PETRONAS CARIGALI PRE-ACTIVITY SAFETY REVIEW (PASR) … · PETRONAS CARIGALI SDN BHD Preliminary Page viii MCB Motor Circuit Breaker MOC Management of Change MOD Module MOL Main Oil

WW All S 04 010 Rev. 1, Dec 2010

Philosophy of Lifesaving Appliances for Offshore Installations

PETRONAS CARIGALI

PRE-ACTIVITY SAFETY REVIEW

(PASR) GUIDELINE

PETRONAS CARIGALI SDN BHD

Pre-Activity Safety Review WW ALL S 04 010 Main Table of Contents Rev. 1, Dec 2010

PETRONAS CARIGALI SDN BHD Main Table of Contents

Page i

PRE-ACTIVITY SAFETY REVIEW

Main Table of Contents

Preliminary

Foreword

Distribution List

Amendment Summary

Preface

Glossary of Abbreviations and Acronyms

Reference Documents

Section 1 Introduction

Section 2 PASR Process

Section 3 Process-Related Activities

Appendices Appendix 1 Sample of Samarang Process-Related Activity Procedures

Appendix 2 Sample Checklist of Tembungo Integrated Shutdown Sequence

Appendix 3 Sample of Checklist of Tembungo Integrated Startup Sequence

Appendix 4 Sample of SMG-A Cooler Spading & Isolation List

Appendix 5 Sample of TBG Integrated Plan on Paper (iPOP)

Appendix 6 Sample of Pre-Shutdown Safety Review Checklist

Appendix 7 Sample of Pre-Startup Safety Review Checklist

Appendix 8 Full Pre-Startup Safety Review Checklist

Appendix 9 Sample of Appointment Letter for PASR Team Leader

Appendix 10 PASR Log

Appendix 11 PASR Phase 2 Form

Pre-Activity Safety Review WW ALL S 04 010 Preliminary Rev. 1, Dec 2010

PETRONAS CARIGALI SDN BHD Preliminary

Page iii

DISTRIBUTION LIST

Copy No. Title Location

01 CEO DPS MD-KL

02

02

02

CEO XS MD-KL

03 XMAS XD - KL

04 XSK XD - KL

05 XSB XD - KL

06 XPM XD - KL

07 XINT XD - KL

08 XAFR XD - KL

09 XATL XD - KL

10 XSEAN XD - KL

11 XSEAS XD - KL

12 XMEA XD - KL

13 XTS XD - KL

14 XGO XD - KL

15 XBD XD - KL

16 XPL XD - KL

17 XHSE XD-KL

18 DGM DD - KL

19 DDR DD - KL

20 DFE DD - KL

21 DDW DD - KL

22 DPP DD - KL

23 DRMB DD - KL

24 DDP DD - KL

25 DHSE DD - KL

26 FIN MD - KL

27 CHSE MD - KL

28 HRM MD - KL

29 PED MD - KL

30 RM MD- KL



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31 SCM-CAA MD – KL

32 SP MD – KL

33 TIM MD – KL

34 PI (CHO) MD – KL

35 MO MO

36 MO (HSE) MO

37 VO VO

38 VO (HSE) VO

39 INO INO

40 INO (HSE) INO

41 MAU MAU

42 MAU (HSE) MAU

43 UO UO

44 UO (HSE) UO

45 PAK PAK

46 PAK (HSE) PAK

47 TO TO

48 TO (HSE) TO

49 IRQ IRQ

50 IRQ (HSE) IRQ

51 PM (CHO) MD-KL

52 PMO PMO

53 PMO (HSE) PMO

54 SBO SBO

55 SBO (HSE) SBO

56 SKO SKO

57 SKO (HSE) SKO



Page v

AMENDMENT SUMMARY

This sheet must be completed in detail at each revision once this document has been

approved.

Details must include revision number, description and indication of which pages and

paragraphs have been revised, date of revision approval, approvers title and signature.

Rev Description Date Approver Title Signature

1 Inclusion of PASR Phase 2 in Section 2 Dec 2010

Notes:

(1) Document Holders to update Amendment record as and when amendments/ new

revision are received.

(2) For description of amendment the Document Holder should indicate correction,

modification, updates or deletion issue.

(3) Document Holder to enter their company reference number, sign and date the

record entry.

(4) Where part amendments are issued, the relevant page(s) will be identified with a

lower case letter in the revision line in the header.



Page vi

PREFACE

This Pre-Activity Safety Review (PASR) Guideline has been developed to ensure that all planned activities associated with process safety during drilling, facilities commissioning, production operations and maintenance, and facilities decommissioning are thoroughly reviewed prior to commencement to prevent adverse HSE consequences. The guideline is based on, or reference is made to relevant PETRONAS Technical Standards, and in line with PETRONAS Carigali’s HSEMS requirement. This document outlines the preparation requirement for process safety management to ensure the risks associated with the process have been reduced to ALARP level. This document only addresses process-related activities. It does not address the review requirement for non-process related activities. For non-process HSE critical activities, similar review/ risk assessment is required to ensure safe execution of activities. This manual shall be revised from time to time as required to ensure that any changes are documented and that any process safety related issues are correctly addressed. Any proposed amendment for continuous improvement from the users should be brought to the attention of Custodian by completing the standard revision request form. A copy of the standard revision request form is contained in PETRONAS Carigali Document Management Procedures (Document no. MY ALL A 05 002).



Page vii

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

The abbreviations and acronyms used in this document shall have the following meaning:

ABV Actuated Ball Valve

AGV Actuated Gate Valve

ALARP As Low As Reasonably Practicable

ASD Assembly Shutdown

BC Battery Charger

BDV Blowdown Valve

CCR Central Control Room

COTP Crude Oil Transfer Pump

ESD Emergency Shutdown

FTHP Flow Tubing Head Pressure

GPA General Public Alarm

HAZOP Hazards Operability

HEMP Hazards and Effects Management Process

HHP High High Pressure

HP High Pressure

HSE Health, Safety and Environment

HSEMS Health, Safety and Environmental Management System

ICR Instrument Control Room

iPOCS Integrated Plant Operations Capabilities System

JHA Job Hazard Assessment

LCV Level Control Valve

LIC Level Indicating Controller

LOTO Lock-Out-Tag-Out

LP Low Pressure

LPS Low Pressure Switch

LSL Level Switch Low



Page viii

MCB Motor Circuit Breaker

MOC Management of Change

MOD Module

MOL Main Oil Line

NSD Non-Shutdown

NTD Next Test Date

OIM Offshore Installation Manager

OPM Operations Procedure Manual

OS Operation Supervisor

PASR Pre-Activity Safety Review

PCSB PETRONAS Carigali Sdn Bhd

PCV Pressure Control Valve

PETRONAS Petroleum Nasional

PHA Process Hazard Assessment

PL Pipeline

PLC Programmable Logic Controller

PM Preventive Maintenance

PMCS Plant Monitoring Control System

PPP Pipeline Protection Panel

PRAP Process-Related Activity Procedures

PSD Process Shutdown

PSHL Pressure Switch High Low

PSL Pressure Switch Low

ROV Remote Operating Valve

RV Relief Valve

SCSSV Sub-Surface Safety Valve

SD Shutdown

SDS Shutdown Switch

SITHP Shut In Tubing Head Pressure



Page ix

SOS Senior Operation Supervisor

SSV Surface Safety Valve

TMM Topside Maintenance Management

UPS Uninterrupted Power Supply



Page x

REFERENCE DOCUMENTS

Doc. No. Title

PTS 60.0101 Health, Safety & Environment Management System Manual

PTS 60.0109 Production and Maintenance Guideline

PTS 60.0401 Hazards and Effects Management Process (HEMP)

PTS 60.2001 PETRONAS Group Guidelines for Permit to Work System

PTS 60.2201 Management of Change (MOC)

PTS 60.2203 Process Safety Information (PSI)

PTS 60.2204 Process Hazard Analysis (PHA)

PTS 60.2205 Operating Procedure (OP) Guideline

PTS 60.2208 Pre-Activity Safety Review (PASR) Guideline

WW ALL S 07 001 PCSB Health, Safety & Environment Management System Manual

Pre-Activity Safety Review WW ALL S 04 010 Introduction Rev. 1, Dec 2010

PETRONAS CARIGALI SDN BHD SECTION 1

Page 1

SECTION 1

INTRODUCTION

Contents Paragraph Page No.

1 INTRODUCTION 2

2 PURPOSE 2

3 SCOPE 3



Page 2

1 INTRODUCTION

This pre-activity safety review (PASR) guideline has been developed to provide guidelines to the PASR team, who are assigned by the facility owner to carry out safety review on the processes at the work site before commencement of planned process-related activities.

All personnel who are involved in PASR must ensure that they are familiar with the requirements and procedures contained in this guideline.

2 PURPOSE

This guideline establishes requirements to conduct a safety review of processes to ensure safe implementation of planned activities. The risks associated with the planned activities shall be thoroughly assessed and the readiness shall be properly reviewed before the commencement of the activities, so as to produce its intended benefits without adverse side effects. The objectives of this guideline are:

(1) Outline the requirements to carry out PASR.

(2) Define selection criteria, roles and responsibilities of PASR team members, to ensure the effectiveness of safety review through proper assessment of process-related risks associated of planned activities.

(3) Provide a coherent, systematic and as simple strategy as possible for all end users to ensure that all prior identified hazards and loss exposures associated with a planned activity’s implementation have been addressed to close-out before commencement of the planned activity.

(4) Ensure the development of detailed activity procedure/ checklists for the process-related activities.



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3 SCOPE

PASR is required for the following process safety related activities. It includes, but not limited to:

(1) All process-related changes i.e. equipment change,

operating parameter change, etc.

(2) Pre-commissioning and commissioning of production facilities and equipment;

(3) Planned shutdown of production facilities and equipment;

(4) Start-up of production facilities;

(5) Maintenance of equipment requiring process isolation;

(6) Simultaneous production and drilling operations;

(7) Simultaneous production and construction;

(8) Simultaneous production and major maintenance; and

(9) Decommissioning of production facilities and equipment.

Details criteria for each of the process-related activities that require PASR is further elaborated in Section 3 of this document. This guideline will be reviewed when any of the following occurs, but not limited to:

(1) Applicable regulations are introduced or revised.

(2) Further improvement required.

(3) Introduce new technology.

All changes made in the PASR guideline shall be approved by the approving authority. The complete guideline shall be distributed to all relevant parties.

Pre-Activity Safety Review WW ALL S 04 010

PASR Process Rev. 1, Dec 2010


Page 1

SECTION 2

PASR PROCESS

Contents

Paragraph Page No.

1 PASR PROCESS FLOW 2

1.1 PASR Process Overview 2

1.2 Acceptance Criteria 7

1.3 Roles and Responsibilities 8

1.4 PASR Activities 9

1.5 PASR Reporting and Documentation 10

1.6 Outline of Process-Related Activities Procedure (PRAP) 11

1.7 PASR Log 12

1.8 Status Monitoring and Assurance 13




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1 PASR PROCESS FLOW

1.1 PASR Process Overview

To ensure safe execution of the planned activities, PASR

shall be conducted prior to the implementation of the

activities. PASR is divided in two phases, i.e.

(1) Phase 1: Risk assessment on the planned activities using the most appropriate tools e.g. HAZID, HAZOP, SWIFT, etc.

(2) Phase 2: Review / verification exercise using appropriate checklist and / or procedures.

Phase 1

The hazards associated with the planned activities shall be

assessed in accordance to the following guidelines:

(1) Line manager (project manager, field manager, drilling manager) is responsible to identify the need for the conduct of PASR.

(2) Line manager to appoint a competent team leader and team members.

(3) Carry out PASR Phase 1 in accordance to this guideline. The review shall identify the required steps/ tasks in executing the process-related activity e.g. shutdown and/or start-up, as well as the required HSE controls to ensure risks associated with the process-related activities are ALARP.

(4) Depending on the nature and complexity of the process-related activity, the appropriate type of tool must be chosen. Example of tools to be used for PASR Phase 1 may include: (a) HAZOP / Mini HAZOP

(b) HAZID

(c) Bowtie

(d) Structured What-if Technique (SWIFT)

(e) Customizes Checklist




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(5) In addition, where process-related activities requiring

the conduct of PASR Phase 1 is intended to be carried out simultaneously with another concurrent activities (e.g. concurrently with construction, maintenance, drilling, etc), the PASR Phase 1 assessment shall be extended to incorporate the risks attributed to the simultaneous activities. The sample assessment of concurrent maintenance activities for a planned shutdown is as illustrated in Appendix 5.

(6) Recommendations resulted from PASR Phase 1 to strengthen the control and recovery barriers shall be incorporated in the relevant documents i.e. the associated procedures.

(7) The deliverable of the PASR Phase 1 is a Process-Related Activity Procedures including checklists to ensure safe execution of the planned activity; for example Samarang-A Shutdown Procedures, Baronia-B Startup Procedures, Dulang-C Commissioning Procedures.

(8) This Process-Related Activity Procedures shall become part of the documentation as required per PETRONAS Integrated Plant Operations Capabilities System’s (iPOCS) Turn Around Management Guideline.

(9) Line manager to approve and implement the Process-Related Activity Procedure including relevant checklists, if any.

(10) All related documents must be kept for 7 years as per HSEMS requirement by the line department.

Phase 2 For ensuring all the identified control and recovery barriers are being implemented as well to confirm operational readiness to commence the planned activities, a review or verification exercise shall be conducted in accordance to the following guidelines: (1) Line manager to appoint a competent team leader

and team members for the verification exercise.

(2) Initiate PASR Phase 2 using PASR Form as shown in Appendix 11.




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(3) In ensuring most of the relevant information has been

deliberated and assessed, a checklist can be used to guide the team as well to record the findings. Sample checklist for shutdown and start-up are as illustrated in Appendix 6 and Appendix 7 respectively.

(4) In addition, for new or modified facility-type review, the use of a standard commissioning checklist may usually suffice. The sample is as given in Appendix 8.

(5) The planned process-related activity shall not proceed if the results from the verification exercise are not acceptable by the Management and/or the project team. Alternative or corrective actions shall be identified and the subject shall be reviewed again until satisfactory. However, some portions of the planned activities could probably commence upon Management’s endorsement.

(6) Recommendations from the verification exercise shall be recorded and shall be closed prior commencement of the planned activities (subject to priority).

(7) All related documents must be kept for 7 years as per HSEMS requirement by the line department.




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Figure 2.1: PASR Phase 1 Process Flowchart

No

Yes

Is the activity

Process-related?

Appoint PASR Team Leader and Members by

line manager.

Conduct PASR Phase 1 i.e. risk assessment

for the planned activity

Develop Process-Related Activity Procedures

including checklists

START

Is it a HSE critical

activity?

No Proceed with the

planned activity

Conduct risk assessment

review on the activity. *

Is the Process-Related

Activity Procedures

approved by

management?

Yes

No

Proceed with the planned

activity.

Yes

Implement all the required control and

recovery measures to ensure safe

execution of the planned activity

* In line with the respective governing guideline.




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Figure 2.2: PASR Phase 2 Process Flowchart

START

Proceed with the planned activity.

Conduct PASR Phase 2 i.e. verification

exercise using appropriate checklist

Record PASR findings and follow up on

results

Are results from

PASR Phase 2

acceptable?

* Conditions to close the findings/ commencing the activity shall be in line with item 1.2

Appoint PASR Team Leader and Members

by line manager.

Do not proceed with the planned activity, identify

alternative/ corrective actions and review again

until satisfactory.

Note: Some portions of the planned activities

could probably commence upon Management’s

endorsement.

Yes

No

Close-out all findings from PASR

Phase 2 exercise*




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1.2 Acceptance Criteria

Findings from PASR Phase 2 need to be prioritised based on the risk and practicality e.g. cost impact, prior execution of the planned process-related activities. For guidance in prioritising, PETRONAS Carigali Risk Assessment Matrix shall be used. The prioritisation of findings is essential in order to formally approve commencement of the process-related activity(ies), particularly in situations where PASR findings and action items are still outstanding. For situations where the planned process-related activity needs to commence prior closure of all the findings and action items, the execution shall be formally approved by appropriate level of authority based on the level of priority as outlined in the table below:

Level of Priority

Conditions to be met Approving Authority

High Activity shall not be allowed to proceed until they are rectified

-

Medium

Activity may proceed, subject to closure of findings/ action items within 2 weeks after commencement

Field Manager

Low

Activity may proceed, subject to closure of findings/ action items within 1 month after commencement

OIM

1.3 Roles and Responsibilities

Line Manager Line manager is the overall responsible person to organize, coordinate and execute the implementation of PASR in a safe and cost effective manner. The Line Manager shall also be responsible and accountable for the management and closure of all findings and actions items arising from PASR activities. PASR Team Leader PASR team leader is a competent operation personnel, who is appointed by Line Manager (e.g. Offshore Installation Manager). His duty is to carry out PASR




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together with his team members prior to the execution of process-related activities. PASR members PASR team member is appointed by PASR team leader from among suitably competent personnel from various technical disciplines (e.g. operations, maintenance, reliability engineering, HSE, etc.) PASR Coordinator Each operating Region/ Division shall appoint PASR Coordinators to be responsible to administering PASR process. PASR Coordinator is a critical resource to ensure proper documentation of PASR activity, monitoring, adequacy of risk assessment and close-out documentation. These responsibilities are assigned to an individual within the functional group such as Field Engineer, and it is an addition to his/her normal duties. It is not separate position in the organization. The typical roles and responsibilities for PASR Coordinator as per followings: (1) Identify the process-related activities that require

PASR.

(2) Register the conduct of PASR in PASR Log.

(3) Coordinate PASR sessions both Phase 1 and Phase 2

(4) Maintain necessary information in PASR log, including tracking of action items and PASR closure.

All PASR reports, for both Open and Closed PASR, shall be kept for a period of seven (7) years.

1.4 PASR activities

Process-related activities that are stated in item 1.2 (e.g. major start-up, shutdown, simultaneous operations, commissioning, decommissioning, etc), shall be subject to a Pre-Activity Safety Review (PASR), both Phase 1 and Phase 2. PASR team will conduct the safety review as per following activities:




Page 9

Phase 1 (1) Identify the sequence of tasks required to execute the

process-related activities (e.g. sequence of tasks to execute the plant shutdown/ startup).

(2) Identify hazards associated with these tasks and identify the required HSE controls to ensure risks associated with the process-related activities are ALARP; and incorporate the identified controls in the sequence of task execution.

(3) Document the sequence of tasks as well as the required HSE controls in Process-Related Activity Procedures including all relevant supporting documentation (e.g. risks assessment as carried out in item 2 above).

(4) Where required, all relevant documentation shall be developed e.g. spading list, drawing, etc.

(5) For guidance in developing the Process-Related Activity Procedures sample is attached.

Phase 2 (1) Using an appropriate checklist suitable for the

planned activity, a review or verification exercise shall be conducted in a team (note: the team could either be the same team of PASR Phase 1, or could be a different team).

(2) The checklist shall be developed mainly to verify the implementation of the control and recovery barriers as well as the operational readiness prior commencing the planned activity.

(3) The checklist shall be covering on below categories, but not limited to:

(a) Work planning.

(b) Isolations / normalisation of process lines.

(c) Fire and gas detection and protection systems.

(d) Utilities.

(e) Logistics.

(f) Equipment inspections and testing.




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(g) Emergency response.

(h) etc.

The samples of checklist, depending on the type of planned activity, are as illustrated in Appendix 6, 7 and 8.

(4) The checklists shall serve as a basis for the PASR Phase 2 team to customise their own checklist, taking categories as applicable to the needs of the planned activities, as well as to cover other activities which may not be directly related to the planned activities, but may still deserve to be part of the review scope as they may have the potential to cause adverse HSE effects to the facility.

(5) As part of effective verification process, relevant documentations shall be referred to i.e. P&IDs, procedures, equipment inspection records, etc.

(6) Interview with affected personnel and site check shall also be conducted to confirm the findings.

1.5 PASR Reporting and Documentation

The PASR and Process-Related Activity Procedures shall be reviewed by relevant technical authority and approved by line manager. All HSE controls identified in the Process-Related Activity Procedures shall be implemented prior to the commencement of the activity. The execution of the process-related activities is to be carried out in accordance to the approved Process-Related Activity Procedures. Any deviation shall be managed in accordance to MOC procedure including the requirement to assess risks posed by the change. The Process-Related Activity Procedures including checklists shall be kept for 7 years.

1.6 Outline of Process-Related Activity Procedures (PRAP)

The deliverable of PASR activities would be the Process-Related Activity Procedures (PRAP) and the outline shall cover detail information of the process related activity, the




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affected facilities, the required steps/ tasks in executing the process-related activity as well as the assessment of simultaneous maintenance activities. However, the outline of PRAP depends on the type of process-related activity, and is not limited to the list specified below (sample outline below is for planned shutdown): (1) Title Page. (2) Authorisation Page. (3) Shutdown Work Program

(a) Facilities affected during shutdown.

(b) Platform status.

(c) Operating Medium.

(d) Floating Resources.

(e) Alarms & Shutdown system.

(f) Shutdown HSE Plan.

(4) Shutdown Activities Workscope for each Facility.

(5) Shutdown Procedure.

(6) Flushing Procedure.

(7) Integrated Plan on Paper (iPOP).

(8) Leak Test and Purging Procedure.

(9) Start-up Procedure.

1.7 PASR Log In addition to Process-Related Activity Procedures (PRAP) and PASR Phase 2 report, PASR Coordinator for each Region and Division shall also maintain a master register of all PASRs initiated within PETRONAS Carigali Region and Division. This may be referred to as Pre-Activity Safety Review (PASR) Log. The PASR Log shall include, as a minimum for effective traceability, detailed information covering: (1) A coding or numbering system for each PASR.




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(2) A name or title for each PASR; mainly indicating the process-related activity.

(3) A date recording the initiation/ execution and completion of each PASR.

(4) Notes or remarks to detail any changes to the initial logging of the PASR activity, status, etc.

(5) Reference to other process e.g. MOC.

Sample of PASR Log is as shown in Appendix 10.

1.8 Status Monitoring and Assurance

In order to help ensure that each Pre-Activity Safety Review system delivers its intended benefits suitably, adequately and effectively, an assurance system is established to serve as mechanisms and procedures to measure, monitor and provide assurance with respect to

performance of PASR implementation. Assurance on PASR should be conducted as part of the overall HSEMS Assurance activity at the facility (as per PTS 60.0102 and PTS 60.0301).

1.8.1 Status Monitoring

The objective of monitoring PASR implementation is to ensure: (1) Findings and action items are properly evaluated and

approved at appropriate levels.

(2) Implementation and close out of PASR are documented by a review of required records: (a) PASR Logs.

(b) Process-related Activity Procedure (PRAP).

(c) PASR Phase 2 checklist.




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1.8.2 Action Tracking

A system shall be established to ensure that all action items are properly monitored and managed to completion. Action tracking as a minimum requires the establishment of a formal system and procedure for: (1) Tracking the status of, and following-up on, identified

corrective and preventive action items arising from PASR activities

(2) Tracking the status of, and following-up on, identified corrective and preventive action items arising from assurance activities and their respective assurance reports.

Pre-Activity Safety Review WW ALL S 04 010 Process-Related Activities Rev. 1, Dec 2010


Page 1

SECTION 3

PROCESS-RELATED ACTIVITIES

Contents

Paragraph Page No.

1 PROCESS-RELATED ACTIVITIES 2

1.1 Process-related Changes 2

1.2 Planned shutdown 2

1.3 Unplanned shutdown 3

1.4 Startup situations 3

1.5 Facilities purging 5



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1 PROCESS-RELATED ACTIVITIES 1.1 Process-related Changes

As part of the Management of Change (MOC), any process-related change shall be subjected to PASR. In complying with MOC system requirements, risk assessments shall be conducted for all change proposals, using an appropriate type of review tool depending on the nature and complexity of the change. Therefore this is in compliance with PASR Phase 1 requirements. PASR Phase 2 shall also be conducted prior execution of the activities and action items shall be tracked to closure as part of PASR Management.

1.2 Planned shutdown

PASR is deemed necessary for major shutdown that fulfils any of below criteria to ensure all the HSE controls are in place, and risks are minimized to ALARP prior to startup:

(1) Shutdown duration is more than 24 hours.

(2) Change of equipment, operating parameters,

chemicals or anything that may affect the process or potential cause of loss of containment.

(3) Mothballing i.e. hazards contained in any equipment.

(4) Involving simultaneous operations i.e. SIPROD.

For shutdowns that do not meet any of the criteria above i.e. unit shutdown (USD), PASR may not be required, provided that the activity does not pose high risk and it is safeguarded by an updated operating procedure. In carrying out the PASR, in particular the development of the Process-Related Activities Procedures for a planned shutdown, the following process-related safeguards are to be considered: (1) Empty sump pile, sump caisson and sump tank.

(2) Perform vent line flushing, if applicable.

(3) Reduce intake and export.

(4) Close in flowing wells.



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(5) Bring down liquid level of vessels, gas compressors

separators to the lowest possible point.

(6) Ramp down all export compressors until idling speed.

(7) Start portable air compressor.

(8) Trigger ESD or initiate shutdown.

(9) Lock out GPA at CCR console.

(10) Perform ESD checklist on all ABV and BDV position as per logic.

(11) Isolation, depressurising, draining and water flushing the lines subject to maintenance or construction work including associated lines up to the first isolation points.

(12) Locking and tagging of isolation valves or spades as per shutdown spading list.

(13) Identify and install barriers for all live lines.

(14) Proceed with shutdown work.

1.3 Unplanned shutdown

PASR is deemed necessary for any unplanned shutdown to ensure all the HSE controls are in place, and risks minimised to ALARP prior to startup. Process-Related Activity Procedures are required for any unplanned shutdown (PSD and ESD) and it can be developed beforehand. The cause of the unplanned shutdown shall be investigated and rectified prior startup.

1.4 Startup situations PASR Phase 1 & 2 shall be conducted for 4 startup situations of offshore and onshore facilities, namely commissioning startup, startup after process shutdown (PSD), startup following emergency shutdown (ESD) with depressurisation, and startup following emergency shutdown (ESD) without depressurization. Additionally, PASR is deemed necessary for startup after shutdowns that fulfill any of the criteria as stated in item 3.2.



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1.4.1 Startup following PSD or ESD (with or without depressurization)

PASR Phase 1 & 2 shall be conducted and Process-Related Activity Procedures shall be developed for any startup following PSD or ESD (with or without depressurisation). The document shall be approved by the Offshore Installation Manager (OIM), with the cause of shutdown investigated and rectified. In certain circumstances, the required Process-Related Activity Procedures can be developed beforehand and incorporated into OPM.

1.4.2 Commissioning startup

Commissioning startup is associated with commissioning of new facilities.

The following requirements among others shall be fulfilled prior to start-up.

(1) All construction works shall be completed with appropriate handover certificates or reports signed off by the platform authority.

(2) All pipework have been hydrotested and drained.

(3) Ensure all positive isolations i.e. spades or blinds installed during the shutdown are removed.

(4) The instrumentation has been calibrated.

(5) All trips and relief valves are in the right setting as per start-up procedure.

(6) Facilities are purged with inert gas to prevent the possible build up of an explosive mixture in the system.

PASR Phase 1 & 2 shall be conducted and Process-Related Activity Procedures shall be developed and incorporate all the controls into Operating Procedures Manual (OPM) for the black startup of the facility.



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1.5 Facilities purging

Purging is important especially for commissioning startup and startup after major maintenance shutdown.

Purging is required to remove the air (oxygen) presence inside the facilities which may possibly cause explosion. Purging shall start from the further upstream point, allowing the inert gas to sweep the air inside the facilities to the furthest possible downstream point. The following procedure should be used as a general guide for purging the facilities: (1) Open the purge connection preferably on the bottom

of the vessel or upstream of the facilities and the valves on top of the vessel or downstream of the facilities preferably the manual depressurisation valves.

(2) All the valves on the level gauges and level switches on vessels and any other instrumentation on vessels or facilities should be in open position during purging.

(3) Close all the drain valves on all vessels.

(4) Start injecting nitrogen into the system at the purge connection or upstream of the facilities. Nitrogen will displace the air in the vessel or facilities and the air together with nitrogen will be evacuated through the other end to the atmosphere or through the manual depressurisation line to the vent system.

(5) Pressurised the system with nitrogen and depressurised slowly to desired pressure as per site-specific purging procedure.

(6) Repeat the pressurisation and depressurisation cycle until the oxygen concentration in the system reduced to between 0% - 7%. Oxygen concentration shall be regularly checked at the purge outlet connection using portable oxygen analyzer.

(7) After purging operation completed, facilities shall be prepared for start-up.

Pre-Activity Safety Review WW ALL S 04 010 Appendices Rev. 1, Dec 2010

PETRONAS CARIGALI SDN BHD APPENDIX 1 Page 1

APPENDIX 1

Contents

Appendix Page No.

1 Sample of Samarang Process-Related Activity Procedures A1-1

2 Sample Checklist of Tembungo Integrated Shutdown

Sequence

A2-1

3 Sample Checklist of Tembungo Integrated Startup

Sequence

A3-1

4 Sample of SMG-A Cooler Spading & Isolation list A4-1

5 Sample of TBG Integrated Plan on Paper (iPOP) A5-1

6 Sample of Pre-Shutdown Safety Review Checklist A6-1

7 Sample of Pre-Startup Safety Review Checklist A7-1

8 Full Pre-Startup Safety Review Checklist A8-1

9 Sample of Appointment Letter for PASR Team Leader A9-1

10 PASR Log A10-1

11 PASR Phase 2 Form A11-1


PETRONAS CARIGALI SDN BHD APPENDIX 1 Page A1-1

Appendix 1 Sample of Process-Related Activity Procedures

SAMARANG INTERGRATED SHUT DOWN AND STARTUP PROCEDURE

PLATFORM : SMG-A /SMP-A/SMDP-A /SMP-B/SMDP-B/ SMP-C /SMJT-D /SMJT-F /SMJT-G /SMJT-E/ SMR-A/ SMK-A

PLAN START : 14-09-2004 to 20-09-2004 Duration : 5 days



AUTHORISATION This guideline contains the arrangements and precautions required for shut down and start up by the ASSET Custodians to ensure the safe execution of the Samarang TMM project, riser repair, pipe line repair, valves change out, hot work activities etc.(refer to the scope of work) By the contractors with work boat assistance. During shut down and start up operation, all activities will be stop for operation to do depressurize or pressurize the systems and make isolations. It also to reduce potential extended time for depressurizes pipeline or vessels. The objective is to ensure all focal point are clear of their function and responsibility and ultimately are able to respond to an emergency in their capabilities and capacity during the period. In the event if there is conflicting statement or uncertainties between this shut down and start up procedure with existing documents and any changes during the actual implementations, the matter is to be revert to the OIM, SOS, OS and operation in charge.

Name Signature Date

Prepared by Yousof Bin Ahmad (Operation Tech)

Reviewed by Boneface Albanus (SOS-Samarang) M Anton Abdullah (SOS-Samarang)

John Masudal (OS-Samarang) Fairuze Yahya (OS-Samarang)

Endorsed by M Johari Amir (OIM-Samarang) A. Thamilrasu (OIM-Samarang)



TABLE OF CONTENTS Paragraph Page No

1 Introduction 4

2 Summary Scope of Work 5

3 Shut Down Guideline For SMG-A 7

4 Shut Down Guideline For SMP-A, SMJT-E & SMJT-G 8

5 Shut Down Guideline For SMP-B 10

6 Shut Down Guideline For SMP-C, SMJT-D & SMJT-F 11

7 Shut Down Guideline For SMR-A 12

8 JHA Attachment 13



1 INTRODUCTION 1.1. SIPCOM WORK PROGRAM

1.2. Platform : -

SM Central: SMQ-A, SMG-A, SMP-A, SMDP-A, SMJT-E, SMJT-G,SMV-AA, SMV-A & SMR-A SM Northern: SMP-B, SMDP-B SM Southern: SMP-C, SMJT-C, SMJT-D, SMJT-F Samarang Kecil

1.3 Platform Status : Shut down/Live during pre and post shut down activities.

1.4 Operating Medium: Instrument air (Central) & Instrument Gas.

1.5 Floating Resources : Rental Work Boat ( MV Sirocco)

1.6 Major Facilities : Facilities that will be maintained live during pre / post shut down job and total shut down during project.

1.7 Alarm and Shutdown System : Platform alarm and shutdown systems are to be functionally tested and accredited functional by OIM. Platform is ready operating using instrument air systems. On remote platform, alternative alarm will be provided by operation and all contraction crew must familiar with the alarm.

1.8 Safety Requirement and Precautions:

Normal hazardous area classification shall govern. The safety requirement and precautionary works shall be implemented as detail in this pre and post shut down procedure.



2. SCOPE OF WORK

2.1 WORKSCOPE SUMMARY AS PER LOCATION

The summary of planned shutdown and pre shut down activities to be carried out for Samarang Platforms by contractors and operation as following:

2.1.1 SMQ-A/SMG-A (1) RV’s rectification by Wehaya (on passing isolation valves)

(2) PM & Punch list clearance for ASD and PMCS. (SD)

(3) LPS-4026 – replace corroded 1” tapping line. (SD)

(4) PCV-3151 & PCV-3152 valve replacement (NSD)

(5) PCV-3430 & PCV-3420 (NSD)

(6) LCV-3060 (NSD)

(7) PLC for SDS to be reset. (SD)

(8) BC3091 readjust voltage. Increase supply voltage. (SD)

(9) Hook-up connection for spare MCB (UPS1/2) - SUMANDAK field project.(SD)

(10) Vent stack obstruction light replace blown bulb and check lamp changer. (SD)

2.2.2 SMV-A (1) Marine lantern check (SD)

(2) NTD check by STS/2

2.2.3 SMP-A (1) PCV-201A replacement (SD)

(2) PCV-2000 replacement (SD)

(3) 3-way valve fuel gas replacement (SD)

(4) 2” condensate line from SMV-AA (SD)-DYG

(5) Header ball valve change out. (SD)



(6) PL-133 inspection & repair.(NSD) Allied Marine (7) PL-132 LP vents line. (NSD) Allied Marine

(8) Receiver door barrel from SMP-C replacement. (SD)

(9) RV’s rectification. (SD) Wehaya

2.2.4 SMDP-A (1) Replace kill knob stand.(SD)

(2) Install extra SR on kill knob line from SANCOP.(SD)

(3) 2” instrument air piping replacement.(SD)-DYG

(4) 1” instrument pipe change out on SR-2A, 2B & 3. (SD)

(5) 4” drain line to sump tank replacement.(SD)-DYG

(6) 4” Blown down line replacement. DYG

(7) Replace blown down valve underneath wellhead area.

(8) Repair corroded grating. DYG

(9) Blow down valve change out – OT

(10) RV’s rectification. (SD) Wehaya Service SD SR.

(11) Gas lift pipe and headers cut and replacement. (SD)

2.2.5 SMP-B (1) PL-139 sectional pipe replacement. (SD) Allied Marine

(2) Riser repair punch list : 10” R6- LP to SMG-A. (NSD) Corroshield

(3) Header ball valves replacement. SM-58L (HP valve), SM50L (All valves) (SD)

(4) 8” LP vent line check valves replacement. (SD)

2.2.6 SMDP-B (1) Header ball valves replacement. (SD) [Sm-60L – LP; 60S-HP; 53S-Test; 64L

– all valves and flow line; 58S-flowline. (2) Replace handrail on chemical tank required hot work. (SD) (3) 2” gas lift replacement. Alab-3 ; SM-51 & SM-65. (SD)



(4) Angle iron support for LCV-301.

2.2.7 SMV-B (1) Marine lantern inspection. (SD)

(2) Vent stack inspection by STS-2.(SD)

2.2.8 SMP-C (1) 8” vent line butterfly valve replacement.(SD)

(2) Install 1 ball valve for water sample on V-300.(SD)

2.2.9 SMJT-C (1) Replace 3/8” parted tubing from PSD-01. (SD)

(2) Service 2” Big Joe regulator for S-1 from HHP.(SD)

(3) Riser repair punch list ; LP ‘B’ to SMP-A. (SD) Corroshield

(4) Replace handrail sockets (Hotwork) SD

2.2.10 SMV-C (1) Marine lantern inspection. (SD)

(2) Vent stack inspection by STS-2.(SD)

2.2.11 SMJT-D (1) Remove 2 pieces check valves on incoming lines SMJT-F.(SD)

(2) Riser repair punch list. (SD) Corroshield

(3) Unblock S1 drain line.(NSD)

(4) 4” Drain ball valves on Receiver R-117 replacement.

(5) Replace 2” x 600# header ball valve for HHP – SD

2.2.12 SMJT-F (1) Remove 2 pieces check valves lines to SMJT-D.(SD)



(2) Unblock S1 drain line.(NSD)

(3) Replace 6” orifice box on main gas lift header (SD)

(4) Replace 2” x 600# header ball valve for HHP – SD

2.2.13 SMJT-G (1) Replace 6” orifice box on gas lift header.(SD)

(2) Replace 2” x 600# header ball valve for HHP - SD

3 Shut Down Guideline For SMG-A

Pre-shutdown task: 14/09/2004 @ 0800 hrs

(1) Run close and open drain pumps to empty the sump pile

(2) Run condensate pump to empty the free water knock out drum on SMV-AA. (task – replace condensate line)

Shut down Guideline: 3.1 Establish proper communication with LGAST, KNDP-A and SMP-A prior to

reduce export to LGAST.

3.2 Ram down HP and LP compressors.

3.3 Run standby diesel generator (G-3670) before shutting down gas turbine generator.

3.4 Bring down vessel level to minimum.

3.5 Wait for SMP-A to initiate ESD by pulling kill knob from SANCOP.

3.6 After ESD trigger, check for vessel pressure and level. If still have pressure trap inside, depressurize the vessel.

3.7 Check for common ABV, ROV, BDV and equipment trip as per logic.

All start-up sequence can be referred in the startup procedure manual

REMINDER!

NO HOT WORK IS ALLOWED DURING FLANGE BREAKING, DEPRESSURIZATION, DRAINING AND LINE FLUSHING.



GAS TEST `TO BE CARRIED OUT PRIOR TO ANY OF THE HOT WORK. 4 Shut Down Guideline For SMP-A/SMDP-A/SMJT-G/SMJT-E

Pre-shutdown task:

(1) Run sump pumps to empty sump pile (SMP-A) and sump tank (SMDP-A) (task – Hot work on SMP-A and replace drain line, blow down line for sump tank at SMDP-A)

(2) Carry out vent line flushing on all line. (SV & HP)

Shutdown Guideline:

4.1 Establish proper communication with SMG-A, CCR, LCOT and KNDP-A prior to reduce intake and export.

4.2 By-pass ASD-01 prior to shut down the station. (for lowering level)

4.3 Ram down HHP compressor until no load or minimum speed.

4.4 Run standby diesel fire water pump.

4.5 Inform KNDP-A to shut down their station.

4.6 Close in flowing wells when the HHP static reach 500psig or minimum pressure. (Last well to close SM9L, 6L, 16S, 17L ; high water cut)

4.7 Bring the HP vessel (V-100A) level to minimum. (task replace PCV-201A)

4.8 The surge vessel (V-300A) level to minimum. (task replace 20” ball valve if valve arrive on time)

4.9 Monitor the pumps and if needed put one export pump on manual during lower down the surge vessel level. At minimum level, stop the pump manually to prevent cavitations.

4.10 Once minimum level is reached, initiate ESD by pulling kill knob at SANCOP module. Monitor the time delay for SANCOP’s kill knob to trigger ESD. If not triggered, instrument personnel to check and rectify the problem.



4.11 After ESD triggered, ensure all rotating equipment are brought to stop and vessels fully depressurized.

4.12 Record all ABVs and BDVs position.

4.13 At SMDP-A, isolate :

(1) 6” main gas lift manual ball valve

(2) 2” individual line gas lift valve

(3) individual valves on the headers to wellheads

(4) gas lift valves on the wellhead

(5) master valves etc.(task – replace main and individual gas lift headers,

valves and piping)

4.14 At SMP-A, close all header ball valves, COTP on off mode, bring up the orifice plate to top position of the orifice box and put tagging of isolation.

4.15 Normalize ASD and PPP panel.

4.16 Proceed to do shutdown jobs.

4.17 SMJT-E and SMJT-G will shutdown when SMP-A ESD.

4.18 Personnel onboard SMJT-G and SMJT-E will carry out shutdown sequence. If the station does not ESD, pull kill knob and check shutdown sequence.

4.19 Close all valves on wellhead.

4.20 At SMJT-G, isolate :

(1) The main gas lift header

(2) Individual gas lift valve

(3) Gas lift valve on the wellhead. (task – replace 6” orifice box )



EQUIPMENT AND PROCESS LINE NEED FLUSHING AND DEPRESSURIZATION

1. Condensate line from SMV-AA to SMP-A – flush and depressurize

2. Drain line to sump tank SMDP-A – flush

3. Drip pan SMP-A – flush and washdown

4. Blow down line SMDP-A – flush

5. LP and Test headers – depressurize and drain

6. Instrument air line SMDP-A –depressurize

7. S-1 – depressurize

8. V-100 PCV-201 - depressurize

9. V-300A – drain (depending on 20” ball valve availability)

10. LP gas line to SMG-A PCV-2000 – depressurize

11. Main and individual gaslift header SMDP-A – depressurize and flush

12. Main gas lift header on SMJT-G - depressurize

All start-up sequence can be referred in the startup procedure manual.

REMINDER!


GAS TEST `TO BE CARRIED OUT PRIOR TO ANY OF THE HOT WORK.



5. Shut Down Guideline For SMP-B/SMDP-B

Pre-shutdown task: (1) Run both sump pumps on SMP/SMDP-B to empty sump pile and tank.

(2) Carry out vent line flushing and rocking LP pipeline.

Shut down Guideline:

5.1 Establish proper communication with SMG-A, CCR, ICR and SMP-A prior do the vent line flushing, rocking and close in well.

5.2 Close in high crude producing wells and let high water cut wells flowing for 3 hours. (SM42S, 51L, 60S, 57S, 66S ; high water cut wells) (task- pipeline sectional cut under water PL-139)

5.3 Manually isolate the LP ABV to SMGA on the cellar deck for pipeline total depressurization. (Corroshield task)

5.4 Inform CCR and SMP-A prior shuting down the station. Pull kill knob.

5.5 Carry out ESD check on all ABV and BDV as per logic. All vessels depressurized.

5.6 Close all flow line valves, wing valves and all header valves SSV as per logic. (task – flow line change out)

5.7 Depressurize the HP, LP and test headers. If required, depressurize HHP header. (Task - ball valves header and flow line change out)

5.8 Normalize all ASD and PPP.

5.9 Proceed with shutdown jobs.



EQUIPMENT AND PROCESS LINE NEED FLUSHING AND DEPRESSURIZATION

(1) HP, LP and Test headers at SMP-B & SMDP-B – depressurize and drain.

(2) Vent lines – depressurize on upstream.

(3) Main and individual gas lift header SMDP-B - depressurize

All start-up sequence can be referring in the manual startup procedure.

REMINDER!



5. Shut Down Guideline For SMP-C/SMJT-C/SMJT-D/SMJT-F

Pre-shutdown task:

(1) Run both sump pumps on SMP/SMJT-C to empty sump pile.

(2) Carried out vent line flushing and rocking LP pipelines.

Shut down Guideline:

5.1 Establish proper communication with SMG-A, CCR, ICR and SMP-A prior carryingout vent line flushing, LP line rocking and ESD test. 5.2 By-pass ASD-001, PPP and manually isolate supply to ABV on LP gas

pipelines to SMP-A prior shuting down the station. (Corrosheild and DESB task)

5.3 Inform SMJT-F first to close in all following wells.

5.4 Allow SMJT-D to flow only high water producing wells for 1-2 hours. (31S,41S & 34L)

5.5 Monitor COTP’s pump and bring down the Surge vessel level to minimum.

5.6 Close all wells at SMJT-C wells except SM19S and 85S.



5.7 Pull kill knob from SMJT-C boat landing. (to check functionality)

5.8 Check that LP pipeline to SMP-A is totally depressurized.

5.9 Carry out ESD check on all ABV and BDV position as per logic.

5.10 Isolate all flow line valves.

5.11 Normalize the isolation valves to ABV (LP gas to SMP-A) after depressurization.

5.12 Normalize all ASD and PPP.

5.13 Proceed with shut down job.

SMJT-F

1. Shut down station by pulling kill knob.

2. Close in all wells by isolating flow line valves.

3. Check ABV position, as per logic.

4. Normalize the kill knob.

SMJT-D

1. Close in wells except SM-31S, 41S & 34L. (high water cut)

2. Estimate the wells to flow for 1-2 hours.

3. Contact SMP-C before pulling kill knob after 1-2 hours

4. Check the station status after ESD.

5. Normalize the kill knob before leaving the station.



EQUIPMENT AND PROCESS LINE NEED FLUSHING AND DEPRESSURIZE 1. All LP gas pipeline to SMP-A – depressurize.

2. Vent lines – depressurize upstream.

3. LP pipeline from SMJT-D

REMINDER!



Prepared by : Yousof Ahmad Reviewed by: .......................................... John Masudal Samarang Ops Supv .......................................... M Anton Abdullah Samarang Senior Ops Supv Aproved by: ........................................... Thamilarasu SK Samarang OIM ........................................... M Johari Amir Samarang OIM


PETRONAS CARIGALI SDN BHD Appendix 2 Page A2-1

APPENDIX 2

SAMPLE CHECKLIST OF TEMBUNGO INTEGRATED SHUTDOWN SEQUENCE

TBG Shutdown Sequence (Shutdown Driver: Vessel Cleaning)

23/01/09 @ 0700hrs (Friday)

Time Task Action Party Check

0700 TBG A/B team to empty sump caisson. TBG A/B (HM,MM, AF)

1530 Toolbox meeting with contractors. (Contractor to prepare and submit PTW for next day, checklist preparation) All

Distribute ESD,PASR checklist.

1700 Power Transfer @ TBG A (G-500 to G-510) TBG A Elect/Mech

Ensure C-520 and P-400 is on duty before power transfer. Switch back to C-510 and P-320 after power transfer.

TBG A Elect/Mech

2000 Start lowering down liquid level for LP & HP flare scrubber liquid. Night Shift (SL,NL)

Empty sump pumps MOD 2,Prod Deck Night Shift (SL,NL)

Bypass V-200 and V-150 LSL and PSL. Night Shift (SL,NL)

TBG A start to lower down V-200 and V-150 liquid level. Night Shift (SL,NL)

Set LIC 5% for V-200 and V-150 Night Shift (SL,NL)

Ensure V-200 and V-150 level reach to the lowest point. Night Shift (SL,NL)

2300 Team depart to TBG B TBG B (AF,AW,NM)

2330 Team ready at TBG B TBG B (AF,AW,NM)

Ensure all systems are ready for shutdown mode. TBG B (AF,AW,NM)

2350 Inform EW CCR on pre-shutdown tasks. Night Shift (SL)

Inform TBG B if everything is ready for ESD activation Night Shift (SL)

24/01/09 @ 0000hrs (Saturday)


0000 To close in high liquid producing wells B8-L & B1-L. (to reduce trunkline pressure from TBG B to TBG A) TBG B (AF,AW,NM)


PETRONAS CARIGALI SDN BHD Appendix 2 Page A2-2

0010 Activate TBG B ESD by kill knob and inform TBG A TBG B (AF,AW,NM)

Go through ESD check list. TBG B (AF,AW,NM)

Manually close flow line and wing valve for all wells and start TBG B system depressurization. TBG B (AF,AW,NM)

Normalize S-315 gas scrubber by nitrogen to open up SDV-2501 and monitor trunkline pressure to 0 psi.

TBG B (AF,AW,NM)

After trunkline pressure reach the lowest point inform TBG A. TBG B (AF,AW,NM)

0015 CCR panelman to activate ESD by killknob before LSL-200 reach the setpoint. CCR (SL,IBT,HM)

Inform EW CCR on shutdown activation confirmation. CCR (SL)

Go through ESD check list. Night Shift (SL,NL)

0030 Manually close flow line and wing valve for all wells. Night Shift (SL,NL)

0040 Tour check at site to ensure all pressure and level reached the lowest point. Night Shift (SL,NL)

0100 Stop Mol Pump P-140 when V-150 level reach 0% on LIC reading. Night Shift (SL,NL)

Manually drain V-200 and V-290 to caisson Night Shift (SL,NL)

Pump up skimmer pile. Night Shift (SL,NL)

Line up SDV-155 and SDV-165 Night Shift (SL,NL)

Restart P-140 to reduce V-150 level. Night Shift (SL,NL)

Prepare for LOTO All

Wait for complete depressurization Process

0200 TBG B team depart back to TBG A TBG B (AF,AW,NM)

0400 Extinguish flare (purge with nitrogen) Night Shift (SL,NL)

0430 LOTO on P-120,P-130,P-140,P-100 and complete check on ALL isolations.

Elect/Process (NJT,SL)

0600 Toolbox meeting (PTW, checklist preparation) All

0615 Handover to shutdown project teams All

0730 Team depart to TBG B TBG B (AS,MM)


PETRONAS CARIGALI SDN BHD APPENDIX 3

Page A3-1

APPENDIX 3

SAMPLE CHECKLIST OF TEMBUNGO INTEGRATED STARTUP SEQUENCE

TBG Start-Up Sequence

TBG A Start-Up Sequence


Ensure all the purging for vessel have been done Process

Tour check to identify isolation, spading removal of all associated line (refer to checklist) Process

Inform EWPA before start up CCR

Perform the following system check : Process

a. Portable air compressor is online and supply enough pressure for instrumentation.

b. L-160 & R-170 total shutdown switch on bypass

c. Gas compressor on bypass

d. Wellhead control panel on bypass

e. SDV 155 & SDV 165 opened

f. SDV-200 & SDV-290 opened

g. Header valve to production separator opened

h. Ensure that all natural producing well’s choke beans are set to the lowest size

i. Ensure all AGV for flowing wells are in open position

j. Ensure the blowdown valve in close position

Inform TBG B operation to start up station (go through TBG B start up sequence) Process

Pressure up all hydraulic supply to ScSSV. Open the master valve and then the SSV Process

Open the wing valve very slowly until the SITHP gradually falls equal to the FTHP. Process

Start the MOL pump when V-150 level reach 40 to 50 %. Electrical

Start the chemical injection pump. Process

Monitor V-210 pressure and start up Gas Compressor.(Check the V-210 for fuel gas supply pressure before initiate)

Process/ Mechanical



Page A3-2

Return the flowing panel to normal operation mode : CCR

a. Acknowledge and reset annunciator panel.

b. L-160 & R-170 switch to normal.

c. Gas Compressor bypass on normal

d. Reset flow computer alarms

Ignite flare Process

Tour check again to ensure all normally open valve are in open position and all normally close valve is in close position. All

TBG B Start-Up Sequence


Ensure all spades have been remove by following the checklist. Process

Plug-off SDV-315 exhaust port Process

Bypass 'ESD bypass' button Process

Pull all 'PSD bypass' button & 'PSHL bypass' button at the Autocon module Process

Inject nitrogen to open SDV-315 (instrument gas scrubber) Process

Inform TBG A before opening SDV-2501 (line to TBG A) Process

Open up 1 well to supply enough pressure to instrument gas scrubber. Process

O/up all wells one by one Process

Monitor station until stabilize Process



Page A4-1

APPENDIX 4

SAMPLE OF SMG-A COOLER SPADING AND ISOLATION LIST

SMG-A COOLER SPADING & ISOLATION LIST E-3095 & E-3105

ISOLATION

NO TAG &

DESCRIPTION ISOLATION

DONE DATE OPERATION TECHNICIAN

PROJECT ENGINEER

OPERATION SUPERVISOR REMARKS

1 E-3095 LUBE OIL COOLER’S INLET & OUTLET 4” FLANGES.

(2 UNITS)

20/08/03 Patrick Edwin M Anton

2 E-3105 - GAS COOLER INLET 6” FLANGES

(3 UNITS).


3 E-3105 - GAS COOLER OUTLET 6” FLANGES

(3 UNITS).


4 HOV-3094

SUCTION MANUAL VALVE CLOSED.


5 HOV-3096

DISCHARGE MANUAL VALVE CLOSED


6 PSV-3095

MANUAL VALVE

CLOSED


7 GT-3095 L/OIL TO E-3095 MANUAL VALVE CLOSE

(NEAR GT-3095 SKID)




Page A4-2

DE-ISOLATION

NO TAG &

DESCRIPTION

DE-ISOLATION

DONE DATE

OPERATION TECHNICIAN

PROJECT ENGINEER

OPERATION SUPERVISOR

REMARKS

1 E-3095 LUBE OIL COOLER’S INLET & OUTLET 4” FLANGES.

(2 UNITS)

27/08/03 Patrick Edwin Boneface

2 E-3105 - GAS COOLER INLET 6” FLANGES

(3 UNITS).


3 E-3105 - GAS COOLER OUTLET 6” FLANGES

(3 UNITS).


4 HOV-3094

SUCTION MANUAL VALVE CLOSED.


5 HOV-3096

DISCHARGE MANUAL VALVE CLOSED


6 PSV-3095

MANUAL VALVE

CLOSED


7 GT-3095 L/OIL TO E-3095 MANUAL VALVE CLOSE (NEAR GT-3095 SKID)


Prepared by, Acknowledgement By OIM :

_______________________ ___________________________

Patrick Pterus. M Johari Amir.

Operation Process/Instrument Tech. Platform Superintendent. Date : Date :



Page A5-1

APPENDIX 5

SAMPLE OF TBG INTEGRATED PLAN ON PAPER (iPOP)

V-290 PL Welltest By Pass Line Modification

ACTIVITIES Materials Resources Who’s responsible? Clashes w/ other activities

HSE Issues Correction Action Parties

/Mitigation

PRE – SHUTDOWN ACTIVITIES

Mob Project Materials 25% Tarmazi no no Tarmazi SV

Mob Manpower no yes 100% Tarmazi no no Tarmazi SV

Site Preparation yes yes Tarmazi yes no Tarmazi SV

Odd Bolting no yes Tarmazi yes hand finger injury gloves/ proper tchq Tarmazi SV

SHUTDOWN ACTIVITIES

USD V-290 no yes OPR yes, VC

SD Welltest System no yes E&I / Opr no no

Remove existing spool no yes Tarmazi no spillage, pressure trap canvas, bleed before remove

Tarmazi SV

Blind Off incoming/outgoing line yes yes Tarmazi no spillage Canvas Tarmazi SV

Modify existing line yes yes Tarmazi/Opr yes, Workover Rig Down

HC existance in spool Cleaning before HW Tarmazi SV

RT & HT yes yes RT team/ Tarmazi/Opr

All activities Radiation, High pressure Midnight, barricade, announcement

Tarmazi SV / OPR

Re-instate back line yes yes Tarmazi yes, VC congested area Tarmazi SV

Power up energize system no yes tarmazi no no Tarmazi SV / OPR

POST- SHUTDOWN ACTIVITIES

Touch-up painting yes yes tarmazi yes fume PPE Tamarzi

Flanges greasing yes yes tarmazi yes no

Install U-Bolt & neoprene sheet yes yes tarmazi yes figer injury gloves Tamarzi

Housekeeping no yes tarmazi yes no

Rig down Equipment no yes tarmazi & opr yes ergonomic, heavy lift proper technique Tamarzi/OPR

Demob no yes trmazi no no



Page A6-1

APPENDIX 6

Sample of Pre-Shutdown Safety Review Checklist

No Descriptions Findings Remarks

Yes No N/A

Work planning

1. Work permit is written and obtained prior to commencement of respective activity.

2. Work scope has been discussed and agreed on with operations, contract holder and contractors.

3. Number of personnel carry out respective work is planned and identified, including shift work.

4. No. of pax on platform is planned, closely monitored and comply to PCSB requirement.

5. Coordination meeting is conducted with involvement from all parties; shutdown plan is developed.

6. Weather condition is taken into account prior to commencement of work.

7. Materials/ parts required for shutdown activities are checked and available at site.

8. Inspection and calibration of equipments/ tools is completed (including tools brought in by contractors)

9. Tools and consumables list is available.

10. All portable equipments are inspected and certified prior to site placement.

11. Shutdown procedure (from shutdown to startup), workpack or site-specific procedure is prepared and approved by management.

12. MOC is raised and approved by TA for modification in process or equipment prior to commencement of activity.



Page A6-2

13. Operating manual (OPM), Hazard and Effect Register (HER) and other relevant documents are available at site for quick reference

14. All trainings required for shutdown activities are completed (both PCSB staff and contractors).

15. All outstanding items have been cleared prior to commencement of activity; otherwise management approval must be granted in order to proceed with open items.

16. Site preparations activities have been completed as per shutdown plan, include:

- erection of scaffolding - utilities set-up - hot bolting(if any) - insulation removal - spade placement/marking (spading list) - temporary equipment inspection & certification - preparation of relevant barriers/ safety

signage etc.

17. Locks (LOTO) are available and adequate.

18. Barricades are available and adequate.

19. Safety officer is identified.

20. Identified area fenced for authorized personnel only.

21. Communications means (radio, GPA etc.) is available and functioning.

22. Pre-mobilization briefing has been conducted for all contractors and staff.

Hydrocarbon liquid

1. Area is free of hydrocarbon.

2. Fire blanket is available.

3. Draining/ bleeding route is checked.

4. Adjacent pipework is leak free.

5. Containers, sumps, pits are prepared/ empty.

Hydrocarbon gas

1. Gas detectors and fire detectors are available and functioning.

2. Gas testing equipment is available and functioning.



Page A6-3

Non-hydrocarbon gas under pressure in pipework (test by N2)

1. N2 purging equipment and supply are available and adequate.

2. Warning signage on pressure testing is available and visible.

Bottled gas under pressure

1. Gas bottles are stored at safe area and properly secured with wire rope.

2. Gas bottles are equipped with flashback arresters and check valve.

3. Gas bottles are certified and color-coded.

Diesel

1. Integrity check on diesel tank is done.

2. Diesel tank is earthed.

3. Diesel is sufficient for shutdown duration.

Overhead/ lifting equipment

1. All lifting gears are checked and certified.

2. Actual weight of the load is confirmed.

3. Lifting plan is prepared and discussed with operations & contractors.

4. Load chart of the crane is correct.

5. Crane standing area is firmed and flat.

6. Integrity check is done (using crane inspection checklist).

7. No unnecessary activities in lifting area.

8. Fire extinguishers, fire hose, and firewatcher are ready.

9. All alarm and emergency system of the crane is checked and functioning.

10. Number of personnel in the lifting area is minimized; access is restricted.

11. Clear escape routes are available.

12. Lifting coordinator is identified.

13. Crane operator is trained and qualified.

14. Crane signaler is trained and qualified.



Page A6-4

Equipments with rotating parts

1. Ensure sufficient clearance for machine operation.

2. Moving parts are properly covered with guards.

3. Appropriate tools are ready for machine operation.

4. Ensure air, water and steam hoses are properly secured.

5. Access is restricted to authorized personnel.

Pressure vessels/ tanks/ separators

1. Ensure sump pile, sump tank, sump caisson and drip pan are empty.

2. Ensure liquid level is at lowest possible level.


4. Ensure no hot work in the bleeding area.

5. Area fenced for authorized personnel only, if required.

6. Wind direction is checked. Gas plume is checked and considered safe.

7. Gas detectors are available and functioning at the nearby working area.

8. Fire extinguishers, fire hose, firewatcher are ready.

9. Tanks, vessels or work pieces are properly earthed.

Mechanical isolation

1. Ensure that spades are in right location (refer to startup and shutdown procedure).

2. Spectacle blinds are turned to correct position (refer to startup and shutdown procedure).

3. Valve opening/ closing sequence for shutdown activities are part of shutdown procedure and communicated to relevant personnel.

4. Pipe specifications are as per designed (refer to P&ID).

Instrument settings

1. Pressure safety valve (PSV) or Relieve valve (RV) settings are as per designed (refer to P&ID).

2. Ensure all instruments settings are as per designed (refer to P&ID) :



Page A6-5

PAH/PAHH PAL/PALL LAH/LAHH LAL/LALL TAH/TAHH TAL/TALL

3. Ensure all gauges & transmitters are available as per P&ID and functioning : PG/PT TG/TT LG/LT FT, flowmeter

4. Fire detection and protection equipments are functioning.

Electrical isolation

1. Equipments/ tools are checked for electrical safety.

2. Locks (LOTO) and isolation tags are available and adequate.

3. Personnel are trained and qualified.

Confined space

1. Blower is available and functioning for sufficient ventilation.

2. BA sets/ oxygen feeder are available, adequate and functioning.

3. Fire extinguishers, fire hose, firewatcher are ready. Firewatcher is trained and qualified.

4. No. of personnel working in confined space is planned and trained (including shift work).

5. Portable gas detector is available and functioning.

6. Access and egress are prepared.

7. Sufficient lighting is prepared.

8. Dust mask is available.

9. Proper tools for collecting and cleaning the sludge are available.

10. Temporary de-contamination room is available, if required.

11. Sunshade is available.



Page A6-6

12. Area is fenced and warning sign is installed.

Gamma rays closed source type - radiography

1. Source container is checked for integrity.

2. Area is fenced for authorized personnel only.

3. Dosimeters for radiographers are available and functioning.

4. Max. exposure of gamma ray at the edge of the fence is checked.

5. Proper lead shields are available.

6. Source recovery or emergency tools are available.

7. Warning sign is installed and visible.

8. Radiographers are physically fit and certified.

Arc, gas and electrical welding

1. Proper PPE is available (welding mask, leather gloves, etc).

2. Welding curtain is prepared.

3. Access is restricted.

4. Welders are trained and certified.

5. Welding equipment is available, functioning, and checked for electrical safety.

6. Welding cable is in good condition.

7. Equipments are properly earthed, as required.

8. For gas acetylene welding/ cutting, cylinder tanks must be segregated during welding activities and stored separately.


Person working at height

1. Safety harnesses are available.

2. Scaffolding is erected by trained & certified personnel, and inspected by certified inspector.

3. Barricade the area underneath the scaffold or platform.

4. Adequate means to transport tools and equipment.

Health check for PCSB staff and contractors

1. Ensure all personnel working onboard are physically



Page A6-7

fit to work.

2. Blood and urine test for personnel working on mercury.

3. Drug and alcohol test for personnel working onboard.

Emergency response

1. ERP document is available at site.

2. Staff is familiar with roles and responsibility of ERT and EMT.

3. Staff is familiar with escape routes.

4. Members of DCT are trained and familiar with fire fighting equipments.

5. Staff is familiar with alarm system and aware of the mustering point.

6. Staff is aware of the location of life saving equipments.

Additives

1. For long duration shutdown, ensure that sufficient amount of corrosion inhibitor and biocide are available for the injection to relevant pipelines, if required.

2. For facilities with waxy crude, ensure that sufficient amount of demulsifier is available for injection to relevant pipelines.

Storage area

1. Dedicated storage area for materials and scheduled waste.

2. Chemicals are segregated accordingly.

3. Copy of MSDS is available at storage area.

4. Ensure proper labeling is displayed.



Page A7-1

APPENDIX 7

SAMPLE OF PRE-STARTUP SAFETY REVIEW CHECKLIST

No Descriptions Findings Remarks

Yes No N/A

Work planning

1. All work permits are signed off accordingly.

2. All construction works is completed and appropriate reports signed off by platform authority.

3. No. of pax on platform is planned, closely monitored and comply to PCSB requirement.

4. Coordination meeting is conducted with involvement from all parties; startup plan is developed.

5. Weather condition is taken into account prior to startup.

6. Used materials/ parts are properly segregated and disposed off.

7. Equipments/ tools are returned to store/ warehouse, or brought back by contractors.

8. Tools and consumables list is checked.

9. All portable equipments are checked and removed from site.

10. Startup procedure, workpack or site-specific procedure is prepared and approved by management.

11. Applicable MOC requirement is met.

12. PHA/HAZOP has been performed and recommendations have been resolved or implemented before startup.

13. Operating manual (OPM), Hazard and Effect Register (HER) and other relevant documents are available at site for quick reference



Page A7-2

14. All trainings required for operating the process are completed (both PCSB staff and contractors).

15. All outstanding items have been cleared prior to startup; otherwise management approval must be granted in order to proceed with open items.

16. Site clean-up have been completed as per startup plan, include:

- Dismantle of scaffolding - Removal of utilities - Insulation installed - removal of spade - removal of temporary equipment - removal of relevant barriers/ safety signage

etc.

17. Locks (LOTO) are checked and removed accordingly.

18. Barricades are removed after work completion.

19. Safety officer is on site.

20. Identified area fenced for authorized personnel are removed.

21. Communications means (radio, GPA etc.) is available and functioning.

22. Safety rules or signs, as needed, have been posted.

23. PPE required for new equipment or chemicals are available prior to startup.

24. Tool box meeting is conducted on daily basis to ensure work carried out in a safely manner.

Hydrocarbon liquid

1. Area is free of hydrocarbon.

2. Gas detectors and fire detectors are available as per P&ID.


4. Adjacent pipework is leak free.

5. Equipment is installed as per design specification.

6. Hydro-testing, tightness, and pressure tests have been completed with satisfactory results.



Page A7-3

7. Leak check is performed.

8. Process line is purged with inert or N2 gas.

9. Warning signage on pressure testing is removed.

10. Fire extinguishers and fire hose are available.

11. Fire blanket is available.

Hydrocarbon gas

1. Gas detectors and fire detectors are available as per P&ID.

2. Equipment is installed as per design specification.

3. Hydro-testing, tightness, and pressure tests have been completed with satisfactory results.

4. Gas testing is completed.

5. Process line is purged with inert or N2 gas.

6. Warning signage on pressure testing is removed.


Bottled gas under pressure

1. Gas bottles are stored at safe area and properly secured with wire rope.

2. Gas bottles are equipped with flashback arresters and check valve.

3. Gas bottles are certified and color-coded.

Diesel

1. Integrity check on diesel tank is done.

2. Diesel tank is earthed.

3. Diesel is sufficient for startup and operation activities.

Overhead/ lifting equipment

1. All lifting gears are checked and certified.

2. Actual weight of the load is confirmed.

3. Lifting plan is prepared and discussed with operations & contractors.

4. Load chart of the crane is correct.

5. Crane standing area is firmed and flat.

6. Integrity check is done (using crane inspection checklist).

7. No unnecessary activities in lifting area.

8. Fire extinguishers, fire hose, and firewatcher are



Page A7-4

ready.

9. All alarm and emergency system of the crane is checked and functioning.

10. Number of personnel in the lifting area is minimized; access is restricted.

11. Clear escape routes are available.

12. Lifting coordinator is identified.

13. Crane operator is trained and qualified.

14. Crane signaler is trained and qualified.

Equipments with rotating parts

1. Ensure sufficient clearance for machine operation.

2. Moving parts are properly covered with guards.

3. Appropriate tools are ready for machine operation.

4. Ensure air, water and steam hoses are properly secured.

5. Critical rotating equipment has been “run-in” to test for operability.

6. Access is restricted to authorized personnel.

Pressure vessels/ tanks/ separators

1. Ensure the manhole is properly boxed-up, secured and all bolts are tighten up as required.

2. Ensure sump pile, sump tank, sump caisson and drip pan are empty.

3. Ensure purging operation is completed.


5. Ensure all valves are open/ close as per operation startup manual. No sign of leak from the valve body or stem.

6. ABV is in good condition and operated as per logic. No instrument air or gas release from the vent port.

7. Upstream or downstream of the unit is checked and confirmed no leakage.

8. Wind direction is checked. Gas plume is checked and considered safe.


10. Tanks and vessels are properly earthed.



Page A7-5

Mechanical isolation

1. Ensure that spades are in right location (refer to startup procedure).

2. Spectacle blinds are turned to correct position (refer to startup procedure).

3. Valve opening/ closing sequence for startup are part of startup procedure and communicated to relevant personnel.

4. Ensure all valves are lined up for startup.

5. Ensure that positive isolations i.e. spades or blinds installed during the shutdown are removed.

6. Pipe specifications are as per designed (refer to P&ID).

Instrument settings

1. Pressure safety valve (PSV) or Relieve valve (RV) are in the right settings (refer to P&ID).

2. Ensure all instruments settings are as per designed (refer to P&ID) : PAH/PAHH PAL/PALL LAH/LAHH LAL/LALL TAH/TAHH TAL/TALL

3. Ensure all gauges & transmitters are available as per P&ID and functioning : PG/PT TG/TT LG/LT FT, flowmeter

4. Instruments, including analyzers have been calibrated, as required.

5. Safety systems, including fire fighting equipment, are in place and have been checked.

6. Control systems, including shutdowns, have been checked.

7. Fire detection and protection equipments are



Page A7-6

functioning.

Electrical isolation

1. Electrical equipments/ tools are checked and kept in safe place.

2. Locks (LOTO) and isolation tags have been removed.

3. De-isolation and energizing is performed by trained and qualified personnel.

Confined space

1. Gas testing is conducted regularly.

2. Vessel inspection and cleaning are completed.

3. Sludge is segregated, and properly disposed off.

4. Access and egress are prepared.


6. Temporary de-containmination room is safely removed, if any.

Emergency response

1. ERP document is available at site.

2. Staff is familiar with roles and responsibility of ERT and EMT.

3. Staff is familiar with escape routes.

4. Members of DCT are trained and familiar with fire fighting equipments.

5. Staff is familiar with alarm system and aware of the mustering point.

6. Staff is aware of the location of life saving equipments.

Storage area

1. Scheduled waste is stored properly in a dedicated area.

2. TENORM waste is stored properly in a dedicated area.

3. Chemicals are kept in drums and stored in a dedicated area.

Copy of MSDS is available at storage area.

5. Ensure proper labeling is displayed.



Page A7-7



APPENDIX 8

PRE-STARTUP SAFETY REVIEW CHECKLIST

Questions Notes and Percentage Compliance Action (Before/After Start-up)

1. Contractor Safety

1.1 What construction work will still be

in progress at time of start-up?

1.2 Will any contractors be allowed to

carry on work during the "startup

period?

1.3 What percent mechanical

completion do you project before

start-up? How much work will have to

be done after start-up? e.g. insulation,

painting, other installation

2. Emergency Planning

2.1 Has a plant emergency procedures

been written and have ALL employees

been trained in the procedure?

2.2* Have all employees participated

in an emergency exercise under the

latest plant plan? When? Review any

significant deficiencies found and

corrective action taken since.

2.3* Is there adequate provision for

emergency egress from

buildings/structures?



Pre-Startup Safety Review Checklist


2.4 Will power failure produces a

hazardous condition? If so, what

protection is provided?

2.5* Are there any key isolating valves

which would need to be shut off in any

emergency situation? Local or remote

operated? Where are they located and

how are they identified?

2.6 What shift manning will be

provided for start-up?

2.7 Other

3. Operations

3.1* Have all new or revised operating

instructions and SOPs been completed?

Have they been reviewed with all

appropriate plant operators and staff?

Documented? Tested? Is the complete

operating manual up to date?

3.2 Are copies of all procedures and

manuals available in the Control

Room?





3.3 Do procedures cover start-u p,

shutdown, emergency shutdown

(various conditions), and normal

operation? e.g. includes loss of utilities,

weather emergency, earthquakes etc.

3.4 Are there procedures covering any

applicable "peripheral" tasks e.g.

sampling, materials handling(drums),

transfers, equipment opening,

emptying dikes or spill containment.

3.5* Have the operator log sheets,

checklists and HSE checklists been

written?

3.6* Are process flow sheets P&IDs and

equipment specifications available in the

Control Room including utility and other

"vendor supplied" units.

3.7 What is the status of operating

discipline program? Have limits been

set all critical?





4. Training

4.1 Review training program which

has been implemented. Is it

complete?

4.2 Who carried out the training?

4.3* How the training been documented

for individual operators? How their

understanding of the training been

tested?

4.4 What training has been done for

day supervisors, shift supervisors,

maintenance supervisors?

5. Government Regulations

5.1 What licenses, permits or

agreements are required by the sites?

Have they been obtained?

5.2 Are there any materials handled on

site that are covered by government

regulations? If so, what chemicals and

what are the requirements under the

government regulations?





5.3 What other government

regulations pertain to the plant site for

safety or environmental or industrial

hygiene or health?

5.4 Is a system in place to be kept

informed of changes in government

requirements?

5.5 Do you have copies of the

existing regulations? Do people have

the necessary knowledge to comply

with these and our permit

requirements?

6. Guarding

6.1* Are all equipment guards

completed and in place? Have they been

included on inspection checklists?

Not observe as equipment, static & rotating, are being installed.

6.2 Are all platform guard-rails,

handrails, safety gates, kick plates

complete? Check for pinch points/sharp

edges/operation of gates?

Not observe as platforms, etc are being installed. Not included in pipework and vessels check list

To include checking of platform, guard rails etc in piping and vessel check list





7. Personal Protective Equipment (Respirators)

7.1 Are any respirators used for

routine, non-routine or emergency

situations? If so, what type?

7.2 Is there a formal method for

approval/selection of respirators?

Who is responsible?

7.3 Is there an inspection, cleaning

and maintenance and storage

program?

7.4 Is there a "beard" and eyeglass

policy for use with respirators?

7.5 Does a training program exist for

correct use and maintenance? What is

frequency? When was it done? By

whom?

7.6 What limitations are placed on

the use?

7.7 If cartridge masks are used, what

is the policy for changing them?

7.8 Who was responsible for setting

the policy?





7.9 Was fit testing conducted prior to

allowing use? Qualitative? Quantitative?

How is it documented?

7.10 Is medical approval required for

use of respirators?

7.11 Are any employees restricted in

their use of respirator protection?

7.12 Are respirators assigned to

individuals?

7.13 If air supplied respirators are

used, what is the source of air? What

protection is in place to ensure that

breathing air is not contaminated?

7.14 Does the respirator program

include contractors? If not the same,

how does it differ?

Protective Equipment/Work Clothes

7.15 Are nuisance dust masks used? In

what service?

7.16 Are there any special uses of

masks on site? Is this special use

documented? E.g. odor control.





7.17 Is protective equipment, such as

glasses, boots and hats provided and

required? What is provided?

7.18 Are work clothes provided? What

is the policy for replacement? Is it worn

off site?

7.19 Are work clothes, protective

equipment laundered? On site or off

site?

7.20 If laundered off site, has the

laundry been checked to ensure no

cross-contamination occurs and

informed of potential hazards?

7.21 Is there a written policy for

selection, use and limitations,

decontamination, maintenance and

storage of protection equipment?

7.22 Who is responsible for selection

of protective clothing? Is data

available to support the selection?

7.23 How is proper maintenance and

storage of protective equipment

assured?

7.24 How is protective equipment

decontaminated?





7.25 Do job procedures and safety

permits specify protective equipment?

7.26 What is the contractor's program?

7.26 Have emergency needs been

identified?

General

7.27 Where are safety showers and

eye baths located? Has this been

reviewed with regard to potential

exposure points, e.g. tank dipping,

truck unloading, filter changes etc?

8. Reactive Chemicals

8.1 Does the project introduce any

increased/new potential for a Reactive

Chemicals incident?

8.2* Has a Reactive Chemicals review

been carried out? By whom?

8.3 Were there any recommendations

from the review? If so, what follow-up

action has been taken?

8.4 Has any new Reactive Chemicals

testing been required? Completed?





8.5 Review controls aimed at

preventing use of incorrect raw

material/acceptance or wrong

material/transfer error.

8.6 Are there any materials or

construction which would present a

Reactive Chemicals hazard in contact

with any of the process materials? How

has the new equipment been screened

to avoid miss-matches of this type?

8.7 Have pumps been checked for

potential to operate "dead-headed"? If

potential exists, is protection needed/

provided?

8.8 Is there potential for energy input

from agitation to cause a Reactive

Chemicals incident? If so, what

protection is provided?





8.9 Has waste handling been

reviewed for reactive chemical

concerns?

9. Electrical

9.1 Review electrical hazard

classifications. Have electric equipment

been installed to this or higher standard?

9.2* Review bonding and grounding of

equipment and structure. Has

bonding/grounding been tested? What

provisions are there for bonding when

loading to or from drums? Has

maintenance testing schedule been

revised to include the new grounding

systems?

9.3 Have all the alarms/interlocks/

relays been set and tested? Has a

program been set up for regular future

testing?





9.4 Review lockout tagout procedures

to be used with the new electrical

equipment. What plant rules apply to

fuse changing?

9.5* Is one-line diagram up to date (as

built) and posted?

9.6 Have electrical drawings been

updated to "as built" status?

9.7 Have electric motors been

meggered, checked for rotation and

lubricated?

10 Instrumentation

10.1 Have limits been set for all

critical control parameters?

10.2* Have "critical instruments" been

identified? Review list and redundancy

provided. Have procedures for regular

testing of critical instruments been

defined and program for future testing

set up?





10.3 Have electronic instruments

been reviewed for vulnerability to

lightning (induced voltage)?

10.4 Are all instruments and

emergency block valves fail safe?

10.5* Are controls/instruments for

"crash shutdown" suitably highlighted?

10.6 Does instrumentation and/or

computer have a non-interruptible

power supply?

10.7* Are logic diagrams available for

computer controlled systems and

interlock systems? Including vendor

supplied items.

10.8 Have all interlocks been

physically checked for correct

operation in all occurrences of

parameter deviation?

10.9* Are all instruments and on-line

analyzers working?





11. Environmental Leak and

Spill

11.1* Review location of gas detectors.

Have procedures been established for

regular testing of detectors?

11.2* Review plant drainage and

location/control of dike drain valves.

11.3 What protection is provided

against overfilling of tanks during

transfer?

11.4 Are there written procedures

covering emergency action for all leaks

or spills?

11.5 Do you have a written program

for environmental management?





11.6 Does this written program include

procedures for : -waste management -

spill control - spill containment -

prevention, detection and Containment

of accidental releases - on and off site

emergency response plan including

response capability - waste and

emission recording and reporting -

audit of site program and performance -

environmental reviews of new facility

design and process and design changes

for existing facilities - environmental

review for introduction of new chemicals

- system to demonstrate compliance

with regulations and guidelines -

employee and community training and

awareness program - energy

conservation

11.7 Are responsibilities and

procedures for waste management

defined?





11.8 Are all treatment and disposal

options identified for wastes and

inventory records maintained?

11.9 Is there a system records of

treatment and disposal kept in

accordance with file retention?

11.10 Are all burnable wastes

incinerated?

11.11 Has your waste management

plan ensured that no liquid or

hazardous wastes being sent to

landfill?

11.12 Are wastes well segregated?

11.13 Have off site facilities been

audited and approved?





11.14 What is the waste storage

system? - labeled with original label (if

used drums) defaced - good containers

compatible with material - spill

containment and leak detection -

segregated used empty drums

11.15 Does your reactive chemical

program cover wastes?

11.16 Has the transport company for

waste been audited and approved?

Monitoring Program

11.17 Do you have a formal

environmental training program for all

employees? Review records and

content.

11.18 Has a monitoring program been

established to meet PETRONAS and

permit requirements? What does it cover

(review) (including noise)?

11.19 Has a baseline study/EIA been

conducted? If so, what were the

recommended monitoring plans?





Technology

11.20 Does the plant comply with all

requirements for Environmental

guidelines for operations? (Review self

checklist and highlight any

discrepancies?) Has "deviation"

approval been obtained from Area VP

for Operations e.g. pumps, vents?

11.21 Are any HLPCs of CFCs used on

site? If so, where?

Containment Drainage

11.22 Are there any below ground

tanks or piping other than clean water

(including gasoline, fuel oil)?

11.23 Are tank farms, storage Areas

(including drums), loading and

unloading areas paved and diked?

11.24 What materials and design

have been used to pave and dike

including pits, valves etc?





11.25 Can spills be contained and

recovered? Small? Large?

11.26 Do procedures and equipment

exist for spill control, containment and

recovery? What is the procedure for

draining dikes, pits, sumps etc?

11.27 Has potential sources for leaks

been identified and consequences

examined e.g. pipe ways?

11.28 Would fire fighting water be

contained in the case of a fire? If not,

where would it go?

11.29 Can drains and sewers be

blocked in the case of a spill?





11.30 Have wall and floor

penetrations through containment

been eliminated or properly sealed?

11.31 Have a number of joints been

minimized and sealed?

11.32 Are drainage systems adequate

to handle worse case flows?

11.33 Are storm water - and

potentially contaminated water

segregated?

12. Pressure Vessels and Pressure

Relief

12.1 Have all pressure vessels been

registered? Regulatory requirement?

12.2 Have baseline thickness

measurements been taken?





12.3 Do all pressure vessels have

safety relief? Do any relief systems

have isolation valves?

12.4 Review conditions used as

design bases for relief capacity.

12.5* Review location of relief

outlets.

12.6 Do multiple relief devices

discharge to a single manifold? If so,

what procedures have been established

for protection of people on removal for

servicing?

12.7* Has piping been reviewed to

identify locations where lines could be

blocked if exposed to heat from the sun

or from heat tracing?





12.8 What is the inspection-frequency

for pressure vessels and relief devices? -

External? Internal? What is the impact

of this on plant operations?

13. Equipment and Piping

13.1* Will the project add any new

glass devices, expansion joints or brittle

equipment? If so, do these have site

registration and authorization? Will the

project eliminate any such devices in

use previously?

13.2* Review any cross-connection

between utility lines and process lines

or equipment.

13.3* Has there been an audit of

construction for completion as per

specification and drawings? (e.g. civil,

structural, electrical etc)

13.4* Review accessibility of operating

valves.

13.5 Has all piping been hydro tested

and flushed?





13.6 Has piping and equipment been

inspected where special materials are

called for? (e.g. stainless or alloy bolts,

spiral wound gaskets, special grease)

13.7* Has complete P&ID check been

done on entire plant? By whom? How

many times?

14. Computers General

14.1 What fire protection is provided?

What materials? e.g. Halo CO2

14.2 Are duplicates of key programs/

records stored in a secure location

external to the plant? E.g. in a fire

proof safe in the Engineering

Department.

14.3 What will happen in the event of a

general power failure? How will the

process be restarted? Does the

computer have the ability to detect loss

of power?

14.4 Is there adequate protection

against over voltage or shorts in

individual circuits?





Process Control Computer

14.5 Who can modify the program?

How is this controlled? Who can make

adjustments to control limits?

14.6 Are alarms classified in priority

categories? Are critical alarms

programmed to repeat at intervals

until the problem cause is corrected?

14.7 What is the manual override

policy and procedures?

14.8* Is there sufficient clearance for

work space with the computer open

back and front?





14.9 Do the operators know what to

do in the event of power failure,

computer failure or alarm conditions?

15. Risk Analysis

15.1* Review F&E Index and MPPD

data.

15.2 Review drainage layout. What

flow rate can be carried?

15.3 Has a Process Hazard Analysis

been carried out for the new plant?

e.g. HAZOPS

15.4 Have existing operational

processes and equipment, not included

in the scope of the new project, been

reviewed for operational compatibility?





16. Fire Protection

16.1* Review location of fire

extinguishers.

16.2* Review testing of deluge systems.

(Deluge systems should have an

acceptance test which follows the

procedure given in a write-up on "Fire

Protection Hydraulics" DCPL S&LP

Manual. The optimum is for the P.A.

Safety Director to witness this test and

in that case it will be desirable to have

run the system prior to the test, to

locate and clear any blocked spray

nozzle. Acceptable alternate would be

to review the test results.)





17. Occupational Health

17.1 Does an industrial hygiene

manual exist? If so, what does it

contain?

17.2 Where are copies kept? Are they

readily available?

17.3 Does the IH manual contain all

required information?

17.4 Has a chemical and Physical Agent

Inventory been established for all job

categories? (Including raw materials,

intermediates, wastes products,

maintenance chemicals etc.)

17.5 Is health and safety information

available on all chemicals listed on

C&PAI (e.g. MSDS, TIME)? Are they

available at all times to employees?

17.6 Is information obtained from

non- PETRONAS suppliers adequate?

Who assesses this information?





17.7 What is the smoking policy?

17.8 What show policy exists? What

facilities are available?

17.9 Are lockers provided for clothes

storage?

17.10 Where is food stored and eaten?

17.11 What are the facilities and

requirements for contractors for

showering, clothes, smoking and

eating?

17.12 Does the site hearing

conservation program comply with

PETRONAS Corporate Guidelines?

17.13 Were audiograms conducted on

new hires for baseline? By whom?

What is the frequency for undertaking

audiometric tests?

17.14 Are any areas expected to

exceed 90 dB? Are signs posted

requiring hearing protection?





17.15 What type of protection is used

(plugs muffs etc.)? Has the protection

been checked to ensure adequate

protection?

17.16 Has training been provided in

potential hazards and correct use and

maintenance of plugs and/or muffs?

17.17 Are there plans to check noise

levels at start-up? How?

17.18 Has ventilation systems

(general, local) been checked to

ensure they meet design

requirements?

17.19* Are air intakes located away

from containment sources?

17.20 If there are multiple hoods on

a system, have they been fitted with

dampers to allow balancing? Has the

balancing been done?





17.21 Have all potential exposure

sources been identified?

17.22 Has all the necessary training

been conducted?

17.23 (Review Records). Has the

training record been reviewed?

17.24 Are any radiation devices

installed monitoring?

17.25 Has a lighting survey been

carried out?

17.26 What monitoring plans do you

have for start-up? Post start-up?





18. Quality Assurance

18.1 Has the quality assurance

program been reviewed in respect of

the new operation?

18.2 Are new raw material

specifications necessary?

18.3 Are new product specifications

necessary? Is it necessary to re-qualify

the plant?

18.4 Has there been preparation for

stringent quality checks on initial

production to monitor new product

composition differences?

19. Maintenance(Assets Protection)

19.1 Does the Maintenance Department

have equipment specs and maintenance

manuals? Have spare parts been

reviewed? Have equipment history files

been commenced?

List of commissioning spares and consumables are available. Only Few spares for vessels at GRT 2 available. Majority has not been delivered. Auditing for availability on site not done. Consumables eg lube oil and hot oil are not on site. Hot oil is expected to be on site 13 Aug 08. Asset register for CMMS for GRT 2 has not been done





19.2 Has a lubrication schedule been

developed and checklist updated? Not available

19.3 Has the PPM program been

established and reviewed? Not develop

19.4 Other issues

19.5 Maintenance update on issues

related to incident 2 Jan 03

19.6 Maintenance update on issues

related to incident on 18 Dec 02





20. Start-up Planning

20.1* Has a complete start-up plan

been prepared?

20.2 Have start-up teams been

established on a regular schedule?

(Supervisors, Tech Center help,

maintenance people, computer people)

20.3 Has line authority been

established in start-up teams?

20.4 Has a maximum daily working span

been set (12-14 hours)? For team

members?

20.5 Have food transportation

arrangements been made for the startup

team?

20.6 Have arrangements been made to

keep out unauthorized visitors?

20.7* Has all construction equipment

been cleared from the plant? Is the

plant housekeeping satisfactory? (All

sheds, welding machines, insulation

storage etc. gone?)





20.8 Will material accounting

procedures be ready for the start-up?

Have feed and product metering,

inventory checks been updated?

20.9 Are plant clerical procedures

organized?

20.10 Operation update on issues

related to incident on

20.11 Operation update on issues

related to incident on





21. Distribution/Transport

21.1 Has a Risk Analysis been

conducted for ALL materials? What was

the recommendation? Have they been

implemented?

21.2 Is a 24 hour emergency response

system in place? Does it follow the

Pacific Area guidelines? If not, what are

the discrepancies and why? What is the

procedure for Marine emergency? Who

has been trained? How has it been

publicized externally?

21.3 What training has been

conducted for the transport

company? Terminal Operator?

Warehouse Operator?

21.4 What discussion has been held

with the emergency responders? Are

they aware of our emergency response

system?





22. PIPING

22.1 Piping subject to thermal expansion

must be sufficiently flexible and supports

adequate to take this into account. Check

if expanding piping, incl. nozzles and

branches, is not installed near

obstructions, support beams etc. When

checking expansion possibility for piping,

take into account insulation, which may

not yet have been installed. (For thermal

expansion take 1 mm per meter length

per 100 C temperatures for C-steel. For

stainless steels take 3 mm/m/

1OOdegC.).

22.2 Check that support in pipe racks

is adequate; for small-bore piping at

least every 3 m.



22.3 Avoid small-bore piping, where

possible. In existing units, remove, or at

least spade, redundant piping. Min. size

process piping size should be DN 40.

Small-bore piping, such as DN 20

sample lines, should be connected to

the process lines via DN 50 weld necks

and the distance between connection

and first block valve minimized.

Reference is made also to DEP 31

.38.01.11, paragraph 2.1 and 3.8. Small-

bore piping should be properly

supported where vibration may be

expected such as on pumps (e.g. PG

manifolds) and sample connections.





22.4 Piping should be able to be flushed

and drained easily. For regular drainage,

possibility for drainage to COC (oily

sewer) should be nearby. Low points in

steam lines to be provided with steam

traps.

22.5 Check/avoid pockets in piping

where liquid could collect during normal

operation and/or where corrosion could

occur. This also applies to e.g. piping in

spray water systems for fire protection

(where non-drained water after use or

testing could corrode internal welds,

where galvanic protection may be

missing). Check also for dead ends.

Minimize or remove. Dead ends of

bypass lines should be self-draining,

where possible.

22.6 Check/avoid screwed connections,

particularly in LPG service or at

temperatures above auto-ignition.

22.7 Thermal relief valves are required in

LPG process piping, if over 500 l. can be

blocked in. Also required in piping

systems over 500 l. in storage areas and

transport lines, which will be regularly

blocked in during normal operation.





22.8 Look for steam rings on

inaccessible piping and equipment

flanges of DN 150 and larger in

hydrogen services above 200°C. To be

considered also for general service

above auto-ignition temperature.

Manifold to be at a safe distance from

the steam rings, some 10 m.

Alternatively, fire walls should be

provided. See also item 24, with respect

to weep holes in steam rings.

22.9 if there is a heat exchanger in a

pump suction line, ensure that the

suction line is self-venting.

22.10 Hot steam lines are to be well-

insulated, where possible danger exists

of auto-ignition of leaking HC's on hot

piping.

22.11 At interconnection of vapor-, and

liquid lines consider the line-up with

regard to possible liquid back flow into

the vapor line, e g. during a compressor

trip.



22.12 Look for pockets in vapour lines

where condensation may occur, in

particular waste gas lines to furnaces. In-

and outlet piping of relief valves and

valves in compressor anti-surge circuits

(kickback system) must be self-draining

away from valves and contain no

pockets. External heating been may be

applied on those pockets which cannot

be avoided.




Questions Notes and Percentage Compliance Action (Before/After Start-up) 22.13 Check whether sampling points

are safe for personnel. Facilities should

be provided for minimum spillage during

sampling, i.e. closed loops or flushing to

slops. Provide sealed, e.g. DOPAK-type,

sample connections for fluids, which

present a health hazard (e.g. with over

5% v. benzene or high concentrations

of n-hexane). Apply 'Strakman'-type

sample valves in hot, viscous service,

instead of sample coolers.

22.14 Flanges should be placed such,

that especially in liquid service during

fire flame impingement on equipment

surfaces, e g. vessels, can be avoided.

Where critical, shielding could be

applied in existing units.

22.15 Vapour lines (incl. steam) should

branch off from the top of main lines.

Small-bore cooling water lines must

also emerge from the top of the main

header.

22.16 Check position of eccentric

reducers. Normally straight side on

bottom of horizontal lines except in

pump suction lines where vapour

pockets may cause cavitations in the

pump.





22.17 Compressor suction lines should

be traced and slope toward knock-out

drum.

22.18 Tracing between isolation valves

of pumps and heat exchanger elements

should be avoided and flushing

connections (FOS/FOR) supplied

instead.

22.19 Where possible, avoid flanges in

LPG service, except where strictly

required for operational or maintenance

reasons.

22.20 Check that anchoring of piping

discharging to atmosphere can

withstand reaction forces.





22.21 Check SB's in rigid piping systems,

where spades could not be placed; also

on equipment nozzles of DN 250 and

larger and in lines of equipment that can

be blocked in with the unit still in

operation. Spacers and spades should be

installed rather than SB's in HP service

(ANS class 900 and higher) below 0°C

and in lines outside the range of

S.38.011 (OEP 31.38.01.11 Para 12).

Spacer rings should also be considered in

hot HP service rather than SB's, for heat

transfer reasons. Spacer rings should be

installed rather than excessively sized

SB's. For sizes of DN 750 or larger, ring

spacers should be placed in the vertical

plane for (easier) handling. In high-

pressure service spades should not be

used at all, since they are generally too

thin.

22.22 In deciding on SB's vs.

conventional spading prior to

maintenance (e.g. pumps) in systems,

where the need for SB's is less clear,

the time required to do the entire

maintenance job should be weighed

against the time needed to turn a SB.





22.23 Ensure SB's or spades can be

turned or placed, when required, i.e.

ensure proper isolation valves placed

with bleed valve to check if SB can be

turned or spade placed. Ensure also

SB's can be turned properly (no

obstructions).

22.24 Check whether weep holes, 6

mm. dia., are present, located directly

downstream header valves in snuffing

steam line manifolds to furnaces, in

steam rings manifolds for hot H2

flanges (see item 8) and in tailpipes of

atm. RV's.

22.25 Check that seal loops in piping are

correctly installed and that facilities are

provided to ensure that the seal is

permanently in place (such as

permanent small water flow to a water

seal, controlled by a restriction orifice in

a supply line to the loop, if there is no

normal water flow through the loop)

22.26 Hot lines under insulation should

not be painted.

22.27 Non-insulated hot lines should

have personnel protection, if accessible

from grade, stairs or walkways.





22.28 Hot piping (>auto-ignition

temps.) should not be laid in culverts,

open to HC spillages.

22.29 Flanges should not be insulated

prior to start-up.

22.30 Check for possible failure of

stainless steel piping by zinc drips from

galvanized structures above piping,

during a fire.

22.31 Check need for fireproofing

critical pipe supports/hangers.

22.32 In fire zones, check fire-proofing

of hydraulic tubing to ROV's - see also

item C15. A min. fire resistance of 15

minutes is normally provided by

stainless steel tubing. Alternatively, C-

steel tubing could be wrapped with

ceramic/mineral fibre material or may

be run through fire-resistant conduits or

may be coated with intumescent paint.

22.33 Pipe racks should be avoided

directly above 'hot' pumps (in service at

or above auto-ignition temperature) or

above pumps in LPG service.



22.34 Supports for valves and

associated piping around hot pumps

(see item 33 above) should be fire-

proofed supports, particularly for

larger-dia piping (i.e. 6" or more).





22.35 Tell-tale vents must be provided in

cold-insulation near (insulated) flanges

for tightness testing during start-up.

Also, if such flanges are used for

spading during shut-down, ensure that

insulation around the flanges is

removable.

22.36 Check insulated equipment for

possibility for rain ingress under the

insulation and for under-lagging

corrosion. Also valid for 'cold'

equipment in humid climates.

23 VALVES

23.1 Apply double valve isolation in

service of piping class ANS 900 and

higher. Inside double block valves of

e.g. pumps and compressors that can

be isolated from the high pressure,

double isolation of vents/drains is no

longer required. Bleed valves in HP

service in general should only be lined

up to flare or closed system.




Questions Notes and Percentage Compliance Action (Before/After Start-up) 23.2 In HP service, ensure isolation

valves can be operated easily, if no

motor-assistance is provided (see item 3

below). Small-size equalization bypass

valves around larger isolation valves

should be provided for this purpose.

23.3 Motor-operated valves (MOV)

should be considered for large valves,

which require regular opening/closure.

This could be above e.g. DN 300 but in

high-pressure service MOV's may be

needed for smaller (e.g. DN 150) valves,

such as discharge isolation valves for

high-pressure pumps

23.4 Isolation valves in small-bore

sample systems should be as close as

possible to the off-take lines.

23.5 Drain valves on equipment and

piping must be capped or blinded if

they are not used during normal

operation.

23.6 For operational drain valves,

see items 25.8-9.

23.7 Check valves may be applied in

continuous drains to closed drain

systems, to prevent back-syphoning.





23.8 Block valves on RV's should

preferably have horizontal spindles to

eliminate accidental valve closure due to

failed gate-spindle connection (modern

gate valves are more robust).

23.9 Block valves are not allowed in

waterlines to safety showers and eye

baths between header and

shower/bath.

23.10 Consider access to valves in

overhead pipe racks.

23.11 Long-stem valves are to be

applied in (possible) cold duty and

should be in vertical position, to

protect the gland and/or the bonnet

from sub-zero conditions.

23.12 Hand-wheels for operational

valves must be easily accessible and

not obstruct walkways.

23.13 For reduced-port valves, check

that piping is self-draining on both

sides of the valves.





23.14 Valves which may be required in

an emergency should be operable from

grade level. Valves that need frequent

attention should be easily accessible.

23.15 Recheck fire resistance (at least

15 minutes) of remote-operated valves,

as per Code BS. 5146. Fire resistance is

also required for appendages, like limit

switches that might prevent the valve

from closing and for the energy supply

system. Air-operated valves are

vulnerable, unless the entire air supply

system is made fire-resistant. An

exception could be made for ROV's in

the suction of those pumps that would

need to be stopped during a fire, in

which case loss of air would cause the

ROV to close, which in turn trips the

pump. See also item B32 on fire-

resistance for hydraulic tubing to ROV's.

23.16 The fail-safe action of ROV's, if

any (double-acting actuators have no

fail-safe position), should be checked.



23.17 It must be checked that the

hydraulic levers of ROV's can be

locked-shut during maintenance on e.g.

pumps. Check that pneumatically

operated ROVs can be opened at the

valve, as well as from a safe location

(see also 28.13).





23.18 Check valves should preferably be

in horizontal line sections and never in

vertical lines with down flow. In upward

vapour lines not recommended either if

liquid could collect on top of the flapper,

when the vapour flow is stopped.

23.19 Check that external flapper shafts

of check valves are properly secured, so

that no leakage to atmosphere can

occur (e.g. by external restraint bar). In

high-risk service use other type check

valve.

23.20 Ensure that check valves between

equipment and its relief valve are fire-

resistant, if they are in the fire zone.

23.21 Hot oil block valves should be

well accessible in view of fire risk.





23.22 Locks on valves should be

minimized to those where valves cannot

be avoided but must remain open /

closed during normal operation. Seal

locks are allowed only on isolation of

thermal relief valves and where the

safety consequences of unauthorized

closure of a valve would not be very

pronounced.

23.23 Welded valves should have

flanged bonnets for maintenance.

23.24 Maintenance access to valves

must not be obstructed by all-welded

steam tracing.

23.25 Check whether lubricants are

allowed in valves in oxygen-enriched

air service.





24 RELIEF VALVES (INCL.

ASSOCIATED PIPING/VALVES)

24.1 Check accessibility of relief- and

de-pressuring valves for maintenance

and inspection.

24.2 Relief valve piping and bypasses

must be self-draining, away from the

relief valves. Inlet piping should

preferably not contain long, say more

than 10 diameters, horizontal sections,

unless these are traced or at the very

least insulated.

24.3 Connections from relief valves are

made on top of the flare header. An

exception may be made for DN 25*25

thermal relief valves which do not need

to be self draining on both sides if the

lines become too long.

24.4 Check if heat tracing is provided to

avoid RV inlet plugging by freezing,

hydrate formation or sublimation.

Provide at least insulation on relatively

long horizontal line sections (longer than

say 10 diameters).



24.5 If relief valve size is determined by

fire, verify the type of insulation, which

was used in calculations. Please note

that PUF is as good as or better than

conventional insulation in providing fire-

resistance.





24.6 Dedicated fire relief valves on

vessels should never be routed to

grade but tied into a closed relief

system.

24.7 In non-vacuum service the space

between a RD and a RV should have a

PA(H) to warn of leaking RD (pinhole).

In vacuum service a PG will suffice. As

an alternative to a PA/PG, the space

between RD and RV could have an

open vent line to flare but this system,

though safe, gives no warning of a

leaking RD.

24.8 Balanced-type RV's should have

open bonnets, venting freely to

atmosphere. Check that bonnet vent

holes are not plugged. These vents

should be tagged for hazardous

materials (e.g. for H2S) and vent holes

should then be provided with instrument

tubing that terminates well above the

RV platform.



24.9 Three-way valves instead of

interlocked valves on relief valves plus

spares should not be allowed, if no

guarantee can be given on total

isolation of any one of the two

positions, needed for removal of a RV

for maintenance.





24.10 Inlet block valves are only allowed

on single relief valves for fire relief only

and if spare relief valves or spare

positions are available. The block

valve(s) of the on-line RV('s) should be

LO. Outlet block valves on RV's and

spare positions should always be LO

(incl. the spare RV or spare position), in

order not to over-pressure the outlet

piping/nozzle in case of a leaking RV.

Check that spare relief valve connections

are open dummies, as per DEP.

24.11 On single relief valves, outlet

block valves (LO) are allowed as long as

there are no inlet block valves. An

exception is made for thermal

expansion valves on equipment that can

easily be isolated and taken out of

operation, like parallel heat exchanger

elements, spare filters or spare

reciprocating compressors. For types of

locks on valves, see section valves, item

23.22.



24.12 With (inter)locking systems,

ensure proper access to these systems

and that interlocking can only be

achieved in the correct sequence. Check

interlock control system, if applicable

(e.g. keys).





24.13 Check presence of ‘tell-tale'

vents between isolation valves and

relief valves (always on inlet side and

on outlet to H25 flare or back to

process).

24.14 In refrigerated service, RD's may

have been placed parallel to RV's, with

30% higher set pressure, for protection

in case of icing (alt.: methanol injection

into RV inlet line).

24.15 Any equipment that directly

affects the capacity of a relief valve,

must be properly tagged in the field

This may include restriction orifices,

check valves and control valves plus

their bypasses. (These must also be

checked regularly). Isolation valves

with small holes drilled in the gates can

serve as thermal relief valves (e.g. in

Cooling Water service); these must

also be properly tagged in the field for

identification (and regular inspection).

24.16 A check valve in a relief route

must be checked to be fire-resistant, if

in the fire zone during fire relief.





24.17 The open end of an RV tail pipe

for flammable HC's should be within the

action radius of fire extinguishing

equipment. If not, a snuffing steam

connection should be provided.

24.18 RV tail pipes to atmosphere

must have a 6 mm dia. weep hole at

the bottom, to drain collected water.

The tail pipe should preferably have

90-degree elbow to prevent rain

ingress (unless calculated reaction

forces prohibit such an elbow).

24.19 Check atm. tail pipes of relief

valves for adequate support against

reaction forces.

24.20 Common atm. vents for a

multitude of RV's should not be applied,

since during maintenance of one of the

RV's personnel may be exposed to

leakage/discharge from the other valves.

24.21 Silencers on atm. relief valves

must be of the non-fouling type.





25 COLUMNS, VESSELS AND

TANKS.

25.1 Check position of drain nozzles.

These should be clear from areas where

heavy equipment such as forklift trucks

may work.

25.2 Drains and vents are to be

provided with valves and blinded or

capped normally.

25.3 Man-ways must be within reach of

hoisting equipment.

25.4 Check possibility for safe entry for

inspection and check availability of

adequate venting facilities (DN 150 or

more).

25.5 Instrument tappings and local

instruments, particularly level gauges,

must be readily accessible, also from

ladders.

25.6 Check if insulation for personnel

protection is provided. Check also

whether any specified fire insulation is

suitable material, hence a hard layer of

intumescent fire insulation material (and

not simple stainless steel sheeting that

covers ordinary insulation material)





25.7 Check if lines can follow vessel

expansion when heating up/cooling

down. Pay special attention to

supports on hot and cold structures.

Check free movement of platforms

25.8 Operational drains to

atmosphere should have two drain

valves, the downstream one being a

spring-loaded quarter-turn ball valve,

in sight of the level gauge and also in

sight of - but at a safe distance from -

the actual drain point. These drains

should be lined up to safe disposal

system by hard-piping or via

tundishes.

25.9 Drainage of liquid LPG

components should be via two

valves, one upstream block valve and

a globe valve, for control. The

distance between the valves should

be min. 600 mm. Thus, if the globe

valve accidentally freezes, the block

valve can still be closed. If freezing

through unattended drainage, even

for a very short time, would cause

severe problems in downstream

systems (e.g. fuel gas), then the

downstream valve should preferably

be a spring-loaded quarter-turn ball

valve.





25.10 Liquid drainage should be done

with min. environmental impact, i.e. to

oily sewer. Those liquids that are

valuable or liquids with a potential

health hazard (e.g. liquids with >5%v

benzene or high concentrations of n-

hexane) should be drained to a closed

collection system, for recovery.

Connections between vessels and closed

drain systems should preferably be open

to atmosphere with sealed drain hubs.

This prevents syphoning flammable

materials back into the vessel. Check

valves may be used, but may not

prevent back-flow.

25.11 For drain lines with seal legs,

ensure that the syphon breaker line

vents to safe location, if gas can be

trapped or accidentally entrained with

the liquid.

25.12 Check if water trapped in

goosenecks can be displaced by

hydrocarbons, i.e. sufficient static head

on the inlet side of the gooseneck.

25.13 No flanges are allowed inside

vessel skirts.

25.14 Check that center-wings of pipes

passing through skirts can move freely.





25.15 Check earthing/bonding.

25.16 Check line-up of emergency de-

pressuring facilities, of ROV's in suction

lines to pumps and of emergency pump-

out systems, where applicable. Check

also fire detection systems (double,

fuseable plastic tubing under air

pressure) and water spray systems on

vessels containing over 4m3 of LPG or

over 10 m3 of HC's above auto-ignition

temperature (generally >220°C).

25.17 Check site procedure for re-

pressuring of cold pressure vessels (e.g.

after de-pressuring LPG), if material is

not suitable for sub-zero °C

temperatures. (Re-pressuring only if

material has warmed up again to

ambient conditions).

25.18 Check presence of level alarm in

open pits for HC drain vessels, to warn

against excessive water collection (rain).

Check also presence of HC detector in

pit to warn against possible build-up of

flammable mixture in the non-ventilated

space. Check electrical equipment in pit

to be suitable for Area Classification

Class 1.





25.19 If nitrogen is used to air-free LPG

storage vessels prior to filling, the utmost

care should be taken during filling, since

during initial filling, especially if carried

out slowly, evaporating LPG can cause

liquid phase temperatures to be well

below those normally assumed for LPG,

since the LPG vapour partial pressure is

then very low. Check procedures at site.

25.20 Tank vents and PV-valves should

be fitted with bird screens.

25.21 PV-valves on fixed-roof tanks

should be installed for more volatile

liquids (if floating-roof tanks are not

specified, such as for gasoline)

26 REACTORS

26.1 Check regeneration connections

are positively isolated from process.

26.2 Check area for suitability of

catalyst handling and safe location of

mobile air compressors, if applicable.



26.3 If a Nitrogen blanket must be

provided on spent catalyst or catalyst

dust drums, ensure that the drum lids

are loose and cannot be clamped shut,

(check if specialized contractors are

used for inert operations/cat, handling)





27 HEAT EXCHANGERS

27.1 Check space for withdrawal of

tube bundles.

27.2 Check, whether piping on the

tube side of heat exchangers can be

removed easily (e.g. by spools) for

dismantling of the tube side for

cleaning or repair.

27.3 Check whether bundles can be

pulled and lowered safely from

platforms and stacked arrangements.

27.4 Check stacked heat exchangers

for the possibility of oil spills on hot

equipment underneath it, especially

during maintenance work.



27.5 Check position/availability and

operability of SB's and the possibility

for draining/venting heat exch.

elements. Each stack of heat

exchangers should have one drain-

and one vent valve. min DN 40,

preferably DN 50, on shell- and tube

side piping. (For drainage to closed

systems see item 25.10).





27.6 Vertical floating head heat

exchangers must have drain valves at

the lowest points in the shells,

especially if hot oil is the medium and

at start-up water has been used for

flushing (also in LPG service on tube

side and steam on shell side, where

residual water could freeze upon de-

pressuring of LPG). For vertical floating

head heat exchangers a separate vent

may be located on the shell for

degassing, if this is not possible via

the vent on the piping.

27.7 Utility connections and drains

should be located correctly, i.e. short

distance from block valves, drains at

low points.

27.8 Check if thermal expansion valves

(TEV) are installed on the colder side, if

this can be blocked in. On LNG/Natural

Gas heat exchangers, a TEV is thus

required on the LNG (cold) side. Check

air cooler bundles for TEV's, if these can

be blocked in.



27.9 Check location of air cooler

bundles, with respect to possible need

for fire protection. Not to be placed

above pumps in service for LPG or

above auto-ignition temperature.





27.10 Check whether FOS/FOR

connections can be properly spaded.


27.12 Check expansion possibility for

elements- sliding supports.

27.13 The body flanges of heat

exchangers should not be insulated,

when in H2 service or with varying

temperature load.

27.14 With insulated flanges, bolts

must be pre-tensioned, since on startup

they will get hot and therefore expand.



27.15 Inaccessible flanges around, and

body flanges of, heat exchangers in H2

service above 200 °C. must be provided

with snuffing steam rings for dispersion

of leakage from the (non-insulated)

flanges. The bottom of the steam ring

should have a 6 mm dia. weep hole for

drainage of condensate. See also item

22.8.

27.16 Condensate may be drained via

steam traps; an upstream strainer is

then required and in addition the trap

must have a bypass. If discharging to a

condensate system, a full-size drain is

also required.





27.17 Check personnel protection

measures on hot exchanger surfaces.

27.18 For leak detection of very light

HC's into open cooling water channels,

outlet piping of coolers may be provided

with T-pieces, from which light HC's are

vented to safe location. HC detectors

can then be placed in the area of the

vents.

28 PUMPS

28.1 Check if line-up of valves around the

pump is correct and that valves are

operable. See also items 23.1-23.3 on

large valves and valves in HP service.

28.2 Check if the pump can be handled

safely for maintenance. Pay special

attention to spading-off possibilities and

to adequate drainage possibilities for line

work, especially if product could spill onto

hot equipment and/or piping nearby. See

also item 28.8.





28.3 Check for SB's on inside of pump

isolation valves (except if valve size

smaller than DN 50). Spades or SB's

also needed on pump vents/drains, if

connected to a common discharge

system (e.g. on pumps in vacuum

service). Need for spades or SB's to be

judged by time it takes to turn spades

vs. time needed to carry out a repair

job.

28.4 Check if facilities have been

provided for pump standby conditions,

notably bypasses around check valves.

Special check valves with holes in the

flappers (not encouraged but only

allowed for drainage of discharge

piping) should be clearly tagged for

regular inspection.

28.5 If there is a heat exchanger in a

pump suction line, ensure suction line is

self-venting.

28.6 Check position of eccentric

reducers. Normally straight side on

bottom of horizontal lines except in

pump suction lines where vapour

pockets may cause pump cavitation.



28.7 Casing drains must be provided with

valves, except for LPG pumps, and

blinded/spaded). See item 25.10 on

connections to a closed drain system.





28.8 Check if double-valve pump vents

(with two block valves and SB on pump

side of vent line) are provided for LPG or

lighter service (vent to flare), if suction

vessel operates under vacuum (vent to

suction vessel) or if venting is required

at start-up at/above auto-ignition

temperature (vent to closed suction

system) For the latter case, it may also

be acceptable to vent to atm. drain (via

hose connection) but only if cold flushing

oil can be supplied to the pump, cold

flushing oil is then bled from the pump

vent system to oily sewer. The pump

contents can then gradually be replaced

by the hot process fluid, once the vent is

closed again. However, hard-piped vent

systems to the suction system are

preferred. Pumps in high vapour pressure

liquid service should have vents between

check valves and discharge valves.





28.9 No tracing between pump block

valves, but instead Flushing Oil

Supply/Return connections, with proper

spade positions. If in high-pour-point

service the piping between discharge

valve and check valve is not flushed, this

particular piping section should be as

short as possible (and possibly traced).

28.10 Pumps for LPG or materials

above auto-ignition temperature must

not have any screwed connections.

28.11 Pumps for LPG or materials above

auto-ignition temperature must be easily

accessible and (preferably) not installed

underneath pipe racks/air-coolers. See

also next item 12.



28.12 Ensure that fire detection

systems (preferably double, fuseable

plastic tubing under air pressure) and,

where required, also water spray

systems are installed over LPG pumps,

over pumps in other HC service above

auto-ignition temperature (generally

over 220°C), over compressor seal oil

pumps and return sumps (see also item

1-10).





28.13 If an ROV is installed in the pump

suction, ensure that a remote switch for

closing the ROV is located at a safe

distance (15 m+), but with the pump

still visible. See also items 23.15-C17 on

ROV's.

28.14 For Y strainers over DN 100,

separate DN 20 drain valves on the

strainers are required. Check easy

access to strainers and easy

replacement of strainer elements.

28.15 Check if PG- and other small-

bore connections are well supported.


28.17 Check motor EX ratings with

respect to Area Classification.

28.18 Check that no process flanges

are located inside noise covers around

pumps and compressors, which could

possibly result in the build-up of a

flammable mixture.

29 COMPRESSORS

29.1 Check if compressor suction lines

are traced and slope toward KO drum.





29.2 Suction lines to compressors with

bottom inlets have pockets, which should

have operational drains (see also 25.8-

9), to check for, and drain, quickly any

liquid prior to (re) startup. The drain

system should either be piped to flare or

alternatively be hard-piped to a point at

grade/AOC (not into a 'closed' drain

system) in a safe (i.e. open, well-

ventilated) location, at a distance of 2-5

m. but still visible from the last of two

drain valves, with no valve but blinded

end flange only at the actual drain point.

Also valid for casing drains on

centrifugal compressors. Suction drains

on pulsation dampers should be lined up

to flare. Drains on discharge damper

could be lined up to flare or alternatively

hard-piped to grade, at 2-5 m. but still

visible from the drain valve; at drain

point no valve but blinded end flange.

29.3 Check if contaminated seal oil tank

has safe location vent with flame

arrestor and (permanent) N2 purge

connection on the tank. Check safe

location of distance piece vents. Sour

seal oil traps should have (locked) open

vents to flare.



29.4 Check relief and remote-operated

valves.






29.6 Check motor EX ratings with

respect to Area Classification.

29.7 With respect to danger of reverse

rotation, distance between compressor

block valves should be as short as

possible, if pressure differential is high.

29.8 Check de-pressuring facilities for

compressors with dry gas seals.

Automatic (AFC) de-pressuring valves

should be installed, if it is impossible to

de-pressure manually from a safe

distance within a few minutes after seal

failure. Dry gas seal purge lines should

be lined up to flare.

29.9 Check if discharge valves for

compressors with dry gas seals are

closed automatically upon seal failure, if

reverse rotation could cause much

damage. Gas seals purges should be

lined-up to flare.





29.10 Check presence of fire protection

facilities for vital compressors for which

no spare are available, such as recycle

gas compressors in Hydro-processing

Units. See also item 28.12 re. fire

protection seal-oil systems.

29.11 In case two electrical seal-oil

and/or lube-oil pumps are installed,

check whether at least one pump

motor is connected to a vital or

emergency power supply system.

30 FURNACES AND BOILERS

30.1 Check available space for tube

withdrawal and cleaning.

30.2 Pay special attention to safety of

fuel systems: - Heavy fuel and LBF

systems to be sufficiently segregated. -

Provisions to prevent liquid fuels from

entering steam and gas systems must be

adequate. - Special requirements for low

pressure/waste gas systems.





30.3 Check that smothering steam

headers are at safe distance (10-15

m.) from the furnace. For individual

lines, coming off headers: - Weep holes

of 6 mm dia. should be provided

immediately downstream of the

isolation valves. - Branch off nozzles

position on top of mains. - Steam lines

to slope (no pockets) back to isolation

valves. - Sufficient steam traps and

drain points provided.

30.4 Check that fuel valves are within

hand reach when looking at the

burners through the observation

windows.

30.5 The emergency shutdown switch

must be at a safe location and fuel trip

valves must be in a non-vulnerable

position.

30.6 Check that trip valves in fuel

service are single-seated and dedicated

(TSO).



30.7 Trip valves must not have

bypasses or hand-wheels, which could

defeat the safeguarding function.





30.8 Check possibilities to test TSO trip

valves.

30.9 Fuel-gas lines ex KO drum must

be traced and slope to KO drum.

30.10 Check mech. min. stops on fuel

control valves, if applicable.

30.11 Check that thermo-wells in

furnace outlet coils are not located too

close to the junction of the coils, since

otherwise a TW may give a false

indication of a coil flow (through

convection from other coil), whilst there

may not be any flow.

30.12 Non-return valves in outlet lines of

some Hydro-processing furnaces,

(minimize backflow upon tube rupture)

must be fire-resistant.

30.13 Check provisions for damper

failure (fail-safe, or min. stop).

30.14 Check purge/ignition timers of

automated ignition systems on

calculations/settings for their specific

actual conditions.







30.15 Check that flame arrestors in

waste gas systems have been placed at

less than 60 pipe diameters from the

waste gas burner(s). No further block

valves are allowed downstream of a set

of parallel arrestors; a TA(H) should be

located just downstream of a flame

arrestor to warn against back-burning.

31 INSTRUMENTATION /CONTROL

VALVES

31.1 Check that, where needed,

emergency shutdown (ESD) or de-

pressuring (EDP) valves have a secure

instrument air supply, that they are in a

safe location and that they are fire-

resistant, incl. the secure instrument air

supply system, ref. DEP 32.45.10.1 0-

Gen. Check that EDP valves are

installed in the correct direction.

31.2 Emergency Shutdown (ESD) and

De-pressuring (EDP) valve stations

must be readily accessible for

maintenance and inspection.



31.3 If for de-pressuring valves two

NDE solenoids are applied, per DEP

32.45 10.1 0-Gen, ensure that all other

specified electrical requirements on

cable routings and alarms on internal

solenoid circuits will be met. Check

cable routings.





31.4 Check whether connections to

safeguarding instrumentation have

been steam-traced, where applicable.

31.5 Check installation details of critical

(instrument) back-flow protection

systems.

31.6 Check critical control/shutoff

valves for correct spring actions and

for possible lock-up systems and/or

minimum stops.

31.7 Trip valves must not be equipped

with bypasses or hand wheels, that

could override the trip action. ESD

valves may only have bypasses, if there

are other trip valves (without bypass)

further downstream.

31.8 Check testing frequency and

extent of instrument safeguarding

systems, incl. trip valves. Check if on-

line testing is possible for testing of

TSO trip valves in services, where

leakage of a TSO valve could cause a

potentially hazardous situation (e.g.

furnace fuel).





31.9 Level gauges in HP and LPG

service should be of a safe type,

preferably of the magnetic type. Level

glasses in class ANS 1500 service are

not allowed. Level gauges in LPG

service in a potential fire zone should

be of the magnetic type. In clean

service level glasses with excess flow

valves could possibly be applied as an

alternative, that could limit loss of

containment, should the glass break

when engulfed in a pool fire.

31.10 Wafer-type level connections and

control valves in potential pool fire areas

must be avoided. In some cases it may

be possible to fire-proof the bolting.

31.11 Ensure that visibility of a level

gauge from a drain point is not blocked

by the lighting facilities.

31.12 Level connections should be

drained to flare, if at all possible.



31.13 Check that pneumatic remote-

operated valves can be opened at the

valve, as well as from a safe location

(see also 28.13).

31.14 Control valve stations should

have drains on both sides of the

control valve, if the valve is spring-to

close in corrosive or toxic service.





31.15 Vent blocks for pressure gauges

and transmitter blocks should be fitted

with recessed vent valves, accessible

only by qualified personnel with a

special key.

31.16 Instrumentation should be

connected via proper instrument tubing

and not via screwed connections This

holds especially for those instrument

connections that are purged to keep the

instrument cool, since during purge

failure the Teflon sealing material may

melt.



31.17 No 90 degree bends are allowed

in stainless steel instrument tubing

connected to the process (such as in

DP-cells), if H2S-induced stress

corrosion could occur.





31.18 (Toxic) gas detectors (e.g. H2S

and HF) should be placed in 'strategic'

locations, either as a point or as area

detection system. For point detection:

within 2-4 m. from pump and

compressor seals, atm. vents and drains

and selected large control valves (e.g. in

high-H2S service), in less well-ventilated

areas. Not required for pumps with

double mech. seals and for compressors

with dry gas seals. The detectors should

be located at elevation 0.9-1.2 m. (not

lower, to avoid splashing by liquid or

rain).

31.19 Check location of gas detectors,

i.e. at floor level for heavier-than-air

gases and at high(er) level (i.e. near

ceiling in buildings, analyzer houses,

etc.) for light gases.

31.20 TP's (thermo-wells) should be

sealed with plastic caps/plugs to

prevent corrosion inside the well (TP's to

be part of regular inspection routines).

32 UTILITY SYSTEMS ( INCL. CONNECTIONS/PIPING)





32.1 Utility connections to be as per

standard arrangement; N2- and steam

connections should have check valves

and be spaded. Drain/vent connections

required for start-up steam supply

during warming-up. On vacuum

systems, the drain line must have a

check valve to minimize possible ingress

of air.

32.2 Check on presence of check valves

on drains in utility injection lines into a

vacuum system, if air ingress possible.

32.3 Small-bore cooling water lines

should be taken off the top of headers.

32.4 Nitrogen purge connections should

be hard-piped to systems that may

require frequent purging (e.g.

reciprocating compressors plus spares).

For non-regular connections a common

point (as per item 1 above) could be

installed from where dedicated N2-

hoses can be run to various purge

connections (with valve/blind).



32.5 Nitrogen should not be used as a

back-up system for Instrument Air.

Even if breathing air is not taken off the

IA system, (direct or via bottles) there is

always the danger that leaking

instruments/control valves in a poorly

ventilated space could cause an

asphyxiating atmosphere to develop.

Instrument air should not be used for

breathing air purposes.




Questions Notes and Percentage Compliance Action (Before/After Start-up) 32.6 Relief valves on commercial

Nitrogen evaporators should never

relieve onto the supporting structure of

the evaporator, since this could

potentially cause brittle fracture of the

supports.

32.7 Drinking water must never be

connected to a process stream, other

than via a break tank or, e.g. in an

analyzer house, via taps. For

interconnections between drinking water

and industrial water, an alternative to a break system could be two check valves

with in between vent, provided there is

no danger of bacteriological

contamination.

32.8 Check that warm-up/start-up vents

on steam systems have silencers fitted.

32.9 Ensure that safety showers are

operable and in correct location.





33 FLARE SYSTEMS AND ATM.

VENT SYSTEMS

Flare Systems:

33.1 This part (flare systems) includes

all relevant items from a 1993 Flare

Workshop, which resulted in a very

comprehensive check list, included in

this report (OP 99-30010) under separate tab: "Flare Reviews'.

33.2 Flare headers must not contain

pockets and must be sloping towards

the flare, with slope 1:200 in the plant

area and 1:500 in the off-plot area.

33.3 Eliminate low points in the flare

system, where possible. Any remaining

low points should be equipped with

preferably open line into KO vessel or

alternatively with an operational drain

the size of which should be DN 150 or

larger. If smaller or not free-draining,

there should be connections for purging

and clearing the line. Drain lines to be

winterized if applicable.



33.4 Ensure that flare piping is well

supported and braced to handle liquid

slugs from liquid relief, particularly

near elbows and tees.




Questions Notes and Percentage Compliance Action (Before/After Start-up) 33.5 Check on heat tracing or insulation

for dead parts of flare piping in colder

climates, since water will always collect.

33.6 Flare headers should not be routed

through high-risk areas, e.g. where a

pool fire could reach flare headers. In

existing units fire shielding could be

applied.

33.7 There should be no open drains,

vents, or instrumentation connections

on the flare piping, through which air

could be drawn in.

33.8 Spades and/or valves in flare lines are to be minimized and restricted to

plant isolation only. Valves to be locked-

open.

33.9 Check sterile area around flare

stack re. radiation heat load.

33.10 Check facilities for smokeless

combustion and specified vs. actual

max. noise level at max. smokeless

capacity at fence.



33.11 Check that two pumps and high-

level alarms have been provided on Flare

KO vessels.




Questions Notes and Percentage Compliance Action (Before/After Start-up) 33.12 Check that oil skimmed from seal

vessels can be routed properly to oily

sewer or direct to the oil compartment

of oil interceptors.

33.13 Check presence of video camera,

to monitor flame and smokeless

combustion.

Atm. Vent Systems:

33.14 Check the location of all atm.

vents, also with regard to installed

silencers. For personnel safety an atm.

vent should be at least 3 m. above the

highest platform in the neigh-bouring

area.

33.15 All atm. vents should have

facilities to prevent rain ingress.

Adequately-sized drain facilities to be

provided on silencers.



33.16 For safe location vents fitted with

flame arrestors, check that the distance

from flame arrestor to vent outlet is no

longer than 60 pipe diameters; also that

the flame arrestor is accessible for

maintenance.





34 ENVIRONMENTAL ASPECTS

(SUMMARY OF SECTIONS A-M)

34.1 Check possibilities for drainage into

oily sewer, incl. slopes and low points.

Spillages should not be allowed to

collect underneath equipment and

should thus be led away from

equipment.

34.2 Ensure hazardous/corrosive

liquids are contained in bunded areas

and that, where necessary, tiling has

been provided. Check also on proper

facilities for removal of such liquids.

34.3 Check site for personnel warning

signs on use of ear and eye protection.

All entries to areas with high-noise or

where toxic chemicals are handled,

should be clearly marked and/or fenced

off. Check that such areas are well away

from the plant fence.



34.4 Check (correct) location of fire,

H2S and HC-gas detectors, beacons

and horns. They should be seen and

heard from all sections of the plant,

which are covered by these systems;

these sections should be well away

from the plant's fence (see also item

22).





34.5 Check for adequate equipment

protection facilities against exposure to

toxic materials, incl. fluids containing

over 20% v. benzene or n-hexane (e.g.

double seals, closed drains).

34.6 Check that operators, while

manipulating drain valves, can see the

emerging effluent as well as the level in

the vessel, that is being drained, whilst

keeping a safe distance in case of e.g.

drainage of H2S-containing liquids.

Provide tundishes if required.

Environmental aspects should not be

neglected (stench, etc.).

34.7 TV cameras should be considered

for a.o. remote monitoring of flares,

stacks and hazardous product handling

areas (e.g. TEL). This list is not all-

inclusive but for guidance only.

34.8 Check whether Waste Handling

Storage has good access, flooring and

roofing, suitable utility connections and

proper drainage to oily sewer.



34.9 Piping should be able to be flushed

and drained easily. For regular drainage,

possibility for drainage to COC (oily

sewer) should be nearby.





34.10 Check whether sampling points

are safe for personnel. Facilities should

be provided for mm. spillage during

sampling. i.e. closed loops or flush to

slops prior to sampling. Provide sealed,

e.g. DOPAK-type, sample connections for

fluids, which present a health hazard

(e.g. fluids with >5% v. benzene or rich

in n-hexane). Apply 'Strakman' type

sample valves in hot, viscous service,

instead of sample coolers.

34.11 Operational drains to atmosphere

should have two drain valves, the

downstream one being a spring-loaded

quarter-turn ball valve, in sight of the

level gauge and also in sight of - but at

a safe distance from -the actual drain

point. These drains should be lined up to

safe disposal system by hard-piping or

via tundishes.





34.12 Liquid drainage from columns,

vessels, pumps, heat exchangers and

other equipment should be done with

min. environmental impact, i.e. to oily

sewer/COC. Those liquids that are

valuable or liquids with a potential

health hazard (e.g. liquids with >5%v.

benzene or rich in n-hexane) should be

drained to a closed collection system,

for recovery. Connections between

vessels and closed drain systems should

preferably be open to atmosphere with

sealed drain hubs. This prevents

syphoning flammable materials back

into the vessel Check valves may be

used, but may not prevent back-flow.



34.13 Check area for suitability of

catalyst handling. If a Nitrogen blanket

must be provided on spent catalyst or

catalyst dust drums, ensure that the

drum lids are loose and cannot be

clamped shut. Ensure facilities allow for

min. dust emission. Check if specialized

contractors will be used for inert

operations/catalyst handling.





34.14 For leak detection of very light

HC's into open cooling water channels,

outlet piping of coolers may be provided

with T-pieces, from which light HC's are

vented to safe location. HC detectors

can then be placed in the area of the

vents.

34.15 Check if contaminated seal oil

tanks for centrifugal compressors have

vent with flame arrestor and

(permanent) N2 purge connection on

the tank. Check safe location of

distance piece vents on reciprocating

compressors.

34.16 Check for proper operational

drains on pockets in large-bore suction

piping upstream of compressors, piped

to oily sewer, so that after a liquid

carry-over incident the line can be

drained quickly, prior to re-startup.

34.17 Check that compressor gas seals

purges are lined-up to flare.



34.18 Check facilities for smokeless

combustion of flares and specified vs.

actual max. noise level at max.

smokeless capacity at fence.

34.19 Check that oil skimmed from water

seal vessels (e.g. in flare systems) can

be routed properly to oily sewer or direct

to the oil compartment of oil

interceptors.





34.20 Check presence of video camera,

installed to monitor smokeless

combustion ex flares and stacks and to

monitor flare flames.

34.21 Check the location of all atm.

vents, also with regard to installed

silencers. For personnel safety an atm.

vent should be at least 3 m. above the

highest platform in the neighbouring

area.

34.22 (Toxic) gas detectors (e.g. H2S

and HF) should be placed in 'strategic'

locations, either as a point or as area

detection system For point detection:

within 2-4 m. from pump and

compressor seals, atm. vents and drains

and selected large control valves (e.g. in

high H2S service), in less well-ventilated

areas. Not required for pumps with

double mech. seals and for compressors

with dry gas seals. The detectors should

be located at elevation 0.9-1.2 m. (not

lower, to avoid splashing by liquid or

rain).



APPENDIX 9

SAMPLE OF APPOINTMENT LETTER FOR PASR TEAM LEADER

Pre-Activity Safety

Review

No.

Date

Name :

Job Title/ Indicator :

Activity :

Location :

You are hereby appointed as PASR TEAM LEADER to conduct PASR on the activity aforesaid to ensure planned activity is sufficiently reviewed before commencement.

Description of DUTY :

Identification of need for PASR

Register the planned activity with HSE department

Form a PASR Team for the planned activity

Conduct PASR at work site using appropriate checklist

Record findings and communicate with relevant parties

Implement preventive/ corrective action if any

Develop Process-Related Activities Procedure (PRAP)

Approval at a level appropriate for the risk (PCSB Risk Acceptance Criteria)

Close-out including communication to all involved parties

PASR data and reports to be submitted to HSE department for logging and filing

Issued and approved for and on behalf of PCSB Sabah Operations (SBO)

SIGNATURE :

NAME :

DESIGNATION :



Page A10-1

APPENDIX 10

PASR Log

Year No. PASR Number Location PASR Title PASR Phase 1

Date PASR Phase 1

Leader PASR Phase 2

Date PASR Phase 2

Leader Approval

Date



Page A10-2

PASR Number PASR Title Action Items Status of Action Items PASR Status Close-out Date Remarks



Page A11-1

APPENDIX 11

PASR PHASE 2 FORM



Page A11-2



Page A11-3



Page A11-4