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MIKHAIL GRAHAM HEY-RIM YOO Humanitarian Intervention in Kosovo
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Humanitarian Intervention in Kosovo

Feb 24, 2016

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Humanitarian Intervention in Kosovo. MIKHAIL GRAHAM HEY-RIM YOO. Contents. Background Analysis Significance Current Situation. BACKGROUND. 1a. Kosovo. Region in southeastern Europe Consisted of majority of Albanians and minority of Serbs and other minorities. 1a. Background. - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
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Page 1: Humanitarian Intervention in Kosovo

MIKHAIL GRAHAMHEY-RIM YOO

Humanitarian Intervention in Kosovo

Page 2: Humanitarian Intervention in Kosovo

Contents

1. Background2. Analysis3. Significance4. Current Situation

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BACKGROUND

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1a. Kosovo

Region in southeastern Europe

Consisted of majority of Albanians and minority of Serbs and other minorities

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1a. Background

Date Important events1912 First Balkan War-> Serbia given sovereignty over

Kosovo1919-1920 WWI-> Kosovo became an integral part of Serbia

under the peace treaties1939-1945 WWII-> Albanian Kosovars collaborated with the

Germans who had occupied Serbia1945 Josip Broz Tito came in power1948 FRY broke ties with Russia and Albania1974 1974 Yugoslav ConstitutionMay 9th, 1980 Tito’s death

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1a. Background

Date Important EventsEarly 1980s Albanians-> rising nationalism and extremist

opinions on ethnic cleansing in KosovoSerbs-> SANU Memorandum

February 1987 Serbian government’s proposal of taking away Kosovo’s autonomy

1987 Rise of Slobodan Milosevic as a political power in Serbian politics

March 1989 Milosevic started stripping away Albanians’ rights the 1974 Yugoslav Constitution

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1a. Historical Background

Date Major Events that Led to Kosovo WarMarch, 1989 Milosevic removed independence of institutions

and renamed Kosovo as the ‘Autonomous Prov-ince of Kosovo and Metohija’

July 2nd, 1989 Albanian delegates of Kosovo Assembly declared Kosovo an independent republic with in FRY

July 5th, 1989 Serbian Assembly dissolved the Kosovo Assembly and dissolved the provincial executive council and assumed full and direct control of the prov-ince

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1a. Historical Background

Date Major Events that Led to Kosovo WarSeptember 7th, 1990 Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo promul-

gated by the disbanded Assembly of KosovoSeptember 28th, 1990

Serbian Constitution promulgated

December 26th, 1990

Milosevic became President of Serbia

1992 Ibrahim Rugova, member of the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) , won the first presiden-tial election in the Republic of Kosovo

December 14th, 1995

Dayton Agreement was officially signed by Milo-sevic and other important political figures

February, 1996 Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) bombed Serb tar-gets

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Kosovo War

“An ethnic Albanian guerrilla movement, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), began attacking Serbs and suspected ethnic Albanian collaborators in late 1997, provoking harsh responses by government forces. In March 1999, after internationally sponsored negotiations failed to halt the violence, NATO launched a 78-day bombing campaign that compelled Serbia to relinquish control over the province. After the fighting ended, hundreds of thousands of ethnic Albanians who had been expelled by government forces returned. NATO and the United Nations took responsibility for Kosovo’s security and civilian administration, though Serbian rule remained legally intact. “ (Freedom House)

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1b. Resolution 1160

Adopted on March 31st, 1998Security Council acted under Chapter VII of the Charter

“Condemning the use of excessive force by Serbian police forces against civilians and peaceful demonstrators in Kosovo, as well as all acts of terrorism by the Kosovo Liberation Army or any other group or individual and all external support for terrorist activity in Kosovo, including finance, arms and training,”

“5. … principles for a solution of the Kosovo problem should be based on the territorial integrity of the FRY…”

“19. Emphasizes that failure to make constructive progress towards the peaceful resolution of the situation in Kosovo will lead to the consideration of additional measures;”

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1b. NATO’s interference

Despite international pressure through Resolution 1160, the Serbs began a new offensive in May in the area around Decani

Over 100,000 Albanian refugees left DecaniThe Blair Government led the way to create public

support and argument that NATO should step in to stop the ethnic cleansing happening in Kosovo

NATO was unwilling to be the cause of Kosovo’s secession

Whether NATO should act without explicit consent from Security Council

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1b. Resolution 1199

Adopted on September 23rd, 1998 Passed by 14 votes (China abstained) Resolution passed under Chapter VII of the Charter

“Affirming that the deterioration of the situation in Kosovo, FRY, constitutes a threat to peace and security in the region,”

“2. Demands also that the authorities of the FRY and Kosovo Albanian leadership take immediate steps to improve the humanitarian situation and to avert the impending humanitarian catastrophe;”

“15. Requests the Secretary-General to provide regular reports to the Council as necessary on his assessment of compliance with this resolution by the authorities of FRY and all elements in the Kosovo Albanian community…”

“16. Decides, should the concrete measures demanded in this resolution and resolution 1160 (1998) not be taken, to consider further action and additional measures to maintain or restore peace and stability in the region;”

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1b. NATO in Action

Britain and USA wanted a stronger resolution than 1199, but was opposed by Russia and China

On October 5th, 1998 Kofi Annan reported a mass killings of civilians in Kosovo

Britain proposed to draft a new resolution authorizing ‘all necessary means’ to stop the massacre in Kosovo

Russia and China vetoedOn October 13th, 1998 NATO issued an activation

order for air strikes against Serbian targets and justified it in terms of resolution 1160 and 1199

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1b. October Agreement

Milosevic, threatened by NATO’s issuance of attack, agreed to an October Agreement accepting the following;

Cessation of hostilities and a return of police and security forces to their barracks

Presence of a verification mission of 1,700 inspectors from the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)

The agreement was predicated on Kosovo remaining an integral part of Yugoslavia

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1b. Resolution 1203

Adopted on October 24th, 1998 Remained divisive among USA, Russia and China Passed with 13 votes (Russia and China abstained)

USA Ambassador stated ‘that a credible threat of force was key to achieving the OSCE and NATO agreements and remains key to ensuring their full implementation… The NATO allies, in agreeing on 13 October to the use of force, made it clear that they had the authority, the will and the means to resolve the issue.’

Russian Ambassador emphasized that ‘enforcement elements have been excluded from the draft resolution, and there are no provisions in it that would directly or indirectly sanction the automatic use of force which would be to the detriment of the prerogatives of the Security Council under the Charter.’

China indicated its worries because the ‘decision was made unilaterally, without consulting the Security Council or seeking its authorization.’

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1b. Negotiations in Rambouillet and Paris Talks

Kosovo Albanians were unhappy with October Agreement, because 1) they were uninvolved in the talks 2) the settlements provided them with less rights than did the Constitution of 1947

In January 15th, 1999 Serb forces killed 45 Albanian civilians in Racak

Peace talks in RambouilletAppendix B of the ‘Kosovo Interim Agreement for Peace and

Self-Government in Kosovo’ proposed that there should be a NATO led international force -> negotiations broke down

Week later, parties met in ParisSerb delegation continued to reject the Contact Group’s terms-

>unsuccessful

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1b. NATO in Action

March 15th, 1999 Serbian forces began a new campaign on Kosovo ethnic cleansing

Unable to reach negotiations, Alliance governments made the decision to launch air strikes against FRY on the night of March 23rd, 1999

NATO’s justification for intervention: 1) NATO’s action is aimed at averting an impending humanitarian catastrophe, 2) NATO’S credibility was at stake, 3) ethnic cleansing in Kosovo could not be allowed to stand in a civilized Europe and that it posed a long-term threat the European security, and 4) NATO’S use of force was in conformity with existing Security Council resolutions

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1b. NATO in Action

NATO’s bombing accelerated the ethnic cleansingWithin weeks of the start of the bombing, thousands of

Kosovar Albanians were killed, over half a million were driven from their homes to become refugees in neighboring countries, and hundreds of thousands more found themselves internally displaced within Kosovo

As the pressure for a ‘result’ grew, NATO focused bombing infrastructural targets leading to deaths of Serbian civilians

KLA operations in the last two weeks of the warNATO succeeded in persuading the Belgrade Government

to accept an EU-Russian peace plan on June 3rd, 1999 officially ending the war

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ANALYSIS

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2a. Supreme Humanitarian Emergency

Estimated 500 killed and 400,000 relocated leading up to NATO action (Wheeler 269)

Reason to believe that many more Albanians would be killed/ driven out

Bosnia '91 (quarter million killed before NATO intervention)

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2b. Last Resort Milosovic was not willing to compromise, and

it did not seem likely that he would. Turned down Rambouillet Agreement.

Critics argue that NATO put forth a deal that no sovereign state would accept (presence of NATO forces for security, reduction of autonomy) to use the rejection that followed as a rationale for intervention.

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2b. Last Resort Three points to counter this argument:

1.) that ignores the point of Rambouillet whose purpose was to limit severely the FRY's sovereignty over Kosovo.

2.) Milosevic had initiated the spring offensive under the cover of negotiations at Rambouillet, and he did not come forth with constructive proposals--> both indicating his unwillingness to negotiate seriously

3.)there was no realistic non-violent alternative to protect Kosovars from human rights violations (Wheeler 283)

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2c. ProportionalityDeath of civilians: 3,368 (Red Cross); 488-527

by NATO air strikes (Human Rights Watch)

Bombing provoked deaths resulting from Serb retaliation (controversial; not necessarily more than what they prevented, but they are deaths nonetheless)

NOT ENOUGH GROUND TROOPS/ half-hearted (lesson that fear of casualties can lead to bad policies that result in more casualties in the intervened state

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2d. Positive Humanitarian Outcome Rescue- goal of ending ethnic cleansing

achieved, forced an agreement, despite collateral damage.

Rebuild (short-term) did nothing to prevent backlash and reverse ethnic cleansing of a quarter million Serbs by Albanians.

Rebuild (long-term)- The jury is still out on the long term humanitarian consequences. On negative side: concerns of Serbs in Kosovo; KFOR troops as possible targets of Kosovar extremists; threat of Albanian nationalism causing disagreement

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2d. Positive Humanitarian Outcome

Rescue

•△

Rebuild (Short-term)

•X

Rebuild (Long-term)

•△

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2e. Humanitarian motive

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2f. Humanitarian justification

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2g. Legality

XAlliance leaders (members of NATO) have

“reinterpreted” Resolution 1160, 1199 and 1203

Russia’s request on debating NATO’s action of violating the UN Charter

German ministers agreed with Russia’s point that there had not been any legal basis for unilateral humanitarian intervention

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2h. Selectivity

○/△KROF failed to prevent the exodus of Serbs

or guarantee the security of those who remained

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2i. Criteria

ThresholdSupreme Humanitarian Emer-gency

Last Resort ○Proportionality XPositive Humanitarian Outcome △/XHumanitarian intervention ○Humanitarian justification ○Legality XSelectivity ○

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SIGNIFICANCE

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3a. Precedent of Unilateral Action “The vote in the Security Council was

historic because, for the first time since the founding of the Charter, seven members either legitimated or acquiesced in the use of force on humanitarian grounds in a context where there was no express Council authorization.” (Wheeler 281)

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3a. Precedent of Unilateral Action First time a group of nations took action

unilaterally Brought into debate the legitimacy of

unilateral action Establishment of new norm?

1945-1990 Kosovo-Unilateral Action O

Unilateral Action X

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3a. Precedent of Unilateral Action Debate over legitimacy Disagreement between countries that were for/

against the intervention Russia and China see it as an illegal invasion of

sovereignty that undermines the international system

BUT ALSO, between those who were for the intervention:

British/ NATO stance: action was legal and justified

German stance: action was illegal, but justified

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3a. Precedent of Unilateral Action

Germany: veto abuse by China and Russia, not the resolutions, justified intervention

The problem with Germany’s argument? It conflicted with the British/NATO stance;

4th rationale for intervention given by Western governments:• 4.) NATO's use of force was in conformity with

existing UN resolutions, and is therefore legal

Germany argued that it was NOT in conformity with existing UN Resolutions

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3b. Aerial Bombing: A Questionable Strategy

Provokes strong reaction* Collateral damage, including civilian deaths Inaccuracy/ accidents

Chinese Embassy

“Illustrates the severe limits on the US willingness to sacrifice for those who find themselves in danger in parts of the world that are peripheral to US security interests.” (Wheeler 240)

Compromise between casualties and efficient strategy

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3c. Importance of Post-Conflict Rebuilding

“reverse” ethnic cleansing Quarter million Serbs massacred after the

end of humanitarian mission Discrimination in present-day Kosovo

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3c. Importance of Post-Conflict Rebuilding

FINT report 2011: still a lot segregation against Serbs (90% Albania, situation totally reversed now). Higher education segregated. Hostile against returning refugees. Freedom to associate/assemble not present. Rigged criminal procedures (Ethnic Albanian officials rarely prosecute cases involving Albanian attacks on non-Albanians; harassment and intimidation of journalists

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3c. Importance of Post-Conflict Rebuilding

(Continued)Positive changes: No more ethnic cleansing, constitution

protects many rights, becoming increasingly independent from Serbia, freedom of speech permitted in constitution (except that of ethnic hostility), unregulated internet, religious freedom

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4d. Internationalization of Conflict Repression of Albanians-> Attack on Serbs

by the KLA-> brutal retaliation->humanitarian intervention

Manipulation of system and great powers by the Albanians to achieve objective?

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CURRENT SITUATION

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4a. Present day Kosovo

On February 17th, 2008 Republic of Kosovo declared independence

In the Security Council, US, UK and France recognized the declaration while China expressed concern and Russia regards it illegal

All of Kosovo’s neighboring states, except Serbia, has recognized Kosovo’s independence

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4a. Present day Kosovo

In 2011, there were border clashes between the Serbs in northern Kosovo and Republic of Kosovo

Intervention from NATO’s KFOR forces eased the tension

On February 14th and 15th, 2012 an advisory referendum on accepting the institutions of Republic of Kosovo was held in northern Kosovo—99.74% opposed this idea