apartheid regime, to justify close

collaboration with it in the economic, diplomatic, and military spheres, and to improve th e

position of American capital in South Africa . 166 American initiatives on the Angolan and

Namibian questions were dismissed as hypocrisy, as US-South African collaboration in a n

effort to manipulate these conflicts to their advantage . 167 With the beginnings of U S

assistance to UNITA in 1985-86, Soviet comment grew shriller still, accusing the US, for

42

example, of cooperation with South Africa on the Namibian issue out of an interest i n

controlling that country's natural resources and, in a more general sense, of using Africa' s

drought and famine to secure concessions from progressiv e states.168

By 1987, however, the degree of hostility to the American role in the region eviden t

in previous years' commentary had diminished . And over much of the period, other more

nuanced trends in the analysis of the American role grew stronger . Even during the period

of the Carter administration, there was limited evidence of disagreement over the clos e

identification of South African and American interests, with one scholar noting in 1977 i n

Mirovaya Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnye Otnoshenia that this connection carried costs for th e

United States in its relations with other African states, and that this created a certain amoun t

of tension in the relationship . 169 Some scholars had by 1980 accepted that Carter

administration policy and even constructive engagement created friction with South Africa .

Shubin, for example, in 1981 noted substantial differences between South African an d

American tactics : the US seeking concessions to win over the middle class black populatio n

in a manner similar to that of the Progressive Federal Party, and South Africa playing on a

Soviet threat which precluded concessions and threatening nonalignment at the expense of its

previous close relations with the West.170 By 1985, some Soviet scholars were mentionin g

positive aspects of American policy on the sanctions issue without qualifying comment .171

These modifications suggested a degree of unhappiness in some circles with the identificatio n

of American and South African policy interests . Such arguments may have been the result o f

cognitive change or of instrumental adaptation . In the latter context, arguing that US and

South African interests were identical on regional issues effectively precluded tacit or explici t

cooperation with the US in peace initiatives such as that involving Angola and Namibia . The

recognition of dissonance between the US and South Africa, by contrast, facilitated suc h

cooperation.

Along these lines, by the summer of 1988 Soviet foreign ministry spokesmen wer e

arguing not only that American and South African interests were incongruent and to som e

extent contradictory, but that the USSR and the United States, to the limited extent that eithe r

party had a stake in regional affairs, shared an interest in opposing apartheid and i n

minimizing the negative fallout from southern African affairs in the overall superpower

43

relationship.172 In other words, the United States had over this period moved from th e

position of unequivocal, but relatively impotent, adversary to assertive potential collaborator ,

as Soviet objectives shifted from supporting revolution and expanding influence, to stabilizin g

established positions and reducing military and economic pressure on sympathetic regimes .

This brings us back to the issue of linkage. Here too there is evidence of some

evolution in Soviet perspectives, particularly in the recent literature . Soviet scholars in the

early 1980s returned to the expression of substantial concern over the possibility of escalatio n

from regional conflicts to the level of superpower confrontation, reflecting perhaps the

dramatic worsening of Soviet-American relations during the Reagan era . This in itself i s

unsurprising . But it does possibly suggest a necessity to develop and deploy instrumenta l

arguments justifying nonintervention in the context of increasing pressure on Third Worl d

allies. This would be consistent with the more modest and cautious recasting of the Sovie t

role in the Third World, and particularly in this region, which I alluded to earlier . With the

accession to power of Gorbachev, there was further evolution in Soviet perspectives. The

frequently heard proposition that political settlements of regional disputes were desirable i n

part because of the negative impact of these disputes on the central relationship between Eas t

and West suggests a recognition of political linkage in the current era, although it does no t

necessarily imply a critical reevaluation of the Soviet view of the subject during the 1970s .

Most recently, however, articles have appeared which are specifically critical of th e

unrealistic quality of previous Soviet dismissal of linkage between Third World conflict and

East-West relations :

Postwar history shows that a more or less serious crisis even in the mos tdistant corner of the planet can quickly resonate -- sometimes very seriously - -on Soviet-American and on interbloc relations . . . The experience of detente o fthe 1970s suggests that it is impossible to seek a normalization of relation sbetween the USSR and the USA, between the Warsaw Pact and NATO, takin ginto account only questions of arms limitation and the adjustment of bilatera lcooperation . . . The development of regional crises and the behavior of the tw osides in relation to such crises was the most important catalyst -- precisely acatalyst and not a pretext -- for the sharp worsening of Soviet-America nrelations at the turn of th e decade.173

The comment distinguishing catalysts from pretexts is an implicit criticism of 1970s

44

views that American efforts to link regional competition to the central relationship wer e

merely pretext to sabotage detente. In an article in Literaturnaya Gazeta, an author went a

step further, specifically criticizing Soviet foreign policy during the Brezhnev era for it s

failure to perceive this linkage.174 This evolution suggests a growing awareness of the

potential costs to the superpower relationship of unilateral involvement in conflicts such a s

those in southern Africa .

The recognition of the limits on the role the USSR is willing or able to play in the

region, of the desirability in such circumstances of the search for political settlement of

regional disputes, and of the existence of limited Soviet and American common interests i n

the region (both with respect to apartheid and to containing the negative consequences o f

regional conflict for the central superpower relationship) carries important implications for

superpower collaboration in the resolution of regional disputes and notably those in souther n

Africa . There is certainly substantial evidence of a reassessment in this context of the Soviet

and American capacity to work together to resolve such conflicts.175 In the region, this has

been manifested recently in the disappearance of critical comment on American initiatives in

southern Africa, and in open Soviet official admission that they are working to convince their

regional allies (Angola, and SWAPO in particular) to cooperate with these initiatives .

There is some evidence to suggest that Soviet analysis of the behavior of other

"imperialist" powers in Africa -- notably France -- also grew more nuanced, with far greate r

attention being paid by serious analysts to difference as well as commonality of interest an d

perspective and to the tensions and contradictions in policy that resulted . The impression on e

gets from Cherkasov's treatment of Franco-American relations in Africa is one of partia l

overlap of distinct sets of national interests and consequent occasional collaboration by two

states pursuing quite different agendas . In presenting this image, he criticizes the tendenc y

noted earlier to lump the Western powers together :

Observers often express the view that France in Chad is participating in a nanti-Libyan game, organized and directed from Washington . In this sense ,France is assigned the role of an extra . We think this is too simplistic ("zdes 'imeet nekotoroe yproshchenie") . France plays its own game in Africa ,produced by its deep and longstanding interests on the African continent . Theanti-Libyan orientation of the policy of France and the US in Africa result sfrom the specific interests of Paris and Washington . If for the US the point is

45

the extinction of the Libyan revolution, France has a more modest objective - -to neutralize the influence of this revolution in Francophone Africa, whic hParis considers its "preserve . i 16

He then goes on to show how this disparity of perspective produces fundamentally differen t

policies and indeed tension between the two powers, as for example when the French denie d

their airspace to American aircraft attacking Libya . Here too then, one sees a growin g

Soviet scholarly recognition that lines are not so easily drawn in Africa, and that the

international situation there is far more complex than previous manichaean analyse ssuggested.177

This trend extended to the treatment of China as well . Indeed, Soviet comment on

China practically ceased in the journal literature after 1981, reflecting presumably a Sovie t

recognition that the reform process within China had brought a significant diminution in th e

level of Chinese activity on the continent . Moreover, it was at this stage that limited Sovie t

efforts to improve their relationship with China began . In this context, the intensel y

anti-Chinese commentary characteristic of the mid- and late 1970s served little purpose while

potentially impeding Soviet diplomacy . The gradual change in Soviet perspectives o n

China's role in Africa is suggested by a paper given at the 2nd Soviet-African Conference i n

1986, where a Soviet author noted that China now "decisively condemns the aparthei d

regime, has closed off any contact with UNITA type groups, and supports the liberatio n

struggle of the peoples of the south of Africa ."178 Another indication of this change of

perspective is a 1986 comment on South Africa's Pan Africanist Congress -- previousl y

closely associated with China in Soviet commentary -- in which the PAC is bashed alon g

conventional lines, but the customary references to China have disappeared .179 More

recently, a PAC delegation was received in Moscow for discussions on South Africa, a

development that would have previously been precluded by Soviet sensitivity to th e

competition with China . 180 With regard to South Africa, the reverse side of Soviet commen t

on American-South African relations was a tendency in the Soviet literature to assert tha t

South Africa too was following an agenda of her own in the region -- the creation of a

sphere of influence comprised of unstable economically dependent states on her periphery

and the turning back of the tide of progress in the region . 18 1 Although the mention of US

46

involvement in this policy did not disappear, it grew less frequent and Soviet writers ofte n

tended to discuss South African activity without such reference and to focus on South Afric a

itself as the principal threat to regional stability . Moreover, in certain instances, as noted

earlier, they mentioned the sharpening of contradictions between the policies of South Afric a

and those of the United States . 182 There was little evidence until recently, however, of an y

wavering in Soviet hostility toward and condemnation of South Africa's foreign policies i n

Africa . One could interpret Asoyan's 1987 consideration of the possibility of meaningfu l

reform within South Africa, the postulation that there exist conflicting tendencies within th e

Afrikaner political elite, and the reasonably clear evidence of Soviet interest in pursuing a

limited diplomatic relationship with South Africa as evidence of evolution here as well .

Moreover, Soviet cooperation in recent peace initiatives involving South Africa suggest s

some revision of their view on the wisdom of negotiation with the republic, as does th e

discussion of the possibility of recognition . 183 This is also evident in practice in the

proliferation of semi-official and official contacts between the USSR and the South Africa ngovernment.184

The increasing tendency of the USSR to de-emphasize ties with ideologically kindre d

regimes and to focus instead on the expansion of ties of mutual benefit without reference t o

ideological orientation is also evident in the relationship with South Africa . A particularl y

obvious example was the formalization of the Soviet-South African collaboration in th e

marketing of diamonds .18 5

In general, Soviet comment on the role of other external actors has recognized to a

greater degree than in the late 1970s and early 1980s the differentiated quality of the action s

of China and the Western powers in Africa, tending to depart from the strictly bipolar

analyses of the earlier period . This suggests not only learning from experience (e .g., the

evidence of clear disparities in American and French perspectives on Chad), but also greate r

sophistication in the analysis of actors such as France . Perspectives on several of th e

Western powers -- most notably France and the United States -- suggest awareness of th e

inadequacies of previous strict zero-sum analysis of their behavior in the region .

47

IV. Conclusions

Clearly there has occurred a substantial transition in Soviet attitudes on Africa .

Pragmatic and relatively pessimistic realism has replaced optimistic zero-sum activism as the

dominant tendency of articulation in Soviet discourse on African politics and international

relations. This shift spans the entire range of issues discussed above .

It is possible to argue that this shift reflects not learning, but tactical adaptation .

After all, there have been previous periods of oscillation between revolutionary romanticis m

and pragmatism in Soviet thinking about and policy toward Africa .186 When environmental

and internal factors shifted in such a way as to favor less ambitious and more cautiou s

policies, Soviet writing shifted in the same direction . There was no real change in th e

paradigm governing Soviet discourse . It was reasonable to conclude that, in many respects ,

"changes" in thinking constituted a rationalization for policy change, rather than a n

experientially induced "schema transformation . "

This skeptical conclusion probably is not entirely valid for these earlier periods ,

though since this issue lies beyond the purview of the present analysis, I shall not go into it .

But it is important to consider here why a similar conclusion is inadequate with regard t o

Soviet perspectives on African politics since 1985 .

There are several reasons to believe that this transition reflects more than a mere

rationalization for change in policy . First, it differs from previous oscillations in that it is i n

many respects not merely a reevaluation of empirical evidence within the context of a n

unchanging interpretive prism, but an attack on the prism itself . To take two of a number of

examples, Soviet scholars now question, if they do not reject, the primacy of class in th e

analysis of African politics . Some combine this with its logical implication -- a questioning

of the applicability of Marxism as a universal theory to conditions in Africa . In the

international sphere, Soviet scholars and policy-makers have abandoned the internationa l

class struggle as the dominant factor in international relations, in Africa as well as elsewhere .

They have replaced it with a reasonably narrow (i .e. non Cold War) conception of state

interest .

Second, there is a problem of sequencing in the rationalization argument . If changes

4 8

in Soviet published perspectives on Africa were driven by policy imperatives, one woul d

expect them to be contemporaneous with, or to follow, evidence of change in policy . But i t

is clear that they predate it . The roots of the shift in the dominant tendency of articulation

on many of the issues considered above lie at the end of the 1970s and in the early 1980s .

They begin, moreover, as tentative and cautious exceptions to the rule and grow graduall y

toward dominance in discourse . In reading this literature, the outsider gets the impression o f

a sequence where near unanimous optimism is challenged by growing dissent based on the

interpretation of accumulated experience . The latter disconfirms the prior conventiona l

wisdom. As time passes, dissent transforms itself into a new pessimistic conventiona l

wisdom. Policy in some respects lags behind .

That the process is driven by experience is evident in the close relationship betwee n

the empirical evidence and the conclusions drawn from it . A few examples suffice. It is the

case empirically that the effort to implant socialism through the vanguard party regime and

the non-capitalist path of development has been an unmitigated disaster . The attempt of the

parties to control politics in a monolithic fashion has alienated those excluded from it or wh o

are unwilling to accept subservience as the price of admission . Nationalization and central

planning, in conjunction with popular reaction to the suppression of opposition, have brough t

economic collapse . These recipes simply do not work in Africa . All other things being

equal, the sane intellectual response to such evidence is growing doubt about the utility of th e

model, coupled with the suggestion of political relaxation and pluralization on the one hand

and economic liberalization on the other . These are the conclusions evident in the Sovie t

literature .

The basic issue here is the relationship between scholarship and politics . This

question is dealt with more fully in the other chapters of this monograph . A few preliminary

comments are pertinent here. Given the traditional nature of Soviet decision-making, on e

might argue that there is no obvious link between scholarly debate and polic y practice.187

This argument seems somewhat stretched . First, the literature cited here includes both

scholars and policymakers . There is no apparent discrepancy between the two.

Second, the two communities are not mutually exclusive . To take an example, Bori s

Asoyan worked for many years in Africa as a journalist for New Times . He then became a

49

deputy director of the Africa Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences . He then entered

government as a senior official dealing with Africa at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs . The

migration of scholars into policymaking or policy implementing positions is by now a well -

known characteristic of change in the foreign policymaking apparatus of the USSR .'" The

role of scholars as consultants to legislative bodies with growing influence over foreign

policy is also expanding . It is hardly likely that these people develop amnesia on the wa y

from the institutes to the Central Committee, the ministries, or the Supreme Soviet .

In short, there is substantial reason, a priori, to consider the trends described here a s

evidence of elite learning . It follows logically that the movement of elites between th e

scholarly community and the realm of policy is likely to affect Soviet behavior . Whether i t

has or has not is primarily a subject for subsequent chapters .

50

NOTES

1.

This article was written with the assistance of Robert Darst and Kimberly Marti n

Zisk . The author wishes to acknowledge the financial support of the Berkeley -Stanford Program for Soviet Studies in the preparation of this study . The researchbenefitted considerably from access to Soviet Africanists under the auspices of a nexchange sponsored by IREX and coordinated by the author .

2.

See Elizabeth K. Valkenier, The USSR and the Third World: An Economic Bind (New

York: Praeger, 1983) for a discussion of differing Soviet perspectives on developmen t

issues . Jerry Hough, in The Struggle for the Third World (Washington, DC :Brookings, 1986), extends this approach to the treatment of a number of importan tsocial and political issues discussed in the academic community . Francis Fukuyama ,in Moscow's Post-Brezhnev Reassessment of the Third World (Santa Monica, CA :RAND, 1986) demonstrates somewhat more muted, but nonetheless significant ,differences of opinion at higher levels of the Central Committee Secretariat and tosome extent in the Politburo itself .

3.

By "revolutionary" I mean the advocacy of radical transformation of existing political ,economic, and social structures, rather than (as with "reform"), efforts to improv esuch structures from within . It would not be entirely correct to label this tendenc yorthodox or dogmatic, since orthodoxy in Soviet-Marxist terms can be used to justifypassivity in policy . In the mid-1960s, for example, a stress on the necessity o fproletarian leadership of the national liberation revolution and a rejection of ThirdWorld adaptations of socialist thought was used to justify a retreat fro mKhrushchevian activism. See S . Neil MacFarlane, Superpower Rivalry and ThirdWorld Radicalism (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), 164, 174 .

4.

Conversations in Washington in October 1987 . Georgii Mirskii makes a relate dpoint :

Operating from the postulate that the path to socialism ought b ydefinition to be not only more progressive, but also more effective thanthat of capitalist development, authors overestimated its positiv emoments . Although they mentioned isolated inadequacies, the yconsidered them temporary and transitional . It is true that somescholars viewed things in more realistic terms and noticed dangerou snegative tendencies . . . But on the whole an unjustifiably positive ton epredominated .

"K voprosu o vybore puti i orientatsii razvivzyushchikhsya stran," Mirovaya

5 1

Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnye Otnoshenia (hereafter MEIMO) no . 3 (1987) : 75-76 .

5.

Alim Keshokov, "Strana molodoi revolyutsii," Kommunist, no . 6 (1978) : 109; Yu.Irkhin, "Efiopia na puti sotsialisticheskoi orientatsii," Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Si l(hereafter KVS), no. 2 (1979) : 84 ; S. P. Nemanov, "Partii avangardnogo tipa vafrikanskikh stranakh sotsialisticheskoi orientatsii," Narody Azii i Afriki (hereafterNAIA), no. 2 (1979) : 18 ; V. Kudryavtsev, "Afrika v bor'be za svoyo budushchee, "Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn' (hereafter MZ), no. 4 (1978) : 36-37.

6.

See, for example, the description of a colloquium on the non-capitalist path o fdevelopment in "Protsessy nekapitalisticheskogo razvitia stran Afriki," NAIA, no. 5(1977): 174, in particular the comments of Yu . A . Yudin, A . V . Kiva, L. M. Entin ,and G. B . Starushenko .

7.

See E. Tarabrin, "Afrika na novom vitke osvoboditel'noi bor'by," MEIMO, no. 2(1979) : 39 . An analysis of Tarabrin's writings from 1975-86 in this journal, in NAIA ,and in MZ suggests that he is one of the more prominent true believers and har dliners in the elaboration of Soviet views on political and social development in Africa .He tends to be consistently positive on states of socialist orientation, vanguard parties ,the non-capitalist path of development, and very negative on the role of the privat esector (local and foreign), the role of the West in sustaining economic backwardnes sand dependence, and the apartheid regime in South Africa . Viktor Kudryavtsev (citedabove in note 5) sustains similar perspectives throughout the period, though with anotable exception (see below) .

8.

See, for example, O . Orestov, "Stanovlenie nezavisimoi Afriki," MZ, no . 10 (1975) :85 ; N . Gavrilov, "Afrika menyaet litso," MZ, no. 6 (1980) : 39.

9.

See, for example, V . Solodovnikov and M . Braginskii, "Rabochii klass v sotsial'noistrukture afrikanskikh stran," MZ, no . 9 (1976) : 45, 46. These authors criticize i nparticular bourgeois sociologists' assertions that :

The moving force of social development in young independent states i snot the struggle of classes, but the struggle of old against new, o ftradition against modernity, the struggle for the modernization o fAfrican society (p . 46) .

10.

Ibid., 50; Tarabrin (note 7, p . 37) ; G . Roshchin, "Ekspansia mezhdunarodnykhmonopolii v Afrike," MZ, no . 6 (1979) : 68 .

11.

Nemanov (note 5, p . 19) ; V . Gafurov, Aktual'nye Problemy sovremmenogonatsional'no-osvoboditel'nogo dvizhenia (Moscow : 1976), 218 .

52

12.

Solodovnikov and Braginskii (note 9, p . 47) . See also Sotsial'nye Sdvigi vNezavisimykh Stranakh Afriki (Moscow: Nauka, 1977), esp . 74; and Anatoli iGromyko, Africa: Progress, Problems, Prospects (Moscow : Progress, 1983 [Russianedition 1981]), 25, 26, 91-97 . Both Solodovnikov and Gromyko were directors of th eAfrica Institute at the time they prepared these contributions to the literature .

13.

See V .S . Yag'ya, "Revolyutsionnye peremeny v Efiopii," NAIA, no. 6 (1975) : 17(note the date of this article, which preceded the first Soviet-Ethiopian agreements byalmost a year) ; M . Barinov, "Efiopia," MZ, no . 4 (1978): 147; Yu . Irkhin (note 5, p .82) ; Yu . Sumbantyan, as cited in V . Katsman and V . Pavlova, "Tendentsii razvitiastran sotsialisticheskoi orientatsii v Afrike," NAIA, no. 4 (1976) : 216 . For a moregeneral positive evaluation of the historical role of armies in socialist-orientedcountries, see B. G . Gafurov (note 11) . This view was not unanimous . See V.Iordanskii's review of Gafurov's book in NAIA, no. 4 (1976) : 161 .

14.

Ye. E. Glushchenko, "Nigeria : Politicheskie instituty razvitogo kapitalizma vusloviakh razvivayushchegosya obshchestva," NAIA, no. 4 (1980) : 45 ; L.N .Pribytovskii, "Nigeria v period voennykh rezhimov," NAIA, no. 6 (1980) : 48-49, 53 .

15.

See I . Andreyev., "Afrika : sotsial'no-klassovye Sdvigi," Kommunist, no . 18 (1982) :94; B . Doubrava, "Antikommunizm i afrikanskaya natsional'naya demokratia," NAIA ,no. 16 (1977) : 51, 58 . See also R. Ul'ianovskii, National Liberation (Moscow:Progress, 1978), 155 .

16.

Keshokov (note 5, p . 113) . This view clearly underestimated not only the continuin gresistance to centralization on the part of peripheral and not so peripheral people ssuch as the Eritreans and Tigreans, but also the continuing devotion of th e"revolutionary" leadership to what the author calls the "great power policy o f'amharacization' . "

17.

For example, E. E. Lebedeva writes:

Tribalism in the city, growing up as a reaction to the breaking up o ratomization of the urban environment, is undermined at the roots b yfurther growth of modern production, and given th esocial-informational potential of the city . Trade unions play animportant role in the strengthening among workers of intertribal tie sand in the realization by them of their common class character .

Review of A .S . Oganova, Urbanizatsia i Formirovanie rabochego klassa Zapadno iAfriki (Moscow : Nauka, 1977) in NAIA, no. 4 (1978): 231 .

53

18.

This appears to be the message, for example, in Yu . Kobishchanov, "Afrika :etnicheskaya pestrota iii edinstvo v mnogoobrazii," MEIMO, no.7 (1978) : 137, 144 .Gromyko (note 12, pp. 49-50), operating from a different methodological perspective ,but arriving at similar conclusions, clearly believed or purported to believe that th eunifying influence of anti-imperialism is far stronger than the divisive consequences oflocal particularistic nationalism . Indeed the latter gets almost no serious treatment (astriking and revealing omission) in this monograph by the director of the Academy o fSciences Africa Institute on the basic problems faced by Africa in the early 1980s .

19.

See Irkhin (note 13, p . 84) on internal reaction in Ethiopia .

20.

Yu . Gavrilov, "Otstaivaya nezavisimost'," MZ, no . 2 (1976) : 129 . For the contraryview on Angola, see V . Sofinskii and A . Khazanov, "Angol'skaya khronikapekinskogo predatel'stva," MZ, no . 6 (1978) : 68-69, where indigenous factors accoun tfor the rise of Holden Roberto's FNLA .

21.

Kudryavtsev (note 5, p . 38) .

22.

V . Vorob'ev, "Retsidivy kolonialistskoi politiki v Afrike," MZ, no . 8 (1978) : 34, 36 .

23.

Y . Dadu, "Speech at the 25th Congress of the CPSU," Kommunist, no. 8 (1976) :80-81 . See also A . Butlitskii, "Angola -- sryv proiskov imperialisticheskoi reaktsii, "MEIMO, no . 5 (1976) : 89, where it is argued that :

The expanses of Angola became a burial ground for many myths, an din particular the myth about the decisive superiority of South Africa' smilitary machine on the African continent . . . Currently new hopefulperspectives are opening before the liberation movements in th esubcontinent . Never before . . . have there been such promising politica land material conditions here for the liquidation of racism and foreig ndomination .

Other authors writing along similar lines include V . Kremenyuk, "Vo imyanatsional'nogo osvobozhdenia," MEIMO, no . 9 (1976); Yu . Shvevtsov, "Mozambik :na puti nezavisimosti," MZ, no . 8 (1975) : 114; A . Orlov, "Vooruzhennaya bor'b anarodov Afriki," Voenno-istoricheskii Zhurnal (hereafter VIZ), no. 12 (1975) : 111 ; B .Fetisov, "Namibia: kolonizatory uporstvuyut," MZ, no. 7 (1975) : 131 .

24.

A . Ivanov and L. Mogila, "Voennaya mashina YuAR -- orudie protiv osvoboditel'no ibor'by afrikanskikh narodov," VIZ, no. 12 (1976) : 88, 93 .

5 4

25. V . Gorodnov, "Yuzhno-Afrikanskaya Respublika : uglublenie krizisa i obostreni ebor'by," ME/MO, no. 4 (1977) : 125 . See also V . Gorodnov, "Fenomen Soueto, "NAIA, no . 2 (1978) : 31, where he argues :

Soweto is the beginning of a new stage of the struggle for the nationaland social liberation of South Africa . . . There will be new Sowetos .The forms of struggle will change, but the pressure will strengthen unti lfinally the entire system of racial discrimination and oppression will b esmashed to smithereens .

This article is one of several in a round table on the revolutionary process in southernAfrica which is of considerable utility in assessing Soviet perspectives on the questio nat that time.

26.

A. Runov, "Agonia rasistskogo rezhima," MZ, no . 12 (1976) : 81 .

27.

Dadu (note 23, p . 80) ; A . Tamarin, "Raschoty i proschoty imperialistov v Afrike, "Kommunist, no . 18 (1976) : 102 ; "Narod Namibii boryotsya," KVS, no . 3 (1978) : 85 ;A. Ivanov, "Yuzhnaya Afrika : v bor'be za likvidatsiyu kolonializma i rasizma," KVS,

no . 19 (1981) : 87; Kremenyuk (note 23, p . 142) ; S . Madzoyevskii ,"Yuzhnoafrikanskii uzel mirovoi politiki," MEIMO, no . 7 (1977) : 21, inter alia .

28.

For example, Gorodnov's characterization of South African attempts at dialogue in th eaftermath of the collapse of the Portuguese in Angola and Mozambique (note 25, firs tcitation, p . 128) . See also the comment on South African "constitutional farces" an dthe necessity of destroying the South African regime if liberation were to be achieve din Namibia and peace were to be restored in the region as a whole in "Narod Namibi iboryotsya" (note 27, p . 85) .

29. For example, the characterization of the ANC in Gorodnov (note 25, first citation, p .125) . See also K. Mikhailov, "Yuzhno-Afrikanskaya Respublika," MZ, no . 6 (1978) :152 ; Ivanov and Mogila (note 24, p . 87) .

30.

See, for example, the criticism of the Black Consciousness Movement for tendencie stowards anti-white racism, for its doubts about class struggle, and for its inadequateapproach to the "national question" -- all of which played into the hands o fimperialism and the apartheid state by weakening the revolutionary movement . A .Makarov, "'Chernoe samosoznanie' i osvoboditel'noe dvizhenie v Yuzhnoi Afrike, "NAIA, no . 2 (1975) : 34-35, 37-38 . M . Lazarev, "Natsional'nye dvizhenia ietnicheskie problemy na sovremennom Vostoke," MEIMO, no. 12 (1978) : 58, 60 ,notes the negative side of black "anti-racism" in impeding the development of nationa lconsciousness in new states, and cites South Africa as an example . In contrast toSoviet comment on Black Consciousness, the treatment of other opposition group ssuch as, for example, the PFP, was virtually nonexistent in the journals .

55

31.

One suspects that Biko and his colleagues were judged worthy of special attentionowing firstly to their mass appeal (potentially at the expense of the ANC) amon gblack youth . A second and perhaps as important reason appears in the Lazarev articl ecited above :

The spearhead of black anti-racism is often directed not only against thegenuine oppressors of African peoples, but also against man yrepresentatives of the white race, independently of their socio-economi cstatus and political positions .

I Lazarev (note 30, p . 60). In other words, the many white members of the SACP andthe ANC were potential targets of this social current .

32. See, for example, Keshokov (note 5, pp. 109, 113) ; Doubrava (note 15, pp . 58, 59) ;Ul'ianovskii (note 15, p . 317, 325-26) ; V. Kirsanov, "Natsional'no-osvoboditel'nay avoina i razgrom inostrannoi interventsii v Angole," VIZ, no . 8 (1977) : 79 .

33.

Ul'ianovskii (note 15, p . 318) ; G. Khromushin, "Tendentsii ideologicheskoi bor'by vAfrike," MZ, no . 5 (1979) : 60 ; A. Gromyko, "Sotsialisticheskaya orientatsia vAfrike," MZ, no . 8 (1979) : 110 ; E. Peryshkin, "U karty mira : Respublika Zambia, "MZ, no . 3 (1977): 155 .

34.

Ul'ianovskii (note 15, pp . 317-19) ; Z . Vinnik, "Neokolonializm v sel'sko mkhozyaistve berega Slonovoi Kosti," NAIA, no. 4 (1975) : 142; S . Kulik, "Kenia :problemy afrikanizatsii," MZ, no. 6 (1975): 135-39 .

35.

Ul'ianovskii (note 15, pp . 316-317) ; S. Borisov, "Svyazi stran SEV s afrikanskim igosudarstvami," MZ, no . 4 (1975) : 146-47; E. Tarabrin, Review of L .D .Yablochkov, "Printsipy vneshnei politiki afrikanskikh gosudarstv," in MZ, no. 9(1975) : 137-38; Orestov (note 8, pp . 77, 85) .

36. For example, A. Gromyko, "Oktyabr' i sud'by Afriki," MZ, no. 8 (1977) : 102-3; L.Aleksandrovskaya, "Afrika v poiskakh strategiisotsial'no-ekonomicheskogo razvitia, "MEIMO, no. 1 (1978) : 40; A . Gromyko and V . Lopatov, "Sotrudnichestvo stran SE Vc nezavisimoi Afriki," NAIA, no . 3 (1978) : 4, 5, 10 .

37.

L . Aleksandrovskaya, "Opyt i problemy natsionalizatsii v stranakh Afriki," MEIMO ,no. 7 (1975) : 48-59 ; Tarabrin (note 7, pp . 42-44) ; V. Solodovnikov and N . Gavrilov ,"Afrika: tendentsii nekapitalisticheskogo razvitia," MZ, no . 2 (1976) : 33, 40 .

38.

See note 33 . On the relevance of Soviet examples of non-capitalist development, seeP . I . Manchkha, Aktual'nye problemy sovremennoi Afriki (Moscow : Izdatel'stvoPoliticheskoi Literatury, 1979), 34-36 . Manchkha does, however, note the existenceof significant differences between the historical conditions faced by the peoples of

5 6

Central Asia and Mongolia and those of Africa .

39.

On the role of traditional institutions and practices, see, inter alia, Aleksandrovskaya(note 36) ; V. Khoros, "Udzhamaa: opyt nekapitalisticheskogo razvitia," NAIA, no . 5(1977) ; N.S. Illarionov, "Problemy modernizatsii traditsionnoi obshchiny vkontseptsiakh 'afrikanskogo sotsializma'," NAIA, no . 3 (1978) : 29-39, esp . 38 ; and I .Svanidze, "Tropicheskaya Afrika : krest'yanskaya obshchina i sotsial'nye peremeny, "NAIA, no. 1 (1979): 16-26 .

40.

See Yu. Alimov, "Retsidivy kolonializma," Kommunist, no. 9 (1978) : 111 ;Khromushin (note 33, p . 47) .

41.

For more skeptical views, see Alimov (note 40, p. 113) ; Khromushin (note 33, p .61); Gromyko (note 33, p . 107) ; Doubrava (note 15, pp . 51-52) ; Manchkha (note 38 ,pp. 167-68) . Skepticism concerning individual and collective or regional self-reliancewas not universal . Some writers in MEIMO took a more positive view (e .g .Aleksandrovskaya (note 36) and idem ., "Razvitie promyshlennosti v Afrike, "MEIMO, no. 4 (1980): 103-4 . As noted earlier, this more positive treatment of self -reliance by scholars writing in MEIMO (as opposed, for example, to NAIA) may beinterpreted as an early form of skepticism concerning the capacity of the CMEA t ofunction as a motor for the development of the African states . More toleran tperspectives towards self-reliance spread towards other journals (e .g ., Narody Azii iAfriki) by 1980, suggesting that this skepticism was also spreading . See, for example ,A . Gromyko, "Afrika v mirovom razvitii i problemy sovetskoi afrikanistiki," NAIA ,no . 3 (1980) : 6 .

42.

S . Sergeev, "Vostochnaya Afrika: proiski reaktsii," MZ, no. 1 (1978) : 78; V .Grigor'ev, "Afrikanskii Rog : imperialisticheskoe vmeshatel'stvo usilivaetsya," MZ ,no . 3 (1978) : 123 .

43.

Vorob'ev (note 22, p . 34) .

44.

Sergeev (note 42, p . 128) ; Grigor'ev (note 42, p . 123) ; Kudryavtsev (note 5, p . 38) ;Barinov (note 13, p . 148) ; Vorob'ev (note 22, p . 34) ; Irkhin (note 5, p . 84) .

45.

Keshokov (note 5, p . 113) ; Alimov (note 41, pp . 111-13) .

46.

Tarabrin (note 35, pp . 137-38) ; Orestov (note 8, pp . 77-78) ; V . Mikhin, "OAE: golossvobodnoi Afriki," MZ, no . 9 (1979) : 117-18 ; Tarabrin (note 7, pp . 40-42) . For asomewhat later commentary on these questions, see Akademia Nauk SSSR, Institu tAfriki, Aktual'nye problemy mezhafrikanskikh otnoshenii (Moscow: MezhdunarodnyeOtnoshenia, 1983), 59-74 .

57

47.

A . Klimov, "Peremeny na politicheskoi karte Afriki i manevry rasistov," MZ, no . 5(1975) : 153 ; V . Vinogradov, "Afrika : iskorenie rasizma: vazhneishaya zadacha," MZ,no. 8 (1976) : 130; A. Runov, "YuAR -- tsitadel' rasizma i reaktsii," MZ, no . 1 0(1976) : 85 .

48.

Mikhin (note 46, p . 117) ; Tarabrin (note 7, p . 39) .

49.

Mikhin (note 46, p . 118) ; Kudryavtsev (note 5, p . 40) .

50.

G. Kuznetsov, "Novye gorizonty Madagaskara," MZ, no. 8 (1975) : 110; D. Borisov,"SSSR -- Somali: otnoshenia razvivaetsya," MZ, no. 10 (1975) : 113-14 ; Yu . Tsaplin ,"Mozambik: pervye shagi respubliki," MZ, no. 6 (1976) : 129-30 ; K. Uralov,"Angola: k novym rubezham," MZ, no. 7 (1976) : 86-87 ; V . Korochantsev ,"Madagaskar : vybor puti," MZ, no. 10 (1976) : 133-34 ; V. Fedorov, "Druzhba isolidarnost' narodov SSSR i Angoly," MZ, no. 11 (1976) : 86-87 ; V. Sidenko,"Efiopia: vremya korennykh peremen," MZ, no. 6 (1977) : 123 ; L. Davidov, "SSSR - -Efiopia : tesnaya druzhba i sotrudnichestvo," MZ, no . 1 (1979) : 102-6 ; V. Sidenko,"Gvineya: podtverzhdenie progressivnogo kursa," MZ, no. 1 (1979) : 134; V.Alekseev, "Mozambik stroit novuyu zhizn', MZ, no . 9 (1979) : 87-88 ; A . Silanin ,"Benin," MZ, no. 10 (1979) : 152-54 ; S . Sergeev, "Vazhnaya vekasovetsko-efiopskogo sotrudnichestva," MZ, no. 11 (1979) : 95-100 .

51.

See, for example, Sergei Kulik's comment on linkages between the Kenya nbourgeoisie and international capital (note 34, p . 136) . On capitalism bringingdependence, see S . Balashov, "Tendentsii razvitia ekonomiki Kenii," MEIMO, no. 3(1978) : 115-22, and esp . 122 . On Zaire's ties to the West, see, for example, K .Uralov, "Zair: imperialisticheskaya interventsia," MZ, no . 6 (1977) : 124-25.

52.

E . Tarabrin, "Problemy Afriki 80-kh godov," MZ, no . 5 (1981) : 51 .

53.

As, for example when Marinin and Khodakova noted with reference to Gabon that :

In its foreign policy activity, the Gabonese government has begun ove rthe past few years to complement its orientation towards the countrie sof the West with a tendency towards greater independence . Gabonparticipates in the nonaligned movement in Africa, and comes outagainst racist regimes .

The authors also noted Gabon's expanding ties with the socialist camp, its agreemen twith Soviet arms control initiatives, and its support for Soviet-sponsored resolutions a tthe United Nations . M. Marinin and L . Khodakova, "Gabonskaya Respublika," MZ,no . 5 (1976) : 158 .

5 8

54.

Ilarionov (note 39, passim and pp. 38-39) ; Nemanov (note 5, p . 26) ; Khromushi n(note 33, pp . 57, 61) ; Gromyko (note 33, pp . 107, 109) .

55.

See note 41 .

56.

For example, E. Peryshkin, "U karty mira : Respublika Zambii," MZ, no . 3 (1977) :

154-55 .

57.

V . Sidenko, "Gvineya : podtverzhdenie progressivnogo kursa," MZ, no . 1 (1979) :134-35 ; Such criticism often merged with the polemic against China, which was sai dto be attempting to peddle the idea of a "Third World," independent of and standin gagainst the West and the Soviet bloc . See Manchkha (note 38, p . 339) .

58.

For example, V . Nesterov, "Dvizhenie neprisoedinenia - vazhnyi fakto rsovremmenykh mezhdunarodnykh otnoshenii," NAIA, no . 6 (1977) : passim, andTarabrin (note 34, p . 138) .

59.

V . Solodovnikov, "Afrika: novyi etap bor'by," MZ, no . 4 (1976) : 133 ; Orestov (note8, p. 77) ; Solodovnikov and Gavrilov (note 37, p . 33) .

60.

Kudryavtsev (note 5, p . 35) ; I . Neklessa, "Likvidatsia ostatkov kolonial'noi sistemy - -nastoyatel'naya neobkhodimost', MZ, no . 3 (1975): 43-44; Ya . Etinger, "Afrika vbor'be s neokolonializmom" (review of Neokolonializm i Afrika v 70-kh godakh) ,MEIMO, no. 12 (1976) : 146 ; R . Vasiliev, "Afrikanskaya politika SShA" (review) ,MZ, no. 3 (1977) : 138 ; Klimov (note 46, p . 152) ; Doubrava (note 15, p . 48) .

61.

Ivanov and Mogila (note 24, pp . 89, 91) ; Kirsanov (note 32, p . 75) ; L. Aleksandrov ,"Sekretnye sluzhby YuAR," NAIA, no . 4 (1976) : passim; V. Shubin,"Voenno-politicheskoe sotrudnichestvo stran Zapada s YuAR," NAIA, no . 3 (1981) :26-37; S . Shestakov, "Narashchivanie vooruzhenii v YuAR i Rodezii," MZ, no 8(1976) : 153-54 . For an early, somewhat more nuanced, view of the relationshipbetween the West and South Africa, see Madzoyevskii (note 21, p . 13) .

62.

S . Astakhov, "Sgovor Tel'-Aviva s Pretoriei," MZ, no. 7 (1977) : 65 .

63.

B . Fetisov, "Namibia : kolonizatory uporstvuet," MZ, no. 7 (1975) : 131 ; Roshchin(note 10, pp . 69-70) .

64.

K . Uralov, "Ostraya problema Yuga Afriki," MZ, no. 4 (1977) : 111-12 .

65.

Orestov (note 8, p . 77) ; K. Gevorgyan, "Otvechaem na voprosy : aparteid --prestuplenie protiv chelovechestva," MZ, no. 1 (1976) : 158 ; E. Tarabrin, "Afrika :osvoboditel'naya bor'ba i proiski imperializma," MEIMO, no . 6 (1980) : 71-74.

59

66.

Yu. Bochkarev and G . Starushenko, "Korotko o knigakh" (review of Urnov, PolitikaYuAR v Afrike), Kommunist, no . 5 (1983) : 127 ; A . Ivanov, "Afrika: manevryimperializma i reaktsii," KVS, no . 24 (1978) : 75-80; Tarabrin (note 65, p . 71) ;Orestov (note 8, p . 77) .

67.

As one writer put it, cooperation with the USSR was a reliable guarantee o fsovereignty . V. Kirsanov (note 32, p . 79) . See also Uralov (note 64, p . 115) .

68.

Orestov (note 8, p . 85) .

69.

Tarabrin (note 7, pp. 42-45), and Tarabrin (note 65, pp . 69, 73, 74) ; Gromyko andLopatov (note 36, pp . 1-15) ; Irkhin (note 5, p . 85) ; Borisov (note 35, p . 146) ;Fedorov (note 50, p . 85); Gromyko (note 36, pp . 102-3) .

70.

Solodovnikov and Gavrilov (note 37, p . 41) .

71.

Tarabrin (note 65, pp . 71, 73) ; Uralov (note 64, pp . 115-16) .

72.

E. Mel'nikov, "Rol' armii v osvobodivshikhsya stranakh Afriki (na primere byvshyk hfrantzuzskikh kolonii)," VIZ, no . 6 (1982) : 61 ; Fedorov (note 50, pp . 86-87) ; L.Davidov (note 50, pp . 104-5) .

73.

Ivanov and Mogila (note 24, p . 92) ; Kirsanov (note 32, p . 76) .

74.

Orlov (note 23, pp . 110-11) .

75.

See Mark Katz, The Third World in Soviet Military Thought (Baltimore, MD : JohnsHopkins University Press, 1982), passim .

76.

Hence, in discussing Namibia, a writer in Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil spoke ofSoviet political and material assistance to SWAPO, without any specific mention o fmilitary instruments . "Narod Namibii boretsya" (note 27, p . 85) . See also Ivanov(note 66) .

77.

Indeed, the just cited contrast between VIZ and KVS may suggest a similar reticenceon the part of the Main Political Administration within the Armed Forces .

78.

Shvevtsov (note 23) ; MZ, no . 8 (1975) : 113 ; Orestov (note 8, p . 77) ; Uralov (not e50, p. 87) .

79.

See, for example, Katzman's dismissive discussion of Western claims concerning th estrategic/military motivations of the USSR -- and in particular the quest for bases -- i nAfrica . V . Katzman, Vnezhnaya Politika Stran Sotsialisticheskoi Orientatsii B Afrik e(Moscow: Nauka, 1985), 148-49, 163 .

60

80.

V . Gulin and I . Povalyaev, "Dva podkhoda k odnoi teme," Morskoi Sbornik, no . 1 1(1979) : 80 .

81.

Alimov (note 41, pp. 109-110, 113) ; Ivanov and Mogila (note 24, p . 88) ; "Narod . . . "(note 76, p . 85) ; G. Roshchin, "Nekotorye osobennosti amerikanskoi pomoshch irazvivayushchimsya stranam Afriki," NAIA, no . 3 (1975) : 118; Madzoyevskii (note27, pp . 12-13) ; A. Prikhodko, "U karty mira : Namibia," MZ, no . 11 (1975) : 146;Vasiliev (note 60, p . 139) .

82. Moses Mabida (General Secretary of the South African Communist Party), "V bor'b eza natsional'noe i sotsial'noe osvobozhdenie naroda," Kommunist, no . 11 (1981) : 105 ;Uralov (note 64, p . 112) ; Vorob'ev, (note 22, pp . 33-40) .

83.

Irkhin (note 5, p. 84); V . Shubin, "Voenno-politicheskoe sotrudnichestvo Zapada sYuAR," NAIA, no. 3 (1981) : passim; A . Gromyko, "XXVI S'ezd KPSS i Zadach isovetskoi afrikanistiki," NAIA, no . 4 (1981): 4 ; E . Tarabrin, "Afrika v global'no istrategii imperializma," MEIMO, no . 2 (1982) : 32-33 ; K. Uralov, "Zair :imperialisticheskaya intervenstia," MZ, no. 6 (1977) : 124-25 ; G. Roshchin ,"Ekonomicheskaya podopleka ekspansii SShA v Afrike," MZ, no . 3 (1978) : 46-50;Vorob'ev (note 22, p . 40) .

84.

Gromyko (note 12, pp. 225-26) .

85.

Gromyko (note 12, p . 221) notes in this context that although Britain continues t oexercise considerable influence in Africa, it "has come to rely more and more on th esupport of the USA ." Elsewhere (p . 232), he notes that while France has over th eyears attempted to maintain and deepen independent diplomatic, economic, andmilitary ties with its ex-colonies and expand its network of relations to such states a sKenya and has attempted to exclude other imperialist states from economi cinvolvement in its sphere of interest, its policies on the continent are generall ycoordinated with its partners in NATO and the EEC .

86.

Madzoyevskii (note 27, p . 20) ; S . Borisov, "Afrika v strategicheskikh zamyslak himperializma," KVS, no . 13 (1980) : 81 ; Gromyko (note 69, p . 104) ; Tarabrin (note65, p . 65) .

87.

Madzoyevskii (note 27 p . 20) .

88.

V . Grigor'ev, "Afrikanskii Rog: imperialisticheskoe vmeshatel'stvo usilivaetsya," MZ ,no. 3 (1978) : 124. Here again one sees the tendency of Soviet writers in this period t otarget actions of the West in Africa as causes of conflict and of damage to East-Wes trelations while denying that Soviet actions have similar effects .

6 1

89. Yu. Alimov, and L. Fedorov, "Samorazoblachenie maoizma v Afrike," Kommunist ,no . 14 (1977) : 106, 114; V . Bogoslovskii, (review of Afrikanskaya politika Pekina) ,MZ, no. 10 (1977) : 138-40; Manchkha (note 38, pp . 286-88) .

90.

B. Viktorov, "Reaktsionnye proiski Pekina v Afrike, KVS, no. 2 (1980) : 81 ; S .Borisov, "Afrika v strategicheskikh zamyslakh imperializma," KVS (1980) : 82-83 ;Gavrilov (note 20, p . 130) ; Uralov (note 51, p . 125); Khromushin (note 33, pp .63-64) ; E. Glushchenko, "Natsional'no-osvoboditel'noe dvizhenie : v podderzhkunarodov Yuga Afriki," MZ, no . 7 (1979) : 117 .

91.

Irkhin (note 5, p . 84) ; A . Kiselev, "Narody Afriki v bor'be protiv rasistskik hrezhimov," KVS, no. 23 (1979) : 85 ; Viktorov (note 90, pp. 82-83) ; Alimov andFedorov (note 89, p . 114) ; K . Asonov, "U karty mira : Angola," MZ, no. 12 (1975) :142; K. Uralov, "Angola: torzhestvo pravogo dela," MZ, no. 4 (1976) : 57-8) ; Uralov(note 50, p . 86) ; Grigor'ev (note 42, p. 124) ; Sofinskii and Khazanov (note 20, pp .70, 72) ; Manchkha (note 38, pp . 286-302) .

92.

For example, E . Titorenko, "Yuzhnaya Rodezia," MZ, no . 2 (1976) : 147-48 ; V.Tyurkin, "OON: podderzhka boryushchikhsya narodov Afriki," MZ, no. 2 (1977) :129-30; A . Boretskii, "Namibia : podderzhka spravedlivoi bor'by," MZ, no . 6 (1978) :127-28; Glushchenko (note 90, p . 116) ; A . Gromyko, "XXVI S'ezd KPSS i zadachisovetskoi afrikanistiki," NAIA, no . 4 (1981) : 6 .

93.

E. Troitskii, "Sotsial'nye problemy afrikanskikh gosudarstv" (review), MZ, no. 4(1978) : 134; S . Sergeev, "Stanovlenie novoi Efiopii," MZ, no . 4 (1979) : 13-14.

94.

R . Ul'ianovskii, "Aktual'nye problemy natsional'no- osvoboditel'nogo dvizhenia isotsialisticheskoi orientatsii," NAIA, no. 6 (1986): 6, 10; V. Iordanskii ,"Tropicheskaya Afrika : dinamika natsional'nogo samosoznanie," MEIMO, no. 1(1980) : 113; V. Iordanskii, "Tropicheskaya Afrika : konflikt arkhaiki i'modernizma'," MEIMO, no. 3 (1982): 108-9, in which the strength of traditionalis min the villages is described as a reaction to progress ; A . Silanin, "U karty mira :Benin," MZ, no. 10 (1979) : 153 ; I . Volkova, "Afrikanskie problemy," MZ, no. 12(1982) : 134 .

95.

On this point, see Academician Tikhvinskii's criticism of Soviet historiography for it sinattention to subjective factors such as religion, in "Nekotorye voprosy rabot ysovetskikh istorikov," Voprosy Istorii, no . 12 (1986) : 6 .

96.

Mirskii (note 4, p . 71). See also Mikhail Kapitsa's (Chairman of the Sovie tAfro-Asian Solidarity Committee) remarks on the significance of traditional factors(as opposed to class) in defining individual identity in the developing countries, i n"Developing countries and today's world," Asia and Africa Today, no. 2 (1990): 6 .

62

97.

As one analyst put it :

All attempts to block private sector activities will not bring success, fo rthey will simultaneously block the development of productive forces,conducing to the stagnation of society .

G . Krylova, "Natsional'no-demokraticheskaya revolyutsia v svete novog opoliticheskogo myshlenia," NAIA, no. 1 (1989) : 53 .

98.

N. Kosukhin and I . Belikov, "Kommunisticheskoe dvizhenie v Afrike," Azia i AfrikaSegodnya, no. 5 (1988) : 6 .

99.

Yu . Osipov and Yu Cherkasov, "Sotsial'no-ekonomicheskie problemy i perspektiv yrazvitia Afriki," MEIMO, no . 8 (1985) : 68-69; Ul'ianovskii (note 94, p. 11) ; V .Sakharov, "Socialist orientation in word and deed," Asia and Africa Today, no. 3(1990) : 4 .

100. See Iordanskii (note 13) .

101. See the discussion of the Nigerian military in E . Pribytovsky, "Nigeria v periodvoennykh rezhimov," NAIA, no . 6 (1980) : passim .

102. Mel'nikov (note 72, pp . 58-61); E . Mel'nikov, "Formirovanie gosudarstvennog oapparata v afrikanskikh stranakh sotsialisticheskoi orientatsii," NAIA, no . 3 (1982) :19-20 .

103. This concern was evident as early as 1980 . See Yu . Gavrilov, "Problemyformirovania avangardnoi partii v stranakh sotsialisticheskoi orientatsii," NAIA, no. 6(1980): 12, 14, 15, and passim.

104. Osipov and Cherkasov (note 99, p . 69) ; V. Korochantsev, "Demokraticheskay aRespublika Madagaskar -- po puti sotsial'nogo progressa," MEIMO, no. 8 (1985) : 87 .

105. N. Gavrilov," Afrika menyaet litso," MZ, no . 6 (1980) : 35 ; R . Ul'ianovskii (note 94 ,p. 5) .

106. For example, G . Fokeev, "Vneshnepoliticheskie problemy sovremennoi Afriki, "(review) MZ, no. 7 (1982): 148 ; V. Vasil'ev, "Nekotorye voprosy sotsialisticheskoiorientatsii," NAIA, no. 5 (1986) : 17-18 ; Ul'ianovskii (note 94, pp . 10-11) .

107.

Ul'ianovskii (note 94, p . 12) ; Kosukhin and Belikov (note 98, p . 7) .

108. S . Kulik, "Zimbabve na novom puti," MZ, no. 3 (1982): 128-29.

63

109. F . Voloshin, "Istoricheskie zavoevania afrikanskikh narodov" (review), MZ, no . 6(1980) : 137 .

110. Osipov and Cherkasov (note 99, p. 69). See also Boris Asoyan's articles i nLiteraturnaya Gazeta (7 November 1987) and (6 July 1988) ; and Kapitsa (note 96, p .5) .

111. In a discussion of alternative strategies for development in early 1984, for example ,Aleksandrovskaya fails to mention socialist orientation . L. Aleksandrovskaya, "Sovietpo razvitiu ekonomicheskikh i sotsial'nykh issledovanii v Afrike," NAIA, no . 1(1984) : 111-16 .

112. Mirskii (note 4, p. 71) . Mirskii's criticism focuses specifically on Soviet scholarshi pof the late 1950s but the discussion which follows suggests his belief that it is onl yrecently that this Eurocentric approach has lost its strength in Soviet scholarship . Seealso Asoyan (note 110) . Georgii Kim, at one time the Director of the Institu tVostokovedenia ANSSSR also took up the theme of Eurocentrism in 1989, noting tha tthe Soviet analysts' efforts "to prove that the East obeyed the general laws o fhistorical development elaborated by Marx and Engels upon a study of European lifefirst and foremost" resulted in the underestimation or the ignoring of distinctiv efeatures of Oriental history, and basic discrepancies between theory and reality . SeeG . Kim, "Soviet oriental studies in a time of perestroika," Asia and Africa Today, no .1 (1989) : 3 .

113. I . Zevelev and A. Kara-Murza, "The destiny of socialism and the Afro-Asian world, "Asia and Africa Today, no . 3 (1989) : 4. There remains some debate about the utilityof the concept of socialist orientation nonetheless. In 1989, for example, a writer i nNAIA noted that although criticism of the dogmatic excesses of socialist orientedregimes was appropriate, denying the possibility of socialist orientation was excessive .See Yu. Potemkin, "Afrika: razlichie orientirov i obshchnost' problem . 0 sotsial'no-ekonomicheskoi politike v stranakh al'ternativnykh orientatsii," NAIA, no. 4 (1989) :27-28 .

114. Viz . Iordanskii's attribution of a significant causal role in the Chad conflict to Frenc hand American intervention in "Vnutrennie i vneshnie prichiny konflikta v Chade, "MEIMO, no. 3 (1984) : 121-22 .

115. G . Gal'perin and V. Sharaev, "Stoikost' efiopiskoi revolyutsii," MZ, no . 9 (1985) :28 . See also G . Krylova, "Revolution: outstanding questions," Asia and Africa Today,no. 2 (1989) : 69 .

116. The Manchester Guardian (25 March 1988), and The Los Angeles Times (12 August1988) . As noted in chapter 4, this was followed in early 1991 by a formal meetin gbetween Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and Jonas Savimbi .

64

117. V. Goncharov, Work in Progress, no. 48 (July 1987) : 7 .

118. In Narody Azii and Afriki's discussion of the second Soviet- African conference hel din 1986, there was simply no mention of armed struggle in the section dealing withtactics of the liberation movement in Southern Africa . See Yu . Ilin, "Vtorayasovetsko-afrikanskaya konferentsia 'za mir, sotrudnichestvo, i sotsial'nyi progress, "NAIA, no . 1 (1987) : 123-24, 130. In a series of articles appearing in Kommunis tduring 1986, Nzo and Kobelev similarly avoided the question of violence . A . Nzo(General Secretary of the South African Communist Party), "Istochnik vdokhnoveni av bor'be za svobodu," Kommunist, no. 6 (1986) : 80-81 ; E. Kobelev, "Kharare :krupnyi uspekh dvizhenia neprisoedinenie," Kommunist, no . 16 (1986) : 108-10.Earlier the statement that violence was an unfortunate necessity was de rigueur i nanalyses of this type. More recently, some Soviet scholars have gone so far as t oargue in print that the time has come to wind up the armed struggle . See, for

example, V. Tikhomirov, as quoted in the Johannesburg Star (23 November 1989) .Although the ANC has itself come to this position recently, there is evidence tha tSoviet pressure on this point in 1988 and 1989 created significant tension between th eSACP and elements of the ANC on the one hand and the Soviets on the other .

119. On this point, see Joe Slovo (General Secretary of the South African Communis tParty), "Krizis aparteida neobratim," Kommunist, no . 5 (1987) : 114 .

120. G . Starushenko, "Problems of struggle against racism, apartheid, and colonialism i nSouth Africa" (Moscow : Africa Institute, 1986), 7-11 . That Starushenko's ideas werecontroversial in Soviet circles at the time he presented them is clear from Ilin' ssummary of his paper (note 118), which ignores all of the original interpretatio n

contained in it . See also Goncharov (note 117, pp. 5-7) ; V. Rasnitsyn, "Rezhimaparteida v osade," MZ, no . 9 (1985) : 100; A . Pokrovskii, "Rezhim aparteida i eg oimperialisticheskie pokroviteil," MZ, no . 8 (1986): 100-1 .

121. B . Asoyan, "Glavari aparteida manevriruet," MZ, no . 10 (1984) : 120; Starushenko(note 120, p . 11) .

122. B . Asoyan, Literaturnaya Gazeta (15 July 1987) . This has been confirmed in th eSoviet view by the accession of President De Klerk and the initiation of negotiation sbetween the government and the ANC .

123.

Slovo (note 119, p . 114) .

124. Kobelev (note 118, pp . 108-10) ; V . Shubin, "Rezhim aparteida -- parametry krizisa, "MEIMO, no . 12 (1985) : 63 ; L. Salgus, "Mezhdunarodnaya konferentsia poaparteidu," MZ„ no 1 (1984) : 158-59; Starushenko (note 120, p . 7) .

125.

Slovo (note 119, p . 114) ; Starushenko (note 120, p . 7) .

65

126. Starushenko (note 120, pp . 12-13) . The fact that this statement was made at aconference with significant participation by ANC representatives suggests that th eSoviets desired to get this message across to their local ally . It should be noted tha tlater Viktor Goncharov stressed that Starushenko was speaking as an individual an dthat his remarks could not be taken as an expression of the policy of the Soviet state(Goncharov, note 117, p . 6). Nonetheless, it remains the case that Soviet purpose swere served by allowing the message to get across that "some people" were thinkin gin these terms, whether or not this was a reflection of the official view .

127. Goncharov (note 117, pp . 6-7) .

128. For the emergence of tensions between the Soviets and their friends in South Africa ,see Africa Confidential 30, no . 7 : 3 ; The Washington Times (31 July 1990) ; AfricaConfidential 31, no. 1 (12 January 1990) : 1, 4 .

129. This passage is cited in "Communist Congress unveils new strategy," The Mancheste rGuardian (19 July 1989) .

130. Joe Slovo, as interviewed in "We belong to one family," World Marxist Review 32 ,no . 5 (May 1989): 7, 8 .

131. Gromyko (note 92, pp . 8-9) .

132. Vasil'ev (note 106, pp . 19, 20) notes the previous Soviet underestimation of th esignificance of backwardness as an impediment to economic development, contra, forexample, Gromyko (note 33, pp . 104-5), who implied that backwardness was a nadvantage. See also Osipov and Cherkasov (note 99, pp . 55-56, 69) ; G . Smirnov ,"Osobennosti vosproizvodstvennykh protsessov v osvobodivshikhsya stranakh Afriki, "MEIMO, no. 7 (1986): 125-132 (where the problem of dependency is treated i ngeneric terms without distinction between states of socialist and capitalist orientation) ;V . Alekseev, "Mozambik stroit novuyu zhizn'," MZ, no . 9 (1979) : 84-85 ; K.Kremen', "Sovetsko-afrikanskaya konferentsia," MZ, no. 12 (1981) : 151, citing amember of the FRELIMO Central Committee, S . Vieira .

133. Osipov and Cherkasov, (note 99, p . 56) . A related point was recently made to me inconversation by a leading Soviet Africanist . He noted that he and his colleagues ha dcome to realize that the real question was not whether states of socialist (or for tha tmatter capitalist) orientation could be built in Africa, but whether viable states of an ysort could be constructed in the African environment .

134. Gavrilov (note 105, p . 34). The possibility of reversibility was recognized by som efrom the beginning of the period under consideration in this chapter . See, for

66

example, V. Kastsman and V. Pavlova, "Tendentsia razvitia stran sotsialisticheskoiorientatsii v Afrike," MZ, no . 4 (1976) : 215 . But comment on the question o freversibility became much more widespread and open with the passage of time .

135. G . Rubinshtein, "Problemy i trudnosti naibolee otstalykh stran," MEIMO, no. 8(1977) : 128-29 ; Osipov and Cherkasov (note 99, pp . 55-56) ; V. Goncharov ,"Ekonomicheskie problemy stran Afriki," MZ, no . 7 (1986) : 55 ; A. Grigoryants, " Ukarty mira: Benin," MZ, no. 10 (1986) : 151-52. Again, one sees a pattern whereisolated expression of an idea gradually evolves into generalized opinion .

136. E. Kovalev and I . Svanidze, "Prodovol'stvennaya problema v Afrike," MEIMO, no. 5(1986) : 138 . This notion has in turn come under criticism, as the Soviets discover themerits of low-intensity traditional patterns of agriculture in feeding rural population sand in sustaining the environment (Conversations in Moscow, January 1990) .

137. Kosukhin and Belikov (note 98, p . 9) .

138. P. Koshelev, "Sovetsko-afrikanskoe ekonomicheskoe sotrudnichestvo v 80-k hgodakh," MZ, no. 9 (1986) : 42-52 ; T. Kravtsova, "U karty mira : Zimbabve," MZ,no . 9 (1986) : 153 . This tendency diminished with the passage of time .

139. See Vasil'ev (note 106, pp. 21-22) .

140. Grigoryants (note 135, p . 152) . It was perhaps for reasons such as these that Beninbecame the first state of socialist orientation in Africa explicitly to abandon "scientifi csocialism . "

141. See the article by Koshelev, Deputy Chairman of the USSR State Committee onInternational Economic Ties (note 138, p . 43) .

142. For example, G . Polyakov, "What shall we buy in Africa?," International Affairs, no .10 (1989) : 68-71 ; Sakharov (note 99, p . 4) . In a recent article, E . Tarabrin lumpedthe USSR with the Western powers in a discussion of the inappropriateness an ddistortive quality of foreign assistance . See E. Tarabrin, "In the grip ofcontradictions", Asia and Africa Today, no. 3 (1990) : 9 .

143. This is particularly true, given continuing skepticism about the option of individual o rcollective self-reliance as a strategy for development . See L. Goncharov, "Afrika vbor'be za novyi mezhdunarodnyi ekonomicheskii proyadok," MEIMO, no . 6 (1982) :52-54 ; and Osipov and Cherkasov (note 99, pp . 61-68) .

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144. Viz . Goncharov (note 135, pp . 56-58) ; A. Vasiliev, "Kriticheskoe ekonomickesko epolozhenie v Afrike: kto vinovat?", Kommunist, no . 13 (1986) : 98-99, 101 ; T .Timofeyev, "Capitalist contradictions and the developing countries," Asia and AfricaToday, no. 2 (1989) : 10-11 .

145. Kosukhin and Belikov (note 98, p . 8) . The last remark suggests that the authors fel tsome necessity to address directly the proposition that an alternative world economi csystem could be centered around the USSR. See also Vasil'ev (note 106, pp . 20-21) ;Kapitsa (note 96, p . 5) ; and Tarabrin (note 142, pp . 9-10) . The contrast betwee nTimofeyev's (note 144) and Tarabrin's treatment of the causes of Africa's economi ccrisis and of the role of international capital is particularly striking . Given thecloseness with which Tarabrin's previous analyses tracked with official doctrine, hi sconversion may suggest a similar development in official thinking on this issue .

146. Tarabrin (note 142, p . 10) . See also Yu . Fedorov, "U karty mira : Kot d'Ivuar," MZ ,no. 8 (1986) : 151-52 .

147. A . Gromyko, "Opyt i perspektivy issledovania problem Afriki," NAIA, no. 1 (1985) :7 . Compare this with his statement of 1981 (note 12, p . 182) to the effect that : "thenet result of investment activity [by the MNCs] was to siphon off resources to th erich capitalist countries .

148. G. Starushenko, in "Obshchee i osobennoe v razvitii stran Afriki," NAIA, no . 2(1980) : 104, provides an early example of the proposition that the states of socialis torientation had to proceed through a long stage of capitalist development . Mirski inoted in 1987 that there was now less evidence than twenty-five years ago that th enewly developing countries were shifting to the noncapitalist path . G. Mirskii ,"Newly independent states : ways of development," Asia and Africa Today, no . 5(1987) : 53 .

149. I . Andreev, "Afrika : sotsial'no-klassovye sdvigi," Kommunist, no. 18 (1982) : 93-94 .Kosukhin and Belikov (note 98, p . 7) . This position harkens back to the discussion o fthe "national bourgeoisie" during the late 1950s .

150. See Fedorov (note 146) on the Ivory Coast . Such judgments are now recognized t ohave been premature, given the near collapse of the Ivoirean and Kenyan economies .

151. In 1978, in contrast to previous remarks concerning the waning of imperialism' sposition in the region, Alimov (note 41, p . 109) noted that imperialism was onceagain a growing threat to African independence and revolution, the lessons o fVietnam having been forgotten . Given the timing, one can assume that this switch i sin response to the Shaba events . See also V. Smirnov, "Dvizhenie solidarnosti : forum

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v Addis Ababe," MZ, no . 11 (1978) : 124 ; Mikhin (note 46, p. 117) ; A . Gromyko ,

"Polozhenie na Yuge Afriki : diplomatia zapada," MZ, no. 2 (1979) : 14 ; A . Gromyko,

"SShA : glavnaya sila neokolonializma v Afrike," MZ, no. 19 (1980) : 29 ; and Borisov

(note 86, p. 82) .

152. Viz. L. Entin, "Problemy Afriki v trudakh sovetskikh uchennykh" (review), MZ, no .

5 (1979): 137 . One suspects from this article as a whole, however, that the autho rholds the opposite view, with this optimism being a pro forma conclusion . In othersections of the article, Entin notes the importance of local factors in accounting forthe sociopolitical development of African states, and lauds the economic experience o fthe Nigerian mixed economy and Soviet ties therewith . Both of these, it has alreadybeen argued, are departures from traditional Brezhnevian positions .

153. A . Gromyko, "Afrika segodnya," Kommunist, no . 3 (1982) : 88 ; A. Urnov, "ZagovorVashingtona i Pretorii protiv Angoly," MZ, no . 3 (1986) : 78-80 ; V . Vasil'kov ,"Imperskaya politika SShA v deistvii," MZ, no . 5 (1986) : 76 ; V. Vigand and M .Kuznetsova, "Dva podkhoda k problemam razvitia Afriki," MZ, no. 2 (1987) : 88.

154. Compare L . Fituni, "Problemy Afriki v krivom zerkale burzhuaznoi propagandy, "MZ, no. 11 (1984) : 120-22 .

155. Andreev (note 149, p . 93) ; Ya. Etinger, "Organizatsia afrikanskogo edinstva :aktual'nye problemy," NAIA, no . 6 (1983): 14, lays the principal blame for conflic ton differences in sociopolitical orientation between African states . See also V . L'vov ,"Voennaya politika Frantsii v Afrike," MZ, no. 5 (1987) : 159 .

156. See E. Tarabrin, "Kto meshaet miru v Afrike," Kommunist, no . 18 (1984) : 89-90.

157. See Goncharov (note 117, p . 4) .

158. See the discussion of the abortive Tripoli Conference in E. Tarabrin ,"Ekspantsionisticheskaya politika SShA v Afrike," MZ, no . 9 (1983) : 44 ; Tarabrin(note 156, pp . 84-85) . For an early expression of reservations about the capacities o fthe OAU along similar lines, see Madzoyevskii (note 27, p . 18) .

159. Bochkarev and Starushenko (note 66, p . 127) ; Mel'nikov (note 72, p . 61) ; Ivanov(note 27, p . 86) ; Yu . Gavrilov, "Razgoryaetsya plamya bor'by protiv aparteida," MZ ,no . 4 (1986) : 116; Goncharov (note 117, p . 60) .

160. Alimov (note 40, p . 115) ; Borisov (note 86, p . 84) .

161. As in the case of Mozambique -- see N . Kaburov, "Zagovor protiv prifrontivykhgosudarstv," KVS, no. 12 (1987) : 83 . The considerable increase in Soviet assistanc eto Angola from 1985 to 1989 provides empirical evidence of this willingness .

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162. V . Goncharov, "Ekonomicheskie problemy stran Afriki," MZ, no . 7 (1986) : 63 ;Koshelev (note 138, p . 43) .

163. "Mezhdunarodnyi kongress po efiopskim issledovaniem," MZ, no . 10 (1986) : 170. Ayear earlier, another author noted that the problem of Western Sahara could be solve donly by peaceful means . V . Evgen'ev, "U karty mira : Zapadnaya Sakhara, MZ, no. 3(1985) : 158 .

164. For example, Kudryavtsev (note 5, p . 38) ; R . Vasiliev, "Zair : neokolonialisticheskayaugroza Afrike," MZ, no. 7 (1978): 134 ; Vorob'ev (note 22, pp. 33, 40) .

165. Mabida (note 82, p . 105) ; Bochkarev and Starushenko (note 66, pp . 127-28 ; Tarabrin(note 156, pp . 90-91) ; A . Ivanov, "Afrika v protivoborstve s imperializmom irasizmom," KVS, no . 4 (1984) : 83-84 ; Yu. Sumbantyan, "Rubezhi bor'by i sozidania :k 10-letiyu natsional'no-demokraticheskoi revolyutsii v Efiopii," KVS, no. 16 (1984) :84; E . Tarabrin, (note 158, pp . 41, 43, 48-49) ; Tarabrin (note 83, pp . 26-28, 31-35) ;Iordanskii (note 114, pp . 121-22) . Iordanskii does note, however (p . 122), a certai ndistance between French and American objectives in the region .

166. T . Tutova, "SShA i YuAR : voprosy dvustoronnykh otnoshenii," NAIA, no. 3 (1985) :6-8; A . Urnov, "Yuzhnoafrikanskii uzel," ME/MO, no . 5 (1984) : 118-21 .

167. A . Urnov, "Al'yans Vashington -- Pretoria i Afrika," MEIMO, no . 3 (1982) : 50, 53 ,55 ; S . Pomerantsev, "Angola : zashchishchaya zavoevania revolyutsii," MZ, no . 3(1984) : 146 .

168. Kaburov (note 161, p. 80) . B . Asoyan, "Afrikanskie ambitsii neokolonizatorov," MZ,no. 6 (1985) : 81 ; A . Vasiliev, "Kriticheskoe Ekonomicheskoe Polozhenie V Afrike :Kto Vinovat?", Kommunist, no . 13 (1986) : 101 .

169. Madzoyevskii (note 27, pp . 13-15) . See also A . Gromyko, "Manevry neokolonializmana Yuge Afriki," MZ, no . 11 (1977) : 97 .

170. (note 61, pp. 35-36) . Shubin does note, however, that these are merely tacticaldifferences .

171. V. Shubin, "Rezhim aparteida -- parametry krizisa," ME/MO, no. 12 (1985) : 63-64.

172. On the limited character of Soviet and American interests in the region and in Sout hAfrica specifically, see Goncharov (note 117, p . 4) .

173. A . Kolosovskii, "Regional'nye konflikty i global'naya bezopasnost'," MEIMO, no . 6(1988): 32 .

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174. V . Dashichev, Literaturnaya Gazeta (18 May 1988) .

175. Mikhail Gorbachev, "Political report of the CPSU Central Committee," Pravda (26February 1986), as translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service -- Sovie t

Union (26 February 1986) : 32 . See also account of Gorbachev's speech on Chissan o

visit in Pravda (4 August 1987): 2 .

176. P. Cherkasov, "Frantsia i konflikty na afrikanskom kontinente," MEIMO, no. 8(1987) : 51-52 . He also notes a degree of tension between France and the UnitedStates over the Namibian issue, as well as French unhappiness with playing secon dfiddle to the United States in efforts to achieve a regional settlement in Souther nAfrica . Cherkasov's initial comment suggests some dispute on the significance an dnature of the French role in Africa, and indeed, it is not difficult to find examples o f

more traditional and simplistic analysis at the time he was writing . See L'vov (note155, pp . 156-58) . On tensions between French and American policy on Chad, se ealso note 164 .

177. Limited Soviet comment on Japan suggests a similar recognition of independence o f

action on the part of that power . A 1982 article in MZ attributed to Japan all of th eusual capitalist motives for involvement in Africa, but failed to associate Japanes epolicy with American concerns or with a broader shared Western perspective on th einternational relations of Africa . S . Modenov, "Yaponskoe vtorzhenie v Afrike," MZ,

no . 11 (1982) : 142-43 .

178. Ilin's summary of a paper by T .L. Deich on China and South Africa (note 118, p .131) . The obscurity of this citation suggests that at that time, the issue was rather

sensitive . Nonetheless, it is illustrative of the trend .

179. "Panafrikanistskii Kongress Azanii : Proshloe i budushchee," NAIA, no . 2 (1986) :

21-30 .

180. There was a similar diminution in Soviet comment on the behavior of Israel in Afric ain the mid-1980s. The previous amplitude of criticism of that country's ties wit hSouth Africa and action as a proxy of the United States in the attempt to penetrat eindependent African states largely disappeared in those journals previously particularl yexercised by Israel's role in the region's affairs (e .g ., MZ) . What comment there wa srecognized important independent Israeli motivations for its activities, rather tha nmerely associating Israel with the United States . Viz . V . Golubev, "Izrail'skoeproniknovenie v Afriku," MZ, no . 11 (1983) : 63-65 .

181. Bochkarev and Starushenko (note 66, p . 127) ; Kaburov (note 161, pp. 80-81) .Kaburov notes in this context "close interaction with Washington ." This formula ,

unlike previous ones, does not suggest subordination .

7 1

182. Valentinov's explanation of the Nkomati and Lusaka Accords, where Valentinov wa sone such instance . He argued that the accords were the result in part of Sout hAfrica's unwillingness to continue to bear the brunt of US efforts to destabilize th estates of socialist orientation in Southern Africa . B. Valentinov, "Za kulisam imanevrov YuAR : SShA na Yuge Afriki," MZ, no . 7 (1984) : 124-25 . This was ,however, contested by others who suggested that the accords were evidence of Sout hAfrican strength and aggressiveness which were largely sustained by the UnitedStates . B . Asoyan, "Al'yans imperializma i aparteida," MZ, no. 8 (1984) : 115-16 .

183. See A. Bovin, Izvestiia (31 December 1988) . As Philip Nel notes, however, th eSoviet government considered such ideas "premature ." See P. Nel, "The changin gcontent of Soviet policy towards Southern Africa," Berichte des Bundesinstituts furostwissenschaftliche und internationale studien, no . 16 (1990) : 43 . Soviet scholarsfrequently stress the desirability of ties with South Africa in conversation, but notealso that fundamental reform in that country is a precondition for a significan texpansion of relations . See Nel's discussion of the expansion of these contacts (pp .41-43) .

184. For example, the visit of Neil van Heerden, the Director General of the South AfricanMinistry of Foreign Affairs to the USSR in the summer of 1990, and the visit of a nofficial Soviet delegation to South Africa in November of 1990 . W . Kuhne, Africaand the end of the Cold War: the need for "new realism" (Ebenhausen, FRG : StiftungWissenschaft und Politik, Forschungsinstitut fur Internationale Politik und Sicherheit ,1990), p . 10 .

185. See The Financial Mail (3 August 1990) . Interviews with Soviet Africanists sugges tconsiderable awareness of the benefits of a substantial expansion in the Soviet-SouthAfrican trading relationship . Not least, trade with South Africa in tropical fruit would ,to some extent, compensate for the erosion of the relationship with Cuba . There i salso evidence of some expansion of cultural ties -- more frequent visits of Sovie tacademics (e.g., Appolon Davidson, Irma Filatova, and Vladimir Tikhomirov) ,journalistic visits expanding, and the Moscow Circus touring South Africa .

186. On the cyclical paradigm, see Frank Fukuyama, "Patterns of Soviet Third Worl dPolicy," Problems of Communism 36, no . 5 (September-October 1987) : 1-13 .

187. Not surprisingly, this point was forcefully made by Soviet Africanists when calle dupon to explain the direction of Soviet policy in southern Africa by a group o fscholars and activists from the region at a recent conference in Nyanga, Zimbabwe .

188. Two pertinent examples are Ivan Ivanov, who moved from IMEMO to th eDepartment of International Economic Organizations of the Foreign Ministry and then

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on to the First Deputy Chairmanship of the State Committee on Foreign Economi cTies, and Evgenii Primakov, who also moved from IMEMO to an advisory role t oGorbachev in the realm of foreign policy . See G . Breslauer, "All Gorbachev's Men, "The National Interest, no . 12 (1988) : 97-98 .