MODERN PHILOSOPHY: A STUDY OF KNOWLEDGE/67531/metadc...MODERN PHILOSOPHY: A STUDY OF KNOWLEDGE LECTURE I: INTRODUCTION TO MODERN PHILOSOPHY I. Introduction A. What is modern philosophy?

MODERN PHILOSOPHY:

A STUDY OF KNOWLEDGE

CATHERINE D O D G E

H O N O R S 4500.700: INDEPENDENT STUDY

DR. GLORIA C O X & D R . JOE BARNHART

15 DECEMBER 2000

MODERN PHILOSOPHY: A STUDY OF KNOWLEDGE

COURSE SYLLABUS

COURSE DESCRIPTION

This course is an introduction to modern philosophy. It provides an overview of six major philosophers: Rene Descartes, Benedict de Spinoza, Gottfr ied Wilhelm Leibniz, John Locke, George Berkeley, and David Hume. The course is intended to acquaint students with the issues and ideas of the modern philosophical period.

COURSE OBJECTIVES

Upon the completion of this course, students will be familiar with the metaphysics, ethics, theology, and epistemology of the six philosophers covered in the course. The course will primarily focus on epistemology as this is a key concern for the modern period.

COURSE OUTLINE

The course will consist of thirteen lectures, beginning with an overview of modern philosophy. Subsequent lectures are topic based; however, chronological development will be emphasized as well. Lectures are as indicated in the attached table.

WEEK i Introduction to Modern Philosophy

STUDY AIDS

2 Introduction to the Big Six Timeline, Philosopher Overviews

3 Rationalist Metaphysics

4 Empiricist Metaphysics

5 Rationalist Ethics 6 Empiricist Ethics

7 Rationalist Philosophy of Religion 8 Empiricist Philosophy of Religion

9 Rationalist Epistemology Part I Meditations diagram. Ideas Diagram - Descartes

IO Rationalist Epistemology Part II Ideas Diagram - Spinoza, and Leibniz

II Empiricist Epistemology Part I Ideas Diagram - Locke, Berkeley, and Hume

12 Empiricist Epistemology Part II

13 Introduction to Kant

LECTURE I:

INTRODUCTION TO

MODERN PHILOSOPHY

MODERN PHILOSOPHY: A STUDY OF KNOWLEDGE LECTURE I: INTRODUCTION TO MODERN PHILOSOPHY

I. In t roduct ion

A. W h a t is modern philosophy?

1. T h e modern philosophical period1

a) T h e modern philosophical period begins w i t h the work of Rene Descartes and ends w i th I m m a n u e l Kant .

b) It is not contemporary phi losophy; to avoid th is confusion, it is somet imes referred to as the classical modern period

c) Approximate dates are f r o m 1600-1800

d) Rene Descartes credited to be the fa the r of modern philosophy since he ushered in this period

2. T h e modern philosophical paradigm

a) Rejected medieval thought , pr imar i ly Aris to te l ian rat ional ism

b) Embraced either al ternative f o r m s of ra t ional ism or empir icism

c) Rejected the idea tha t the h u m a n m i n d has access to reali ty itself

d) Asser ted that h u m a n s have access to an indirect representat ion of the real wor ld ( th rough sensory experience and conceptual izat ion)

e) T h e h u m a n mind is restricted (by i tself) f r o m direct apprehension of reality

f ) Inf luenced heavily by science of the period, including Newton ian physics and Gali leo 's heliocentric v i ew of the universe; In his Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica (1687), s ir Isaac N e w t o n establishes 3 laws of mot ion and the law of universal gravitation2 :

(1) T h a t a body remains in its s tate of rest unless it is compelled to change tha t state by a force impressed on it

1 Paul K. Moser and Arnold vander Nat, eds. Human Knowledge: Classical and Contemporary Approaches (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 109.

2 www.britannica.com (selection: Isaac Newton)

http://www.britannica.com


(2) T h a t the change of mot ion ( the change of velocity t imes the mass of the body) is propor t ional to the force impressed

(3) T h a t to every action there is an equal and opposite reaction

(4) Universa l gravitat ion, which he conf i rmed f r o m such phenomena as the t ides and the orbi ts of comets, states that every particle of mat te r in the universe at tracts every other particle wi th a force tha t is proport ional to the product of their masses and inversely proport ional to the square of the distance be tween their centres.

B. W h a t were the key concerns of modern philosophers?

1. Metaphysics3

a) Literally means "wha t comes a f te r physics"

b) T e r m first used by s tudents of Aris tot le regarding wha t he called his "f irst phi losophy"

(1) Aristot le 's "f i rs t phi losophy," f o u n d in Metaphysica, explores the characterist ics of "Being as such" and inquires into the character of "the substance tha t is f ree f r o m movement , " or the most real of all things, the intelligible reality on which every th ing in the world of nature was thought to be causally dependent .

(z) Aristot le 's "second phi losophy," in his Physica, was the invest igat ion of the na ture and propert ies of wha t exists in the natural , or sensible, wor ld

c) Today , metaphysics refers to the philosophical s tudy whose object is to de termine the real na ture of th ings—to determine the meaning, s tructure, and principles of wha tever is insofar as it is

d) A division of phi losophy that is concerned w i t h the fundamen ta l nature of reality and being and tha t includes ontology, cosmology, and o f t en epis temology 4

3 www.britannica.com (selection: metaphysics) 4 www.webster.com (selection: metaphysics)


http://www.webster.com


e) H a v i n g to do w i t h specu l a t i ons a b o u t t h e m e a n i n g and

n a t u r e of t h e un ive r se ; c o n c e r n e d w i t h w h a t lies b e y o n d t h e

phys ica l w o r l d of s enso ry expe r i ence

2. Ethics 5

a) A l so r e f e r r ed to as m o r a l p h i l o s o p h y

b) T h e disc ipl ine c o n c e r n e d w i t h w h a t is m o r a l l y good a n d bad,

r igh t a n d w r o n g .

c) T h e t e r m is also appl ied to a n y s y s t e m or t h e o r y of m o r a l va lues or pr inciples .

3. Ph i l o sophy of Rel igion

a) T h e s tudy , f r o m a ph i lo soph ica l pe r spec t ive , of t he n a t u r e of

re l igion a n d re l ig ious bel ief , i nc lud ing such speci f ic ques t i ons as

t he ex i s tence a n d n a t u r e of G o d a n d t h e p r e sence of evil a n d

s u f f e r i n g in the wor ld . 6

4. Ep i s t emology 7

a) T h i s w a s t he p r i m a r y issue d i scussed b y m o d e r n

ph i lo sophe r s a n d t h u s w e wi l l s p e n d t h e m o s t t i m e o n th i s topic

b ) T h e s t udy of the or ig in , n a t u r e , a n d l i m i t s of h u m a n

knowledge ; deals w i t h q u e s t i o n s such as:

(1) W h a t is the l imi t of h u m a n k n o w l e d g e ?

(2) H o w m u c h can h u m a n s eve r h o p e to k n o w ?

(3) W h a t is the h u m a n capac i ty f o r k n o w l e d g e ?

(4) H o w can w e k n o w t h a t w e k n o w s o m e t h i n g ? (i.e.

C a n the senses be t r u s t ed? C a n t h e in te l lec t be t rus t ed? )

c) T h e n a m e is de r ived f r o m t h e G r e e k w o r d s episteme

( k n o w l e d g e ) a n d logos ( r e a s o n )

d) Ep i s t emology has had a long h i s t o r y s p a n n i n g t h e t i m e of

t he p re -Socra t i c G r e e k s u p to t h e p r e s e n t . A l o n g w i t h

m e t a p h y s i c s , logic, a n d e th ics , it is one of t h e f o u r m a i n f i e lds of

5 www.br i tannica .com (selection: ethics) 6 w w w . w e b s t e r . c o m (selection: ph i losophy o f religion) 7 www.br i tannica .com (selection: ep i s t emology)




MODERN PHILOSOPHY: A S T U D Y OF KNOWLEDGE LECTURE I: INTRODUCTION TO MODERN PHILOSOPHY

philosophy, and nearly every great philosopher has contributed to the literature on this topic

e) Epistemology, or the theory of knowledge, at tempts to discover:

(1) The extent of our knowledge

(2) The standard or criteria by which knowledge is to be judged

f ) There are two primary epistemological paradigms:

(1) Rationalism

(a) Characterized by a priori knowledge8

(i) Literally means " f rom what is before"

(ii) The Latin phrases a priori and a posteriori were used in philosophy originally to distinguish between arguments f rom causes and arguments f rom effects.

(iii) Knowledge that is independent of all particular experiences

(iv) " W e posses innate ideas, and that, being aware of their logical relationships, we have a priori knowledge of the world as it really is"9

(v) Relating to or derived by reasoning f rom self-evident propositions10

(2) Empiricism"

(a) Characterized by a posteriori knowledge

(i) Literally means " f rom what is after"

8 www.brittanica.com (selection: a priori knowledge) 9 Paul K. Moser and Arnold vander Nat, eds., Human Knowledge: Classical and Contemporary Approaches

(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 109. 10 www.webster.com (selection: a priori) " Paul K. Moser and Arnold vander Nat, eds. Human Knowledge: Classical and Contemporary Approaches

(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 109.

http://www.brittanica.com


MODERN PHILOSOPHY: A S T U D Y OF KNOWLEDGE LECTURE I: INTRODUCTION TO MODERN PHILOSOPHY

(ii) Knowledge that is derived f rom experience

(b) Empiricists reject innate ideas and a priori knowledge

(c) All knowledge originate f rom sensory experience

(d) There is no a priori knowledge of the world as it really is

(e) Empiricist Motto: W e can only know what we experience

C. W h o are the modern philosophers?

As with any period, there are too many philosophers to study them all so we will focus on six major philosophers of the modern period, three rationalists and three empiricists.

1. Rationalists

a) Rene Descartes

b) Benedict de Spinoza

c) Gottfr ied Wilhelm Leibniz

2. Empiricists

a) John Locke

b) George Berkeley

c) David Hume

Immanuel Kant, a German philosopher, follows these six and attempts to integrate the beliefs of all six philosophers above - reconciling empiricism and rationalism to some extent. We will not have time in this course to cover the extensive writings and complex ideas of Kant; however, this course provides a solid foundation regarding the philosophers above, and includes an introduction to Kant. Thus, students will be adequately prepared for future studies of Kant upon completion of this course.

LECTURE V.

INTRODUCTION

TO THE BIG Six

MODERN PHILOSOPHY: A STUDY OF KNOWLEDGE LECTURE Z: INTRODUCTION TO THE BIG SIX

I. In t roduct ion

A. W h o are the modern philosophers?

1. Rationalists

a) Rene Descartes

See Descartes overview (in the S tudy Aids section)

b) Benedict de Spinoza

See Spinoza overview (in the S tudy Aids section)

c) Got t f r i ed W i l h e l m Leibniz

See Leibniz overview (in the S tudy Aids section)

2. Empiricists

a) John Locke

See Locke overview (in the S tudy Aids section)

b) George Berkeley

See Berkeley overview (in the S tudy Aids section)

c) David H u m e

See H u m e overview (in the S tudy Aids section)

LECTURE 3:

RATIONALIST

METAPHYSICS

MODERN PHILOSOPHY: A STUDY OF KNOWLEDGE LECTURE 3: RATIONALIST METAPHYSICS

I. Rationalist Metaphysics

A. Rene Descartes

1. Dualist ic Sys tem

a) A radical dist inction between mind, the essence of which is th inking, and body, the essence of wh ich is extension

(1) Descartes ' dual ism creates a problem between the mind and the body, which includes quest ions such as

(a) H o w do the m i n d and body interact?

(b) H o w are ideas f r o m the material wor ld impr in ted onto an incorporeal mind?

(2) T h e m i n d / b o d y problem tha t Descartes creates th rough his dual ism becomes a key issue tha t fu tu re philosophers are forced to deal w i th

(3) It should be noted tha t t hough m a n y philosophers deal w i th the m i n d / b o d y confl ict , d i f fe rent te rminology is o f ten incorporated by other th inkers

(4) Mind is also referred to as

(a) Intellect

(b) Soul

(c) Spirit

(d) Wi l l

(5) Body is also referred to as

(a) Mat ter

(b) Corporeal substance

b) Th roughou t his wri t ings, a tens ion or conflict between mind

and body are evident:


(1) "For I also judged tha t to have the power of moving itself, as well as the power of sensing or of cogitating, in n o w way pertains to the na tu re of a body."1

(2) "I knew, f r o m this, tha t I was a substance the whole essence or nature of which is only to th ink, and which , in order to be, does not have need of any place, and does not depend on any material th ing . T h u s this T , that is to say, the soul th rough wh ich I am, is ent i re distinct f r o m the body, and is even easier to k n o w than it, and, even if the lat ter were not al all, the soul would not cease to be all tha t wh ich it is."2

c) T h e m i n d / b o d y conflict per ta ins only to humans ; God is perfect for he lacks these t w o confl ic t ing natures:

(1) "I judged f r o m this tha t it could not be a perfect ion in G o d to be composed of these two natures, and that , as a consequence, he was not thus composed."3

(2) Note : T h e above quote is a perfect example of the rationalist ic paradigm as discussed in lecture 1. Descartes concludes by reason (and analysis) that God mus t indeed consist of merely one na ture for G o d is perfect. His assumpt ion is that the dual na ture of h u m a n s is the source of our imperfect ion - our reason leading us one w a y and our bodily appeti tes leading us another way -and thus he determines tha t God, in order to secure H i s perfection, must consist of only one nature, that of mind .

2. Cartesian Universe

a) Consis ts of:

(1) Th ink ing , unex tended souls (mind )

(2) Un th ink ing , ex tended bodies (mat te r )

b) T h e mater ial wor ld exists because it appears to exist and we are inclined to believe it exists; G o d is perfect and therefore would not deceive us regarding the mater ia l world 4

1 Rene Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, t rans. George H e f f e r n a n ( N o t r e Dame, Indiana: Univers i ty of Not re Dame Press, 1992), p. 33. 2 Ibid., p. 53. 3 Ibid., p. 55.

MODERN PHILOSOPHY: A STUDY OF KNOWLEDGE LECTURE Y. RATIONALIST METAPHYSICS

(I) "For, since he [God] has plainly given to me ... a great propensity to believe that these ideas are emitted by corporeal things, I do not see how, if these ideas would be emitted f rom elsewhere than f r o m corporeal things, it could be understood that God is not a deceiver. And thus corporeal things do exist."5

c) Material world emits ideas into souls

(1) W e know that ideas are emitted into our souls by matter because it occurs regardless of our consent or action.6

(2) "But, since God not be a deceiver, it is completely manifest that he [God] immits these ideas into me neither immediately through himself nor even by means of some mediating creature in which their objective reality might be contained not formally, but rather only eminently."7

(3) "All things that are contained objectively in the ideas are contained eminently."8

d) Mechanistic

(1) Descartes refers to the "machine of the human body"9

(2) "Namely, it occurred to me, first, that I had a face, hands, arms and in this whole machine of members such as it also shows itself in a corpse and which I designated by the term 'body'."10

(3) Animals have no souls

(a) For Descartes, the soul is equivalent to the intellect or rational capacity; thus animals, lacking rational capacity, are reduced to corporeal substance - matter in motion (machines)

4 W e will discuss Descartes proof of God's existence and his goodness in lecture 7, w h i c h covers the religious beliefs o f the rationalists. 5 Rene Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, trans. George Heffernan ( N o t r e Dame, Indiana: Univers i ty of Notre Dame Press, 1992), p. 77. 6 Ibid., p. 74. 7 Ibid., p. 77. 8 Ibid. 9 Ibid., p. 82. 10 Ibid., p. 32.

M O D E R N PHILOSOPHY: A S T U D Y OF KNOWLEDGE

LECTURE 3: RATIONALIST METAPHYSICS

B. Benedict de Spinoza

1. Metaphysical M o n i s m

a) T h e idea tha t there is only one single substance which makes up the universe

(1) Substance is def ined by being completely independent - that which has a propensi ty to exist - thus only G o d qualifies

b) Everyth ing tha t exists makes up th is one substance

c) It is illogical for more than one substance to exist

(1) "Since God is an absolutely inf in i te being, of w h o m no at t r ibute which expresses an essence of substance can be denied and he necessarily exists, if there were any substance except God, it would have to be explained th rough some at tr ibute of God, and so two substances of the same at t r ibute would exists, wh ich is absurd. A n d so

except God, no substance can be or, consequent ly , be 1 »»

conceived.

d) Th i s one substance is:

(1) Inf in i te

(2) Div ine

(3) Identical w i th nature

e) Mind & Body

(1) M i n d and body, which were substances for Descartes,

are merely at tr ibutes of the one substance (God and

Na tu re ) for Spinoza

(2) T h e r e is no m i n d / b o d y confl ic t for Spinoza as they are just two at tr ibutes of the same substance

(a) Mind and body are one and the same

(b) T w o ways of conceiving the same thing

" Benedict de Spinoza, "The Ethics," A Spinoza Reader: The Ethics and Other Works, ed. and trans. Edwin

Curley (Princeton: Princeton Univers i ty Press, 1994)7 P- 93-


(3) Being has infinite attributes

(a) "God, whom I define as a being consisting of infinite attributes, each of which is infinite, or supremely perfect in its kind." u

(4) As finite creatures, we are only aware of two attributes:

(a) Intellect (mind)

(b) Extension (body)

(5) "Turning now to the universal Natura naturata, or those modes or creatures which immediately depend on, or have been created by God - we know only two of these: motion in matter, and intellect in the thinking thing."13

2. Pantheism

a) Referred to by Spinoza as Deus sive Natura, God or Nature

(1) "Since nothing can be or be conceived without God, it is certain that all things in nature involve and express the concept of God, in proportion to their essence and perfection. Hence the more we know natural things, the greater and more perfect is the knowledge of God we acquire, or (since knowledge of an effect through its cause is nothing knowing some property of the cause) the more we know the natural things, the more perfectly do we know God's essence, which is the cause of all things."14

(2) "And since Nature or God is one being, of which infinite attributes are said, and which contains in itself all essences of created things, it is necessary that of all this there is produced in thought an infinite idea, which

12 Benedict de Spinoza, "Letter 2," A Spinoza Reader: The Ethics and Other Works, ed. and trans. Edwin Curley (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), p. 67. 13 Benedict de Spinoza, "Short Treatise on God, Man and His Well-Being," A Spinoza Reader: The Ethics and Other Worhs, ed. and trans. Edwin Curley (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), p. 58. 14 Benedict de Spinoza, "Theological-Political Treatise," A Spinoza Reader: The Ethics and Other Worhs, ed. and trans. Edwin Curley (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), p. 28.


contains in itself objectively the whole of Nature , as it is in itself."15

b) H u m a n s are merely part of na ture

c) Rejects teleological16 v iew of na tu re

(1) From the Greek telos (end) and logos (reason)

(2) Explanat ion by reference to some purpose or end; also described as f inal causality, in contras t wi th explanat ion by eff icient causes only. H u m a n conduct , insofar as it is rational, is generally explained wi th reference to ends pursued or alleged to be pursued; and h u m a n thought tends to explain the behavior of o ther th ings in nature on this analogy, either as of themselves pursuing ends, or as designed to fulf i l l a purpose devised by a mind t ranscending nature .

d) A purely mechanis t ic v iew of nature , like Descartes ' , which collapses metaphysics into physics17

e) Spinoza 's pan the i sm has myst ical overtones, and thus provides a scientific and rat ional f o r m of spir i tual i ty that is very attractive to many today.

C. Go t t f r i ed W i l h e l m Leibniz

1. Monadology

a) T h e wor ld is composed of monads

(1) Greek te rm for unit18

(2) N o Parts

(3) Indivisible

(4) Unex tended

15 Benedict de Spinoza, "Short Treatise on God, Man and H i s Wel l -Being," A Spinoza Reader: The Ethics

and Other Works, ed. and trans. Edwin Curley (Princeton: Princeton U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1994), p. 59* 16 (selection: te leology) 17 Darren Staloff , "Lecture 33: Spinoza - Rationalism and the Reverence for Being," Great Minds of the Western Intellectual Tradition, 3r Edition, Part III (The Teaching Company , 2000). 18 Gordon H. Clark, Thales to Dewey (Jefferson, Maryland: T h e Trin i ty Foundation, 1989), p. 349.


(5) Nei ther grow nor decay; begin and end only wi th creation or annih i la t ion

(6) Dist inct (no t w o alike)

(7) Subject to cont inuous change ( in ternal )

(8) Always perceiving

b) Every substance is a m o n a d and every monad is a substance

(1) T h e opposite of Spinoza ' s metaphysic , which posited one substance, for Leibniz posits a plural universe wi th inf ini te substances

(2) For Leibniz, the essential characterist ic of substance is simplicity and uni ty ; t hus bodies, wh ich are composed of parts, could never qual i fy as substances

c) Every body /o rgan i sm is a collection of monads , or substances

d) Every monad is like a mi r ro r of the universe tha t contains it and the universe itself is conta ined implici t ly in it

(1) "Every simple substance has relat ions which express all the others and tha t it is consequent ly a perpetual living mir ror of the universe."1 9

e) T h e life of a monad is pre-ordained by God

(1) All monads act in h a r m o n y according to God ' s pre-ordained plan for t h e m

(2) Since all bodies are an aggregate of monads , and the universe is conta ined in every monad , "consequent ly every body responds to all tha t happens in the in the universe, so tha t he w h o saw all, could read in each one wha t is happening everywhere , and even w h a t has happened and w h a t will happen." 2 0

19 Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, "Monadology," Discourse on Metaphysics, trans. George Montgomery (LaSalle, Illinois: Open Court Publishing Company, 1994), p. 263. 20 Ibid., p. 265.


(3) Everything tha t can happen to a monad fol lows f r o m its own essential characterist ics and not f r o m the inf luence of an o ther ent i ty

(4) T h e y are the source of their o w n internal activity21

(a) " T h e natura l changes of the M o n a d come f r o m an in ternal principle, because external cause can have no inf luence upon its inner being."22

(5) God has wr i t t en the "score" for each monad such that each one works together in perfect conjunct ion to produce the wor ld we see

(b) S y m p h o n y analogy: A s if a individual music ians are each placed in separate rooms, w i th their score; all begin to play, independent ly of one another (and unaware of one another) , and if each music ian 's per formance were recorded and compiled in to one piece, it would reveal perfect harmony 2 3

f ) Dominan t monad

(1) Every living body has a dominan t monad , which in the soul in animals2 4

g) Body & Soul

(1) T h e body and soul are a lways united2 5

(2) T h e soul has a lways been present in the body

(c) "It has been decided tha t not only is the organic body already present before conception, but also tha t a soul, in a word , the animal itself, is also in this body"2 6

21 Gottfr ied Wi lhe lm Leibniz, "Monadology," Discourse on Metaphysics, trans. George Montgomery (LaSalle, Illinois: Open Cour t Publishing Company , 1994), p. 255.

"Ibid., p. 253. nd 23 Roger Scruton, A Short History of Modern Philosophy: from Descartes to Wittgenstein, 2" ed. ( N e w York: Routledge, 1996), p. 73. 24 Gottfr ied Wi lhe lm Leibniz, "Monadology," Discourse on Metaphysics, t rans. George Montgomery (LaSalle, Illinois: Open Cour t Publishing Company , 1994), p. 267. 25 Ibid. 26 Ibid., p. 268.


(3) T h e body and soul w o r k together according to God ' s pre-ordained h a r m o n y (Leibniz is unable to adequately explain, o ther than to say God has ha rmonized the two according to his pre-ordained plan.)

(a) " T h e y are f i t ted to each other in vi r tue of the pre-established h a r m o n y be tween all substances, since they are all representa t ions of one and the same universe."2 7

(b) "Souls act in accordance wi th the laws of f inal causes th rough their desires, purposes and means. Bodies act in accordance w i th the laws of eff icient causes or of mot ion. T h e two realms, that of efficient causes and tha t of f inal causes, are in ha rmony , wi th each other."2 8

(c) "According to this sys tem bodies act as if (to suppose the impossible) there were no souls at all, and souls act as if there were no bodies, and ye t both body and soul act as if the one were inf luencing the other."2 9

17 Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, "Monadology," Discourse on Metaphysics, trans. George Montgomery (LaSalle, Illinois: Open Court Publishing Company, 1 9 9 4 X P« 269. 18 Ibid., p. 267. 29 Ibid., p. 267.

LECTURE 4:

EMPIRICIST

METAPHYSICS

MODERN PHILOSOPHY: A STUDY OF KNOWLEDGE LECTURE 4: EMPIRICIST METAPHYSICS

I. Empiricist Metaphysics

A. John Locke

1. Mater ia l ism

a) His materialist sys tem for the most part denies metaphysics

(1) T o speculate of metaphysics is to go beyond the l imits of h u m a n knowledge1

(2) All ideas come f r o m experience and we have no experience of the metaphysica l world, and thus cannot know it

(a) "Let us then suppose the mind to be, as w e say, whi te paper, void of all characters, w i thou t any ideas; how comes it to be furnished? ... T o this I answer , in one word, f r o m experience. In that all our knowledge is founded, and f r o m tha t it u l t imately derives itself."2

b) Locke himself was a Chr is t ian , but his empirical sys tem does not allow for knowledge regarding the metaphysical for the most part; he makes two except ions to his empirical sys tem -for the self and God

(1) Locke accepts Descartes cogito ergo sum (I th ink, therefore I am), assert ing tha t our existence is k n o w n intuit ively

(a) " O u r knowledge of our own existence is intui t ive ... w e perceive it so plainly and so certainly tha t it nei ther needs nor is capable of any proof. I th ink , I reason, I feel pleasure and pain: can any of these be more evident to me than my o w n existence? If I doubt of all other things , that very doubt makes me perceive my o w n existence, and will not suffer me to doubt of that."3

'John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. A. D . W o o l e y ( N e w York: Penguin Group,

1974), PP- 65-6. 2 Ibid., p. 89. 3 Ibid., p. 378.


(2) God ' s existence is k n o w n to us by reason, ra ther than experience

c) Later empiricists, w h o adopt his ideas but do not share his fai th , are not as willing to make th is exception to empir ic ism

d) A tension remains due to this exception; the existence of G o d can be known, but not tha t of angels or demons, wh ich m us t be excepted by fa i th

(1) " T h e existence of a G o d reason clearly makes k n o w n to us, as has been show. T h e knowledge of existence of any other thing we can have only by sensation; for , there being no necessary connex ion of real existence wi th any idea a m a n hath in his m e m o r y , nor or any other existence but tha t of G o d w i t h the existence of a part icular man, no part icular man can k n o w the existence of any other being, but only when , by the actual operating upon him, it makes itself perceived by h im. For, the having the of any th ing in our mind no more proves the existence of tha t thing, than the picture of a man evidences his being in the world, or the visions of a dream make thereby a t rue his tory." 4

(2) " T h e having the ideas of spirits does not make us k n o w than any such th ings do exist w i thou t us, or that there are any f ini te spirits, or any other spiritual beings, but the Eternal G o d ... A n d therefore concerning the existence of f in i te spirits, as well as of several o ther things, we mus t content ourselves wi th the evidence of fai th; but universal, certain proposi t ions concerning this ma t te r are beyond our reach."5

2. M i n d / B o d y conflict

a) Locke does not a t t empt to solve the m i n d / b o d y confl ict as it

is beyond the limit of h u m a n knowledge

(1) "I th ink we are at a loss, both in the one and the other; and can as little unde r s t and h o w the parts of body cohere, as how we ourselves perceive or move."

4 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. A. D . W o o l e y ( N e w York: Penguin

Group, 1974)1 PP- 387-88. 5 Ibid., pp. 393-94-6 Ibid., p. 195.


(2) "Another idea w e have of body is the power of

communication of motion by impulse; and of our souls the

power of exciting of motion by thought. These ideas, the one of body, the other of our minds , every day 's experience clearly furnishes us wi th; but if here again we inquire how this is done, we are equally in the dark."7

(3) " T h e substance of spirit is u n k n o w n to us, and so is the substance of body equally u n k n o w n to us."8

(4) "For whensoever we wou ld proceed beyond these simple ideas we have f r o m sensat ion and reflection, and dive fu r the r into the nature of things , we fall present ly in to darkness and obscurity, perplexedness and diff icult ies, and can discover no th ing f u r t h e r but our own bl indness and ignorance."9

b) He merely states we have a clear and dist inct idea of the soul

(1) " T h e one is as clear and dis t inct an idea as the other: the idea of th inking, and mov ing a body, being as clear and dist inct ideas as the ideas of extension, solidity, and being moved ... It is for w a n t of ref lect ion that w e are apt to th ink that our sense show us no th ing but material things."10

B. George Berkeley

1. A number of his contemporaries considered h im a metaphysic ian and not an empiricis t because of his emphas i s on existence and being in his Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge11

2. Most f amous for his denial of the exis tence of corporeal mat te r

a) Mat te r does not exist, only m i n d (perceiving spirits)

b) The re is no existent mat ter beyond our perception; sensible

objects exist only in the mind

c) If mat ter exists wi thout the percept ion of the mind, then w e

are creatures wi thout purpose

7 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. A. D . W o o l e y ( N e w York: Penguin Group, 1974), p. 195. 8 Ibid., p. 196. 9 Ibid., p. 197. 10 Ibid., 192. 11 Paul Strathern, Berkeley in 90 Minutes (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2000), p. 17.


(1) "If therefore it were possible fo r bodies to exist w i thou t the mind ... w i thou t any reason at all, that God has created innumerable beings tha t are entirely useless, and serve to no manne r of purpose."12

d) T h e concept of mat te r itself is a contradict ion

(1) " N o w for an idea to exist in an unperceiving thing, is a mani fes t contradiction; fo r to have an idea is all one as to perceive: tha t therefore where in color, f igure, and the like qualities exist, must perceive them; hence it is clear there can be no un th ink ing substance or substratum of those ideas."13

(2) "By mat ter therefore we are to unders tand an inert , senseless substance, in wh ich extension, figure, and mot ion, do actually subsist. But it is evident f r o m wha t we have already shown, tha t extension, f igure and mot ion are only ideas exist ing in the mind, and that an idea can be like nothing but ano ther idea, and tha t consequently nei ther they nor their archetypes can exist in an unperceiving substance. Hence , it is plain, tha t the very not ion of wha t is called matter or corporeal substance,

involves a contradict ion in it."14

3. Existence is based on perception (by the mind )

a) His f a m o u s phrase is esse est percipi: " to be is to be perceived"15

b) T h e wor ld is mainta ined by G o d

(1) Even if no other mind is perceiving, God is there to perceive, and thus by his perceiving he main ta ins the existence of the wor ld

c) T h i s does not mean the real wor ld is a dream; things really exists and ideas are not copies as they are for Locke or Descartes - the idea is the th ing itself, wh ich exists

12 George Berkeley, A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge (Indianapolis: Hackett

Publishing Company, 1982), p. 30. 13 Ibid., p. 25. 14 Ibid., p. 26. 15 Ibid., p. 24.


(1) "Ideas imprinted on the senses are real things, or do really exist; this we do not deny, but we deny they can subsist without the minds which perceive them, or that they are resemblances of any archetypes existing without the mind: since they very being of a sensation or idea consists in being perceived, and an idea can be like nothing but an idea."16

4. Mind/Body Conflict

a) Materialists cannot reconcile the mind/body conflict

(1) "For though we give materialists their external bodies, they by their own confession are never the nearer knowing how our ideas are produced: since they own themselves unable to comprehend in what manner body can act upon spirit, how it is possible it should imprint any idea in the mind."17

b) Berkeley believes his system solves the mind/body conflict

(1) The world consists only of active, perceiving spirits

(a) "Whereas a soul or spirit is an active being, whose existence consists not in being perceived, but in perceiving ideas and thinking."18

(2) God's spirit acts to imprint ideas on our senses

(a) "It remains therefore that the cause of ideas is an incorporeal active substance or spirit."19

(3) Thus, the mind/body conflict is resolved by removing body (matter) f rom the equation.

(4) Only one substance exists, that of spirit

(a) "From what has been said, it follows, there is not any other substance than spirit, or that which

yf 20 perceives.


Publishing Company, 1982), p. 58. 17 Ibid., p. 30. 18 Ibid., p. 79. " Ibid., p. 33. 20 Ibid., p. 25.


(5) Because mat te r does not exist , there is only spirit; the spirit of God acts upon the spiri ts of humans , impr in t ing ideas upon our senses

5. Berkeley's Purpose

a) Berkeley was strongly Angl ican and thus extremely critical of non-believers, referr ing to the "mons t rous sys tems" which " impious and profane persons readily fall in w i th those sys tems which favor their inclinations, by deriding immater ia l substance, and supposing the soul to be divisible and subject to corruption as the body."21

b) Berkeley desired to end the rising skept icism and atheism, which he fel t mater ia l ism was the cause of

(1) "For as we have shown the doctr ine of mat ter or corporeal substance, to have been the main pillar and support of skepticism, so likewise upon the same foundat ion have been raised all the impious schemes of atheism and irreligion."22

C. David H u m e

1. H u m e takes empir ical metaphysics to the nex t logical step

a) According to Locke, all our knowledge comes f rom sensory experiences. Thus , since we k n o w noth ing but mat ter , the result is a materialistic phi losophy tha t leaves little room for God.

b) Anglican Bishop Berkeley re fu ted Locke's material ism by asserting tha t we have no knowledge of such a th ing as mat ter . "All matter , so far as we k n o w it, is a menta l condit ion; and the only reality tha t we k n o w directly is mind ." By doing so, Berkeley saves the world f r o m mater ia l ism, thus making it safe for God. 23

c) Using Berkeley's a rgument , H u m e argues tha t w e likewise have no concept of mind. Thus , n o w both mind and mat te r have been destroyed and we are lef t w i th skepticism for h u m a n s have been reduced to bundles of sensory perceptions.


Publishing Company, 1982), p. 59. 11 Ibid. 23 Wi l l Durant, The Story of Philosophy ( N e w York: Simon & Schuster, 2000), p. 195.


2. Mind

a) Asserts we have no knowledge of mind

b) No idea of mind (if the mind is defined as an unchanging non-material substance within)

(1) No impression of the self and therefore no idea of the self - just bundles of impressions

(2) Our ideas cannot go beyond sense impressions and we have no impressions of the mind, except perhaps a bundle of impressions

3. Body

a) W e can never observe a connection between our perceptions and actual things, thus we cannot establish that objects cause the impression

b) Our belief in the existence of external objects is unjustified

4. Skepticism

a) Hume is considered a modified skeptic24

(1) "Should it be said, that, f rom a number of uniform experiments, we infer a connexion between the sensible qualities and the secret powers ... T h e question still recurs, on what process of argument this inference is founded? W h e r e is the medium, the interposing ideas, which join propositions so very wide of each other? It is confessed, that the colour, consistence, and other sensible qualities of bread appear not, of themselves, to have any connexion with the secret powers of nourishment and support. For otherwise we could infer these secret powers f rom the first appearance of these sensible qualities, wi thout the aid of experience ... Here then is our natural state of ignorance with regard to the powers and influence of all objects."25

b) Hume denies the existence of everything except the actual impressions themselves

14 Hume's skepticism will be discussed further in Lecture 12, w h e n H u m e ' s epis temology is covered. 25 David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Eric Steinberg (Indianapolis: Hackett

Publishing Company, 1993), pp. 23, 24.


(1) N o corporeal bodies

(2) N o cont inui ty

(a) "For all inferences f r o m experience suppose, as their foundat ion , tha t the f u t u r e will resemble the past, and tha t similar powers will be conjoined w i t h similar sensible qualities. If there be any suspicion, that the course of na ture may change, and that the past may be no rule for the fu ture , all experience becomes useless, and can give rise to no inference or conclusion. It is impossible, therefore , tha t any a rgument s f r o m experience can prove this resemblance of the past to the fu ture ; since all these a rgumen t s are founded on the supposi t ion of tha t resemblance."2 6

(3) N o cause and effect

(a) "But no man, having seen only one body move af ter being impelled by another , could infer , tha t every other body will move af ter a like impulse. All inferences f r o m experience, therefore , are effect of custom, not of

yy27 reasoning.

(4) N o G o d

(a) " T h e idea of God, as meaning an inf ini te ly intelligent, wise, and good Being, arises f r o m reflecting on the operat ions of our own mind, and augment ing , wi thou t l imit, those qualities of goodness and wisdom." 2 8

c) None of our scientific conclusions are based on reason

(1) "I say then, that , even af ter we have experience of the operat ions of cause and effect, our conclusions f r o m experience are not founded on reasoning, or any process of the understanding." 2 9

26 David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Eric Steinberg (Indianapolis: Hackett

Publishing Company, 1993), p. 24. 27 Ibid., p. 28. 18 Ibid., p. 11. 29 Ibid., p. 21.


d) M i n d / B o d y conflict3 0

(1) T h e conflict remains because we are totally ignorant of how the mind and body interact; the power by which the mind affects the body is u n k n o w n

(2) H u m e rejects the typical reliance upon God for the unexplained, such as in the m i n d / b o d y conflict , because we are as ignorant of God as we are of the powers

(a) " W e are ignorant , it is true, of the manne r in which bodies operate on each other: The i r force or energy is entirely incomprehensible: But are we not equally ignorant of the manne r or force by which a mind, even the supreme mind, operates either on itself or on body?"31

e) Some would say H u m e ' s skepticism forces h im to become solipsistic

(1) In phi losophy, solipsism was fo rmer ly moral egoism (as used in the wr i t ings of I m m a n u e l Kant) , but now, in an epistemological sense, it is the ex t reme f o r m of subjective idealism tha t denies tha t the h u m a n mind has any valid ground for believing in the existence of anyth ing but itself.32

(2) T h e British idealist F .H. Bradley, in Appearance and Reality (1897), characterized the solipsistic view as follows: "I cannot t ranscend experience, and experience is my experience. From this it fol lows tha t noth ing beyond myself exists; for w h a t is experience is its ( the self 's) states."33

30 Dav id H u m e , A n Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Eric Steinberg (Indianapolis: Hackett

Publishing C o m p a n y , 1993), pp. 4 2 - 4 8 .

31 Ibid., p. 48. 32 www.br i tann ica . com (selection: so l ips i sm) 33 www.br i tann ica . com (selection: so l ips i sm)



LECTURE 5:

RATIONALIST

ETHICS

MODERN PHILOSOPHY: A STUDY OF KNOWLEDGE LECTURE 5; RATIONALIST ETHICS

I. Rationalist Ethics

A. Rene Descartes

1. Provisional Moral i ty

a) Provides a moral code, wh ich is later presented as final, for use while seeking the t ru th

b) V e r y pragmatic; aim at happiness

(1) " In order that I did not r emain irresolute in my actions whi le reason would oblige me to do so in my judgments , and tha t I did not cease to live as happily as I could during this t ime, I f o r m e d for myself a provisional moral i ty , wh ich consisted of but three or four maxims, which I would gladly like to share w i th you."1

c) W h y provisional?

(1) Descartes "promised" himself to "perfect" his " judgments more and more," but he is aware of constant change in his tory concerning wha t is regarded as t ru th 2

(a) "I did not see anyth ing in the wor ld that were always to remain in the same state."3

(2) Thus , he does not obligate himself to main ta in this moral i ty, nor any other t ruths , fo r life because of this constant change

(a) "I would have thought tha t I was commi t t ing a big mistake against good sense if, because I once approved of something, I had obliged myself to take it to be good once again at a later t ime, when it would perhaps have ceased to be so or when I would have ceased to regard it to be such."4

d) Four Provisions

(1) Obey the cus toms and laws of m y count ry

1 Rene Descartes, Discourse on the Method, ed. and trans. George Heffernan (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1994), p. 41. 2 Ibid, p. 43. 3 Ibid. 4 Ibid.

MODERN PHILOSOPHY: A STUDY OF KNOWLEDGE LECTURE 5: RATIONALIST ETHICS

(a) "I t seemed to me tha t the most useful th ing was to regulate myself in accordance w i th those w h o m I wou ld have to live ... I ought to take note ra ther of tha t which they practiced than of tha t wh ich they said."5

(b) T h i s included re ta ining the religion of his upbr inging and conduct ing himself according to the modera te opin ions of his t ime

(c) W h e n there is variat ion, choose the path of modera t ion

(d) In agreement w i th Aristot le, Descartes advocates modera t ion and believes tha t mos t f o rms of excess are bad

(2) Make behavioral actions based off the most convincing evidence and then act resolutely and consistent ly as t hough these decisions were certain

(a) Because life will not wai t on our deliberations

(b) " A n d thus , the actions of life o f ten tolerating no delay, it is a very certain t ru th that , w h e n it is not in our power to discern the t ruest opinions, w e mus t fo l low the most probable."6

(c) T o avoid regret

(d) " A n d th is was capable f r o m then on of freeing me f r o m all regret and the remorse tha t usually agitate the consciences of those feeble and fal ter ing m i n d s wh ich allow themselves incons tant ly to go and to practice as good those th ings wh ich they later judge to be bad."7

(3) Change your desires ra ther than a t tempt ing to change

the wor ld

5 Rene Descartes, Discourse on the Method, ed. and trans. George Heffernan (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1994), p. 43. 6 Ibid. 7 Ibid.

MODERN PHILOSOPHY: A STUDY OF KNOWLEDGE LECTURE y; RATIONALIST ETHICS

(a) W e are powerless concerning much of the external world , but power fu l regarding our o w n thoughts and emot ions

(b) " T o accustom myself to believe that there is noth ing tha t be entirely wi th in our power but our thoughts" 8

(c) Th i s is the secret of past phi losophers

(i) W h e n w e realize every th ing is outs ide our control , except our thoughts , we rel inquish all desires and are able to f i n d peace and con ten tmen t

(ii) Learn to be content , " tending natural ly to desire no th ing but those th ings wh ich our unders tand ing represents to it in some fashion as possible" because "all the goods tha t are outside us" are " removed f r o m our

"9 power.

(iii) Mos t men never learn to do th is and thus are never happy because they constant ly seek to control tha t wh ich they can never control

(4) Always seek the t ru th

(a) Af t e r reviewing the occupat ions of humank ind , Descartes de termines that he could not do bet ter than to "spend all m y life in cult ivating reason, and in advancing, as fa r as I could, in the knowledge of the t ru th , fo l lowing the me thod tha t I had prescribed to myself."1 0

(b) Discovery of t ru ths th rough his me thod provided h im great satisfaction, render ing all else inconsequent ial

(c) "For, God, having given each of us some light in order to dis t inguish the t rue f r o m the false, I

8 Rene Descartes, Discourse on the Method, ed. and trans. George Heffernan (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1994), p. 43. 9 Ibid., p. 45. 10 Ibid.


LECTURE 5; RATIONALIST ETHICS

would not have believed tha t I ought to for a single m o m e n t to content myself w i th the opinions of others."11

e) Conclus ion

(1) Descartes moral i ty allows h im to live no d i f ferent ly then other moral people do

(a) " A n d thus, w i thou t living in a fashion different , in appearance, f r o m that of those who, not having any task but to lead a sweet and innocent life, make an e f fo r t to separate pleasures f r o m vices, and who, in order to enjoy their leisure wi thou t being bored, make use of all those diversions which are honest."12

B. Benedict de Spinoza

1. Spinoza greatly inf luenced by Descartes ' Discourse on Method and Meditations (both were published before Spinoza reached the age of ten)

a) Spinoza 's Treat ise on the Emenda t ion of the Intellect is m u c h like Descartes ' Discourse

(1) Autobiographical style

(2) Begins by stat ing all tha t experience had taught h im tha t all th ings in ord inary life are empty and fut i le

(3) C o m m i t s himself to medi ta t ion to seek out t r u th

(4) Recommends a provis ional moral i ty

2. W o r l d l y Distractions13

a) Th ree T y p e s

(1) Sensual Pleasure

(a) T e m p o r a r y

" Rene Descartes, Discourse on the Method, ed. and trans. George Heffernan (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1994), p. 45. 12 Ibid., p. 49. 13 Benedict de Spinoza, "Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect," A Spinoza Reader: The Ethics and Other Works, ed. and trans. Edwin Curley (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), pp. 3'4*


(b) Can overtake us

(c) Causes confus ion

(d) Dulls the mind

(2) W e a l t h

(a) Sought for its o w n sake

(b) Assumed to be the highest good

(3) H o n o r

(a) T h e most en t rapping of all fo r it is v iewed as being good and the u l t imate end which everything is directed

(b) T o pursue it, w e mus t fo l low the dictates of other men ' s reason (social con fo rmi ty )

b) Mus t be given up in order to pursue the t ru th

(1) Giving up certain evils for a certain good ( t ru th )

(2) "But all those th ings m e n ordinar i ly strive for, not only provide no r emedy to preserve our being, but in fact hinder that preservat ion, o f t en cause the destruct ion of those w h o possess them, and a lways cause the destruction of those w h o are possessed by them."1 4

3. T r u t h

a) Eternal

(1) It cannot perish as wor ld ly dis t ract ions do, leaving us sad

(a) "But love toward the eternal and inf ini te th ing feeds the m i n d w i t h a joy entirely exempt f r o m sadness. T h i s is greatly to be desired and sought wi th all our strength."1 5

14 Benedict de Spinoza, "Treatise on the Emendat ion o f the Intellect," A Spinoza Reader: The Ethics and

Other Works, ed. and trans. Edwin Curley (Princeton: Princeton U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1994), p. 4. 15 Ibid., pp. 4-5.

MODERN PHILOSOPHY: A STUDY OF KNOWLEDGE LECTURE 5; RATIONALIST ETHICS

4. Good and Bad, Perfect and Imperfect

a) Relative denominations

(1) "For nothing, considered in its own nature, will be called perfect or imperfect, especially after we have recognized that everything that happens happens according to the eternal order, and according to certain laws of Nature."16

5. The True or Highest Good

a) To arrive at perfection is the highest good

(1) Perfection consists in having a nature in which there is union of the mind with the whole of Nature

b) Anything that leads to perfection is a true good

c) Spinoza's goal

(1) To obtain this nature of perfection

(2) "I wish to direct all the sciences toward one end and goal, namely, that we should achieve, as we have said, the highest human perfection. So anything in the sciences which does nothing to advance us toward our goal must be rejected as useless - in a word, all our activities and thoughts are to be directed to this end."17

d) This nature - how obtained?

(1) "First, to understand as much of Nature as suffices for acquiring such a nature."18

(2) "Next, to form a society of the kind that is desirable, so that as many as possible may attain it as easily and surely as possible."19

(3) "Third, attention must be paid to Moral Philosophy and to the Instruction concerning the Education of children."20

16 Benedict de Spinoza, "Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect," A Spinoza Reader: The Ethics and Other Works, ed. and trans. Edwin Curley (Princeton: Princeton Universi ty Press, 1994)1 P« 5« 17 Ibid., p. 6. 18 Ibid., p. 5. 19 Ibid., pp. 5-6.


(4) "Because Health is no small means to achieving this end, fourth, the whole of medicine must be worked out."21

(5) "And because many difficult things are rendered easy by ingenuity, and by it we can gain much time and convenience in life, fifth, Mechanics is in no way to be despised."22

6. Provisional Morality

a) Following Descartes' lead, Spinoza likewise establishes a provisional morality because life will not wait on our deliberations

(1) "But while we pursue this end [the highest human perfection], and devote ourselves to bringing the intellect back to the right path, it is necessary to live. So we are forced, before we do anything else, to assume certain rules of living as good."23

b) Three Provisions

(1) Speak in a way that ordinary people can understand and do whatever does not interfere with obtaining our goal

(2) "To enjoy pleasures just so far as suffices for safeguarding our health."24

(3) "To seek money, or anything else, just so far as suffices for sustaining life and health, and conforming to those customs of the communi ty that do not conflict with our aim."25

7. The Ethics

a) Spinoza's great work, wri t ten f r o m 1663-65, but published posthumously (1677)

20 Benedict de Spinoza, "Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect," A Spinoza Reader: The Ethics and Other Works, ed. and trans. Edwin Curley (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), p. 6. 21 Ibid.

Ibid. 13 Ibid. 24 Ibid. 25 Ibid.

MODERN PHILOSOPHY: A STUDY OF KNOWLEDGE LECTURE Y RATIONALIST ETHICS

b) His ethics in this work are very s imilar to his provisional moral i ty, wh ich is now presented as f ina l

c) V irtue

(1) " T h e f irs t and only founda t ion of virtue, or of the me thod of living rightly is the seeking of our own advantage."2 6

(2) V irtue is its o w n reward

(a) "Blessedness is not the reward of virtue, but v i r tue itself; nor do we enjoy it because we restrain our lusts; on the contrary, because we enjoy it, we are able to res t ra in them." 2 7

(3) Based on unders tanding (our mot iva t ion behind our act ions)

(a) "A man cannot be said absolutely to act f r o m vir tue insofar as he is de te rmined to do someth ing because he has inadequate ideas, but only insofar as he is de termined because he understands."2 8

(4) T h e Greatest V irtue

(a) "Knowledge of G o d is the mind ' s greatest good; its greatest v i r tue is to k n o w God."2 9

d) Good and Evil

(1) Relative

(a) "As for as good and evil are concerned, they also indicate nothing posit ive in the things, considered in themselves ... For one and the same th ing can, at the same t ime, be good, and bad, and also indifferent . For example , music is good for one w h o is melancholy, bad for one w h o is

26 Benedict de Spinoza, "The Ethics," A Spinoza Reader: The Ethics and Other Works, ed. and trans. Edwin Curley (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), p. 263. 27 Ibid., p. 264. 28 Ibid., p. 211. 19 Ibid., p. 213.

MODERN PHILOSOPHY: A STUDY OF KNOWLEDGE LECTURE Y. RATIONALIST ETHICS

mourn ing , and nei ther good nor bad to one w h o is deaf."30

(2) W h a t is useful is good, w h a t prevents us f r o m mas ter ing some good is evil31

(3) T h i n g s that disagree w i th our na ture are evil and th ings tha t agree w i th our na ture are good32

(4) G o o d th ings cause the preservat ion of the proport ion of mot ion and rest the h u m a n body ' s parts have wi th one another and evil th ings cause the par ts of the h u m a n body to have a d i f ferent propor t ion of mot ion and rest to one another.3 3

(5) J °y a n ( i cheerfulness are good, sadness and melancholy are evil

e) Self Knowledge

(1) " H e w h o unders tands himself and his affects clearly and dist inct ly loves God, and does to the more, the more he unders t ands himself and his affects."3 4

C. Got t f r i ed W i l h e l m Leibniz

1. Leibniz never directly addresses the subject of ethics, though both his Discourse on Metaphysics and his Monadology provide insight into his under lying moral phi losophy

2. Leibniz has a very s t rong Chr is t ian fa i th (and thus adherence to Chr is t ian mora l i ty )

a) H e was born to a pious Lutheran f ami ly

b) His fa i th wil l be discussed fu r the r in Lecture 7, which covers his phi losophy of religion

30 Benedict de Spinoza, "The Ethics," A Spinoza Reader: The Ethics and Other Works, ed. and trans. Edwin Curley (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), p. 199-31 Ibid., p. 200. 31 Ibid., pp. 213-14. 33 Ibid., p. 221. 34 Ibid., p. 253-

MODERN PHILOSOPHY: A STUDY OF KNOWLEDGE LECTURE y: RATIONALIST ETHICS

3. Goodnes s /Mora l i t y

a) Because of his fai th, goodness and moral i ty are identical wi th piety

(1) "For he [ G o d ] is not only the Archi tec t and the eff icient cause of our being, but he is also our Lord and Final Cause, w h o ought to be the whole goal of our will, and who , alone, can make our happiness."3 5

(2) " W i s e and v i r tuous persons w o r k in behalf of everything which seems conformable to the presumpt ive or antecedent will, and are, nevertheless, content w i th w h a t God actually brings to pass th rough his secret, consequent and determining will."36

b) For this reason, he does not need to explain w h a t moral i ty or ethics are, for they are contained w i th in the Bible

4. Happiness

a) W e can f ind happiness th rough loving God3 7

b) "God alone can render the soul happy or unhappy" 3 8

5. H a r m o n y

a) The re is a " h a r m o n y which appears be tween the physical realm of na ture and the moral realm of grace, tha t is to say, between God, considered as the architect of the mechan i sm of the world and God considered as the Mona rch of the divine city of spirits."39

6. Beauty

a) "Beauty consists of uni ty in diversity; the greatest beauty is the m a x i m u m uni ty in the m a x i m u m diversi ty."4 0

35 Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, "Monadology," Discourse on Metaphysics, trans. George Montgomery (LaSalle, Illinois: Open Court Publishing Company, 1994), p. 272. 36 Ibid. 37 Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Discourse on Metaphysics, trans. George Montgomery (LaSalle, Illinois: Open Court Publishing Company, 1994), p. 62. 38 Ibid., pg. 63. 39 Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, "Monadology," Discourse on Metaphysics, trans. George Montgomery (LaSalle, Illinois: Open Court Publishing Company, 1994), p. 271. 40 Gordon H. Clark, Thales to Dewey (Jefferson, Maryland: The Trinity Foundation, 1989), p. 350.


LECTURE y: RATIONALIST ETHICS

7. Ci ty of God

a) Th i s is a "mora l world wi th in a natura l world"4 1

b) As the architect of the natural world, G o d has created natural laws to punish sin and rewards piety

c) God is a perfect monarch and thus, in the end, " there will be no good action unrewarded and no evil action unpunished" 4 2

41 Gottfried Wi lhe lm Leibniz, "Monadology," Discourse on Metaphysics, trans. George Montgomery

(LaSalle, Illinois: Open Court Publishing Company, 1994), P« 270. 42 Ibid., p. 271.

LECTURE 6:

EMPIRICIST

ETHICS

MODERN PHILOSOPHY: A STUDY OF KNOWLEDGE LECTURE 6: EMPIRICIST ETHICS

I. Empiricist Ethics

A. John Locke

1. Moral principles

a) No t innate1

b) Accepted by people because they are profi table

c) V a r y throughout the wor ld

(i) If you consider history, and survey the actions of men, you will f ind no "no principle of moral i ty to be named, or rule of v i r tue to be though t on ... wh ich is not, somewhere or other , sl ighted and condemned by the general fashion of whole societies of men, governed by practical opinions and rules of living quite opposite to others."2

d) O f t e n derived th rough superst i t ion3

e) Need to be examined

2. Good and Evil4

a) Good is tha t which increases pleasure or d iminishes pain of mind and body

b) Evil is that tha t which decreases pleasure or increases pain of

mind and body

c) O u r emot ions are caused by good and evil

3. Moral Good and Evil

a) " T h e conformi ty or d isagreement of our vo lun ta ry actions to

some power of the law-maker; wh ich good and evil, pleasure or


1974), P- 79-2 Ibid., p. 80. 3 Ibid., p. 82. 4 Ibid., pp. 159-60.


pain, attending our observance or b reach of the law by the decree of the law-maker, is that we reward and punishment."5

4. Moral Rules or Laws6

a) 3 Types

(1) Divine Law

(a) Used to determine if an action is a sin or a duty

(b) Decreed by God

(2) Civil Law

(a) Used to determine if an action is criminal or innocent

(b) Determined by the commonweal th

(3) Philosophical Law (Law of Opinion/Reputat ion)

(a) Used to determine if an action is a virtue or a vice

(b) Determined by society

(c) Culturally relative

(i) "Thus the measure of what is everywhere called and esteemed virtue and vice is this approbation or dislike, praise or blame, which, by a secret and tacit consent, establishes itself in the several societies, tribes, and clubs of men in the world, whereby several actions come to f ind credit or disgrace amongst them, according to the judgment, maxims, or fashions of that place."7

(d) Virtue is that which is publicly esteemed and considered praiseworthy

John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. A. D. W o o l e y ( N e w York: Penguin Group,

1974), p. 222. 6 Ibid., pp. 222-226. 7 Ibid., p. 224.

MODERN PHILOSOPHY: A S T U D Y OF KNOWLEDGE LECTURE 6: EMPIRICIST ETHICS

(e) Commendat ion and Discredit

(i) Throughout history, this appears to be the strongest motivator of human behavior

(ii) H u m a n s of ten do not consider the consequences of disobeying divine law, but this is not the case with society for "no man escapes the punishment of their censure and dislike."8

5. Morality

a) "Morality is the relation of actions to these rules."9

(1) H u m a n behavior is compared to the 3 types of law listed above; this process is that of morality

b) Error in moral judgment occurs when an action is judged according to the wrong rule.10

c) Capable of demonstrat ion

(1) "I am bold to thing that morality is capable of demonstration ... since the precise real essence of things moral words stand for may be perfectly known, and so the congruity and incongruity of the things themselves be certainly discovered; in which consists perfect knowledge.""

(2) Key problem in morality is unclear definitions of moral words; thus, "definitions can make moral discourses clear."12

6. Cause of Error

a) A great cause of error is the incorrect association of ideas

(1) "Some of our ideas have a natural correspondence and connexion one wi th another; it is the office and excellency of our reason to trace these, and hold them

8 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. A. D . W o o l e y ( N e w York: Penguin Group, 1974), p. 225. 9 Ibid., p. 225. 10 Ibid., p. 227. 11 Ibid., p. 315. 12 Ibid., p. 315.


together in that un ion and correspondence which is founded in their peculiar beings. Besides this, there is another connexion of ideas whol ly owning to chance or custom,"13

(2) W e tend to see the incorrect association of ideas (by chance or cus tom) clearly in others, but not ourselves

(3) W e need to examine the association of our ideas to ver i fy tha t they are connected by reason (and not cus tom or chance), wh ich will lead to sound moral i ty

(4) Locke gives several examples of classical condit ioning, in wh ich h u m a n s incorrectly associate negative emot ions w i t h someth ing completely neutral , which results in irrat ional behaviors

(a) Example: Chi ldren having an aversion to books or learning because of the pain and cruel ty endured dur ing their education

(5) Th i s is similar to Aris tot le 's ethics, in wh ich he stresses the moral educat ion of children such tha t they learn to delight in the good and despair in the bad.

(a) Aristot le believes tha t w i th t ra in ing the appropriate emot ions can associated w i th the appropriate acts.

(b) Aris tot le unders tood the integral part tha t emot ions play in h u m a n behavior and w e n t so fa r as to say tha t "mora l excellence is concerned w i t h pleasures and pains; it is on account of the pleasure tha t we do bad things, and on account of the pain tha t we abstain f r o m noble ones."14


Group, 1974), pp. 250-51. 14 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics (Amherst , N e w York: Prometheus Books, 1987), p. no.


B. George Berkeley

1. No t specifically addressed by Berkeley

2. Evident in his Treatise, and his religious voca t ion /af f i l i a t ion , tha t Berkeley is s t rongly Chris t ian (Angl ican)

3. T h e Chr is t ian religion the best cure for vice

a) "The eyes of the Lord are in every place beholding the evil and the

good ... A clear v iew of wh ich great t ru ths cannot choose but fill our hearts wi th an awfu l c i rcumspect ion of holy fear, wh ich is the strongest incentive to virtue and the best guard against vice"15

4. Abstract ideas of morali ty diff icul t to f r a m e and o f t en h a r m f u l

a) " T h e opinion tha t those and the like words [happiness, goodness, justice, v i r tue] and the like s tand for general not ions abstracted f r o m all part icular person and actions, seems to have rendered moral i ty diff icult , and the s tudy thereof less use to mank ind . A n d in effect, the doctr ine of abstraction has not a little contr ibuted towards the spoiling the most useful par ts of knowledge."1 6

C. David H u m e

1. Reason

a) According to H u m e , reason has t w o capacities: It assists h u m a n s in relat ions of ideas (logic and mathemat ics ) and in de te rmining cause and effect .

b) It is the role of reason, or the head, to provide the means -one can reason the effect of a part icular behavior or action.

c) Reason can serve as a guide as to how one may at tain a particular goal and it al lows one to comprehend

d) Reason incapable of serving as the basis for moral i ty

15 George Berkeley, A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1982), pp. 86-87. 16 Ibid., p. 62.


(1) " W h a t is intelligible, wha t is evident, what is probably, what is true procures only the cool assent of the understanding."17

(2) "It appears evident, that the ult imate ends of human actions can never, in any case, be accounted for by reason, but recommend themselves entirely to the sentiments and affections of mankind, wi thout any dependance on the intellectual faculties."18

2. Emotions

a) Hume is an emotivist

(1) Morality based on emotion

b) In contrast to reason, emotions, or the heart, deal with ends; moral decisions are grounded in moral sentiment

c) It is the heart 's role to motivate a person to moral behavior

(1) " W h a t is honourable, what is fair, what is becoming, what is noble, what is generous, takes possession of the heart, and animates us to embrace and maintain it."19

d) Humans have two conflicting types of emotions, which motivate our behavior20

(1) Self-love

(a) Includes emotions such as greed, ambition, vanity

(b) Characteristics

(i) Idiosyncratic (specific to the individual)

(ii) Intense

(iii) Short-lived

17 David Hume, "An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals," Theories of Ethics, ed. Paul A. Newberry (Mountain View, California: Mayfield Publishing Company, 1999)? P« 22°* 18 Ibid., p. 257' 19 Ibid., p. 220. 20 Ibid., pp. 248-49.


LECTURE 6: EMPIRICIST ETHICS

(2) Moral S e n t i m e n t / H u m a n S y m p a t h y

(a) Includes emot ions such love, benevolence, concern for the wel fare of others

(b) H u m a n s y m p a t h y is the facet of human nature which is the founda t ion of all social life and personal happiness

(c) It is h u m a n na ture to laugh wi th the laughing, to grieve wi th the grieving

(d) Characteris t ics

(i) C o m m o n a m o n g all individuals

(ii) W e a k

(iii) Cons t an t

e) Moral Relativism

(1) Al though he compares moral judgment to taste, H u m e avoids relat ivism by assert ing that the moral sent iments , though weak, are universal and constant: " the human i ty of one m a n is the human i ty of every

yy 21

one.

3. Moral W o r t h

a) Based on util i ty

(1) Rejects any sys tem of mora l i ty not founded on fact

and observation2 2

(a) Th i s is both the empir ic is t and the uti l i tarian

in H u m e surfacing

(2) H u m e ' s moral phi losophy a ims at the greatest happiness of others and of the self, which is beneficial to society

21 Dav id H u m e , "An Enquiry Concern ing the Principles o f Morals," Theories of Ethics, ed. Paul A.

Newberry (Mounta in V i e w , California: Mayf ie ld Publishing C o m p a n y , 1999) > P« 249* 12 Ibid., p. 2I21.


(a) "V irtue derives its existence entirely f r o m its necessary use to the in tercourse and social state of mankind." 2 3

(3) Basis of uti l i ty does not d imin i sh morali ty

(a) "For wha t s t ronger founda t ion can be desired or conceived for any duty , than to observe, tha t h u m a n society, or even h u m a n nature, could not subsist, w i thou t the es tab l i shment of it."24

(4) Just ice and Benevolence

(a) Justice and benevolence are two key vir tues in H u m e ' s ethics, wh ich he discusses at length

(b) Justice and benevolence are both useful to society, but they each lie at d i f ferent ends of the uti l i ty spect rum.

(c) Benevolence is use fu l for society because it is other-oriented. T h o s e w h o are benevolent add to the ha rmony , happiness and well being of the society.

(d) Justice is useful fo r society because it provides for fair dis tr ibut ion of scarce goods, security of one 's possessions, and order in the society.

23 David Hume, "An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals," Theories of Ethics, ed. Paul A.

Newberry (Mountain V i e w , California: Mayf ie ld Publishing C o m p a n y , 1999), p. 224. 24 Ibid., p. 231.

LECTURE 7:

RATIONALIST

PHILOSOPHY OF

RELIGION

MODERN PHILOSOPHY: A STUDY OF KNOWLEDGE LECTURE 7: RATIONALIST PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

I. Rationalist Phi losophy of Religion

A. Rene Descartes

1. God

a) Perfect

b) T h e basis of our existence1

c) Ontological Proof of God ' s Existence

(1) Descartes posits that he has an inna te idea of God as a perfect being

(2) H e himself is not perfect so where did this idea come f rom? It mus t be f r o m God.

(3) "I n this fashion, it remained tha t th is idea had been posited in me by a nature tha t t ru ly were more perfect than I was, and tha t even possessed in itself all the perfect ions of which I could have any idea, tha t is to say, to express myself in one word , tha t were God."2

d) Faith in G o d a gif t f r o m God3

e) A good mot iva tor for moral i ty

(1) "And , since in this life greater rewards of ten be offered to vices than to vir tues, f ew people would prefer w h a t is r ight to wha t is useful if they did not fear God or expect another life."4

2. Soul

a) Immor ta l

(1) Because it is dist inct f r o m the body

1 Rene Descartes, Discourse on the Method, ed. and trans. George Heffernan ( N o t r e Dame, Indiana:

Univers i ty of Notre Dame Press, 1994), p. 55. 2 Ibid., p. 53. 3 Rene Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, trans. George Heffernan ( N o t r e Dame, Indiana:

Univers i ty o f Notre Dame Press, 1992), p. 13. 4 Ibid.

MODERN PHILOSOPHY: A STUDY OF KNOWLEDGE LECTURE 7 ; RATIONALIST PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

(a) " O u r soul is of a na ture entirely independent of the body, and, as a consequence, that it is no t at all subject to die w i t h it."

(b) "And, a l though I migh t perhaps ... have a body which is very closely joined to me, because I have - on the one hand - a clear and dist inct idea of me myself , in so fa r as I am only a cogitat ing th ing and not an extended one, and because I have - on the other hand - a dist inct idea of [ the] body, in so far as it is only an extended th ing and not a cogitating one, it is still certain tha t I am really and t ruly distinct f r o m m y body, and tha t I can exist wi thou t it."5

b) Unex tended

c) Indivisible

(1) "The re is a great difference be tween the mind and the body consisting therein tha t by its na ture the body be always divisible, but the mind be completely indivisible."6

3. Free Wi l l

a) W e cannot complain of imperfec t ion as it is due to our f ree will, which God has given us, al lowing us a role in the wor ld 7

4. Sin and Error

a) Cause of our errors is tha t our will is inf ini te , but the intellect is not

b) W e extend our will to th ings tha t we do not unders tand

c) " W h e r e f r o m , therefore do my errors originate? ... because the will open more widely than the intellect, I do not contain the will w i th in the same limits, but ra ther do I even ex tend it to the th ings that I do not unders tand. Because the will be

5 Rene Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, trans. George Hef fernan (Notre Dame, Indiana:

Univers i ty of Notre Dame Press, 1992), p. 76. 6 Ibid., p. 82. 7 Ibid., p. 62.

MODERN PHILOSOPHY: A STUDY OF KNOWLEDGE LECTURE 7 : RATIONALIST PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

indifferent to these things, it easily turns away f rom the true and good, and thus both am I deceived and do I sin."8

B. Spinoza

1. God

a) "By God I understand a being absolutely infinite, that is, a substance consisting of an infinity of attributes, of which each one expresses an eternal and infinite essence."9

b) Stripped of all anthropomorphism

(1) Anthropomorphism is an interpretation of what is not human or personal in terms of human or personal characteristics10

(2) God is not omniscient, compassionate, wise, and the like

(a) Because these things [omniscience, compassion, wisdom] are only certain modes of the thinking thing, they can neither be nor be understood without that substance of which they are modes. Tha t is w h y they cannot be attributed to him, who is a being existing of himself, wi thout anything else.""

(3) Has no emotions

(a) "God is without passions, and is not affected wi th any affect of joy or sadness."12

(b) "Strictly speaking, God loves no one, and

hates no one."13

(i) We cannot expect God to love us back

8 Rene Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, trans. George Heffernan (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992), p. 59. 9 Benedict de Spinoza, "The Ethics," A Spinoza Reader: The Ethics and Other Works, ed. and trans. Edwin Curley (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), p. 85. 10 www.webster.com (selection: anthropmorphism) 11 Benedict de Spinoza, "Short Treatise on God, Man and His Weil-Being," A Spinoza Reader: The Ethics and Other Worhs, ed. and trans. Edwin Curley (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), p. 56. 11 Benedict de Spinoza, "The Ethics," A Spinoza Reader: The Ethics and Other Works, ed. and trans. Edwin Curley (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), p. 253. 13 Ibid.


MODERN PHILOSOPHY: A STUDY OF KNOWLEDGE LECTURE y: RATIONALIST PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

c) On to log i ca l P roof of G o d ' s Ex i s t ence (a v a r i a t i o n )

( i) G o d is d e f i n e d as a subs t ance " c o n s i s t i n g of i n f in i t e

a t t r ibu tes , each of w h i c h e x p r e s s e s e t e rna l a n d i n f i n i t e

essence, necessar i ly exis ts" 1 4

d) D e u s sive N a t u r a

(1) G o d or N a t u r e

(2) Pan the i s t i c

(3) "Al l t h i n g s in n a t u r e invo lve a n d e x p r e s s t he concep t

of G o d in p r o p o r t i o n to t he i r e s sence a n d pe r f ec t i on .

H e n c e t h e m o r e w e k n o w n a t u r a l t h ings , t h e grea te r a n d

m o r e pe r fec t is t h e k n o w l e d g e of G o d w e acqui re , o r

(s ince k n o w l e d g e of an e f f ec t t h r o u g h i ts cause is n o t h i n g

bu t k n o w i n g s o m e p r o p e r t y of t he cause ) t h e m o r e w e

k n o w na tu r a l t h ings , t h e m o r e pe r f ec t l y w e do k n o w

G o d ' s essence, w h i c h is t h e cause of all th ings ." 1 5

(4) G o d is s i m p l y t h e s u m to ta l of e v e r y t h i n g t h a t is

(5) N a t u r e w i t h o u t defec t

(a) " N o t h i n g h a p p e n s in N a t u r e w h i c h can be

a t t r i bu t ed to a n y defec t in it, f o r N a t u r e is a l w a y s

t h e same , a n d its v i r t u e a n d p o w e r of ac t ing a re

e v e r y w h e r e one a n d t h e s a m e , t h a t is, t h e l aws

and ru les of N a t u r e , a cco rd ing to w h i c h all t h i n g s

happen , a n d change f o r m o n e f o r m to ano the r , are

a lways a n d e v e r y w h e r e t h e s ame . So the w a y of

u n d e r s t a n d i n g the n a t u r e of a n y t h i n g , of

w h a t e v e r k ind , m u s t also be t h e same , n a m e l y ,

t h r o u g h u n i v e r s a l l aws a n d ru les of Na ture . " 1 6

2. Soul

a) N o pe r sona l i m m o r t a l i t y

14 Benedict de Spinoza, "The Ethics," A Spinoza Reader: The Ethics and Other Works, ed. and trans. Edwin Curley (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), p. 91. 15 Benedict de Spinoza, "Theological-Political Treatise," A Spinoza Reader: The Ethics and Other Works, ed. and trans. Edwin Curley (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1 9 9 4 X P« 28. 16 Benedict de Spinoza, "The Ethics,"A Spinoza Reader: The Ethics and Other Works, ed. and trans. Edwin Curley (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), p. 153.

MODERN PHILOSOPHY: A STUDY OF KNOWLEDGE LECTURE 7 ; RATIONALIST PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

(1) Mind and body are one, uni ted substance; t hus w h a t happens to one mus t necessarily happen to the other

(2) "Since man is a created, f in i te thing, and so on, it is necessary that wha t he has thought , and wha t w e call the soul, is a mode of tha t a t t r ibute we call thought , w i t h o u t any th ing other than this mode belonging to his essence; so much so that if this mode perishes, the soul is also destroyed, a l though the preceding at t r ibute remains immutable."1 7

b) Since there is but one substance, a par t of the h u m a n mind is eternal

(1) " T h e h u m a n mind cannot be absolutely destroyed wi th the body, but someth ing of it r emains wh ich is eternal."18

(2) N o memory of life on earth or our personali ty

(3) A re-unit ing w i th the one, eternal substance of the world

3. Free Wi l l

a) A n illusion; we are ignorant of the causes of our actions19

b) It is illogical because h u m a n s are a part of na ture and all actions have a cause

(1) " T h e will, like the intellect, is only a certain mode of th inking. A n d so each vol i t ion can nei ther exist nor be determined to produce an effect unless it is de te rmined by another cause, and th is cause again by another , and so on, to inf ini ty . Even if the will be supposed to be inf in i te [Descartes] , it mus t still be de termined to exist and produce an effect by God, not insofar as he is an absolutely inf ini te substance, but insofar as he has an at tr ibute that expresses the inf in i te and eternal essence of thought ."2 0

17 Benedict de Spinoza, "Short Treatise on God, Man and His Weil-Being," A Spinoza Reader: The Ethics and Other Works, ed. and trans. Edwin Curley (Princeton: Princeton Universi ty Press, 1994), p. 58. 18 Benedict de Spinoza, "The Ethics," A Spinoza Reader: The Ethics and Other Works, ed. and trans. Edwin Curley (Princeton: Princeton Universi ty Press, 1994), p. 256. 19 Ibid., p. 157. 20 Ibid., pp. 105-06.


c) By defini t ion, only G o d is f ree

(1) " T h a t thing is called f ree wh ich exists f r o m the necessity of its na ture alone, and is de te rmined to act by itself alone. But a th ing is called necessary, or ra ther compelled, which is de termine by another to exist and produce an effect in a certain and de terminate manner."2 1

d) God Bound

(1) By his nature

(a) "For all th ings have necessarily fol lowed f r o m God ' s given nature, and have been de termined f r o m the necessity of God ' s na ture to exist and produce an effect in a certain way ... So th ings could have been produced in no other way and no other order."2 2

e) De te rmin i sm

(1) M a n a part of na ture

(a) "It is impossible for man not to be a part of Na tu re and not to fo l low the c o m m o n order of Nature."2 3

(2) " In nature there is noth ing cont ingent , but all th ings have been de termined f r o m the necessity of the divine nature to exist and produce an effect in a certain way."2 4

(3) "For since no one does any th ing except according to the predetermined order of nature , that is, according to God 's eternal guidance and decree, it fol lows tha t no one chooses any m a n n e r of l iving fo r himself , nor does anything, except by the special calling of God, w h o has chosen h im before others for this work, or for this manne r of living."25

0 T h e Free Individual

21 Benedict de Spinoza, "The Ethics," A Spinoza Reader: The Ethics and Other Works, ed. and trans. Edwin Curley (Princeton: Princeton Universi ty Press, 1994), p. 86. 22 Ibid., p. 106. 23 Ibid., p. 240. 24 Ibid., p. 104. 25 Benedict de Spinoza, "Theological-Political Treatise," A Spinoza Reader: The Ethics and Other Worhs, ed. and trans. Edwin Curley (Princeton: Princeton Universi ty Press, 1994)> p- 25.


(1) T h o u g h S p i n o z a a d v o c a t e s d e t e r m i n i s m a n d d e n i e s

t h e f r e e d o m o f t h e w i l l , h i s s y s t e m h a s a t e n s i o n i n

w h i c h h e a s s e r t s t h a t f r e e d o m c o m e s t h r o u g h r e a s o n

( a ) S i m i l a r t o t h e n o t i o n " K n o w t h e t r u t h a n d i t

w i l l s e t y o u f r e e " ; b e i n g a w a r e o f d e t e r m i n i s m

f r e e s y o u

(2) T h e f r e e m a n is l e d b y r e a s o n a n d d o e s n o t f e a r d e a t h

( a ) " I c a l l h i m f r e e w h o is l e d b y r e a s o n a l o n e . " 2 6

( b ) " A f r e e m a n , t h a t is , o n e w h o l i v e s a c c o r d i n g

t o t h e d i c t a t e o f r e a s o n a l o n e , i s n o t l e d b y f e a r ,

b u t d e s i r e s t h e g o o d d i r e c t l y , t h a t is, a c t s , l i v e s ,

a n d p r e s e r v e s h i s b e i n g f r o m t h e f o u n d a t i o n o f

s e e k i n g h i s o w n a d v a n t a g e . A n d s o h e t h i n k s o f

n o t h i n g l e s s t h a n d e a t h . I n s t e a d h i s w i s d o m i s a

m e d i t a t i o n o n l i f e . " 2 7

( c ) " O u r a c t i o n s - t h a t is , t h o s e d e s i r e s w h i c h a r e

d e f i n e d b y m a n ' s p o w e r , o r r e a s o n - a r e a l w a y s

g o o d " 2 8

(3) S p i n o z a d e f i n e s h u m a n f r e e d o m a s " a f i r m e x i s t e n c e ,

w h i c h o u r i n t e l l e c t a c q u i r e s t h r o u g h i m m e d i a t e u n i o n

w i t h G o d , s o t h a t i t c a n p r o d u c e i d e a s i n i t s e l f , a n d

o u t s i d e i t s e l f e f f e c t s a g r e e i n g w i t h i t s n a t u r e ^ w i t h o u t i t s

e f f e c t s b e i n g s u b j e c t e d , h o w e v e r , t o a n y e x t e r n a l c a u s e s

b y w h i c h t h e y c a n b e c h a n g e d o r t r a n s f o r m e d . " 2 9

(4)

4 . G r e a t e s t G o o d

a ) " T h e l o v e o f G o d i s m a n ' s h i g h e s t h a p p i n e s s a n d

b l e s s e d n e s s , a n d t h e u l t i m a t e e n d a n d o b j e c t o f a l l h u m a n

a c t i o n s , t h e o n l y o n e w h o f o l l o w s t h e d i v i n e l a w is t h e o n e w h o

u n d e r t a k e s t o l o v e G o d , n o t f r o m f e a r o f p u n i s h m e n t , n o r f r o m

l o v e f o r a n o t h e r t h i n g , s u c h a s p l e a s u r e s o r r e p u t a t i o n , a n d t h e

26 Benedict de Spinoza, "The Ethics," A Spinoza Reader: The Ethics and Other Works, ed. and trans. Edwin Curley (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), p. 235. 27 Ibid. 28 Ibid., pg. 239. 29 Benedict de Spinoza, "Short Treatise on God, Man and His Well-Being," A Spinoza Reader: The Ethics and Other Works, ed. and trans. Edwin Curley (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994X P« 63.

» S R U ° ° «

' N F R N PHILOSOPHY: A STUDY OF KNOWLEDGE ~**TQNALIST PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

GfOjs/ y because he knows God, or because he knows tha t

dge and love of God is the highest good."30

:les , - ail l

e x pla ined 'ledge of God is the mind ' s greatest good; its greatest «« be «,

: e (a

o k n o w God."31

t ion

i) Un ion wi th G o d

Version) (a) Spinoza said tha t he strove to at tain "union

ing"36 w i th God, produce t rue ideas in myself , and make

all these th ings k n o w n to my fel low men also. For S ° n f o r we can all share equally in this salvation ... - detail o f t h * ^ U s t be agreeing a lways in all things."3 2

asJn the ° n8*s £»37 untain. (2) No t salvation in the Chr i s t i an sense, but an ear thly

salvation in which w e live according to the highest good, in union wi th God

Divine Law

perfect and th ^ " ^ ° s u m ~ t o t a ^ t^ i e divine âw> a n c^ * t s highest U s precept, is to love G o d as the highest good ... For the idea

of God dictates this: that God is our greatest good, or tha t P° s s ib l e World knowledge a n <^ l ° v e ° f God is the u l t imate end

s toward which all our act ions are to be directed."33

' e c ' u s e » S s l oi e va r ; miracles n MAY BE^' e° °h>ta' ' j at a ) m i r a c l e s a s "no th ing happens in na ture which does not

fol low f r o m its laws"34

b) God and nature are one, so natura l laws are God ' s laws -thus the "power of nature is inf ini te , and tha t its laws are so

rderlyf broad tha t they extend to everyth ing which is conceived by the

°£evei2t s divine intellect i tselP3 5

noza, "Theological-Political Treatise," A Spinoza Reader: The Ethics and Other Works,

.vin Curley (Princeton: Princeton Univers i ty Press, 1994), p. 29. inoza, "The Ethics," A Spinoza Reader: The Ethics and Other Works, ed. and trans.

Princeton: Princeton Univers i ty Press, 1994), p. 213. 0 m e r y pinoza, "Short Treatise on God, Man and H i s Wel l -Being," A Spinoza Reader: The Ethics

isy ed. and trans. Edwin Curley (Princeton: Princeton Univers i ty Press, 1994), p. 63. ipinoza, "Theological-Political Treatise," A Spinoza Reader: The Ethics and Other Works,

"°r£e Edwin Curley (Princeton: Princeton Univers i ty Press, 1994), p. 29.

Very

r£e

MODERN PHILOSOPHY: A STUDY OF KNOWLEDGE LECTURE 7; RATIONALIST PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

c) T h i n g s t h a t appear to us as mi rac l e s can all be exp la ined accord ing to the laws of n a t u r e

C . Leibniz

1. G o d

a) O n t o l o g i c a l Proof of G o d ' s E x i s t e n c e (a ve r s ion )

(1) D e f i n e d as t he " N e c e s s a r y Being"3 6

(2) " I t is t h u s t h a t t he u l t i m a t e r ea son f o r t h i n g s m u s t be

a necessa ry subs tance , in w h i c h t h e detai l of t he changes

shal l be p resen t mere ly po ten t i a l ly , as in the f o u n t a i n -

head, a n d th i s subs t ance w e call God." 3 7

b) Cha rac t e r i s t i c s

(1) Pe r fec t

(a) G o d is s u p r e m e l y good a n d pe r fec t a n d t h u s

abides by th i s pr inciple 3 8

(b) H e has c rea ted t h e bes t of all possible w o r l d s

(c) G o d crea ted t h e w o r l d he d id because in it

"has been o b t a i n e d t h e grea tes t possible va r ie ty ,

t oge the r w i t h t h e g rea te s t o rde r t h a t m a y be; t h a t

is to say, t h r o u g h t h i s m e a n s has been o b t a i n e d

the grea tes t poss ible per fec t ion ." 3 9

(2) O r d e r l y

(a) " G o d does n o t h i n g w h i c h is n o t o rder ly , a n d

t h a t it is no t even poss ib le to conceive of e v e n t s

w h i c h are no t regula r . " 4 0

36 Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, "Monadology," Discourse on Metaphysics, trans. George Montgomery (LaSalle, Illinois: Open Court Publishing Company, 1994), p. 260. 37 Ibid., p. 259. 38 Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, "Discourse on Metaphysics," Discourse on Metaphysics, trans. George Montgomery (LaSalle, Illinois: Open Court Publishing Company, 1994), p. 3* 39 Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, "Monadology," Discourse on Metaphysics, trans. George Montgomery (LaSalle, Illinois: Open Court Publishing Company, 1994), p. 263. 40 Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, "Discourse on Metaphysics," Discourse on Metaphysics, trans. George Montgomery (LaSalle, Illinois: Open Court Publishing Company, 1994), p. 10.


(b ) U n l i k e Sp inoza , Le ibn iz m a k e s an excep t ion

f o r mi rac les because of h is f a i t h

(c) In t h e case of mirac les , Le ibniz asser t s t h a t

G o d is o n l y v io l a t ing s u b o r d i n a t e r egu la t ions a n d

t h a t t h e y do no t go aga ins t t h e regu la r o rde r of

n a t u r e

(d ) "For it can be sa id t h a t t h i s n a t u r e is o n l y a

c u s t o m of G o d ' s w h i c h he can c h a n g e on the

occas ion of a s t r o n g e r r e a son t h a t t h a t w h i c h

m o v e d h i m to use t hese regula t ions ." 4 1

(3) Reasonab le

(a ) "Fo r to t h i n k t h a t G o d ac ts in a n y t h i n g

w i t h o u t h a v i n g a n y r ea son f o r his wi l l ing , even if

w e ove r look the f ac t t h a t such ac t ions seem

imposs ib le , is an o p i n i o n w h i c h c o n f o r m s l i t t le t o

G o d ' s g lory ." 4 2

2. Body & Soul

a) In a n i m a l s , t h e d o m i n a n t m o n a d is t he soul

b ) Al l souls h a v e bodies , excep t f o r G o d

c) W o r t h of a Sp i r i t

(1) O n l y sp i r i t s m a d e in G o d ' s i m a g e

(2) O n l y sp i r i t s a re able to se rve h i m of the i r o w n f r e e

wi l l

(3) " A s ingle spir i t is w o r t h a w h o l e w o r l d , because it no t

on ly e x p r e s s e s t he w h o l e w o r l d , b u t it also k n o w s it a n d

g o v e r n s i tself as G o d does."4 3

(4) E v e r y subs t ance in t he u n i v e r s e exp res ses the w h o l e

un ive r se ; b u t spi r i t s are u n i q u e because t h e y express G o d

r a the r t h a n t h e w o r l d

d) Souls can e n t e r i n to a r e l a t i onsh ip w i t h G o d

41 Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, "Discourse on Metaphysics," Discourse on Metaphysics, trans. George Montgomery (LaSalle, Illinois: Open Court Publishing Company, 1994), p. 11. 42 Ibid., p. 6. 43 Ibid., p. 61.


(1) "Spir i ts are able to en ter in to a sort of social relat ionship wi th God, and w i th respect to them he is not only w h a t an inventor is to his machine, ... but he is also w h a t a prince is to his subjects, and even w h a t a fa ther is to his children."4 4

e) At death, there is not a complete separat ion of body and soul as both never cease to exist

(1) T h e soul nei ther generated nor destroyed, and thus immor ta l

(2) "Therefore , we may say, tha t not only the soul ... is indestructible, but also the an imal itself is."45

f ) Personal Immor ta l i ty of the Soul

(1) "But the intell igent soul, knowing tha t it is having the ability to say tha t w o r d T so ful l of meaning, not only cont inues to exist , metaphysical ly far not more certainly than do the others , but it r emains the same f rom the moral s tandpoin t , and const i tu tes the same personality, for it is its m e m o r y or knowledge of this ego which renders it open to p u n i s h m e n t and reward." 4 6

(2) "Also the immor ta l i t y w h i c h is required in morals and religion does not consist in mere perpetual existence, which pertains to all substances, for if addi t ion there were no remembrance of w h a t had been, immor ta l i ty would not be at all desirable."4 7

g) Union of Body and Soul

(1) T h e union of the body is possible because the soul follows it own laws and the body fol lows its o w n laws. T h e y work together according to God ' s pre-established ha rmony (of monads) .

(2) "According to this sys t em bodies act as if (to suppose

the impossible) there were no souls at all, and souls act as

44 Gottfried Wi lhe lm Leibniz, "Monadology," Discourse on Metaphysics, trans. George Montgomery (LaSalle, Illinois: Open Court Publishing Company, 1 9 9 4 ) , p. 270. 45 Ibid., p. 268. 46 Gottfried Wi lhe lm Leibniz, "Discourse on Metaphysics," Discourse on Metaphysics, trans. George Montgomery (LaSalle, Illinois: Open Court Publishing Company, 1 9 9 4 ) , p. 58. 47 Ibid.


if there were no bodies, and yet both body and soul act as if the one were influencing the other."48

3. Free Wil l

a) By definition, humans appear not to be free

(1) "As the individual concept of each person includes once for all everything which can ever happen to him, it can be seen, a priori the evidence or the reasons for the reality of each event, and why one happened sooner than the other."49

b) Yet, Leibniz argues they are free because, although our entire life consists in the concept of us, we chose freely all that occurs in our life

(1) "But these events, however certain, are nevertheless contingent, being based on the free choice of God and his creatures. It is true that their choices always have their reasons, but they incline to the choices under no compulsion of necessity."50

(2) "He [God], without at all necessitating our choice, determines it by that which appears most desirable."51

(3) Ex: There are an infinite number of possible Adolph Hitlers that God could have created to exist. Each Hitler would consist of the choices and totality of his life. It just happens that God chose to create the Adolph Hitler who freely chose to annihilate six million Jews.

(a) So his actions were freely chosen, but it is God who chose him to exist such that he could make those choices.

(b) Thus, the process of Election is really God's process of choosing which individuals will exist;

48 Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, "Monadology," Discourse on Metaphysics, trans. George Montgomery (LaSalle, Illinois: Open Court Publishing Company, 1 9 9 4 ) , p. 269. 49 Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, "Discourse on Metaphysics,0 Discourse on Metaphysics, trans. George Montgomery (LaSalle, Illinois: Open Court Publishing Company, 1 9 9 4 ) , p. 19-50 Ibid. 51 Ibid., p. 49.

MODERN PHILOSOPHY: A STUDY OF KNOWLEDGE LECTURE 7; RATIONALIST PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

he is e lec t ing the i r ex i s tence , no t the i r f a t e f o r

t h a t is chosen of t h e i r o w n f r ee will5 2

4. C i t y of G o d

a) C o m p o s e d of t he to t a l i ty of all sp i r i t s

b) T h i s is a " m o r a l w o r l d w i t h i n a n a t u r a l wor ld" 5 3

c) " T h e m o s t pe r fec t s ta te t h a t is poss ib le u n d e r t he m o s t

pe r fec t mona rch . " 5 4

d) T h e r e is a h a r m o n y b e t w e e n t h i s m o r a l r e a lm a n d he na tu ra l

rea lm, as G o d is t he crea tor of b o t h

e) " U n d e r t h i s pe r fec t g o v e r n m e n t , t h e r e wi l l be no good ac t ion

u n r e w a r d e d a n d n o evil ac t ion u n p u n i s h e d ; e v e r y t h i n g shou ld

t u r n ou t f o r t h e we l l -be ing of t h e good." 5 5

5. G o o d

a) Iden t ica l w i t h p ie ty

(1) Loving G o d

(2) A c c e p t i n g G o d ' s wi l l

(3) Liv ing a v i r t u o u s l i fe acco rd ing to t he reve la t ion of

J e s u s C h r i s t a n d his gospel

b) H i g h e s t G o o d

(1) " F o r he [ G o d ] is n o t o n l y t h e A r c h i t e c t a n d e f f i c i en t

cause of o u r being, b u t he is also o u r Lord and Final

Cause , w h o o u g h t to be t h e w h o l e goal of our wil l , a n d

w h o , a lone, can m a k e o u r happ iness . " 5 6

6. Evil

a) G o d p e r m i t s evil

52 Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, "Discourse on Metaphysics," Discourse on Metaphysics, trans. George Montgomery (LaSalle, Illinois: Open Court Publishing Company, 1 9 9 4 ) , pp. 52-54. 53 Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, "Monadology," Discourse on Metaphysics, trans. George Montgomery (LaSalle, Illinois: Open Court Publishing Company, 1 9 9 4 ) , p. 270. 54 Ibid. 55 Ibid., p. 271. 56 Ibid., p. 272.

13


(1) "If the action is good in itself, we may say that God wishes it and at t imes c o m m a n d s it, even though it does not take place; but if it is bad in itself and becomes only good by accident th rough the course of events ... if all this takes place we must say tha t G o d permi t s the evil, and not that he desired it, a l though he has co-operated by means of the laws of na ture wh ich he has established. H e k n o w s how to produce the greatest good f rom

m. r t h e - "57

7. Salvat ion

a) Revelation th rough Jesus Chr is t and his gospel, which has

revealed to us h o w much God loves us58

b) "God alone can render the soul happy or unhappy; and how the souls of the r ighteous are protected by his hand against all upheavals of the universe, since G o d alone is able to act upon them; h o w none of our acts are forgot ten; how everything is to be accounted for ... in fact how everyth ing mus t result in the greatest welfare of the good, for then shall the r ighteous become like suns and nei ther our sense nor our minds have ever tasted of anyth ing approaching the joys which G o d has laid up for those w h o love him."5 9

57 Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, "Discourse on Metaphysics," Discourse on Metaphysics, trans. George Montgomery (LaSalle, Illinois: Open Court Publishing Company, 1994), p. 12. 58 Ibid., p. 63. 59 Ibid.

14

LECTURE 8:

EMPIRICIST

PHILOSOPHY OF

RELIGION

MODERN PHILOSOPHY: A STUDY OF KNOWLEDGE LECTURE 8: EMPIRICIST PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

I. Empiricist Phi losophy of Religion

A. John Locke

1. Disliked religious fanat ic ism and religious intolerance

2. W a s a tolerant Angl ican himself

3. Desired to heal the breach among English Protes tants as well as wi th Catholics

a) Believed there were only 2 essential Chr is t ian teachings:

(1) Accept Jesus as the Chr is t

(2) Live in accordance wi th his teachings

4. Idea of God

a) Not innate1

b) Perfect qualities and then ex tend 2

(1) "Hav ing , f r o m w h a t we exper iment in ourselves, got the ideas of existence and durat ion, of knowledge and power, of pleasure and happiness, and of several other qualities and powers , which it is bet ter to have than to be wi thout ; w h e n w e would f r a m e an idea the most suitable we can to the Supreme Being, we enlarge everyone one of these w i th our idea of inf in i ty , and so put t ing them together, make our complex idea of God."3

(2) H u m e later uses this same reasoning to explain how

h u m a n s came up w i th the idea of God

c) Locke makes an exception to his empir ical sys tem for God

(1) God ' s existence k n o w n by reason4

(a) Cosmological Proof of God ' s Existence

1 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. A. D. W o o l e y ( N e w York: Penguin Group, 1974), p. 84. 2 Ibid., p. 288. 3 Ibid., p. 197. 4 Ibid., pp. 379'38I-


(b) Creation and the order of the universe necessitate a creator

(c) Being cannot come f rom nonbeing

(d) Thus, an eternal, powerful , and knowing Being must have created us

(2) Ontological Proof of God's Existence

(a) The very definition of God (a perfect, omniscient, eternal, and existing Being) necessitates his existence

(b) This proof created by Anselm of Canterbury (died 1109 C. E.) in the medieval period, but all of the rationalists use variations of this proof for God's existence in their metaphysics

(c) Locke dismisses as not being a strong enough proof5

5. Free Wil l

a) Locke believes the question "Does man have free will?" is the wrong question to be asking in the first place

b) The more proper questions is, "Is man free?" as freedom belongs to the agent, not the will

(1) Freedom is a power, and powers belong to agents

(2) The will is a power, so you cannot attribute freedom to a power

c) Freedom

(1) Freedom consists "in our being able to act or not to act, according as we shall choose or will."6

(2) "Freedom consists in the dependence of existence, or not existence of any action, upon our volition of it, and

5 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. A. D. W o o l e y ( N e w York: Penguin Group,

1974), p. 381. 6 Ibid., p. 171.


not in the dependence of any action, or its contrary, on our preference."7

(3) Freedom should not be confused wi th desire

(a) Wi l l and desire can be in conflict , wh ich il lustrates tha t they are dist inct f r o m one another

d) Desire

(1) Desire is an "uneasiness of the mind for w a n t of some absent good."8

(2) Desire de te rmines the will, not the greatest Good

e) Happiness

(1) All desire happiness

(2) Everyone pursues happiness and desires "wha t makes any part of it."9

0 T h e Greatest Good, w h y it is not a lways desired

(1) "All present pain, wha teve r it be, makes a par t of our present misery; but all absent good does not at any t ime make a necessary part of our present happiness, nor the absence of it make a part of our misery."10

g) M a n is indeed f ree

(1) Based on c o m m o n sense, Locke asserts we are f ree

(a) W e can choose to speak, or not to speak; to move or not to move - thus, we are free. W h o can deny this?

(2) " T h a t so far as anyone can, by the direction of choice of his mind, preferr ing the existence of an action to the nonexis tence of an action, and vice versa, make it to exist or not exist, so far he is f ree ... For how can we th ink

7 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. A. D. Wooley (New York: Penguin Group, 1974), p. 171. 8 Ibid., p. 173. 9 Ibid., p. 174. 10 Ibid., pp. 174-75-


anyone f reer than to have the power to do wha t he will?"11

h) Freedom wi th in Limits

(1) W e are l imited by our o w n strength, knowledge, and abilities as well as by natura l laws, such as gravi ty

(2) W e are also l imited by t ime and space - to choose one action is to lose the opt ion of choosing another

(3) "So that in respect of act ions wi th in the reach of such a power in h im a m a n seems as f ree as it is possible fo r f reedom to make him."1 2

6. Soul

a) W e have a clear and dist inct idea of soul, as clear as tha t of body (Descar tes cogito)13

(1) "These ideas, the one of body, the other of our minds , every day 's experience clearly furn ishes us with; but if here again we inquire how this is done, we are equally in the dark."14

b) A n y doubts regarding the soul can also be made of the body; the l imits of h u m a n knowledge are met w h e n regarding ei ther

(1) " T h e substance of spirit is u n k n o w n to us, and so is the substance of body equally u n k n o w n to us."15

(2) "I t h ink we are at a loss, both in the one and the other; and can as little unders tand how the parts of the body cohere, as h o w we ourselves perceive and move."

c) T h e soul is defined as "a substance tha t thinks, and has a power of exciting mot ion in body, by will, or thought."1 7

11 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. A. D. W o o l e y ( N e w York: Penguin

Group, 1974), PP- 169-70. 11 Ibid., p. 170. 13 Ibid., p 192. 14 Ibid., p. 195. 15 Ibid., p. 196. 16 Ibid., p. 195. 17 Ibid., p. 194.


7. Spirits

a) W e can only believe in t h e m based on fai th, as there is no empirical evidence of t hem

b) " T h e having the ideas of spirits does not make us k n o w than any such th ings do exist w i t h o u t us, or tha t there are any f in i te spirits, or any other spiri tual beings, bu t the Eternal God ... A n d therefore concerning the existence of f in i te spirits, as well as of several other things, we mus t conten t ourselves wi th the evidence of faith; but universal , certain proposi t ions concerning this mat te r are beyond our reach."18

B. George Berkeley

1. Anglican Bishop by vocation

a) Strong Angl ican beliefs

(1) "For af ter all, w h a t deserves the f i rs t place in our studies, is the considerat ion of God and our duty; wh ich to promote, as it was the ma in dr i f t and design of my labors, so shall I es teem t h e m altogether useless and ineffectual , if by w h a t I have said I cannot inspire m y readers wi th a pious sense of the presence of God: and having shown the falseness or van i ty of those barren speculations, which make the chief employment of learned men, the bet ter dispose t h e m to reverence and embrace the salutary t ru th of the Gospel, which to k n o w and to practice is the h ighest perfect ion of h u m a n nature."19

b) Crit ical and unsympathe t i c to non-Chr i s t i ans and atheists

(1) " W e should ra ther wonde r , tha t men can be found so

stupid as to neglect [ the obvious evidence of God in the

natural world] ."2 0

c) Intolerant

(1) Did not advocate f ree t hough t


Group, 1974), PP- 393-94-19 George Berkeley, A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge (Indianapolis: Hackett

Publishing Company, 1982), p. 87. 20 Ibid., p. 86.


2. God

a) God's existence and presence completely obvious

(i) "And yet this consistent un i fo rm working, which so evidently displays the goodness and wisdom of that governing spirit whose will constitutes the laws of nature

(2) "It is therefore plain, that nothing can be more evident to anyone that is capable of the least reflection, than the existence of God, or a spirit who is intimately present to our minds ... in short, in whom we live, and move, and have our being."22

(3) "The existence of God is far more evidently perceived than the existence of men; because the effects of nature are infinitely more numerous and considerable, than those ascribed to human agents. There is not any mark that denotes a man, or effect produced by him, which does not more strongly evince the being of that spirit who is the Author of Nature/923

Soul

a) Referred to by Berkeley as Spirit

(1) "For by the word spirit we mean only that which thinks, wills, and perceives."24

(2) " W h a t I am myself, that which I denote by the term I, is the same with what is meant by soul or spiritual substance."25

b) An simple, active, undivided, perceiving being

(1) "A spirit is one simple, undivided, active being: as it perceives ideas, it is called the understanding, as it


Publishing Company, 1982), p. 35. 22 Ibid., p. 83. 23 Ibid., p. 82. 14 Ibid., p. 79. 25 Ibid.


produces or otherwise operates about them, it is called the will."26

(2) "A soul or spirit is an active being, whose existence consists not in being perceived, but in perceiving ideas and thinking." 2 7

c) N o idea of the soul

(1) Ideas are passive and inert ( the opposite of spirit); thus, there can be no idea of an active and perceiving being because ideas cannot represent to us that which acts

(a) " T o have an idea which shall be like that active principle of mot ion and change of ideas is absolutely impossible. Such is the nature of spirit

or that which acts, tha t it cannot be of itself perceived, but only by the effect which it produces."28

(b) " W e k n o w other spirits by means of our o w n soul, which in tha t sense is the image or idea of them, it having a like respect to o ther spirits, that blueness or heat by me perceived has to those ideas perceived by another."2 9

(c) " T h e knowledge I have of other spirits is not immediate , as is the knowledge of my ideas: but depending on the in te rvent ion of ideas, by me referred to ages or spirits dis t inct f r o m myself , as effects or concomitant signs."30

d) Immor ta l

(1) " T h e soul is indivisible, incorporeal, unextended, and it is consequent ly incorruptible ... N o t h i n g can be plainer, than that the motions, changes, decays, and dissolutions which we hourly see befall natural bodies ... cannot possible affect an active, simple, uncompounded

"6 George Berkeley, A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1982), p. 33. 27 Ibid., p. 79. 28 Ibid., p. 33. 29 Ibid., p. 79. 30 Ibid., p. 81.


substance: such a being therefore is indissoluble by the force of nature, tha t is to say, the soul of man is naturally immortal/931

4. Imperfect ion

a) Defects of Na tu re

(1) Have purpose

(a) Provide variety

(b) A u g m e n t the beauty of creation

b) God not th r i f ty

(1) It is just as easy for God to make a perfect plant, animal, world, or being as it is to make a faul ty one

(2) " T h e splendid profus ion of natura l th ings should not be interpreted, weakness or prodigali ty in the agent w h o produces them, but ra ther be looked on as an a rgument of the riches of his power."3 2

c) Pain

(1) O u r view of the wor ld is too na r row so we cannot see the big picture, in wh ich pain is a integral part

(2) In the big scheme of things, tha t which appears to be evil, has the "na ture of good, w h e n considered as l inked wi th the whole sys tem of beings."33

Miracles

a) W e typically a t t r ibute as miracles only tha t which in ter rupt the natural course of things, even the order of t he universe is itself a miraculous sign of power, wisdom, and intelligence34

b) God is capable of any miracle, but has chosen to act according to the laws of nature, wh ich he has set in place35

31 George Berkeley, A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1982), p. 82. 32 Ibid., p. 85. 33 Ibid., p. 86. 34 Ibid., p. 45.


LECTURE 8: EMPIRICIST PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

c) O n occasion, w h e n necessary, G o d acts in w h e n which are out of the ord inary

(1) G o d does this rarely, in order to main ta in the miraculous nature of miracles

(2) God more of ten tries to convince our reason of his existence th rough the order of na ture

C. H u m e

God

a) W e have no experience of God and therefore no impression of h im

(1) " W e have no idea of the Supreme Being but w h a t we learn f r o m reflection on our o w n facult ies. W e r e our ignorance, therefore , a good reason for rejecting anyth ing , we should be led in to tha t principle of denying all energy in the Supreme Being as much as in the grossest matter."3 6

b) H u m e uses Locke's explanat ion for our concept of God

(1) Imagine all of the good qualit ies in ourselves and then expand t h e m infinitely3 7

2. Soul

a) Referred to by H u m e as the m i n d ( removing the religious connota t ion)

b) No t im mor t a l

(1) W e have no reason to believe tha t the soul cont inues on af ter the body has ceased

(2) Immor ta l i ty is w i sh fu l th ink ing on our part

c) W e have no knowledge of the soul

35 George Berkeley, A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1982), p. 47. 56 David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Eric Steinberg (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1993), p. 48. 37 Ibid., p. 11.


d) N o idea of m i n d (if the mind is def ined as an unchanging non-mater ia l substance w i th in )

(i) N o impress ion of the self and therefore no idea of the self - just bundles of impress ions

e) O u r ideas cannot go beyond sense impress ions and we have no impress ions of the mind, except perhaps a bundle of impressions

3. Miracles

a) N o true miracle has ever occurred (one tha t is verified by numerous reliable sources and und i spu ted)

b) Stories of miracles abound because we delight in gossip and the miraculous3 8

(1) Interes t ing

(2) Provide hope

(3) W e w a n t to believe in t h e m

c) All ancient scriptures ful l of miracles

(1) A n indicat ion of the change in the way people see the wor ld as miracles are no longer c o m m o n (advent of science)

d) Believed in pr imari ly by " ignorant and barbarous nations"3 9

4. Religion

a) Religion is beyond the bounds of h u m a n knowledge

(1) " W h i l e w e argue f r o m the course of nature, and infer a part icular intelligent cause ... w e embrace a principle, which is both uncer ta in and useless. It is uncertain; because the subject lies ent i rely beyond the reach of h u m a n experience."4 0


Publishing Company, 1993), pp. 7^'79-39 Ibid., p. 79. 40 Ibid., p. 98.

MODERN PHILOSOPHY: A S T U D Y OF KNOWLEDGE LECTURE 8: EMPIRICIST PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

b) It is a method of accounting for phenomena in the world41

c) Not necessary as all can be found through empiricism

(i) "All the philosophy, therefore, in the world, and all the religion, which is nothing but a species of philosophy, will never be able to carry us beyond the usual course of experience, or give us measures of conduct and behavior different f rom those which are furnished by reflections on common life."42

5. Christianity

a) Based on very weak evidence

(1) "Our evidence, then, for the t ruth of the Christian religion is less than the evidence for the t ruth of our senses; because, even in the first authors of our religion, it was no greater; and it is evident it must diminish in passing f rom them to their disciples; nor can any one rest such confidence in their test imony, as in the immediate objects of his sense."43

b) Belief in Christianity should be faith based; to test it by reason would destroy it44

(1) "But its [divinity and theology] best and most solid foundation is faith and divine revelation."45

c) The miracle of faith necessary to believe in Christ ianity

(1) "So that, upon the whole, we may conclude, that the Christian Religion not only was at first attended with miracles, but even at this day cannot be believe by any reasonable person wi thout one. Mere reason is insufficient to convince us of its veracity: And whoever is moved by Faith to assent to it, is conscious of a continued miracle in his own person, which subverts all the principles of his understanding, and gives him a


Publishing Company, 1993), p. 96. 42 Ibid., p. 101. 43 Ibid., p. 73. 44 Ibid., pp.89-90. 45 Ibid., p. 114.


LECTURE 8: EMPIRICIST PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

determination to believe what is most contrary to custom and experience."46

46 Dav id H u m e , An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Eric S te inbe rg ( Ind ianapol i s : H a c k e t t

Publ i sh ing C o m p a n y , 1 9 9 3 ) , p. 90.

12

LECTURE 9:

RATIONALIST

EPISTEMOLOGY

PART I

MODERN PHILOSOPHY: A STUDY OF KNOWLEDGE LECTURE 9: RATIONALIST EPISTEMOLOGY PART I

I. Rat ional is t Ep i s t emology

A. Rene Descar tes

1. Meditations on First Philosophy (see d i a g r a m )

a) M e d i t a t i o n I: Concerning the things that can be called into doubt

(1) Descar tes beg ins by d o u b t i n g e v e r y t h i n g

(a) "Bu t r a the r a m I fo rced , f ina l ly , to concede

t h a t of the t h i n g s w h i c h I once he ld to be t r u e

t he re is n o n e t h a t it w o u l d no t be p e r m i t t e d to

doub t - a n d th i s no t t h r o u g h lack of cons ide ra t ion

or levi ty, bu t because of va l id and med i t a t ive

reasons." 1

(2) H i s n e x t s tep is to f i n d s o m e t h i n g t ha t is cer ta in

b) M e d i t a t i o n II: Concerning the nature of the human mind: that it

be more known that [the] body.

(1) Desca r tes d e t e r m i n e s one cer ta in t h i n g - t ha t he

exis ts

(a) H e doub t s e v e r y t h i n g , bu t real izes t h a t "as

long as I shal l be cog i ta t ing tha t I a m s o m e t h i n g " 2

(b) T h e r e f o r e , his f a m o u s s t a t e m e n t cogito ergo

sum ("I t h i n k , t h e r e f o r e I a m . " )

(c) "I cognize ove r t l y t h a t n o t h i n g can be

perceived b y m e m o r e easi ly or m o r e ev iden t ly

m y t h a n m y mind, "3

c) M e d i t a t i o n III : Concerning God, that he exists

(1) C lea r & Di s t i nc t C r i t e r i o n of T r u t h

(a) Based of f cogito ergo sum; Descar tes assured he

exis ts so he asks h i m s e l f w h a t w a s the cr i te r ion of

th i s ce r t a in ty

1 Rene Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, trans. George Heffernan (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992), p. 29.

2 Ibid., p. 32. 3 Ibid., p. 39.


(b) "I a m ce r ta in t h a t I a m a cogi ta t ing th ing . D o

I n o w also k n o w , t h e r e f o r e , w h a t w o u l d be

requ i red in o rde r t h a t I m i g h t be cer ta in of

a n y t h i n g ? " 4

(c) T h e c r i t e r ion f o r cogito c learness a n d

d i s t inc tness , t h u s he der ives his c r i te r ion fo r t r u t h

(d) "I n th i s p r i m a r y cogn i t ion [cogito ergo sum]

the re is, n a m e l y , n o t h i n g o the r t h a n a cer ta in

clear a n d d i s t inc t pe rcep t ion of t ha t w h i c h I

a f f i r m ... A n d so I n o w seem to be able to

es tabl ish as a genera l ru le t h a t all w h i c h I ve ry

clearly a n d d i s t inc t ly perce ive is t rue ." 5

(2) G o d Exis t s

(a) Desca r t e s pos i t s t h a t he has an i nna t e idea of

G o d as a pe r f ec t be ing; h is idea of G o d is t he m o s t

t rue idea he has

(i) "For , o n t h e con t r a ry , because th i s idea

of G o d be m a x i m a l l y clear a n d d is t inc t ,

and because it c o n t a i n [ s ] m o r e object ive

real i ty t h a n a n y o t h e r idea, the re is no idea

m o r e t r ue t h r o u g h itself , n o r is t he re a n y

idea in w h i c h less suspic ion of fa l s i ty

w o u l d be ." 6

(b) H e h imse l f is n o t pe r fec t so w h e r e did t h i s

idea come f r o m ? It m u s t be f r o m G o d .

(c) "Su re ly t ha t , if t h e object ive rea l i ty of any one

of m y ideas w e e so grea t t h a t I w o u l d be cer ta in

t h a t t he s a m e rea l i ty is ne i the r f o r m a l l y nor

e m i n e n t l y in me , and , t he re fo re , t h a t I myse l f

c anno t be t h e cause of t h i s idea, it necessar i ly

fo l lows t h e r e f r o m t h a t I a m not a lone in t he

wor ld , bu t r a t h e r t h a t t h e r e also exis t s s o m e o t h e r

t h i n g w h i c h is t he cause of t h a t idea."7

4 Rene Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, trans. George H e f f e r n a n ( N o t r e D a m e , Indiana:

Univers i ty o f Notre D a m e Press, 1992), p. 40.

5 Ibid.

6 Ibid., p. 49.

7 Ibid., p. 46.


(d) " I n th i s f a s h i o n , it r e m a i n e d t h a t th i s idea had

been pos i t ed in m e b y a n a t u r e t h a t t r u ly w e r e

m o r e pe r f ec t t h a n I w a s , a n d t h a t even possessed

in itself all t h e p e r f e c t i o n s of w h i c h I could have

a n y idea, t h a t is to say, to exp re s s myse l f in one

w o r d , t h a t w e r e G o d . " 8

d) M e d i t a t i o n I V : Concerning the true and the false

(1) A t u r n i n g a w a y f r o m t h e senses t o w a r d r eason a n d the in te l lec t

(2) G o d Ex i s t s

(a) Desca r t e s f u r t h e r i l lus t ra tes h is p roof of G o d

t h a t ar ises f r o m t h e fac t t h a t he has an idea of

G o d w i t h i n h i m

(b) " A n w h e n I p a y a t t e n t i o n t h e r e t o t h a t I doubt ,

or t ha t I a m a t h i n g i n c o m p l e t e a n d i n d e p e n d e n t ,

t h e r e occurs to m e t h e clear a n d d is t inc t idea of an

i n d e p e n d e n t a n d c o m p l e t e being, t h a t is, of G o d .

A n d f r o m th i s one t h i n g - t h a t t he r e w o u l d be

such an idea in me , or t h a t I w o u l d ex is t as one

h a v i n g th i s idea - I so m a n i f e s t l y conc lude t h a t

G o d also exis ts , a n d t h a t m y w h o l e ex i s t ence

d e p e n d s o n h i m at i nd iv idua l m o m e n t s . " 9

(3) K n o w l e d g e beg ins w i t h G o d

(a) " A n d n o w I s e e m to see a w a y by w h i c h one

m i g h t get f r o m t h a t c o n t e m p l a t i o n of t h e t r u e

G o d - in w h o m , n a m e l y , all t he t r ea su re s of the

sciences a re h i d d e n - to t h e cogn i t i on of o the r

th ings ." 1 0

(4) G o d does n o t deceive, so m y facu l t i e s can be t r u s t ed

(a) "For , if I have w h a t e v e r is in m e f r o m G o d ,

and he w o u l d no t h a v e g iven to m e a n y f acu l ty of

err ing, I do n o t s e e m to be able ever to err ."

8 Rene Descartes , Meditations on First Philosophy, trans. George H e f f e r n a n ( N o t r e D a m e , Indiana:

Univers i ty o f N o t r e D a m e Press, 1992), p. 53.

9 Ibid., p. 55.

10 Ibid.

MODERN PHILOSOPHY: A STUDY OF KNOWLEDGE LECTURE 9; RATIONALIST EPISTEMOLOGY PART I

(5) Yet, we know we err

(a) This is because our faculty of judging truth, which is f rom him, is not infinite is us"

(b) Our will is infinite, but our intellect is finite -thus, we err because we extend our will to things we do not understand12

(6) How can we avoid error?

(a) By always allowing the perception of the intellect to precede the determination of the will13

(b) Never extend the will to things which are not clearly and distinctly exhibited by the intellect

(c) "Ever clear and distinct perception is without a doubt true"14

(d) Therefore, if you do not go past what is clear and distinct, you will never err

e) Meditation V: Concerning the essence of material things; and again concerning God, that he exists

(1) Essence of Material Things

(a) Those qualities which Locke called Primary (extension, solidity, mobility, figure) are true

(b) Innate Ideas

(c) "I f ind within me innumerable ideas of certain things which, even if they would perhaps exist nowhere outside me, still cannot be said to be nothing."15

(d) Math most certain of innate ideas

11 Rene Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, trans. George H e f f e r n a n ( N o t r e D a m e , Indiana:


12 Ibid., p. 59.

13 Ibid, p. 61.

14 Ibid., p. 63.

15 Ibid., pg. 65.


(a) " T h i n g s p e r t a i n i n g to

a r i t h m e t i c or g e o m e t r y or to p u r e

a n d abs t rac t m a t h e m a t i c s in

genera l , I e v i d e n t l y recogn ized - to

be t he m o s t ce r ta in ones of all."16

(2) G o d Exis t s (a ve r s ion of t h e O n t o l o g i c a l P r o o f )

(a) By de f in i t i on - a pe r f ec t Being - G o d ex i s t s

(b) " T h e ex i s t ence of G o d can n o m o r e be

separa ted f r o m t h e essence of G o d ... t h a n the idea

of a val ley can be sepa ra t ed f r o m the idea of

m o u n t a i n - so m u c h so t h a t it w o u l d be jus t as

con t r ad i c to ry to cog i ta te G o d ( t h a t is, a m o s t

h igh ly pe r fec t b e i n g ) in w h o m ex i s tence w o u l d be

lacking ( t ha t is, in w h o m a pe r f ec t ion w o u l d be

lacking) as to cogi ta te a m o u n t a i n f r o m w h i c h a

va l ley w o u l d be miss ing ." 1 7

(3) Al l k n o w l e d g e d e p e n d s o n G o d ' s ex i s tence

(a) " A n d t h u s I do p l a in ly see t h a t t h e ce r t i t ude

and t r u t h of all k n o w l e d g e d e p e n d s on t h e one

cogni t ion of t h e t r u e G o d - so m u c h so tha t ,

be fo re I w o u l d k n o w h i m , I could have pe r fec t ly

k n o w n n o t h i n g a b o u t a n y o t h e r t h ing . " 18

(4) T h r o u g h G o d , w e can h a v e ce r t a in ty of o u r

k n o w l e d g e

(a) But n o w i n n u m e r a b l e t h i n g s - b o t h of G o d

and h imse l f a n d of o t h e r in te l lec tua l th ings , as

we l l as, too, all of t h a t corporea l n a t u r e w h i c h is

t he object of pu re m a t h e m a t i c s - can be fu l l y

k n o w n by, a n d ce r t a in to, me."1 9

f ) M e d i t a t i o n V I : Concerning the existence of material things and

the real distinction of the mind from the body

(1) M a t t e r

16 Rene Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, trans. George H e f f e r n a n ( N o t r e Dame , Indiana:


17 Ibid.

18 Ibid., p. 70.

19 Ibid.


(a) Mat te r exists because G o d does not deceive

(i) Mat te r emi ts ideas into us

(2) Senses

(a) Descartes had doubted his senses completely, but not so n o w

(i) "I t h ink tha t surely not all the things tha t I seem to have f r o m the senses are rashly to be admit ted; ye t I also th ink tha t not all such th ings are to be called into doubt."2 0

(b) T h e senses can be t rus ted and used, but only w h e n their l imi ta t ions are recognized

(i) O u r sense percept ions "s ignify to the mind wh ich th ings wou ld be accommodat ing or incommodious to the composi te of wh ich it is a part, and which perceptions are, to this extent , clear and dist inct enough ... concerning essence, however , these percept ions s ignify only very obscurely and confusedly."2 1

(3) M i n d vs. Body

(a) Descartes k n o w n for his dual ism, in which he makes a dis t inct ion be tween m i n d and body

(i) "The re is a great d i f ference between the mind and the body consist ing therein tha t by its na ture the body be always divisible, but the m i n d be completely indivisible."2 2

2. Knowledge

a) Descartes greatly disappointed in his educat ion

(1) Feels he has learned no th ing

20 Rene Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, trans. George Hef fernan ( N o t r e Dame, Indiana:

Univers i ty o f Notre Dame Press, 1992), p. 76.

21 Ibid., p. 80.

22 Ibid., p. 82.


LECTURE 9; RATIONALIST EPISTEMOLOGY PART I

(2) H e has a very low regard fo r liberal arts and the philosophical sciences

(a) H e makes a break f r o m the uncertain philosophical sciences and advocated the applied sciences, in which we can have certainty

(i) "For these not ions have show me that it is possible to arrive at knowledge tha t be very useful for life, and that , in place of that speculative phi losophy that one teaches in the schools, one can f ind a practical philosophy."2 3

(b) H e wan ted to direct science away f r o m belief, which he believed was more suited to philosophy, and toward knowledge

(3) Method

(a) Four Step Method 2 4

(i) Doubt every th ing

(a) Accept only w h a t is clear and dist inct

(ii) S impl i fy

(a) Divide into smaller parts for resolving

(iii) Reconstruct

(iv) General ize and make enumera te

(b) H e believes method was the crucial missing e lement in his education, so he spends much t ime developing a method

(i) "But, like a man w h o walks all alone and in the shadows, I resolved to go slowly and to use so much circumspection in all

13 Rene Descartes, Discourse on the Method, ed. and trans. George Heffernan (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1994), p. 87. 14 Ibid, p. 35.


th ings that , if I did advance but very little, I would, at least, very well guard against falling. I also did not wan t to begin to

ect totally any of the opinions tha t had ace been able to slip into my credence

without having been introduced there by reason, unt i l I had f i rs t spent enough t ime on devising a plan for the work that I was under tak ing and on seeking the true me thod for arr iving at the knowledge of all the th ings of wh ich my mind would be capable."25

(c) His me thod becomes the new standard fo r science

(i) "For in the end the method, which teaches one to fol low the true order and to enumera te exact ly all the c i rcumstances of tha t which one is seeking, contains all that which gives cer ta inty to the rules of ar i thmetic."2 6

(ii) " N o w , having the intent ion of spending m y whole life in the search for a science so necessary, and having found a path that seems to me such that , by fol lowing th is pa th [ the four step method] , one ought infal l ibly to f ind this science."27

( a ) i t is his assert ion tha t th rough his method we can master na ture

(i) By focusing on practical phi losophy (applied sciences) using his method, we will be able to employ nature for the purposes to wh ich it is appropriate and " thus render ourselves, as it were, masters and possessors of nature."2 8

Descartes, Discourse on the Method, ed. and trans. George Hef fernan ( N o t r e Dame, Indiana: /s i ty o f Notre Dame Press, 1994), p. 33.

1., p. 37. /id., p. 87.

îd.

LECTURE IO:

RATIONALIST

EPISTEMOLOGY

PART %

s o p h v ; a STUDY OF

MON^'STEP,STMOIOC YP°ZTGE

KNOWLEDGE GY PART II

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k n o w f c d ^ d ° v , d ™ at ° y r i r s

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a def ini t ion

e n 7 ^ 5 ^ ^ ' ; , , , r * « « * < . * . knowledge f f t f P r ° X , m a t e « < " e ...

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° b e called perfect 3 j r-n inmost essence o f t l T f c •° ^ W t 0

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.ode [reason] comprehends the t thing and is without danger of it is what we must chiefly use."

iding t ruth via reason

: clearly and distinctly understand, d nature dictate to us, not indeed in ore excellent way, which agrees best

ie mind, so that everyone who has of the intellect has doubtless self."2

d attends to a thought - to weigh it, , in good order, the things legitimately i it - if it is false, the mind will

but if it is true, the mind will illy, without any interruption, to 5 f rom it."3

the Intellect,", c n * intellect99 A

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i: Princeton Univers i ty Press, 1994) > P» 51-;e," A Spinoza Reader: The Ethics and Other Works,

Jniversity Press, 1994)1 P- XI«

of the Intellect," A Spinoza Reader: The Ethics and

mi Princeton Univers i ty Press, 1994X P- 55-

MODERN PHILOSOPHY: A STUDY OF KNOWLEDGE LECTURE jo: RATIONALIST EPISTEMOLOGY PART II

3. Method

a) "So we shall take care to explain h o w it [ four th mode -reason] is to be used, tha t we may under s t and u n k n o w n th ings by this kind of knowledge and do so a directly as possible."4

b) A i m of method: clear and dist inct idea via reason

(1) As wi th Descartes, only clear and dist inct ideas correspond to reality

(2) " T h e aim, then, is to have clear and dist inct ideas, tha t is, such as have been made f r o m the pure mind, and not f r o m for tu i tous mot ions of the body."5

c) T w o Step Method

(1) Form a Def in i t ion

(a) " T h e th ing be conceived ei ther th rough its essence alone or t h rough its proximate cause ... For really, knowledge of the effect is nothing but acquiring a more perfect knowledge of its cause."6

(b) Avoid inferences by abstraction

(c) Proceed by f o r m i n g thoughts based on the def ini t ion

(2) Know the Condi t ions of a Sound Def in i t ion

(a) " T o be called perfect , a def ini t ion will have to explain the inmos t essence of the thing, and to take not to use certain propia in its place."7

(b) Propia are propert ies which , while not part of the essence of a thing, fo l low f r o m its essence

(c) T h e def ini t ion mus t include the proximate cause

4 Benedict de Spinoza, "Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect," A Spinoza Reader: The Ethics and Other Worhs, ed. and trans. Edwin Curley (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1 9 9 4 ) ) P« 5 1 -5 Ibid. 6 Ibid. 7 Ibid., p. 52.

MODERN PHILOSOPHY: A STUDY OF KNOWLEDGE LECTURE JO: RATIONALIST EPISTEMOLOGY PART II

(d) All the th ing ' s proper t ies mus t be deduce able f r o m the def in i t ion

(e) T h e def ini t ion mus t be a f f i rmat ive

4. Ideas

a) God the cause

(1) All ideas exist in G o d

(a) T h e h u m a n m i n d is par t of the inf ini te intellect; thus , w h e n the h u m a n mind perceives, God, " insofar as he cons t i tu tes the essence of the h u m a n mind, has th is or tha t idea"8

(2) " T h e formal being of ideas admi t s God as a cause only insofar as he is considered as a th ink ing thing, and not insofar as he is explained by any other at tr ibute.

T h a t is, ideas, both of God ' s a t t r ibutes and of s ingular things, admit not the objects themselves , or the th ings perceived, as their ef f ic ient cause, but God himself , insofar as he is a th ink ing th ing ." 9

b) Order and Connect ion

(1) T h e same binding force in na tu re is the binding force of ideas

(a) " T h e order and connect ion of ideas is the same as the order and connect ion of things."10

(2) Logical inference is w h a t connects clear and dist inct ideas; likewise, na ture is connect by logical inference and thus is logically necessary - every change in na ture has a cause and thus al causes are de te rmined

c) T rue and Falsity of Ideas

(1) "All ideas, insofar as they are related to God, are

t rue.""

8 Benedict de Spinoza, "The Ethics," A Spinoza Reader: The Ethics and Other Worhs, ed. and trans. Edwin Curley (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), p. 123. 9 Ibid., p. 118. 10 Ibid., p. 119. 11 Ibid., p. 137.

MODERN PHILOSOPHY: A STUDY OF KNOWLEDGE LECTURE JO; RATIONALIST EPISTEMOLOGY PART II

(2) " E v e r y idea w h i c h is in us is absolute , or adequa t e a n d per fec t , is t rue . " 12

(3) "Fa ls i ty cons i s t s in t he p r i v a t i o n of k n o w l e d g e w h i c h

inadequa te , m u t i l a t e d a n d c o n f u s e d , ideas invo lve . " 13

B. G o t t f r i e d W i l h e l m Leibniz

1. T w o Kinds of T r u t h 1 4

a) T r u t h s of Fact

(1) C o n t i n g e n t ( the i r oppos i t e is poss ib le)

(2) Empi r i ca l

b) T r u t h s of Reason

(1) N e c e s s a r y ( the i r oppos i t e is no t poss ib le)

(2) A n a l y t i c

2. M i n d

a) N o t a b l a n k tablet

b) M i n d a l w a y s t h i n k s

(1) Disagrees w i t h Locke, w h o says the m i n d does n o t

a l w a y s t h i n k

(a) Since bodies can ex i s t w i t h o u t m o t i o n , souls

m u s t be able to ex i s t w i t h o u t ac t iv i ty

(z) " A subs t ance c a n n o t ex i s t w i t h o u t ac t iv i ty , a n d

indeed t h a t t he r e neve r is a b o d y w i t h o u t mot ion." 1 5

c) A s s e r t s i n n a t e ideas ex is t

12 Benedict de Spinoza, "The Ethics," A Spinoza Reader: The Ethics and Other Works, ed. and trans. Edwin Curley (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), p. 137. 13 Ibid. 14 Anthony Kenny, "Leibniz," A Brief History of Western Philosophy (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1 9 9 8 ) , p . 2 2 6 . 15 Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, "New Essays on the Human Understanding," Human Knowledge: Classical and Contemporary Approaches, Paul K. Moser and Arnold vander Nat, eds., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 149.

MODERN PHILOSOPHY: A STUDY OF KNOWLEDGE LECTURE io: RATIONALIST EPISTEMOLOGY PART II

(i) Says he a n d Locke m a y n o t disagree so m u c h in ideas as in l anguage

(a) "For a f t e r h a v i n g devo ted t h e w h o l e of his

f i r s t book to the re jec t ion of i nna te knowledge ,

u n d e r s t o o d in a cer ta in sense, he never the les s

admi t s , at t he beg inn ing of the second book a n d

in those w h i c h fo l low, t h a t the ideas w h i c h do n o t

or ig inate in t he sensa t ion come f r o m ref lec t ion .

N o w ref lec t ion is n o t h i n g bu t an a t t en t i on to t h a t

w h i c h is a l ready in us, a n d the senses do no t give

us w h a t w e a l ready b r ing w i t h us."16

3. Ideas

a) N o t f r o m the senses

(1) Senses on ly p rov ide ins t ances

(a) For necessary t ru th s , w e m u s t have pr inc ip les

w h o s e "proof does n o t depend u p o n ins tances ...

a l though w i t h o u t t he senses it w o u l d neve r have

come in to o u r heads to t h i n k of them." 1 7

(b) " T h e senses, a l t hough t h e y are necessary f o r

all ou r ac tual acqu i r ing of knowledge , are by n o

m e a n s su f f i c i en t to give us the w h o l e of our

knowledge , s ince t he senses never give a n y t h i n g

bu t ins tances , t ha t is to say par t icu la r or

ind iv idua l t ru ths ." 1 3

(2) - i t is a lways fa lse to say t h a t all o u r concep t ions

come f r o m the so-called ex t e rna l sense, because t hose

concep t ions w h i c h I have of myse l f a n d of m y t h o u g h t s ,

and consequen t ly of being, of subs tance , of act ion, of

iden t i ty , and of m a n y o t h e r s c a m e f r o m an i n n e r yt 19

exper ience .

b) Al l ideas in ou r souls

16 Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, "New Essays on the Human Understanding," Human Knowledge: Classical and Contemporary Approaches, Paul K. Moser and Arnold vander Nat, eds., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 148. 17 Ibid., p. 147. 18 Ibid. 19 Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, "Discourse on Metaphysics," Discourse on Metaphysics, trans. George Montgomery (LaSalle, Illinois: Open Court Publishing Company, 1994), p. 46.

MODERN PHILOSOPHY: A STUDY OF KNOWLEDGE LECTURE IO: RATIONALIST EPISTEMOLOGY PART II

(i) " W e have in our souls ideas of everything, only because of the continual act ion of God upon us, tha t is to say, because every effect expresses its cause and therefore the essences of our souls are cer tain expression, imi ta t ions or images of the divine essence, divine thought , and divine will, including all the ideas which are there contained."2 0

c) Monads and Perception

(1) All monads perceive and are the source of their o w n activity

(a) Monads mirror the world , but not because they are acted upon by it, but because of God ' s pre-established h a r m o n y

(2) O n l y God acts upon us

(a) " W e may say, therefore , tha t God is for us the

only immedia te external object, and tha t we see

th ings th rough h im." 21

(i) N o causat ion in perception (on the part

of mat ter )

(b) "For example, w h e n w e see the sun or the stars, it is God w h o gives to us and preserves in us the ideas and wheneve r our senses are affected according to his o w n laws in a certain manner , it is he, w h o by his con t inua l concurrence, de termines our thinking." 2 2

20 Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, "Discourse on Metaphysics," Discourse on Metaphysics, trans. George Montgomery (LaSalle, Illinois: Open Court Publishing Company, 1994)? P* 47* 21 Ibid. 22 Ibid.

LECTURE M

EMPIRICIST

EPISTEMOLOGY

PART I

MODERN PHILOSOPHY: A S T U D Y OF KNOWLEDGE LECTURE n: EMPIRICIST EPISTEMOLOGY PART I

I. Empiricist Epistemology

A. John Locke

i. Ideas

a) Defined

(1) The object of the mind

(2) The term idea is used by Locke to express "whatever is meant by phantasm, notion, species, or whatever it is which the mind can be employed about in thinking."1

(3) Ideas are not exact copies of things

(a) " W e may not th ink (as perhaps usually is done) that they are exactly the images and resemblances of something inherent in the subject, most of those of sensation being in the mind no more the likeness of something existing without us, than the names that stand for them are the likeness of our ideas, which yet upon hearing they are apt to excite in us."2

(4) Ideas are the thing as perceived by the mind

b) Origination

(1) All ideas originate f rom sensation or reflection

(a) "External objects fu rn i sh the mind with the ideas of sensible qualities, which are all those different perceptions they produce in us; and the mind furnishes the understanding with the ideas of its own operations."3

c) Types of Ideas

(1) Abstract Ideas


1974), p. 66. 2 Ibid., p. HI. 3 Ibid., p. 91.

MODERN PHILOSOPHY: A STUDY OF KNOWLEDGE LECTURE II: EMPIRICIST EPISTEMOLOGY PART I

(i) N o o n e can i n v e n t a tas te neve r

expe r i enced b y the i r pala te , or scent t h e y

have n e v e r s m e l l e d

( iv) N o b l i n d p e r s o n can have an idea of

color; no r a deaf p e r s o n the idea of s o u n d

(4) C o m p l e x Ideas

(a) T h e c o m b i n i n g of severa l s imple ideas i n to

c o m p o u n d o n e s

(b) T h r e e t y p e s of c o m p l e x ideas 7

(i) M o d e s

(a) C o m b i n a t i o n s of s imple ideas

w h i c h do no t r ep resen t d i s t inc t

pa r t i cu l a r t h i n g s subs i s t ing b y

t h e m s e l v e s ; t h e y are d e p e n d e n c e s

o n or a f f e c t i o n s of subs tances

(b) Ex: T r i a n g l e , g ra t i tude , m u r d e r

( i i) S u b s t a n c e s

(a) C o m b i n a t i o n s of s imple ideas

w h i c h r e p r e s e n t d i s t inc t pa r t i cu la r

t h i n g s subs i s t ing by t h e m s e l v e s

(b) Ex: Sp i r i t

(i i i) Re la t i ons

(a) T h e c o m p a r i n g of o n e idea w i t h

a n o t h e r

(b ) Ex: Fa ther , w i fe , i m p e r f e c t

2. Q u a l i t i e s

a) " T h e p o w e r to p roduce a n y idea in o u r m i n d I call qua l i ty of

the subjec t w h e r e i n t ha t p o w e r is ."8

7 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. A. D. W o o l e y ( N e w York: Penguin Group, 1974), pp. 133-34. 8 Ibid., p. 112.

MODERN PHILOSOPHY: A S T U D Y OF KNOWLEDGE LECTURE U: EMPIRICIST EPISTEMOLOGY PART I

d) The mind can then operate on the ideas of sense and create new ideas of reflection

4. The Limits of Human Knowledge

a) W e need to examine human understanding and become aware of the limits to our knowledge because going beyond our limits only leads to doubt and skepticism13

b) Our knowledge cannot go beyond our ideas, and is actually narrower than our ideas14

(1) Intuitive and demonstrative knowledge cannot extend itself to all the relations of our ideas

(2) Sensitive knowledge (based on senses) is narrower still, for it can only reach "no fur ther than the existence of things actually present to our senses."15

B. George Berkeley

1. Ideas

a) Characteristics

(1) Never abstract16

(a) Disagrees wi th Locke concerning abstract ideas as he does not believe they exist

(b) Says that what Locke refers to as modes and qualities cannot be abstracted by the mind

(c) Berkeley rejects abstract ideas because he believes that we cannot separate and object f rom the sensation or perception of it in our mind

(d) "So far I will not deny I can abstract, if that may properly be called abstraction, which extends only to the conceiving separately such objects, as it is possible may really exist or be actually

-ocke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. A. D. Woo ley ( N e w York: Penguin

1974), P- 66. pp. 33i'32. p. 332. ;e Berkeley, A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge (Indianapolis: Hackett

ing Company, 1982), pp. 7-21.

MODERN PHILOSOPHY: A STUDY OF KNOWLEDGE LECTURE U: EMPIRICIST EPISTEMOLOGY PART I

perce ived a sunde r . But m y conce iv ing or

i m a g i n i n g p o w e r does n o t e x t e n d b e y o n d t h e

poss ib i l i ty of real e x i s t e n c e or pe rcep t ion . H e n c e

as it is imposs ib le f o r m e to see o r fee l a n y t h i n g

w i t h o u t an ac tua l s e n s a t i o n of t h a t t h ing , so it is

imposs ib le f o r m e to conce ive in m y t h o u g h t s a n y

sensible t h i n g or object d i s t i nc t f r o m t h e

sensa t ion or pe rcep t ion of it."17

(e) Belief t h a t m o d e s a n d qua l i t i e s can be

abs t rac ted has o n l y led to " i n n u m e r a b l e e r ro r s

and d i f f i cu l t i e s in a l m o s t all p a r t s of k n o w l e d g e " 1

( f ) G e n e r a l ideas ex is t , b u t no t abs t r ac t ideas

(g) Source of t h i s e r ro r is language 1 9

(2) Pass ive

(3) I ne r t

(4) Lacking p o w e r s

(a) Rejects Locke 's a s se r t i on t h a t t h e p o w e r s

(qua l i t ies ) are the cause of ideas

(b) Al l qual i t ies of ob jec t s b e c o m e like Locke 's

s econdary qual i t ies

(c) Al l qual i t ies of objec t are re la t ive t o the

perce iver

(d) A r e no t copies of t h e ac tua l object ; do n o t

r e semble t h e object

(5) " A l i t t le a t t e n t i o n wi l l d i scover t o us t h a t t h e v e r y

be ing of an idea impl ies p a s s i v e n e s s a n d i n e r t n e s s in it,

i n s o m u c h t h a t it is imposs ib le f o r an idea to do a n y t h i n g ,

or, s t r ic t ly speaking , to be t h e cause of a n y t h i n g : n e i t h e r

can it be t h e r e semblance or p a t t e r n of a n y act ive be ing ...

17 George Berkeley, A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1982), p. 25. 18 Ibid., p. 8. 19 Ibid., p. 17.

MODERN PHILOSOPHY: A STUDY OF KNOWLEDGE LECTURE n: EMPIRICIST EPISTEMOLOGY PART I

Whence it plainly follows that extension, figure and motion, cannot be the cause of our sensations."20

b) Origination

(1) Ideas are caused by spirit, specifically, God's spirit

(a) Simple

(b) Active

(i) Perceiving (known as the understanding)

(ii) Operating (known as the will)

(c) Undivided

(d) Incorporeal

(2) God's spirit acts to imprint ideas on our senses

(a) "It remains therefore that the cause of ideas is an incorporeal active substance or spirit."21

(b) God is "a spirit who is intimately present to our minds, producing in them all the variety of ideas or sensations, which continually affect us, on whom we have an absolute and entire dependence, in short, in whom we live, and move, and have our being,"22

2. Human Knowledge

a) Agreed with Locke that all human knowledge is derived f rom experience; however, experience only provides us with a series of sensations

b) Berkeley takes the concept of ideas to their logical consequence

(1) Wê never experience the object itself, only the idea of it ( through our perceptions)

20 George Berkeley, A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1982), p. 33. 11 Ibid., p. 33. 21 Ibid., p. 83.

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