Locke: A Guide for the Perplexed

8/3/2019 Locke: A Guide for the Perplexed

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LOCKE:

A GUIDE FOR THE PERPLEXED


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Continuum Guides for the Perplexed

Continuums Guides or the Perplexed are clear, concise, and accessible

introductions to thinkers, writers, and subjects that students and readers can

fnd especially challenging. Concentrating specifcally on what it is that makes the

subject difcult to grasp, these books explain and explore key themes and ideas,

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Guides for the Perplexedavailable from Continuum:

Adorno: A Guide for the Perplexed, Alex Thomson

Arendt: A Guide for the Perplexed, Karin Fry

Aristotle: A Guide for the Perplexed, John Vella

Bentham: A Guide for the Perplexed, Philip Schofeld

Berkley: A Guide for the Perplexed, Talia Bettcher

Deleuze: A Guide for the Perplexed, Claire Colebrook

Derrida: A Guide for the Perplexed, Julian Wolreys

Descartes: A Guide for the Perplexed, Justin Skirry

The Empiricists: A Guide for the Perplexed, Laurence Carlin

Existentialism: A Guide for the Perplexed, Stephen Earnshaw

Freud: A Guide for the Perplexed, Celine Surprenant

Gadamer: A Guide for the Perplexed, Chris Lawn

Habermas: A Guide for the Perplexed, Lasse Thomassen

Hegel: A Guide for the Perplexed, David James

Heidegger: A Guide for the Perplexed, David Cerbone

Hobbes: A Guide for the Perplexed, Stephen J. Finn

Hume: A Guide for the Perplexed, Angela Coventry

Husserl: A Guide for the Perplexed, Matheson Russell

Kant: A Guide for the Perplexed, TK Seung

Kierkegaard: A Guide for the Perplexed, Clare Carlisle

Leibniz: A Guide for the Perplexed, Franklin Perkins

Levinas: A Guide for the Perplexed, B.C. Hutchens

Merleau-Ponty: A Guide for the Perplexed, Eric Matthews

Nietzsche: A Guide for the Perplexed, R. Kevin Hill

Plato: A Guide for the Perplexed, Gerald A. Press

Pragmatism: A Guide for the Perplexed, Robert B. Talisse and Scott F. Aikin

Quine: A Guide for the Perplexed, Gary Kemp

Relativism: A Guide for the Perplexed, Timothy Mosteller

Ricoeur: A Guide for the Perplexed, David Pellauer

Rousseau: A Guide for the Perplexed, Matthew Simpson

Sartre: A Guide for the Perplexed, Gary Cox

Socrates: A Guide for the Perplexed, Sara Ahbel-Rappe

Spinoza: A Guide for the Perplexed, Charles Jarrett

The Stoics: A Guide for the Perplexed, M. Andrew Holowchak

Utilitarianism: A Guide for the Perplexed, Krister Bykvist


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Continuum International Publishing Group

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Patricia Sheridan 2010

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A catalogue record or this book is available rom the British Library.

ISBN: HB: 978-0-8264-8983-8

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Library of Congress Cataloguing-in-Publication Data

Sheridan, Patricia.

Lockea guide or the perplexed / Patricia Sheridan.

p. cm.Includes bibliographical reerences and index.

ISBN-13: 978-0-8264-8983-8 (HB)

ISBN-10: 0-8264-8983-4 (HB)

ISBN-13: 978-0-8264-8984-5 (pbk.)

ISBN-10: 0-8264-8984-2 (pbk.)

1. Locke, John, 16321704. I. Title.

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CONTENTS

Introduction 1

Chapter One: Lockes Theory o Ideas 9

Chapter Two: Lockes Theory o Matter 33

Chapter Three: Lockes Theory o Language 51

Chapter Four: Lockes Theory o Identity 65

Chapter Five: Lockes Theory o Morality 81

Chapter Six: Lockes Theory o Knowledge 99

Notes 119

Bibliography 121

Further Reading 127

Index 131


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1

INTRODUCTION

Lockes Essay Concerning Human Understanding, published in 1690,

is a tour de forceit is an ambitious work, devoted to constructing

a oundational theory o knowledge, o language, and o the nature

and origin o ideas. But the expansiveness o its subject matter,

combined with the sometimes painstaking detail o its discussions,

can make it a challenging work to read. The diverse and sometimes

sprawling discussions o the Essay can tend to obscure the thematic

coherence o the project as a whole. It is thereore useul, at the out-

set, to try to identiy the general theme o the work, and Locke gaveus some clues to that eect in his introductory Epistle to the Reader.

Unortunately, Locke does not straightorwardly state what his pri-

mary concern is, and he manages to oer us two somewhat dier-

ent versions o his motivation or writing the Essay. Despite this,

there is a general point o view regarding knowledge that is promi-

nent in both accounts, and which brings all the pieces o Lockes

work into ocus.

In an ot-quoted section o the Epistle, Locke describes the

ambition o his work as the modest one o serving natural science.

He describes himsel as privileged to be employed as an Under-

Labourer in clearing the Ground a little, and removing some of the

Rubbish, that lies in the way to Knowledge (Epistle, 10). The re-

quent appeal to various principles o natural science throughout

the text, combined with Lockes sel-characterization as under-

labourer to the sciences, has led some readers to presume that theprimary goal o the Essay is to construct a theory o ideas that sup-

ports and deends modern scientiic methods. There is no doubt

that much o the Essay is intended as a means o accomplishing

this end; however, we risk misunderstanding the intent o the Essay

i we read Lockes work solely in this light. Though Lockes work

is clearly motivated by his interests in modern science, the Essay

also devotes signiicant space to questions o moral and religious


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LOCKE: A GUIDE FOR THE PERPLEXED

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knowledge. Unless we wish to dismiss these topics as being only

tangential to Lockes natural scientiic commitmentsand there is

little reason to do sowe need to understand the scope o the Essayin somewhat broader terms.

In the course o the Epistle, Locke amously recounts another

source o inspiration or writing the Essay. He explains that his

interest in writing the Essay was stirred by a discussion one evening

with several o his riends, on subjects that Locke identiies only

as being very remote rom the topic o the Essay (though James

Tyrell, one o the riends in attendance that evening, later identiied

their topics o discussion as morality and religion). Ater a lengthydebate, Locke recounts, their discourse came to a standstill when

they realized they were dealing with issues so dense and compli-

cated that no resolution was orthcoming. As Locke recalls,

it came into my Thoughts, that we took a wrong course; and that,

beore we set our selves upon Enquiries o that Nature, it was nec-

essary to examine our own Abilities, and see, what Objects ourUnderstandings were, or were not itted to deal with. (Epistle, 7)

Morality and religion also have a place beside natural science as

subjects explored at signiicant length in the Essay, yet the inspi-

ration or the Essay should not be sought in one speciic subject.

Lockes motivating concern can be discerned by paying close atten-

tion to the more general question Locke raises in the quote above.

Lockes overriding interest in the Essay is not to lay oundationsor any speciic discipline; Locke aims to examine the nature o

inquiry, its oundations, its standards or truth, and the means

we have or improving systematic investigations o all kinds. For

Locke, success in any intellectual undertaking, be it natural sci-

ence, morality, or religion, depends upon having a undamental

grasp o the origin and nature o knowledge itsel. Locke thus calls

or a proper accounting o our ideas and the relations that can rea-sonably be drawn between them. In this way, we may avoid the

pitalls o aiming at certainty where there is only probability, or

claiming knowledge where there is none to be had. As Locke puts

this in Book I o the Essay, It is thereore worth while, to search

out the Bounds between Opinion and Knowledge; and examine by

what Measures, in things, whereo we have no certain Knowledge,

we ought to regulate our Assent, and moderate our Perswasions


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INTRODUCTION

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(1.1.3). The enterprise o examining the origin and content o our

ideas is ultimately aimed at establishing what our minds are capable

o knowing and setting appropriate standards or truth. As Lockesees it, the problems that inhibit real learning arise rom a ailure

to appreciate this; assertions that exceed the boundaries o human

ideas and reason lead us into irresolvable debate as well as perni-

cious overconidence.

Locke requently reers to the ittedness or suitableness o our

minds to certain kinds o inquiry; he thinks our minds are ash-

ioned such that we may gain knowledge in degrees appropriate to

our human needs. He does not, thereore, think we ought to holdall o our inquiries to the same standard o knowledge; or Locke,

the relative potential or knowledge in our scientiic, moral, and

religious pursuits depends on the ideas we have and what these

ideas are taken to represent. For Locke, the contents o thought,

our ideas, originate in experience. As a result, whatever we can con-

clude about the world is limited to our experiences; or Locke, most

o these ideas are necessarily incompletewe can have no ideaso the world as it exists beyond our perceptual experience. Locke

oers us a humbled conception o scientiic knowledge. This might

seem to be an odd conclusion or a thinker who seeks to provide

an epistemological oundation or science. However, Lockes task

is not to undermine science, but to instill an appropriate modesty

in our approach to scientiic theory, consistent with the Baconian

program. Modern science, as Bacon conceived it, is predicated on

limitshypotheses need constant testing, and hopeully, perect-ing, with the goal not o absolute truths, but o useul and practical

outcomes or human lie. In this same spirit, Locke explores the

limits o scientiic understanding, and sets out to establish appro-

priate standards or the justiication o our scientiic belies. As we

will see, Locke also seeks to mark out relatively appropriate stan-

dards or moral and religious knowledge.

Locke spends a great deal o time pointing out the gaps in, andinadequacies o, experiential ideas. However, Lockes view is not

a call or skepticism. In deining the limits o knowledge, Locke

emphasizes the proper appreciation o what we needto know to live

well. Lockes epistemology is pragmatic; though many things can-

not be known with certainty, we do, he thinks, have the tools neces-

sary or achieving a level o assurance, with regard to the truth or

alsity o our belies, that is adequate to living well and happily. As


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Locke sees it, then, inquiry does not have to aim at absolute truths

and certainties, but at providing the greatest possible knowledge

that will serve the requirements o lie, whether in natural science,religion, or morality. In the Epistle, Locke states that despite the

critical response his work will generate, he will always have the

satisfaction to have aimed at Truth and Usefulness (Epistle, 9). To

this end, Locke sets out to examine knowledge itselnot only its

limits and extent, but also its origin in experience. With its empha-

sis on the perils o dogmatism and superstition, the Essay sought

to lay the groundwork or a kind o intellectual accountability that

would not only ree rational individuals rom religious, political,and intellectual oppression, but also encourage them to embrace

their responsibilities as rational agents to use reason in guiding

them to the best possible lie. As Locke explains, humans have been

given Whatsoever is necessary or the Conveniences o Lie, and

Inormation o Virtue; and [God] has put within the reach o their

Discovery the comortable provision or this Lie and the Way that

leads to a better (1.1.5). Certainty with regard to many things willelude us. But to disdain our limits and cast doubt on whatever can-

not be known with certainty is to misunderstand the practical unc-

tion o knowledge and to extol only that kind o knowledge that

reaches to the loty heights o abstraction and absolute truth.

Lockes early experiences at Oxord and the acquaintances he

made there had a ormative inluence on his work. It is, thereore,

useul, by way o introduction, to understand something o Lockes

lie and career.

BIOGRAPHY

Locke was born in Somerset, England, on August 28, 1632. His

ather, John Locke senior, was a landowner, attorney, and minor

Government administrator. During the English Civil War, Lockes

ather ought on the side o Parliament under Alexander Popham,

a member o the Somerset gentry who became a member o par-

liament ater the war. Locke senior maintained his connection

with Popham, whose inluence allowed him to recommend young

John Locke to Westminster School, one o the leading schools in

England at that time. Here Locke gained a irst-class education and

was eventually elected to Christ Church, Oxord in 1652.


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INTRODUCTION

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Oxord at this time was dominated by the Aristotelianism o

the Middle Ages, and students ollowed a standard curriculum o

logic, metaphysics, and classical languages leading to a Bachelor oArts degree. Like his predecessor the amed philosopher Thomas

Hobbes, Locke ound the curriculum o Oxord tremendously out-

dated, and, in the words o Hobbes years earlier, the philosophy

taught was Aristotelity, with no emphasis on original thought but

rigide truth.1 Though Oxord may not have been quite so dogmat-

ically devoted to Aristotelianism as Hobbes suggests, there seems

to have been some intellectual divide in this period between the

Aristotelians and those embracing the new wave o ideas emerg-ing at this time. Locke himsel was no doubt recalling his days at

Oxord in his numerous characterizations o the Schools as insti-

tutions o pointless disputation over beuddling terminology. As

he charges in Book III, the Schoolmen dispute obscure terminol-

ogy rather than aiming at discovering new or useul knowledge or

humankind. Locke describes them in the ollowing glowing terms:

aiming at Glory and Esteem, or their great and universal

Knowledge, easier a great deal to be pretended to, than really

acquired, ound this a good Expedient to cover their Ignorance,

with a curious and inexplicable Web o perplexed Words, and

procure to themselves the admiration o others, by unintelligible

Terms, the apter to produce wonder, because they could not be

understood, whilst it appears in all History that these proound

Doctors were no wiser, nor more useul than their Neighbours;and brought but small advantage to humane Lie, or the Societies

wherein they lived. (3.10.8)

This learned ignorance (3.10.10), as Locke calls it, was, i not the

only intellectual activity at Oxord, at least predominant enough to

have concerned modern thinkers such as Locke and Hobbes.

The intellectual environment o Oxord was changing in theseventeenth century. The English Royal Society was ounded at

Oxord by John Wilkins. Wilkins gathered a group o intellectuals

dedicated to the principles o a burgeoning new science devoted

to the Baconian enterprise o ounding science in the historical

method o experimentation and hypothesis. Locke was introduced

to the ideas o this society through his riend Richard Lower, and

his interest in new approaches to medicine and natural science


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grew. Robert Boyle eventually took over as the leading voice o the

society. Locke was closely association with Boyle, and was thereby

exposed to Boyles groundbreaking theoretical work on atomisticmechanism. Throughout his lie, Locke was devoted to the work o

the great names in modern science, working closely with Boyle and

developing riendships with Sydenham, Huygens, and Newton.

During his earlier days at Oxord, Locke explored the possibil-

ity o pursuing the law, ordination into the ministry, and medicine.

His detailed notes indicate he was reading a great number o medi-

cal works through the 1650s, most notably Harveys groundbreak-

ing work on the circulation o the blood. In the 1660s, Locke wasappointed to several college oices, eventually becoming a college

tutor. Throughout this period, Locke was engaging in inormal

studies in medicine, having decided to become a physician. Locke

even set up a laboratory at Oxord to study medicine and anatomy.

At this time Locke was also busy developing his political views,

penning early tracts on the authority o the state vis--vis the indi-

vidual and on religious toleration. In the early 1660s, Locke wrotewhat is now known as the Two Tracts on Government. His interest in

moral philosophy was also developing at this time, and he penned a

then-unpublished work which has come to be known as the Essays

on the Law of Nature.

It was at this time that Locke established his riendship with

Anthony Ashley Cooper, one o the wealthiest men in England, and

an important politician, who would be enormously inluential in

Lockes lie. Cooper was unwell and arrived at Oxord to take themedicinal waters there. In 1667, Cooper invited Locke to live with

him as his personal physician, secretary, and researcher. Locke let

Oxord and lived with Lord Ashley or the next eight years, irmly

establishing himsel as Lord Ashleys riend. In 1668, he diagnosed

an abscess on Lord Ashleys liver and recommended lie-saving

surgery.

During his years in Lord Ashleys residence, Locke was not onlydevoted to the study o modern science, but also continued his work

on political theory. In 1667, he wrote the Essay Concerning Toleration.

At this time, Locke was chiely involved in helping Lord Ashley

in establishing trade with the colonies, particularly with regard to

ounding colonies in the Carolinas. Locke was deeply involved in

drating the constitution o the Carolinas, and writing documents

regarding other public policy issues such as the monetary situation


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INTRODUCTION

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in England. Lord Ashley was eventually orced to lee England or

the more politically tolerant Holland, ater terms o imprisonment

in the Tower o London. Ashley had been strongly opposed to thesuccession to the throne o the Catholic brother o Charles II. He

had been active in supporting the exclusion bill that would have

prevented this succession. The rising tensions between Protestant

and Catholic parties made the situation in England suiciently

threatening that Locke ollowed Lord Ashley to Holland in 1683.

It was in Holland that Locke inished his work An Essay on

Toleration, along with the Essay Concerning Human Understanding.

By this time, Locke had also beriended a number o English revo-lutionaries in exile. The English Government attempted to extra-

dite a number o them back to England, including Locke. Charles

II was eventually succeeded by his Catholic brother, James II, who

was orced to lee to France in the ace o mounting opposition,

culminating in the arrival, in 1688, o a revolutionary orce led by

the Protestant William o Orange. This was known as the Glorious

Revolution. This event marked the change in power rom king toParliament, and had enormous implications or the political climate

o England.

Locke returned to England in 1688, and soon ater published the

Essay Concerning Human Understanding and The Two Treatises of

Government. For the remaining years o his lie, Locke lived with his

long-time riend, and one-time romantic interest, Damarais Masham

and her husband Sir Francis Masham. Here Locke enjoyed a lively

intellectual riendship with Lady Masham, as well as entertainingmany o the luminaries o his day. Locke died on October 28, 1704.


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CHAPTER ONE

LOCKES THEORY OF IDEAS

Lockes goal in Books I and II is to examine the content o human

consciousness and the origin o ideas, but his project is not to pro-

duce a mere taxonomy. Lockes intent is to rethink traditional con-

ceptions o knowledge and intellectual accountability. What we see

Locke objecting to, time and again, in Book I is the all-too-common

tendency people have to accept the truth o traditional principlesregarding religion, morality, and the natural sciences without pay-

ing suicient attention to the degree o their evidentiary support.

Locke saw a great danger in accepting as true what one takes on

authority alone, and sought to turn the attention o philosophy to

knowledge itsel and the proper methods or discovering truth.

BOOK I: LOCKES ARGUMENT AGAINST INNATE IDEAS

Book I can be read as a kind o ground-clearing or Lockes project

in the subsequent three books o the Essay. Where Books IIIV

deal with aspects o Lockes positive theory o ideas, Book I con-

centrates on the view o ideas which Locke presumably considered

his main oilthe theory o innate ideas. To understand the view

that Locke is attacking in Book I, it is useul to consider the innatist

assertions ound in the writing o leading theologians and philoso-phers o Lockes day.

Innatist thinkers generally believed that the knowledge o God

and o our moral duties (among other things) resides in the mind

rom birth. There were stronger and weaker versions o this posi-

tion in the air in the seventeenth century. The stronger position

can be characterized as the nave theory o innateness, according

to which there are a number o principles stamped on the mind at


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birth, or, as it was commonly expressed, written into the hearts of

men. These innate principles typically included the undamentals

o religious belie, mathematical axioms, and a host o commonlyheld moral propositions. The nave position was rejected by a num-

ber o people at the time, who proposed a somewhat toned-down

version o the innate ideas thesis. This more moderate view does

not hold that propositions are actually resident in the mind, but

rather that the mind seems predisposed to recognize the truth o

certain propositions in the manner o a kind o recollection. Bishop

Edward Stillingleet, who was a amous interlocutor o Lockes,

argued that the widespread belie in Gods existence (and particu-larly the readiness o assent among people who had not ormerly

been exposed to the notion) suggests that God has stamped a uni-

versal character of himself upon the minds of Men.1 Stillingleet

identiies two speciic conditions under which a proposition may

be considered innate: 1. If it be such as bears the same importance

among all person. 2. If it be such as cannot be mistaken for the char-

acter of any thing else.2

For Stillingleet, the universality and clar-ity o certain propositions was evidence that they were, at the very

least, amiliar to human reason. Henry More, who was one o the

great intellectuals o his day, held that the mind is, as it were, pre-

programmed to recognize true propositions when presented with

them; much as one remembers a tune when one hears the irst ew

notes, these ideas are, according to More, triggered or awakened by

experience. Propositions he has in mind include geometrical truths,

such as the whole is bigger than the part or the three angles ina triangle are equal to two right ones. Ralph Cudworth, another

important thinker o the seventeenth century, held that reason

has an innate grasp o the principles o natural science. Cudworth

argued that empirical observation cannot discover the essence o

things in the world, which he took to be the great end o scientiic

inquiry. Rather, essences are discovered by looking inward, relect-

ing on what the intellect already, in some sense, knows; essences arecharacters written into the intellect. He explained as ollows:

As to the universal and abstract theorems o science, the terms

whereo are those reasons o things, which exist no where but

only in the mind itsel (whose noemata and ideas they are) the

measure and rule o truth concerning them can be no oreign

or extraneous thing without the mind, but must be native and


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domestic to it, or contained within the mind itsel, and thereore

can be nothing but its clear and distinct perception.3

He continues in this vein, explaining that while the senses can per-

ceive individual objects in the world, abstract universal rationes,

reasons, are that higher station o the mind, rom whence looking

down upon individual things, it hath a commanding view o them,

and as it were a priori comprehends or knows them.4 Many think-

ers in Lockes day held some brand o innate ideas theory. But it

was commonly believed by nave and moderate innatists alike that

reason was like a light or candle in each and every one o us, con-taining, in some sense, all the most basic principles o natural and

moral philosophy, which were just waiting to be teased out by expe-

rience. Reason was seen as a storehouse o knowledge, cognizant o

true propositions prior to, and thus independently o, experiential

data. Experience could act as a catalyst or bringing this knowledge

to consciousness, but it was not seen as its origin. As John Smith,

another Cambridge Platonist wrote,

There are some radical principles o knowledge that are so

deeply sunk into the souls o men, as that the impression cannot

easily be obliterated, though it may be much darkened . . . [it]

hath well observed, that the common notions o God and virtue

impressed upon the souls o men, are more clear and perspicu-

ous than any else.5

Typically, the proponents o innate ideas appealed to the divine ori-

gin o these ideas as a basis or their legitimacy. This succeeded in

making such ideas beyond reproach and immune to critical scru-

tiny. It also had the eect o giving supposedly innate propositions

the status o axiomatic principles on which to ound metaphysical

and moral doctrines.

Locke would have been very amiliar with this kind o reasoning,and saw in it the seeds or error and dogmatism o the very worst

kind. The doctrine o innate ideas signaled or him a deense o intel-

lectual authoritarianism; as Locke warns, the teacher o absolute

truths can make a Man swallow that or innate Principles, which

may serve to his purpose, who teacheth them (1.4.24). Whereas, he

continues, i the oundations o knowledge were properly examined

by each person, the principles once taken to be authoritative by


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their innateness would be discovered as having sprung rom the

minds o Men, rom the being o things themselves (1.4.24). True

learning, or Locke, happens only once practical and speculativeprinciples are properly understood as arising rom the workings

o human reason on the ideas o experience. Critical analysis and

intellectual accountability would ollow, he believed, once the veil

o intellectual absolutism was drawn back. Locke sought to put or-

ward a more rigorous oundation or the assertion and analysis o

knowledge claims.

Lockes method is at turns destructive and reconstructive. Book

I exposes the tenuous claims made in support o innate principleso knowledge; Book II seeks to establish the oundations or a new

approach to questions o truth and knowledge. First and oremost,

he aims to show that reason does not contain propositions innately,

nor is the mind in any sense cognizant o them prior to the workings

o reason upon our ideas.

In Book I, Locke takes aim at two kinds o propositions: specula-

tive and practical. Speculative propositions are those dealing withabstract mathematical principles; practical propositions are general

principles o theology and morality. Locke sets out to show that

the alleged innateness o these propositions rests on two mistaken

assumptions: that they are universally known, and that they are rec-

ognizable as sel-evident to any rational person. It is, Locke explains,

common or innatists to point to the universality o consent to cer-

tain propositions. Consider the ollowing proposition, which would

all under Lockes heading o speculative principles: The three anglesof a triangle are equal to two right ones. No one doubts the truth o

this claim, so the innatist argument would go, and so we can say

with a air amount o conidence that this is universally agreed to

be true. I every person can see the truth o this proposition, then

we can airly assume that the proposition represents innate knowl-

edge. The conclusion the innatist draws, as we have seen, is that such

propositions are so readily understood that they must be ideas themind, in some sense, already knew or recognized to be true.

What does Locke say to this line o reasoning? He argues that it

does not ollow rom universal consent that a proposition must origi-

nate in reason alone. But, worse than this, he writes, there are no

propositions to which all o humankind universally assent. Locke

oers two separate but related lines o argument. The irst challenges

that since children and idiots (by which we can take him to mean


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people who are not in possession o mature reasoning skills) do not

recognize these sorts o propositions to be true, it is simply alse to

say that they are innately known by the mind (i by innately knownwe mean, in the nave sense, that the proposition is something o

which every mind is conscious rom birth). O course, the position

most o Lockes innatist opponents hold does not require that the

principles be present to consciousness: though we may not actually

have entertained these ideas, they are known, or at least recognizable,

by the mind nonetheless. This is held to be the case by thinkers such

as More and Stillingleet, on the grounds that these propositions are

so immediately assented to once the mind is presented with them.Locke thinks this is a very weak claim or their innateness, since it

boils down to a trivial claim about the capacity o human reason to

discover truths. This brings us to Lockes second line o attack. As

Locke sees it, i any proposition a person discovers to be true must

have been an innate one, the innatist is in danger o implying that a

person could reach the end o her lie never having discovered a host

o truths that were planted in her mind rom birth. This would meanthat these truths are, at once, in the mind but never conscious to the

mind, which Locke considers an untenable position. The innatist will,

o course, counter that principles are innate in the sense that they are

truths the mind is capable o discovering through the use o reason.

Locke argues that this not only ails to prove that these propositions

are innate, but, worse, leaves us no way o sorting the innate prin-

ciples unveiled by the use o reason rom all the non-innate principles

we discover to be true through the use o reason. There is simply noway, he argues, o sorting out the principles we learn via experience

and reason, and those the mind supposedly remembers rom its store

o innate knowledge. In act, he points out, the process o discovering

the truth o something such as a geometrical theorem could as easily

rely on our reasoning about our ideas, and perceiving the relations

between them, as upon some immediate assent arising rom the rec-

ollection o innate principles. I the ormer is generally our methodor the discovery o truths, then how is it that we determine whether

a principle o which we discover the truth is an innate one or simply

the result o careul reasoning? Thus, he writes,

I desire to know how irst and innate Principles can be tried;

or at least it is reasonable to demand the marks and characters,

whereby the genuine, innate Principles may be distinguished


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rom others; that so, amidst the great variety o Pretenders, I

may be kept rom mistakes. (1.3.27)

Locke begs a little truce with prejudice and the orbearance o cen-

sure (1.3.28) as he lays out his alternative theory o the origin o

speculative and practical principles.

A dominant theme o Lockes discussion is that o epistemic

justiicationin other words, the reasons one gives or claiming

a proposition to be true or alse. He begins by pointing out that

the principles most commonly taken to be innate are not in act

immune rom the demand or justiication. Some, he grants, areanalytically true, by virtue o deinition (e.g. it is impossible for the

same thing to be and not to be). In such cases, we perceive their truth

on the basis o the deinition o terms alone. But even in the case o

analytically true principles, our assent is not obviously innate; the

imputation o innateness ignores the act that or anyone to see the

truth o such propositions, she must irst be cognizant o the terms

involved and the ideas to which these terms reer. Particularly inthe case o the general terms, which are the content, most oten, o

analytic propositions, people have to learn these terms and their

signiication and do simply see their relations upon irst hearing

the words. Locke wonders in what sense this is an innate proposi-

tion, as opposed to one that is perceived to be true by a process o

reasoning rom our learned concepts and vocabulary.

Non-analytic propositions, Locke continues, need to be proven to

be true, and are not simply immediately grasped by any rational per-son who hears them or the irst time. Very ew people can see the truth

o the Pythagorean theorem upon irst seeing it, or example. Once it is

explained to us, and we ollow the steps o the proo, most rational peo-

ple assent to its truth, but this is an assent that requires a clear under-

standing and thorough examination o the proo, or what Locke reers

to as the demonstration. This does not make demonstrative proposi-

tions less true than analytical ones, but their truth is perceived lessimmediately. The point, however, is that many o the principles held

to be innate actually turn out to rest upon rational proos, which are

the reasons one gives ones assent to them as true, and, in the absence

o a thorough understanding o the concepts involved, no amount o

innateness is going to make their truth clear to the mind.

In considering practical principles, Locke argues that not only

is the knowledge o moral rules not universal and uniorm across


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15

cultures, but even where a set o moral rules are in place and univer-

sally assented to, the perception o their truth depends on critical

analysis, or, as Locke puts it, on some exercise o the Mind (1.3.1).They do not simply lie open to the mind, nor are they immediately

assented to upon our irst hearing them (which is conirmed by the

great number o people who pay them no heed). People assent to

moral principles on the basis o reasons given in their deense, and

not immediately upon being told they are true. Locke does not deny

that many o our most basic moral principles have a reasonable-

ness that a thinking person cannot deny, but this, Locke argues,

actually serves the argument against their innateness. I they wereimprinted in our minds in some way, they would constantly inlu-

ence us (and, again, the great numbers o us who have acted against

moral dictates rom time to time are proo against this). Added to

this, considering that there is no way o recognizing innate truths

as distinct rom rationally derived truths, Locke asks whether it is

not a more reliable guide to the truth o moral propositions that

we just, as a matter o course, scrutinize our belies and subjectthem to critical analysis. The innatists ail to show why innateness

does anything more, or anything better, than analysis and rational

deduction by way o providing epistemic justiication or the practi-

cal and speculative principles we commonly take to be true.

Books I and II o the Essay present somewhat dierent approaches

to the issue o innateness and its epistemological relevance. In Book

I, Locke presents his arguments against the possibility o innate

principles, and in Book II he sets out to show that our ideas are allexperiential in origin. Although Locke is clearly evoking a uniorm

commitment to the view that the content o the mind cannot have

its origins in reason itsel, these two books have struck some read-

ers as dealing with two dierent issues. Book I is an explicit argu-

ment against innate principles and not against innate ideas. The

positive theory o Book II is an account o the experiential origins

o ideas, which serve as the building blocks or propositions, butwhich are not, clearly, propositions themselves. The conclusion that

some commentators have drawn is that Book I proves only that

propositions are not innate, leaving the doctrine o innate ideas

unharmed. In other words, Locke does not seem to have laid the

proper groundwork or Book II.

Why, then, does Locke start with the repudiation o innate prin-

ciples, when his real interest in Book II centers on the experiential


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origin o innate ideas? Lockes decision to make this his opening

salvo is hardly a mistake, considering the multiple editions the

Essay went through in Lockes lietime. The more plausible answeris that Book I can be seen as setting the epistemological tone or the

Essay. Locke is making a case against reason as the sole source o

speculative or practical principles. He asserts at the outset o Book

I that it would be suicient to convince those who do not subscribe

to the innate principles view that all human knowledge is ounded

in the natural sensory aculties and not in reason alone. But, he

explains, in order to better convince those who are o the opinion

that knowledge is ounded in innate principles, he will begin by set-ting out the Reasons, that made me doubt o that Opinion (1.2.1).

The large project o the Essay is not merely an accounting o the

origin o ideas, however, but a pointing out o the dangers o over-

blown opinions that exceed the boundaries o analysis or empiri-

cal veriication. His introduction to Book I recounts his reason or

undertaking the Essay. Here he writes as ollows:

I suspected we began at the wrong end, and in vain sought or

Satisaction in a quiet and secure Possession o Truths, that

most concernd us, whilst we let loose our Thoughts into the vast

Ocean oBeing, as i all that boundless Extent, were the natural

and undoubted possession o our understandings . . . Thus men,

extending their Enquiries beyond their Capacities, and letting

their Thoughts wander into those depths, where they can ind

no sure Footing, tis no Wonder, that they raise questions, andmultiply Disputes . . . (1.1.7)

Holding general principles to be innate allows thinkers to simply

assume their truth rather than make serious steps toward under-

standing the grounds or believing them to be true. The irst step, it

seems to Locke, is to show that general principles cannot be innate,

and thereby clear the way or a plausible positive account o howthese general principles are arrived at by the mind and how their

truth or alsity ought best to be determined.

BOOK II: LOCKES EMPIRICIST THEORY OF IDEAS

The cornerstone o Lockes epistemology is his theory o

ideas, according to which ideas are the basic content o human


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consciousness. For Locke, ideas are deined as [w]hatsoever the

Mind perceives in it sel, or is the immediate object o Perception,

Thought, or Understanding (2.8.8). The project o Book II is todescribe the nature and origin o ideas. At the outset, Locke sets

the stage or this project with the ollowing proposal: Let us sup-

pose the Mind to be, as we say, white Paper, void o all Characters,

without any Ideas: How comes it to be urnished? (2.1.2). As Locke

conceives it, the mind is dispositionally capable o thinking, but

it cannot do so until it is urnished with ideas. The mind acquires

ideas via two experiential routes: sensation or relection. Sensation,

or Locke, is an Impression, or Motion, made in some part o thebody, as produces some Perception in the Understanding (2.1.23).

Once the mind receives an idea rom sensation, it begins consider-

ing, reasoning, remembering, believing, and all the other mental

operations o which it is capable. By turning its gaze inward, so

to speak, the mind also perceives these operations themselves, and

thereby, Locke explains, stores it sel with a new set oIdeas, which

I call Ideas oReflection (2.1.24).Sensation and relection are the two exclusive routes by which

the mind receives ideas. But precisely what kind o inormation

do we get through these avenues o experience? Lockes theory is

best described as compositionalist. While the greatest number o

ideas we routinely think about are ideas o things with a multitude

o characteristics (such as tree, person, or dog), these are actually

complex ideas composed by the mind out o oundational ideas

derived rom experience. Locke calls these simple ideas, which arelike atomic entities, in the sense that they are the basic building

blocks o all the complex ideas and propositions o which the mind

is aware at any given moment. To illustrate the simplicity o expe-

riential ideas, consider the idea o a rose. It may seem to be the sin-

gular idea o a particular object, but in act it is an idea composed

rom a complexity o simple ideas. I we careully analyze the idea

o a rose, we can actually identiy the various simple ideas and theirexperiential source: the idea o red, which comes rom vision; the

idea o sot, rom touch; the idea o scent, rom smell; and so on.

Each o these ideas enters the mind as a distinct perception. Lockes

account o simple ideas introduces not only the oundations but the

limits o human understanding. As he explains at the end o chapter

I, the act that we have ive senses means that the inormation we

get about the world is necessarily restricted. I we had our senses


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18

and were made without taste buds, then we would never impute

the quality o lavor to anything in the world; it would be, so to

speak, o our radar. It is possible to imagine beings with six orseven senses, who might have sensory experiences o qualities o

things in the world that we will never be aware o. Locke challenges

that this is a point anyone who does not set himsel proudly at the

top o all things (2.1.3) should be prepared to accept.

COMPLEX IDEAS

The implication or a compositionalist view such as Lockes is thatthe complex ideas the mind entertains are not ideas directly derived

rom experience. We never directly perceive the composite rose

itsel, but only the sense data received piecemeal by our minds. For

Locke, all o our complex ideas, like that o a rose, are constructed

by the mind rom simple ideas. While the mind is wholly passive

(2.12.1) in the reception o simple ideas, it is very active in building

complex ideas, and propositions about them, once it has been ur-nished with these basic building blocks.

For Locke, complex ideas are ideas either o modes, substances,

or relations. The distinction Locke draws between modes and sub-

stances is especially important or Lockes theory o ideas. As com-

plex ideas, both are constructed by the mind rom simple ideas o

sensation or relection. Both also have what Locke calls real and

nominal essences. However, while, in the case o modes, the nomi-

nal and real essences are the same, in the case o substances, thereal essence is unknown to us.

For Locke, the real essence o a thing is its internal constitution,

such that all the qualities o that thing low rom it in a true unity;

the nominal essence is the essence imputed to it through the creation

o complex ideas. We have knowledge o real essences when we have

a complete picture o a things intrinsic and necessary properties

and how these properties are united. Let us take, as an example, therather obscure geometrical idea o a chiliagon (a thousand-sided

igure). In this case, the idea consists o a combination o simple

ideas, combined by the human mind and representing nothing

that actually exists in the extra-mental world. The combination o

ideas that go into the general idea o a chiliagon is arbitrary, since

the idea chiliagon itsel originated in the human mind. This would

count as a complex idea o a mode, on Lockes account. In this case,


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we have the idea o a chiliagons real essenceour idea o the chil-

iagon is its real essence, since we constructed the idea o the thing

entirely in our minds. In such cases our ideas are, to use Lockesterm, adequate. That is, every property o that thing corresponds to

an idea in our minds.

In the case o ideas o substances, on the other hand, the real

essence is unknown. Like complex ideas o modes, they are ormed

by the mind, comprising all the qualities we take to be relevant and

necessary to that thing. The dierence is that ideas o substances

are taken to represent combinations o qualities that have a real

unity in the world outside the mind. These ideas are generallycombined according to the manner in which the mind repeatedly

receives them. I a number o ideas are always received simultane-

ously, we tend, Locke posits, to suppose that these qualities have

some real connection to one another and originate rom some com-

mon source. In this way, we determine a nominal essence or the

thing. We take these things to have a unity o properties that is

ashioned by nature. So our complex idea o a rose seems like a uni-tary idea because we take the ideas o which it is composed to have

some real unity in nature. However, since we never directly perceive

the uniying principle o the rose, there is a key eature to our idea

o it that we do not possessthat is, its actual substance, or uniy-

ing structure. Substance ideas are thereore termed inadequate by

Locke, since there are properties o material things or which we

have no corresponding ideas (and we have no way, Locke thinks,

o ever getting that kind o adequate knowledge about substances).Because o the inadequacy o these ideas, the real and nominal

essences come apart where substance ideas are concerned.

IDEAS AND THE VEIL OF PERCEPTION

The standard interpretation o Lockes theory o ideas is reerred

to as the representational thesis. According to this view, Lockesees ideas as intermediaries between the extra-mental world and

the conscious perceiving mind. We can think o this as a tripar-

tite account o perception: the object, the mind, and the idea o the

object created in the mind. On this reading, Locke thinks o ideas

as things caused by some extra-mental object and representing that

object to the mind in some way. The idea is a kind o mental picture

o the worldly object, and it is the idea alone o which the perceiver


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has immediate awareness. Let us consider the experience o a color.

The redness o an apple is caused in the mind by real eatures o

some object in the extra-mental world and the eects o these ea-tures on our sensory receptors (in this case, eyes). The perceiver has

the idea o red as a result o this causal process, but, importantly,

the perceiver sees only the red idea and not the object itsel that

caused the idea in her mind. The idea o red represents the object,

but only indirectly. The consequence is that humans never directly

perceive the extra-mental world, but are only ever directly aware

o the ideas that stand between the conscious sel and the world

outside the mind. The ideas stand as a kind o veil or curtain pro-hibiting access to the world as it exists beyond our perceptions o it.

This might seem to raise some considerable problems regarding the

accuracy o these ideational representationsi I only ever directly

perceive the red color idea created in my mind, then can I ever say

with any certainty that it is an accurate representation o the apple

itsel? The properties o the thing itsel are not perceptually acces-

sible to me, only the ideas they produce in my mind, and this makesthe veriication o the accuracy o my perceptual ideas seemingly

impossible.

An alternate interpretation reads Lockes theory o ideas quite

dierently. It is reerred to as the adverbial account o Lockes the-

ory o ideas, and, originating with Locke scholar John Yolton, has

appealed to a growing number o Locke scholars. This view sheds a

somewhat dierent light on the relationship between the perceiver

and the perceived than we get rom the representational reading.The adverbial account rejects the view that ideas, or Locke, are

things that stand in an intermediary relationship between objects

and minds. Instead, ideas are seen as characterizing the manner

o human perception rather than standing as the objects o human

consciousness. They are adverbial in the sense they represent the

act o perception; ideas are perceptions or this account. The intent

here is to salvage a more direct account o perceptual awarenessrom Lockes theory, thereby saving his view rom the unpalatable

veil o perception problem. The way this account does so is to read

Lockes ideas as the expression o the way in which extra-mental

objects appear to the mind. So, or example, on the representa-

tional account o ideas as objects, the idea o a color is the mental

representation o some hidden eature or activity o the object. On

the adverbial account, the idea o red that I get rom the apple is a


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unction o the way my mind perceives the apple. On this account

we could interchange the phrases I see red and I see redly with

no alteration o Lockes meaning.The advantage o the adverbial account is its rejection o the

classiication o ideas as objects, thus eliminating the somewhat

clunky ontological baggage that comes with the representational

view. It also manages to capture Lockes heavily conceptual notion

o sensory perception. However, its advantage as an epistemologi-

cal account is not entirely clear or the purposes o appreciating

Lockes approach to questions o metaphysics. The question o rep-

resentation will arise again, particularly in the context o Lockesideas o primary and secondary qualities, and in his discussion o

substance, and in each case we can see Lockes attempt to strictly

delineate what can be said about external reality on the basis o the

limits o our sensory perceptions. For Locke, the world that lies

beyond our perceptual experiences is simply not something about

which we can say anything meaningul, because we can have no

ideas o this world. Whether we decide to see this as a dangerousroute to skepticism or as simply a kind o epistemological prudence

depends on how much we want to worry about the possibility that

there may be inescapable boundaries to (and quite likely errors in)

our understanding o the world outside the mind. That said, the

adverbial account does not seem to resolve the veil o ideas problem

with regard to the metaphysics o substance.

At this stage, we can let this debate stand. The central point to

bear in mind is that the theory o ideas is Lockes attempt to cap-ture something o the conceptual nature o perceptionsensory

perceptions are a unction o bare sensation andmy conscious expe-

rience o that sensation, whether directly as idea-presentations o

sensory phenomena or indirectly via resembling ideas in my mind.

Lockean ideas are a central eature o human sensory perception,

such that sensory perception is, in a very important sense, as much

a mental process as it is a physical process. Locke does, however,try to address the so-called veil o ideas problem by sorting sensory

ideas into primary and secondary quality ideas.

IDEAS OF PRIMARY QUALITIES

Locke will not commit himsel to the real nature o things external

to the mind, but there is a lot he thinks we can say about objects on


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the basis o the power they have to produce certain simple ideas in

our minds. The idea opower, according to Locke, is the idea o the

ability something has to produce ideas in the mind. So, or example,the idea o coldness is taken as a sign o some power, or quality, in

that body to produce the idea o coldness in our minds. The prob-

lem that arises in Lockes theory, as we have seen, is that we have

no way o veriying whether our sensory ideas accurately represent

real eatures o material things. Coldness is a good example o the

problem. I my hand is very hot prior to my touching something,

then the object will eel colder than i my hand is very cold prior to

the experience. The object has not changed in this case, but it pro-duces two dierent ideas depending on the conditions surrounding

the experience. While we can say that there is a power or quality in

that body to produce the idea o coldness in us, we cannot say with

any certainty that the idea o coldness represents some real eature

o the body itsel. Do any o our ideas represent real eatures o

bodies in the world? Locke thinks that our ideas o what he terms

primary qualities are ideas we can (with a air amount o coni-dence) presume to resemble real qualities in bodies.

Primary qualities, as Locke deines them, are real qualities (i.e.

powers) in objects, and those qualities are just like the ideas we

have o themthese ideas are Resemblances o [bodies], and their

Patterns do really exist in the Bodies themselves (2.8.15). Primary

qualities include ideas o solidity, extension, igure, and mobility.

Lockes list o primary qualities is consistent with the corpuscu-

larian materialist science that was gaining dominance in Lockesday. On this view, all matter is composed ultimately o tiny bits o

matter, called corpuscles (or what we might now call atoms). The

movement o these parts, their cohesion, and their relative luidity

all contribute to the overall appearance o that body and account

or its eects on the human senses. Perceptual experience is thus

a unction o the motion o these particles o matter aecting the

senses in certain ways. Speciically, the motion o a bodys mate-rial parts transers motion to our sensory organs via impact and

thereby produce sensory ideas in our minds. As Locke explains it,

objects produce ideas in us maniestly by impulse, the only way

which we can conceive Bodies operate in (2.8.11). Lockes meta-

physical commitments are never ar rom the surace. When Locke

speaks o primary qualities such as the Bulk, Texture, and Motion

o [a bodys] insensible parts (2.8.10), he is presuming an atomistic


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account o matter. For Locke, the ideas we have o primary quali-

ties are inseparable rom the real object, since they represent the

qualities o atoms. Evidence or this is not oered in great detailhere, but Locke is not necessarily slipping something past us by

ailing to account or his corpuscularian (or atomistic) leanings.

Locke admits at the end o chapter VIII that he engaged in

Physical Enquiries a little urther than, perhaps, I intended

(2.8.22). Locke does not want to commit himsel to theories regard-

ing what may be beyond our perceptual capacities. However, this

need not inhibit hypotheses that would best explain the relevant

phenomena. Lockes distinction o primary and secondary quali-ties can be read as an attempt to sort through our ideas o mate-

rial objects on the basis o their explanatory strength. For Locke,

the act that we have ideas such as solidity and texture, and that

they provide a plausible basis or explaining perception, makes the

corpuscular picture the best going explanation. The corpuscular

account underlying his theory o ideas provides a reasonable basis

or determining which o our ideas resemble real qualities o matterand which do not. Locke is correct to state that without this kind

o distinction nothing very clear or comprehensible could really be

said about ideasa theory o mental content has to make some

attempt to account or the origin and veridicality o the things we

think about, and, or Locke, this origin lies in the material compo-

sition o objects. Primary qualities provide the basic causal story

or all o our ideas about substances. The microparticles o matter

provide us with ideas o their intrinsic properties, but their con-tact with our senses also produce a host o ideas in our minds that

are, i you will, by-products o their material and motive properties.

These by-products o material motion are what Locke calls second-

ary quality ideas.

SECONDARY QUALITIES

Secondary qualities also represent powers in objects to produce

sensations in us. The ideas we have o secondary qualities, however,

do not resemble intrinsic qualities o objects. These include ideas o

color, sound, and taste. These ideas are produced in the mind by the

motion o material particles acting on the senses, yet the result is apt

to mislead us into mistaking appearance or reality. When we have

the idea o green produced in us by a lea, we might well presume


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that green is a real quality o the object (as when we say, The lea is

green). In a sense, it is a real quality in the object, or Locke; how-

ever, the real quality is not a green color, but a power in the objectto produce an idea o green in the mind. The object, the lea in this

case, is not, in any intrinsic sense, green, but the motions o its mate-

rial parts can produce that idea in us under the right circumstances.

Rubies, on the other hand, have the power, by their dierent par-

ticulate constitution, to produce ideas o red in the perceiver. In

this way, Locke challenges the nave assumption that our sensory

impressions directly relect the natural world. However, his appeal

to primary qualities as the causal origin o these ideas is meant tosave the theory rom alling into complete skepticism. Secondary

quality ideas represent real qualities, or powers, in the object, but

in an indirect ashion. With primary quality ideas, Locke collapses

the distinction between appearance and reality, and oers us some

means o grounding secondary ideas, albeit indirectly, in objects

themselves.

PERCEPTION AND JUDGMENT

When the mind receives a number o simple ideas simultaneously,

it not only relates these ideas, but it makes immediate judgments

regarding these relations o ideas. Judgment, or Locke, is a speciic

kind o assent the mind gives when it takes two ideas to be related

by some third idea. For example, when we relate red and sweet

with the idea o some uniying substance in which they inhere, weorm the complex idea o an apple, which we judge to be an object

having real unity. Judgment is a aculty o the mind that allows us

to ill in the gaps in our knowledge with probable conjecture.

Judgments can be discarded, or suspended, when our want o inor-

mation is too great to conidently assent to the relation o ideas we

are considering. When we judge ideas to be related, our judgment

turns out to be right only i it actually relects a real connectionbetween those ideas; it is a alse judgment i it turns out we have

assented to a relation between what are, in act, unrelated ideas.

Judgments can be hasty or even irrational. Our judgments regard-

ing objects can even, sometimes, distort the perceptual inormation

available to us. Locke considers, by way o example, the visual per-

ception o a gold-colored globe. The idea we get rom sight is that

o a lat Circle variously shadowd (2.9.8). This is no dierent in


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visual content rom looking at a painting o a gold-colored globe

shaded to give the appearance o three-dimensionality. But, rom

past experience, we know that convex three-dimensional igurescause ideas o certain patterns o light. Our judgment draws on

past experiences and makes similar inerences in visually similar

cases. People with vision connect spatial with visual ideas, but since

sight ideas can only be those involving impressions made on the

eyes, producing two-dimensional patterns o light, any other quali-

ties we impute to an object are the result o our judgment making

quick associations between these ideas and our tactual experiences

o objects around us. In other words, objects look a certain way tous because they eel a certain way to us as well. The mind is illing

in, with its store o related simple ideas, the dimensionality that we

do not have immediately presented to us in vision. We are gener-

ally unaware o the degree to which our judgments ill in present

gappy experiences with inormation rom past experiences. Our

minds are so quick to relate inormation rom sight to the inorma-

tion gathered repeatedly and habitually rom our senses that weare requently apt to take that or the Perception o our Sensation,

which is an Idea ormed by our Judgment (2.9.9). We may think we

are seeing dimensionality, when in act we are supplementing visual

data with tactile data stored in our memories. What commonly

happens, Locke explains, is that we simply ail to notice the mul-

tiaceted ideas o sensation that go into making up our requently

quite visual perception o things.

MOLYNEUXS PROBLEM

One o the most amous and controversial passages in the Essay

arises at this point in Lockes discussion. A correspondent o

Lockes, William Molyneux, proposed the example o a man born

blind who knew the dierence between cubes and spheres on the

basis o touch alone. Molyneux speculates that i a cube and asphere were placed on a table in the mans room and he were sud-

denly to regain his sight, the man would not be able to properly

identiy the objects (ormerly known only by touch) on the basis

o sight alone. Locke eagerly accepts this analysis, adding that the

mind requently imputes to vision what has actually been received

rom other senses. I we only ever touched objects then the strictly

visual clues would, Locke and Molyneux suggest, be wanting. It is


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worth noting here that Locke sets a condition on the experiment:

he states that the man at irst sight, would not be able with cer-

tainty to say, which was the Globe, which the Cube, whilst he onlysaw them (2.9.10). The condition here is that the experiment must

measure what kind o distinction the man could make between the

objects at first sight, with no chance to walk around the objects and

see them rom all sides.

A typical rationalists response to Locke is provided by the phi-

losopher Gottried Leibniz, who argues that the newly sighted man

would be able to distinguish the two geometrical igures on the

basis o sight alone. Leibniz ignores Lockes condition and arguesthat i the man possessed the suicient rational concepts o the geo-

metrical qualities o cubes and spheres, he could, on this basis, tell

which was which simply by observing their respective properties.

While Leibniz grants that the mind is urnished with ideas rom

sensation, these are only conused ideas; in making an accurate

judgment o things, the mind appeals to a prioriprinciples such as

those in geometry. In other words, reason itsel ills in the expe-riential gaps with its own innate ideas. Some hay has been made

o the unairness o Lockes condition in deliberately stacking the

deck in avor o his theory. However, whether the man can look all

around the cube or not, the point to be gleaned rom Lockes and

Leibnizs respective answers is not aectedthe question at issue

here is whether spatial qualities can be inerred rom sight alone. I

the answer is yes, then the mind is adding something not given in

sensory perception but which it must already have known. Lockesanswer is that the only ideas we have are experiential. Since the

newly sighted person has no past experience o relations between

visual and tactile ideas, he has no ideas o the visual cues that we

connect with three-dimensionality with which to make judgments

about what he perceives. Sighted people know how angles look

because they have both elt them and looked at them, and they have

put these ideas together to orm judgments in uture visual situa-tions. The newly sighted person has no such store o data.

This example sheds light on Lockes theory o perception and

judgment. Reason associates ideas and produces a (hopeully) plau-

sible account o the nature o objects. But reason can work only

with the ideas it is given in experience. The blind man has no intel-

lectual resources or making the connection between the eel o a

sphere and the look o a spherenot until he has actually both


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seen and elt one. The issue has undergone a dizzying amount o

analysis in light o a variety o experimental considerations. It is not

clear that this is an issue that can be easily settled by appeal to casestudies or human physiology; experiments even recently have been

inconclusive. However, the relevant point or Lockes theory is that

the mind cannot simply apply geometrical concepts such as three-

dimensionality in some a priori manner. The visual cues are not

suicient or this, regardless o how much the newly sighted person

might know about geometry. Ideas o igure and dimensionality are

acquired over time, with the combined perceptual experiences o

touch and sight. The relations we draw between our experientialideas are ormed, and perected, through repeated perceptual expe-

riences, or Locke.

LOCKES ETHICS OF BELIEF

Lockes work can be seen as not merely descriptive but prescriptive

as well: Locke seeks to propose a oundation or taking intellectualresponsibility or the judgments we make regarding the truth or al-

sity o ideas. In act, Lockes theory o ideas is predicated on the

notion that our complex ideas and the propositions we build rom

them are the constructions o the human mind. This leaves us with

a great deal o intellectual reedom but at the expense o any innate,

traditional, or oundational axioms on which to base our systems

o belie. Every rational individual has access to the oundations o

knowledge on Lockes accountexperiential ideasand each per-son is capable o making judgments regarding those ideas in more

or less intellectually responsible ways to the end o providing or

our needs. As we have seen, Locke thinks we can trace the causal

origins o our ideas and sort out those which represent reality and

those which do so only indirectly. On these oundations, we can

begin to evaluate the relations we draw between our ideas and then

alter our judgments accordingly. For Locke, this has more thanmerely intellectual ramiications. There is a moral tone to Lockes

discussion that characterizes it as an ethics o beliethe view that

we each have a duty to ensure that our belies are rational and well-

ounded not only or the pursuit o knowledge, but or the broader

goods o social harmony, happiness, trust, and mutual respect.

The appeal to tradition and authority did not strike Locke as

providing suiciently rigorous standards or determining the truth


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or alsity o our belies. Without a clear comprehension o the ori-

gin o ideas and proper grounds or accounting or the belies they

hold, people are liable to be the victims o authority and prejudicein the posture o blind Credulity (1.4.24). The presumption o

innateness has led eectively to an end o critical inquiry, relieving

each person o the duty o properly examining the grounds or her

belies; innateness being once accepted, Locke explains, it eased

the lazy rom the pains o search, and stoppd the enquiry o the

doubtul (1.4.24).

Locke presents the reader with an evidentiary requirement or

belie, beyond which we have no excuse or holding belies to betrue. In Book IV, he explains that anyone must accept this who is

motivated by a love o truth. As he writes,

[w]hoever goes beyond this measure o Assent, tis plain receives

not Truth in the Love o it; loves not Truth or Truths sake, but

or some other bye end. For the evidence that any Proposition is

true (except such as are sel-evident) lying only in the Proos aMan has o it, whatsoever degrees o Assent he aords it beyond

the degrees o that Evidence, tis plain all that surplusage o

assurance is owing to some other Aection, and not to the Love

o Truth: It being as impossible, that the Love o Truth should

carry my Assent above the Evidence, that there is to me, that it

is true. (4.19.1)

For Locke, however, this is about more than just intellectualaccountability. He speaks, at times, as i we have a moralduty to

attend to these belie requirements as well. Taking evidentiary lim-

its as ones guide is the means to ulilling ones duty as a rational

being. As he warns,

He that believes, without having any Reason or believing, may

be in love with his own Fancies; but neither seeks Truth as heought, nor pays the Obedience due to his Maker, who would have

him use those discerning Faculties he has given him, to keep him

out o Mistake and Errour. (4.17.24)

Reason is a God-given aculty, or Locke, and this is a key element

in his ethics o belie. God created each o us with the end o living

our lives as well as we can, and employing reason is the surest way


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to this end. Living according to reason, Locke explains, keeps each

person rom error and provides the satisaction o doing his Duty

as a rational Creature (4.17.24). It is an egalitarian vision o indi-vidual sel-realization, i you will.

According to Locke scholar Nicholas Wolterstor,

Lockes picture o the community o responsible believers is the

picture o democracy in which each listens to his or her own

inner voice o Reason and no one treats any voice outside him-

sel or hersel as authoritativeunless his or her Reason tells

him or her to do so.6

This makes each o us a better person, and as a result makes society

better as well. A society o credulous people is one that is subject to

tyranny and abuse. It is no small power, Locke warns, to have the

Authority to be the Dictator o Principles, and Teach o unques-

tionable Truths; and to make a Man swallow that or an innate

Principle, which may serve to his purpose, who teacheth them(1.4.25). W.K. Cliord echoes this sentiment in his amous essay

The Ethics o Belie, where he writes,

The danger to society is not merely that it should believe wrong

things, though that is great enough; but that it should become

credulous, and lose the habit o testing things and inquiring into

them; or then it must sink back into savagery.7

Lockes Essay repeatedly warns readers o the dire eects o irra-

tionality and gullibility. It is a leitmoti o the work that humans are

better, and human society happier, when individuals take intellec-

tual responsibility or the belies they hold. People who are denied

ree access to a wide range o opinions about the world, gained

through reading and rational inquiry, are, Locke writes, conined

to narrowness o Thought, and enslaved in that which should be thereest part o a Man, their Understandings (4.20.4). In such states,

eort is made by authoritarian Governments to

propagate Truth, without Knowledge; where Men are orced,

at a venture, to be o the Religion o the Country; and must

thereore swallow down Opinions, as silly people do Empiricks

Pills, without knowing what they are made o, or how they will


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work, and have nothing to do, but believe that they will do the

Cure. (4.20.4)

We must endeavor to do the best we can as rational beings; however,

Locke does not see this as an easy task.

ERROR AND THE ASSOCIATION OF IDEAS

The very nature o human cognition leaves us susceptible to errors

in judgment, according to Locke. The reason or this is the con-

tinual inclination o the human mind to orm connections betweenideas. This is something the mind does very quickly, and it does so

largely on the basis o habitual and repeated experiences. So, or

example, the mind very quickly makes the connection between the

perceptual experience o sunlight and the attendant experience o

warmth. On the basis o repeated experiences, we come to associate

the idea o warmth with the sun, and this goes into making up our

complex idea o the sun. Without this natural proclivity o the mindto move rom one idea to another related idea, we would be unable

to ormulate judgments about the world. However, this natural ten-

dency o the mind is a double-edged sword. People, Locke observes,

hold all kinds o views that strike us as odd or extravagant. We

are very good at pointing to wrong-headed views in others, but are

oten very bad at recognizing erroneous judgments o our own.

Although sel-love has some part to play in this, it is not the whole

story. Education and prejudice also play some role, but, again, arenot the root cause:

he ought to look a little arther who would trace this sort o

Madness to the root it springs rom, and so explain it, as to

shew whence this law has its Original in very sober and rational

Minds, and wherein it consists. (2.33.3)

While the mind does a very good job at noting correspondences

and connections between our various simple and complex ideas, it

does so with a greater or lesser degree o empirical exactness. So,

when the mind makes a connection between sunlight and warmth

we tend to think o this as being a airly accurate representation o

the sunlight and its qualities. However, i someone were to believe

that there is a connection between sunlight and the divine power o


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a sun deity, we might say that this connection is a more controver-

sial association o ideas that is not strictly relective o perceptual

experience o the sun. This kind o connection seems to be more aproduct o custom, tradition, and education. Associations can also

be made on very idiosyncratic grounds: a person who becomes very

ill ater eating a certain ood may come to associate that ood with

illness. The very idea o that ood will make her think o illness.

Again, this is not an association that we might think o as relec-

tive o the powers o that object, but a conused causal connection

instead.

Once the mind has made these connections, it is, Locke writes,very hard to separate them, they always keep in company, the

one no sooner at any time comes into the Understanding, but its

Associate appears with it (2.23.5). In much the same way that a

musician can play a song perectly the same every time, owing to

the act that the ideas o the notes are all connected very deeply in

her mind, the sun worshipper will make the connection between

sunlight and the deity whenever the idea o sunlight is beore hermind. People make all kinds o connections between ideas, imput-

ing causal connections between things that are not actually causally

connected, or attributing qualities to things that do not, in nature,

have such qualities. So, i we consider the range o associations

people orm, rom a belie in witchcrat via the evil eye, to spirits

at work in matter, or even that the colors and sounds o objects are

directly represented in perception, we see that people are capable o

orming associations o ideas on less than purely empirico-rationalgrounds. The act that the mind is capable o orging such strong

links between ideas accounts or why our mistaken judgments can

be taken or truths even by otherwise quite rational people. It is

this act o our cognition, he writes, that gives Sence to Jargon,

Demonstration to Absurdities, and Consistency to Nonsense,

and is the oundation o the greatest, I had almost said, o all the

Errors in the World (2.33.18). The greatest mistakes happen, Lockethinks, when the mind unites things that are not actually joined.

This leads to a host o very serious errors, including prejudice, bad

science, and intolerance. Lockes answer is to inspect the grounds

or ones associations o ideas, or it is in the ullest comprehension

o the origin o our ideas and the proper basis or their connection

to one another that we can escape, to whatever degree possible, the

conines o prejudicial reasoning.


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Locke seems to hold out hope that we can improve our reason-

ing by thoughtul examination o the grounds or the associations

we make between our ideas. In act, Locke sounds as though thisis required or any rational person given the dire consequences o

holding ill-ounded belies based on mistaken associations o ideas.

Lockes taxonomy o ideas is intended as groundwork or assessing

and analyzing the belies one holds. In understanding the source

o our ideas, we understand not only the limits o knowledge, but

also the proper grounds or evaluating the belies we hold. This

comes out most clearly in Book IV o the Essay, which deals with

knowledge and opinion. However, it is hinted at in the inal chap-ter o Book II. We have the means o determining the experiential

cause o our ideas, and i we are careul we can sort out the kinds

o associations between ideas that have some plausible cause in the

real nature o things and those that are conused misapprehensions

arising rom custom and prejudice. As Locke explains in Book IV,

true reasoning consists in inding out the proos or ones belies,

ordering those proos clearly, establishing the connections betweenthem plainly and simply, and drawing the reasonable conclusion

rom them. The irst step in this program is grasping the nature and

origin o our ideas, and learning how to sort our ideas out clearly.

The way to knowledge is, Locke writes in Book IV, to get andfix

in our minds clear, distinct, and complete Ideas, as ar as they are to

be had . . . and by comparing them with one another, inding their

Agreement, and Disagreement, and their several Relations and

Habitudes (4.12.6). The more care we take in attending to this pro-cess, the better we will be at distinguishing truths rom alsehoods.


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things. A related conception o substance is that o substance as a

substratumthat is, a thing which is the bearer or holder o proper-

ties and which is conceived, in some sense, distinctly rom perceiv-able properties, but which uniies or grounds them in some way. In

order to understand this more clearly, consider the claim The dog

has brown ur. The presumption is that there is some thinghaving

the quality o brown ur. We commonly make such claims, and in

so doing presume that something unites perceivable qualities into

one cohesive entity. Despite the act that anything we say about the

dog is going strictly to involve observable properties, most people

would be disinclined to assert that the dog, as such, is nothing morethan a bundle o perceivable properties cohering in nothing at all.

The existence o substance as an ontological entity, as distinct

rom the properties a thing exhibits, has long been heavily debated.

To assert the existence o substrata risks holding either o two

untenable positions: either we are asserting the existence o bare

particulars (particular things that have no qualities in themselves,

but are the holders o qualities), which are conceptually baling,or we are proposing the existence o something which is, in prin-

ciple, concealed rom direct perception. In Lockes day it was an

idea that many adherents o the new science were beginning to

question, though even atomism relied upon an inerence rom per-

ceivable qualities to their imperceptibly small material causes. But

just what is the relationship between the substance and the quali-

ties o objects? Much o what Locke has to say about substance is

inormed by the atomistic theory o material bodies.

SUBSTANCE AND EARLY-MODERN MATERIALISM

One o Lockes primary inluences in this regard was Sir Robert

Boyle, an early, and enthusiastic, advocate o the so-called new

science. His theory o body, which he termed the corpuscularian

hypothesis, was the most amous articulation o the new sciencesatomistic materialism. According to Boyle, all material bodies are

composites o ultimately small particles o matter, termed corpus-

cles. The atomic parts have the same material qualities as the larger

composite bodies do, namely size, shape, location, solidity, and

extension. The speciic texture, shape, and other perceivable quali-

ties o compound bodies are explicable with reerence to the con-

iguration o their component atomic particles. On Boyles account,


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LOCKES THEORY OF MATTER

35

substance denotes these atomic particles. As such, the notion o

substance cannot easily be construed as a basic entity that holds

or uniies properties. Properties o an object are produce

Locke: A Guide for the Perplexed

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