-
IMCA The International Marine Contractors AssociationRepresents
offshore, marine and underwater engineering companies
Carlyle House, 235 VTel: +44 (0) 20 7931 8171 Fax: +44 (0) 20
79
Incorporating AODC an
The information contained herein is givenFor the avoidance of
doubt no legal liability shall att
Proceedings ofWORKING SAFER OFFSHORE
Safety, Health and the Environmentin Marine Contracting
IMCA Seminar24-25 January 2002
Old Trafford, Manchesterauxhall Bridge Road, London, SW1V 1EJ,
UK31 8935 E-mail: [email protected] Website: www.imca-int.com
d DPVOA VAT Registration No: GB 653339823
for guidance only and endeavours to reflect best industry
practice.ach to any opinion and/or recommendation and/or statement
herein contained.
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IMCA
The International Marine Contractors Association (IMCA) is
theinternational trade association representing offshore, marine
andunderwater engineering companies. It was formed in April
1995from the amalgamation of AODC (the International Association
ofUnderwater Engineering Contractors) and DPVOA (the
DynamicPositioning Vessel Owners Association).
IMCA promotes improvements in quality, health,
safety,environmental and technical standards through the
publication ofinformation notes, codes of practice and by other
appropriatemeans.
It is organised through four distinct divisions each covering
aspecific area of members interests: Diving, Marine,
OffshoreSurvey, Remote Systems and ROVs.
There are, additionally, two core committees that relate to all
foursectors, covering: Safety, Environment & Legislation
Training, Certification & Personnel Competence
Working Safer Offshore
IMCAs Safety, Environment & Legislation Core
Committeeorganised this two-day seminar on safety, health and
theenvironment in marine contracting to bring together onshore
andoffshore management responsible for safety and
offshoreoperational personnel for a series of presentations and
discussionson key safety issues in the industry.
www.imca-int.com/sel/
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IMCA The International Marine Contractors AssociationRepresents
offshore, marine and underwater engineering companies.
Working Safer OffshoreSafety, Health and the Environment in
Marine Contracting
A seminar for onshore and offshore management responsible for
safety
24-25 January 2002at
Old Trafford, ManchesterHome of Manchester United Football
Club
P R O C E E D I N G S
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WORKING SAFER OFFSHORE
IMCA Safety, Environment & Legislation Core Committee Page
1
CONTENTS
Programme
............................................................................................................2
Overview
..................................................................................................................5Philip
Wiggs, IMCA Technical Co-ordinator
Introduction
..........................................................................................................11Chris
van Beek, Heerema Marine ContractorsChairman, IMCA Safety,
Environment & Legislation Core Committee
Presentations
.......................................................................................................13
Safety culture: How it differs world-wide, how to manage the
difference ............... 13Sjaak Pappe, ITIM
Behavioural safety: An American perspective
.................................................................
21Mark Guest, Halliburton HSE Director, KBR (Onshore)
Behaviour-based accident prevention process
.................................................................
25Allan Hannah, Technip-Coflexip
Does legislation always help improve safety? Positive and
negative examples ........ 29Joop van de Westen, ITIM
Leading safety performance indicators
...............................................................................
39Ken London, Stolt Offshore
Safety incentives
......................................................................................................................
45Sal Ruffino, European Marine Contractors
Reports on Discussions
...................................................................................47
Behavioural safety management
...........................................................................................
48
Leading safety performance indicators
...............................................................................
51
Safety incentives
......................................................................................................................
53
Delegate List
........................................................................................................55
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Programme WORKING SAFER OFFSHORE
Page 2 IMCA
Day One Thursday 24 January 2002
11:00-12:00 REGISTRATION
12:00-12:15 Introduction & WelcomeAims of WorkshopChris van
Beek, Heerema Marine ContractorsChairman, IMCA Safety, Environment
& Legislation Core Committee
12:15-13:15 Safety CultureHow it Differs World-Wide, How to
Manage the DifferencesSjaak Pappe, ITIMITIM culture and management
consultants a leading consultancy with acknowledgedexpertise in
matching culture with business requirements
13.15-14:00 LUNCH
14:00-14:30 Behavioural Safety: An American PerspectiveMark
Guest, Halliburton HSE Director, KBR (Onshore)
14:30-15:00 Behaviour-Based Accident Prevention ProcessAllan
Hannah, Technip-Coflexip
15:00-15:20 COFFEE
15:20-16:10 TABLE DISCUSSIONS
Behavioural Safety Management How to improve safety of an
offshore crew What are the barriers to improving safety and how can
these be
overcome?
How does culture influence safety?Feedback from Table
Discussions to Workshop
16:10-17:00 Does Legislation Always Help Improve Safety?Positive
and Negative ExamplesJoop van de Westen, ITIM
17:00 Summary and Discussion
17:15 CLOSE
19:00 DRINKS RECEPTION, followed by theSEMINAR DINNER at the
Golden Tulip Hotel
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WORKING SAFER OFFSHORE Programme
IMCA Safety, Environment & Legislation Core Committee Page
3
Day Two Friday 25 January 200209:00-09:05 Introduction to Day
Two
Mike OMeara, Halliburton HSE Director, KBR
(Offshore)Vice-Chairman, IMCA Safety, Environment & Legislation
Core Committee
09:05-09:35 Leading Safety Performance IndicatorsKen London,
Stolt Offshore
09:35-09:45 Safety IncentivesIntroduction by Sal Ruffino,
European Marine Contractors
09:45-10:55 TABLE DISCUSSIONS
Safety Incentives Do safety awards and other
incentives work? Perverse incentives how can
these be avoided? How should they be set up? The offshore crew
perspective
Leading Safety PerformanceIndicators Will measuring leading
indicators reduce the numberof undesirable events?
Are the six IMCA-identifiedleading performance indicatorsreally
proactive?
and are they practical tomeasure?
Do they provide a commonmeasurement, regardless of sizeof
operation?
Feedback from Table Discussions to Workshop
10:55-11:15 COFFEE
11:15-11:45 Case Study: Offshore Accidents and Lessons
LearnedMat Schreurs, Heerema Marine Contractors
11:45-12:55 Learning from IncidentsCommunications involved in
Safety Getting the Message Right Diving incidents Gary Hurst,
Technip-Coflexip Case study Mike Dobeson, European Marine
Contractors Learning from the fishing industry Stephen Bruce,
Technip-CoflexipGENERAL DISCUSSION
What can be learnt from these incidents? Are there any common
themes? How can this be used to make offshore work sites safer?
12:55-13:10 Seminar Close-out General DiscussionChris van Beek,
Mike OMeara Views on seminar format, content Format for future
events Suggestions for IMCA initiatives
13:10 CLOSE, followed by LUNCH
14:00 TOUR OF OLD TRAFFORD STADIUMincluding the Manchester
United Museum and Trophy Room
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WORKING SAFER OFFSHORE Overview
IMCA Safety, Environment & Legislation Core Committee Page
5
SEMINAR OVERVIEWPhilip Wiggs, IMCA Technical Co-ordinator
A total of 86 delegates attended at the Stretford Suite in the
stadium overlooking the ManchesterUnited pitch, to hear a
particularly impressive set of talks and take part in some lively
discussions as tohow culture, behaviour and legislation affects
safety, how management should be aware of theinfluences and utilise
that knowledge to improve safety management.
Day One
Chris van Beek of Heerema Marine Contractors and Chairman of
IMCAs Safety,Environment & Legislation (SEL) Core Committee
opened the session, introducing SjaakPappe of ITIM, a culture and
management consultancy. This was very well receivedinteractive
explanation of how differing cultures react in sometimes
surprisingly different waysto safety matters. It gave an insight
into ones own thinking and conditioning and the ways inwhich
understanding of a nationalitys culture is essential in assessing
how to effectively managesafety of personnel from all parts of the
globe.
After lunch, Mark Guest, Halliburton HSE Director, KBR (Onshore)
started the afternoonsession with an American perspective. This
demonstrated his heartfelt commitment to safety.He emphasised the
need for two-way communication between workforce and managementand
for a total emphasis on teaching safe behaviour, so that employees
want to work safely.Effective leadership was paramount and the
importance of carefully observing work behaviourwas underlined. The
information obtained from those observations needed to be
properlyanalysed. This was one way that employees could begin to
understand why people operated ina certain manner and only by
understanding that could employers use strategies to
affectbehaviour and lead people to work safely. Mark explained how
the aspect of family was usedto focus people on their importance to
their own family unit, so keeping them alive to thepersonal
consequences of an accident. His view was that accidents should not
be viewed asstatistics, but as individual, personal, traumatic
experiences. The need to constantlyconcentrate on the effects of
strategies was pointed out and, most of all, a need to bepassionate
about safety and demonstrate a commitment to it. That commitment
would itselfresult in support beyond expectations.
Alan Hannah of Technip-Coflexip presented a thought-provoking
overview of behaviour-based accident prevention. Despite the number
of safety initiatives in existence, he pointedout that even a
decreasing trend meant accidents were still happening, which means
people aregetting hurt. Graphs and statistics could encourage
complacency. He showed how a reducedamount of lost time incidents
could actually translate into 4 or 5 LTIs every week. His viewwas
that a zero figure was attainable and should constantly be striven
for. Safe behaviour isthe key and the hearts and minds of workforce
and management needed to be educated tothat end. He used slides to
demonstrate the horror of injury, both pictorially and by
namingpersonnel and identifying their individual injuries. He
showed that 85% of accidents areattributable to at risk behaviour
and how important it is for management to become morepro-active in
improving safety behaviour, attitudes, condition culture and
systems. By outliningthe CSO process, he showed how ORCA (Observe,
Record, Consult and Agree) is used toidentify behaviours, collate
data and, by consultation, use that data to remove the
behaviouraldanger, exploring how such a process worked in practice
and what pitfalls to watch out forwhen implementing it.
Each of the twelve tables of delegates then entered into
separate discussions on behaviouralsafety management.
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Page 6 IMCA
The three chosen questions were:
How to improve safety of an offshore crew What are the barriers
to improving safety and how can these be overcome? How does culture
influence safety?One person in each group summarised their answers
and fed that back to the floor, whichitself resulted in further
discussion. The notes made by that person were handed in and
theseare summarised later on in this document, together with a
summary of the salient points notedby Jane Bugler, which were made
on a flip chart during the feedback discussions.
Joop van de Westen of ITIM took the last session of the day,
posing the question ofwhether legislation improved safety. He gave
some positive and negative examples to illustratehis views.
He asked whether it was necessary to have a culture of
punishment for breaking safety rules,whether this distracted from
the rules fundamental purpose. Also there was danger in
anindividuals interpretation of a rule and great care needed to be
taken in presentation of a ruleor warning, particularly with
illustrative signs. He expressed the need to concentrate onleading
people to think safely as opposed to blindly following rules.
Chris van Beek summarised the day and there was some general
discussion, no doubtcontinued in the evening at the seminar
dinner.
Day Two
The following day was introduced by Mike OMeara, Halliburton HSE
Director,KBR (Offshore) and Vice-Chairman of IMCAs SEL Committee,
who introduced Ken Londonof Stolt Offshore, a member of the
committee, to talk about leading safety performanceindicators
(LPIs).
Ken London set out the key six leading indicators of safety
performance as currently proposedby the committee and provided a
discussion paper (copied later in this document).He described how
the leading indicators were determined by the IMCA workgroup,
submittedto the SEL Committee and that they were now being
presented for wider IMCA participation.
The advantages of using LPIs are set out in the paper and the
copies of the slides. He pointedout that three of the LPIs could be
readily introduced, that one might be burdensome toadministrate and
that two might need further measurement criteria definition. The
SELCommittee will review the comments from the seminar and will
then re-draft the leadingindicators document for wider IMCA review.
He requested that all IMCA members try topilot the use of LPIs in
2002.
Sal Ruffino, European Marine Contractors, then talked about the
effectiveness of safetyincentive schemes, or their lack of
effectiveness if they are not carefully conceived.He expressed the
view, which was agreed with on the floor, that despite the best of
intentions,some schemes can be counter productive and their best
elements, such as bringing aboutsafety improvement, modifying
behaviour and heightening awareness can be lost. That themewas
noticeably reinforced by comments made in the table discussions
which followed.
The table discussions were split into two sections, one half of
the room being given thefollowing questions:
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WORKING SAFER OFFSHORE Overview
IMCA Safety, Environment & Legislation Core Committee Page
7
Safety Incentives
Do safety awards and other incentives work? Perverse incentives
how can these be avoided? How should they be set up?The other half
were asked:
Will measuring leading indicators reduce the number of
undesirable events? Are the six IMCA- identified leading
performance indicators really proactive? Are they practical to
measure? Do they provide a common measurement, regardless of size
of operation?The same procedure was followed as in the day before
and the summary of the collated notesis provided later in this
document.
The remainder of the second day was devoted to the topic of
offshore incidents and lessonslearned from them, with discussion on
the ways in which lessons can be learned whenincidents do occur.
IMCA gratefully acknowledges the major contribution of the
presentersboth to the seminar itself, provoking fascinating and
very constructive debate, and into thewider work programme of
IMCA's Safety, Environment & Legislation Core Committee.
Wewould point out that presenters did not necessarily talk about
incidents in their owncompanies and thank all contributors to this
session.
Mat Schreurs of Heerema Marine Contractors talked of how lessons
could be learned fromoffshore accidents and demonstrated this from
a case study of an incident.
There was then a group of three presentations in which aspects
of learning from incidents andthe importance of communication of
safety messages was highlighted.
The first was from Gary Hurst of Technip-Coflexip, who used
video footage of actualincidents, kindly provided by IMCA members,
to dramatically bring home the importance ofattention to detail and
of following sound safety practice, especially when carrying out
routinejobs. In one situation an incident had occurred and valuable
lessons learned. In another, adangerous incident had been prevented
from occurring and a relatively simple task preventedit from
happening in future.
Mike Dobeson of European Marine Contractors illustrated an
incident, which did not causeany injury or damage, but which had
the potential to do so. He showed how the in-houseenquiry
identified the importance of procedure and how vital lessons were
learned.
Stephen Bruce of Technip-Coflexip gave a candid account of his
background in the NorthSea fishing industry and the totally
different regime in which he used to work, which involved awholly
different approach to safety. He also used video of an actual
rescue to emphasise thedangers involved in that culture. His
telling point, at the close of his talk, was that companiesshould
be aware that they could easily be employing people brought up in
such cultures orsimilar, from many areas of the world.
There was general discussion on the floor as to what could be
learned from the incidents,whether there were any common themes and
as to how this could be used to make offshorework sites safer.
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WORKING SAFER OFFSHORE
Page 8 IMCA
Delegates attention was also drawn to the IMCA Safety Flash
system for the dissemination ofanonymised information on incidents
and the lessons learned from them (details of the systemon the
following page). Discussion told of the usefulness of these flashes
to those responsiblefor offshore safety. The importance of ongoing
use of the flashes, both in learning from close-out reports and
follow-up actions and from periodic review of older flashes to
ensure thelessons are not forgotten, was noted. It was also pointed
out that the success of the systemdepends on the wide dissemination
of safety flashes, both through the IMCA membership andonwards
through member companies internal distribution systems.
Chris van Beek and Mike OMeara then brought the seminar to a
close with general discussion.It was agreed that the talks and
video presentations were very well received and that they
hadinspired a great deal of thought and discussion. There was a
striking commonality inconclusions of speakers who had viewed the
subject from a range of perspectives.The feedback from the floor
was lively and constructive and would be carefully
studied,especially in relation to the work being done on leading
safety performance indicators.
Summary The Way Forward
The close out discussion showed that there was a strongly felt
need to take safety initiativesforward, to look at the ordinary
routine issues as well as the extraordinary. Many would nowconsider
culture issues differently as a result of the discussions. Some
might think more aboutmanaging change; encouraging better
communication between managers and workforce; therewas still a need
for training and familiarisation and contingency plans for when
things go wrong.It was thought that companies should actively
demonstrate support for those who query safetyissues no matter when
or from what level. Safety flashes and company safety notices
shouldbe followed up and not discarded as irrelevant purely because
they might be old.Perhaps attention could be drawn to old notices
in company newsletters, so as to try and helpprevent history
repeating itself. There should be more sharing of information and a
willingnessto disseminate and learn from incidents. The pressure to
increase the interval between safetyand survival training courses
should be resisted. The question of the ageing work force shouldbe
addressed and more people brought into the industry. It was also
hoped that any futuresession would involve more personnel from the
offshore workforce.
These and a back-deck load of other thoughts were in mind at the
end of the session.The forest of hands on the floor showed
agreement that the event had been very worthwhileand that a repeat
follow up event should be arranged for next year.
After lunch, there was a well attended and much appreciated tour
of the Old Trafford Stadium.
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IMCA Safety, Environment & Legislation Core Committee Page
9
IMCA SAFETY FLASH SYSTEM1. IMCA member reports
incident/dangerous occurrence to IMCA Secretariat
Report can be in any format, e.g. in-house company report,
internal accident/ incidentreport, separate notification to
IMCA.
2. IMCA Secretariat anonymises/sanitises report, as appropriate,
to eliminatecompany name, location, date, etc. and produces draft
safety flash
3. IMCA sends draft safety flash to IMCA contact reporting the
informationfor approval
4. Once approval given to draft text, IMCA issues safety flash
to IMCAmembers
5. Safety flash circulated to all named IMCA contacts for:
Safety, Environment & Legislation Training, Certification
& Personnel Competence Diving Division
Safety, Medical, Technical & Training Committee Marine
Division Offshore Survey Division Remote Systems & ROV Division
Additional safety flash distribution listby e-mail and/or hard
copy, depending on persons noted preference.
For further information on the IMCA Safety Flash system, or to
contribute a report, pleasecontact Jane Bugler, Technical Director
[email protected] or using the contactdetails on the cover
page of these proceedings.
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Page 10 IMCA
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WORKING SAFER OFFSHORE Welcome and Introduction
IMCA Safety, Environment & Legislation Core Committee Page
11
WELCOME AND INTRODUCTIONChris van Beek, Heerema Marine
Contractors
Chairman, IMCA Safety, Environment & Legislation Core
Committee
Jan 2002 IMCA SEL seminar 2002 www.imca-int.com IMCA
WELCOME
IMCAInternational Marine Contractors Association
Working Safer Offshore
A seminar for onshore and offshore management responsible for
safety
Jan 2002 IMCA SEL seminar 2002 www.imca-int.com IMCA
IMCAInternational Marine Contractors Association
200 marine contractors/suppliers as member articles in the
constitution: To seek to improve the technical and safety aspects
and
hence the efficiency of the international offshore, marineand
underwater contracting industries by all reasonablemeans.
To promote improvements in quality, health, safety,environmental
and technical standards through thepublication of guidance notes,
codes of practice and othermedia in order to promote responsible
self-regulation.
Jan 2002 IMCA SEL seminar 2002 www.imca-int.com IMCA
IMCA Safety Statistics
00 . 5
11 . 5
22 . 5
33 . 5
44 . 5
5
1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0
L T A F R
1997 1998 1999 2000
LTAs 236 257 196 227
Million hrsworked
47.6 52.9 52.8 65.6
LTAFR 4.96 4.86 3.72 3.46
Jan 2002 IMCA SEL seminar 2002 www.imca-int.com IMCA
IMCA actions
Safety flashes Lessons Learned exchanges Guidelines
Seminars/Workshops Information Platform
Jan 2002 IMCA SEL seminar 2002 www.imca-int.com IMCA
Behavioural age
Accidentrates
time
Engineering &HardwareImprovements
Safety ManagementSystems & Procedures
Safety Behaviours
1998
/2002
measuring
Jan 2002 IMCA SEL seminar 2002 www.imca-int.com IMCA
Indicators developments
UnderlyingsustainabilityIndicators
UnderlyingenvironmentalIndicators
UnderlyingsafetyIndicators
Sustainabilityperformanceindicator
Environmentalperformanceindicator
Safetyperformanceindicators
lagging
leading
measuring
Jan 2002 IMCA SEL seminar 2002 www.imca-int.com IMCA
Seminar Objectives to update members/participants on latest
developments on SHE matters to involve offshore managers
responsible
for SHE to exchange best practices among members/
participants to provide an opportunity for informal
discussions on HSE in practice to provide input for IMCA
developments
Jan 2002 IMCA SEL seminar 2002 www.imca-int.com IMCA
Seminar subjects Intercultural expert explaining SHE do's
and
don'ts in different countries Behavioural aspects
Leading/lacking performance indicators Best Practice presentation
offshore contractors Case study serious accident Buffet and
cocktail evening to encourage informal
discussion Discussions to exchange ideas, experience and to
provide input for IMCA developments
Have a very interesting seminar Working Safer Offshore!
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WORKING SAFER OFFSHORE Presentations
IMCA Safety, Environment & Legislation Core Committee Page
13
SAFETY CULTURE:How it differs world-wide,
How to manage the differencesSjaak Pappe, ITIM
American ?
What would the captain of an oiltanker say if his ship had to
beabandoned, if he was...
German ?
Greek ?
French ?
British?
Dutch?
Its a Challenge !!!
Its forbidden to jump
Its the right procedure
If we dont jump well lose face
Its a matter of honour
Its the sporting thing to do
Lets sit down and talk about it
Italian ?
HOW THEY DO IT IS EMBEDDED IN THEIR
TRADITION AND CULTURE
WHAT MANAGERS DO IS THE SAMETHE WORLD OVER
PETER DRUCKER
Going global has its barriers
Management challenges US and European senior executives say they
face when managing across different countries
Changing individual behaviour 69 %
Cultural differences 65 %Business practice differences 52
%Headquarters too remote 44 %Labor law differences 41 %Accounting
and tax differences 36 %
Source: PricewaterhouseCoopers
In the narrow sense: Civilisation( Art, Science, Education)
In the broad anthropological sense: Collective programming of
the human mind
2 MEANINGS OF CULTURE
Individual
Collectiveby group
Common to all mankind
Inheritedlearned
Learned
Inherited
Culture
Group: E.G. nation, profession, organisation, family
HUMAN MIND PROGRAMMED BY HEREDITY AND EXPERIENCE ON 3 LEVELS
When you re a kid, you don t have much variety of experience
You live with your parents and that s all you know. You grow up
thinking whatever they do isnormal
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There followed an experiment, where half of the delegates were
shown Picture A, then theother half were shown Picture B.
Picture A Picture B
The whole group of delegates was then shown Picture C and asked
to say what they saw.
What did you see!
Picture C
Delegates who had seen Picture A generally said they could see a
face, whereas those who hadseen Picture B mostly saw a mouse. The
trick was then revealed:
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WORKING SAFER OFFSHORE Presentations
IMCA Safety, Environment & Legislation Core Committee Page
15
PRACTICES
Symbols
Heroes
Rituals
Values
Culture
ValuesBroad preferences for one state of affairs over others to
which strong emotions are attached
VALUESThe culture of a group is manifested, among other things,
in the distributionof values within the group.
What is similar to our own culture is normal and good
What is different from our own culture is abnormal and bad
CULTURAL BIAS
THE EXPLANATION TO BE FOUND IN CHILDHOOD
Culture affects:
Our way of thinking Our perceptions Our way of acting and
organizing The way we relate to each other
CULTURE IS LEARNED, NOT INHERITEDCULTURE IS VERY STABLE
General
Relative
STATEMENTS ABOUT CULTURE
Value differences between countries canbe explained by four
categories ofnational culture
Managing hierarchy
Managing relationships
Managing oneself
Managing uncertainty
National culture
All animals are equal, but some
are more equal than others
George Orwell
MANAGING AUTHORITY
High Hierarchy Cultures
Dependent Hierarchy is existential Privileges Superiors
inaccessible
Low Hierarchy Cultures
Independent Hierarchy for convenience Equal rights Superiors
accessible
MANAGING AUTHORITY
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Delegates were then tested on their perception of the differing
cultures of various countries:
BELGIUM GB PORTUGAL NL INDIA
Which country culture scores highest on
HIERARCHY ?
Which country culture scores highest on
HIERARCHY ?
65 35 63 38 77
BELGIUM GB PORTUGAL NL INDIA
Anglo Saxons often complain that when they make a request from
HQ to colleagues at the same hierarchical level in France, Spain or
Italy, they get a positive response, but then nothing happens.
The request has not been understood because ofthe language
barrier
The request has been understood but, due to the language
barrier, they have difficulty in telling their British counterparts
that it can t be done
It s impossible to do what has been asked, but they cannot bring
themselves to say so because that would involve a loss of face
It s a sign of a lack of motivation
They actually have less authority than the Anglo Saxons thought
they had
Implications -Managing authority
Attitudes towards bosses / sub-ordinates
The boss is always right
Recognition of status, position
Decision making
Decentralised, matrix Centralised, line
PDI-
PDI+
MANAGING RELATIONSHIPS
What would you do if one of yourcolleagues asked you for a
financialcontribution to buy a coffin for hisuncles funeral?
Separation between private andworking life
I societies
the Self individual opinions communication explicit loss of
self-respect task important
We societies
the Group: We opinion of the group communication implicit loss
of face relationship important
MANAGING RELATIONSHIPS
Which country culture is the most WE oriented?
GERMANY THAILAND NL ITALY SPAIN
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WORKING SAFER OFFSHORE Presentations
IMCA Safety, Environment & Legislation Core Committee Page
17
Which country culture is the most WE oriented?
67 20 80 76 51
GERMANY THAILAND NL ITALY SPAIN
According to a Chinese saying, Westerners are naive. They
believe what people say.
The Chinese never say what they think.
In individualistic cultures people are indeed credulous.
The Chinese tend not to say how things really are, butrather
what they think others wants to hear.
In China a written statement has more power than an oral
agreement. So dont accept an oral agreement unless it isbacked up
in writing.
In individualistic countries people pay more attention to what
is said than to how it is said or to body language.
Implications -Managing Relationships
Importance of developing relationship before doing business
Communication styles: direct versus indirect
Selling yourself or your product
MANAGING ONESELF
Safety Employee of the Month:
reward or punishment?
Trying to be betterthan others is neithersocially nor
materiallyrewarded
There are rewards inthe form of wealth orstatus for
thesuccessful achiever
Safety Employee of the Month ! Safety Employee of the Month
!
Tough societies
Clear safety objectives and targets Status Confrontation,
competition Admiration for achievers
Tender societies
Moving safety objectives and targets Levelling: safety rules are
for all Consensus Empathy for the unfortunate
MANAGING ONESELF
Which country culture is the most TOUGH?
ITALY NL GB FRANCE NORWAY
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Which country culture is the most TOUGH?
70 14 66 43 8
ITALY NL GB FRANCE NORWAY
Swedes ask more often for clarification than Americans while
working together. Why?
In many fields Americans are most advanced. Therefore they know
more and have a lower need to ask questions
Swedes have more difficulty in understanding what is meant due
to the language barrier
Americans have a stronger drive to make it in life than Swedes.
Therefore Americans tend to show their ignorance
less
Swedes are more inquisitive than Americans. It only doesnt show
up front as they are so serious at the same time, unless they get
drunk, of course
Americans are doers, whereas Swedes love to discuss issues just
for the sake of the discussion
Implications - Managing oneself
Competitive - solidarity
Marketing - motivation
Confrontations, decisiveness
Walk the talk - recognising success
Proposal
Decision
Succesfulimplementation
MAS- MAS+
Consensus
Decisive
MANAGING UNCERTAINTY
In Germany everything is forbidden unless it is allowed
In the UK everything is allowed unless it is forbidden
In France everything is allowed even if it is forbidden
High Uncertainty
Need for structure and rules Security Showing emotions
Stressful
Low Uncertainty
Low need for structure and rules Risk taking Emotions not shown
Relaxed
UNCERTAINTY AVOIDANCEManaging uncertainty
Which country culture scores highest on
UNCERTAINTY AVOIDANCE ?
GREECE GB AUSTRIA NL SINGA PORE
Which country culture scores highest on
UNCERTAINTY AVOIDANCE ?
112 35 70 53 8
GREECE GB AUSTRIA NL SINGA PORE
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IMCA Safety, Environment & Legislation Core Committee Page
19
Implications -Managing Uncertainty
Different planning approaches
Importance of expertise
Language and communication
Risk acceptance / ownership
RELATIVE POSITION OF SOMECOUNTRIES IN THE 4 CATEGORIES
FRA
GBR
POR
AUT
DEN
Hierarchy I or we Tough / tender UncertaintyMalaysia USA Japan
Greece
Austria Guatemala Sweden Singapore
Ethnocentric judgement
Culture shock
Ineffectiveness of normal organisational practice
Technology transfer often not culturally neutral
PROBLEMS OF ENCOUNTERSACROSS CULTURES
Manager 's role varies across culturesSource : Andr Laurent
20 30 40 50 6010 70 80 % Percentage in agreement
Great Britain
SwedenNetherlandsUSADenmark
SwitzerlandBelgiumGermanyFranceItalyIndonesiaJapan
1718
2327
384446
5366
7378
1718
2327
384446
5366
7378
It is important for a managerto have at hand precise answers
tomost of the questions that hissubordinates may raise about their
work
10
MENTAL IMAGES
Contest Network Family Pyramid Solar system Machine
C o m p e titio n C o n s e n s u s L o ya lty a n dh ie ra rc h
y
L o ya lty ,h ie ra rc h y
a n d im p lic ito rd e r
H ie ra rc h y a n dim p ers o n al
b u re a u cra cy
O rd er
-P D I+ ID V-U A I
+ M A S
-P D I+ ID V
-U A I/ U A I-M A S
+ P D I-ID V-U A I
+ P D I-ID V+ U A I
+ P D I+ ID V+ U A I
-P D I ID V /+ ID V
+ U A I
CENTRAL CONCEPT
- Protection against liability- Know the rules- Show that you
put effort in instructing people about rules- Yet, results more
important than following rules correctly
CONTEST implications for safety rules
-Useful as general guidelines
-Subject to change due to consensus
-Make convenants (informal contracts)
-Be flexible in enforcing rules (Dutch crossing - unimportant
rules are for convenience only)
NETWORK implications for safety rules
-In-group rules important-Made/changed by power holder-Inform
people about rules, as they are probably not written down,
certainly not behavioural rules-Be strict in enforcing rules
FAMILY implications for safety rules
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WORKING SAFER OFFSHORE
Page 20 IMCA
-In-group rules and rulesset by system / boss
areimportant-Strong need to know why,how tasks should
beimplemented-Made/changed by powerholder-Inform people aboutrules,
as they are probably notwritten down, certainly notbehavioural
rules-Be strict in enforcing rules
PYRAMID implications for safety rules
- Rules important, yet people try to beat the system
- Need for conceptualisation
- Be strict in enforcing those rules which are crucial
SOLAR SYSTEM implications for safety rules
- Rules make the system work
- Rules made by experts
- Stick to the rules
- Make rules objective by putting them on paper
MACHINE and safety rules The cultural tool kit
Understanding the golden rule: The more things become emotional,
the more culture plays a role
Understand the rationale of another person inanother culture:It
will help you understand them better
I T I MP.O.Box 97
1190 AB Ouderkerk a/d AmstelThe Netherlands
Tel: +31-70-302 30 30Fax: +31-70-346 37 75E-mail:
[email protected]://www.itim.org
Culture and Management Consultants
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WORKING SAFER OFFSHORE Presentations
IMCA Safety, Environment & Legislation Core Committee Page
21
BEHAVIOURAL SAFETY:An American Perspective
Mark Guest, Halliburton HSE Director, KBR (Onshore)
Shaping Accident Free Environments
Why Behavioral Based Safety?
S.A.F.E. Process Main Menu
TrainTrainEducateEducate
IncidentIncidentInjury FreeInjury Free
EnvironmentEnvironment
CommunicateCommunicateResultsResults
BehaviorBehaviorObservationObservation
Survey andSurvey andGather infoGather info
AnalyzeAnalyzeInformationInformation
LeadershipLeadership Measure for SuccessMeasure for Success
Leadership
Leadership is the art of getting someone else todo something
that you want done, because they
want to do it.
Dwight D. Eisenhower
Leadership Role
Re-Create Safety as a value.
Provide the example for others to follow.
Apply and tune the process.
Shape the working environment for possibilities.
Provide Antecedents and Consequences for safe behavior.
S.A.F.E. Process Main Menu
TrainTrainEducateEducate
IncidentIncidentInjury FreeInjury Free
EnvironmentEnvironment
CommunicateCommunicateResultsResults
BehaviorBehaviorObservationObservation
Survey andSurvey andGather infoGather info
AnalyzeAnalyzeInformationInformation
LeadershipLeadership Measure for SuccessMeasure for Success
Train / Educate
Educate leaders and employees about the principles and rationale
of BBS.
Follow up education with training. Training targets behavior
directly.
S.A.F.E. Process Main Menu
TrainTrainEducateEducate
IncidentIncidentInjury FreeInjury Free
EnvironmentEnvironment
CommunicateCommunicateResultsResults
BehaviorBehaviorObservationObservation
Survey andSurvey andGather infoGather info
AnalyzeAnalyzeInformationInformation
LeadershipLeadership Measure for SuccessMeasure for Success
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Behavior Observation
TTotal otal SSafety afety TTask ask OObservationbservation
Targets all work behaviors.
Teaches what safe behavior looks like.
Gets the workforce involved in safety.
Puts emphasis on safe behaviors.
Changes worker perception about the right thing to do.
S.A.F.E. Process Main Menu
TrainTrainEducateEducate
IncidentIncidentInjury FreeInjury Free
EnvironmentEnvironment
CommunicateCommunicateResultsResults
BehaviorBehaviorObservationObservation
Survey andSurvey andGather infoGather info
AnalyzeAnalyzeInformationInformation
LeadershipLeadership Measure for SuccessMeasure for Success
Analyze InformationOne of the most powerful tools in your
BBS
plan is to have the ability to effectively Assess,Identify and
Plan for Change within your
working environment.
Analyze Information
To affect long term change in behavior, you must understand why
people do the things they do.
The ABC model provides for this analysis and understanding.
(Activator Behavior Consequences) When employees are involved in
this process they begin to want to work safely.
S.A.F.E. Process Main Menu
TrainTrainEducateEducate
IncidentIncidentInjury FreeInjury Free
EnvironmentEnvironment
CommunicateCommunicateResultsResults
BehaviorBehaviorObservationObservation
Survey andSurvey andGather infoGather info
AnalyzeAnalyzeInformationInformation
LeadershipLeadership Measure for SuccessMeasure for Success
Communicating Results
Show me a group of safe and happyemployees and Ill show you
a
leadership body that is effectivelycommunicating with their
employees.
Communicating Results
Communication, both positive and negative, influence the degree
and frequency of safe performance.
You can never communicate enough.
Communicate by many different means.
Focus on the positives.
S.A.F.E. Process Main Menu
TrainTrainEducateEducate
IncidentIncidentInjury FreeInjury Free
EnvironmentEnvironment
CommunicateCommunicateResultsResults
BehaviorBehaviorObservationObservation
Survey andSurvey andGather infoGather info
AnalyzeAnalyzeInformationInformation
LeadershipLeadership Measure for SuccessMeasure for Success
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IMCA Safety, Environment & Legislation Core Committee Page
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Survey and Gather info
Only by identifying what parts of the safetyprocess is going
well, as well as what is not,
can you identify the proper correctiveactions to take.
Survey and Gather info
The use of employee Perception Surveys are critical to
understanding the climate and sustaining employee participation in
the safety process.
Listen Carefully.
Perceptions whether true or not represent reality and safety
behavior is a direct result of those perceptions.
S.A.F.E. Process Main Menu
TrainTrainEducateEducate
IncidentIncidentInjury FreeInjury Free
EnvironmentEnvironment
CommunicateCommunicateResultsResults
BehaviorBehaviorObservationObservation
Survey andSurvey andGather infoGather info
AnalyzeAnalyzeInformationInformation
LeadershipLeadership Measure for SuccessMeasure for Success
Process Measurement
What gets measured gets done
Process Measurement
Concentrate on actions not statistics. We can not eliminate
injuries by managing statistics better.
Include employee satisfaction, attendance, morale and other such
measurements as an important part of the safety process. Measure
how you are doing.
Target leading not lagging indicators.
What Commitment Really is
When you become clear on what you want to do and whatyoure
passionate about and commit to it, resources willline up that you
never expected.
Until one is committed, there is a hesitancy and the chanceto
draw back always making us ineffective concerning allacts of
initiative and creation.
There is one elementary truth, the ignorance of which
killscountless ideas and splendid plans: that the moment
onedefinitely commits oneself, the providence moves, too.
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25
BEHAVIOUR-BASED ACCIDENTPREVENTION PROCESS
Allan Hannah, Technip-CoflexipMember, IMCA Safety, Environment
& Legislation Core Committee
CSO - Name of the meeting
SYNOPSISSYNOPSIS
INITIATIVES..ANOTHER SAFETY PROCESS? CULTURE EVOLUTION PEOPLE
FOCUS DRIVERS FOR CHANGE BEHAVIOUR BASED SAFETY THE CSO PROCESS
BENEFITS WHAT NOT TO DO HOW YOU CAN HELP QUESTIONS
CSO - Name of the meeting
SAFETY INITIATIVESSAFETY INITIATIVES
ASA
T.O.F.S
SMAT
RECOGNITION& REWARDSCHEMES
COMPETENCEASSURANCE
SCHEMES
COMPETENCEASSURANCE
SCHEMES
DO WE NEED ANOTHERDO WE NEED ANOTHERPROCESS?PROCESS?
CSO - Name of the meeting
DO WE REALLY NEEDDO WE REALLY NEEDANOTHER SAFETY PROCESS?ANOTHER
SAFETY PROCESS?
I BelieveI Believe We Do, We Do,
Because. Because.
CSO - Name of the meeting
IMCA MEMBER STATISTICSIMCA MEMBER STATISTICS
012345
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000LTIFR
DECREASING TREND IS VERY ENCOURAGING A GOOD PERFORMANCE BUT SUCH
SMALL NUMBERS DISGUISE REALITY..
1996146 LTIs1997 2361998 2571999 1962000 227
Equates to 4 - 5Equates to 4 - 5LTIs LTIs every week!every
week!
85% of Accidents Attributable to At Risk Behaviour
CSO - Name of the meeting
THE 13 YEAR CSO TREND -THE 13 YEAR CSO TREND -Where is it taking
us??Where is it taking us??
LTI PERFORMANCE 13 YEAR TREND ALL CSO VESSELS
02468
101214
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
Year
toDa
te
LTI F
req
uenc
y
EQUIPMENT
SYSTEMS & PROCEDURES
WE MUST GET OFF THE PLATEAUSTEP CHANGE TO INJURY FREE
WORKSITESITS NOT A PIPE DREAM!HEARTS & MINDS & SAFE
BEHAVIOUR IS THE KEY.
PEOPLE
CSO - Name of the meeting
SAFETY ISNT ABOUT STATISTICSSAFETY ISNT ABOUT STATISTICS.ITS
ABOUT PEOPLE.ITS ABOUT PEOPLE
INCIDENTS LIKE THIS ARE PREVENTABLE.
IT HAPPENED BECAUSE OF AT RISK BEHAVIOUR..
REMEMBER THE 85%.
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WORKING SAFER OFFSHORE
Page 26 IMCA
CSO - Name of the meeting
Safety Is Not a Numbers GameSafety Is Not a Numbers Game - Its
About People.. - Its About People..
Jim Comerford Severe facial injures & broken teeth
Edvaldo Da Silva Fractured leg
Tim McEniery Severed tendon, middle finger, R hand
Terry Wilson 1 finger broken, 1 partially amputated
Jair Alves Periera Deep laceration to arm
Adimar Souza Part of thumb amputated
Marcilio Maciel Part of R middle finger amputated
Plotnikov Severe ankle sprain
Matthew Park Partial amputation L hand
Daniel Day Severe hand injury
John Wood Dislocated shoulder
Gilberto Santos Sprained ankle
John Baines Sprained wrist
John Stewart Severe hand injury
Jose Luiz Martins Arm / Hand Injury
Brian Hagan Chest injury
Doe Sprained ankle
Doe Head injury
CSO - Name of the meeting
CSO Fleet Offshore Statistics -CSO Fleet Offshore Statistics
-1999 & 20001999 & 2000
Business As Usual!
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
Jan
Feb
Mar
Apr
May
Jun Ju
lAu
gSe
p Oct
Nov
Dec
Jan
Feb
Mar
Apr
May
Jun Ju
lAu
gSe
p Oct
Nov
Dec
LTIF
/Mill
ion
Man
hour
s ActionAction
SatisfactionSatisfaction
CSO - Name of the meeting
Drivers for ChangeDrivers for Change
These results have occurred despite a sustained safety effortby
IMCA members
Members offshore family continue to be hurt in
unacceptablenumbers.
We all strive for ZEROZERO Lost Time Injuries We are not going
to achieve the target unless we change our
approach to safety
If We Do What Weve AlwaysIf We Do What Weve AlwaysDone, Well Get
What WeveDone, Well Get What Weve
Always GotAlways GotCSO - Name of the meeting
WHY BOTHER.?WHY BOTHER.?What are the ObjectivesWhat are the
Objectives
STOP PEOPLE GETTING INJURED
Behaviour is a recognised factor in accident causation
Engage all staff in the improvement effort - give the crewmore
ownership
Maintain & improve on an already good safety performance
Move to a more pro-active approach
Improve safety behaviours, attitudes, conditions, culture
&systems
CSO - Name of the meeting
Behaviour-Based Safety - What Is It?Behaviour-Based Safety -
What Is It?
Accidents involve peoples behaviour If you want to decrease
accidents, you must increase safe
behaviour & reduce at-risk behaviour
At-risk behaviours are caused or encouraged by attitudinal
&cultural factors
Since behaviour is measurable it can be managed Safe behaviour
can be managed by:
Identifying the behaviours critical to accident causation
Training people to measure them Using the results to provide early
feedback to:
y the workforce to guide their future behavioury management to
guide its decision making
CSO - Name of the meeting
THE CSOL PROCES & ORCATHE CSOL PROCES & ORCA
At-Risk BehavioursAt-Risk Behaviours
We focus on eliminating At-Risk Behaviours
Fatalities
Lost Time Injuries
First Aid Injuries
Near Miss Reports
bserve bserve
ecord ecord
onsult onsult
gree gree
OORR
CCAA
CSO - Name of the meeting
Behaviours can beSafeor
At-Risk
AnObservable
Act
AnObservable
Act
BehaviourBehaviour
CSO - Name of the meeting
Key Elements of ORCAKey Elements of ORCA
1. Identify Critical Behaviours1. Identify Critical Behaviours
2. Gather data2. Gather data
3. Provide Feedback3. Provide Feedback 4. Use Data to remove
barriers4. Use Data to remove barriers
O bserve
R ecord
C onsult
A gree
O bserve
R ecord
C onsult
A gree
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CSO - Name of the meeting
WHAT IS THE ORCA PROCESSWHAT IS THE ORCA PROCESS
Firstly, this process is about behaviourbehaviour, not names.
Observers:
approach a work group / individual and explain they intend
tospend 5-10mins observing the work
record safe and at-risk behaviour using checklists specific
toCSO incident history
discuss the results with, & get feedback from, those
observed give results to facilitator for input to database &
faxing ashore
NO NAMES ARE RECORDEDNO NAMES ARE RECORDEDEXCEPTEXCEPT THE
OBSERVERS THE OBSERVERS
CSO - Name of the meeting
Comparisons Between Near MissComparisons Between Near Miss
Reporting & ORCA Reporting & ORCA
Every Near Miss report is a surprise Not all Near Miss Reports
are welcomed as they sometimes reflect
poorly on worksite supervision Personnel the subject of a Near
Miss Report are often unaware one has
been raised - so the opportunity to influence future behaviour
is lost The quality and value of Near Miss Reports varies widely By
the time a Near Miss is submitted, its too late
Every ORCA Observation is part of a planned process We dont have
to invent near misses to meet targets ORCA is about
behaviourbehaviour, not quality of performance Observations are
made against set criteria developed from CSOs
specific incident history Observers are formally trained
Observation results are discussed with personnel at the time -
the
opportunity is there to positivelypositively influence
futurefuture behaviour
CSO - Name of the meeting
Two Key BenefitsTwo Key Benefits
Since you are measuring behaviour you do not have to waitfor an
incident to occur first.
y Identification of at-risk behaviour becomes an
early-warning[predictive] system for accidents
Involving the workforce in developing a list of
behaviourscritical to safety
y It is specific to their work environmenty Is a strong
enrolling factor in site safety awareness and
developing a personal commitment to improving site safety
CSO - Name of the meeting
How This Important InitiativeHow This Important InitiativeCan Be
DestroyedCan Be Destroyed
Undermining it through ignoranceI dont know what its about but
it sounds rubbish to me
Using the results to beat people around the headI want a 10%
increase in % safe behaviour by next week - or else
Using the results as a contest between sitesYoure at the bottom
of the league, whats wrong with you!
Allowing your Clients to hijack the resultsThat 40% score is
unacceptable, we / you must do something!
CSO - Name of the meeting
How You Can HelpHow You Can Help
Understand it Ask questions, particularly of the trained ORCA
Observers
Support it Provide positive support and commitment - &
especiallyespecially
encourage Observations to be undertaken regularly
Dont make it a contest The results willwill differ between sites
- accept it, and use them
carefully
Identification of at-risk behaviour represents an opportunityfor
improvement Not a mandate to discipline people..
Dont expect overnight results Changing behaviour, then attitude,
then culture, takes time
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29
DOES LEGISLATION ALWAYSHELP IMPROVE SAFETY?
Positive and Negative ExamplesJoop van de Westen, ITIM
The title of this presentation speaks for it self. Do rules make
our life safer? Life in general and in ourcase specific referring
to the working environment.
Does legislation and rules help improve safety? I say: NO. And
this is not true or, at least, notcompletely true. In this
presentation I will share with you my thoughts about this subject.
I hope toshow to you what I do mean when I say no, rules do not
make our life safer.
With you, I would like to put the subject in perspective. And
therefore I made this presentationconsisting of the following
items. I would like to tell you something about:
1. Rules, regulations and penalties.2. What do rules do?3. Some
attitudes and rules. 4. Do rules make our lives safe?5. Rules and
human behaviour6. Conclusion: does legislation help improve
safety?7. Lets do things different
RULES, REGULATIONS AND PENALTIES
What are rules and regulations?
Rules and regulations are commands. They dictate our behaviour
and as, icing on the cake, thesecommands have repercussions. We
have to follow that what is written. And very often, if we do
notfollow what is written, we expose ourselves to a penalty.
Society is going to punish us if we dont followthe rules, but only
when it is noticed - only if someone else saw us breaking the rule.
And do the rulesachieve what they are meant for? Do we all happily
obey them, or is it the penalties that do the work?Let us find
out.
Please follow me to a street corner. We want to cross the street
to the shops on the other side, butthe pedestrian sign is red. Do
we walk? No. I suggest we'd better wait. Why do I wait?
Becausecrossing a red light can be dangerous and certainly there is
a repercussion if I do it. I am violating thelaw and I have no
intention to do so. Why not? Not only because it might be
dangerous. There is afair possibility that my act will be noticed
by someone representing the makers of that law and if theydo, I
might have a fair chance of punishment. So I wait and hopefully you
with me.
I like to go faster. I am late and my boss is waiting, or I am
going to miss an appointment. I carefullylook around. That black
car with the fat driver - is he a policemen? No, I dont think so.
Do I see anypatrol car? No cameras? Lets go! But hulas, the fat
driver was a policeman and the black car anundercover police car.
We will be punished with a fine. It is tough, it cost us our
money.
Lets go offshore and observe a particular offshore worker on a
remote area of the unit. The sun isshining and the work is waiting
to be done. We can hear the offshore worker mumble:
I want to finish this job but all these safety precautions do
hinder me Pff. It is rather hot, lets takeoff the hard hat. Safety
goggles, why should I? No one to see, so no problem at all. It is
safe. Lifejacket? I can barely move as it is. These fire retardant
coveralls are to thick.
Management should listen to what we have to say. Ladies and
gentlemen, you should listen to him:Damn, my supervisor is coming.
Where are me glasses, quick, my hard hat.
Why all of a sudden so safety conscious? The answer is obvious.
The supervisor represents theinstitute that wrote the rules and
attached to the rules are penalties. And the offshore worker
knowsthe penalties. It gives the supervisor some sort of control
over his subordinate, but not over hisintention to behave safe.
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Page 30 IMCA
The penalties at work are of a different nature than the fines
we may expect to get after speeding.If one breaks the rules at
work, he or she may expect a more serious effect. The philosophy to
putpenalties with rules is obvious, it creates fear. The rules say
"If you do not obey, I am going to hurtyou".
Through the penalties the designers of rules try to influence
human behaviour, but not very successfully.
I would like to show this to you by the results of a survey done
by my colleague, Sjaak Pappe, andmyself. The title of this survey
is 'A rule per Accident'. The question we would like to see an
answerfor was simple. Is there, with the increasing number of
rules, a decrease of incidents and accidents?We were anxious to
find out if this was true and, if so, if there was any correlation
between the two.
The reason why we chose this subject had anything to do with the
remark made by people who directlyhave to deal with rules - the, if
I may say so, blue collar workers. This is what they said:
It is not surprisingly that accidents happen if you consider the
number of rules we have to deal with;We did not know whether this
was a fact.
But enough people were making this kind of remarks and it
triggered us. We started the job and, afterquite a while, we were
able to present a survey of 124 pages about this subject. Some time
has gonesince the survey and we learned a great deal since than. We
learned about the connection betweenrules and people. We now think
we have the answer to all questions. Whether we are right or
not,the future will tell us. I would like to use findings and facts
of our survey to support certain elements ofthis presentation and I
will not stop at the conclusions we drew at that time. Things have
evolved andI would like to share a number of them with you.
But first lets see go back to the original subject. Rules. We
have seen that penalties work. What aboutthe work site? Do they
work there? One of the outcomes of our survey on the question 'Do
workersfollow the rules - yes or no?' was that 14% of the
participants stated they break the rules if they can dothis
unnoticed. 42% did not give a clear answer. The question is what
can you make of this?
Another outcome of our survey showed us that employees believe
rules are made by management formanagement, i.e. to protect
managers against law suits. You may find the same conclusion in
othersurveys as well. The answer stands for the opinion of workers
that rules are written without them.They are excluded, not heard,
and some of these men are much aware that they could contribute to
thecontent of rules. Valerie Sutherland believes that excluding
people will make them apathetic and,according to her, this can be
seen as a main driver for accidents. It has to do with human
behaviourand I will come back on this later on.
As a contradiction I would like to mention another outcome of
our survey: 66% of the workers areconvinced rules will prevent
accidents.
What are rules anyway?
Safety rules, according to Mr Sticht, can be classified as
functional lines. Most texts of rules are of thetype 'ready to do'.
Reading and memorising is not the intention. It should be seen as
an aid to help fulfila certain specific task. With instructions,
manuals and procedures, they form regulations. If we makethem
official, then we call these Law.
What do rules do?
Rules are written with the intention to prevent us from
accidents. So, we can be satisfied. There are somany rules now that
life is completely safe. Wrong. According to Mr Schot and Mr
Stallen, safety rulesare indeed written to prevent accidents. But
the language used is so difficult that they drive to
accidentsinstead to prevent these. People have problems
understanding them. Brune and Weinstein read thestatements of Schot
and Stallen and thought 'This cant be true. Lets prove they are
wrong;. So theyinvestigated, for some time, reports about incidents
in nuclear plants. They looked at about 800incidents and found out
that over 300 were caused by regulations. They then categorised the
type oferrors which, to them, triggered the incidents. They came up
with six categories. These are: the use ofincomplete procedures;
disregarding procedures; use of inaccurate procedures; poor
communication byimplementation of rules; use of wrong procedures
and wrong interpretation of rules.
Lets draw a careful conclusion: based on what we said we may
assume that more rules will lead to moreaccidents. At the same time
it shows how complex rules can be.
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IMCA Safety, Environment & Legislation Core Committee Page
31
Feeling safe is meaningless
Companies make their employees wear helmets. It is a safety
precaution and protects the worker.People feel safer with a hard
hat on, but is it truly safe? This is one of the side effects of
rules on people.The rule states what and how they have to act and,
if they follow the rules, it is safe. But one can makemistakes
here. I remember the person who went offshore to work on a rig. His
supervisor told him todo a certain job on a small platform.
"Remember", the supervisor said, "remember to take the
safetyprecautions. You know how strict we are about that". "Yes
sir", the employee responded, "I knowwhat I have to do" and,
indeed, the guy did put on a safety harness and attached a safety
line. Then hestarted to climb the steep ladder leading to the
little platform. It took him quite a while to get up toreach the
platform. It took him only seconds to get back on the main deck.
What happened? Once onthe small and narrow platform, he stumbled
over some rubbish left by somebody else (good housekeeping). There
was no railing to protect him from falling and he tumbled over and
landed on the maindeck, in spite of his safety line.
People ran towards the loudly crying victim, including his
supervisor, very concerned. How could thishappen? Did the line
brake? Then they found out the very simple answer. The height of
the platformwas about 5 meters. The victim did take a safety line
from the storage not noticing he took a line of10 meters length.
Later, when he was asked why he took that line, his answer was
simple. The safetyrule states that anyone working at height should
wear a safety line attached to a safety belt. He couldnot remember
any rule indicating to check the length of the line before
attaching it. He did not knowwhat line he was putting on.
You will say This is stupid and yes, you are right, it certainly
is stupid to put on a safety line withoutchecking it, but, on the
other hand, it shows us the trust someone can put in the rules.
These ruleswere his safety line.
These things happen more than we like. People sometimes blindly
follow the rules trusting their safetyis in good hands.
I would like to discuss attitudes and rules with you, therefore
I would like to use some examples ofhow people look at rules. It
seems they believe rules make things safer. Then, I always ask
myself, whatis the effect of rules? Then back to some results of
our survey, particularly that part where individualsgive their
opinion whether rules makes their life more safe.
I would like to look with you at the phenomenon of the written
word and the human behaviour, thelaw and men, regulation and
obedience. What are rules doing with people??? You may find some
ofthe statements on the screen intriguing, true or not, open for
debate.
Rules and Unsafe Acts and the Opinion of Individuals
Some time ago in a safety meeting we suddenly spoke about rules
and unsafe acts. The manager whowas leading the meeting did put the
following argument on the table. He said "One should stick to
therules at all times". This manager is a safety person. I asked
him what he meant. He said: If you're onthe road and speeding, then
this is dangerous. I countered his statement with a question -
howdangerous is speeding? "Well," he said, "if the limit is 120k
and you drive faster, then this is a dangerousact". At that moment
I started to believe that he really believed in what he said. He
was convinced ofthe fact that law dictates a safe speed limit here.
His statement made me think about people and rules.Was he aware why
the speed limit was made in the first place? For what purpose?
Now we have two things to consider here. People who believe the
best thing to do is follow the rule; and Are rules always right and
is it safe to follow them just like that?Rules can be dangerous
We continued the discussion about speed, speed limits and
dangerous acts. I found it amazing thatgrown people apparently do
put so much faith in the law. They, at least, gave the impression
that folksnot sticking to the rules endanger themselves and their
fellow men.
This I find a scary thing. In black and white these men said "As
long as you keep to the speed limit youare conducting in a safe
way". One of the men did its best to convince me that driving
faster than 120kis a dangerous act. The government did the right
thing to put a speed limit in place.
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People can make rules dangerous.
This is not true. Rules in themselves are not dangerous. It is
us interpreting rules and bending them ina way that we think this
is what they mean. I would not be surprised if that person believes
driving intown at the official speed of 50k is also a very safe act
no matter the circumstances.
I was also very surprised to hear people did not know the true
reason for implementing the speed limitof 120k on the Dutch
Highways. For sure it had nothing to do with safety. It was only
installed at atime when the petrol was scarce, reason for the
Premier at the time, Mr den Uyl, to limit speed to100k. His words
were "This is just for a short while. Once we have enough fuel
again, we will undo thespeed limits". Maybe he meant what he said.
Fact is, it never happened. As a compromise we areallowed to drive
120k, but thats it. Let me make myself clear. I am not a fan of
fast driving. I dobelieve that driving in itself is a risk. A speed
of 20k can be dangerous in particular situations. Modernvehicles
are constructed in such a way that, technically speaking, we can
drive them safely at high speed.
What I find scary is the remarks I listened to of young male
drivers. They were discussing the make oftheir cars and how fast
they could go. Safety and risk were not part of the debate. Asked
"Why not?",they reacted very surprised. "The design of cars today
is such that even if you meet an accident, nothingwill happen to
you, so why worry?" Well, I do.
Maybe you will say "People can think and will know how to handle
situations". Maybe true, but believeyou me that some people have
peculiar ways of interpreting rules, regulations, signs and what
have you.To illustrate, I would like to bring you back to the
sixties. I remember in The Hague, Netherlands, theintroduction of a
new traffic sign. The intention of the design was to make drivers
aware to keepdistance. The sign showed two cars and a hand in
between with the words 'Keep Distance'. In ameeting we discussed
the intense traffic in the city and the dangerous behaviour of some
drivers. Thanone of the persons in the meeting said that it was not
only people to account for the danger. Also thegovernment is to
blame, as he said. "Look at the new traffic sign demanding one
should keep distancebetween cars, but only one hand distance". This
person was very serious about this.
With these examples I would like to show to you the peculiar
effects rules can have on people.The safety manager and the
gentlemen from the traffic meeting. The safety manager convinced
aboutthe fact that rules are true guidelines in life. As long as
you obey the rules, nothing will happen to you.I hope he is the
only one, but I am sure I am mistaken. In spite of the many rules,
incidents continue tohappen.
Do rules make our lives safe?
I once worked for an American oil drilling company. We had
several jack-ups on the North Sea andabout 240 employees working in
shifts. The company was well organised and we had a dedicated
safetydepartment in place. The officers of the safety department
did visit the sites on a regular base, talking tothe employees.
allowing them to bring forward practical solutions. One day they
were informed about adangerous situation. On a particular deck on
the rigs it was not safe to be there. The railing was notsuitable
enough to prevent people from falling overboard. This was brought
up in our manager'smeeting and the safety department emphasised the
necessity of putting new railing on all of theinstallations. We
considered ourselves as very safety conscious. Very much to our
surprise, the generalmanager declined the proposal. He was put
under pressure to motivate his decision and this is what hesaid. We
are convinced that the present situation might be dangerous. I am
convinced," he said, "thatwe indeed should replace these parts of
the installation. But, so far, no accidents occurred and as longas
there is no Mining Regulation in place dictating us to have such
railing, I am not willing to spend anymoney on it." I knew this
manager very well and his integrity was beyond suspicion. After the
meeting,I asked him for his reasons and, irritated, he shook his
head. Joop, he said, as long as there is no law tomake us put up
these railings, it means that in fact there is no dangerous
situation. For him the matterwas closed.
People who are continuously confronted with many (written) rules
get used to the situation that forthem there is no need to think.
Why should they? Big brother took over thinking and to safeguard
allpeople, including workers, therefore, he made rules and
regulations. "You should do this" or "Youshouldn't do this". I am
certain you all have plenty of examples to illustrate my statement.
It makespeople more or less docile and certainly rules aim to
achieve control over human behaviour, controland to give direction.
But often it is the thought of a penalty one may receive when
breaking the rulethat stops people from making a decision based on
their own ideas. An example for this is the situationat night time
in a city. No one except one car, waiting for the red stop sign. No
one else to see.
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The driver does not cross the sign. He/she feels that it is not
right to cross the red stop sign. It is notdone and it is safe to
wait until the sign turns into green. Not done and the idea of
safety are twoimportant things.
We are so used to repercussions if we do something that is not
allowed. If we are speeding, we willcheck if there is no policemen
in the neighbourhood.
Several workers on a drilling rig said "If my supervisor is out
of sight, I will neglect the rules". Askingwhy, the answer was
"Since these rules are useless and only made to protect my boss2. A
study ofDr Jop Groeneweg proved that many rules are written with
the intention to free a company fromindemnification, not to make
life of its employees safer. Mr Etzioni said "Maximise moral
dialogue,minimise legislation".
Rules and human behaviour
According to Mr Nuttin, people tend to make a distinction
between the world of words and the worldof deeds. Although one
should expect the two are connected, this seems not to be the case.
There istension between what is said or declared and what behaviour
shows us. This indicates a total absenceof rationale. Important
here is the intellectual ability to solve problems. We are aware
that we will notbe able to solve all problems. It seems that we do
not use our brains very logical all the time. Thisseems to be
necessary in order to be able to make quick decisions whether they
are wise or less wise.If we consider this, than it is a quick
conclusion that rules are not contributing much to our safety.
There are lots of theories about human behaviour in relation to
rules and regulations. The majority ofthese theories support the
statement that human behaviour is irrational with a tendency not to
followthe rules. Maybe this sounds confusing and even a bit scary,
but there is hope. Although people actirrationally, according to Mr
Perrow, this is a positive and helpful aspect of behaviour.
Potential incidentsituations show many characteristics which
conflict with each other or some are hardly visible. In thesecases
rationality will not be of great help to us.
We have to realise that rules are created based upon the
assumption of absolute human rationality.Thinking of what was just
said, we may assume that rules are not sufficient to serve its
purpose.Still, those who make the rules still believe people live
up to the rules and as a result there will be lessincidents happen.
Then reality. We asked workers in the oil and gas industry if they
have a book withrules and we were happy to learn the answer. "Yes",
said 82%. "We do have a booklet with rules".So, rules help after
all. "But having such a book is nice, are you using the book
mister?" then 48% says"oh well, some times" and 27% declared to
have read the book once but dont use it. I have no ideaabout the
rest of the world, but in the Netherlands we asked people if they
are aware of the mininglegislation which is applicable offshore.
"Certainly" said 75%. We have the law books on board, whichare
accessible to all of us". Isnt it great, 75%? When we asked people
if they understand what iswritten in the mining law books, 72%
replied with "Eh? Oh well, I think it means this, but I am not
sure".Far better is the situation with company rules - rules you
make. 51% knows more or less what thoserules are, but 49% are
certain about these rules. How certain are folks if they say "I do
understand therules"? Further questioning revealed that 65% of the
workers see company rules as clear and stipulating.Another 30%
admits that they find rules multi-interpretable. A rule with
various meanings.
Making mistakes. All safety rules are violated. This is not the
same as making a mistake. A mistakehowever is many times confused
with violations. This is not correct. A mistake is experienced
bypeople when their actions do not lead to the aimed result. We may
assume that no individual has theintention to make mistakes. To
avoid mistakes, people make their own rules - very often we may
callthese safety rules - and these rules are adjusted every time a
person makes a mistake so the chance ofmistakes reduces. This
assumption proofs that individuals basically are capable to handle
their ownsituation. Basic thought: no rules needed. But let's not
be hasty.
Talking about violations, we refer to a total different scale of
actions than mistakes. To simplify ourlives, if there are no rules,
there will be no violations. There will be mistakes and, by
adjusting andcreating the rules, we can turn any form of undesired
behaviour into a violation. Do rules help to improve safety? I said
"No" and I am convinced about it. If you ask people in the fieldif
they feel safer with or without rules, then 73% answer "The number
of rules we have is okay, but let itstop. No more rules". Why? Are
there sufficient rules? Our group told us they ignore the
rulesintentionally and this was 64% of the group.
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"Why do you ignore rules?" "Because they hinder", said 41% and
38% said "Why should we stick tothe rules, they do not improve my
safety."
Are we ready for a conclusion?
What have we discussed so far?
We looked at rules, regulations and penalties. What are rules?
We found out that they arecommands, dictating our behaviour and if
we do not follow the rules then we may receive a punishment.We have
seen that penalties do help to make us obey rules and regulations.
This is based on fear, noton understanding, not on common
sense.
We have seen that, when the risk of being caught is small, we
are willing to break the rules. This iseasier when the working and
practicality of rules are at question. 14% of the response group of
oursurvey declared to break the rules if they could do this unseen,
thus unnoticed. 42% did not give astraight answer. This can make us
wonder. "What are they doing? Are they like the offshore
worker,sitting in the sun on that remote part of the installation,
considering his safety situation since nosupervisor was in
sight."
We have seen that the type of penalties between the law and
company rules and regulations are of adifferent type. The latter
has impact on the labour relation of an employee and of far more
implicationthan the financial penalties of violating the law.
Promising is the 66% of the workers stating that to theiropinion
rules indeed prevent accidents. This promising thought however will
lose its credibility furtherin the presentation when we discuss if
workers really understand the nature of rules and regulations.
What do rules do?
We have seen that rules are written with the intention to
prevent accidents. We all are aware aboutthe enormous number of
rules existing in the world. Based on earlier assumption, one could
say "Well,we did a good thing. All those rules made our world a
safer place to work in". But then there is thisproblem. Scientists
say that many rules are leading towards accidents instead of
preventing us from it.We have seen that people feel safe because
rules do exist. They do things without thinking, just becauserules
indicate what they have to do they do not use their brains
anymore.
We talked about attitudes and rules. I pictured some examples I
had experienced in the past. Howsome people believe the rules tells
us what is safe. They are ready to discuss the subject but not
willingto give up the idea of rules. Is it a new bible? It is also
scary to realise there is people out there, whointerpret rules and
signs wrongly. The guy, and he was well respected and as far as I
know a veryintelligent chap, thinking that indeed the government
made this new traffic sign convincing motorists tokeep distance
between vehicles. Just one hand away. Scary, is it not? Rules are
not dangerous inthemselves. It is us who make them dangerous.
"Do rules make our lives safe?" was another question we
discussed. I used the example of thisAmerican drilling company with
the American general manager. He refused to consider
arecommendation made by the safety department. A recommendation
that made sense to our opinionbut not to his. Why? Because he did
not have to do it since it was not required by law and he used
thisas an excuse not to spent any money. He twisted the safety idea
by saying "If it is not described in thelaw, it is not a dangerous
situation". What can you do against this kind of people? By the
way, this chapis no longer responsible for the safety of other
people. He was terminated and started his craw fishrestaurant. In
the neighbourhood of Houston, so be aware. Fact is that when people
are confrontedconstantly with a large number of rules, some sort of
mechanism starts. They stop thinking. Whyshould they? We are
efficient people after all, so why do things which do not make
sense? The sensiblething here are the rules. But do we put so much
trust in rules or is it something else? What about thepenalties all
rules promise if you do not obey them? Scientist Etzioni pleaded to
minimize the rules butmaximise the moral dialogue.
I showed some more scientists. In rules and human behaviour I
introduced the fact of two worlds.One world contains words and the
other is the world where we do things. Separate worlds and
noconnection. There is even a tension between the two. We tend to
say something and somethingdifferent. Scientists like Nuttin call
it the absolute absence of rational.
Another scary finding by scientists is the fact that besides
human act irrational, they tend to violate orignore rules. So there
is a gap between the makers of rules and those they are made for.
To make
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makers of rules happy, we asked offshore workers if they had a
book with rules. "Yes," said 82%, "wedo have such a book" and I
thought, "Yes, rules help after all". But I was wrong. 38% of the
mendeclared "Why should we stick to the rules, they do not improve
my safety".
So can we reach a conclusion? Do we have an answer to the
question "Do rules help improvesafety?"
This is what workers offshore said: We are having more accidents
and you know why? Because theykeep making more and more rules.
It is not only the offshore worker complaining about the massive
number of rules, but it is not only thenumber of rules. Also the
way they are written. Like they are written for children, or the
opposite -the language used is too 'officialese'. Companies are
paternalistic. It is no use to deny, it is the peoplewho experience
rules this way.
My point here is that nearly no one is considering the situation
and the safety of a particular moment intime. This is what it is
all about. Thinking. Yes, we say that rules are needed to make the
world goround. I say no. No rules are needed to make things safer,
this is my true belief. All it takes to makething safer is good
quality of hardware, clear and concise instructions to be used for
particular jobs andcommitted people. Committed in my perception
means people who are aware that doing things safelyis an absolute
must. And management - we/you should help them to be committed. To
understandwhat it takes to take really care about themselves. We
have to make sure that people do not have toworry about the
penalties if they do not follow a rule. Rules like: If you dont
wear your hardhat, you may be subject of termination. If you are
under influence of alcohol, you are not allowed on the
installation. If you dont wear the required safety belt and line,
we will be after your ass Do rules help?
This is what I think. We still have to do with rules. Modern
technology is far to complex to pretend weare able to know every
detail of what surrounds us. Rules have to help us out here. What I
do notbelieve in are penalties. We should be able to organise our
organisations in such way that we do notneed penalties. Let's start
with the assumption that we all are responsible people no matter
what rankwe are in. Let's design systems allowing all organisation
members to change attitudes when needed.Make people aware that the
most important thing is their health. The fact that employees can
returnhome in the same state as they came to work should be the key
note. I do see opportunities for rulesto help to improve safety.
But under certain strict conditions.
Lets do things differently
I will address these as alternatives.
People who live, work and survive in the Nordic areas, are very
much aware that only they areresponsible for their own safety. In
other words, they respect their lives. With every activity
theyundertake, even when there are rules in place, they think about
what could happen to them and basedon these thoughts, they make the
situation a safe one. Their goal is to do the job and finish it
healthy.They believe no rule in itself will or can safeguard them.
Rules are considered as any other tool to beused to do the job.
Bicyclists in the cities are acting differently from the
bicyclists in the countryside. For both, the ruledictates that they
should have sufficient lights on their bicycle and have them
working when it is dark.Those in the cities seem not to care about
lights. They hardly use them. Those using a bike in thecountry have
working lights. They are aware of the fact that it is crucial for
their safety to be seen bymotorists in the dark. Their lives depend
on visibility.
Lets introduce the buzzwords commitment and ownership.
Commitment of any employee to his/herown life. They should truly
appreciate they are the ones responsible for their own safety and
health.Train them to scrutinise the situation they have to do their
work in. Is it safe? Can I do my job safely?What do I have to do to
make it safe?
Certainly, it is to much to say we can do away with all rules.
It will take time but I do believe that therewill come a time that
indeed we can do without rules as such. Still, there will remain a
necessity forwritten instructions. Due to the complexity of our
technology is, one cant expect that users of this
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technology are for a 100% familiar with it. There will always be
the need for manuals and procedures.But, these manuals and
procedures should be written in such a way that they are clear and
concise.Only than they are meaningful and a valuable tool for those
who have to do the work.
When you are organised, have your regular safety meetings,
painted lines on the floor, created anemployee safety committee,
but you are still having incidents, behaviour based safety may be
the stepyou are missing. If people are still taking risks in spite
of all you have done to make them safetyconscious, your next step
might be a solution that goes beyond awareness. Behaviour-based
safety leadsemployees to routinely work safely.
To focus on human behaviour is obvious once we realise that 90%
of all accidents are human failurerelated. People are taking
shortcuts and therefore risks and they have a reason to do so.
Som