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IMCA The International Marine Contractors Association Represents offshore, marine and underwater engineering companies Carlyle House, 235 Vauxhall Bridge Road, London, SW1V 1EJ, UK Tel: +44 (0) 20 7931 8171 Fax: +44 (0) 20 7931 8935 E-mail: [email protected] Website: www.imca-int.com Incorporating AODC and DPVOA · VAT Registration No: GB 653339823 The information contained herein is given for guidance only and endeavours to reflect best industry practice. For the avoidance of doubt no legal liability shall attach to any opinion and/or recommendation and/or statement herein contained. Proceedings of WORKING SAFER OFFSHORE Safety, Health and the Environment in Marine Contracting IMCA Seminar 24-25 January 2002 Old Trafford, Manchester
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  • IMCA The International Marine Contractors AssociationRepresents offshore, marine and underwater engineering companies

    Carlyle House, 235 VTel: +44 (0) 20 7931 8171 Fax: +44 (0) 20 79

    Incorporating AODC an

    The information contained herein is givenFor the avoidance of doubt no legal liability shall att

    Proceedings ofWORKING SAFER OFFSHORE

    Safety, Health and the Environmentin Marine Contracting

    IMCA Seminar24-25 January 2002

    Old Trafford, Manchesterauxhall Bridge Road, London, SW1V 1EJ, UK31 8935 E-mail: [email protected] Website: www.imca-int.com

    d DPVOA VAT Registration No: GB 653339823

    for guidance only and endeavours to reflect best industry practice.ach to any opinion and/or recommendation and/or statement herein contained.

  • IMCA

    The International Marine Contractors Association (IMCA) is theinternational trade association representing offshore, marine andunderwater engineering companies. It was formed in April 1995from the amalgamation of AODC (the International Association ofUnderwater Engineering Contractors) and DPVOA (the DynamicPositioning Vessel Owners Association).

    IMCA promotes improvements in quality, health, safety,environmental and technical standards through the publication ofinformation notes, codes of practice and by other appropriatemeans.

    It is organised through four distinct divisions each covering aspecific area of members interests: Diving, Marine, OffshoreSurvey, Remote Systems and ROVs.

    There are, additionally, two core committees that relate to all foursectors, covering: Safety, Environment & Legislation Training, Certification & Personnel Competence

    Working Safer Offshore

    IMCAs Safety, Environment & Legislation Core Committeeorganised this two-day seminar on safety, health and theenvironment in marine contracting to bring together onshore andoffshore management responsible for safety and offshoreoperational personnel for a series of presentations and discussionson key safety issues in the industry.

    www.imca-int.com/sel/

  • IMCA The International Marine Contractors AssociationRepresents offshore, marine and underwater engineering companies.

    Working Safer OffshoreSafety, Health and the Environment in Marine Contracting

    A seminar for onshore and offshore management responsible for safety

    24-25 January 2002at

    Old Trafford, ManchesterHome of Manchester United Football Club

    P R O C E E D I N G S

  • WORKING SAFER OFFSHORE

    IMCA Safety, Environment & Legislation Core Committee Page 1

    CONTENTS

    Programme ............................................................................................................2

    Overview ..................................................................................................................5Philip Wiggs, IMCA Technical Co-ordinator

    Introduction ..........................................................................................................11Chris van Beek, Heerema Marine ContractorsChairman, IMCA Safety, Environment & Legislation Core Committee

    Presentations .......................................................................................................13

    Safety culture: How it differs world-wide, how to manage the difference ............... 13Sjaak Pappe, ITIM

    Behavioural safety: An American perspective ................................................................. 21Mark Guest, Halliburton HSE Director, KBR (Onshore)

    Behaviour-based accident prevention process ................................................................. 25Allan Hannah, Technip-Coflexip

    Does legislation always help improve safety? Positive and negative examples ........ 29Joop van de Westen, ITIM

    Leading safety performance indicators ............................................................................... 39Ken London, Stolt Offshore

    Safety incentives ...................................................................................................................... 45Sal Ruffino, European Marine Contractors

    Reports on Discussions ...................................................................................47

    Behavioural safety management ........................................................................................... 48

    Leading safety performance indicators ............................................................................... 51

    Safety incentives ...................................................................................................................... 53

    Delegate List ........................................................................................................55

  • Programme WORKING SAFER OFFSHORE

    Page 2 IMCA

    Day One Thursday 24 January 2002

    11:00-12:00 REGISTRATION

    12:00-12:15 Introduction & WelcomeAims of WorkshopChris van Beek, Heerema Marine ContractorsChairman, IMCA Safety, Environment & Legislation Core Committee

    12:15-13:15 Safety CultureHow it Differs World-Wide, How to Manage the DifferencesSjaak Pappe, ITIMITIM culture and management consultants a leading consultancy with acknowledgedexpertise in matching culture with business requirements

    13.15-14:00 LUNCH

    14:00-14:30 Behavioural Safety: An American PerspectiveMark Guest, Halliburton HSE Director, KBR (Onshore)

    14:30-15:00 Behaviour-Based Accident Prevention ProcessAllan Hannah, Technip-Coflexip

    15:00-15:20 COFFEE

    15:20-16:10 TABLE DISCUSSIONS

    Behavioural Safety Management How to improve safety of an offshore crew What are the barriers to improving safety and how can these be

    overcome?

    How does culture influence safety?Feedback from Table Discussions to Workshop

    16:10-17:00 Does Legislation Always Help Improve Safety?Positive and Negative ExamplesJoop van de Westen, ITIM

    17:00 Summary and Discussion

    17:15 CLOSE

    19:00 DRINKS RECEPTION, followed by theSEMINAR DINNER at the Golden Tulip Hotel

  • WORKING SAFER OFFSHORE Programme

    IMCA Safety, Environment & Legislation Core Committee Page 3

    Day Two Friday 25 January 200209:00-09:05 Introduction to Day Two

    Mike OMeara, Halliburton HSE Director, KBR (Offshore)Vice-Chairman, IMCA Safety, Environment & Legislation Core Committee

    09:05-09:35 Leading Safety Performance IndicatorsKen London, Stolt Offshore

    09:35-09:45 Safety IncentivesIntroduction by Sal Ruffino, European Marine Contractors

    09:45-10:55 TABLE DISCUSSIONS

    Safety Incentives Do safety awards and other

    incentives work? Perverse incentives how can

    these be avoided? How should they be set up? The offshore crew perspective

    Leading Safety PerformanceIndicators Will measuring leading

    indicators reduce the numberof undesirable events?

    Are the six IMCA-identifiedleading performance indicatorsreally proactive?

    and are they practical tomeasure?

    Do they provide a commonmeasurement, regardless of sizeof operation?

    Feedback from Table Discussions to Workshop

    10:55-11:15 COFFEE

    11:15-11:45 Case Study: Offshore Accidents and Lessons LearnedMat Schreurs, Heerema Marine Contractors

    11:45-12:55 Learning from IncidentsCommunications involved in Safety Getting the Message Right Diving incidents Gary Hurst, Technip-Coflexip Case study Mike Dobeson, European Marine Contractors Learning from the fishing industry Stephen Bruce, Technip-CoflexipGENERAL DISCUSSION

    What can be learnt from these incidents? Are there any common themes? How can this be used to make offshore work sites safer?

    12:55-13:10 Seminar Close-out General DiscussionChris van Beek, Mike OMeara Views on seminar format, content Format for future events Suggestions for IMCA initiatives

    13:10 CLOSE, followed by LUNCH

    14:00 TOUR OF OLD TRAFFORD STADIUMincluding the Manchester United Museum and Trophy Room

  • WORKING SAFER OFFSHORE

    Page 4 IMCA

  • WORKING SAFER OFFSHORE Overview

    IMCA Safety, Environment & Legislation Core Committee Page 5

    SEMINAR OVERVIEWPhilip Wiggs, IMCA Technical Co-ordinator

    A total of 86 delegates attended at the Stretford Suite in the stadium overlooking the ManchesterUnited pitch, to hear a particularly impressive set of talks and take part in some lively discussions as tohow culture, behaviour and legislation affects safety, how management should be aware of theinfluences and utilise that knowledge to improve safety management.

    Day One

    Chris van Beek of Heerema Marine Contractors and Chairman of IMCAs Safety,Environment & Legislation (SEL) Core Committee opened the session, introducing SjaakPappe of ITIM, a culture and management consultancy. This was very well receivedinteractive explanation of how differing cultures react in sometimes surprisingly different waysto safety matters. It gave an insight into ones own thinking and conditioning and the ways inwhich understanding of a nationalitys culture is essential in assessing how to effectively managesafety of personnel from all parts of the globe.

    After lunch, Mark Guest, Halliburton HSE Director, KBR (Onshore) started the afternoonsession with an American perspective. This demonstrated his heartfelt commitment to safety.He emphasised the need for two-way communication between workforce and managementand for a total emphasis on teaching safe behaviour, so that employees want to work safely.Effective leadership was paramount and the importance of carefully observing work behaviourwas underlined. The information obtained from those observations needed to be properlyanalysed. This was one way that employees could begin to understand why people operated ina certain manner and only by understanding that could employers use strategies to affectbehaviour and lead people to work safely. Mark explained how the aspect of family was usedto focus people on their importance to their own family unit, so keeping them alive to thepersonal consequences of an accident. His view was that accidents should not be viewed asstatistics, but as individual, personal, traumatic experiences. The need to constantlyconcentrate on the effects of strategies was pointed out and, most of all, a need to bepassionate about safety and demonstrate a commitment to it. That commitment would itselfresult in support beyond expectations.

    Alan Hannah of Technip-Coflexip presented a thought-provoking overview of behaviour-based accident prevention. Despite the number of safety initiatives in existence, he pointedout that even a decreasing trend meant accidents were still happening, which means people aregetting hurt. Graphs and statistics could encourage complacency. He showed how a reducedamount of lost time incidents could actually translate into 4 or 5 LTIs every week. His viewwas that a zero figure was attainable and should constantly be striven for. Safe behaviour isthe key and the hearts and minds of workforce and management needed to be educated tothat end. He used slides to demonstrate the horror of injury, both pictorially and by namingpersonnel and identifying their individual injuries. He showed that 85% of accidents areattributable to at risk behaviour and how important it is for management to become morepro-active in improving safety behaviour, attitudes, condition culture and systems. By outliningthe CSO process, he showed how ORCA (Observe, Record, Consult and Agree) is used toidentify behaviours, collate data and, by consultation, use that data to remove the behaviouraldanger, exploring how such a process worked in practice and what pitfalls to watch out forwhen implementing it.

    Each of the twelve tables of delegates then entered into separate discussions on behaviouralsafety management.

  • WORKING SAFER OFFSHORE

    Page 6 IMCA

    The three chosen questions were:

    How to improve safety of an offshore crew What are the barriers to improving safety and how can these be overcome? How does culture influence safety?One person in each group summarised their answers and fed that back to the floor, whichitself resulted in further discussion. The notes made by that person were handed in and theseare summarised later on in this document, together with a summary of the salient points notedby Jane Bugler, which were made on a flip chart during the feedback discussions.

    Joop van de Westen of ITIM took the last session of the day, posing the question ofwhether legislation improved safety. He gave some positive and negative examples to illustratehis views.

    He asked whether it was necessary to have a culture of punishment for breaking safety rules,whether this distracted from the rules fundamental purpose. Also there was danger in anindividuals interpretation of a rule and great care needed to be taken in presentation of a ruleor warning, particularly with illustrative signs. He expressed the need to concentrate onleading people to think safely as opposed to blindly following rules.

    Chris van Beek summarised the day and there was some general discussion, no doubtcontinued in the evening at the seminar dinner.

    Day Two

    The following day was introduced by Mike OMeara, Halliburton HSE Director,KBR (Offshore) and Vice-Chairman of IMCAs SEL Committee, who introduced Ken Londonof Stolt Offshore, a member of the committee, to talk about leading safety performanceindicators (LPIs).

    Ken London set out the key six leading indicators of safety performance as currently proposedby the committee and provided a discussion paper (copied later in this document).He described how the leading indicators were determined by the IMCA workgroup, submittedto the SEL Committee and that they were now being presented for wider IMCA participation.

    The advantages of using LPIs are set out in the paper and the copies of the slides. He pointedout that three of the LPIs could be readily introduced, that one might be burdensome toadministrate and that two might need further measurement criteria definition. The SELCommittee will review the comments from the seminar and will then re-draft the leadingindicators document for wider IMCA review. He requested that all IMCA members try topilot the use of LPIs in 2002.

    Sal Ruffino, European Marine Contractors, then talked about the effectiveness of safetyincentive schemes, or their lack of effectiveness if they are not carefully conceived.He expressed the view, which was agreed with on the floor, that despite the best of intentions,some schemes can be counter productive and their best elements, such as bringing aboutsafety improvement, modifying behaviour and heightening awareness can be lost. That themewas noticeably reinforced by comments made in the table discussions which followed.

    The table discussions were split into two sections, one half of the room being given thefollowing questions:

  • WORKING SAFER OFFSHORE Overview

    IMCA Safety, Environment & Legislation Core Committee Page 7

    Safety Incentives

    Do safety awards and other incentives work? Perverse incentives how can these be avoided? How should they be set up?The other half were asked:

    Will measuring leading indicators reduce the number of undesirable events? Are the six IMCA- identified leading performance indicators really proactive? Are they practical to measure? Do they provide a common measurement, regardless of size of operation?The same procedure was followed as in the day before and the summary of the collated notesis provided later in this document.

    The remainder of the second day was devoted to the topic of offshore incidents and lessonslearned from them, with discussion on the ways in which lessons can be learned whenincidents do occur. IMCA gratefully acknowledges the major contribution of the presentersboth to the seminar itself, provoking fascinating and very constructive debate, and into thewider work programme of IMCA's Safety, Environment & Legislation Core Committee. Wewould point out that presenters did not necessarily talk about incidents in their owncompanies and thank all contributors to this session.

    Mat Schreurs of Heerema Marine Contractors talked of how lessons could be learned fromoffshore accidents and demonstrated this from a case study of an incident.

    There was then a group of three presentations in which aspects of learning from incidents andthe importance of communication of safety messages was highlighted.

    The first was from Gary Hurst of Technip-Coflexip, who used video footage of actualincidents, kindly provided by IMCA members, to dramatically bring home the importance ofattention to detail and of following sound safety practice, especially when carrying out routinejobs. In one situation an incident had occurred and valuable lessons learned. In another, adangerous incident had been prevented from occurring and a relatively simple task preventedit from happening in future.

    Mike Dobeson of European Marine Contractors illustrated an incident, which did not causeany injury or damage, but which had the potential to do so. He showed how the in-houseenquiry identified the importance of procedure and how vital lessons were learned.

    Stephen Bruce of Technip-Coflexip gave a candid account of his background in the NorthSea fishing industry and the totally different regime in which he used to work, which involved awholly different approach to safety. He also used video of an actual rescue to emphasise thedangers involved in that culture. His telling point, at the close of his talk, was that companiesshould be aware that they could easily be employing people brought up in such cultures orsimilar, from many areas of the world.

    There was general discussion on the floor as to what could be learned from the incidents,whether there were any common themes and as to how this could be used to make offshorework sites safer.

  • WORKING SAFER OFFSHORE

    Page 8 IMCA

    Delegates attention was also drawn to the IMCA Safety Flash system for the dissemination ofanonymised information on incidents and the lessons learned from them (details of the systemon the following page). Discussion told of the usefulness of these flashes to those responsiblefor offshore safety. The importance of ongoing use of the flashes, both in learning from close-out reports and follow-up actions and from periodic review of older flashes to ensure thelessons are not forgotten, was noted. It was also pointed out that the success of the systemdepends on the wide dissemination of safety flashes, both through the IMCA membership andonwards through member companies internal distribution systems.

    Chris van Beek and Mike OMeara then brought the seminar to a close with general discussion.It was agreed that the talks and video presentations were very well received and that they hadinspired a great deal of thought and discussion. There was a striking commonality inconclusions of speakers who had viewed the subject from a range of perspectives.The feedback from the floor was lively and constructive and would be carefully studied,especially in relation to the work being done on leading safety performance indicators.

    Summary The Way Forward

    The close out discussion showed that there was a strongly felt need to take safety initiativesforward, to look at the ordinary routine issues as well as the extraordinary. Many would nowconsider culture issues differently as a result of the discussions. Some might think more aboutmanaging change; encouraging better communication between managers and workforce; therewas still a need for training and familiarisation and contingency plans for when things go wrong.It was thought that companies should actively demonstrate support for those who query safetyissues no matter when or from what level. Safety flashes and company safety notices shouldbe followed up and not discarded as irrelevant purely because they might be old.Perhaps attention could be drawn to old notices in company newsletters, so as to try and helpprevent history repeating itself. There should be more sharing of information and a willingnessto disseminate and learn from incidents. The pressure to increase the interval between safetyand survival training courses should be resisted. The question of the ageing work force shouldbe addressed and more people brought into the industry. It was also hoped that any futuresession would involve more personnel from the offshore workforce.

    These and a back-deck load of other thoughts were in mind at the end of the session.The forest of hands on the floor showed agreement that the event had been very worthwhileand that a repeat follow up event should be arranged for next year.

    After lunch, there was a well attended and much appreciated tour of the Old Trafford Stadium.

  • WORKING SAFER OFFSHORE Overview

    IMCA Safety, Environment & Legislation Core Committee Page 9

    IMCA SAFETY FLASH SYSTEM1. IMCA member reports incident/dangerous occurrence to IMCA Secretariat

    Report can be in any format, e.g. in-house company report, internal accident/ incidentreport, separate notification to IMCA.

    2. IMCA Secretariat anonymises/sanitises report, as appropriate, to eliminatecompany name, location, date, etc. and produces draft safety flash

    3. IMCA sends draft safety flash to IMCA contact reporting the informationfor approval

    4. Once approval given to draft text, IMCA issues safety flash to IMCAmembers

    5. Safety flash circulated to all named IMCA contacts for:

    Safety, Environment & Legislation Training, Certification & Personnel Competence Diving Division

    Safety, Medical, Technical & Training Committee Marine Division Offshore Survey Division Remote Systems & ROV Division Additional safety flash distribution listby e-mail and/or hard copy, depending on persons noted preference.

    For further information on the IMCA Safety Flash system, or to contribute a report, pleasecontact Jane Bugler, Technical Director [email protected] or using the contactdetails on the cover page of these proceedings.

  • WORKING SAFER OFFSHORE

    Page 10 IMCA

  • WORKING SAFER OFFSHORE Welcome and Introduction

    IMCA Safety, Environment & Legislation Core Committee Page 11

    WELCOME AND INTRODUCTIONChris van Beek, Heerema Marine Contractors

    Chairman, IMCA Safety, Environment & Legislation Core Committee

    Jan 2002 IMCA SEL seminar 2002 www.imca-int.com IMCA

    WELCOME

    IMCAInternational Marine Contractors Association

    Working Safer Offshore

    A seminar for onshore and offshore management responsible for safety

    Jan 2002 IMCA SEL seminar 2002 www.imca-int.com IMCA

    IMCAInternational Marine Contractors Association

    200 marine contractors/suppliers as member articles in the constitution: To seek to improve the technical and safety aspects and

    hence the efficiency of the international offshore, marineand underwater contracting industries by all reasonablemeans.

    To promote improvements in quality, health, safety,environmental and technical standards through thepublication of guidance notes, codes of practice and othermedia in order to promote responsible self-regulation.

    Jan 2002 IMCA SEL seminar 2002 www.imca-int.com IMCA

    IMCA Safety Statistics

    00 . 5

    11 . 5

    22 . 5

    33 . 5

    44 . 5

    5

    1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0

    L T A F R

    1997 1998 1999 2000

    LTAs 236 257 196 227

    Million hrsworked

    47.6 52.9 52.8 65.6

    LTAFR 4.96 4.86 3.72 3.46

    Jan 2002 IMCA SEL seminar 2002 www.imca-int.com IMCA

    IMCA actions

    Safety flashes Lessons Learned exchanges Guidelines Seminars/Workshops Information Platform

    Jan 2002 IMCA SEL seminar 2002 www.imca-int.com IMCA

    Behavioural age

    Accidentrates

    time

    Engineering &HardwareImprovements

    Safety ManagementSystems & Procedures

    Safety Behaviours

    1998

    /2002

    measuring

    Jan 2002 IMCA SEL seminar 2002 www.imca-int.com IMCA

    Indicators developments

    UnderlyingsustainabilityIndicators

    UnderlyingenvironmentalIndicators

    UnderlyingsafetyIndicators

    Sustainabilityperformanceindicator

    Environmentalperformanceindicator

    Safetyperformanceindicators

    lagging

    leading

    measuring

    Jan 2002 IMCA SEL seminar 2002 www.imca-int.com IMCA

    Seminar Objectives to update members/participants on latest

    developments on SHE matters to involve offshore managers responsible

    for SHE to exchange best practices among members/

    participants to provide an opportunity for informal

    discussions on HSE in practice to provide input for IMCA developments

    Jan 2002 IMCA SEL seminar 2002 www.imca-int.com IMCA

    Seminar subjects Intercultural expert explaining SHE do's and

    don'ts in different countries Behavioural aspects Leading/lacking performance indicators Best Practice presentation offshore contractors Case study serious accident Buffet and cocktail evening to encourage informal

    discussion Discussions to exchange ideas, experience and to

    provide input for IMCA developments

    Have a very interesting seminar Working Safer Offshore!

  • WORKING SAFER OFFSHORE

    Page 12 IMCA

  • WORKING SAFER OFFSHORE Presentations

    IMCA Safety, Environment & Legislation Core Committee Page 13

    SAFETY CULTURE:How it differs world-wide,

    How to manage the differencesSjaak Pappe, ITIM

    American ?

    What would the captain of an oiltanker say if his ship had to beabandoned, if he was...

    German ?

    Greek ?

    French ?

    British?

    Dutch?

    Its a Challenge !!!

    Its forbidden to jump

    Its the right procedure

    If we dont jump well lose face

    Its a matter of honour

    Its the sporting thing to do

    Lets sit down and talk about it

    Italian ?

    HOW THEY DO IT IS EMBEDDED IN THEIR

    TRADITION AND CULTURE

    WHAT MANAGERS DO IS THE SAMETHE WORLD OVER

    PETER DRUCKER

    Going global has its barriers

    Management challenges US and European senior executives say they face when managing across different countries

    Changing individual behaviour 69 %

    Cultural differences 65 %Business practice differences 52 %Headquarters too remote 44 %Labor law differences 41 %Accounting and tax differences 36 %

    Source: PricewaterhouseCoopers

    In the narrow sense: Civilisation( Art, Science, Education)

    In the broad anthropological sense: Collective programming of the human mind

    2 MEANINGS OF CULTURE

    Individual

    Collectiveby group

    Common to all mankind

    Inheritedlearned

    Learned

    Inherited

    Culture

    Group: E.G. nation, profession, organisation, family

    HUMAN MIND PROGRAMMED BY HEREDITY AND EXPERIENCE ON 3 LEVELS

    When you re a kid, you don t have much variety of experience

    You live with your parents and that s all you know. You grow up thinking whatever they do isnormal

  • WORKING SAFER OFFSHORE

    Page 14 IMCA

    There followed an experiment, where half of the delegates were shown Picture A, then theother half were shown Picture B.

    Picture A Picture B

    The whole group of delegates was then shown Picture C and asked to say what they saw.

    What did you see!

    Picture C

    Delegates who had seen Picture A generally said they could see a face, whereas those who hadseen Picture B mostly saw a mouse. The trick was then revealed:

  • WORKING SAFER OFFSHORE Presentations

    IMCA Safety, Environment & Legislation Core Committee Page 15

    PRACTICES

    Symbols

    Heroes

    Rituals

    Values

    Culture

    ValuesBroad preferences for one state of affairs over others to which strong emotions are attached

    VALUESThe culture of a group is manifested, among other things, in the distributionof values within the group.

    What is similar to our own culture is normal and good

    What is different from our own culture is abnormal and bad

    CULTURAL BIAS

    THE EXPLANATION TO BE FOUND IN CHILDHOOD

    Culture affects:

    Our way of thinking Our perceptions Our way of acting and organizing The way we relate to each other

    CULTURE IS LEARNED, NOT INHERITEDCULTURE IS VERY STABLE

    General

    Relative

    STATEMENTS ABOUT CULTURE

    Value differences between countries canbe explained by four categories ofnational culture

    Managing hierarchy

    Managing relationships

    Managing oneself

    Managing uncertainty

    National culture

    All animals are equal, but some

    are more equal than others

    George Orwell

    MANAGING AUTHORITY

    High Hierarchy Cultures

    Dependent Hierarchy is existential Privileges Superiors inaccessible

    Low Hierarchy Cultures

    Independent Hierarchy for convenience Equal rights Superiors accessible

    MANAGING AUTHORITY

  • WORKING SAFER OFFSHORE

    Page 16 IMCA

    Delegates were then tested on their perception of the differing cultures of various countries:

    BELGIUM GB PORTUGAL NL INDIA

    Which country culture scores highest on

    HIERARCHY ?

    Which country culture scores highest on

    HIERARCHY ?

    65 35 63 38 77

    BELGIUM GB PORTUGAL NL INDIA

    Anglo Saxons often complain that when they make a request from HQ to colleagues at the same hierarchical level in France, Spain or Italy, they get a positive response, but then nothing happens.

    The request has not been understood because ofthe language barrier

    The request has been understood but, due to the language barrier, they have difficulty in telling their British counterparts that it can t be done

    It s impossible to do what has been asked, but they cannot bring themselves to say so because that would involve a loss of face

    It s a sign of a lack of motivation

    They actually have less authority than the Anglo Saxons thought they had

    Implications -Managing authority

    Attitudes towards bosses / sub-ordinates

    The boss is always right

    Recognition of status, position

    Decision making

    Decentralised, matrix Centralised, line

    PDI-

    PDI+

    MANAGING RELATIONSHIPS

    What would you do if one of yourcolleagues asked you for a financialcontribution to buy a coffin for hisuncles funeral?

    Separation between private andworking life

    I societies

    the Self individual opinions communication explicit loss of self-respect task important

    We societies

    the Group: We opinion of the group communication implicit loss of face relationship important

    MANAGING RELATIONSHIPS

    Which country culture is the most WE oriented?

    GERMANY THAILAND NL ITALY SPAIN

  • WORKING SAFER OFFSHORE Presentations

    IMCA Safety, Environment & Legislation Core Committee Page 17

    Which country culture is the most WE oriented?

    67 20 80 76 51

    GERMANY THAILAND NL ITALY SPAIN

    According to a Chinese saying, Westerners are naive. They believe what people say.

    The Chinese never say what they think.

    In individualistic cultures people are indeed credulous.

    The Chinese tend not to say how things really are, butrather what they think others wants to hear.

    In China a written statement has more power than an oral agreement. So dont accept an oral agreement unless it isbacked up in writing.

    In individualistic countries people pay more attention to what is said than to how it is said or to body language.

    Implications -Managing Relationships

    Importance of developing relationship before doing business

    Communication styles: direct versus indirect

    Selling yourself or your product

    MANAGING ONESELF

    Safety Employee of the Month:

    reward or punishment?

    Trying to be betterthan others is neithersocially nor materiallyrewarded

    There are rewards inthe form of wealth orstatus for thesuccessful achiever

    Safety Employee of the Month ! Safety Employee of the Month !

    Tough societies

    Clear safety objectives and targets Status Confrontation, competition Admiration for achievers

    Tender societies

    Moving safety objectives and targets Levelling: safety rules are for all Consensus Empathy for the unfortunate

    MANAGING ONESELF

    Which country culture is the most TOUGH?

    ITALY NL GB FRANCE NORWAY

  • WORKING SAFER OFFSHORE

    Page 18 IMCA

    Which country culture is the most TOUGH?

    70 14 66 43 8

    ITALY NL GB FRANCE NORWAY

    Swedes ask more often for clarification than Americans while working together. Why?

    In many fields Americans are most advanced. Therefore they know more and have a lower need to ask questions

    Swedes have more difficulty in understanding what is meant due to the language barrier

    Americans have a stronger drive to make it in life than Swedes. Therefore Americans tend to show their ignorance

    less

    Swedes are more inquisitive than Americans. It only doesnt show up front as they are so serious at the same time, unless they get drunk, of course

    Americans are doers, whereas Swedes love to discuss issues just for the sake of the discussion

    Implications - Managing oneself

    Competitive - solidarity

    Marketing - motivation

    Confrontations, decisiveness

    Walk the talk - recognising success

    Proposal

    Decision

    Succesfulimplementation

    MAS- MAS+

    Consensus

    Decisive

    MANAGING UNCERTAINTY

    In Germany everything is forbidden unless it is allowed

    In the UK everything is allowed unless it is forbidden

    In France everything is allowed even if it is forbidden

    High Uncertainty

    Need for structure and rules Security Showing emotions Stressful

    Low Uncertainty

    Low need for structure and rules Risk taking Emotions not shown Relaxed

    UNCERTAINTY AVOIDANCEManaging uncertainty

    Which country culture scores highest on

    UNCERTAINTY AVOIDANCE ?

    GREECE GB AUSTRIA NL SINGA PORE

    Which country culture scores highest on

    UNCERTAINTY AVOIDANCE ?

    112 35 70 53 8

    GREECE GB AUSTRIA NL SINGA PORE

  • WORKING SAFER OFFSHORE Presentations

    IMCA Safety, Environment & Legislation Core Committee Page 19

    Implications -Managing Uncertainty

    Different planning approaches

    Importance of expertise

    Language and communication

    Risk acceptance / ownership

    RELATIVE POSITION OF SOMECOUNTRIES IN THE 4 CATEGORIES

    FRA

    GBR

    POR

    AUT

    DEN

    Hierarchy I or we Tough / tender UncertaintyMalaysia USA Japan Greece

    Austria Guatemala Sweden Singapore

    Ethnocentric judgement

    Culture shock

    Ineffectiveness of normal organisational practice

    Technology transfer often not culturally neutral

    PROBLEMS OF ENCOUNTERSACROSS CULTURES

    Manager 's role varies across culturesSource : Andr Laurent

    20 30 40 50 6010 70 80 % Percentage in agreement

    Great Britain

    SwedenNetherlandsUSADenmark

    SwitzerlandBelgiumGermanyFranceItalyIndonesiaJapan

    1718

    2327

    384446

    5366

    7378

    1718

    2327

    384446

    5366

    7378

    It is important for a managerto have at hand precise answers tomost of the questions that hissubordinates may raise about their work

    10

    MENTAL IMAGES

    Contest Network Family Pyramid Solar system Machine

    C o m p e titio n C o n s e n s u s L o ya lty a n dh ie ra rc h y

    L o ya lty ,h ie ra rc h y

    a n d im p lic ito rd e r

    H ie ra rc h y a n dim p ers o n al

    b u re a u cra cy

    O rd er

    -P D I+ ID V-U A I

    + M A S

    -P D I+ ID V

    -U A I/ U A I-M A S

    + P D I-ID V-U A I

    + P D I-ID V+ U A I

    + P D I+ ID V+ U A I

    -P D I ID V /+ ID V

    + U A I

    CENTRAL CONCEPT

    - Protection against liability- Know the rules- Show that you put effort in instructing people about rules- Yet, results more important than following rules correctly

    CONTEST implications for safety rules

    -Useful as general guidelines

    -Subject to change due to consensus

    -Make convenants (informal contracts)

    -Be flexible in enforcing rules (Dutch crossing - unimportant rules are for convenience only)

    NETWORK implications for safety rules

    -In-group rules important-Made/changed by power holder-Inform people about rules, as they are probably not written down, certainly not behavioural rules-Be strict in enforcing rules

    FAMILY implications for safety rules

  • WORKING SAFER OFFSHORE

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    -In-group rules and rulesset by system / boss areimportant-Strong need to know why,how tasks should beimplemented-Made/changed by powerholder-Inform people aboutrules, as they are probably notwritten down, certainly notbehavioural rules-Be strict in enforcing rules

    PYRAMID implications for safety rules

    - Rules important, yet people try to beat the system

    - Need for conceptualisation

    - Be strict in enforcing those rules which are crucial

    SOLAR SYSTEM implications for safety rules

    - Rules make the system work

    - Rules made by experts

    - Stick to the rules

    - Make rules objective by putting them on paper

    MACHINE and safety rules The cultural tool kit

    Understanding the golden rule: The more things become emotional, the more culture plays a role

    Understand the rationale of another person inanother culture:It will help you understand them better

    I T I MP.O.Box 97

    1190 AB Ouderkerk a/d AmstelThe Netherlands

    Tel: +31-70-302 30 30Fax: +31-70-346 37 75E-mail: [email protected]://www.itim.org

    Culture and Management Consultants

  • WORKING SAFER OFFSHORE Presentations

    IMCA Safety, Environment & Legislation Core Committee Page 21

    BEHAVIOURAL SAFETY:An American Perspective

    Mark Guest, Halliburton HSE Director, KBR (Onshore)

    Shaping Accident Free Environments

    Why Behavioral Based Safety?

    S.A.F.E. Process Main Menu

    TrainTrainEducateEducate

    IncidentIncidentInjury FreeInjury Free

    EnvironmentEnvironment

    CommunicateCommunicateResultsResults

    BehaviorBehaviorObservationObservation

    Survey andSurvey andGather infoGather info

    AnalyzeAnalyzeInformationInformation

    LeadershipLeadership Measure for SuccessMeasure for Success

    Leadership

    Leadership is the art of getting someone else todo something that you want done, because they

    want to do it.

    Dwight D. Eisenhower

    Leadership Role

    Re-Create Safety as a value.

    Provide the example for others to follow.

    Apply and tune the process.

    Shape the working environment for possibilities.

    Provide Antecedents and Consequences for safe behavior.

    S.A.F.E. Process Main Menu

    TrainTrainEducateEducate

    IncidentIncidentInjury FreeInjury Free

    EnvironmentEnvironment

    CommunicateCommunicateResultsResults

    BehaviorBehaviorObservationObservation

    Survey andSurvey andGather infoGather info

    AnalyzeAnalyzeInformationInformation

    LeadershipLeadership Measure for SuccessMeasure for Success

    Train / Educate

    Educate leaders and employees about the principles and rationale of BBS.

    Follow up education with training. Training targets behavior directly.

    S.A.F.E. Process Main Menu

    TrainTrainEducateEducate

    IncidentIncidentInjury FreeInjury Free

    EnvironmentEnvironment

    CommunicateCommunicateResultsResults

    BehaviorBehaviorObservationObservation

    Survey andSurvey andGather infoGather info

    AnalyzeAnalyzeInformationInformation

    LeadershipLeadership Measure for SuccessMeasure for Success

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    Behavior Observation

    TTotal otal SSafety afety TTask ask OObservationbservation Targets all work behaviors.

    Teaches what safe behavior looks like.

    Gets the workforce involved in safety.

    Puts emphasis on safe behaviors.

    Changes worker perception about the right thing to do.

    S.A.F.E. Process Main Menu

    TrainTrainEducateEducate

    IncidentIncidentInjury FreeInjury Free

    EnvironmentEnvironment

    CommunicateCommunicateResultsResults

    BehaviorBehaviorObservationObservation

    Survey andSurvey andGather infoGather info

    AnalyzeAnalyzeInformationInformation

    LeadershipLeadership Measure for SuccessMeasure for Success

    Analyze InformationOne of the most powerful tools in your BBS

    plan is to have the ability to effectively Assess,Identify and Plan for Change within your

    working environment.

    Analyze Information

    To affect long term change in behavior, you must understand why people do the things they do.

    The ABC model provides for this analysis and understanding. (Activator Behavior Consequences) When employees are involved in this process they begin to want to work safely.

    S.A.F.E. Process Main Menu

    TrainTrainEducateEducate

    IncidentIncidentInjury FreeInjury Free

    EnvironmentEnvironment

    CommunicateCommunicateResultsResults

    BehaviorBehaviorObservationObservation

    Survey andSurvey andGather infoGather info

    AnalyzeAnalyzeInformationInformation

    LeadershipLeadership Measure for SuccessMeasure for Success

    Communicating Results

    Show me a group of safe and happyemployees and Ill show you a

    leadership body that is effectivelycommunicating with their employees.

    Communicating Results

    Communication, both positive and negative, influence the degree and frequency of safe performance.

    You can never communicate enough.

    Communicate by many different means.

    Focus on the positives.

    S.A.F.E. Process Main Menu

    TrainTrainEducateEducate

    IncidentIncidentInjury FreeInjury Free

    EnvironmentEnvironment

    CommunicateCommunicateResultsResults

    BehaviorBehaviorObservationObservation

    Survey andSurvey andGather infoGather info

    AnalyzeAnalyzeInformationInformation

    LeadershipLeadership Measure for SuccessMeasure for Success

  • WORKING SAFER OFFSHORE Presentations

    IMCA Safety, Environment & Legislation Core Committee Page 23

    Survey and Gather info

    Only by identifying what parts of the safetyprocess is going well, as well as what is not,

    can you identify the proper correctiveactions to take.

    Survey and Gather info

    The use of employee Perception Surveys are critical to understanding the climate and sustaining employee participation in the safety process.

    Listen Carefully.

    Perceptions whether true or not represent reality and safety behavior is a direct result of those perceptions.

    S.A.F.E. Process Main Menu

    TrainTrainEducateEducate

    IncidentIncidentInjury FreeInjury Free

    EnvironmentEnvironment

    CommunicateCommunicateResultsResults

    BehaviorBehaviorObservationObservation

    Survey andSurvey andGather infoGather info

    AnalyzeAnalyzeInformationInformation

    LeadershipLeadership Measure for SuccessMeasure for Success

    Process Measurement

    What gets measured gets done

    Process Measurement

    Concentrate on actions not statistics. We can not eliminate injuries by managing statistics better.

    Include employee satisfaction, attendance, morale and other such measurements as an important part of the safety process. Measure how you are doing.

    Target leading not lagging indicators.

    What Commitment Really is

    When you become clear on what you want to do and whatyoure passionate about and commit to it, resources willline up that you never expected.

    Until one is committed, there is a hesitancy and the chanceto draw back always making us ineffective concerning allacts of initiative and creation.

    There is one elementary truth, the ignorance of which killscountless ideas and splendid plans: that the moment onedefinitely commits oneself, the providence moves, too.

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  • WORKING SAFER OFFSHORE Presentations

    IMCA Safety, Environment & Legislation Core Committee Page 25

    BEHAVIOUR-BASED ACCIDENTPREVENTION PROCESS

    Allan Hannah, Technip-CoflexipMember, IMCA Safety, Environment & Legislation Core Committee

    CSO - Name of the meeting

    SYNOPSISSYNOPSIS

    INITIATIVES..ANOTHER SAFETY PROCESS? CULTURE EVOLUTION PEOPLE FOCUS DRIVERS FOR CHANGE BEHAVIOUR BASED SAFETY THE CSO PROCESS BENEFITS WHAT NOT TO DO HOW YOU CAN HELP QUESTIONS

    CSO - Name of the meeting

    SAFETY INITIATIVESSAFETY INITIATIVES

    ASA

    T.O.F.S

    SMAT

    RECOGNITION& REWARDSCHEMES

    COMPETENCEASSURANCE

    SCHEMES

    COMPETENCEASSURANCE

    SCHEMES

    DO WE NEED ANOTHERDO WE NEED ANOTHERPROCESS?PROCESS?

    CSO - Name of the meeting

    DO WE REALLY NEEDDO WE REALLY NEEDANOTHER SAFETY PROCESS?ANOTHER SAFETY PROCESS?

    I BelieveI Believe We Do, We Do,

    Because. Because.

    CSO - Name of the meeting

    IMCA MEMBER STATISTICSIMCA MEMBER STATISTICS

    012345

    1996 1997 1998 1999 2000LTIFR

    DECREASING TREND IS VERY ENCOURAGING A GOOD PERFORMANCE BUT SUCH SMALL NUMBERS DISGUISE REALITY..

    1996146 LTIs1997 2361998 2571999 1962000 227

    Equates to 4 - 5Equates to 4 - 5LTIs LTIs every week!every week!

    85% of Accidents Attributable to At Risk Behaviour

    CSO - Name of the meeting

    THE 13 YEAR CSO TREND -THE 13 YEAR CSO TREND -Where is it taking us??Where is it taking us??

    LTI PERFORMANCE 13 YEAR TREND ALL CSO VESSELS

    02468

    101214

    1988

    1989

    1990

    1991

    1992

    1993

    1994

    1995

    1996

    1997

    1998

    1999

    2000

    Year

    toDa

    te

    LTI F

    req

    uenc

    y

    EQUIPMENT

    SYSTEMS & PROCEDURES

    WE MUST GET OFF THE PLATEAUSTEP CHANGE TO INJURY FREE WORKSITESITS NOT A PIPE DREAM!HEARTS & MINDS & SAFE BEHAVIOUR IS THE KEY.

    PEOPLE

    CSO - Name of the meeting

    SAFETY ISNT ABOUT STATISTICSSAFETY ISNT ABOUT STATISTICS.ITS ABOUT PEOPLE.ITS ABOUT PEOPLE

    INCIDENTS LIKE THIS ARE PREVENTABLE.

    IT HAPPENED BECAUSE OF AT RISK BEHAVIOUR..

    REMEMBER THE 85%.

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    CSO - Name of the meeting

    Safety Is Not a Numbers GameSafety Is Not a Numbers Game - Its About People.. - Its About People..

    Jim Comerford Severe facial injures & broken teeth

    Edvaldo Da Silva Fractured leg

    Tim McEniery Severed tendon, middle finger, R hand

    Terry Wilson 1 finger broken, 1 partially amputated

    Jair Alves Periera Deep laceration to arm

    Adimar Souza Part of thumb amputated

    Marcilio Maciel Part of R middle finger amputated

    Plotnikov Severe ankle sprain

    Matthew Park Partial amputation L hand

    Daniel Day Severe hand injury

    John Wood Dislocated shoulder

    Gilberto Santos Sprained ankle

    John Baines Sprained wrist

    John Stewart Severe hand injury

    Jose Luiz Martins Arm / Hand Injury

    Brian Hagan Chest injury

    Doe Sprained ankle

    Doe Head injury

    CSO - Name of the meeting

    CSO Fleet Offshore Statistics -CSO Fleet Offshore Statistics -1999 & 20001999 & 2000

    Business As Usual!

    0

    1

    2

    3

    4

    5

    6

    Jan

    Feb

    Mar

    Apr

    May

    Jun Ju

    lAu

    gSe

    p Oct

    Nov

    Dec

    Jan

    Feb

    Mar

    Apr

    May

    Jun Ju

    lAu

    gSe

    p Oct

    Nov

    Dec

    LTIF

    /Mill

    ion

    Man

    hour

    s ActionAction

    SatisfactionSatisfaction

    CSO - Name of the meeting

    Drivers for ChangeDrivers for Change

    These results have occurred despite a sustained safety effortby IMCA members

    Members offshore family continue to be hurt in unacceptablenumbers.

    We all strive for ZEROZERO Lost Time Injuries We are not going to achieve the target unless we change our

    approach to safety

    If We Do What Weve AlwaysIf We Do What Weve AlwaysDone, Well Get What WeveDone, Well Get What Weve

    Always GotAlways GotCSO - Name of the meeting

    WHY BOTHER.?WHY BOTHER.?What are the ObjectivesWhat are the Objectives

    STOP PEOPLE GETTING INJURED

    Behaviour is a recognised factor in accident causation

    Engage all staff in the improvement effort - give the crewmore ownership

    Maintain & improve on an already good safety performance

    Move to a more pro-active approach

    Improve safety behaviours, attitudes, conditions, culture &systems

    CSO - Name of the meeting

    Behaviour-Based Safety - What Is It?Behaviour-Based Safety - What Is It?

    Accidents involve peoples behaviour If you want to decrease accidents, you must increase safe

    behaviour & reduce at-risk behaviour

    At-risk behaviours are caused or encouraged by attitudinal &cultural factors

    Since behaviour is measurable it can be managed Safe behaviour can be managed by:

    Identifying the behaviours critical to accident causation Training people to measure them Using the results to provide early feedback to:

    y the workforce to guide their future behavioury management to guide its decision making

    CSO - Name of the meeting

    THE CSOL PROCES & ORCATHE CSOL PROCES & ORCA

    At-Risk BehavioursAt-Risk Behaviours

    We focus on eliminating At-Risk Behaviours

    Fatalities

    Lost Time Injuries

    First Aid Injuries

    Near Miss Reports

    bserve bserve

    ecord ecord

    onsult onsult

    gree gree

    OORR

    CCAA

    CSO - Name of the meeting

    Behaviours can beSafeor

    At-Risk

    AnObservable

    Act

    AnObservable

    Act

    BehaviourBehaviour

    CSO - Name of the meeting

    Key Elements of ORCAKey Elements of ORCA

    1. Identify Critical Behaviours1. Identify Critical Behaviours 2. Gather data2. Gather data

    3. Provide Feedback3. Provide Feedback 4. Use Data to remove barriers4. Use Data to remove barriers

    O bserve

    R ecord

    C onsult

    A gree

    O bserve

    R ecord

    C onsult

    A gree

  • WORKING SAFER OFFSHORE Presentations

    IMCA Safety, Environment & Legislation Core Committee Page 27

    CSO - Name of the meeting

    WHAT IS THE ORCA PROCESSWHAT IS THE ORCA PROCESS

    Firstly, this process is about behaviourbehaviour, not names. Observers:

    approach a work group / individual and explain they intend tospend 5-10mins observing the work

    record safe and at-risk behaviour using checklists specific toCSO incident history

    discuss the results with, & get feedback from, those observed give results to facilitator for input to database & faxing ashore

    NO NAMES ARE RECORDEDNO NAMES ARE RECORDEDEXCEPTEXCEPT THE OBSERVERS THE OBSERVERS

    CSO - Name of the meeting

    Comparisons Between Near MissComparisons Between Near Miss Reporting & ORCA Reporting & ORCA

    Every Near Miss report is a surprise Not all Near Miss Reports are welcomed as they sometimes reflect

    poorly on worksite supervision Personnel the subject of a Near Miss Report are often unaware one has

    been raised - so the opportunity to influence future behaviour is lost The quality and value of Near Miss Reports varies widely By the time a Near Miss is submitted, its too late

    Every ORCA Observation is part of a planned process We dont have to invent near misses to meet targets ORCA is about behaviourbehaviour, not quality of performance Observations are made against set criteria developed from CSOs

    specific incident history Observers are formally trained Observation results are discussed with personnel at the time - the

    opportunity is there to positivelypositively influence futurefuture behaviour

    CSO - Name of the meeting

    Two Key BenefitsTwo Key Benefits

    Since you are measuring behaviour you do not have to waitfor an incident to occur first.

    y Identification of at-risk behaviour becomes an early-warning[predictive] system for accidents

    Involving the workforce in developing a list of behaviourscritical to safety

    y It is specific to their work environmenty Is a strong enrolling factor in site safety awareness and

    developing a personal commitment to improving site safety

    CSO - Name of the meeting

    How This Important InitiativeHow This Important InitiativeCan Be DestroyedCan Be Destroyed

    Undermining it through ignoranceI dont know what its about but it sounds rubbish to me

    Using the results to beat people around the headI want a 10% increase in % safe behaviour by next week - or else

    Using the results as a contest between sitesYoure at the bottom of the league, whats wrong with you!

    Allowing your Clients to hijack the resultsThat 40% score is unacceptable, we / you must do something!

    CSO - Name of the meeting

    How You Can HelpHow You Can Help

    Understand it Ask questions, particularly of the trained ORCA Observers

    Support it Provide positive support and commitment - & especiallyespecially

    encourage Observations to be undertaken regularly

    Dont make it a contest The results willwill differ between sites - accept it, and use them

    carefully

    Identification of at-risk behaviour represents an opportunityfor improvement Not a mandate to discipline people..

    Dont expect overnight results Changing behaviour, then attitude, then culture, takes time

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  • WORKING SAFER OFFSHORE Presentations

    IMCA Safety, Environment & Legislation Core Committee Page 29

    DOES LEGISLATION ALWAYSHELP IMPROVE SAFETY?

    Positive and Negative ExamplesJoop van de Westen, ITIM

    The title of this presentation speaks for it self. Do rules make our life safer? Life in general and in ourcase specific referring to the working environment.

    Does legislation and rules help improve safety? I say: NO. And this is not true or, at least, notcompletely true. In this presentation I will share with you my thoughts about this subject. I hope toshow to you what I do mean when I say no, rules do not make our life safer.

    With you, I would like to put the subject in perspective. And therefore I made this presentationconsisting of the following items. I would like to tell you something about:

    1. Rules, regulations and penalties.2. What do rules do?3. Some attitudes and rules. 4. Do rules make our lives safe?5. Rules and human behaviour6. Conclusion: does legislation help improve safety?7. Lets do things different

    RULES, REGULATIONS AND PENALTIES

    What are rules and regulations?

    Rules and regulations are commands. They dictate our behaviour and as, icing on the cake, thesecommands have repercussions. We have to follow that what is written. And very often, if we do notfollow what is written, we expose ourselves to a penalty. Society is going to punish us if we dont followthe rules, but only when it is noticed - only if someone else saw us breaking the rule. And do the rulesachieve what they are meant for? Do we all happily obey them, or is it the penalties that do the work?Let us find out.

    Please follow me to a street corner. We want to cross the street to the shops on the other side, butthe pedestrian sign is red. Do we walk? No. I suggest we'd better wait. Why do I wait? Becausecrossing a red light can be dangerous and certainly there is a repercussion if I do it. I am violating thelaw and I have no intention to do so. Why not? Not only because it might be dangerous. There is afair possibility that my act will be noticed by someone representing the makers of that law and if theydo, I might have a fair chance of punishment. So I wait and hopefully you with me.

    I like to go faster. I am late and my boss is waiting, or I am going to miss an appointment. I carefullylook around. That black car with the fat driver - is he a policemen? No, I dont think so. Do I see anypatrol car? No cameras? Lets go! But hulas, the fat driver was a policeman and the black car anundercover police car. We will be punished with a fine. It is tough, it cost us our money.

    Lets go offshore and observe a particular offshore worker on a remote area of the unit. The sun isshining and the work is waiting to be done. We can hear the offshore worker mumble:

    I want to finish this job but all these safety precautions do hinder me Pff. It is rather hot, lets takeoff the hard hat. Safety goggles, why should I? No one to see, so no problem at all. It is safe. Lifejacket? I can barely move as it is. These fire retardant coveralls are to thick.

    Management should listen to what we have to say. Ladies and gentlemen, you should listen to him:Damn, my supervisor is coming. Where are me glasses, quick, my hard hat.

    Why all of a sudden so safety conscious? The answer is obvious. The supervisor represents theinstitute that wrote the rules and attached to the rules are penalties. And the offshore worker knowsthe penalties. It gives the supervisor some sort of control over his subordinate, but not over hisintention to behave safe.

  • WORKING SAFER OFFSHORE

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    The penalties at work are of a different nature than the fines we may expect to get after speeding.If one breaks the rules at work, he or she may expect a more serious effect. The philosophy to putpenalties with rules is obvious, it creates fear. The rules say "If you do not obey, I am going to hurtyou".

    Through the penalties the designers of rules try to influence human behaviour, but not very successfully.

    I would like to show this to you by the results of a survey done by my colleague, Sjaak Pappe, andmyself. The title of this survey is 'A rule per Accident'. The question we would like to see an answerfor was simple. Is there, with the increasing number of rules, a decrease of incidents and accidents?We were anxious to find out if this was true and, if so, if there was any correlation between the two.

    The reason why we chose this subject had anything to do with the remark made by people who directlyhave to deal with rules - the, if I may say so, blue collar workers. This is what they said:

    It is not surprisingly that accidents happen if you consider the number of rules we have to deal with;We did not know whether this was a fact.

    But enough people were making this kind of remarks and it triggered us. We started the job and, afterquite a while, we were able to present a survey of 124 pages about this subject. Some time has gonesince the survey and we learned a great deal since than. We learned about the connection betweenrules and people. We now think we have the answer to all questions. Whether we are right or not,the future will tell us. I would like to use findings and facts of our survey to support certain elements ofthis presentation and I will not stop at the conclusions we drew at that time. Things have evolved andI would like to share a number of them with you.

    But first lets see go back to the original subject. Rules. We have seen that penalties work. What aboutthe work site? Do they work there? One of the outcomes of our survey on the question 'Do workersfollow the rules - yes or no?' was that 14% of the participants stated they break the rules if they can dothis unnoticed. 42% did not give a clear answer. The question is what can you make of this?

    Another outcome of our survey showed us that employees believe rules are made by management formanagement, i.e. to protect managers against law suits. You may find the same conclusion in othersurveys as well. The answer stands for the opinion of workers that rules are written without them.They are excluded, not heard, and some of these men are much aware that they could contribute to thecontent of rules. Valerie Sutherland believes that excluding people will make them apathetic and,according to her, this can be seen as a main driver for accidents. It has to do with human behaviourand I will come back on this later on.

    As a contradiction I would like to mention another outcome of our survey: 66% of the workers areconvinced rules will prevent accidents.

    What are rules anyway?

    Safety rules, according to Mr Sticht, can be classified as functional lines. Most texts of rules are of thetype 'ready to do'. Reading and memorising is not the intention. It should be seen as an aid to help fulfila certain specific task. With instructions, manuals and procedures, they form regulations. If we makethem official, then we call these Law.

    What do rules do?

    Rules are written with the intention to prevent us from accidents. So, we can be satisfied. There are somany rules now that life is completely safe. Wrong. According to Mr Schot and Mr Stallen, safety rulesare indeed written to prevent accidents. But the language used is so difficult that they drive to accidentsinstead to prevent these. People have problems understanding them. Brune and Weinstein read thestatements of Schot and Stallen and thought 'This cant be true. Lets prove they are wrong;. So theyinvestigated, for some time, reports about incidents in nuclear plants. They looked at about 800incidents and found out that over 300 were caused by regulations. They then categorised the type oferrors which, to them, triggered the incidents. They came up with six categories. These are: the use ofincomplete procedures; disregarding procedures; use of inaccurate procedures; poor communication byimplementation of rules; use of wrong procedures and wrong interpretation of rules.

    Lets draw a careful conclusion: based on what we said we may assume that more rules will lead to moreaccidents. At the same time it shows how complex rules can be.

  • WORKING SAFER OFFSHORE Presentations

    IMCA Safety, Environment & Legislation Core Committee Page 31

    Feeling safe is meaningless

    Companies make their employees wear helmets. It is a safety precaution and protects the worker.People feel safer with a hard hat on, but is it truly safe? This is one of the side effects of rules on people.The rule states what and how they have to act and, if they follow the rules, it is safe. But one can makemistakes here. I remember the person who went offshore to work on a rig. His supervisor told him todo a certain job on a small platform. "Remember", the supervisor said, "remember to take the safetyprecautions. You know how strict we are about that". "Yes sir", the employee responded, "I knowwhat I have to do" and, indeed, the guy did put on a safety harness and attached a safety line. Then hestarted to climb the steep ladder leading to the little platform. It took him quite a while to get up toreach the platform. It took him only seconds to get back on the main deck. What happened? Once onthe small and narrow platform, he stumbled over some rubbish left by somebody else (good housekeeping). There was no railing to protect him from falling and he tumbled over and landed on the maindeck, in spite of his safety line.

    People ran towards the loudly crying victim, including his supervisor, very concerned. How could thishappen? Did the line brake? Then they found out the very simple answer. The height of the platformwas about 5 meters. The victim did take a safety line from the storage not noticing he took a line of10 meters length. Later, when he was asked why he took that line, his answer was simple. The safetyrule states that anyone working at height should wear a safety line attached to a safety belt. He couldnot remember any rule indicating to check the length of the line before attaching it. He did not knowwhat line he was putting on.

    You will say This is stupid and yes, you are right, it certainly is stupid to put on a safety line withoutchecking it, but, on the other hand, it shows us the trust someone can put in the rules. These ruleswere his safety line.

    These things happen more than we like. People sometimes blindly follow the rules trusting their safetyis in good hands.

    I would like to discuss attitudes and rules with you, therefore I would like to use some examples ofhow people look at rules. It seems they believe rules make things safer. Then, I always ask myself, whatis the effect of rules? Then back to some results of our survey, particularly that part where individualsgive their opinion whether rules makes their life more safe.

    I would like to look with you at the phenomenon of the written word and the human behaviour, thelaw and men, regulation and obedience. What are rules doing with people??? You may find some ofthe statements on the screen intriguing, true or not, open for debate.

    Rules and Unsafe Acts and the Opinion of Individuals

    Some time ago in a safety meeting we suddenly spoke about rules and unsafe acts. The manager whowas leading the meeting did put the following argument on the table. He said "One should stick to therules at all times". This manager is a safety person. I asked him what he meant. He said: If you're onthe road and speeding, then this is dangerous. I countered his statement with a question - howdangerous is speeding? "Well," he said, "if the limit is 120k and you drive faster, then this is a dangerousact". At that moment I started to believe that he really believed in what he said. He was convinced ofthe fact that law dictates a safe speed limit here. His statement made me think about people and rules.Was he aware why the speed limit was made in the first place? For what purpose?

    Now we have two things to consider here. People who believe the best thing to do is follow the rule; and Are rules always right and is it safe to follow them just like that?Rules can be dangerous

    We continued the discussion about speed, speed limits and dangerous acts. I found it amazing thatgrown people apparently do put so much faith in the law. They, at least, gave the impression that folksnot sticking to the rules endanger themselves and their fellow men.

    This I find a scary thing. In black and white these men said "As long as you keep to the speed limit youare conducting in a safe way". One of the men did its best to convince me that driving faster than 120kis a dangerous act. The government did the right thing to put a speed limit in place.

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    People can make rules dangerous.

    This is not true. Rules in themselves are not dangerous. It is us interpreting rules and bending them ina way that we think this is what they mean. I would not be surprised if that person believes driving intown at the official speed of 50k is also a very safe act no matter the circumstances.

    I was also very surprised to hear people did not know the true reason for implementing the speed limitof 120k on the Dutch Highways. For sure it had nothing to do with safety. It was only installed at atime when the petrol was scarce, reason for the Premier at the time, Mr den Uyl, to limit speed to100k. His words were "This is just for a short while. Once we have enough fuel again, we will undo thespeed limits". Maybe he meant what he said. Fact is, it never happened. As a compromise we areallowed to drive 120k, but thats it. Let me make myself clear. I am not a fan of fast driving. I dobelieve that driving in itself is a risk. A speed of 20k can be dangerous in particular situations. Modernvehicles are constructed in such a way that, technically speaking, we can drive them safely at high speed.

    What I find scary is the remarks I listened to of young male drivers. They were discussing the make oftheir cars and how fast they could go. Safety and risk were not part of the debate. Asked "Why not?",they reacted very surprised. "The design of cars today is such that even if you meet an accident, nothingwill happen to you, so why worry?" Well, I do.

    Maybe you will say "People can think and will know how to handle situations". Maybe true, but believeyou me that some people have peculiar ways of interpreting rules, regulations, signs and what have you.To illustrate, I would like to bring you back to the sixties. I remember in The Hague, Netherlands, theintroduction of a new traffic sign. The intention of the design was to make drivers aware to keepdistance. The sign showed two cars and a hand in between with the words 'Keep Distance'. In ameeting we discussed the intense traffic in the city and the dangerous behaviour of some drivers. Thanone of the persons in the meeting said that it was not only people to account for the danger. Also thegovernment is to blame, as he said. "Look at the new traffic sign demanding one should keep distancebetween cars, but only one hand distance". This person was very serious about this.

    With these examples I would like to show to you the peculiar effects rules can have on people.The safety manager and the gentlemen from the traffic meeting. The safety manager convinced aboutthe fact that rules are true guidelines in life. As long as you obey the rules, nothing will happen to you.I hope he is the only one, but I am sure I am mistaken. In spite of the many rules, incidents continue tohappen.

    Do rules make our lives safe?

    I once worked for an American oil drilling company. We had several jack-ups on the North Sea andabout 240 employees working in shifts. The company was well organised and we had a dedicated safetydepartment in place. The officers of the safety department did visit the sites on a regular base, talking tothe employees. allowing them to bring forward practical solutions. One day they were informed about adangerous situation. On a particular deck on the rigs it was not safe to be there. The railing was notsuitable enough to prevent people from falling overboard. This was brought up in our manager'smeeting and the safety department emphasised the necessity of putting new railing on all of theinstallations. We considered ourselves as very safety conscious. Very much to our surprise, the generalmanager declined the proposal. He was put under pressure to motivate his decision and this is what hesaid. We are convinced that the present situation might be dangerous. I am convinced," he said, "thatwe indeed should replace these parts of the installation. But, so far, no accidents occurred and as longas there is no Mining Regulation in place dictating us to have such railing, I am not willing to spend anymoney on it." I knew this manager very well and his integrity was beyond suspicion. After the meeting,I asked him for his reasons and, irritated, he shook his head. Joop, he said, as long as there is no law tomake us put up these railings, it means that in fact there is no dangerous situation. For him the matterwas closed.

    People who are continuously confronted with many (written) rules get used to the situation that forthem there is no need to think. Why should they? Big brother took over thinking and to safeguard allpeople, including workers, therefore, he made rules and regulations. "You should do this" or "Youshouldn't do this". I am certain you all have plenty of examples to illustrate my statement. It makespeople more or less docile and certainly rules aim to achieve control over human behaviour, controland to give direction. But often it is the thought of a penalty one may receive when breaking the rulethat stops people from making a decision based on their own ideas. An example for this is the situationat night time in a city. No one except one car, waiting for the red stop sign. No one else to see.

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    The driver does not cross the sign. He/she feels that it is not right to cross the red stop sign. It is notdone and it is safe to wait until the sign turns into green. Not done and the idea of safety are twoimportant things.

    We are so used to repercussions if we do something that is not allowed. If we are speeding, we willcheck if there is no policemen in the neighbourhood.

    Several workers on a drilling rig said "If my supervisor is out of sight, I will neglect the rules". Askingwhy, the answer was "Since these rules are useless and only made to protect my boss2. A study ofDr Jop Groeneweg proved that many rules are written with the intention to free a company fromindemnification, not to make life of its employees safer. Mr Etzioni said "Maximise moral dialogue,minimise legislation".

    Rules and human behaviour

    According to Mr Nuttin, people tend to make a distinction between the world of words and the worldof deeds. Although one should expect the two are connected, this seems not to be the case. There istension between what is said or declared and what behaviour shows us. This indicates a total absenceof rationale. Important here is the intellectual ability to solve problems. We are aware that we will notbe able to solve all problems. It seems that we do not use our brains very logical all the time. Thisseems to be necessary in order to be able to make quick decisions whether they are wise or less wise.If we consider this, than it is a quick conclusion that rules are not contributing much to our safety.

    There are lots of theories about human behaviour in relation to rules and regulations. The majority ofthese theories support the statement that human behaviour is irrational with a tendency not to followthe rules. Maybe this sounds confusing and even a bit scary, but there is hope. Although people actirrationally, according to Mr Perrow, this is a positive and helpful aspect of behaviour. Potential incidentsituations show many characteristics which conflict with each other or some are hardly visible. In thesecases rationality will not be of great help to us.

    We have to realise that rules are created based upon the assumption of absolute human rationality.Thinking of what was just said, we may assume that rules are not sufficient to serve its purpose.Still, those who make the rules still believe people live up to the rules and as a result there will be lessincidents happen. Then reality. We asked workers in the oil and gas industry if they have a book withrules and we were happy to learn the answer. "Yes", said 82%. "We do have a booklet with rules".So, rules help after all. "But having such a book is nice, are you using the book mister?" then 48% says"oh well, some times" and 27% declared to have read the book once but dont use it. I have no ideaabout the rest of the world, but in the Netherlands we asked people if they are aware of the mininglegislation which is applicable offshore. "Certainly" said 75%. We have the law books on board, whichare accessible to all of us". Isnt it great, 75%? When we asked people if they understand what iswritten in the mining law books, 72% replied with "Eh? Oh well, I think it means this, but I am not sure".Far better is the situation with company rules - rules you make. 51% knows more or less what thoserules are, but 49% are certain about these rules. How certain are folks if they say "I do understand therules"? Further questioning revealed that 65% of the workers see company rules as clear and stipulating.Another 30% admits that they find rules multi-interpretable. A rule with various meanings.

    Making mistakes. All safety rules are violated. This is not the same as making a mistake. A mistakehowever is many times confused with violations. This is not correct. A mistake is experienced bypeople when their actions do not lead to the aimed result. We may assume that no individual has theintention to make mistakes. To avoid mistakes, people make their own rules - very often we may callthese safety rules - and these rules are adjusted every time a person makes a mistake so the chance ofmistakes reduces. This assumption proofs that individuals basically are capable to handle their ownsituation. Basic thought: no rules needed. But let's not be hasty.

    Talking about violations, we refer to a total different scale of actions than mistakes. To simplify ourlives, if there are no rules, there will be no violations. There will be mistakes and, by adjusting andcreating the rules, we can turn any form of undesired behaviour into a violation. Do rules help to improve safety? I said "No" and I am convinced about it. If you ask people in the fieldif they feel safer with or without rules, then 73% answer "The number of rules we have is okay, but let itstop. No more rules". Why? Are there sufficient rules? Our group told us they ignore the rulesintentionally and this was 64% of the group.

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    "Why do you ignore rules?" "Because they hinder", said 41% and 38% said "Why should we stick tothe rules, they do not improve my safety."

    Are we ready for a conclusion?

    What have we discussed so far?

    We looked at rules, regulations and penalties. What are rules? We found out that they arecommands, dictating our behaviour and if we do not follow the rules then we may receive a punishment.We have seen that penalties do help to make us obey rules and regulations. This is based on fear, noton understanding, not on common sense.

    We have seen that, when the risk of being caught is small, we are willing to break the rules. This iseasier when the working and practicality of rules are at question. 14% of the response group of oursurvey declared to break the rules if they could do this unseen, thus unnoticed. 42% did not give astraight answer. This can make us wonder. "What are they doing? Are they like the offshore worker,sitting in the sun on that remote part of the installation, considering his safety situation since nosupervisor was in sight."

    We have seen that the type of penalties between the law and company rules and regulations are of adifferent type. The latter has impact on the labour relation of an employee and of far more implicationthan the financial penalties of violating the law. Promising is the 66% of the workers stating that to theiropinion rules indeed prevent accidents. This promising thought however will lose its credibility furtherin the presentation when we discuss if workers really understand the nature of rules and regulations.

    What do rules do?

    We have seen that rules are written with the intention to prevent accidents. We all are aware aboutthe enormous number of rules existing in the world. Based on earlier assumption, one could say "Well,we did a good thing. All those rules made our world a safer place to work in". But then there is thisproblem. Scientists say that many rules are leading towards accidents instead of preventing us from it.We have seen that people feel safe because rules do exist. They do things without thinking, just becauserules indicate what they have to do they do not use their brains anymore.

    We talked about attitudes and rules. I pictured some examples I had experienced in the past. Howsome people believe the rules tells us what is safe. They are ready to discuss the subject but not willingto give up the idea of rules. Is it a new bible? It is also scary to realise there is people out there, whointerpret rules and signs wrongly. The guy, and he was well respected and as far as I know a veryintelligent chap, thinking that indeed the government made this new traffic sign convincing motorists tokeep distance between vehicles. Just one hand away. Scary, is it not? Rules are not dangerous inthemselves. It is us who make them dangerous.

    "Do rules make our lives safe?" was another question we discussed. I used the example of thisAmerican drilling company with the American general manager. He refused to consider arecommendation made by the safety department. A recommendation that made sense to our opinionbut not to his. Why? Because he did not have to do it since it was not required by law and he used thisas an excuse not to spent any money. He twisted the safety idea by saying "If it is not described in thelaw, it is not a dangerous situation". What can you do against this kind of people? By the way, this chapis no longer responsible for the safety of other people. He was terminated and started his craw fishrestaurant. In the neighbourhood of Houston, so be aware. Fact is that when people are confrontedconstantly with a large number of rules, some sort of mechanism starts. They stop thinking. Whyshould they? We are efficient people after all, so why do things which do not make sense? The sensiblething here are the rules. But do we put so much trust in rules or is it something else? What about thepenalties all rules promise if you do not obey them? Scientist Etzioni pleaded to minimize the rules butmaximise the moral dialogue.

    I showed some more scientists. In rules and human behaviour I introduced the fact of two worlds.One world contains words and the other is the world where we do things. Separate worlds and noconnection. There is even a tension between the two. We tend to say something and somethingdifferent. Scientists like Nuttin call it the absolute absence of rational.

    Another scary finding by scientists is the fact that besides human act irrational, they tend to violate orignore rules. So there is a gap between the makers of rules and those they are made for. To make

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    makers of rules happy, we asked offshore workers if they had a book with rules. "Yes," said 82%, "wedo have such a book" and I thought, "Yes, rules help after all". But I was wrong. 38% of the mendeclared "Why should we stick to the rules, they do not improve my safety".

    So can we reach a conclusion? Do we have an answer to the question "Do rules help improvesafety?"

    This is what workers offshore said: We are having more accidents and you know why? Because theykeep making more and more rules.

    It is not only the offshore worker complaining about the massive number of rules, but it is not only thenumber of rules. Also the way they are written. Like they are written for children, or the opposite -the language used is too 'officialese'. Companies are paternalistic. It is no use to deny, it is the peoplewho experience rules this way.

    My point here is that nearly no one is considering the situation and the safety of a particular moment intime. This is what it is all about. Thinking. Yes, we say that rules are needed to make the world goround. I say no. No rules are needed to make things safer, this is my true belief. All it takes to makething safer is good quality of hardware, clear and concise instructions to be used for particular jobs andcommitted people. Committed in my perception means people who are aware that doing things safelyis an absolute must. And management - we/you should help them to be committed. To understandwhat it takes to take really care about themselves. We have to make sure that people do not have toworry about the penalties if they do not follow a rule. Rules like: If you dont wear your hardhat, you may be subject of termination. If you are under influence of alcohol, you are not allowed on the installation. If you dont wear the required safety belt and line, we will be after your ass Do rules help?

    This is what I think. We still have to do with rules. Modern technology is far to complex to pretend weare able to know every detail of what surrounds us. Rules have to help us out here. What I do notbelieve in are penalties. We should be able to organise our organisations in such way that we do notneed penalties. Let's start with the assumption that we all are responsible people no matter what rankwe are in. Let's design systems allowing all organisation members to change attitudes when needed.Make people aware that the most important thing is their health. The fact that employees can returnhome in the same state as they came to work should be the key note. I do see opportunities for rulesto help to improve safety. But under certain strict conditions.

    Lets do things differently

    I will address these as alternatives.

    People who live, work and survive in the Nordic areas, are very much aware that only they areresponsible for their own safety. In other words, they respect their lives. With every activity theyundertake, even when there are rules in place, they think about what could happen to them and basedon these thoughts, they make the situation a safe one. Their goal is to do the job and finish it healthy.They believe no rule in itself will or can safeguard them. Rules are considered as any other tool to beused to do the job.

    Bicyclists in the cities are acting differently from the bicyclists in the countryside. For both, the ruledictates that they should have sufficient lights on their bicycle and have them working when it is dark.Those in the cities seem not to care about lights. They hardly use them. Those using a bike in thecountry have working lights. They are aware of the fact that it is crucial for their safety to be seen bymotorists in the dark. Their lives depend on visibility.

    Lets introduce the buzzwords commitment and ownership. Commitment of any employee to his/herown life. They should truly appreciate they are the ones responsible for their own safety and health.Train them to scrutinise the situation they have to do their work in. Is it safe? Can I do my job safely?What do I have to do to make it safe?

    Certainly, it is to much to say we can do away with all rules. It will take time but I do believe that therewill come a time that indeed we can do without rules as such. Still, there will remain a necessity forwritten instructions. Due to the complexity of our technology is, one cant expect that users of this

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    technology are for a 100% familiar with it. There will always be the need for manuals and procedures.But, these manuals and procedures should be written in such a way that they are clear and concise.Only than they are meaningful and a valuable tool for those who have to do the work.

    When you are organised, have your regular safety meetings, painted lines on the floor, created anemployee safety committee, but you are still having incidents, behaviour based safety may be the stepyou are missing. If people are still taking risks in spite of all you have done to make them safetyconscious, your next step might be a solution that goes beyond awareness. Behaviour-based safety leadsemployees to routinely work safely.

    To focus on human behaviour is obvious once we realise that 90% of all accidents are human failurerelated. People are taking shortcuts and therefore risks and they have a reason to do so. Som