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140021668 IR: 3059 Anglo-American Relations since 1939: The Special Relationship Professor: Dr. Gavin Bailey Friends with Benefits 'I hereby declare that the attached piece of written work is my own work and that I have not reproduced, without acknowledgement, the work of another.’ Word Count:4,862
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International Relations Essay

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The Anglo-American special relationship is widely understood to have experienced a series of strains following the Second World War. During the early 1960’s to late 70’s these strains involved the weakened British economy, America’s war in Vietnam, Britain’s focus on Europe, and the ultimate collapse of the Bretton Woods system. All of these strains were placed against the backdrop of the Cold War and the divergent roles within this war that the two countries sought respectively.
This essay attempts to explain these tumultuous years of transition within the Anglo-American special relationship between 1963 and 1973.
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Page 1: International Relations Essay

140021668

IR: 3059 Anglo-American Relations since 1939: The Special Relationship

Professor: Dr. Gavin Bailey

Friends with Benefits

'I hereby declare that the attached piece of written work is my own work and that I have not re-produced, without acknowledgement, the work of another.’

Word Count:4,862

Introduction

Page 2: International Relations Essay

The Anglo-American special relationship is widely understood to have experienced a se-

ries of strains following the Second World War. During the early 1960’s to late 70’s these strains

involved the weakened British economy, America’s war in Vietnam, Britain’s focus on Europe,

and the ultimate collapse of the Bretton Woods system.1 All of these strains were placed against

the backdrop of the Cold War and the divergent roles within this war that the two countries

sought respectively.

This essay attempts to explain these tumultuous years of transition within the Anglo-

American special relationship between 1963 and 1973. While the focus of discussion is framed

between these dates, it becomes obvious that one must establish exactly from whence any such

changes transitioned from. Accordingly, the first part of this paper will examine the Anglo-

American relationship as characterized by Eisenhower and Macmillan between 1957 and 1960.

This period, often referred to as the ‘Golden Age’2 of the Anglo-American relationship, is when a

renewal of the relationship occurred following what Britain considered to be a serious US be-

trayal in Suez. This reconciliation is characterised by a renewed nuclear cooperation between the

US and Britain, through the repeal of the MacMahon Act and Eisenhower’s offer of the Skybolt

missiles and Polaris options to Macmillan. Understanding the positive and renewed condition of

the Anglo-American relationship between Eisenhower and Macmillan, provides the contrast nec-

essary to explain the fractured relationship within the transition years between 1963 and 1973.

The second part of this paper will then explain the aforementioned strains which occurred

within the Anglo-American relationship during the 1960s and 1970s. Again, such strains are

thought to be an amalgamation of the Vietnam war, Britain’s entry into the European Economic

1 Dobson, Allen. The Years of Transition: Anglo-American Relations 1961-1967. Routledge, 1995.2 Ashton, Nigel J. “Harold Macmillan and the ‘Golden Days’ of Anglo-American Relations Revisited, 1957–63.” Diplomatic History 29, no. 4 (September 2005): 691–723.

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Committee (EEC), and the ending of the Bretton Woods system. This troubling combination dur-

ing the 1960s and 1970s is summed up by Allen Dobson:

Much of the economic and defence framework, within which fruitful Anglo- Ameri-can co-operation had taken place in the twenty-five years since the end of the Second World War, disappeared. The USA had turned more to the Far East and away from Europe, because of the war in Vietnam, the growing economic importance of Japan, and increasing irrita-tion with her European allies.3

These tensions and strains within the Anglo-American relationship might also be considered

through the perspectives of realism. If a realist perspective is to be taken, this transition period of

Anglo-American relations is proof that any alliance which exists does so not because of a special

relationship, but rather because of utility and mutual threat. A central example of this utility

within the relationship would be the nuclear co-operation of the Polaris deal. While the key ex-

amples of mutual threat were obviously the Cold War and Vietnam. The essay will therefore

conclude by considering whether or not this transition period from 1963 to 1973 is evidence of

an Anglo-American relationship built completely upon utility and mutual threat.

Eisenhower & Macmillan

The Suez crisis of 1956 is acknowledged as a very low point in the Anglo-American rela-

tionship. Anglo-Egyptian relations had been tense, with frustrations stemming from failed nego-

tiations over British withdrawal of troops from the Suez Canal Zone base.4 Matters were made

worse when Egyptian president Abdul Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal Company. Prime Min-

ister Anthony Eden saw Nasser’s actions as being not only an ‘affront on British prestige, but

also an attack on vital national interests.’5 The British and French sought to put an end to

3 Dobson, The Years of Transition, 138. 4 Fain, W. Taylor. “John F. Kennedy and Harold Macmillan: Managing the ‘Special Relationship’ in the Persian Gulf Region, 1961-63.” Middle Eastern Studies 38, no. 4 (October 1, 2002): 95–122. 5 Smith, Simon C. “THE ANGLO-AMERICAN ‘SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP’ AND THE MIDDLE EAST 1945–1973.” Asian Affairs 45, no. 3 (November 2014): 425–48.

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Nasser’s actions and leadership through negotiations and ultimately force if necessary. Eden

sought diplomatic and military support from the US, support that did not come.

Near the end of October in 1956 Britain and France attacked Egypt, removing the Saudis

occupying the Buraimi Oasis.6 This unilateral action was not well received by Eisenhower. This

tension brought upon the Anglo-American relationship was largely in part due to Britain not hav-

ing consulted America at all before attacking, as well as being the sort of ‘gunboat diplomacy‘

that might ruin Western attempts at the containment of Communism within the Third World.7

Eisenhower was then determined to stop the British and French by demanding withdrawal. The

US placed pressure on Britain and France through the UN as well as selling sterling and blocking

any aid from the IMF.8 The financial pressures of a ruined pound left the British no choice but to

comply with Eisenhower’s request for military withdrawal.

The Suez crisis left a very bitter taste in the mouth of the Anglo-American relationship. It

seems quite clear that the “specialness” of the relationship had no bearing on the behavior of the

US in regard to assumptive support of Britain. The Suez crisis is then a warning of what happens

when the Anglo-American alliance fails to maintain a unity of interests, common perception of

threat, and agreement on policy. Furthermore, the crisis seems to also be a clear example of the

failure to communicate. While the British did not consult the US when it chose to unilaterally at-

tack, Eden and Macmillan assumed that military and financial support would come from the US.

In his memoir Macmillan said this in respect to the assumption of US backing: “I was confident

that if and when the moment for action arrived we should have, if not the overt, at least the

covert sympathy and support of the Government and people of the United States.”9 Likewise the

US did not expect the unilateral military action of Britain, assuming that they would be consulted

6 Smith, “THE ANGLO-AMERICAN,” 433. 7 Dobson, The Years of Transition, 118. 8 Ashton, “Harold Macmillan,” 693. 9 Harold Macmillan, Riding the Storm, 1956–1959. London: Macmillan, 1971, p. 104.

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by Britain first before any use of force within the Suez. This failure of communication is in fact

quite ironic. The irony comes from the fact that a special relationship is often qualified by tight-

knit and clear communication between political and military structures; however, in the case of

the Suez crisis the special relationship lent itself to many assumptions which ultimately resulted

in a breakdown of communication.

While the Suez crisis was most certainly a very low point in the Anglo-American rela-

tionship, a renewal was soon to come. This renewal came from the premiership of Macmillan in

January 1957.10 It was at the Bermuda Conference in March of 1957 that Macmillan and Eisen-

hower seemingly repaired the Anglo-American relationship. This reconciliation came from the

mutual utility of nuclear co-operation. Soviet nuclear threat during the Suez crisis left the US

with a desire to ensure a stronger Western nuclear presence. At the Bermuda Conference the US

‘proposed stationing intermediate-range ballistic missiles in Britain.’11Meetings at the Bermuda

Conference allowed for the preemptive steps necessary for the Anglo-American nuclear co-oper-

ation that would culminate in response to the launch of Sputnik on October 4th 1957.12 The threat

of Sputnik prompted further nuclear co-operation between the US and Britain, ultimately result-

ing in the repeal of the McMahon Act. An exchange of nuclear information and nuclear co-oper-

ation between the US and Britain of this magnitude had not occurred since the Second World

War. Included within the negotiations between Eisenhower and Macmillan over nuclear co-oper-

ation were the agreements to sell Skybolt missiles to Britain, as well as the option for Britain to

purchase Polaris missiles.13 In return, the US was able to secure the Holy Loch submarine base

and the Fylingdales spy station from the British. The launch of Sputnik realigned a mutual utility

10 Dobson, The Years of Transition, 118.11 Dobson, The Years of Transition, 120. 12 Ashton, “Harold Macmillan,” 699. 13 Blackwell, Stephen. “Pursuing Nasser: The Macmillan Government and the Management of British Policy To-wards the Middle East Cold War, 1957--63.” Cold War History 4, no. 3 (April 2004): 85–104.

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and the mutual threat of Russian communism that was lost between the Anglo-American rela-

tionship during the Suez. The freshly mended Anglo-American relationship leading into the

1960s would soon face the difficult transition years.

The Early 1960s

The early 1960s saw the young John F. Kennedy into the office of the US presidency.

The personal relationship shared between Macmillan and Kennedy was to be one of high senti-

ment and mutual trust and support.14 Nuclear defence and the Skybolt missile crisis in particular,

were a testament to the personal relationship shared between Kennedy and Macmillan. The han-

dling of the Skybolt missile crisis and what would be the Nassau agreement, seemed to have

been a promising start to the Anglo-American relationship in the early 1960s.

The nuclear strategy of Kennedy and US Defence Secretary Robert McNamara was one

of Western nuclear consolidation.15 The central control of this multinational nuclear force was of

course to be under the US. McNamara sought to strip Western Europe of any nuclear indepen-

dence outside of American control; the thought being that a multinational nuclear force headed

by the US would prevent unwanted US involvement in Nuclear wars it ‘disapproved of but might

nevertheless be drawn into as a member of the Western camp.’16 McNamara’s nuclear policy was

at odds with a British independent nuclear deterrent. So when McNamara set out to end the Sky-

bolt missile project, the British independent nuclear deterrent was directly threatened. Macmil-

lan saw the loss of Skybolt as the end of Britain as a nuclear power, and his only hope would be

to secure the Polaris missiles.17 Meeting with Kennedy at the Nassau conference in December of

1962, Macmillan was able to argue that refusing to sell Polaris missiles to Britain would most

certainly be the end of British nuclear independence and would seriously rupture the Anglo-

14 Ashton, “Harold Macmillan,” 707. 15 Dobson, The Years of Transition, 127. 16 Dobson, The Years of Transition, 127.17 Ashton, “Harold Macmillan,” 720.

Page 7: International Relations Essay

American relationship. Macmillan also took pains to point out how loss of Britain’s nuclear inde-

pendence would threaten domestic politics of his government which would ultimately threaten

US desires to see the British join the EEC.18 Kennedy was convinced by Macmillan, and the Nas-

sau Agreement was reached.

The key point to be taken from the Skybolt crisis and the Nassau Agreement was that the

Anglo-American relationship survived not because of power threats or even mutual utility, both

reasons that any realist would assume necessary. Instead Macmillan was able to pursue and se-

cure British nuclear interests by way of an appeal to his sentiments toward Kennedy.19 The nu-

clear co-operation that was reinforced by the Nassau Agreement, indicated a reliance upon mu-

tual trust between the US and Britain.20 Mutual trust and sentiment are not acknowledged by re-

alist to be serious influences of a relationship between states. The Skybolt missile crisis and the

relationship between Macmillan and Kennedy seem to be an indication that the Anglo-American

relationship is not only built upon mutual utility and threat. Perhaps the Anglo-American rela-

tionship can also involve the mutual trust and sentiment between political leaders. No doubt

Kennedy and Macmillan shared one of the highest relationships involving such trust and senti-

ment.

The Transition Years: 1963-1973

Having established where the Anglo-American relationship stood in the early years of

Macmillan as well as Kennedy, there can now be a contrast for understanding the transition years

of the relationship. The Anglo-American relationship found most of its strengthening, in the

years of Macmillan, in the efforts toward nuclear co-operation. We saw this strengthening begin

with Eisenhower and Macmillan’s agreement to repeal the MacMahon Act after the Suez crisis.

18 Ashton, “Harold Macmillan,” 720.19 Melland, Claire. “Britain and a New World Role: The Nassau Agreement 1962 and Its Effect on International and Anglo-European Relations, and the Anglo-American ‘Special Relationship,’” 2011. 20 Dobson, The Years of Transition, 130.

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Their efforts toward a stronger Anglo-American relationship through nuclear co-operation was

carried on by Kennedy. Despite opposition within his own administration during the Skybolt

missile crisis, Kennedy agreed to sell the Polaris missiles to Britain by way of the Nassau Agree-

ment. It would seem that the late 1950s and early 1960s were a period of strong Anglo-American

relations.

One might have thought at the time that the Anglo-American relationship would only

continue to be fruitful, carrying on into 1960s and 70s. This was not to be the case. The transition

years of the Anglo-American relationship after Kennedy’s assassination proved to be trouble-

some. As previously mentioned the change from what was a strong and determined relationship

entering into the early 1960s, hinged upon the interconnectedness of a British financial crisis, the

Vietnam war, and British membership of the EEC.

Economic struggles and the EEC: French Rejection

The early 60s were a time of continued economic difficulty for Britain. The British were

faced with an ‘uncompetitive economy, large overseas debts and obligations, and the task of

maintaing confidence in sterling.’21 These threats were the beginning of pressures that would

eventually undermine the Bretton Woods System. Allen Dobson points out that the British con-

sidered membership of the European Economic Community as a means of escape from the bur-

dens of their struggling economy. One would assume that if the British were to transition into the

EEC their interests would naturally move away from the Atlantic, becoming primarily shaped by

a more Eurocentric influence. This no doubt would certainly strain the Anglo-American relation-

ship, and US policy makers would not encourage any such Europeanisation of Britain via mem-

bership of the EEC. The Americans, however, saw Britain’s membership in the EEC as some-

thing that would strengthen not weaken the Anglo-American relationship.

21 Dobson, The Years of Transition, 125.

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The Kennedy administration proposed British entry into the ECC in hopes of not only re-

lieving the monetary strains of supporting the British through their financial troubles, but also to

secure a pro-western influence within the ECC.22 The fear of Britain and the US was that General

de Gaulle of France would see through the British application into the EEC. The Anglo-Ameri-

can relationship and British entrance into the EEC would have been perceived by de Gaulle as ‘a

challenge to his leadership of Europe and be an American Trojan Horse that would influence Eu-

ropean policy on the basis of Atlantic rather than European interests.’23 Despite Macmillan’s at-

tempts to persuade de Gaulle of British devotion to Europe in their meetings at the Champs sum-

mit of 1962, de Gaulle was not convinced.24 At this meeting Macmillan even proposed the unit-

ing of Anglo-French nuclear power. This of course was just before the Skybolt crisis, which

would reveal the weakness of British nuclear force. The Skybolt crisis had ultimately demon-

strated the British dependence upon America. This dependence was perceived by de Gaulle to be

anti-European, and is considered by some historians to be the final straw that led to de Gaulle’s

veto of Britain’s application into the ECC.25 The Anglo-American relationship had tainted de

Gaulle’s perception of British intentions of EEC membership, and ultimately caused the first

French veto of British application to the EEC. This would be the first instance of the Anglo-

American special relationship’s negative influence over British application to the EEC. The sec-

ond instance of a French veto would come under the premiership of Harold Wilson and the presi-

dency of Lyndon Johnson.

The Second ECC Rejection & Vietnam

The looming economic troubles of Britain continued into the premiership of Harold Wil-

son in October of 1964. The sterling continued to weaken as the tremendous balance of payments

22 Melland, “Britain and a New World Role,” 70. 23 Dobson, The Years of Transition, 126. 24 Ashton, “Harold Macmillan,” 717. 25 Melland, “Britain and a New World Role,” 76.

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deficit worsened; this ultimately would continue to pressure Britain's defence programmes and

military commitments east of the Suez as well as destabilise Bretton Woods.26 The Anglo-Ameri-

can relationship continued to weaken as the US began its engagement of the war in Vietnam. De-

spite US assistance in propping up the ever weakening sterling, through the acquiring of Western

Bank loans and encouraged support from the IMF, the British refused to send troops into Viet-

nam.27 Johnson’s desire for British military support in Vietnam was based on the assumption that

it would have bestowed a kind of Western consensus and legitimacy over US action in Viet-

nam.28 He also appealed to the very nature of the Anglo-American relationship, assuming that

British support of troops was expected if US financial support of the British were to continue.

Why were the British seemingly so unwilling to provide the military support of troops to

their Atlantic cousins? Wilson’s refusal to send British troops to Vietnam was mainly due to his

heading of a Labour Party who were adamantly opposed to the pro-war foreign policy of the pre-

vious Conservative government. The Labour Party pushed a foreign policy that would be anti-

imperialist with an ultimate aim at serious attempts to ease Cold War tensions. The potential es-

calation of this war caused Labour leaders to fear the direct Soviet or Chinese involvement in

supporting the Northern Vietnamese; any such involvement would certainly not serve in the re-

laxing of the Cold War.29 Wilson also was faced with Britain’s commitment of 54,000 troops in

their Indonesian-Malaysian confrontation, claiming to be overstretched as it were when pres-

sured by Johnson for troops.30

26 Dobson, The Years of Transition, 131. 27 Vickers, Rhiannon. “Harold Wilson, the British Labour Party, and the War in Vietnam.” Journal of Cold War Studies, no. 2 (2008): 41.28 Vickers, “Harold Wilson,” 7. 29 Spelling, Alex. “‘A Reputation for Parsimony to Uphold’: Harold Wilson, Richard Nixon and the Re-Valued ‘Special Relationship’ 1969–1970.” Contemporary British History 27, no. 2 (June 2013): 192–213.30 Spelling, “A Reputation for Parsimony,” 193.

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As Wilson continued to provided public support of the US involvement in Vietnam,

whilst never providing military support of troops, the economic troubles of sterling continued to

plague the Anglo-American relationship. The fear of both the British and Johnson, was that the

economic struggle would lead to a devaluation of sterling ultimately damaging the British de-

fence commitments east of Suez and Bretton Woods.31 Therefore despite Johnson’s frustrations at

what was perceived to be a failing in the special relationship, in regard to British provision of

troops, aid was given to relieve the pressure on sterling. In fact from 1965 to 1966 the ‘US bilat-

erally had put over $1.7 billion at Britain’s disposal.’32

These attempts by the US to support sterling in hopes of preventing British defence cuts

east of Suez were done in vain. In July of 1967 British Secretary of Defence Denis Healey an-

nounced the planned withdrawal of all troops in its military bases east of Suez by the mid-

1970s.33 Britain felt it could no longer sacrifice the economic stability of its domestic interests

for the sake of its foreign military commitments east of Suez. To make matters worse Healey an-

nounced the devaluation of sterling in November of the same year. This devaluation would lead

to increased pressures on the US dollar, unsustainable oversea’s defence in Vietnam. and the ulti-

mate collapse of the Bretton Woods System.34 Furthermore, the second attempt at British appli-

cation of the EEC had been denied by de Gaulle once again in May earlier that same year.35

Gaulle still had suspicions of the Anglo-American special relationship and was unwilling to al-

low Atlantic interests to interfere with his leadership of Europe. This second rejection of British

entrance into the EEC by France would be the reasoning behind Britain’s alienation from the An-

glo-American special relationship during the premiership of Heath.

31 Dobson, The Years of Transition, 132. 32 Dobson, The Years of Transition, 133. 33 Spelling, “A Reputation for Parsimony,” 194. 34 Spelling, “A Reputation for Parsimony,” 195. 35 Melland, “Britain and a New World Role,” 116.

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Heath, Nixon, and EEC Success

The election of Edward Heath in 1970 brought the reinstatement of the British Conserva-

tive Party. This was assumed as what would be a promising relationship between Heath and the

conservative Nixon administration. Of course this was not the case, as many have noted the

Nixon-Heath era to be one of the lowest points of the Anglo-American special relationship. This

in part was due to Heath’s distant attitude toward America in a pursuit of successful acceptance

into the EEC.36

The first meeting between Heath and Nixon at Chequers set the tone for what would be a

revitalised Europeanism, through the gradual detachment of Britain from the special relationship.

During this initial meeting between the two leaders, Heath was unwilling to accept any American

support with the application into the EEC. Heath was determined that Britain was not to be

‘America’s Trojan Horse in Europe.’37 It would seem that Heath’s disregard for the Anglo-Ameri-

can special relationship, instead preferring the “natural relationship,” was founded on the eco-

nomic constraints of Britain and the devaluing of sterling.38 Indeed, Heath’s main priority was to

promote British interests. Heath seemed to have believed that turning to the EEC would best

serve these interests through an assumed strengthening of the British economy.

It was in May of 1971 that Heath was able to meet with French President Georges Pompi-

dou, ensuring him that Britain was fully committed to Europe.39 Heath revealed to Pompidou that

“there could be no special partnership between Britain and the United States, even if Britain

wanted it, because one was barely a quarter size of the other. But such a partnership was possible

in Europe.”40 Heath’s distance from the Anglo-American special relationship successfully secured

36 Spelling, Alex. “Edward Heath and Anglo-American Relations 1970-1974: A Reappraisal.” Diplomacy & State-craft 20, no. 4 (December 2009): 638–58.37 Dobson, The Years of Transition, 141. 38 Spelling, “Edward Heath,” 641. 39 Melland, “Britain and a New World Role,” 115. 40 Spelling, “Edward Heath,” 643.

Page 13: International Relations Essay

the French President’s approval of British entry into the EEC; and in January of 1973 Britain was

a part of the EEC.41

The Anglo-American special relationship had completely moved into a new direction

during the premiership of Heath. Never before had a prime minister made such careful intentions

to distance Britain from the special relationship. Heath seemed to have abandoned the previously

established dependence upon the US, reaching out instead toward the promise of europeanisation

and the economic stability of the EEC.42 This of course was a strain on American interest regard-

ing European policy since Heath’s detachment from the special relationship implied a disregard

for the concerns of the Atlantic.

Conclusion

It would appear that the Anglo-American relationship was weakened greatly from 1964

to 1973. It most certainly would not be considered “special,” and was in fact moving further and

further away from the special relationship enjoyed in the late 1950s into the early 60s. The An-

glo-American relationship had seen a recovery after the bitter Suez crisis in 1957. Eisenhower

and Macmillan were able to foster nuclear co-operation between the US and Britain. They

worked together on an agreement to repeal the McMahon Act and secured agreements to place

Skybolt and Polaris missiles in the hands of the British.

Similarly, Kennedy also was able to work with Macmillan towards strengthening Anglo-

American relations through nuclear co-operation. As with the Suez crisis, the Anglo-American

41 Dobson, The Years of Transition, 142. 42 Dobson, The Years of Transition, 143.

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relationship was once again threatened in the early 1960s. McNamara’s desire to end the Skybolt

missile program would consequentially also be the end of a British independent nuclear deter-

rent. This threat to the Anglo-American relationship was avoided through the Nassau Agreement

reached by Kennedy and Macmillan. The Nassau Agreement secured Polaris missile options for

the British, alleviating any threat to an independent nuclear deterrent.

When considering these periods of the Anglo-American relationship, it seems evident

that both the US and British governments shared the mutual utility and threat that a realist would

deem essential to an Anglo-American alliance. It is this mutual utility and common threat that

sustained the recovery of the Anglo-American relationship after both the Suez and Skybolt

crises. Both the US and Britain held what they believed to be similar Cold War roles, sharing ul-

timately in the common threat of Communism. This common threat is what allowed them to find

a mutual utility through nuclear co-operation .

In the transition years that followed the successful Anglo-American relationship during

the late 1950s into the early 1960s, it might be argued that the Cold war roles changed due to a

shift in perceived common threat. The strain experienced by the Anglo-American relationship in

these transition years from 1963 to 1973 was certainly a mixture of the British financial crisis,

British entrance into the EEC, the war in Vietnam, and the eventual collapse of the Bretton

Woods System. The two most impactful strains were no doubt Vietnam and British entrance into

the EEC. From the perspective of realism, both served to greatly explain the fracturing of the An-

glo-American relationship when considering mutual utility and common threat.

Vietnam was a war that premier Wilson continuously refused to participate in militarily.

This indicated a movement away from the united front against Communism that had been

present between the US and UK since after the Second World War. It can be argued that because

Page 15: International Relations Essay

Britain was unable to share in the mutual threat of Vietnam, a breakdown of perceived mutual

utility would naturally ensue. This did in fact happen, as frustrations continued to build over US

financial support of Britain. This support seemed unwarranted if the British were not willing to

send troops to Vietnam or even uphold military commitments east of the Suez. Without the re-

quired mutual threat,Vietnam, the Anglo-American relationship suffered greatly. The British

economic struggles only served to worsen the situation, ultimately providing the foundation for

Britain’s desire to enter the EEC.

Britain’s failed attempts at entering the EEC during this time period were thought to be a

result of the Anglo-American special relationship. The French suspicion of such “specialness”

was behind the veto which blocked British entrance twice. Economic pressures continued as the

sterling was devalued and the Bretton Woods began to crumble. It seems that primer Heath, in

his desire for British economic stability, made entrance into the EEC the utmost priority. Heath

would not let the association of a special Anglo-American relationship give rise to a third veto.

His premiership was then one of distance from the US, ushering in a europeanisation of Britain

that had not been seen before.

This detachment from the Anglo-American special relationship ultimately secured

Heath’s approval by French President Pompidou, securing Britain’s successful acceptance into

the EEC. It is evident then that Heath no longer saw a mutual utility in the Anglo-American re-

lationship. This lack of perceived mutual utility could be thought to have supported Heath’s dis-

tancing from the US. Indeed it would seem that Heath had transferred the mutual utility tradition-

ally enjoyed by Britain and the US, to the French and the other EEC members.

The transition years from 1963 to 1973 were obviously a low point in the Anglo-Ameri-

can special relationship. This period was a movement away from the successful nuclear co-oper-

Page 16: International Relations Essay

ation that had occurred in the late 1950s and early 60s. It is evident that due to a lack of common

threat during the war in Vietnam, Anglo-American relations were unable to clearly identify mu-

tual utility. This frustration at the lack of mutual utility manifest itself on both sides of the At-

lantic. The US was growing disinterested in financially supporting a Britain who failed to meet

her military obligations; while Britain became more and more anxious to alleviate economic

pressures through the disassociation of the special relationship in favour of EEC acceptance.

In conclusion, it is apparent that the failed Anglo-American alliance was the result of an

inability to maintain common threat and mutual utility. This is clearly the case when comparing

the period of the Anglo-American relationship in 1963 to 1973 with that of the late 1950s and

early 60s. The later was united under the common threat of the Soviets and fear of Communist

expansion, while maintaining mutual utility through nuclear co-operation. This was not the case

during the transition period. The once deeply shared mutual threat of Communism was fractured

by Britain’s inability to participate in Vietnam. Economic strains and the devaluation of sterling

served only to push the British further away from America, ultimately seeking refuge in the arms

of the EEC. The transition period from 1963 to 1973 is then a clear example of an Anglo-Ameri-

can relationship that was once built upon mutual utility and common threat. It was during these

years that the absence of such utility and threat was revealed.

Page 17: International Relations Essay

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Page 18: International Relations Essay

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