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Goodness of Sanskrit Studies in Honour of Professor Ashok N. Aklujkar Edited by Chikafumi Watanabe Michele Desmarais Yoshichika Honda D. K. Printworld New Delhi, India January 2012
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Observations on Yogipratyaksa - Raffaele Torella

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Observations on Yogipratyaksa - Raffaele Torella
Published in Sanskrit Sadhuta
Goodness of Sanskrit
Studies in Honour of Professor Ashok N. Aklujkar
Edited by
Chikafumi Watanabe, Michele Desmarais, Yoshichika Honda
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Page 1: Observations on Yogipratyaksa - Raffaele Torella

Goodness of Sanskrit

Studies in Honour of

Professor Ashok N. Aklujkar

Edited by

Chikafumi Watanabe

Michele Desmarais

Yoshichika Honda

D. K. Printworld

New Delhi, India

January 2012

Page 2: Observations on Yogipratyaksa - Raffaele Torella

Observations on yogipratyakṣa

Raffaele Torella

1A seemingly marginal topic in the immense panorama of the philosophies of

India is the ‘perception of the yogi’ (yogipratyakṣa, yogijñāna), the special pow-

er of insight and visualisation that most of the Indian traditions attribute to the

yogis. The term ‘yogi’ here does not designate someone who has just happened

to devote himself to the ancient practices of this discipline, but rather a being

that, though being ‘human,’ is perceived as being (or having become) intrinsi-

cally different from the generality of men. Indian philosophers, including the

loftiest ones, call them asmadviśiṣṭa ‘different from [superior to] us.’ The exis-

tence of such powers in yogis is taken for granted. Not only is the need to prove

them not felt, but they are considered so firmly rooted in common sense (loka-

prasiddha) as to be confidently used for exemplification, that is, to confirm the

existence of other phenomena deemed to be problematic or somehow in need of

demonstration.2 This article does not aim at an exhaustive treatment of this topic,

but only presents some of the guidelines of a research in progress, which will,

hopefully in a not too distant future, take the shape of a monograph.

As a provisional starting point, we could take the third section of the Yoga-

sūtra, dealing with supernatural powers (vibhūti), particularly sūtras 16–55.

From the sustained practice of yoga, a radical enhancement of the normal pow-

ers of perception derives, which enables the yogi to see distant objects or objects

of very minute dimensions, including the atoms, to understand the voices of all

living beings, to know the past and the future, to penetrate other minds, to know

what happened in his and others’ previous lives, to foresee the moment of death,

to obtain superhuman strength, to know the position of stars and sidereal spaces,

to eliminate the need for food, and so on. The fact that these beliefs were not re-

stricted to the circles specifically involved in the theory and practice of yoga is

shown by the hints, brief but nonetheless quite explicit, that we can find in other

1 I am very grateful to David Mellins for kindly improving my English, and for his helpful

comments.

2 See e.g. Utpaladeva resorting to the example of the magic creation of the yogi to account

for Śiva creating the universe without a material cause (Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikā, I.5.7,

II.4.10; cf. Torella 2002: 116, 179).

From “Saṁskṛta-sādhutā: Goodness of Sanskrit. Studies in Honour of Professor Ashok N. Aklujkar. Edited by ChikafumiWatanabe, Michele Desmarais, and Yoshichika Honda. Published by D. K. Printworld, New Delhi, India, 2012.”

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ancient texts, such as those of Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya.3 Vaiśeṣika, a school that for

sure cannot be suspected to indulge in the mystic or irrational, refers to the per-

ception of the yogi in its very root-sūtra (IX.13–17, according to Candrānanda).4

These sūtras are implicitly referred to in a passage of Praśastapāda’s

Padārthadharmasaṁgraha (Biardeau 1964: 120, Isaacson 1993: 146–147), which

adds some interesting elements to the overall picture:

But for yogis, who are superior to us, when [in the condition called]

yukta,5 an unerring seeing of the object’s own nature arises, by virtue

of [their] internal organ [which] is assisted by dharma arising from

yoga, in regard to [the following substances:] their own ātman and

[the ātman of] others, ether, space, time, atoms, air and the internal

organ, [as well as] in regard to the qualities, actions, universals and

ultimate individuators which are inherent in these [substances], and

in regard to [the category] inherence. Furthermore, for [yogis in the

condition called] viyukta, perceptual knowledge arises in regard to

objects which are fine (sūkṣma), concealed [from sight], or at a

[great] distance […] (Padārthadharmasaṁgraha, pp. 464–465; transl.

Isaacson 1993: 146–147).

Later on, Praśastapāda returns to the subject, and elaborates on it. In fact, there

are also other types of ‘seers,’ first and foremost the vedic ṛṣis, who are under-

stood to have ‘seen’ the vedic hymns, to have authored the root-sūtras of various

branches of learning, and to be the ultimate authorities on language. These semi-

divine beings belong to an irretrievable past, and their ontological distance from

us cannot be filled, even more than the distance that divides us from another

‘different,’ precisely the yogi.6 But with some exceptions…

In the ṛṣis, the creators of tradition [Śrīdhara glosses: ‘the authors of the

Veda,’] by virtue of a conjunction between the internal organ (manas)

3 Pakṣilasvāmin Vātsyāyana (around 500 CE) in his Bhāṣya on Nyāyasūtra I.3 (p. 9) refers to

pratyakṣaṁ yuñjanasya yogasamādhijam, quoting Vaiśeṣikasūtra IX.13.

4 Wezler (1982: 664–669) tentatively states that the date of the insertion of these sūtras in

the body of the Vaiśeṣikasūtra is relatively recent (post-Praśastapāda?).

5 yukta is said of the yogi in the state of perfect absorption (samādhi); the yogi is termed

viyukta, when he has come out of samādhi.

6 However, when later speculation on this subject more and more shifts to its epistemolo-

gical implications, yogijñāna and ṛṣijñāna will tend to be taken as mere synonyms.

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and the self,7 and of a special merit, an intuitive cognition (prātibha)

arises, which furnishes an infallible vision regarding objects which ex-

ceed sensorial faculties and belong to the past, the future or the

present—such as dharma—, and which may, or may not, figure in re-

vealed texts. This form of cognition is, primarily, widespread among

the divine seers, but sometimes it may also occur among ordinary beings,

as when a little girl says: “Tomorrow, my brother will come, it is my

heart to say so.” Then, there is the cognition of the ‘perfects’ (siddha),

which however is not basically different from the latter8 (ibid., pp. 627–

629).

The terms yogipratyakṣa (or yogijñāna), ṛṣijñāna, siddhajñāna and pratibhā,9

though arising in contexts that are (at least partially) distinct, end up being taken

as synonymous terms by medieval traditions, united by a common potential: the

possibility for the individual to have a different kind of cognition from the ordi-

nary. According to Nyāya (but also to many other schools that tacitly accept the

Nyāya way to account for ordinary reality), normal cognition is characterised by

the interaction of six factors, which mutually condition each other through their

7 That is, by ‘jumping’ the other factors that come into play in the ordinary cognitive process,

established by the Vaiśeṣikasūtra (V.2.12, IX.15) in the number of four (ātman, indriya,

manas, artha; in ordinary perception they can be reduced to three or two, according to the

specific nature of the object perceived (Padārthadharmasaṁgraha pp. 459–464; cf.

Lyssenko 1998: 88–89). See also Nyāyasūtra I.9.

8 According to Praśastapāda, the main difference between ṛṣijnāna and siddhajñāna lies in

the fact that the former is spontaneous, while the latter depends on a special effort and is

the result of a process of ‘perfection,’ which involves the use of unguents and other magi-

cal substances (cf. Lyssenko 1998: 101–102). On the ‘cognition of siddhas,’ see also

Yogasūtra III.32.

9 To these we can add prajñā (particularly in the Buddhist context); according to Jayaratha

(ad Tantrāloka I.2, vol. I, p. 17), prajñā is equivalent to pratibhā. Bhartṛhari links explic-

itly pratibhā to yoga: in fact, yoga is listed among the six possible causes of pratibhā

(Vākyapadīya II.152). As an example of this kind of pratibhā, the Vṛtti mentions pre-

cisely one of the most characteristic powers of the yogi: penetrating the minds of others (p.

222 parābhiprāyajñānādiṣu). According to Vākyapadīya I.37–38, some particular beings

(the Vṛtti simply says: śiṣṭāḥ), with their ‘divine’ eyes (ārṣeṇa cākṣuṣā), can perceive what

exceeds the range of ordinary senses; what they say cannot be invalidated by inference. In

these beings, in whom light has become manifest and mind is not defiled, the knowledge

of the past and future arises, and this knowledge does not differ from perception.

472 Observations on yogipratyakṣa

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interaction: self, body, senses, sense objects, the mind, internal sense (Nyāya-

sūtra I.9); as we have seen (fn. 7), in the classical Vaiśeṣika doctrine these fac-

tors are reduced to four.

At this point, we can already figure out the possible primary reason why,

from inside the brahmanical tradition, staunch opponents of any form of yogi-

pratyakṣa have risen, as discordant voices in an essentially unison choir. In de-

nying even the theoretic possibility of a special perception by the yogi, the

Mīmāṁsakas are not so much driven by their strong realistic stance, which keeps

them distant from any mystical or esoterical practice, but, rather, by the episte-

mological consequences of such a privileged power of cognition.10 To admit that

man, either due to a natural gift or a specific psychophysical training, is given

access to what exceeds the range of senses (or, we can add, of human reason),

poses a threat to atīndriya par excellence, dharma, whose radical otherness

requires foundation on a non-human authority: vedic revelation. For this,

Mīmāṁsā has established itself as the exclusive interpreter and guardian. Sig-

nificantly, the Mīmāṁsakas’ anti-yogi polemics flares up in precisely at the time

that Buddhist tradition introduces yogipratyakṣa. Unsurprisingly, this does not

occur within mystico-religious schools, but precisely within logico-epistemol-

ogical ones.

It is in fact Dignāga who is the first to consider yogic perception as one of

the recognised varieties of the primary means of knowledge, perception (praty-

akṣa), side by side with sensorial perception, ‘mental’ (mānasa) perception and

the introspective awareness (svasaṁvitti) that every mental event has of itself. In

Pramāṇasamuccaya I.6cd, he defines yogic perception as “the vision of the

object as it is in itself (arthamātra°), unmixed with the teaching of the mas-

ters.”11 Dignāga’s qualification “as it is in itself” (°mātra°) is explained by

10 The considerations of the Mīmāṁsakas—in the words of their main exponent, Kumārila

(Ślokavārttika, Codanā 134–136; cf. McCrea forthcoming)—concern primarily the possi-

bility of verification: if yogipratyakṣa is taken in the highest sense of perception of what is

intrinsically beyond the cognitive power of ordinary man, or as synonymous with ‘omni-

science,’ then it escapes verification (unless by another omniscient). If, instead, it is

understood as the perception of an object that is outside the range of normal perception

only occasionally and provisionally, then it is indeed verifiable but also basically futile.

11 Pramāṇasamuccaya I.5cd yogināṁ gurunirdeśāvyatibhinnārthamātradṛk, to which the

svavṛtti has very little to add: yoginām apy āgamavikalpāvyavakīrṇam arthamātra-

darśanaṁ pratyakṣam. Therefore, ‘the teaching of the masters’, according to Dignāga, is

to be understood as ‘the conceptualisations deriving from [or ‘the various alternatives pro-

vided by] the revealed tradition.’ Cf. the occurrence of this unusual compound in Vākya-

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Jinendrabuddhi, as meaning “with the exclusion of any erroneous superim-

position.”12 This concept, as introduced by Dignāga, is taken up and developed

by Dharmakīrti, who in the Nyāyabindu describes the yogic perception as that

‘which arises at the end of the progressive intensification of the meditation

(bhāvanā) on a real object’ (I.11 bhūtārthabhāvanāprakarṣaparyantajaṁ yogi-

jñānaṁ ceti).13 From Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇavārttika (PV) III.281–286 and

Pramāṇaviniścaya I, pp. 27–29, vv. I.28–32, we learn that what makes this cog-

nitive experience unique is its identification with ‘meditation, visualisation, in-

ner cultivation’—conceptual and projective processes, which however attain

such a vividness and clarity (sphuṭa, spaṣṭa) that they become indistinguishable

from sensorial perception proper.14 In fact, the laconic definition by Dignāga

and the very few passages that Dharmakīrti devotes to this theme strike us for an

undeniable difference in emphasis: while the former mentions yogipratyakṣa

only at the moment of the presentation of the pramāṇas, the latter seems to insert

it in a context that is essentially soteriological (cf. Eltschinger forthcoming).

Furthermore, Dignāga’s requirement that yogipratyakṣa be ‘unmixed with the

teaching of the masters’ does not seem to figure in Dharmakīrti’s conception,

which admits that bhāvanā may encompass this in its process, since a ‘correct’

bhāvanā may be applied only to an object sanctioned by the teaching of the

Buddha—or even provided by him, such as the Four Noble Truths. The two lev-

els of understanding have been unified only by the post-Dharmakīrti authors. It

is not without a certain uneasiness that we see Jinendrabuddhi continue his con-

cise comments on Dignāga’s ‘epistemological’ treatment by shifting abruptly to

the meditative-soteriological orientation that will be later adopted by Dharma-

padīya II.233cd anāgamavikalpā tu svayaṁ vidyopavartate. After all, also ordinary praty-

akṣa could share this definition; the difference, if I understand it correctly, is that yogi-

pratyakṣa does not depend on sensorial faculties (Viśālāmalavatī p. 57 yathā mānasam avi-

kalpakam pratyakṣam, tathā yoginām api; Pramāṇasamuccayasvavṛtti p. 3 […] indriyān-

apekṣatvān mānasaṁ […].

12 Viśālāmalavatī, pp. 56–57 mātraśabdo ’dhyāropitārthavyavacchedārthaḥ.

13 On the many problematic aspects of this definition see below.

14 This point is the object of strong criticism by all brahmanical opponents (see below). It is

very interesting to contrast what Dharmakīrti and Utpaladeva (cf. Torella 2007: 546–548,

556–561) understand by sphuṭatva in a very similar context, and to see the different, if not

opposite, ways they propose to realise it.

474 Observations on yogipratyakṣa

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kīrti.15 Lastly, to further complicate the matter, there is the fact that it is not al-

together clear (at least, to me) who precisely are the Buddhist referents of

Kumārila’s critique, which does not seem to be addressed to the positions of

Dignāga and Dharmakīrti alone.

The Buddhist concept of yogipratyakṣa thus evolves apart from mere super-

natural powers,16 which are the culmination and the prize of the career of a pro-

ficient yogi, as the admission of the yogic cognition is more and more tightly

bound to the concept of ‘omniscience,’ proper to the Buddha, and the basis of

the truth of his teaching, which cannot (nor does it want to) claim extrahuman

authority. Moreover, the concept of omniscience is itself problematic in that it

oscillates between an omniscience that we could define as quantitative and ana-

lytic, and another seen to be qualitative and synthetic. While the former (sarva-

sarvajñatva)17 refers to a knowledge of the immense heap of objects that form

the universe, the latter (sarvajñatva, upayuktasarvajñatva), being oriented to the

path of liberation (by far preferred by the Buddhists and finding a parallel in

Upaniṣadic notions of the term) can conceivably consist in the knowledge of a

single thing (cf. McClintock 2000) through which the great truths of Buddhism

(impermanence, the non-existence of the self, etc.) can be derived. This theme,

which becomes popular in later speculation, beginning with that of Jñānaśrīmitra,

had already been introduced by Dharmakīrti (PV II.30–31): “He who knows the

true reality of what has to be abandoned or appropriated, along with the means to

realise this [abandon and appropriation]: he alone is to be considered a valid

means of knowledge, and not at all he who knows everything. Therefore, we

should be concerned only by his knowledge regarding what has to be practised,

while his knowing the number of all insects is of no use to us.” It is precisely

15 However, Dharmakīrti, though undoubtedly focusing on the meditative aspect, appears

well aware that other dimensions are also present in yogipratyakṣa; see his remarks on the

yogi’s penetration of other minds in PV III.453–457, examined in Franco forthcoming.

16 In the Buddhist circles such powers (ṛddhi, abhijñā) are confined to a well defined di-

mension and acknowledged as partly common also to non-Buddhist traditions (cf. Jaini

1974: 81, Eltschinger 1997: 83). Dharmakīrti’s irony on this matter (PV II.33) is quite

telling: “Let us admit that one may have the power of seeing at great distance (dūraṁ

paśyatu), or that he does not have such a power, but he should see instead the truth that we

require [for our liberation] (tattvam iṣṭaṁ tu paśyatu)! If one endowed with the power of

seeing at great distance should be a means of knowledge [of the truth], then we should

worship the vultures…”

17 This is, for instance, the kind of omniscience that Jainism attributes to its founder (Jaini

1974: 70–75).

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with the quotation of PV II.30 that Ratnakīrti sets out the treatment of upayukta-

sarvajña ‘he who knows everything is [soteriologically] useful’ in the Sarvajña-

siddhi (p. 1).18 It does not seem inappropriate to somehow link sarvasarvajña-

tva with the knowledge of ‘real things’ (vastu), and upayuktasarvajñatva with the

knowledge of their properties (vastudharma, like impermanence, etc.); see below

fn. 33. Pakṣilasvāmin Vātsyāyana had already formulated a similar concept.

According to the Bhāṣya on Nyāyasūtra I.1.1, (°prameya° tattvajñānān niḥ-

śreyasādhigamaḥ ‘From the true knowledge of […] the objects of valid cog-

nition […] there is an attainment of the supreme good’), prameya does not refer

to any object of valid cognition but only to the objects whose correct knowledge

leads to liberation. In this context, the Nyāyabhāṣya mentions the four artha-

padas ‘significant statements?,’19 which correspond to ‘what has to be eliminated’

(heyam), ‘the cause of what has to be eliminated’ (tasya nirvartakam), ‘absolute

elimination’ (hānam ātyantikam) and ‘means to elimination’ (tasyopāyaḥ), and

thus are basically homologous to the Four Noble Truths of Buddhism.

The general impression one gathers from the lines just sketched is that Bud-

dhist philosophers care less for the yogic dimension proper and the various pow-

ers to be derived from this, their interest rather focusing on the epistemological

and meditative implications of the yogipratyakṣa. The same approach is fol-

lowed also by their opponents par excellence, the Mīmāṁsakas, who seem to

have no more than a benevolent indifference towards the mirabilia of the yogi,

provided that he limits himself to ‘playing’ with them.

For their part, in addressing the issue of yogipratyakṣa the Buddhists seem

driven by two different yet concentric aims: on the one hand, to admit in the in-

dividual the capacity of seeking for truth by his forces alone, independently from

the support of any revelation, and, on the other, to protect the central tenets of

Buddhism from brahmanical critics, who, through sophisticated dialectics, are

capable of questioning any truth obtained by way of reasoning. The latter of

these might be the motif of the entrance of yogipratyakṣa into the epistemol-

ogical and apologetic agenda of Dignāga and his followers: to save the Four

Noble Truths from the scathing criticism of the brahmanical philosophers by

presenting them as warranted by the means of knowledge widely admitted to be

the most reliable, the direct perception, though by a non-ordinary person, such as

the yogi and, prior to him, the Buddha—whence the attacks, primarily of the

18 On the omniscience in the sense of upayuktasarvajñatva, see Steinkellner 1978: 125,

Moriyama forthcoming.

19 Here the two lemmas of the compound padārtha, generally translated as ‘category,

thing,’ are purposely inverted.

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Mīmāṁsakas, against all claim of direct confrontation with matters of nonhuman

experience and, more generally, to omniscience (by the Buddha and Mahāvīra).

Such criticism was less severe in Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika, which, being less direct-

ly concerned than the Mīmāṁsā with protecting vedic revelation, limit them-

selves to denying the omniscience alone, and admit yogipratyakṣa, provided that

it does not become too ambitious.20 The post-dharmakīrtian speculation, particu-

larly with Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnakīrti,21 perseveres in the analysis of yogi-

pratyakṣa, but its main concern is the defence of the Buddha’s omniscience

against the refutations of Mīmāṁsakas and Naiyāyikas.

Thus, from a relatively marginal theme in the cursus of the yoga adepts, the

issue of yogipratyakṣa opens to a far wider dimension, absolutely crucial for

Indian philosophy as a whole: the question of whether a seeker of truth may do

without revealed tradition. Revelation becomes necessary when truth is shown

to be beyond the reach of human knowledge. But, in the face of this requisite,

India has allowed, or at least not excluded, an alternative solution: a special

power of direct penetration which evades the perilous channels of direct percep-

tion (however prestigious it may be), inference and other indirect means of

knowledge. In the vedic sphere, two powers—which are sometimes distinct

from each other, sometimes intertwined or partially coincident—fall into this

category: dhī ‘mental vision, visualisation’ and pratibhā ‘direct intuitive pene-

tration.’22 The latter has a longer and more articulated life,23 while the former

remains restricted to vedic domain or becomes, in non-technical usage, synony-

20 One can even surmise that Vaiśeṣika antedates Buddhism in warranting what cannot be

demonstrated—or, at least, cannot be ‘seen’ (atīndriya)—through yogipratyakṣa, when it

allows the yogi the capacity to ‘see’ the inherence, the atoms and so on (see the passage of

Praśastapāda quoted above), and even the antyaviśeṣa of the various atoms and liberated

souls (Lyssenko 1998: 105–110). Cf. Wezler 1982: 669, Lyssenko 1998: 112–114.

21 The Sarvajñasiddhi of Ratnakīrti (Bühnemann 1980) closely follows the two works that

his master Jñānaśrīmitra devoted to this theme, the Yoginirṇayaprakaraṇa and the Sarva-

jñasiddhi (Steinkellner 1977, 1978). The issue of the Buddha’s omniscience is already

present in the Tattvasaṁgraha and the Pañjikā thereon (McClintock 2000).

22 For dhī, I refer to the famous monograph that Gonda devoted to this term, having so indef-

inite contours (Gonda 1963); on pratibhā, see Gonda 1963: 318–348, Kaviraj 1990, Tola

1990.

23 Pratibhā is also the gift that Sarasvatī bestows to her children, the poets (Granoff 1995).

On the role of pratibhā in artistic creation and aesthetic speculation—extraordinarily

interesting but too vast and complex to be even cursorily touched on here—see recently

Shulman 2008.

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mous with ‘knowledge’ in its most general sense.24 A special prestige is as-

cribed to pratibhā in advaita Śaivism of Kashmir. When in the Tantrāloka (TĀ)

Abhinavagupta proceeds to a classification of masters, it is the ‘intuitive’ master

that is given the highest rank: his intuitive knowledge (prātibhaṁ jñānam), also

known as the ‘great’ knowledge (mahājñānam), does not depend either on the

scriptures or other masters; to him all the other masters have to pay homage.25

Thus, pratibhā—like yogipratyakṣa for the Buddhists—is placed at the summit

of spiritual experience by the śaivādvaitins. Buddhism often describes the spiri-

tual progress as consisting of three levels: śruta ‘the teaching derived from au-

thoritative texts,’ cintā ‘intellectual reflection’ and, lastly, bhāvanā ‘meditative

realisation or spiritual cultivation.’26 Yogipratyakṣa is connected with the latter

24 In common usage, pratibhā (or prātibhajñāna) often becomes interchangeable with yogi-

jñāna/yogipratyakṣa. Cf. e.g. Jayaratha ad TĀ XVI. 242 (vol. X, p. 95): yoginām prāti-

bhajñānādav atīndriyārthaviṣayaṁ jñānam.

25 “The master in whom the correct reasoning [sattarka; as a technical term, it is the highest

aṅga of śaiva yoga] has manifested holds authority on everything, is a ‘consecrated one’

(abhiṣikta), being initiated by the goddesses of his own consciousness (svasaṁvittidevī).

Among all the masters he is rightly said to be the principal. In his presence, the other

masters—the ‘constructed ones’ (kalpita)—have no authority.” (TĀ IV.42b–44a; transl.

based on Gnoli 1999: 87).

26 Pramāṇaviniścaya I p. 27 yoginām api śrutamayena jñānenārthān gṛhītvā yukti-

cintāmayena vyavasthāpya bhāvayatāṁ tanniṣpattau yat spaṣṭāvabhāsi […]. Cf. the first

Bhāvanākrama of Kamalaśīla (p. 514 tatra prathamaṁ tāvat śrutamayī prajñotpādanīyā/

tayā hi tāvad āgamārtham avadhārayati/ tataś cintāmayyā prajñayā nītaneyārthaṁ nir-

vedhayati/ tatas tayā niścitya bhūtam arthaṁ bhāvayen nābhūtam). Śruta, cintā and

bhāvanā mark three levels of prajñā. Such progression is also well known in the śaiva

circles (TĀ XIII.327). According to Arcaṭa, the yogi (whose power of perception is at

stake) is he who possesses the yoga—to be understood in the dual sense of samādhi and

prajñā ‘faculty of discerning’ (Dharmottarapradīpa, p. 70 prajñā ca vivekakaraṇaśaktir

draṣṭavyā). Therefore, the yogi is the one who, at the same time, is permanently absorbed

(in samādhi) and intent in the activity of discernment (ibid. nityasamāhito vivekakaraṇa-

śaktitatparaś ca yogī). This interpretation is echoed by the Bauddhatarkabhāṣā (cf.

Kajiyama 1963: 53): “Yogi is he who possesses the yoga, in the sense of a) samādhi, i.e.

the concentration of the mind on a single point (cittaikāgratā°), and b) prajñā, the discrim-

inative knowledge of the ultimate truth of all things (niḥśesavastutattvavivecikā).” On the

‘way of bhāvanā’ (bhāvanāmārga) as the culmination of the ‘way of [intellectual] vision’

(darśanamārga), see Eltschinger forthcoming.

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(PV III.281ab prāguktaṁ yogināṁ jñānaṁ teṣāṁ tad bhāvanāmayam).27 How-

ever, while bhāvanā is gradual by its very nature, becoming more and more in-

tense through constant practice, and operates on conceptual contents that are

progressively refined and dynamised till they cannot be distinguished from

direct perceptions, pratibhā, on the contrary, does not need any preparation or

gradation, for it enlightens and transforms instantly. The ascending hierarchy of

masters described in the TĀ begins with kalpita ‘formed, constructed’, proceeds

to kalpita-akalpita ‘formed-spontaneous,’ and concludes with akalpita ‘sponta-

neous’: the kalpita master is characterised by bhāvanā, and the akalpita master is

characterised by pratibhā. One could note that this may be suitable to an esoter-

ic and relatively marginal tradition, such as the Trika, less concerned than

Mīmāṁsā with defining an orthodoxy (to the limit that this term can be applied

to Indian religions) or at least with establishing an atemporal, non-human tradi-

tion as the cornerstone of the social and religious sphere.28 However, although it

cannot be denied that Abhinavagupta highly praises the ‘spontaneous’ (sāṁ-

siddhika) or ‘self-born’ (svayambhū) master, being able to tune himself with the

absolute without—or even against—any traditional teaching, the existence of

this ‘perfect,’ whose mere sight would suffice to liberate the man that may casu-

ally meet him (TĀ III.40), is presented as so exceptional and rare as to leave the

impression that this represents only a theoretical possibility, a borderline idea

conceived of in order that the too tightly controlled building of tradition should

not risk imploding. And while it is true that the Kiraṇa-tantra determines that

out of the three possible kinds of knowledge—respectively those arising from

the master, the scriptures and spontaneously—the latter is by far the highest

(vidyāpāda, IX.14ab), the texts mostly warn the adept against trusting to a mas-

ter who embodies such kind of knowledge—the ‘spontaneous’ or ‘self-born’

master—and, after all, recommend the ‘normative’ master (cfr. TĀ XXIII.7–10).

Thus, apparently it would remain only Buddhism which defends the pri-

macy of yogic perception without reservation. But is this indeed how things

stand? On a closer scrutiny, Buddhism seems quite far away from encouraging a

solitary tête-à-tête between the individual seeker, equipped with his supernormal

powers of perception, and truth. Yogic perception, Dharmakīrti clearly says,

cannot be a guarantee of truth by itself alone, but has to apply itself to a certain

27 This does not mean that bhāvanā coincides with yogipratyakṣa; rather, bhāvanā is what

makes yogipratyakṣa possible.

28 To this end, Mīmāṁsā will not hesitate even to downplay the significance of the cognitive

moment of the vedic seers themselves, an attitude that a careful observer can discern also

in Śaṅkara.

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content whose truthfulness has been ‘already’ guaranteed by a valid means of

knowledge, in this case the authoritative teaching of the Buddha (weighed by the

adept’s reason? See below). The object of meditation must be ‘real,’ and this

warning is introduced to exclude fancies, dreams or hallucinations, which

bhāvanā might have the power to render as vivid as real things. More generally,

the object of bhāvanā must have first passed, successfully, through the second of

the three levels of prajñā mentioned above, cintā ‘intellectual reflection.’ See

PV I.286ab tatra pramāṇaṁ samvādi yan prāṅnirṇītavastuvat, Pramāṇaviniścaya

I.28cd yaj jñānam avisaṁvādi tat pratyakṣam akalpakam, Nyāyabindu I.11

bhutārthabhāvanā° (which Dharmottara p. 70 comments upon: pramāṇa-

śuddhārthagrāhitvāc ca saṁvādakam). In this manner, yogipratyakṣa can match

also the second of the requirements that Dharmakīrti has established for praty-

akṣa in general: being kalpanāpoḍha and abhrānta (the former is echoed by PV

III.281c vidūtakalpanājālam, etc.). All authors agree that the object of medita-

tion par excellence (‘real’ as it has the guarantee of the Buddha, besides the

‘secondary’ rational verification by the adept) is the Four Noble Truths.29 Only

after such rational scrutiny, the job of bhāvanā can be carried out and be cogni-

tively significant: it progressively gives a dazzling aspect to that conceptual con-

tent and eliminates in it all discursive elaboration.

Therefore, the Buddhist yogi is not required (or allowed) to contemplate the

darkness of the universe in search of his own truth, but can exercise his powers

only on pre-defined objects already consecrated by (Buddhist!) tradition. In

other words, he knows at the very outset what he will have to find: neither more

nor less than the Four Noble Truths of the Buddha, which it is not up to him to

discover, but at most to re-discover, making them his own. The truths of Bud-

dhism are not accessible to normal perception or human reasoning: their original

discovery is due to the Buddha and we must derive them from him, but not prior

to examining his reliability.30 I am well aware that by saying so I am taking a

significant distance from the prevailing position in Buddhological studies,

according to which (cf. e.g. Franco forthcoming, Eltschinger forthcoming) the

29 As Eltschinger forthcoming notes, only Prajñākaragupta adds something: paraloka (Pra-

māṇavārttikālaṁkāra p. 327, on PV III.286b, prāṅnirṇītavastu paralokacaturāryasatyādikaṁ

tadviṣayam eva pratyakṣam).30 It has been noted that the characteristics ascribed to the Buddha, which guarantee his

status as a pramāṇa, have a definite counterpart (and also a possible source) in the

characteristics of the āpta, listed in Nyāyabhāṣya (Franco 1997: 29–42). On āpta in

Nyāyabhāṣya and his relationship with the yogi, see Biardeau 1964: 120–128. Inter-

estingly, Nyāyabhāṣya p. 97 notes: evam āptopadeśaḥ pramāṇam/ evaṁ cāptaḥ pramāṇam.

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Buddhist adept submits the cardinal doctrines of Buddhism (above all, the Four

Noble Truths) to a personal scrutiny, and accepts them only after giving a

rational demonstration of them. But, if the Buddhist adept possesses all the cog-

nitive tools to ‘prove’ the Four Noble Truths by himself, I wonder why Buddhist

tradition has felt the need to strive so much to recognise Buddha’s status of

pramāṇa. A possible answer would be that the Buddha, as can be seen from the

texts, has arrived at the truths of Buddhism by way of direct (yogic) perception;

it is only the subsequent verification that may require the resort to inference, and

this is so precisely because the adept is not able to arrive at them by a spon-

taneous perception of his own (cf. the śruti-smṛti relationship, described in

Dharmaśāstra as a perception-inference relationship). But evidently this infer-

ential proof is not felt as a ‘strong’ proof, whence the resort to yogipratyakṣa-

bhāvanā to re-enact somehow the original pratyakṣa of the Buddha. One might

object that Buddhist tradition distinguishes two levels in the teaching of the

Buddha: one, of a mainly noetical character, lends itself to rational verification,

the other—rather concerning behaviours, ethical aspects, cosmology, ultramun-

dane life—constitutes the (strictu sensu) atīndriya component of it, and, as such,

is intrinsically inaccessible to rational scrutiny, only allowing a generic control

of non-contradiction (cf. Eltschinger 2007: 74–77, 100–101).31 Furthermore,

one might wonder whether the Buddha has attained the knowledge of this second

level thanks to special powers (yogipratyakṣa), which instead did not prove nec-

essary for the first level (the adept in fact being able to arrive at them by his ra-

tional forces alone). But since the Four Noble Truths are unanimously con-

sidered as the principal element (pradhāna; cf. e.g. PV I.217c), it seems hardly

plausible that the foundation of what is atīndriya might instead be cognised by

ordinary means (which the adept could reproduce by himself).

I deem it possible to abstract the following statement by Dharmakīrti from

its context (the scrutiny of Dignāga’s inclusion of scriptural authority in the do-

main of inference) and take it as a general truth: “Man is incapable of existing

without the support of revealed scripture” (PVsvavṛtti p. 108 nāyaṁ

puruṣo ’nāśrityāgamaprāmāṇyam āsituṁ samarthaḥ). Cf. Prajñākaragupta (p. 76

ad PV II.5b; cit. in Moriyama forthcoming): “Precisely for this, error is elimi-

nated only by the revealed doctrine (śāstra) pronounced by an omniscient, not by

any other person. Thus, a means of valid knowledge is only the omniscient’s

word. In the absolute sense, a means of valid knowledge is only the omni-

scient’s knowledge and nothing else. This is the ultimate truth. (ata eva

31 Interestingly, Prajñākaragupta seems somehow to unify the two levels, when he lists both

āryasatyāni and paraloka as the possible objects of yogipratyakṣa (see above fn. 29).

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śāstreṇaiva sarvajñoktena moho nivartyate, nānyenety anena prakāreṇa sarvajña-

vacanam eva pramāṇam iti paramārthataḥ sarvajñajñānam eva pramāṇam,

nāparam iti paramārthaḥ).

The word of the Buddha (buddhavacana) plays an essential role in the consti-

tution of Buddhist doctrine, and the authority of buddhavacana is based on the

conviction of his omniscience (and, for the Buddhists, also of his compassion).

This is apparent also from the attitude suggested by Kumārila, who in the Bṛhaṭ-

ṭīkā (cf. Kataoka 2003: 40–41) endeavours above all to confute the Buddhist

assertion: “The teaching [of the Buddha] constitutes a valid means of knowledge,

since it has been pronounced by the omniscient Buddha.”32 Although admitting

that yogipratyakṣa has been introduced by Dharmakīrti in a mainly soteriological

context (which seems different from Dignāga’s), it is a given fact that Kumārila

understands it and attacks it for its epistemological significance, having as his

principal aim challenging the notion of āpta/pramāṇa, referred to the Buddha,

which indeed rests primarily on the special power of perception of the yogi/

Buddha. In the progression of the Buddhist adept (cf. Eltschinger forthcoming),

yogipratyakṣa takes on the essential meaning of ‘meditation, inner cultivation’

(bhāvanā) and has the main function of eliminating the most subtle and insinu-

ating form of satkāyadṛṣṭi ‘the conviction that the I exists’, that called sahaja ‘in-

nate’—whereas the path of vision (darśanamārga) is sufficient to eliminate this in

its vikalpita (or parikalpita) version. Bhāvanā is the way to achieve the ‘natu-

ralness’ of such attainment, its taking place without any conscious effort (svarasa,

anābhoga). In sum, bhāvanā has in fact been given an ‘assimilative’ function

(and also a ‘purgative’ one in that it destroys kleśas), much more than a ‘cognitive’

function.33 Bhāvanā or yogic perception is applicable only at a subsequent stage

of engagement and in a subsidiary way, when the aim is to instill in the contents

of the teaching the necessary vividness for the spiritual path and everyday life to

32 That is, not because the truth of his teaching has been rationally proved.

33 It has been rightly stressed (Eltschinger forthcoming) that bhāvanā is only the means to

yogipratyakṣa, its cause (cf. PV III. 281b bhāvanāmayam, 284d bhāvanābalanirmitam;

Pramāṇaviniścaya I v. 31c bhāvanāpariniṣpattau; etc.). However, one might reply that at

the end (paryanta; cf. the Nyāyabindu quoted above) of the bhāvanā process, only the mo-

dality of the cognitive act changes (from conceptual to aconceptual), not its content. Re-

ferring to Jñānaśrīmitra’s statement, yogipratyakṣa is reliable only as far as it invests the

properties of the real thing (vastudharma), not the real thing itself; cf. Steinkellner 1978:

133. I would reply to Prevereau’s (1994: 76, fn. 2) nice formulation “it [yogipratyakṣa]

reveals truths, not facts” that, after all, the facts are precisely made by the totality of their

true aspects (including impermanence, and so on).

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be imbued with it, and, possibly (as we have hypothesised above), also for the

teaching of the Buddha to be defended more efficaciously against its brahman-

ical opponents. It seems likely to conclude that, for the Buddhists, only percep-

tion is able to create ‘persuasion.’34 An indirect confirmation might come from

the fact that the Mīmāṁsakas direct such strong criticism precisely against the

Buddhist claim that yogipratyakṣa may be entitled to be classified as ‘percep-

tion.’35

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