Humanitarian Intervention Theo Farrell, CSI Lecture 2, 2011.

HumanitarianIntervention

Theo Farrell, CSI Lecture 2, 2011

Humanitarian intervention

Definition:

‘forcible military intervention in humanitarian crises’

in failed states to secure aid

against murderous states to stop atrocities

The new interventionism

1988-1993: 20 new missions

UN peacekeeping budget

* $230 m in 1988

* $800 m – $1.6 b in 1990s

Rare during Cold War

1. Superpower stand-off 

2. Insufficient public pressure

3. UNSC log-jam

Traditional peacekeeping

• Chapter VI and a half’ activity

- Required ceasefire and consent

• Limited in number, size and scope

- 1948-1978: 13 missions 

- 1978-1988: none

- supervise truces

The blue helmets

UN Charter

Article 2(3): Settle disputes by ‘peaceful means’

Article 2(4): refrain from ‘threat or use of force’

Article 2(7): non-intervention

Article 51: inherent ‘right of self-defence.’

Chapter VII: peace enforcement – in response to a ‘threat to international peace and security.’

Humanitarian? Not in name

India in East Pakistan (1971)

Tanzania in Uganda (1978)

Vietnam in Cambodia (1978)

France in Central African Republic (1979)

Cold war attitude

“The notion that because a regime is detestable foreign intervention is justified and forcible overthrow is legitimate is extremely dangerous. That could ultimately jeopardise the very maintenance of international law and order.”

French rep to UNSC, on Vietnamese intervention in Cambodia, 1978

Many interventions

UN: Somalia (1992-95), Bosnia (1992-95), Cambodia (1992-93), East Timor (1999)

Coalition: northern Iraq (1991)

ECOWAS: Liberia (1990), Sierra Leone (1997)

CIS: Tajikistan (1993), Georgia (1992)

NATO: Kosovo (1999)

Serb thugs in action

UN impotence

Failure at Srebrenica

Somalia: mission over (1993)

Lessons from intervention failures

SOMALIA (1992-1994)

dangers of crossing the consent divide

BOSNIA (1992-1995)

dangers from peace spoilers 

need to induce consent

Shadow of Somalia

Agenda for Peace (1992) v. Supplement to an Agenda for Peace (1995)

PDD-25 The Clinton Administration’s Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations (1994)

Rwandan genocide

800,000 massacred in 100 days (April-July 1994)

Hutu extremists v. Tutsi and Hutu moderates

Causes of civil war

Mary Kaldor – ‘new wars’: identity, non-state actors, and low-tech.

Paul Collier – greed v. grievance: economic motives

Stuart Kaufman – elite manipulation v. mass moments: myths about ‘ancient hatreds’

Road to genocide

Elite manipulation of tribal identity

Collapse in commodity prices

French military support to Hutu extremists

Tutsi RPF assault on Kigali in 1993 leads to inclusion of Tutsis in govt

The trigger: shooting down President’s plane (6 April 1994)

Rwanda, 1994

UN disgrace

UN Response

UNAMIR reduced from 2,500 to 270 (21 April)

UNSCR 918 expands force to 5,500 (17 May) 

2,300 strong French force create “Humanitarian Protection Zone” (9 July)

Could intervention have worked?

the French success?

pace of slaughter?

UNAMIR warned of genocide

Politics of HI: public opinion

1. ‘CNN effect’: dependent on degree of policy certainty and political unity

2. ‘Bodybags effect’: misunderstood by policymakers

Politics of HI: UNSC politics

log-rolling problem 

veto problem 

posturing problem 

co-ordination problem

Peace ops: principles and practicalities

Objective – often ambiguous and unattainable

Unity of effort – divergent troop contributors

Mass – dispersal of forces

Surprise – little speed and secrecy in peace operations

Peace ops: public opinion and operational pathologies

Strategic compression of battlefield

Full-force protection

Over-reliance on air power 

Focus on exit strategies

Doctrine of International Community

Are we sure of our case?

Have we exhausted diplomatic options?

Does the military instrument offer prudent and achievable goals?

Are we prepared to be in this for the long term?

Is our national interest truly engage?

Tony Blair, Chicago, 22 April 1999

The future of humanitarian intervention?

Evolving norm

– state practice over time

– each intervention ‘unique’?

International Criminal Court: agent for action

R2P, Kosovo and Iraq – rising powers push back

Western appetite post Iraq and Afghanistan?