Lewis and t he Semantics-Pragmatics Divide

Department of Computer ScienceCenter for Cognitive Science

Rutgers University

Lewis andthe Semantics-Pragmatics

DivideErnie Lepore

Matthew Stone

OutlineRethinking semantics and pragmatics• coordination (Lewis 1969)• the conversational record (Lewis 1979)Linguistics and the socialImplications for philosophical practice

BackgroundLast time: Intentions• Intention recognition is an important

ingredient of understanding, collaboration

BUT• Problematic to locate linguistic

knowledge using intentions

Need to look elsewhere to get clear on the scope of linguistic rules as social constructs

CoordinationSituations where agents’ actions must

agree• but no intrinsic reason to prefer one

joint strategy over another

CoordinationExamples from Lewis (1969)• Arrange a meeting• Restart an interrupted phone call• Row a boat• Share the road when driving• Perform a search as a group• Collude to set prices• Signal a choice

Coordination as a gameC1 C2 C3

R1 1;1 0;0 0;0

R2 0;0 1;1 0;0

R3 0;0 0;0 1;1

Games and reasoningIf an agent chooses her action

deliberately, she must consider her expectations about her partner.

Idealization: equilibrium• no player would change his move,

given the moves the others make

Games and reasoningWe generally expect equilibria in real life• where agents play repeatedly

they can learn to match one anothereven if individual decisions are heuristic

Equilibrium describes regularity in behavior

• Lets us ascribe certain states to agents (perhaps tacit or implicit)

State underlying equilibriumIt’s common knowledge that(1) everyone conforms to R(2) everyone expects everyone else to

conform to R(3) everyone prefers to conform to R on

the condition that others do

Lewis: this is a conventionObjections:• Silent about how conventions are

instituted

That’s the point.• Lewis describes how we can get

convention from salience, precedents and convergence – but this is just one story among many

Games and reasoningA range of mechanisms explain

equilibrium• Architecture – we’re only biologically

capable of one equilibrium• Salience – we’re so constituted that

preferred equilibrium leaps to mind• Experience – we’ve learned that others

follow a given equilibrium

All potentially relevant to language facultyArchitecture: Universal GrammarSalience: Primitive preferences for

particular patterns of interpretationExperience: Acquired lexical items,

syntactic parameter settings, etc.

Lewis: this is a conventionObjections:• We don’t have to know all these things

(Burge)

Fair point – let’s talk about ‘social competence’ instead as whatever lets us solve (certain) coordination problems – not prejudging the actual status of skills, knowledge, choice & alternatives

Lewis: this is a conventionObjections:• Lewis’s conventions are always

followed – this seems too strong (Gilbert, Millikan)

• Examples: handing out cigars, using ‘bank’ to mean financial institution

Lewis: this is a conventionObjections:• Lewis’s conventions have to achieve

preferred outcomes – this seems too strong (Gilbert, Millikan)

• Examples: decorating for Christmas specifically with red and green

Lewis: this is a conventionObjections:• Seems to assume coordination

problem exists antecedently of equilibrium – this seems too strong (Marmor)

• Examples: playing chess by the rules

ResponseIn keeping with idea of social

competence, let’s think of coordination problems are rational reconstructions

Lewis on SignalingOne party produces signal,

knowing the state of the worldThe other acts,

having seen the signal

Explains information carried by signal,but a long way from meaning

Signaling example‘one if by land, two if by sea’

Sexton hangs certain patterns of lightsconditional on what British are doing

Revere prepares particular pattern of defenseconditional on what lights he sees

They want equilibrium

Signaling games1L2S 1S2L

1L2S 1;1 0;0

1S2L 0;0 1;1

ProblemsMeaning is underdetermined• 1 light: the British are coming by land

or• 1 light: prepare the land defenses!

or• both?

ProblemsMeaning only present at equilibrium• So what about coordination that

succeeds through other mechanisms – salience? good luck? partial or tentative precedents?

Lewis on ConventionLewis attempts to generalize to

languageby directly understanding truth conditionsas conventions for agents to use certain sentences in certain conditions(namely, when they are true)

Lewis on ConventionThis is very cumbersomeAnd doesn’t seem to get at the real

difficulties

Another ideaLanguage combines social competence

with specific institutions targeted at meaning

Specifically: the conversational record (Lewis 1979)

Conversational recordList of propositions associated with

discourseSpecifies• interlocutors’ environment• what has been said already• what the purposes and plan is• what standards of meaning are in play• what issues are open• what conversation is committed to(Lewis 1979, Thomason 1990)

Conversational recordRecord is dynamic• topic can change• meaning standards can be negotiated• presuppositions can be challenged• interlocutors can commit to new

propositions or rescind previous commitments

Utterances specify updates• generally, as a matter of meaning

Conversational recordAbstraction• Free to specify discourse referents,

standards for vague predicates,other constructs from formal theories

• Need not be tied to interlocutors’ knowledge or belief

Record is arbitraryIn key respects, it’s up to us how the

record changes

So it’s natural to think of the record as an object of coordination

Coordinating on the RecordOne way of thinking• I have my version of what’s happened• You have your version of what’s

happened• When it lines up, we’ve communicated

Compare Neale’s presentation here

Coordinating on the RecordOne way of thinking• I have my version of what’s happened• You have your version of what’s

happened• When it lines up, we’ve communicated

Drawback: describing cases of miscommunication, clarification, etc.

Coordinating on the RecordAn indirect way of thinking• Each of us defers to practices• Meanings specify how to update the

record• We coordinate on what we defer to

Coordinating on the RecordAn indirect way of thinking• Each of us defers to practices• Meanings specify how to update the

record• We coordinate on what we defer to

Promises a better handle on miscommunication, clarification

The Received ViewSemantics• linguistic specification of reference,

truth• settles what the speaker is saying

Pragmatics• general principles of inference and

strategy• settles what speaker is doing

ProblemsFails to describe linguistic knowledge• more linguistic facts than supposes• e.g., rules for indirection,

presupposition, information structure, etc.

Fails to describe interpretive inference• wide range of practices for engaging

with imagery, drawing insights

Overall pictureKey theoretical notion is inquiry• process (normally collaborative)

in which interlocutors settle how things are

Requires• public meanings• open to negotiation, debate

Overall pictureInquiry privileges conventional meaning• depends on conversational record• depends on coordination

Allows for a broad understanding of meaning

Excludes insight or point of open-ended, idiosyncratic engagement with utterance

Inquiry and CRConversational record tracks inquiry• Assertion registers proposition on

recordas commitment of one party

• Enables further follow up, such asclarification questions,arguments for or against,agreement or disagreement by other parties

Record ensures a shared interpretation

How will this affect philosophy?Better arguments, but more difficult

ones.

Close with case study:• Grice versus ordinary language

philosophers

Color: the dialecticClaim: color supervenes on appearance• Something is red just in case it looks

red under normal conditions to appropriately endowed observers.

Objection (Austin):• Hogwash! You’d only say something

looked red if it wasn’t red!

Color: the dialecticReply (Grice):• Well, yes, you wouldn’t say something

looks red unless it wasn’t red.• But, that’s not part of the meaning of

“it looks red”, it’s an implicature.

Us:• Sorry Grice, your linguistics is bogus.

What next?Us:• Sorry Austin, your linguistics is bogus

too!

Often say “something looks red” when it is:

• His fake tan looks orange.• Contaminated water still looks clear.• The distant shores look green and

inviting.(examples after google

searches)

What next?Us:• Sorry Austin, your linguistics is bogus

too!

When “it looks red” means it’s not, it’s because of intonation.

No objection to analysis of color,as long as you don’t use that intonation!

Similar casesBelieve and know.Try and succeed.Or and and.

Ordinary language folks: 1st suggests not 2nd

Grice: That’s just an implicature.Us: You’re both wrong.

1st suggests not 2nd if marked elsewherelots of times 1st doesn’t suggest not 2nd.

Basic point Our theories need to acknowledge the richness and complexity of language and communication.

We can do the linguistics and philosophy we want without unhelpful categories like “conversational implicatures”.