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1 NCCI Security Trends Analysis (August 2010) serves as internal advice for NCCI members only and should not be forwarded outside of your organization. If forwarded internally, care must be taken to ensure that it is not passed on to any third parties. NCCI Security Trends Analysis August 2010 3 RD AUGUST 2010 The NCCI Security Trends Analysis is provided to member NGOs on a monthly basis as an informational and advisory report on possible trends, threats and incidents based on information received from NGOs, the media, international organizations and official sources. Every reasonable effort is made to ensure the accuracy of the information contained in this analysis. NCCI collates information from reliable sources. Where a source is in doubt, NCCI seeks to corroborate that information. There may be an occasion when some information is included and its accuracy cannot be guaranteed. This typically occurs with an emerging or developing situation when it is considered in the best interests of NCCI’s member organizations to be made aware of any available information. Technical and general information is available to members at the NCCI website: www.ncciraq.org We welcome comments and contributions from the NGO community to make this tool as useful as possible. Please do not hesitate to contact us at: [email protected] We thank you in advance for NOT disseminating this document and ensuring that it is only circulated between members within your organisation.
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NCCI Security Trends Analysis August 2010Hundreds of thousands of Shiite pilgrims marched to Karbala and the Iraqi government deployed more than 30,000 additional policemen and soldiers

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Page 1: NCCI Security Trends Analysis August 2010Hundreds of thousands of Shiite pilgrims marched to Karbala and the Iraqi government deployed more than 30,000 additional policemen and soldiers

1

NCCI Security Trends Analysis (August 2010) serves as internal advice for NCCI members only and should not be forwarded outside of your organization. If forwarded internally, care must be taken to ensure that it is not passed on to any third parties.

NCCI Security Trends Analysis

August 2010

3RD AUGUST 2010

The NCCI Security Trends Analysis is provided to member NGOs on a monthly basis as an informational and advisory report on possible trends, threats and incidents based on information received from NGOs, the media, international organizations and official sources. Every reasonable effort is made to ensure the accuracy of the information contained in this analysis. NCCI collates information from reliable sources. Where a source is in doubt, NCCI seeks to corroborate that information. There may be an occasion when some information is included and its accuracy cannot be guaranteed. This typically occurs with an emerging or developing situation when it is considered in the best interests of NCCI’s member organizations to be made aware of any available information. Technical and general information is available to members at the NCCI website: www.ncciraq.org We welcome comments and contributions from the NGO community to make this tool as useful as possible. Please do not hesitate to contact us at: [email protected] We thank you in advance for NOT disseminating this document and ensuring that it is only

circulated between members within your organisation.

Page 2: NCCI Security Trends Analysis August 2010Hundreds of thousands of Shiite pilgrims marched to Karbala and the Iraqi government deployed more than 30,000 additional policemen and soldiers

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NCCI Security Trends Analysis (August 2010) serves as internal advice for NCCI members only and should not be forwarded outside of your organization. If forwarded internally, care must be taken to ensure that it is not passed on to any third parties.

Map of Iraq

Page 3: NCCI Security Trends Analysis August 2010Hundreds of thousands of Shiite pilgrims marched to Karbala and the Iraqi government deployed more than 30,000 additional policemen and soldiers

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NCCI Security Trends Analysis (August 2010) serves as internal advice for NCCI members only and should not be forwarded outside of your organization. If forwarded internally, care must be taken to ensure that it is not passed on to any third parties.

Table of Contents

NCCI Security Trends Analysis August 2010

Recent Attacks

Shiite Pilgrims ……………………………………………………………………………………………….…………………………….… 4

Sahwa Members ……………………………………………………………………………………………………….…………………… 4

Liquor Stores, Jewellery Vendors, and Banks …………..…………………..…………………….…………………………. 6

Baquba City ………………………………………………………………………………………………………….………….………..….. 7

Residential Bombings in Anbar………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 7

Continued Political Stalemate

Enduring Deadlock in New Government Formation ………………………………………………….….……….….….. 8

Politicians becoming Assassination Targets ………………………………………………………….……………..….……. 9

Mass Demonstrations and Protests ……………………………………………………………….…..……………………...... 10

US-Led Drawdown of MNF-I

Drawdown Progress …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 10

Potential Peacekeeping Mission …………………………………………………………………………………………………… 11

Assessing ISF Capabilities and Preparedness ………………………………………………………………………………… 11

Gradually Transferring Sovereignty to Iraqis ……………………………………………………………………………...... 12

Possible Re-Emergence of Al-Sadr ……………………………………………………………………………………….……….. 12

Page 4: NCCI Security Trends Analysis August 2010Hundreds of thousands of Shiite pilgrims marched to Karbala and the Iraqi government deployed more than 30,000 additional policemen and soldiers

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NCCI Security Trends Analysis (August 2010) serves as internal advice for NCCI members only and should not be forwarded outside of your organization. If forwarded internally, care must be taken to ensure that it is not passed on to any third parties.

NCCI Security Trends Analysis August 2010

Recent Attacks

Attacks on Shiite Pilgrims

Hundreds of thousands of Shiite pilgrims marched to the city of Kadhumiya in northwest Baghdad on 7th

July to mark the anniversary of the death of Moussa Al-Kadhum, who was the seventh of the twelve Shiite Imams in the 8

th century. This year, more than 50 pilgrims were killed and 300 wounded when a crowd was attacked by

a suicide bomber on 6th

July. This attack occurred in the predominantly Sunni city of Adhamiya, an area that many pilgrims opted to avoid due to its reputation as a stronghold for Iraqi insurgent groups, and particularly Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). Less than 24 hours after this attack, more than 11 pilgrims were killed in other bombings that occurred in Baghdad.

The Ba’ath party severely restricted these types of pilgrimages under the former regime. Since the 2003 Multi-National Force (MNF-I) invasion, these pilgrimages have drawn impressive crowds of Shiites from the greater region. As a result of past attacks targeting pilgrims, the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and the Government of Iraq (GoI) imposed heightened security measures in Baghdad during this year’s pilgrimage. Vehicles were banned in the mainly Shiite area of Kadhumiya, where the shrine itself is located. 200,000 additional police officers and soldiers were stationed along the pilgrims' main routes. There was also a temporary, city-wide ban on motorbikes, bicycles, and even carts in order to reduce the risk of vehicle attacks. It is interesting to note that the GoI did not respond to Shiite cleric Moqtada Al-Sadr’s offer to help the ISF protect Shiite holy sites. This lack of response, coupled with the attacks on Shiite pilgrims that were not averted by ISF, may further agitate Moqtada Al-Sadr’s followers.

A more recent pilgrimage between 26th

and 28th

July, which commemorated the life of the twelfth Imam Al-Zeman (Mahdi), was also a target for violence. Hundreds of thousands of Shiite pilgrims marched to Karbala and the Iraqi government deployed more than 30,000 additional policemen and soldiers to patrol the area. Two car bombs exploded near Karbala, killing at least 22 and wounding 54. In targeting Shiite pilgrims and places of worship, insurgents are attempting to reignite sectarian violence in Iraq. Other mosques have been recently bombed, including a Shiite mosque in Abu Sayeda of Diyala on 21

st July.

Sahwa Members Increasingly Targeted

Over the past few months, leaders and members of the Sahwa movement (also known as “the Awakening” or “the Sons of Iraq”) have been popular targets for sophisticated, well-planned assassinations. These violent incidents generally involve gunmen, sometimes disguised as ISF members, attacking former or current Sahwa members in their homes or neighborhoods with silencer weapons or sticky bombs

1. As of the parliamentary

elections in March, the government has appeared indifferent to the assassinations of several high-profile Sahwa members. This may have dangerous consequences, as the Sahwa have become a critical aspect of Iraq’s delicate security situation.

1 Sticky bombs are deadly explosives that can be attached to a vehicle via adhesive or magnet.

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NCCI Security Trends Analysis (August 2010) serves as internal advice for NCCI members only and should not be forwarded outside of your organization. If forwarded internally, care must be taken to ensure that it is not passed on to any third parties.

NCCI Record of Attacks against Sahwa Members from June 2010 - July 2010

Date of Incident 2010

Description of Security Incident

25th July The ISF recovered the kidnapped son of a local Sahwa leader in Baquba, Diyala. The son was reportedly kidnapped by gunmen.

22nd July A suicide bomber attacked Sahwa members in the Qaim district of Anbar. This resulted in many casualties.

21st July In the Mechanic neighbourhood of Dura, Baghdad, an unidentified group blew up a liquor store and disseminated flyers that urge Sahwa members to immediately quit their jobs.

21st July Gunmen assassinated one Sahwa leader in Dura, Baghdad, with silencer weapons. In an apparently separate incident in Dura, two Sahwa members were kidnapped.

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18th July A bomber targeted a queue of Sahwa members who were waiting to receive their pay checks at a government building in southwest Baghdad. The explosion killed 44 and wounded at least 40.

18th July Gunmen stormed the house of a Sahwa leader in the Yusufiya district of Baghdad, killing the man and 4 of his sons.

15th July The ISF arrested Sahwa members in the Rasheed district in southern Baghdad. A local Sahwa leader was recently assassinated in the same area.

14th July Gunmen, disguised in ISF uniforms, attacked a meeting of Sahwa members in Dura, Baghdad, and killed 16 Sahwa

members. The gunmen used silencer weapons.

13th July Gunmen attacked and injured a former Sahwa leader in his home in the Abu-Ghraib district of the governorate of Anbar.

4th July A local Sahwa leader in the Mechanic neighborhood of Dura, Baghdad, was assassinated by a sticky bomb.

27th June Gunmen killed a Sahwa member and his wife in northern Baquba, Diyala.

17th June The ISF detained 7 Sahwa members in Dura, Baghdad.

14th June An attack against a Sahwa-guarded checkpoint in the Ammiriya area of western Baghdad resulted in 6 deaths, including a local Sahwa leader.

*** These records were compiled based on NCCI’s daily updated Field Network Reports, which can be viewed by NCCI members only at the following link: http://www.ncciraq.org/index.php?option=com_user&view=login&return=aHR0cDovL3d3dy5uY2NpcmFxLm9yZy9pbmRleC5waHA/b3B0aW9uPWNvbV9jb250ZW50JnZpZXc9YXJ0aWNsZSZpZD0xNDkmSXRlbWlkPTk3Jmxhbmc9ZW4=

The Sahwa forces are former Sunni insurgents who began to join the US-led MNF-I forces in 2005. The MNF-I offered Sahwa fighters incentives to turn against AQI and other insurgent groups. In return, the Sahwa fighters received arms and weapons, $300 monthly salaries, and other benefits from the MNF-I. The Pentagon has consistently credited the Sahwa fighters for significantly curbing AQI’s influence in Baghdad, Anbar and many other governorates that witnessed the worst bloodshed and violence from 2006-2008.

The Iraqi government is no longer actively ensuring security for Sahwa fighters in many governorates. In fact, most Sahwa fighters have recently had their monthly salaries cut. The Iraqi government’s reluctance to align with and protect Sahwa fighters may stem from GoI’s interest in building the ISF’s capabilities. Indeed, GoI may aim to weaken the numerous local, non-governmental militias that could potentially challenge the ISF’s control over the country. In early June 2010, the ISF disarmed more than 10,000 Sahwa fighters, mostly in the governorate of Diyala. Many Sahwa members have since warned that their cooperation with the ISF in many

volatile governorates will cease if more weapons permits are further revoked.

Many disarmed Sahwa members can no longer defend themselves against the potential enemies that they made as a result of assisting ISF and MNF-I over the past years. While 40,000 Sahwa members have been integrated into government positions in relevant ministries, it is estimated that at least an additional 40,000 Sahwa members are largely unemployed and uneducated. Some experts warn that if the new government does not responds to Sunni and Sahwa fighters’ demands, then the Sahwa members may become vulnerable for recruitment into other insurgent groups, including AQI, and take up arms against the ISF.

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NCCI Security Trends Analysis (August 2010) serves as internal advice for NCCI members only and should not be forwarded outside of your organization. If forwarded internally, care must be taken to ensure that it is not passed on to any third parties.

It is unclear which group(s) is primarily responsible for the latest wave of violence and assassinations targeting

Sahwa members. Many Sahwa members contend that AQI is to blame, seeking vengeance for Sahwa’s

perceived treachery against the Iraqi insurgent forces when it began direct cooperation with the MNF-I in

2005-2006. Indeed, AQI has taken responsibility for many recent bombings and shootings against Sahwa

fighters. Others claim that non-Sahwa, Sunni fighters are now attacking Sahwa members in revenge for their

defection from the insurgency to the MNF-I.

Liquor Stores, Jewellery Vendors and Banks among Popular Targets

While incidents of sectarian violence have decreased in recent years, violent crime rates continue to soar in many areas of Iraq. It appears that criminals and insurgents are increasingly able to exploit security gaps as the Iraqi government remains entangled in a national political deadlock.

According to NCCI’s daily updated Field Network Reports, there has been a rising trend in attacks against liquor stores. After the MNF-I invasion in 2003, liquor stores were popular insurgent targets. Restaurants and other places of entertainment were also frequent targets for attack. Some liquor store owners were murdered, threatened, or had their property destroyed. At the peak of violence in 2006 and 2007, most liquor shops closed down or only sold alcohol to close friends and neighbours. Along with security improvements in recent years, many stores have begun to reopen. Many analysts say that insurgents intend to capitalize on the political vacuum, and are increasingly turning towards organized crime as many insurgent militias weaken.

NCCI Record of Attacks against Liquor Stores from May 2010 - July 2010

Date of Incident 2010

Description of Security Incident

21st July In the Mechanic neighbourhood of Dura, Baghdad, an unidentified group blew up a liquor store and disseminated flyers that urge Sahwa members to immediately quit their jobs.

13th July Three liquor stores were attacked and blown up by gunmen in Dura, Baghdad, on 60th Street. Several injuries were reported.

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15th June A bombing in the Ghadeer area of eastern Baghdad targeted a liquor store.

8th June IEDs targeted a liquor store and an internet café in Dura, Baghdad, on 60th Street. Both buildings were destroyed.

1st May A car bomb targeted a liquor store in the Shurta area of southwestern Baghdad. This attack resulted in 9 deaths and 18 injuries.

*** These records were compiled based on NCCI’s daily updated Field Network Reports, which can be viewed by NCCI members only at the following link: http://www.ncciraq.org/index.php?option=com_user&view=login&return=aHR0cDovL3d3dy5uY2NpcmFxLm9yZy9pbmRleC5waHA/b3B0aW9uPWNvbV9jb250ZW50JnZpZXc9YXJ0aWNsZSZpZD0xNDkmSXRlbWlkPTk3Jmxhbmc9ZW4=

In the past few months, there have been several reports of gunmen raiding jewellery shops and markets, particularly in Baghdad. In most of these attacks, the criminals have escaped with large quantities of gold and shot the store owners and bystanders. Causalities are generally high in these types of raids, and the gunmen are usually armed with sophisticated weaponry, like silencers. Jewellers in Falluja, as well as other cities where multiple attacks have occurred, have reported that they are being summoned by local police, recommended to hire bodyguards, and counselled to keep weapons in their shops. Local police have repeatedly reported that insurgents, and especially AQI, are trying to replenish dwindling funds by selling stolen jewellery on the black market.

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NCCI Security Trends Analysis (August 2010) serves as internal advice for NCCI members only and should not be forwarded outside of your organization. If forwarded internally, care must be taken to ensure that it is not passed on to any third parties.

NCCI Record of Attacks against Jewellers and Jewellery Thefts from May 2010 - July 2010

Date of Incident 2010

Description of Security Incident

25th July Gunmen killed a returnee Christian family and stole their jewellery and car in Dura, Baghdad. The family had just returned to Iraq from Germany one day prior to the attack.

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11th July Unidentified armed men raided a house in the Zenjili area, west of Mosul city. The armed men stole jewellery and escaped. One woman was killed in the attack. Another woman and a 9-year-old girl were wounded.

7th July The ISF uncovered a plot to rob jewellery stores in Diwaniya city in the governorate of Qadissiya.

17th June The ISF began to enforce new security measures to protect banks and jewellery shops in the governorate of Wasit after a noticeable increase in criminal attacks against these businesses.

9th June Two armed women attempted to rob a jewellery store in Dura, Baghdad. People outside of the store were able to apprehend them.

12th May An armed group robbed a jewellery store in Suwaira district in the governorate of Wassit. The owner was injured and all of his jewellery was stolen.

1st May Two jewellery shops and a money changer were robbed in Dura and Qahira, Baghdad. The owners were killed.

*** These records were compiled based on NCCI’s daily updated Field Network Reports, which can be viewed by NCCI members only at the following link: http://www.ncciraq.org/index.php?option=com_user&view=login&return=aHR0cDovL3d3dy5uY2NpcmFxLm9yZy9pbmRleC5waHA/b3B0aW9uPWNvbV9jb250ZW50JnZpZXc9YXJ0aWNsZSZpZD0xNDkmSXRlbWlkPTk3Jmxhbmc9ZW4=

Robberies and attacks targeting banks have also risen in recent months, with security measures around banks subsequently tightening. Of the most notable bank-related security incidents, the 13

th June attack against the

Central Bank of Iraq left more than 15 individuals dead, 50 wounded, and caused widespread panic in downtown Baghdad. AQI claimed responsibility for the attack, which was executed by three suicide bombers and ten gunmen. Iraqi authorities are investigating the case further, as it appears that sensitive corruption case documents were burned in a fire set on the second floor of the building. Thus far, officials appear to believe that this fire incident was separate from the coordinated attack.

Baquba City Witnesses Wave of Attacks Baquba city, the capital of the governorate of Diyala in eastern Iraq, was recently the site of three consecutive

days of bombing incidents. On the 19th

of July, a car bomb that exploded near a restaurant in the village of Al

Ezat killed 7 and injured 17. The next day, Iranian pilgrims passing through the town of Kesireen by bus were

hit by a suicide bomber’s car. The explosion killed 7 and wounded 7 seven others. There are also reports that

a car bomb exploded in Qarataba sub-district on the 20th

, killing 6 people and injuring 12, but this information

has not been confirmed by officials. On the 21st

July, a bombing in the district of Abu Sayeda killed between 13

and 15 people and wounded at least 40 others. It appears that a car bomb was detonated near a mosque.

The ISF has recently enforced heightened security measures, such as curfews, and searched vehicles entering

and leaving Baquba city. While it remains unknown what group(s) is responsible for these attacks, many Sunni

insurgents and AQI members have relocated to Diyala from provinces like Anbar, where Sahwa aligned with

the MNF-I to drive these groups out beginning in 2005.

Residential Bombings on the Rise in Anbar In June and July 2010, numerous attacks have targeted the homes of Iraqi officials, and particularly high-

ranking Iraqi police officers. Unidentified groups of gunmen have planted and blown-up IEDs in private

residences, typically while Iraqi officials are in the homes with their families. This type of attack is occurring at

least weekly in the cities of Ramadi and Falluja in the governorate of Anbar. No group has claimed

responsibility, although many officials suspect that AQI is taking revenge against police officers who have

cooperated with the ISF or the MNF-I. This pattern of violence aims to undermine local Iraqis’ confidence in

the local police and security forces’ abilities to secure Anbar and other relatively volatile governorates of Iraq.

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NCCI Security Trends Analysis (August 2010) serves as internal advice for NCCI members only and should not be forwarded outside of your organization. If forwarded internally, care must be taken to ensure that it is not passed on to any third parties.

NCCI Record of Residential Bombings in July 2010 Date of Incident 2010

Description of Security Incident

22nd July Gunmen blew up police officers’ homes in Ramadi, Falluja, and other cities in the governorate of Anbar.

18th July Gunmen blew up the home of an ISF captain. The home was located in the Abu-Ghraib district of western Baghdad.

13th July Gunmen blew up four homes in the Tamaeem area of Ramadi city, resulting in 2 deaths. The houses belonged to police officers who reside in the governorate of Anbar.

12th July Unidentified gunmen blew up two homes that belonged to police officers in Ramadi, the capital of Anbar. Several casualties were reported.

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4th July The ISF dissembled an IED that had been implanted in front of the house of a Provincial Council member in the area of Nasiriyah in the southern governorate of Thi Qar.

*** These records were compiled based on NCCI’s daily updated Field Network Reports, which can be viewed by NCCI members only at the following link: http://www.ncciraq.org/index.php?option=com_user&view=login&return=aHR0cDovL3d3dy5uY2NpcmFxLm9yZy9pbmRleC5waHA/b3B0aW9uPWNvbV9jb250ZW50JnZpZXc9YXJ0aWNsZSZpZD0xNDkmSXRlbWlkPTk3Jmxhbmc9ZW4=

Continued Political Stalemate Post-Parliamentary Elections Enduring Deadlock in New Government Formation Approximately four and a half months after the national parliamentary elections in Iraq, which occurred on 7

th

March 2010, there is still no coalition with the majority that is necessary to declare victory and select a cabinet for Iraq’s next government. A political party or coalition would need 163 seats of the total 325 seats in Parliament in order to receive a mandate to form a new government. A period of post-election coalition building is normal in the Iraqi system, as no single party is expected to win a sufficient majority by electoral vote alone. Ayad Allawi’s Sunni and nationalist Iraqiyya coalition received the most seats, 91. Iraqiyya is closely trailed by the current Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki’s party, the State of Law. The State of Law party has a largely Shiite base and received 89 seats. The elected MPs have met only once since the election results were officially certified by the Iraqi Supreme Court on 1

st June. The 14

th June parliamentary session lasted a total of twenty minutes. This session was

essentially a formality to swear-in MPs; there was no open discussion on government formation. Many MPs are telling the public that they need more time to negotiate before they can decide who will assume the position of Prime Minister and appoint other high officials. Numerous private negotiations between Ayad Allawi, Nouri Al-Maliki, Jalal Talabani, Moqtada Al-Sadr, and other leading politicians have taken place in Iraq, Syria and other neighbouring countries. Despite these talks, the political process has failed to move forward. The latest scheduled parliamentary session was to be held on 28

th July, but it was postponed that morning. There is no official word as to when the next parliamentary

session will be scheduled. The US Vice President Biden and the US embassy are urging Al-Maliki and Allawi to reach a power-sharing agreement. The US administration does not want any politicians closely affiliated with Iran, such as Al-Sadr and Hakeem, to lead the next government. Some politicians have publically stated that they do not anticipate any substantial formation in terms of a new government until after the month of Ramadan, which will likely end between the 8

th and the 12

th September 2010. Analysts generally agree that this political and power

vacuum leaves Iraq more vulnerable than usual to domestic or foreign attacks.

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NCCI Security Trends Analysis (August 2010) serves as internal advice for NCCI members only and should not be forwarded outside of your organization. If forwarded internally, care must be taken to ensure that it is not passed on to any third parties.

Politicians becoming Assassination Targets Hundreds of politicians, tribal chiefs, police officers, Sunni clerics and Sahwa members have been assassinated in different localities throughout Iraq since the early March 2010 parliamentary elections. Other Iraqi elites, including university professors and judges, have also been increasingly targeted in multiple violent incidents. The four and a half month power vacuum at the national level has provided insurgents with more opportunities to heighten turmoil, intimidate high-level decision and policy makers, and threaten to further stall the formation of a new government. The Iraqiyya political party, a coalition of secular, nationalist and Sunni interests that won the most seats in the recent elections, has been a popular target for assassination. Iraqiyya leader Ayad Allawi has allegedly survived assassination plots at his home, the Baghdad International Airport, and in other settings. Allawi’s leading rival, current Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki—the leader of the State of Law party, which currently holds the second largest bloc in parliament—says that he has also been targeted for assassination on many occasions. Mosul city in the governorate of Ninewa appears to have the highest concentration of assassinations. Mosul city is part of the northern disputed territories, a source of tension between many Arabs and Kurds. This city is also a local stronghold for the Iraqiyya alliance. At least 3 Iraqiyya leaders have been assassinated in Mosul since March and there have been more than a dozen unsuccessful assassination attempts in the same area. Most of these attacks have been systematically planned and executed by disguised squads of gunmen equipped with homemade silencers or sticky bombs. As a result, some politicians have decided to arm themselves or to go into temporary hiding within or outside of Iraq. Many politicians have been attacked in their own homes, putting their family members at risk of injury or death. On the 31

st June and 1

st July, authorities reported that a “campaign of assassinations” killed at least 14 people

in Baghdad and Mosul alone, including 8 Iraqi police officers, an Iraqi general, a government intelligence officer, a Sahwa member, a tribal sheikh, and a senior member of Baghdad’s Provincial Council. On 9

th July,

the Vice President of the Iraqi Supreme Court, Mr. Hasan Aziz, was assassinated when a sticky bomb exploded underneath his car. His wife was critically injured. These are just a few examples of the near daily incidents that are pressuring many high-calibre individuals to flee Iraq, at least temporarily, until stability returns. Allawi has accused the incumbent Iraqi government of not providing adequate security provisions for fellow Iraqiyya party members, and even suggested in an interview with the England’s Times newspaper that the Al-Maliki’s administration might be aiding assassins. Many Iraqiyya officials and other victims of assassination attempts claim that some members of the ISF and local Iraqi police are either feeding intelligence to the gunmen, or actually participating in the attacks. Some Iraqiyya members admit that they no longer report intimidating threats or assassination attempts to the authorities. Al-Maliki contends that any politician is potentially vulnerable for assassination in the current political climate and has steadily refuted Allawi’s accusations as little more than “politically motivated.” The identity of those who are attacking high profile Iraqi figures—as well as their motives—remains uncertain.

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NCCI Security Trends Analysis (August 2010) serves as internal advice for NCCI members only and should not be forwarded outside of your organization. If forwarded internally, care must be taken to ensure that it is not passed on to any third parties.

NCCI Record of Assassinations and Assassination Attempts against Local and National Iraqi Leaders from June 2010 - July 2010

Date of Incident 2010

Description of Security Incident

28th July The Imam of the Salam Mosque in Araij village, south of Mosul, was assassinated in his house by unidentified armed men.

28th July A former member of the Ninewa Provincial Council, Ibraheem al-Mareer, was assassinated near his house in Mosul city. He was one of the representatives of the Arabic Tribes Gathering from 2005-2009.

13th July There was an assassination attempt against the director of the Department of Health, MP Qutaiba al-Jubouri, during his visit to the Samarra district in the governorate of Salah Al-Din.

13th July Gunmen assassinated a public servant working in the Baghdad municipality in the Harthiya area.

13th July Gunmen attacked the house of a former local leader of the Sahwa in Abu-Ghraib district of the governorate of Anbar. The former Sahwa leader was seriously injured.

12th July Unidentified gunmen assassinated a tribal leader in Ramadi city, the capital of the governorate of Anbar.

4th July The head of the Clergymen League was assassinated in the governorate of Anbar.

1st July The ISF found the body of the chairman of the local council of Khalij in the governorate of Basrah. It appears that he was kidnapped before he was killed.

1st July An official working in the Ministry of Defence was assassinated by a sticky bomb attached to his car in the Dura-Michanic neighbourhood of Baghdad.

29th June Authorities reported a failed assassination attempt involving an IED that targeted the Vice Governor of the governorate of Ninewa. The attack damaged the Vice Governor’s personal vehicle.

16th June MP Bashar Al-Egaidi, who won in the previous general election, and his driver were killed by armed men. The attack occurred near Al-Egaidi’s home in the Al-Amil neighbourhood of Mosul city.

13th June Gunmen assassinated a police officer in Kadhimyah, Baghdad. dfsdfads

9th June A Sahwa member and his wife were assassinated by gunmen in Yusufiya, Baghdad.

9th June A former Sahwa member was assassinated by a sticky bomb attached to his car in Baghdad.

9th June A sticky bomb targeting a Sahwa member exploded in Baghdad. 4 people were killed in the explosion, including a tribal sheik.

8th June An IED exploded in the Mechanic neighbourhood of Dura, Baghdad, injuring 5 Sahwa members.

8th June An IED that was planted on a Sahwa member’s vehicle exploded in the governorate of Kirkuk, resulting in his death.

*** These records were compiled based on NCCI’s daily updated Field Network Reports, which can be viewed by NCCI members only at the following link: http://www.ncciraq.org/index.php?option=com_user&view=login&return=aHR0cDovL3d3dy5uY2NpcmFxLm9yZy9pbmRleC5waHA/b3B0aW9uPWNvbV9jb250ZW50JnZpZXc9YXJ0aWNsZSZpZD0xNDkmSXRlbWlkPTk3Jmxhbmc9ZW4=

Mass Demonstrations and Protests On 18

th June, more than 4,000 Iraqi civilians gathered for an apparently unplanned demonstration, demanding

a better electricity supply in the governorate of Basrah. This event garnered international attention as 2 Iraqis were killed and several wounded in a violent confrontation with local police officers. Soon afterwards, protests sprung up in several other cities, mainly concentrated in southeastern Iraq. On 22

nd June, hundreds

of protesters clashed with riot troops posted outside of the provincial administrative offices in Nasiriyah; it is reported that 17 policemen and several civilians were wounded.

In some poor and underserviced neighbourhoods, protests against increasing power and water cuts are a near daily occurrence. Most Iraqis only receive between two to six hours of electricity daily, as compared to the

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NCCI Security Trends Analysis (August 2010) serves as internal advice for NCCI members only and should not be forwarded outside of your organization. If forwarded internally, care must be taken to ensure that it is not passed on to any third parties.

average Iraqi’s access to between sixteen and twenty-four hours of electricity pre-2003 invasion. Temperatures in Baghdad now soar to above 50 degrees Celsius, and Basrah regularly reaches above 55 degrees Celsius. The government also increased electricity rates on 1

st June 2010, doubling the average

household electricity bill according to experts at the Union of Electrical Professions in Iraq.

Few politicians have responded to public outcry with sympathetic gestures or concrete action. As the national political impasse continues and Iraq approaches the hottest months of the year, frustration is likely to build and may result in more protests.

US-Led Drawdown of MNF-I

Drawdown Progress

The United States military is in the process of sharply reducing the number of foreign forces in Iraq. At the height of the troop surge in 2007, almost 165,000 American troops were deployed throughout Iraq. The Obama administration developed a specific timetable for withdrawal in February 2009, committing the US to drawdown forces to 50,000 by the end of August. This plan was based on the Status of Forces Agreement (SoFA) that former President Bush had negotiated with the Iraqi Parliament during his last months in office. An estimated 65,000 American service members are still in Iraq a month prior to this deadline. US military personnel officially say that the drawdown is “ahead of schedule.” The drawdown date, 31

st August 2010, was chosen based on American officials’ assumptions that a new Iraqi

government would be formed by June 2010 at the latest. Nearly five months after the 7th

March 2010 parliamentary elections, no political party has formed an adequate alliance to assume leadership of the next coalition government. While some Iraqi politicians continue to assert that a government coalition could be formed in the near future, many analysts are less optimistic, predicting that a coalition will be formed in mid/late August, or even in the fall, at the earliest. Some American military officials have suggested that the US reconsider the pace of withdrawal. However, in light of low US domestic support for the war and occupation of Iraq, there are no signs that the Obama administration will adjust or adapt the withdrawal timetable. Furthermore, it is unlikely that President Obama would modify drawdown plans in the short-term, as there is a lot of political pressure for him to deliver on his 2008 campaign promise of full withdrawal of US operations from Iraq by 2011. In spite of Iraq’s current political stalemate and power vacuum, the US government contends that drawdown must continue as scheduled. Ninety-four bases will remain in Iraq after the August drawdown deadline. All American forces should withdraw by the end of 2011 based on the SoFA terms. However, US forces could potentially maintain a presence in Iraq after that date. Some analysts assert that once a new Iraqi government is formed, the US could pressure Iraq to amend terms of the SoFA and allow US forces to remain in Iraq after 2011.

Potential Peacekeeping Mission In July 2010, the commander of American forces in Iraq, General Raymond T. Odierno, publicly expressed his support for the future deployment of a UN peacekeeping in Iraq. He appears to envision a peacekeeping mission commencing post-US withdrawal. Odierno contends that such a force should be deployed in the disputed territories, like Kirkuk and Nineveh. The Iraqi public’s response to this announcement has varied. In Mosul, Ninewa, and other major cities, there were large demonstrations protesting against the potential establishment of a UN military presence in Iraq. On the other hand, many politicians, including the governor of Kirkuk, Abdul Rahman Mustafa, urged Iraqis to await further details before condoning or condemning Odierno’s proposal.

Assessing the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF): Capabilities and Preparedness Since the SoFA agreement in 2007, there has been a greater sense of urgency to train and equip a substantial Iraqi army that would be capable of securing Iraq from the considerable domestic and foreign threats that the

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NCCI Security Trends Analysis (August 2010) serves as internal advice for NCCI members only and should not be forwarded outside of your organization. If forwarded internally, care must be taken to ensure that it is not passed on to any third parties.

country currently faces. While there are remaining concerns about the future state of security post-US drawdown after 31

st August 2010, there is even more disagreement about how the ISF might fare post-US

withdrawal, which is scheduled for the end of 2011, based on the SoFA stipulations. There have been persistent concerns that some ISF members are not “loyal,” but rather infiltrators from AQI and other local militias. MNF-I officials claim that infiltrators are seeking to gather intelligence and execute attacks. While some suspected cases of infiltration have been investigated or disclosed, the extent of this alleged phenomenon is not clear at present. There is also a general lack of training, equipment and even human resources in the ISF. In February 2010, with significant MNF-I drawdown fast-approaching, many members of the Al-Maliki administration launched public pleas to the US to boast support for the ISF. The responsibility of training Iraqi forces has been transferred from the Vinnell Corporation contractors and the MNF-I to three Iraqi training battalions. Yet this positive development in local capacity and development is offset by other challenges. ISF recruitment remains low and the desertion rate is high. Since 2005, the US government has provided the ISF with more than $18 billion for “equipment, supplies, services, training, facility and infrastructure repair, renovation, construction, and funding.” In the past year, the US has transferred more than 500,000 items—ranging from generators to trailers—to the ISF in preparation for the August drawdown deadline. Despite this, some ISF officers still report that there is a lack of vehicles, weapons and even uniforms for their troops. The ISF helped ensure that Iraq remained relatively secure during the March parliamentary elections, yet the enduring political stalemate means that there is no new government—or legitimate national leaders—for the security forces to consult with on pressing security issues that may arise. American military officials have commented that the ISF can generally respond to and handle internal security issues, but they warn that the ISF is not yet equipped or trained to ward off external, foreign threats from neighboring countries.

Gradually Transferring Sovereignty to Iraqis In September 2010, the remaining “non-combat” troops in Iraq will maintain many combat functions and responsibilities in addition to training the ISF. Indeed, the transition of American troop activities from “combat operations” to “stability operations” after 31

st August 2010 is more of a change in semantics than on-the-

ground conditions. Despite the personnel and equipment reduction, US troops will continue to arrest and kill insurgents, and initiate joint raids with the ISF, in largely the same manner as before. Moreover, out of the remaining troops, 4,500 special operation forces will “actively track and fight guerrilla cells” and serve as intelligence agents. The Obama administration envisions withdrawing the remaining troops in gradual, steady increments until the end of 2011. On 15

th July 2010, US generals officially transferred sovereignty over Camp Cropper, the last jail in Iraq under

total American control, to the Iraqis. Five days later, it was reported that four prisoners—three of whom are allegedly leading members of AQI—escaped. Other detainees have also escaped in the weeks following recent transfers of prisons into Iraqi hands. Earlier in June, Ali Lufti Jassar al-Fawi, the man convicted of kidnapping and murdering British aid worker Margaret Hassan of Care International in October 2004, also disappeared from the prison where he was held. While prisons are officially under the control of Iraqis, the US government claims that American troops will retain control over about 200 inmates and oversee certain blocks of prisons in Iraq. Most of these detainees are suspected of having ties with AQI or are former politicians from the Ba’ath party. US officials contend that they were asked by the Iraqi government to retain this level of oversight in certain prisons. Possible Re-Emergence of Al-Sadr

There is speculation that the previously influential Al-Mahdi militia, under the direction of Moqtada Al-Sadr, may be re-emerging and rearming, poising itself to regain control. Indeed, the political faction of Al-Sadr’s followers won 40 seats and is considered a formidable parliamentary bloc. As a major faction in the Iraqi National Alliance (INA), the Sadrists share the party’s 68 seats in the new parliament. Four and a half months after elections, with no unity government and escalating violence in many governorates, many Al-Mahdi

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members have begun calling for Sadrists to “protect their neighbourhoods,” echoing rhetoric that was typical of Sadrists before their militia was previously disbanded.

Moqtada Al-Sadr, who belongs to an influential clerical family, inaugurated Al-Mahdi Army in 2003. Al-Mahdi mainly recruited poor, young Shiite men from Badr city, southern Iraq, and many other impoverished areas into a sectarian militia that targeted the MNF-I and the ISF. However, Al-Sadr demobilized the militia in March 2008 after an ISF raid—popularly known as the “Charge of the Knights”—completely debilitated Al-Mahdi forces.

More recently, Iraqis in Habibiya, Sadr City, and many other former Sadrist strongholds have reported a visible resurgence in Sadrist activities of a non-military nature. Some Sadrist leaders appear to be enacting civic improvement programs, providing computer and Qur’an courses, offering money to sick community members for medical treatment, and repairing long broken-down sewage lines. The results and extent of outreach for these activities are unclear. As former Al-Mahdi officers offer these services, they appear unarmed.

Former Al-Mahdi fighters have warned that should AQI and other insurgent group continue to advance attacks on Shiite communities and holy sites—similar to the bombings that killed and injured Shiite pilgrims in early July—Al-Mahdi may regroup and target fighters from these entities. This could threaten stability in many fragile environments, particularly amidst spreading frustration and a national political stalemate with no foreseeable end.

However, most experts agree that Al-Mahdi will not launch any major offensive against the MNF-I or the ISF in the weeks leading up to and following major MNF-I troop drawdown. The US/MNF-I troop withdrawal has been a consistent Sadrist demand; accordingly, Sadrists do not want to undermine the drawdown process in this sensitive period. Also, there is speculation that an ideological dispute is evolving within the Sadrists, resulting in a rift between the pro-Iranian and nationalist factions. The nature of this quarrel is not entirely clear and has not taken the form of armed conflict, but it most likely weakens Sadrists’ capabilities to regroup Al-Mahdi forces. For the time being, Moqtada Al-Sadr remains in the Iranian holy city Qom, where he is completing intensive seminary studies. Most of his followers believe that he will not return to Iraq until the MNF-I completely withdraw.