Volume 01, Number 1 Fall 2001
© 2002 by The American Philosophical Association ISSN: 1067-9464
NEWSLETTER ON PHILOSOPHY AND COMPUTERS
FROM THE EDITOR, JON DORBOLO
REPORT FROM THE CHAIR, ROBERT CAVALIER
Luciano Floridi: Philosophy and Computing: An IntroductionREVIEWED BY ANTHONY BEAVERS
George B. Dyson: Darwin Among the Machines:The Evolution of Global Intelligence”
REVIEWED BY PETER SUBER
Alan Januszewski: Educational Technology: The Development of a ConceptREVIEWED BY JON DORBOLO
COMPUTER ETHICS INFORMATION, DOUGLAS BIRSCH
“The Passing of a Polymath”
Jon Dorbolo, Editor Fall 2001 Volume 01, Number 1
APA NEWSLETTER ON
Philosophy and Computers
FROM THE EDITOR
Jon DorboloOregon State UniversityJon.Dorbolo@orst.edu
The investigation of computing and philosophy appears tobe a self-organizing system. Publications are proliferating,CAP conferences are expanding, and an internationalassociation has formed. All of this provides evidence thatthe philosophical issues clustered around the computationalturn are coalescing into a bonafide academic field.
At the recent Carnegie-Mellon University Computing andPhilosophy conference, significant effort was focused on theshape that an International Association of Computing andPhilosophy (IACAP) should take. Consensus was reachedon several issues, most importantly that Tony Beavers will leadthe effort and take responsibility for organizing the association.Tony’s plan involves three key points:
1) IACAP will be a membership organization fundedby member dues.
2) IACAP will promote and support CAP events(conferences, colloquia, seminars, etc.) that arelocally organized by members.
3) IACAP will provide advanced technology andresources to its members.
The IACAP leadership consists of association officers andan Executive Committee.
Executive Director:Beavers, Anthony (University of Evansville)beavers@noetic_labs.com
President:Cavalier, Robert (Carnegie-Mellon University)email@example.com
Vice President:Dorbolo, Jon (Oregon State University)Jon.Dorbolo@orst.edu
Secretary:Ess, Charles (Drury University)firstname.lastname@example.org
Executive Committee:Barnette, Ron (Valdosta State University)Bringsjord, Selmer (Rensselaer Polytechnic)Bynum, Terry (Connecticut State University)Coleman, Kari (University of British Columbia)Croy, Marvin (University of North Carolina at Charlotte)Floridi, Luciano (Oxford)Hinman, Larry (San Diego State University)Moor, James (Dartmouth)Suber, Peter (Earlham College)Tavani, Herman (Rivier College)Traiger, Saul (Occidental College)Uzgalis, Bill (Oregon State University)Your opportunity to enter into and participate in this effort
at its genesis is rapidly coming. Check the CAP conferencesites for links to the IACAP site.
CAP@CMU (Carnegie-Mellon University),http://caae.phil.cmu.edu/CAAE/CAP/CAP@OSU (Oregon State University),http://osu.orst.edu/groups/capCAP@Europe (University of Glasgow),http://www.gla.ac.uk/departments/philosophy/ECAP.htmlIf adding to the momentum of the computational turn
seems worthwhile to you, there are two key moves you canmake now: write and publish a related book or article, or joinIACAP. These are not mutually exclusive options.
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Jon Dorbolo, Editor4140 Valley LibraryOregon State UniversityCorvallis OR 97331-4502541.737.3811Jon.Dorbolo@orst.edu
Bill Uzgalis, Associate EditorOregon State UniversityWuzgalis@orst.edu
Larry Hinman, Internet Resources EditorSan Diego State Universityhinman@acusd.edu
Douglas Birsch, Computing Ethics EditorShippensberg State Universitydrbirs@ship.edu
Ron Barnette, Teaching in Cyberspace EditorValdosta State Universityrbarnett@grits.valdosta.peachnet.edu
Send comments, inquiries, and submissions concerning thisnewsletter to the Editor Jon.Dorbolo@orst.edu.
REPORT FROM THE CHAIR
APA Committee on Philosophy andComputers
Robert Cavalier, ChairCarnegie Mellon Universityrc2z@andrew.cmu.edu
During 2000-2001 the committee sought to investigate andadvance the relation between “philosophy and computers”by working closely with the Steering Committee of theComputing and Philosophy conference in order to encouragethe development and expansion of CAP. The PAC committeealso sponsored special sessions at the Division Meetings ofthe APA.
There are now regular CAP East (CAP@CMU) and CAPWest (CAP@OSU) sessions. The URLs for these conferencesare http://caae.phil.cmu.edu/CAAE/CAP/ and http://osu.orst.edu/groups/cap/ (CAP at Oregon State providesstreaming video archives of its presentations). Expect to seeCAP conferences over the next few years in Europe, LatinAmerica, and the Pacific Rim. In fact, our first CAP abroadconference, spearheaded by Susan Stuart, will be at theUniversity of Glasgow March 27 - 29, 2003 (http://www.gla.ac.uk/departments/philosophy/ECAP.html). Plans
are also underway to hold a World Congress on Computingand Philosophy in 2005. All this speaks well for continuedgrowth in the convergence of information technologies andphilosophical activity.
A “CAP Awards” program has been established in orderto recognize individual faculty contributions to computing andphilosophy. Faculty members can receive these awards bybeing nominated by their campuses. The nomination needsto be accompanied by a proposal and letters of support fromthe Department Chair as well as a Dean or Provost. The firstCAP Award was given to Professor Michael Byron from KentState during the August 2001 CAP@CMU (information aboutCAP Awards can be found on the CAP web-sites).
With the recent death of Herb Simon, members of thecommittees proposed that future CAP@CMU keynotespeeches be entitled “The Herbert A. Simon Lecture.” Herbwas committed to both the pedagogical and theoreticalaspects of computing and philosophy. Herb was also a strongsupporter of our CAP conferences, and offered two keynotespeeches at CAP, the last one being in the summer of 2000. Itis only appropriate that we remember him this way.
A final CAP matter: At the 2001 August CAP at CarnegieMellon, formation of the International Association forComputing and Philosophy (IACP) was announced. Thisindependent organization will serve as the umbrella groupfor current and future CAP conferences.
PAC will also seek permission from the APA to establisha John Barwise Prize for significant and sustainedcontributions to Computing and Philosophy. As with HerbSimon, John had a life-long commitment to both thepedagogical and theoretical aspects of computing andphilosophy. A drive is now underway to acquire funds for anendowment for this Prize.
As for PAC sponsored APA Division presentations, in 2000-2001 we emphasized the “computational turn” that isoccurring within the fields of Logic, Epistemology, and Ethics.
An Eastern Division special session was entitled “NewModels for Approaching Reason and Argument.” Tom Burke(University of South Carolina ) gave a presentation on thephilosophical and pedagogical foundations for Barwise andEtchemendy’s logic software (“Language, Proof, and Logic”).Richard Scheines (Carnegie Mellon) described thedevelopment and assessment of web-based courseware forcausal and statistical reasoning.
At the Pacific Division meeting Clark Glymour, in aprovocative talk entitled “Automating Normal Science: Rocksto Genes,” presented work in applied philosophy of scienceto demonstrate the idea that causal discoveries can reliablybe made by algorithmic procedures. And at the CentralDivision meeting Charles Ess and Susan Dwyer addressedthe “Cultural and Ethical Dimensions of the World Wide Web”and the “Moral Dangers of Cyberporn” respectively.
Finally, a symposium on “The Impact of Computing onthe Teaching of Philosophy” (co-sponsored by the APACommittee on Teaching and the APA Committee onPhilosophy and Computers) will be held at the EasternDivision APA this December. All in all, it’s been anotherproductive season for computing and philosophy.
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Philosophy and Computing: AnIntroduction, by Luciano Floridi,Routledge,1999.
Reviewed by Anthony BeaversUniversity of Evansvilletb2@evansville.edu
Luciano Floridi’sPhilosophy andComputing: AnIntroduction is asurvey of someimportant ideasthat ground the newly emerging area of philosophy known,thanks to Floridi, as the philosophy of information. It waswritten as a textbook for philosophy students interested inthe digital age, but is probably more useful for postgraduateswho want to investigate intersections between philosophyand computer science, information theor y and ICT(information and communications technology). The book isdivided into five independent chapters followed by a worthy,though impressionistic, afterthought under the title of theconclusion.
Chapter One, “Divide et Computa: Philosophy and theDigital Environment,” begins by outlining four topics toconsider when examining the significance of the digitalrevolution: 1) computation, 2) automatic control, 3) modelingand virtual reality, and 4) information management. Thispreliminar y outline is followed by a brief historicalconsideration of the transition from analogue to digitalinformation processing and the importance of “digitization”for developing mechanical means to manage information.
According to Floridi, this digitization has occurred in threemain areas. Regarding the scope of digitized content, we havemoved from numerical data to sounds and images. At thesame time, our interfaces to the computer have become lessdigital and more humane. Graphical user interfaces andWYSIWYG software have quickly replaced punch cards. Inthe area of connectivity, we have moved from the mainframeto the Internet, hence, to the possibility of a global informationnetwork. Together these transformations are accelerating theevolution of the infosphere and consequently its dramaticeffect on the shape of society.
These changes are of world historical significance, thusworthy of philosophical investigation, as the last part of thechapter shows. Already philosophers are responding to theseimportant developments, particularly in the areas ofInformation and Management Systems Methodology, FormalOntology, The Metaphysics of Virtual Reality, The Epistemologyof Computing, The Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence,Computer Ethics, The Philosophy of Artificial Life, ThePhilosophy of Computer-Mediated Communication, andArtificial Morality. Together these areas are unified by Floridiunder a preliminary definition: “…the philosophy of
information is primarily concerned with the whole domainof phenomena represented by the world of information, andinclines towards a metatheoretical approach only in so far asit addresses the philosophical problems implicit in the worldof information by starting from the vantage point representedby information science, computer science and ICT” (18).
Chapter Two, “The Digital Workshop,” presents somecomputer basics. It begins with a discussion of some earlycomputational machinery, including analogue devices suchas water clocks and thermostats, and the analytical engineof Charles Babbage. This brief introduction is followed by alengthy and difficult treatment of Turing Machines thatcontains the important elements of Turing Machinecomputation. The limitations of the Turing Machine are brieflytreated at the end of this section in order to make room forthe important application of Boolean algebra to computationand the innovations of Von Neumann respecting the moderncomputer’s architecture. This leads to a helpful discussionon the basic architecture of programming languages thatillustrates why they are essential and important for the recenttransformations in the infosphere. The chapter ends bylooking at the various types of computers, both commercialand personal. As a whole, this survey of the history ofcomputation and its mechanization is reasonably complete.The main issues are here. But, as the informed reader willsuspect, this is a lot of ground for anyone to cover in just 25pages. Floridi tries, but the sheer scope of materialsummarized in such a short space and an awkward use ofsymbolic notation makes the story a bit unclear. This criticismis local, however, and should be restricted to some sectionsof chapters two and five. The middle chapters are quite clear,and since these chapters provide what is revolutionary, thebook as a whole does not suffer much because of a few densesections.
In Chapter Three, “A Revolution Called Internet,” Floridisummarizes the history of the Internet, defines its variousdimensions and addresses its potential impact on the “humanencyclopedia.” After a brief history, the book considers theInternet as “the totality of three different spaces: theinfrastructure (the physical dimension), the memory platform(the digital dimension), [and] the semantic space (thecyberspace dimension)” (61). The division is fair andnecessary to ground the difference between the physicalnetwork and the arrangement of information on this network.Indeed, it is precisely this difference that makes the Internetuseful as a vehicle of information arrangement andtransmission. This analysis is followed by a catalogue of someof the uses of the Internet, such as E-mail, Bulletin Boardcommunities and the World-Wide Web, along with someanalysis of their significance as communications tools. Thechapter then briefly considers the potential effects of theInternet on organized knowledge.
Chapter Four, “The Digital Domain: Infosphere, Databasesand Hypertexts,” was this reader’s favorite, largely because itgoes a good way toward establishing a philosophy of thedatabase. Though talk of such things might initially sound likethe stuff of computer science, those who study canonicalphilosophy will find themselves on familiar ground. Thechapter appeals to recognizable thinkers such as Plato,Aristotle, Kant and Hegel, and even includes a section called“the aesthetic and the ontological interpretation ofdatabases.” After a philosophical and historical introduction,
a must read for anyone interested inthe intersection between philosophyand the new computational climatethat is emerging with the Internet
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the chapter considers the relationship between the databaseand the encyclopedia, followed by a comprehensibledefinition of the database and an outline of its various types.Mid-way through the chapter, the reader will find an interestingdiscussion of the difference between data, information andknowledge. The section is a gloss, as Floridi admits, butenough is said to differentiate between three concepts thatare often conflated in ordinary speech. This differentiationsets the stage for several subsequent sections that head inthe direction of what might be called information engineering.
The chapter continues with a very brief look at a fewissues in computer ethics, such as “Rich and Poor in theInformation Economy” and a short enumeration of issuessuch as the standardization of the infosphere, data security,copyright infringement, privacy and pornography. Thisinterlude into ethics is followed by a rich and lengthydiscussion of what may be the most important element ofmodern information arrangement, hypertext. Here, Florididives deeply into analysis. Hypertext is defined as aninformation retrieval system made up of “a discrete set ofsemantic units,” “a set of associations,” and “an interactiveand dynamic interface” (119-120). These concepts aretogether clarified by considering seven provocations thatFloridi labels as “fallacies” and that are worth quoting here.
1) The electronic fallacy: hypertext is a uniquelycomputer-based concept.2) The literary fallacy: hypertext began primarily as anarrative technique and hence it is essentially a new formof literary style.3) The expressionist fallacy: hypertext has arisen as andshould be considered primarily a writing-pushedphenomenon.4) The “politically correct” fallacy: with hypertext, thereader is in complete control of whatever contents orfunctions are available and hence is no longer subject tothe writer’s authority.5) The obsession with the rhetoric of syntax: hypertext isnon-linear writing and challenges the bookishassumption that contents have to be presented in a linearfashion.6) The mimetic fallacy: hypertext mimics the associativenature of the human mind and therefore is better suitedto its activities.7) The methodological fallacy: hypertext will replaceprinted books. (120-128)Chapters Three and Four are insightful. Here, Floridi is
doing something that I have yet to see done elsewhere: heanalyzes the data structures that are emerging because ofthe Internet and electronic databases and considers theirimpact on the organized body of knowledge from aphilosophical perspective. He rightfully implies that issues ofinformation arrangement do belong in philosophy and are asintrinsic to it as metaphysics and epistemology.
Chapter Five, “Artificial Intelligence: A Light Approach,”however, is a bit of an anomaly. It is a full one-third of thebook, yet seems to be more of a summary addendum tackedonto the end. It includes much of the standard AI introductorymaterial, discussions of good old-fashioned AI, the Turing Testand its limitations, the various areas of AI application, lightAI, fuzzy logic (another very difficult section along with thesection on the Turing Machine mentioned above), neural nets,
parallel computing, quantum computing, expert systems,robotics and cybernetics. But even at eighty pages, the textmoves very quickly. It is packed with information; yet, it is asummary that will perhaps best be appreciated by thosealready familiar with the issues.
The concluding section is a playful step back from therigorous detail of the rest of the book. It raises some issues ofinterest to those who study human nature and would like ajumping off point for thought on the relationship betweenwhat is happening to us informationally and what this mightmean for our destiny as a species. As a hint, the reader of thisreview might appreciate the following quotation:
The history of human emancipation has been, sofar, not devoid of success. Nature, animals,technological devices and the labour of other humanbeings have all been employed to transform energyinto force and to manage information. The paradoxof the industrial and the information revolutions,however, is that in both cases the fundamentalanthropological project seems to have failed,although nothing should have been more successfulthan the engine and the computer in sanating(healing) and liberating human time, developinghomo faber into homo sapiens and then bringingboth closer to extinction in favour of homo ludens.(221-222)
Provocative and short, the conclusion itself asserts athesis that could well be a theme for another book.
Now here are some remarks for a general review of thebook as a whole. With this book, Floridi has attempted a verydifficult task. He starts the book with an acknowledgment ofthe difficulty that comes with writing any philosophy textbook:“We expect the author to introduce all the basic elements inthe field clearly and succinctly, while providing an interestingperspective from which to interpret them fruitfully. Thisdoubles the chances of getting things wrong and generates aparadoxical tension between originality and lack of novelty”(ix). We can imagine that this situation is all the morecomplicated when one attempts an introductory textbook fora field of study that is in its infancy, as is the philosophy ofinformation. Floridi is hard at work in his other writings tooutline what a philosophy of information should entail and isstill defining its initial terms. This may partly explain why thebook moves along so clearly with insight and innovation insome places and why it bogs down in others, particularlywhere it tries to summarize a vast amount of establishedmaterial in a small space.
The book is at its best where Floridi is most creative.Chapters Three and Four, on the Internet and databases,respectively, breathe easily and read well, along with offeringsome much needed and innovative assessment. Floridi is rightto want to introduce the technical aspects of digitalcomputation and the Internet into the manifold ofphilosophical problems, and these two chapters go along wayin setting the stage. Even by themselves, these two chaptersmake the book well worth reading, though the more historicalsections are worth the review.
I would recommend the book as a transitional text forprofessionals interested in moving from the traditional issuesof computation and AI into the analysis of more recentdevelopments in information storage, retrieval and
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organization brought about by the Internet. The book is richin detail, and the catalogue of facts enumerated along theway is well worth having at one’s disposal. It is a must readfor anyone interested in the intersection between philosophyand the new computational climate that is emerging with theInternet. Additionally, the scholarly-minded will appreciatethe scope of the research that lies behind this work asindicated in its extensive bibliography.
Darwin Among the Machines:The Evolution of GlobalIntelligence, George B. Dyson,Perseus Books, 1997.
Reviewed by Peter SuberEarlham Collegepeters@earlham.edu
Dyson’s book is an argument disguised as an intellectualhistory. The argument is that all intelligence is collective, inthe way that human intelligence emerges from the collectionof unintelligent neurons, and that a global collectiveintelligence is now emerging from the growinginterconnections among human beings and their machines.The history traces the rise of computation and thinking aboutmachine intelligence from Hobbes to the present. The historyis fascinating and detailed. The thesis about collectiveintelligence is fascinating but lacking the detail which wouldmake it more than merely suggestive.
Each chapter spends most of its time on figures anddevelopments in the history of computation and AI. Someare major figures in every telling of this story, such as Leibniz,Babbage, Boole, Turing, Gödel, and von Neumann. Someare major figures in other fields whose contribution tocomputing or AI has not been widely recognized, such asHobbes, Robert Hooke, Samuel Butler, Charles Peirce, andH.G. Wells. And some are nearly forgotten figures withprescient or eccentric ideas, or both, whom Dyson haspainstakingly resurrected to fill in the story, such as AlfredSmee, Allan Marquand, Lewis Fry Richardson, Julian Bigelow,Nils Barricelli, William Ross Ashby, Olaf Stapleton, FredericMyers, and Paul Baran. There are other histories ofcomputation which tell the main story well, perhaps withmore technical detail than Dyson, but they omit the quirkyminor figures Dyson includes here. I know of no other historyof pre-20th century thinking about machine intelligence asrich, detailed, or surprising as this one.
As parts of the history, Dyson eventually discusses manyexamples of collectives with emergent problem-solvingabilities which exceed the abilities of their separatecomponents. Apart from the example of brains, he considersHobbes’ Leviathan, networks of human calculators, free-market economies, and the evolution of multi-celledorganisms.
At the end of each chapter, Dyson draws lessons for hisgrowing thesis about evolution, collectives, emergence, life,and intelligence. Because these chapter-closing reflectionsexplicate the book’s title and subtitle better than the historicalstory, one concludes that Dyson is telling the history for thesake of this thesis, and not the other way around.
These closing reflections are intriguing, plausible, andrich with implications, but always brief, sometimes oracular,and not closely tied to evidence in the chapter. As a colleagueof mine likes to write in the margins of student papers, thesepropositions are “important if true.” But Dyson does not givethem the elaboration and support they deserve, and whichhe does give to his history. One gets the sense, with somefrustration, that the primary thesis gets secondary attention.
This is my only complaint about the book. The thesis istoo interesting and important to leave in the impressionisticstate in which he leaves it. And unlike impressionistic authors,Dyson can do better, as we know from the other 98% of thebook. This is the complaint of a reader who was persuadedto take the idea seriously. I’d like to see the author do thesame.
This criticism may be unfair. It’s possible that Dyson’sthesis cannot yet be given the detailed exposition andargument to which philosophers are accustomed. Dyson hasdone a service to marshal enough evidence to make the thesisplausible and to make us vigilant for clues relevant to its truth.But I’m afraid that philosophers will be impatient with thebrevity of Dyson’s treatment of his own thesis, and beimpatient roughly to the extent that they find his thesis worthexploring. Nevertheless I recommend this book tophilosophers, in part to increase the chance that others willpick up this thesis where Dyson left off.
A large part of the appeal of this book, apart from thevery engaging history and very suggestive thesis, is itsnuanced, alternative vision of machine intelligence, whichmakes the sci-fi scenarios still present in the philosophicalliterature look superficial. Dyson gives no attention to thecommon view of stand-alone artificial intelligence, whichmight pass a Turing Test, be installed in a robotic body, andinteract with human society and other intelligent robots. Hefinds it more plausible and fruitful to think of human beingsand machines in a symbiotic relationship. Already we dependon machines and machines depend on us, and this mutualdependence will become more complex and far-reachingover time. Both poles of this symbiotic relationship evolve,and together we co-evolve. Dyson wants to break down thedistinction between technology and biology, and seemachines, together with the human-machine symbiosis, assubject to natural selection. The examples of other collectiveswhich have evolved to surpass their components in survivalstrength and intelligence suggest that the future of machineintelligence is more collective than isolated, more natural thanartificial, and more a vector or society of human intelligencethan a rival of it.
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Educational Technology: The Developmentof a Concept, Alan Januszewski, 2001.
Reviewed by Jon DorboloJon.Dorbolo@orst.edu
Education is changing rapidly and totally. Much of this changeis fueled by the cycle of technology development, especiallyinformation technology. Within this vortex of transformation
The term audiovisual communications was explicitly setas a transitional term pending future revision. The termeventually settled upon, to present, is educational technology.
Januszewski’s method is to methodically expand uponthe key concepts within each official definition, developingthe historical contexts, theoretical positions, and politicalagenda that influence the meanings of that concept. Fromthe 1963 definition of audiovisual comminations (quaeducational technology), he treats the following concepts indetail:
TheoryProcessCommunicationsMessageLearningControlAlong the way he details the intersections of the
educational technology movement with behaviorism whichled to the educational methods of teaching machines andprogrammed instruction.
Among the influential figures in the development of theeducational technology concept introduced in this book isJames D. Finn, chair of the 1963 definition commission. Finn’simpact on educational theory and practice is broad. I believethat he will become a familiar figure in the future study ofeducation. He is largely responsible for refocusing theemphasis in the audiovisual technology camp from themanagement of equipment to a field of research with its ownlearning theory. Finn dedicated much of his career activityto opposing the notion that technology is a category of objects:machines, tools, instruments, and gadgets. Rather, he argued,technology is a process and a way of thinking. The uses oftechnological objects follows from this way of thinking, suchthat machines are;
symbols...and must be thought of in terms of inconnection with systems, organizational patterns,utilization practices, and so forth to present the truetechnological picture.” (P.24)
Given Finn’s success in translating his vision intoorganizational action, this picture of technology as a processis critical these days when faced with promoters of technologymediated or automated education who proclaim thattechnology is merely a tool and is ultimately value neutral. Itturns out that the founding figure of educational technologystands in stark opposition to contemporary instrumentalists.The machines and programs that we use for education haveall along been designed to advance an agenda. To deny thateducational technology is value laden and agenda advancingis to contradict the one of the most potent ideas thatcontemporary educational technology is predicated upon.
The 1963 definition of educational technology wasintended to provide a conceptual ground for a field ofeducational research. Finn was out to create a self-sustainingprofession complete with a professional association, trainingand criteria of professional competence, a code of ethics,and “an organized body of intelligent theory constantlyexpanded by research” (p.21). Those goals resulted in theAssociation for Educational Communication and Technology(AECT) which counted 21,000 members in 1972 (see http://www.aect.org). The growth of the organization led to a varietyof controversies including the descriptive title of the
we are witness to changes in the ways that education relatesto society, the roles that educators play, the populations oflearners, and the value that formal learning has for individuals.In order to understand the character and direction of thistransformation, we must make sense of the technologyemployed as well as the principles and assumptions guidingits employment. Educational Technology: The Developmentof a Concept by Alan Januszewski is a philosophicallysophisticated history of the definition of educationaltechnology. Unlike many philosophical projects of definitionand concept analysis, Januszewski’s has the advantages of avery brief time frame (since the 1920’s) and a progression ofofficial definitions produced by a professional organization.What Januszewski does with this concise range of time andtopic is to produce a conceptual map that leads to the social,political, theoretical, and philosophical territories that overlapwith the idea of educational technology. In tracing this map,the reader comes to discover how the idea of educationaltechnology is driven by a particular theory of learning andhow thoroughly our educational institutions are dependenton that theory. Most urgent is the need to understand theagenda that educational technology sets for teaching andlearning, for that agenda is implicit in the design of the toolsthat are now commonplace in our educational environment.
Januszewski’s analysis covers the four official definitionsproduced by the Association for Educational Communicationand Technology (AECT) from 1963 to 1994. The AECT wasformed in 1970 when the Department of Audio VisualInstruction (DAVI), established in 1932, separated from theNational Education Association (NEA), taking with it 10,000members. In 1963 University of Southern California Educationprofessor James D. Finn chaired a commission with theobjective of defining the role of technology in education. Theresulting definition was published as a monograph in 1963and contains in it the major ideas that have directededucational technology since. The key statements in thisdefinition are;
Audiovisual communications is that branch ofeducational theory and practice primarily concernedwith the design and use of messages which controlthe learning process…Its practical goal is the efficientutilization of every method and medium ofcommunication which can contribute to thedevelopment of the learner ’s potential.(Januszewski, 2001, 18).
To deny that educational technology is valueladen and agenda advancing is to contradict theone of the most potent ideas that contemporaryeducational technology is predicated upon.
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organization’s area of activity and different aspects of theofficial definition. Audiovisual communications was replacedby educational technology and a new commission produceda revised definition in 1972.
Among the ideas targeted for revision was control. The1963 definition states that educational technology(provisionally termed “audiovisual communications”) is “thebranch of educational theory and practice primarilyconcerned with the design and use of messages whichcontrol the learning process.” (Januszewski, 2001, 18). Thisis one area of Januszewski’s book that I find lacks sufficientdevelopment. Norbert Weiner introduced the idea ofcybernetic control in Cybernetics (1948), refined it in TheExtrapolation, Interpolation, and Smoothing of StationaryTime Series with Engineering Applications, (1949), andadvanced it in Cybernetics: Communication and Control inthe Animal and the Machine (1961). Weiner’s notion is formaland mathematical. There is a plethora of informal (andmisdirected) appropriation of the control and feedbackconcepts in all manners of literature. Finn was seeking toformalize the study of education. The relation between thetheory of cybernetic control and the intended applications toeducation would seem to be one of the crucial ideas ineducational technology.
In the 1972 definition of educational technology (and thetwo subsequent revisions), control was replaced withfacilitate. The later concept continues to have currency incontemporary education language to the degree thatfacilitator commonly replaces teacher or instructor in manyforms of educational text. Still, facilitate does not convey thecrucial ideas that control did in the first definition. Yet, theinformation technology that has become the tool-set foreducational technology does contain the feedback andcontrol components as its underlying form. How the idea ofeducational technology as a process relates to the logic anddesign of its tools is an area of importance that needs furtherinvestigation. Control, as used in cybernetic and systemstheory is a different category of concept than any of the othersin the educational technology definitions. Control wasintroduced as a formal concept with a mathematicalexpression. It is not clear that theory, process ,communications, message, learning, or facilitate follow thatsame intention.
Januszewski does not take up the distinction betweeneducational technology and distance education. It is notnecessary to his project to do so. Yet, as the two are frequentlyconflated, I think it important to explain the difference. Thehistory of distance education begins about 150 years ago.Industrial age transportation and public postal systems madeit possible to exchange instructional materials at a distance.It is plain that distance education is a result of industrialtechnology (Keegan, 1996, 7-8). As technology advances, sodo the prospects for distance education. The impact of theinternet on distance education is still open to assessment,but consider the state of affairs in 1995: at least ten distanceeducation systems around the world were serving up to100,000 at a time for an annual total of about 3.5 millionlearners. Most of these were television and correspondencesystems. All of the ten had been long-established (some formore than 50 years) and none of the ten were in the UnitedStates (Keegan, 1996, 4). Distance education is a firmly-basedpractice by which much of the world’s higher education
learners are educated. The defining features of distanceeducation are that it is formal education (i.e. mediated by aneducational institution) in which the teacher and learner aswell as the learner and the learner group are separated intime and space.
Educational technology does not presume a space/timeseparation of teacher and learner and learner group; face-to-face communication may well be part of the educationaltechnology model, but not in distance education. Distanceeducation is a type of teaching and learning. Educationaltechnology is a process in which technology is applied to theproblems of teaching and learning (but, here I depart fromthe AECT definitions). The key point is that distance educationis a large and growing force in all levels of education. Wemay be on the path to seeing distance education becomethe primary form of educating for all post-secondary learners.Being that all distance education is mediated by technology,the study of educational technology is fundamental todistance education. Januszewski points us in the rightdirection for the investigation into our changing educationalenvironment.
Notes1. (2001. Libraries Unlimited, Inc.: Englewood, CO. 2. http://www.lu.com).2. Henry A. Wise, Motion Pictures as an Aid in Teaching AmericanHistory (Yale UP, 1939), p. 1).Weiner, N.(1961), Cybernetics: Communication and Control in theAnimal and the Machine. Cambridge MA: The MIT Press.Wiener, N., The Extrapolation, Interpolation, and Smoothing ofStationary Time Series with Engineering Applications, New York:Wiley, 1949.
COMPUTER ETHICS INFORMATION
Douglas BirschShippensburg University of Pennsylvaniadrbirs@ship.edu
This issue’s column discusses two computer ethics texts andtwo useful websites. The first text is the second edition ofComputers, Ethics, and Society by M. David Ermann, Mary B.Williams, and Michele S. Shauf. Oxford University Presspublished the first edition in 1990 and the second edition,containing about 80 percent new articles, came out in 1997.While this 340-page edited volume does not include the latestarticles in the field, it is a solid collection of essays that willbe useful to readers. The editors remark that, “The SecondEdition analyzes the promise and problems of computers, andhelps students recognize the broad social, cultural, economic,and psychological effects of computers.” In an effort toaccomplish this, they have chosen a broad range ofinterdisciplinary readings, which are divided into four parts.Part 1, “Computers in an Ethics Framework,” contains sevenarticles grouped under the following headings: “The EthicalContext of Computing,” “Ethical Theories We All Use,” and“Is Our Intuitive Moral Sense a Reliable Guide?” The secondsection, “Computers and Personal Life,” includes nine articlesunder these headings: “Privacy Concerns in ComputerizedSociety,” Effects of Computerization on Personal Fulfillment,
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and “How Computers Affect Interpersonal Relationships.”The third part, “Computers and the Just Society,” has elevenarticles grouped under the headings “Work in ComputerizedSociety,” “Computer Law in the Just Society,” and “The Roleof Government in Computerized Society.” The fourth and finalsection contains eight articles under two headings “WhatPeople Do Matters” and “Professional Codes.” Overall, thetext contains a slightly dated, but very useful selection ofarticles on computer ethics and information technology.
The second text from Jones and Bartlett Publishers isCyber Ethics: Morality and Law in Cyberspace by RichardSpinello. Published in 2000, this 165-page book covers alimited number of topics related to the Internet andCyberspace. The author mentions two main purposes for thisbook. The first purpose is to explore the social costs andmoral problems that have been produced by the expandeduse of the Internet and World Wide Web. The second purposeis to investigate the question: Is the proper model of Internetcontrol centralized state controls or decentralized individualcontrols? Thus, the text has a more narrow focus than manybooks on computer or information ethics. While the book’sfocus may not be as broad as other texts, the concentrationon the Internet and cyberspace may increase its relevanceand interest for students. Readers will find six chapters inthe book with the following titles: “The Internet and EthicalValues,” “Governing and Regulating the Internet,” “FreeSpeech and Content Control in Cyberspace,” “IntellectualProperty in Cyberspace,” “Regulating Internet Privacy,” and“Securing the Electronic Frontier.” Most of the chapterscontain an Introduction, an extended and accessiblediscussion of the issue, discussion questions, and a coupleof case studies. The book also includes a Glossary,Bibliography, and Index. Overall, Cyber Ethics contains aninteresting, accessible, and recent discussion of someimportant and relevant issues related to the Internet andcyberspace.
Two extremely useful websites related to computer ethicsare “Ethics in Computing” and “Ethics and InformationTechnology.” The “Ethics in Computing” website is supportedby North Carolina State University and is maintained by Dr.Edward F. Gehringer at http://www2.ncsu.edu/eos/info/computer_ethics. This well-organized site has links to articlesand cases. Some of the subtopics also have studyguides,discussion questions, and lecture notes included. The sitecan be searched with a search engine found on the homepage. “Ethics in Computing” is organized into eight majorsections, which are divided into subtopics. The “Basics”section contains links to ethical theories, codes of ethics, andwhistleblowing. The section on commerce contains linksrelated to issues such as anticompetitive practices,spamming, cybersquatting, and term papers. The part onsocial/justice has links to equity of access and workplaceissues among others. The computer abuse section containslinks about worms, viruses, and hacking. Another sectionhas links related to speech issues, such as netiquette,pornography, hate speech, and email. The part on intellectualproperty has links to patents and copyright laws, softwarepiracy, and an excellent section on MP3s. The privacy sectioncontains links to encryption and various other privacy issues.Finally, an area labeled “Risks” contains links related toartificial intelligence, software safety and reliability, andnetwork security. While there are many sites with links, this
one is very well organized and has articles from a wide varietyof sources. The site should be extremely useful.
The second useful website, “Ethics and InformationTechnology,” is supported by the Colorado School of Minesand can be found at http://www.mines.edu/Academic/computer/ethics/. This site is not as extensive as the previousone, but it has some links that make it very useful. The creatorsof the site state that, “The following links have been createdas a starting point to help members of the CSM communitylearn more about CSM policies as well as the ethical issuesassociated with the use of information and communicationstechnologies in our society.” It is the links to CSM policiesthat make the site particularly interesting and useful. Thesepolicies can be compared to those in place at the student’sinstitution for a valuable learning exercise. The site alsocontains additional links grouped under the followingheadings: “Netiquette,” “Ethics in Computing Links,”“Cyberspace for Non-Lawyers,” “Security,” “Identity Theft,”“Copyright,” “Copying and Music on the Internet,”“Trademarks and Patents,” “Software Licensing and Piracy,”Spamming and Chain Letters,” and “Free Speech, Privacy, andAnonymity.” This is a clearly organized site with links to alimited number of useful sites and to the computer andinformation technology policies of the Colorado School ofMines.
I hope you find this information useful. Please feel freeto let me know about books, websites, or journals that shouldbe brought to the attention of our colleagues(email@example.com). I am also interested in short articles onany topic related to computer ethics and informationtechnology.
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The Passing of a Polymath
Jon DorboloOregon State UniversityJon.Dorbolo@orst.edu
Polymath. n. Greek, from poly (many) + manthanein(to learn). A person of encyclopedic learning.
Herbert Alexander Simon is the paradigmcase of a polymath. His bibliographyextends to 962 published works. This bodyof literature covers an unbelievably widerange of scholarly, technical, and practicalfields. He is a pioneer of artificialintelligence, Nobel Laureate in economicscience, radical innovator in psychology,founder of cognitive science, innovator inphilosophy and history of science, major
contributor to political science, statistics, design theory, publicadministration, organization theory, computer science,management science, social psychology, and education.Herbert Simon, admired by all and loved by many, diedFebruary 9, 2001.
CAP@CMU in August 2000 was fortunate to receive akeynote address from Herbert Simon (with Hyunchul Kim,Carnegie Mellon), Heuristic Methods to Achieve ‘NaturalProofs’ in a Computer Tutor for Logic. Simon’s presentationincluded an argument demonstrating that computers arecapable of mathematical discovery.
Simon shared with Alan Newell the A.M. Turing Award(1975) from the Association for Computing Machinery, for thefirst artificial intelligence program. The award wasaccompanied by this statement; “Herbert A. Simon’s scientificoutput goes far beyond the disciplines in which he has heldprofessorships: political science, administration, psychologyand information sciences. He has made contributions in thefields of science theory, applied mathematics, statistics,operations research, economics and business and publicadministration (and), in all areas in which he has conductedresearch, Simon has had something of importance to say.”
In economics, Simon produced a model of human beingsas beings of limited rationality who use heuristic decisionprocedures to circumvent limitations of time and memory.This constituted a radical departure from the traditional viewof humans as wholly rational decision makers. Chief amongthe honors received for this work was a Nobel Prize inEconomic Sciences in 1978. Among the key works in thisarea are Human Problem Solving, with A. Newell, (1972);Models of Discovery (1977); The New Science of ManagementDecision, revised edition (1977); and Models of BoundedRationality (1981).
In the 1960’s Simon successfully challenged the basicprecept of behaviorism — the prohibition from considerationof internal processes. Alternately, Simon proposed thathuman beings use symbolic processes to solve problems,
reason, speak and write, learn and invent. He went on todemonstrate the roles of these processes via computerprograms that simulate human behavior. This activity gaverise to the currently vital areas of cognitive psychology andcognitive science. Among other honors, he was awarded theGold Medal Award for Psychological Science from theAmerican Psychological Foundation (1988).
In a brilliant article, Putting it all Together, Simon’s maincollaborator for nearly 40 years, Alan Newell, summed upSimon’s genius as turning on a conceptual pivot point; “Thecentral idea is bounded rationality –– there are limits on manas a decision maker and these limits, especially those ofcognitive processing in all its varied forms, loom large inman”s behavior. Everything that Simon has done hasstemmed from the working out of this idea.” (Newell, 1989,p.400).
Simon’s insight into the bounds of human rationality leadto a vast array of applications in areas where problem solving,decision making, and information processing operate. Thefollowing table (adapted from Newell, 1989, p. 436) indicatesareas where Simon’s insight took him with great effect. Theright column provides representative citations that make agood starting point to Simon’s work in that area.
While not exhaustive of Simon’s breadth of influence,this table leaves me astonished that one person couldunderstand and innovate so much. While it shows Simon asupreme intellect, there is another lesson to be learned fromthis cluster of accomplishments. According to Newell,Simon’s genius consisted in his ability to apply a rich idea(bounded rationality) to a wealth of topics. That this idea isso broadly applicable, supports the conclusion that thesetopics have common ground in the theory of problem solvingand decision making. When we understand that humandecisions are not the result of a closed rational system, but
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are functions of processes that seek to compensate for limitedinformation and processing power, then we are led tochallenge the classic philosophical conception of the agentor aggregate of agents.
In economics, Simon contended that the theory of“economic man,” which pictures the individual invariablychoosing a course that s/he believes will maximize self-interest, fails to account for the inherent uncertainty of humanaction. This rational and self-interested agent is also thefamiliar character who populates modern moral theories.Economic and ethical theories must be revised in light of thelimits that Simon posits to human rationality, and action mustbe recast in terms of the decision making processes that seekto compensate for those limits. This is equally true oforganizational behavior, social psychology, political action,and scientific activity. By challenging the received picture ofthe human thinker/agent, Simon succeeds in shaking thefoundations of many areas at once. At minimum, this exposesto us the shared assumptions that these varied areas ofintellectual pursuit rest upon. That, alone, is an insight worthyof reflection.
Herbert Simon went far beyond the role of shaker andchallenger. He focused much of his study on the specificprocesses of human cognition: the components of problemsolving and decision making. In this work, cognitive scienceis born. Table 2 shows the range of information processesthat Simon took under investigation and the dates of keypublications from those investigations.
Newell regards this cluster of cognitive topics, and therecognition that they share common problems, as pointingthe way to a unified theory of cognition. It is this unity oftopic, Newell asserts, that Simon has long recognized andsought to clarify; “Thus Herb, with a serenity and presciencethat some of the rest of us lack, has always seen the field
whole –– has seen it as the unfolding of a single central idea.It has allowed him to move from topic to topic within thearea, always assured that the particular bit of the cathedralhe happens to work on will add to the total structure –– willhelp put it all together” (Newell, 1989).
If anything could be more striking than the prospect of aunified theory of cognition, it would be the prospect ofapplying awareness of our bounded rationality to the task ofincreasing human ability: i.e. education. Simon spent muchof his work in the 1990’s and 2000’s on matters of education.Whereas issues of economics and organization (and perhapsethics) are impacted by changes in decision theory, so too iseducation impacted by changes in our understanding ofproblem solving.
In a 1998 address to the Carnegie-Mellon EngineeringCollege, Simon observed; “When we study the process ofdesign, we discover that design is problem solving. If you havea basic theory of problem solving, then you are well on yourway to a theory of design. This discovery came as no deepsurprise to those of us who had been doing cognitive researchon human thinking in other domains. Design is a special kindof problem solving…We are beginning to learn what kind ofa problem solving process design is, and what its underlyingprinciples are. If we want to teach design effectively, then weas teachers ought to know a good deal about its theory andabout the empirical evidence that supports the theory. Andthese matters ought to enter into the construction of ourcourses and ought to enter into the construction of theinstructional technology that we use in those courses.”
One of the powerful insights in seeing the design processas a type of problem solving is that thereare limits on that process from the start;“Design is usually the kind of problemsolving we call ill-structured. Unlike theTower of Hanoi or even chess, you don’tstart off with a well-defined goal. Nor doyou start off with a clear set of alternatives,or perhaps any alternatives at all. Goalsand alternatives have to emerge throughthe design process itself: One of its firsttasks is to clarify and elaborate goals and to begin to generatealternatives.” (Simon, 1998).
This insight may be applied to learning generally; i.e.learning and teaching are problem solving processes. As indesign, the alternatives of teaching and learning are generatedas the process proceeds. A realistic (i.e. effective) educationalprocess involves an indeterminate starting point and anuncertain path to the end point. This insight runs counter tomuch of traditional and contemporary educationalprocedures that start and end with known factors. In manycurricula, all of the relevant information is already present inthe readings and lectures-to-be. The learning task is one ofprocessing that information efficiently. We test for theacquisition of that knowledge by instruments in which all ofthe alternatives are available (e.g. multiple choice exams).Such practices run counter to Simon’s understanding ofproblem solving as a process conditioned by boundedrationality. Realistic education will accord to models basedon the genuine dynamics of problem solving and decisionmaking. It is essentially a creative process —
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open ended and experiential. If uses of educationaltechnology were based on such principles, we may hope forsignificant advances in education. Unfortunately, mostapplications of educational technology do not even comeclose. Thus, there is ample opportunity and need to developthe dimensions of Simon’s central idea.Philosophers would do well to take up thatchallenge.
CAP@CMU in August 2001 openedwith a Herbert Simon memorial deliveredby Jim Moor (Dartmouth College), DavinLafon (MS, Carnegie Mellon), RichardScheines (Carnegie Mellon), and PrestonCovey (Carnegie Mellon). Throughout thetalks, there ran a common thread ofprofound respect (“awe” might be more accurate) forSimon”s extensive knowledge and powerful intellect. Inseveral instances, strong emotion gave proof to the humanity,compassion, and patience which Herbert Simon extendedto his colleagues and students. The man was loved and ismissed. An excellent memorial website is provided byCarnegie-Mellon at http://www.cs.cmu.edu/simon/memorial.html.
We all owe it to ourselves to process some of HerbertSimon”s information. Below is a selected bibliography whichis a mere fraction of his oeuvre. A comprehensivebibliography is available at http://www.psy.cmu.edu/psy/faculty/hsimon/hsimon.html.
In his intellectual auto-biography, Models of My Life,Herbert Simon reflected on his (then) 68 years with thefollowing;
“In describing my life, I have situated it in a labyrinthof paths that branch, in a castle of innumerablerooms. The life is in moving through that garden orcastle, experiencing surprises along the path youfollow, wondering (but not too solemnly) where theother paths would have led: a heuristic search forthe solution of an ill-structured problem. It needs nosumming up beyond the living of it.” (Simon, 1991,p.367).
Selected BibliographySimon, H.A. (1947). Administrative Behavior. New York, NY:Macmillan.Simon, H.A., Smithburg, D.W., & Thompson, V.A. (1950). PublicAdministration. New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf.Simon, H.A., (1954). Bandwagon and underdog effects andthe possibility of election predictions. Public OpinionQuarterly, 18, 245-253Simon, H.A., & Guetzkow, H. (1955a). A model of short- andlong-run mechanisms involved in pressures toward uniformityin groups. Psychological Review, 62, 56-68.Simon, H.A. (1955b). On a class of skew distribution functions.Biometrika, 42, 425-440.Simon, H.A. (1961). Modeling human mental processes.Proceedings of the Western Joint Computer Conference, May,111-120.Newell, A., & Simon, H.A. (1961). Computer simulation ofhuman thinking. Science, 134, 2011-2017.
Simon, H.A. (1961). The control of the mind by reality: Humancognition and problem solving. In S.M. Farber and R.H.L.Wilson (Eds.), Control of the mind (pp. 219-232). New York,NY: McGraw-Hill.Newell, A., & Simon, H.A. (1961). Simulation of humanthought. In D. Wayne (Ed.), Current trends in psychologicaltheory (pp. 152-179). Pittsburgh, PA: University of PittsburghPress.Newell, A., & Simon, H.A. (1962). Computer simulation ofhuman thinking and problem solving. In M. Greenberger (Ed.),Management and the computer of the future (pp.94-133). NewYork, NY: Wiley.Simon, H.A. (1965). Understanding creativity. CarnegieReview, 1964/1965, No. 2, 8pp.Simon, H.A. (1969). The Sciences of the Artificial. The KarlTaylor Compton lectures.] Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.Simon, H.A. (1970). The axiomatization of physical theories.Philosophy of Science, 37, 16-26.Newell, A., Perlis, A.J., & Simon, H.A. (1967). What is computerscience? [Letter to the editor.] Science, 157, 1373-1374.Holt, C.C., Modigliani, Muth, J., & Simon, H.A. (1960). PlanningProduction, Inventories, and Work Force. Englewood Cliffs,NJ: Prentice-Hall.Simon, H.A., & Rescher, N. (1966). Cause and counterfactual.Philosophy of Science, 33, 323-240.Simon, H.A. (1967). Motivational and emotional controls ofcognition. Psychological Review, 74, 29-39.Simon, H.A. (1977). The New Science of Management Decision(rev. ed.). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.Ijiri, Y., & Simon, H.A. (1977). Skew Distributions and the Sizesof Business Firms. Amsterdam: North-Holland.Simon, H.A. (1979). Models of Thought (Vol. I). New Haven,CT: Yale University Press.Simon, H.A. (1979). What kind of place is a university? PITT,(University of Pittsburgh publication) 34(1), 9-11.Simon, H.A. (1979). Artificial intelligence research strategiesin the light of AI models of scientific discovery. Proceedingsof the Sixth International Joint Conference on ArtificialIntelligence, 2, 1086-1094.Simon, H.A. (1982). Models of Bounded Rationality (Vols. 1 &2). Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.Newell, A. (1989). Putting it All Together. In ComplexInformation Processing: The Impact of Herbert A. Simon.Klahr, D., Kotovsky, K. (Eds.). Hillsdale, NJ: LawrenceErlbaum.Simon, H.A. (1989). Human experts and knowledge-basedsystems. In M. Tokoro, Y. Anzai, and A. Yonezawa (Eds.),Concepts and characteristics of knowledge-based systems(pp. 1-21). Amsterdam: North Holland.Simon, H.A. (1990). Epistemology: Formal and empirical. InW. Sieg (Ed.), Acting and reflecting (pp. 127-128). Dordrecht:Kluwer Academic Publishers.Simon, H.A. (1990). Information technologies andorganizations [Interview]. The Accounting Review, 65, 658-667.Kaplan, C., & Simon, H.A. (1990). In search of insight. CognitivePsychology, 22, 374-419.
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Kulkarni, D., & Simon, H.A. (1990). Experimentation inmachine discovery. In J. Shrager and P. Langley (Eds.),Computational models of scientific discovery and theoryformation (Chap. 9). San Mateo, CA: Morgan Kaufmann.Simon, H.A. (1990). Discovery by computers. In P. Wegner(Ed.), Strategic directions in computing research (pp. 42-48).Association of Computing Machinery and The ComputingResearch Association, ACM Press.Simon, H.A. (1990). A mechanism for social selection andsuccessful altruism. Science, 250, 1665-1668.Simon, H.A. (1991). Mind as machine: The cognitive revolutionin behavioral science. In R. Jessor (Ed.), Perspectives inbehavioral science: The Colorado lectures (Chap. 3). Boulder,CO: Westview Press.Simon, H.A. (1991). Comments on the symposium “ComputerDiscovery and the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge.” SocialStudies of Science, 21, 143-148.Simon, H.A. (1991). Black ravens and a white shoe. BritishJournal for the Philosophy of Science, 42, 339-342.Simon, H.A. (1989). Testimony: Social and Behavioral SciencePrograms in the National Science Foundation. U.S. House ofRepresentatives, Subcommittee on Science, Research andTechnology.Simon, H.A. (1992). The computer as a laboratory forepistemology. In L. Burkholder (Ed.), Philosophy and thecomputer (pp. 1-23). Boulder, CO: The Westview Press.Simon, H.A. (1992). Linguistics a natural science? Comment.Communications of the Workshop for Scientific Linguistics,2(8), 43-44.Simon, H.A., & Schaeffer, J. (1992). The game of chess. InR.J. Aumann and S. Hart (Eds.), Handbook of game theory(Vol. 1, pp. 2-17). Holland: Elsevier.Simon, H.A. (1992). Altruism and economics. EasternEconomic Journal, 18(1), 73-83.Simon, H.A. (1993). A very early expert system. Annals of theHistory of Computing, 15(3), 63-68.Simon, H.A. (1993). The human mind: The symbolic level.Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, 137, 638-647.Simon, H.A. (1994). Bottleneck of attention: Connectingthought with motivation. In W.D. Spaulding (Ed.), Integrativeviews of motivation, cognition, and emotion, (pp. 1-21).Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press.Simon, H.A. (1995). Rationality in political behavior. PoliticalPsychology, 16, 45-63.Simon, H.A. (1995). AI is an empirical science. The World andI, 10(7), 326-327.Simon, H.A. (1995). The information-processing theory ofmind. American Psychologist, 50(7), 507-508. [The 1993American Psychological Association Award for LifetimeContribution to Psychology lecture.]Simon, H.A. (1997). Scientific approaches to the question ofconsciousness. In J.D. Cohen and J.W. Schooler (Eds.),Scientific approaches to consciousness (Chapter 28).Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.Simon, H.A. (1997). On the possibility of accurate publicprediction. Journal of Socio-Economics, 26(2), 127-132.Simon, H.A. (1997). The future of information systems. Annalsof Operations Research, 71, 3-14.
Simon, H.A. (1998). Economics as a historical science.Theoria, 13(32), 241-260.Simon, H.A. (1998). What we know about learning. Journalof Engineering Education, 87(4), 343-348.Simon, H.A. (1999). The discovery of magnetic induction ofcurrent:The interplay of phenomena and concepts [Abstract].History of Science Society, 1999 Annual Meeting Program, p.147.Simon, H.A. (2000). Observations on the sciences of sciencelearning. Journal of Applied Developmental Psychology, 21(1),115-121.Simon, H.A. (2000). Universal basic income and the flat tax.Boston Review, 25(5), 9-10.Simon, H.A. (2000). Issues of methodology in using empiricaldata to test theories of cognition. In Proceedings of theSeventh Annual ACT-R Workshop. Carnegie Mellon University,Pittsburgh, PA.Simon, H.A. (2000). Public administration in today’s world oforganizations and markets. PS: Political Science & Politics,33(4), 749-756.Simon, H.A. (2001). Seek and ye shall find: How curiosityengenders discovery (pp. 3-18). In K.D. Crowley, C.D. Schunn,& T. Okada (Eds.), Designing for science: Implications fromeveryday classroom, and professional settings. Mahwah, NJ:Erlbaum.Simon, H.A. (2001). Achieving excellence through education(pp.181-194). In M. Ferrari (Ed.), The pursuit of excellencethrough education. Mahwah, NJ:Erlbaum.