Hirohito, The Emperor's Army and Pearl Harbor

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Hirohito, the Emperor's Army and Pearl HarborAuthor(s): Saki DockrillSource: Review of International Studies, Vol. 18, No. 4 (Oct., 1992), pp. 319-333Published by: Cambridge University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20097309 .

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Review of International Studies (1992), 18, 319 333 Printed inGreat Britain

Hirohito, the Emperor's Army andPearl Harbor*SAKI DOCKRILL

The death of Hirohito on 7 January 1989 provided the Japanese with an opportunityof reappraising the Showa era, as Hirohito's reign is called in the Japanese calendar.This lasted for sixty-two years, which the press described as years of 'turmoil anddrastic changes.'1. While the role of the Emperor and, to a greater degree, the roleof the military in imperial Japan have been long-running themes for historians,intellectuals, and journalists, Hirohito's death certainly encouraged the publicationof a large number of books, including reprints of works about the Pacific War,from semi-official histories, the memoirs of some of the leading decision makersand a series of histories of Japan from 1868 to 1945.2 Television programmesshowed for two full days panel discussions by historians and documentary films ofthe Showa era?a series of bloody wars inChina and eventually with the Americans,the British and the other Allied powers, leading to unconditional surrender and

occupation.3Domestic reactions varied from indifference to a sense of relief, while there werethose who felt that they could for the first time bury their memories of a tragic andconfused period. Some felt sorry for the man who had reigned during Japan'smost difficult period of international relations, while others admired the Emperor'spacifism. There was also a section of the population and some intellectuals whowere critical about the role of the emperor in prewar politics. A simple and importantquestion was why he allowed Japan to become bogged down in a fifteen-years'war in China and subsequently in the Pacific in December 1941? The Emperor'slegal position under the old (Meiji) constitution remains controversial. YokotaKichisabur?, a supreme court judge, concluded in 1949 that as the Emperor was

deeply involved in the preparation for, and the outbreak of, the Pacific War and that,

* The original draft of this article was first presented at the Military History Seminar, at the Institute ofHistorical Research, University of London, inDecember 1990. The revised and second draft of thisarticle was presented at the British International History Annual Conference, BISA, Durham inSeptember 1991. The author is very grateful to the IHR seminar and the audience at Durham for theirhelpful advice. The research was made possible by the John M. Olin Foundation, Department ofHistory, Yale University and by the MacArthur Foundation, Department of War Studies, King'sCollege London.1Asahi Shimbun (daily newspaper) (hereafter cited as Asahi) 7 January 1989; ainichi Shimbun (dailynewspaper), 7 January 1989; Asahi Evening News, 1 January 1989.2 For instance, eight volumes of Taihei yo senso e no michi (The Road to the Pacific War) originallypublished in 1962-3 were re-designed and re-printed in 1988 (Tokyo) Sugiyama memo edited by theImperial Army General Staff (which was originally published in 1967) (Tokyo, 1989); See also theinteresting study of the Japanese Emperor by Thomas Crump, The Death of an Emperor (Oxford andNew York, 1991).3 The author was in Tokyo at the time of the death of Hirohito.

319


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320 Saki Dockrillas he had approved the decision, he could not escape his responsibility for that war.4Some argue that even if the emperor was legally immune from all responsibility, hedid have moral obligations to the Japanese and to the populations of conqueredcountries who suffered from Japanese military aggression during the war.5 Othersbelieve that the Emperor was manipulated by politicians and the military during theperiod.6In fact, Hirohito wanted to abdicate at least three times as a means of atoning forthe nation's responsibility for the war?first, on 29 August, 1945, when Hirohito putthis case strongly to Marquis Kido K?'ichi (the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal),second, inNovember 1948, when the Tokyo war tribunal imposed death sentences onseven of the leaders of the war-time Japan, notably General Toj? Hideki, and finally,when the Emperor repeated his offer to abdicate in the aftermath of Japan's signatureof the peace treaty in September 1951.7 However, his desire to admit his responsibilitywas frustrated by various Japanese advisors?court officials and political leaders?bythe American policy of preserving the throne for the sake of the stability of occupiedJapan, and probably by the Emperor's own personality which did not resist toostrenuously the combined opposition of internal and external opinion to his proposedabdication. He was instead persuaded to remain on the throne as a symbol of Japan.In the aftermath of Hirohito's demise, a leading Japanese newspaper wrote that:the death of Hirohito should not be regarded as the end of Japanese debates aboutresponsibility for the war and that Japan should realize that no other nation but Japan needsto reflect upon Japan's sins in the past.8

More recently the Emperor's monologue of eight hours, which was recordedbetween March and April 1946 by five court officials, has been published. In this,Hirohito discussed the events which took place from the assassination of ChangTwo-lin, the war lord of Manchuria by the Kwantung Army in 1928 down to the endof the Pacific War in August 1945. Hirohito dictated this, without relying on anymemos or notes, and, despite occasional flaws in his memory of events, the record hasconfirmed that Hirohito was fairly well briefed by his decision makers about Japan'snational strategies.This article will first deal with the Emperor's relations with the Japanese MilitaryEstablishment. Secondly, it will try to demonstrate that Hirohito was not absolutesovereign as was defined under theMeiji Constitution nor did he merely listen to andaccept the advice of his officials, civilian and military, as has been generally acceptedby historians. On the contrary, he did try to influence the crucial decisions made by

4 For instance, see Asahi, 9, 12 and 16 January 1989; D. Irokawa (interview), Asahi Journal, 27 January1989, pp. 14-6. See also Kisaka in Taiheiyo senso, pp. 16-17; Shin Nihon Bunkagu Kai (New Japan

Literary Association), Han Tennou sei ron (Anti-Emperor Views) (6th edn, Tokyo, 1986).5 For instance, Asahi, 12 January 1989; K Hayashi, 'Senso Sekinin to wa nanika' (What is theWarResponsibility?) in Bungei-shunju (Tokyo), 67, no. 4 (March 1989), pp. 264?5.6 This reflects the main stream of Japanese thinking; for instance, Asahi 9, 12 and 16 January 1989;discussions by critics, writers, and historians on TV (channels 2, 6, 8, 10) on 7 January 1989; S. Oue,Tennou no guntai (The Emperor's Army) (Tokyo, 1988).7 H. Takahashi, Shocho Tennou (The Emperor as a Symbol), pp. 18-59; see also Sukemasa Iriye (whoserved at the board of the Chamberlain in the Imperial Household after 1935 and was the GrandChamberlain from 1969 until his death in 1985), Iriye Jijucho no shuki (Iriye Grand Chamberlain'sDiaries), entries of 11May and 17August 1948 printed in Asahi, 1February 1989; and entry of 2May1951 (in which Iriye observes that the Emperor finally gave up his plans to abdicate), in Asahi, 3February 1989.8 Author's translation, quoted from Asahi, 9 January 1989.


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Hirohito, the Emperor's Army and Pearl Harbor 321

his Governments after 1937, without trying to behave as a dictator, a role which healways rejected. A final theme is therefore to examine how he tried to exert some influence on policy and why he failed, in the last resort, to avert war inDecember 1941.

The Emperor and Imperial Japan's military establishment

Under the Meiji Constitution, (largely modelled on the German Imperial Constitution), proclaimed in 1889, the Emperor was the supreme authority in Japan, andthe people were subject to the Emperor. Cabinet ministers were to be appointed bythe Emperor as his assistants, and were responsible to him and not to theDiet for theconduct of Japan's domestic and foreign policy. Moreover, under article 3, theEmperor was defined as having a 'Holy Existence' and as such he was immune fromprosecution. Under article 11, the Emperor commanded the Japanese army and navyand possessed the right of Supreme Command. This was a system of absolute

monarchy, but as a general rule, understood by the leading military/civilian officialsas well as by the Emperor, he was to be a constitutional monarch and was to act onlyon the advice of his responsible officials.9Consequently, under the fiction of the Emperor's approval, the Japanese executivebranch could conclude treaties with foreign nations, declare war, and appoint civilianand military officers, while the Diet was concerned only with budgetary and legis

lative issues. However, even on these issues, once the government had obtained theEmperor's approval for a law, the Diet had no power over that law, while theEmperor was entitled to reject legislation passed by the Diet.The executive branch was a complex organisation. It comprised: (1) the cabinetwhere two active serving officers represented the Army and theNavy Departments astheir respective ministers. (The participation of active service officers was abolished in1912 but reintroduced in 1936); (2) the General Staff of the Army and of the Navy,and (3) other elite advisory bodies with direct access to the Emperor, such as (a) theGenro (a non-constitutional group of senior military/civilian officials who hadcontributed to the establishment of the Meiji government), (b) senior statesmen(represented by ex-prime ministers), (c) the Privy Council (a constitutional bodywhich was to examine the constitutionality of Japan's treaties with other nations); (d)court officials such as the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and the Grand Chamberlain.The Emperor was the Supreme Commander of the nation's armed forces andthis was laid down in an Imperial Mandate in 1882. The Japanese army came intoexistence in December 1870 and originally comprised 10,000 men drawn from theSatsuma, Ch?shu, and Tosa regional clans.10 The Army General Staff was establishedin 1878 as a planning organization and had a right of audience with the Emperor toseek the latter's approval for matters related to planning, logistics and strategy, while

9 For a succinct account in English of Imperial Japan's decision-making system, see S. Imai, 'Cabinet,Emperor, and Senior Statesmen', inDorothy Borg and Shumpei Okamoto (eds.) Pearl Harbor as

History 1931-41 (New York and London, 1973), pp. 53-79; S. Ienaga, Japan's Last War (Oxford,1979), ch. 3; see also an English translation of the Meiji Constitution in Edwin Hoyt, Japan'sWar?The Great Pacific Conflict (London and Melbourne, 1986). Appendix E, pp. 439-49.10For the origins of the Japanese Imperial army, see Akira Fujiwara, Nihon gunji shi (Japanese Military

History), vol. 1 (Tokyo, 1987), pp. 1-27.


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322 Saki Dockrill

theWar Minister exercised executive powers.11 By the 1930s, the right of audiencewith the Emperor had been expanded to include not only the Chief of the ArmyGeneral Staff, but also the Chief of the Navy General Staff (which was established in1893 on the eve of the Sino-Japanese War) and two cabinet members, the Minister oftheWar and theMinister of the Navy.12

The nature of the Emperor's Army

The so-called Emperor's Army were not always highly motivated. The first conscription measure was introduced in 1873. It was very restrictive , exempting the wealthy,civil servants, medical students, and the eldest sons of families. As a result, only 3 percent of the total population who were fit to serve in the army were drafted. The Meijiconstitution revised this and national service became compulsory. However, about10 per cent of those who were subject to national service evaded the call up and onlyabout 5 per cent of those available went into the armed forces.13

With the rapid build-up of military strength after the Sino-Japanese War of 18941895, the size of the Army nearly doubled and reached about 20 divisions, while the

Navy consisted of 106 ships, including 11 cruisers and 23 destroyers. However, thewar with the Russians in 1904-1905 was a bitter struggle. The Russian Army inManchuria was ten times larger than the Japanese army and the six months fightingon the Liaotung peninsula cost 59,000 Japanese lives, nearly 45 per cent of the army'sfighting strength. The Japanese army's morale accordingly declined.14In December 1926, a conscription law was passed in the Diet, which made allJapanese males over twenty years old eligible to undergo three years service in thenavy or two years in the army, with a further four to five years in the reserves andfinally ten more years sub-reserve training. Thus even after the completion of activeservice, a former conscript might be recalled at any time during this lengthy reserveperiod and naturally enough the system was never popular.15 For instance, by 1932,only about 15 per cent of those who were eligible for service were drafted16 and duringthe Manchurian crisis in 1933, the Japanese Government issued a proclamation to thenation to the effect that Japan was in a state of national emergency and that thosewho tried to escape from national service should be ashamed of themselves.17

Moreover, barrack life was far from attractive: strict obedience to higher officerswas obligatory, and frequently these officers meted out private punishments on theirsubordinates. Soldiers were ordered to fight to the death and desertion in front of11 S. Oue, Tennou no guntai, pp. 136-7.12 Ibid. pp. 163-7; Fujiwara, Nihon gunji shi, pp. 81-2.13 Ibid. pp. 32-4, 56-8, 62-8; Oue, Tennou no guntai, pp. 69-70.14Fujiwara, Nihon gunji shi, pp. 81?4, 103-6, 108-115; S. Sakano, Kindai Nihon no shuppatsu (The

Origins of Modem Japan), (Tokyo, 1989), pp. 209-11; T. Furuya, Nichiro Sens? (Russo-JapaneseWar) (Tokyo, 1989), pp. 96-160; W. G. Beasley, Japanese Imperialism, 1894-1945 (Oxford, 1987), p.91. The Imperial military courts dealt with increasing numbers of soldiers who failed?or refused?toobey the regulations: 2,222 cases in 1906, 1,992 in 1907 and 2,203 in 1908 with about 1,600 deserters.See Fujiwara, Nihon gunji shi, pp. 134-5; M. Sumiya, Dai'nihon teikoku no shiren (Japanese Empire'sChallenge) (Tokyo, 1987), pp. 341-3.15Oue, Tennou no guntai, pp. 71-80; Fujiwara, Nihon gunji shi, p. 173.16 Ibid. pp. 237-8.17Oue, Tennou no guntai, p. 65.


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enemy troops entailed the automatic imposition of the death penalty.18 The survivalrate in the Emperor's Army during the Pacific War reflected the hierarchial nature ofthe army even in death: for instance, within one war-time battalion, 67 per cent ofofficers above the rank of Second-Lieutenant, 39 per cent of non-commissionedofficers, the only 18 per cent of its foot soldiers returned home.20 The rapid increaseinmilitary manpower?ten times between 1937 and 1941?meant not only hastilytrained officers, but also increased numbers of poorly trained and medically unfitsoldiers mobilized from the sub-reserve and reserve forces, who comprised about 40per cent of the entire military.20 During the Pacific War, soldiers' morale remainedlow and the Imperial Military Court dealt with increasing numbers of soldiers whofailed to, or refused to, obey and regulations?1,138 soldiers were punished in 1937,2,875 in 1938 and 3,148 in 1941.21

With an underclass of reluctant and oppressed soldiery, Japan's military establishment was directly responsible only to the Emperor so that opportunities for theredress of grievances by the lower ranks were non-existent. The General Staff of theArmy and the Navy was independent of the Cabinet, except for budgetary matters.This meant that there was always confusion as to which authorities were makingdecisions on issues which fell into the grey area between foreign and military affairs.22Before Hirohito came to the throne inDecember 1926, there existed, however, at leastan appearance of coordination between the Government and the General Staff. Thiswas because pre-1920 Japanese decision makers were relatively clearer than theirsuccessors about their foreign policy goals and also because the by now agingfounders of theMeiji Government were still able to influence the selection of militaryand civilian leaders. Externally, Japan was recognised as a major Pacific power.Furthermore, Japan was involved in wars only for relatively brief periods?notablybetween 1894 and 1895, and between 1904 and 1905, with a minor expedition tooccupy Germany's leased territory of a Shantung and her island chains, theCarolines, theMarianas, and Marshalls in the Pacific during the First World War.23The period after 1937 lacked these relatively stable factors which had been hithertoconducive to successful collective leadership. As Japan became embroiled inwar withChina, the General Head Quarters was established inNovember 1937 and continuedits existence until the end of the Second World War. The GHQ was a war-time bodydesigned to coordinate army and navy policies and at its head was the SupremeCommander, the Emperor. This meant that during the war, Hirohito had to act bothas a constitutional monarch and as the Supreme Commander, with priority given tothe latter role.24 In order to give the cabinet a voice inwar-time decision making, the

18Fujiwara, Nihon no gunji shi, pp. 127-34; Oue, Tennou no guntai pp. 98-104.19Asahi editorial, 'From Showa to Heisei', part 3, 11 January 1989.20 Fujiwara, Nihon gunji shi, pp. 237^0; J. Kisaka, Taiheiyo senso (The Pacific War) (Tokyo, 1989), pp.170-2; Fujiwara, Nitchu zenmen senso (The Chinese-Japanese War), (Tokyo, 1988), pp. 268-70; Oue,Tennou no guntai, pp. 365-87.21 Fujiwara, Nihon gunji-shi, pp. 239-40; and Nitchu zenmen senso, pp. 268-70; Kisaka, Taiheiyo senso,

pp. 170-2; Oue, Tennou no guntai, pp. 365-87.22 T. Kobayashi, 'Kaigun gunshuku joyaku 1921-36' (Naval Disarmament Treaty) in Taiheiy? senso e nomichi, vol. 1, pp. 3-9ff, 100-1; Oue, Tennou no guntai, pp. 135-8.23 For the Meiji leaders' handling of the Sino-Japanese War and the Russo-Japanese War, see Oue,Tennou no guntai, pp. 154-5; D. Irokawa, Kindai kokka no shuppatsu (The Departure to aModernState) (Tokyo, 1989), pp. 413-22; Fujiwara, Nihon gunji shi, ch. 4; Sumiya, Dai'nihon-teikoku no shiren(Tokyo, 1987), pp. 243-52; Furuya, Nichiro Senso, pp. 58-93; Bouei-Cho Senshi shitsu (ed.), Daihon'ei

Rikungunbu (1) (The Imperial Army Head Quarters) (Tokyo, 1969), pp. 32-47, 89-127.24Oue, Gozen kaigi (The Imperial Conference) (Tokyo, 1991), p. 186.


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324 Saki Dockrillprime minister, Prince Konoe, set up an Imperial-Headquarters-Cabinet LiaisonConference at the same time inNovember 1937.25 This will be referred to below as theLiaison Conference.

Japan's conclusion of the Tripartite Military Pact in September 1940

Hirohito's reign during the 1930s is often described as the period of the militaryascendancy. This is not entirely accurate. Rather, the quality of Japan's militaryleadership declined, as did its discipline.26 This was demonstrated by the quasiindependent actions of overseas commanders who often acted without any instructions from the General Staff in Tokyo, as, for instance, during theManchurian crisisin September 1931 and the conflict inNorth China after the clash between Japaneseand Chinese troops near the Marco Polo bridge in July 1937.27

Officers promoted during the early 1920s to replace those who had founded theMeiji Government were not as professional as their predecessors nor did they havemuch experience in international affairs, largely because of their poor education.Army colleges did not provide instruction in analytical skill or international relationsand their courses were limited to the study of narrowly focused military tactics andstrategies. Overall, officer education was not really geared to the training of militaryprofessionals in the broad sense, and they were either encouraged to think of themselves as warriors or sought to become politicians or bureaucrats.28The decline in the military leadership coincided with the decline in the quality ofcivilian decision makers?Prime Minister Konoe was well known for his weakpersonality, his inability to formulate a coherent policy towards China, towards theTripartite Alliance or towards relations with the United States. Foreign MinisterMatsuoka was expansionist, ambitious and opportunistic. Hirohito disliked most ofthe officers of the Imperial Army, but had never been greatly impressed by the civilianleaders who served under him either. Overall, there was a complete lack of confidence

between Hirohito and his advisers.The long-drawn-out Japanese military conflict in China after 1931 eventually led

Japan to expand towards the south, thereby becoming involved in war with both25A. Kazama, Konoe Naikaku (The Konoe Cabinet) (Tokyo, 1982), pp. 48-62.26Michael Barnhart, Japan Prepares for Total War (Ithaca and London, 1987), pp. 64-76.27 For the Kwantung Army's militant actions in 1928, 1931 and 1937, see T. Shimada, Kanto-gun (The

Kwantung Army) (35th edn, Tokyo, 1986), pp. 47-74; and 'Manshu jihen no tenkai' (TheDevelopment of the Manchuria Incident), in Taiheiyo senso e no michi, vol. 2, pp. 3-34 ff; S. Baba,

Manshu-jihen e no michi (The Road to the Manchurian Incident) (9th edn, Tokyo, 1988), pp. 185-217;K. Seki, 'Manshu jihen senshi' (History Prior to the Manchuria Incident) in Taiheiyo senso e no michi,vol. 1, pp. 287-327; K. Eguchi, Jugo-nen senso no kaimaku (The Outbreak of the 15 Years' War)(Tokyo, 1988), pp. 22-30, 58-79; See also Y. Saji, Ishihara Kanji, 2 vols. (Tokyo, 1989), pp. 21-65.

For the views of Ishihara and Itagaki (who mobilized the Kwantung army) on Manchuria, seeTaiheiyo senso e no michi-shry? hen (The Road to the Pacific War, Documents) (hereafter cited asDocuments), pp. 77-107, 124-6; S. Honj?, Honjo nikki (Honjo Diaries) (Tokyo, 1989), pp. 22, 150-3.For the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937, see S. Hayashi, Taiheiyo senso (The Pacific War)(Tokyo, 1980), pp. 40-58; Fujiwara, Nitchu zenmen senso, pp. 62-83, 109-15; I. Hata, 'Nitchu sens?no gunjiteki tenkai' (Military Developments of the Chinese-Japanese War) in Taiheiyo senso e no

michi, vol. 4, pp. 27-9.28 For the education of officers, see M. Takahashi, Showa no gunbatsu (The Military Clique of ShowaPeriod) (Tokyo, 1988), pp. 11-26; Oue, Tennou no guntai, pp. 104?20; Fujiwara, Nihon no gunji shi, pp.75-8, 191-5.


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the United States and Britain. On several occasions, the Emperor expressed hisopposition to further expansion, but itwas doubtful whether he had a firm grip on thecomplexity of events after July 1937.29 He blamed the war with China exclusively onthe machinations of the Imperial Army.30 However, there was a strong section of the

Army General Staff, led by Major-General Ishihara and Tada, the Deputy Chiefof the General Staff, who also opposed further expansion in China, mainly becausethey were becoming apprehensive about the build-up of the Soviet army near theManchurian border.31

On the other hand, the cabinet?having witnessed the initial successes of theJapanese army?shifted from opposition to the war to a demand that severe conditions be imposed on Chiang's Government for ending it. The cabinet hotheads,including Prime Minister Konoe, Foreign Minister Hirota, Minister of Finance

Kaya, in cooperation with the army hardliners, confronted the pro-negotiation groupin the Army General Staff. Heated exchanges between Hirota and Tada on 15January at the Liaison Conference culminated in the defeat of the pro-negotiationgroup, and Konoe's publication on 16 January 1938 of his famous statement thatJapan would no longer deal with the Nationalist Chinese Government.32 Hirohito inhis monologue made no mention of this change of attitude on the part of his Cabinet

ministers.Japan's decision to form amilitary alliance with Nazi Germany in September 1940was probably the most ominous development as far as Hirohito was concerned.

Following Japan's conclusion of the anti-Comintern pact with Nazi Germanyin November 1936 (which Italy joined one year later), Hitler, early in 1939, formally proposed that the anti-Comintern pact be reinforced by a tripartite allianceagreement. However, the Navy leaders, headed by Admiral Yonai Mitsumasa, theMinister of the Navy, Vice Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku, the Deputy Minister ofthe Navy, and Rear-Admiral Inoue Shigeyoshi, the Chief of the Bureau of Military

Affairs, were strongly opposed to this move.33 Berlin's sudden conclusion of a nonaggression pact with Moscow in August 1939 meant for Japan that her mainpurpose of deterring the USSR by a projected tripartite pact was thrown into the

melting pot. Shocked by this new development, Tokyo suspended the negotiationswith Germany.34Given Hirohito's Anglophilism, he was strongly opposed to strengthening Japan'sties with Nazi Germany, which would probably lead to Britain becoming an enemy of29Hayashi, Taiheiyo senso, pp. 49-76ff; Y. Kojima, Tennou, vol. 3 (Tokyo, 1989), pp. 188-215ff.30 'Showa Tennou no dokuhaku hachi-jikan' (Showa Emperor's Eight Hours' Monologue), in Bungei

Shunju (December 1990), pp. 105-7 (hereafter cited asMonologue).31 Japan Defence Agency, War History division (ed.), Daihon'ei rikugunbu (The Imperial ArmyHeadquarters), vol. 1 (Tokyo, 1969), pp. 406-14, 425-36; Inaba et al. (eds.), Kaisen-gaik? shi:Documents (Diplomatic History before the Outbreak of theWar) in Taihei-yo senso e no michi, pp.256-9; I. Hata, 'Nitchu senso no gunjiteki tenkai', pp. 11-14, 24-6, 32.32Hata, ibid. pp. 36-8; A. Iriye, The Origins of the Second World War inAsia and the Pacific, (Londonand New York, 1987), p. 49;

I.Nish, 'The Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere', inK. Neilsonand R. Pr?te (eds.), Coalition Warfare?An Uneasy Accord (Ontario, 1983), pp. 129-30.33 Japan Defence Agency, Military History Division (ed.), Dihon'ei kaigunbu-rengo kantai (1) (TheImperial Navy General Headquarters?The Combined Fleet) (Tokyo, 1975), pp. 447-57; see alsoArthur Marder, Old Friends, New Enemies (Oxford, 1981), pp. 98-101; H. Agawa, translated by J.

Bester, The Reluctant Admiral?Yamamoto and the Imperial Army (Tokyo and New York, 1979), pp.185-91.34 T. Ohata, 'The Conclusion of the Anti-Comintern Pact and the Problem of its Reinforcement,1935-1939', in The Road to the Pacific War, vol. 5, pp. 159-61.


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326 Saki DockrillJapan. Hirohito summoned the new prime minister, Abe, who replaced Hiranuma inthe wake of the conclusion of the Russo-German non-aggression pact, and orderedhim to adopt

apro-Anglo-American line in future.35 Following the short-lived AbeCabinet, the Emperor recommended Admiral Yonai as prime minister in January1940 in the hope that he would be able to prevent the conclusion of the tripartitealliance. However, the Yonai Cabinet was too weak to resist the pressure of the

pro-German Japanese Army and Yonai's efforts to maintain good relations withBritain and the United States were frustrated.36 After Yonai was replaced by Konoe,Hirohito still clung to the hope that the Navy's reluctance to cooperate with NaziGermany might prevent the formation of the tripartite alliance.37

However, the second Konoe Cabinet adopted basic guidelines in July 1940 whichcalled for Japan's expansion towards the south by taking advantage of the defeat ofFrance and Britain in Europe, while at the same time, moving closer to NaziGermany and Italy.38 According to Matsuoka, the projected tripartite militaryalliance should be expanded later to include Soviet Russia and that, with such a fourpower alliance, Japan could deal with the United States from a position of strength,which in turn would facilitate the ending of the war in China in Japan's favour. TheArmy hardliners supported these ideas, while the Navy General Staff remainedopposed to an outright alliance directed against the United States and Britain.39 The

Navy also warned a joint Navy-Army meeting on 27 August 1940 that itwould bevery difficult to maintain the fighting capabilities of both the Army and Navy onceJapan had embarked on a war with the United States, since she largely depended onthat country for raw materials. Therefore, the Navy insisted that the idea of south

wards expansion by military means be treated with considerable circumspection.40During Germany's bombing of British towns and cities, Hirohito saw the headline'the British Museum set on fire by aGerman bomber' in his morning newspaper of 10

September and he immediately called his Lord Keeper, Marquis Kido, and asked himwhether 'there was any possibility that Japan might intervene as mediator betweenGermany and Britain in order to avoid any further destruction of Britain's culturalassets.' Kido pointed out that such an initiative would be somewhat difficult at this

time.41Indeed, Matsuoka was negotiating with a German special mission led by HeinrichStahmer in Tokyo on 9 and 10 September, and at the Liaison Conference on 14

September, the foreign minister told the Navy representatives that:

35Monologue, pp. 108-9.36Hayashi, Taiheiyo senso, pp. 133^7.37Monologue, pp. 110-11.38Documents pp. 319-23; The Imperial Army General Staff (ed.), Sugiyama memo, vol. 1, pp. 5-16;'Important National Policies Relevant to the Outbreak of the Pacific War', A-700-9-49, DiplomaticRecord Office, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo (hereafter cited as JDRO). For the origins of

Japan's thinking about the move towards the south, see Hata, 'Futsuin shinchu to gun no nanshinseisaku' (The Invasion of French Indochina and the Military's Policy for Southward Expansion), inTaiheiy? sens? e no michi, vol. 6, pp. 145-60.39 J. Tsunoda, 'Nihon no taibei kaisen' (Japan's Opening of theWar with the USA), in Taihei yd sens? eno michi, vol. 7, pp. 53-5; Record of the preliminary conference between T?j? (War minister), Yoshida(Navy minister), Matsuoka and Konoe at Konoe's residence in Tokyo, on 19 July 1941; see

Documents, pp. 319-20.40 Sugiyama memo, vol. 1, pp. 17-24.41 Kojima, Tennou?the Pacific War (Tokyo, 1988), p. 121; K. Kido, Kido Diaries, vol. 1 (Tokyo, 1966),p. 821.


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the time has come for Japan to make it clear whether she should stand on the side ofItaly/Germany in opposition to the Anglo-American powers ... if Japan had to swallow allthe American conditions for ending the war with China, she would have to abandon all ideasabout constructing the new order in East Asia. Do you think that our people would acceptthese consequences and what about some ten million soldiers who were killed on theContinent infighting war there?42

Matsuoka was backed by the prime minister and the Army, and the Navy finallyaccepted the decision to conclude the Tripartite alliance. By that time, the so-calledanti-Tripartite Alliance trio (Yamamoto, Yonai, and Inoue) had gone from the

Ministry of the Navy and the Navy's mainstream thinking was influenced by apro-German middle-echelon group in the Bureau of Military Affairs.43On 16 September 1940, Konoe visited the Imperial Court to inform the Emperor ofthe result of the Liaison Conference. Hirohito told his prime minister: T do think thatit would be better to take time and to see how German-Russian relations developedin future before concluding the treaty with Germany.' Hirohito did not trust Nazi

Germany, regarding it as an opportunist state; however, Konoe answered thatGermany could be trusted.44 Hirohito then said, T wonder how the Navy could copewith the US, as I often heard that the result of the Naval exercises always turned outto be Japan's defeat against the US.45 The Emperor continued that he would be veryworried about Japan's future if Japan concluded the tripartite alliance and askedKonoe (who had dissolved his cabinet in January 1939, in exasperation at the continued dead lock inChina) whether 'under the circumstance, you should be preparedto throw in your lot with me'. Konoe was deeply touched by the Emperor's remarks,but neither he nor Matsuoka, in spite of the Emperor's pleas, changed their mindsand the tripartite alliance was concluded on 27 September 1940.46

Hirohito's approval of Japan's decision for war

Hirohito's apprehensions about future German-Russian relations proved to becorrect?Nazi Germany invaded the USSR on 22 June 1941. A four-power alliancewas obviously now unattainable?in September 1940 Prime Minister Konoe hadthought that Japan's conclusion of a tripartite military alliance was a sensible policy,but by the summer in 1941 itwas out of the question.47 Accordingly, Konoe wantedto change Japan's policy entirely, involving the dissolution of the tripartite pact,42 Author's translation of Konoe memorandum in Sugiyama memo, p. 35; See also 'Konoememorandum on the tripartite pact', undated, reel 1 of Fumimaro Konoe papers, the National Diet

Library, Tokyo.43K. Ikeda, Kaigun to nippon (The Navy and Japan) (Tokyo, 1989), pp. 104-13; C. Hosoya, 'TheTripartite Alliance and the Russo-Japanese Treaty

ofNeutrality',

in Taihei ydsenso e no michi, vol. 5,

pp. 204-6.44 Sugiyama memo, pp. 36-7; Kojima, Tennou, vol. 4, pp. 124-5.45 Ibid. p. 125; Incidentally, Admiral Yamamoto, in a letter to Navy Minister Oikawa, admitted the factthat Japan never defeated the United States through the Naval exercises. See Yamomoto to Oikawa(letter), 7 January 1941, in Self-Defence Agency, Military History Division (ed.), Hawaii Sakusen(Strategy for Hawaii), (Tokyo, 1967), p. 7.46 Kojima, Tennou vol. 4, pp. 125-7; Kido, Diaries, p. 822; Monologue, pp. 111-2.47 'Konoe memorandum on the tripartite pact', reel 1,Konoe papers.


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328 Saki Dockrill

and at the same time making efforts to improve relations with the United States.48Foreign Minister Matsuoka reacted differently and he obtained an audience withthe Emperor on the day of the outbreak of the Russo-German war. According toMatsuoka's view, now that theWar had broken out inRussia, Japan should fight onthe side of Nazi Germany against the Soviet Union, which in turn would delayher plan to move towards South Indochina. However, under these circumstances,Japan would have to fight not only the Soviet Union in the north but also the

Anglo-American powers in the south. The foreign minister's ideas upset Hirohito andthe emperor became extremely doubtful about Matsuoka's competence49, suggestedto Konoe that Matsuoka be removed from the cabinet.50 However, Konoe could notmake up his mind at that time and itwas not until 18 July 1941 that Konoe dissolvedhis cabinet and formed his third cabinet, which effectively secured Matsuoka'sdismissal.Hirohito's opposition to hostilities with the Soviet Union in the north in cooperation with Nazi Germany together with Japan's expansion towards the southreflected the views of the majority of his civilian and military officials. However,Matsuoka was not dismissed immediately and since he was a strong and dominatingcharacter, he was still able to influence the ensuing debates at meetings of theLiaison-Conference in the wake of the Russo-German War. The Army regardedRussia as the traditional enemy of Japan. None the less, in view of its recent militarydefeat by the Soviet Army in disputed border areas of Manchuria in 1938 and in 1939and given that the war with the Chinese continued, the Army would only agree tofight the Soviet Union if the latter's strength was substantially reduced (by about onehalf), such as by transferring its troops from the Far East to theWestern front.51 Asa result, Japan's basic national guidelines, which were ratified by the Emperor on 2July 1941, laid down that Japan should proceed with her plan tomove towards SouthIndochina, and should resort to war with the Soviet Union only when circumstances

were propitious.52Matsuoka's subsequent dismissal on 18 July and growing suspicions aboutthe possibility of a rapid German victory over Russia enabled the Army to shelve itsplan to challenge the Soviet Union on 9 August 1941.53However, partly because theJapanese decision makers were so deeply involved in the debate as to whether Japanshould fight in the north first or the south later or embark on both strategies atthe same time, there were no serious discussions about the implications of Japan'smove into South Indochina on 23 July 1941 and few anticipated that the UnitedStates, Britain and the Netherlands would immediately place economic sanctions onJapan. Finally, on 1August 1941, the United States imposed a full oil embargo onJapan. Hirohito was equally surprised by these measures and by the seriousness48 T. Yabe, Konoe Fumimaro (Tokyo, 1976), p. 571; Shigenori Togo, Jidai no ichimen (memoirs), (Tokyo,

1989), pp. 150-1.49Monologue, pp. 113-14; Yabe, Konoe, pp. 569-71; Oue, Gozen kaigi, pp. 69-70; Kido, Diaries, p. 884;C. Hosoya, 'The Tripartite Alliance and the Russo-Japanese Treaty of Neutrality', in Taiheiyo senso eno michi, vol. 5, p. 310.50Monologue p. 113-14.51 For the records of 32nd to 37th Liaison Conferences, on 25, 26, 27, 28 and 30 June and 1 July, seeDocuments, pp. 445-63; Oue, Gozen kaigi, pp. 71-2, 76-7; Yabe, Konoe, p. 571; Daihon'ei kaigun bu,vol. 2 (Tokyo, 1979), pp. 336-42.52 'National Guidelines in the light of Developments of International Situation', on 2 July 1941,A-700-9-49, JDRO.53Hosoya, 'The Tripartite Alliance . . .', pp. 323-31; Oue, Gozen kaigi, pp. 87-8.


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with which the military now began to prepare for a possible war with theWesternpowers.54

Japan had little room for manoeuvre, as the oil embargo would allow Japan tosurvive only for two years, and in the case of war, for one and half years.55 There werefew options left for Japan. She could either make peace by making considerable concessions to the United States, or prepare to go to war with her, or by a combinationof both negotiation and preparations for war. The third approach was the core of thedecision made at the Imperial Conference on 6 September 1941.

Historians have hitherto dismissed the Emperor's role as minimal, partly becausethe Emperor merely presided over the so-called Imperial Conference without usually

making any comments at all. Nevertheless, the Imperial Conference was regarded asthe highest decision-making organ. There were often meetings between top officialsand the Emperor prior to the Imperial Conference about the issues which were to bediscussed or decided at the Imperial Conference. The day before the ImperialConference on 5 September 1941, the Emperor arranged a meeting with the Armyand Navy Chiefs of the General Staff, and the prime minister. At this meeting,Hirohito emphasised that Japan should, if possible, choose peace and diplomacy overpreparations for a possible war.56 The next day, at the Imperial Conference, theEmperor, following a request by prime minister Konoe, who now desperately wantedto avoid war with the US, read a poem by his grandfather to express once again hisdesire for peace.57 His appeal was not entirely ignored by Japanese leaders. The Navyand the Army became confused as to whether they really wanted to go to war, as wasshown during their subsequent meetings on 7, 8, 9 and 12October 1941.58 The Navyremained dubious about going to war in the south, which seemed to be merely ameans of compensating for the Army's failure to settle the situation in China, whileat the same time, the Army leaders, confronted with a long war of attrition inChina,were faced with a dilemma. If the Navy leaders admitted their inability to wage waragainst the United States and urged the Army leaders to reconsider their strategy, thewar minister might have been able to persuade his subordinates to agree to some kindof conditional withdrawal from China which would not involve the loss of face forthe Army. However, the Navy leaders were generally reluctant to intervene in whatseemed to them to be entirely a political matter, that is 'negotiations or war', sincethey believed that such a decision should be left to the prime minister. The Navy'sindecision placed Konoe in a quandary as to how to determine Japan's future courseand, after failing to persuade the Army leaders to preserve peace with the UnitedStates by withdrawing from China, he resigned.59General T?j?, who replaced Konoe as prime minister on 18October, was a loyal,if somewhat simple-minded, follower of the Emperor. To him, Hirohito's poem wasabsolute gospel. T?j? wanted to maintain peace with the United States, but did notknow how to do so. Having made so many aggressive and expansionist moves, therewas now a huge gap between American conditions and what Japan could accept. Thewithdrawal of troops from China (excluding Manchuria) was a sticking point, and

54Daihon'ei kaigunbu, vol. 2, pp. 349-52ff; Oue, Gozen kaigi, pp. 85-7; Monologue, p. 114.55Kido, Diaries, pp. 895-6; Daihon'ei kaigunbu, vol. 2, pp. 452-3.56 Sugiyama memo, vol. 1, pp. 309-11.57 Ibid. pp. 311-12; Kido, Diaries, pp. 905-6; Monologue, p. 116; Yabe, Konoe, pp. 604-5.58Daihon'ei kaigunbu, vol. 2, pp. 484?504ff; Daihon'ei rikugunbu, vol. 5, pp. 90-137.59Yabe, Konoe, p. 622; Kido, Diaries, pp. 914-16; Togo, Jidai no ichimen, pp. 195-6.


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330 Saki Dockrill

T?j? had no confidence that he could persuade the Army hardliners to accept this. Hedecided that he could not go further than the September decision, that is, to preparefor war, while negotiations with the Americans were continuing.60According to Oue's recent study, if the Emperor had insisted on peace, thereby

reversing the September decision, T?j? would have tried to fulfil the Emperor's will.The consequence of accepting all the American conditions in order to avoid warmight have been amilitary revolt, but T?j? was already making arrangements to copewith a possible coup d'etat.61 However, Hirohito stopped insisting on peace and theImperial Conference on 5 November 1941 decided that if the negotiations with theUnited States were not completed by 1st December 1941, Japan would go to war. Itwas evident that Hirohito was also now divided about whether war could be avoided.

At conferences with themilitary leaders he began to ask detailed strategic and tacticalquestions?about the extent of the readiness of the Navy and the Army for war,about the air defence of mainland Japan, about the effects of weather on militaryoperations inMalaya and the Hongkong area, etc.?questions designed to ascertainwhether Japan had any chance of winning a war if it came.62At a conference on 2 November, he asked his subordinates whether he shouldrequest the Pope to mediate.63 He also told General Sugiyama on 15November thatthe military preparations should be called off if the negotiations with the US weresuccessful.64 The Emperor was also informed at a conference with Navy and ArmyChiefs of General Staff on 3 November that Japan would make a surprise attack atPearl Harbor on 8 December, Japanese local time.65 Admiral Yamamoto, now theSupreme Commander of the Combined Fleet, who still believed that Japan shouldnot resort to a war which might impoverish the nation, had to determine amethod of

making it possible for Japan to win a war, quickly by demoralizing the Americans.66This required that two conditions be met: Japan must resort to an offensive strategyin the initial stage by attacking the American Pacific fleet at Pearl Harbor andthat war with the United States must be declared about half an hour before such asurprise attack. Yamamoto believed that if Japan resorted to military force withouteven completing the formality of a declaration of war, this would strengthen theAmericans' will to fight, and would, in turn, make it impossible for the Japanese toend the war in the south quickly.67 Itwas not until 19October that the Navy GeneralStaff, who had initially thought that Yamamoto's strategy was too unconventionaland risky, was persuaded to approve the Pearl Harbor operation.68

60 See Daihon'ei rikugunbu (5), pp. 186-26Iff; M. Hosaka, Tojo Hideki to tennou nojidai, vol. 1(T?j? Hideki and the Emperor's Era) (Tokyo, 1988), pp. 254-99ff. At a Conference with Hirohito on2November 1941, T?j? cried when he reported to the Emperor that T?j? could not persuade hisministers to decide for peace. See: Daihon'ei rikugunbu, (vol. 5) p. 261; Hosaka, T?j?, p. 299;

Sugiyama memo, pp. 386-7.61Oue, Gozen kaigi, pp. 211-12; Hosaka, Tdjo, p. 277; Daihon'ei rikugunbu, vol. 5, pp. 266-7.62 For instance, Conference with military leaders on 2, 3, 5 and 15November, in Sugiyama memo,pp. 387-8,431,525.63 Sugiyama memo, p. 387.64 Sugiyama memo, p. 625.65 Ibid. p. 387-8; Daihon'ei rikugunbu, vol. 5, pp. 336-40.66 See the record of meeting between Yamomoto and Nagano on 29 September 1941 inDaihon'eikaigunbu, vol. 5, p. 484.67Hawaii sakusen, pp. 5-33, 73-89ff; Shigeo Fukuda, 'America no tainichi sansen' (US Participation intheWar with Japan), Taiheiyo senso e no michi, vol. 7, pp. 370-5.68Hawaii sakusen, p. 12.


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In mid-November the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were also examining thesituation in the event of the war. In a minute on justifying war, (Tai-gi M?i-bun),the Ministry put forward three reasons which it thought could justify a Japaneseresort to war with theWest: First, for 'the right of existence'?'the United States, incooperation with Britain, the Netherlands, and China, threatened Japan's security,deprived the nation of its important resources and imposed economic sanctions tothe extent in which made it nearly impossible for Japan to survive peacefully'. The

Ministry thought that 'the right of existence' would express the nature of the warbetter than the often-used phrase 'the right of self-defence'. The second reason wasthe expansion of Anglo-American influence from China and finally, for the peacefuldevelopment of East Asia under Japan's leadership.69 Its officials also examinedvarious possible ways of informing the United States that war had been declared,but eventually decided that Japan should declare war either at the same time, or justafter, Japan's surprise attack. They were aware that this action would violate theHague convention, but they believed that it would ensure the success of the initialoperation.70The so-called Hull note, which Japan received on 27 November, stated that theUnited States recognized the Chiang regime as the sole legitimate government ofChina, and, at the same time, demanded that Japan withdraw all her troops fromChina and Indo-China. This was interpreted by the Japanese decision makers as an'ultimatum', calling on Japan to relinquish all the gains she had made after the'Manchuria incident' in 1931. The Liaison Conference, which convened duringthe afternoon of the 27th, unanimously agreed that the American proposal wascompletely unacceptable to Japan. After nearly seven months of negotiations, someministers were surprised, while the others were disappointed, by the strong termscontained in the note.71

On 29 November, Hirohito, still not sure whether he should approve the decisionfor war, arranged a meeting with key cabinet ministers and ex-prime ministers,including, T?j?, Konoe, Hirota, Yonai and Hiranuma, to ask for their views. Theseappeared to Hirohito to be a consensus for war, although there were a few abstractremarks against such a course.72Hirohito was aware that the Navy was reluctant to go to war and in view of theEmperor's fears about the danger of such a course, Prime Minister T?j? suggestedthat Hirohito arrange ameeting with Navy leaders. On 30November, Navy MinisterShimada and Chief of General Staff General Staff Nagano were summoned to theImperial Palace. According to Shimada's memoirs, the Emperor told them 'in awarm and calm manner' that 'While the nation was on war footing, once she went to

war, I gather that itmight be a long one. Are you sure that you still intend to go towar as planned?' Admiral Shimada thought that the Emperor was trying to face'courageously' the fact that Japan was compelled to go to war, although he wanted toavoid it.73 In order to allay Hirohito's apprehensions, Navy leaders replied that theyhad full confidence in victory. On 1 December 1941, Hirohito ratified Japan's69 Folders (3) and (20), A-700-9-51, JDRO.70 Folder (22), A-700-9-51, JDRO.71Daihon'ei rikugunbu, vol. 5, pp. 486-92; Daihon'ei kaigunbu, vol. 2, pp. 546-9; Togo, Jidai no ichimen,

pp. 247-65.72Monologue, pp. 119-20; Sugiyama memo, pp. 535-6; Daihon'ei rikugunbu, vol. 5, pp. 495-9.73Daihon'ei rikugunbu, vol. 5, pp. 504?5; Daihon'ei kaigunbu, vol. 5, pp. 548-9.


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332 Saki Dockrilldecision for war at the Imperial Conference. According to aminute by T?j?'s PrivateSecretary on 1December, the prime minister said that 'when I arrived at the conclusion that Japan had to go to war, I asked for the Emperor's approval. However,he had great difficulties in authorizing the decision for war ... Iwas aware that theEmperor really wanted peace.'74Hirohito approved Japan's decision because of the oil crisis, the Cordell Hull Noteof 26 November 1941, and the general mood in Japan which appeared to favourwar. Under these circumstances, he confessed that he was not able to veto the finaldecision. He was also aware of the possible consequences of such a veto?militaryrevolts, internal revolution, the assassination of his close officials and probably ofhimself.75

Conclusion

Two things are clear about the Emperor's attitude in December 1941. He was notentirely opposed to Japan's decision to go to war, because he could see no otheralternative. Hirohito wanted Japan to work with the existing international status quo,and to cooperate with Britain and the United States. He also believed that Japanshould try to keep on good terms with China. He acknowledged the fact that whileManchukuo was created as a result of Japan's invasion, it could, however, beregarded as properly within her sphere of influence, as the Lytton report hadsuggested in 1933.76However, he was certainly sympathetic with the prevailing feelingin Japan, nurtured over the years, that Japan had suffered from the effects of awhite-dominated international system.77 Nevertheless, he believed that if Japanwanted to challenge the Anglo-American hegemony by military means, she shoulddo so only if she was certain of victory. This would explain the detailed strategicquestions he asked his military chiefs on the eve of Pearl Harbor. His letter to his son,Akihito, in the aftermath of Japan's defeat in September 1945, reflected the rationality of the Emperor's thinking. Hirohito wrote that:I wanted to say why Japan lost the war, this was because Japan believed too much in her

Empire, and as a result she underestimated Anglo-American power. Secondly, our militarymen emphasized moral too much and forgot about science. During my grandfather's time

[i.e. theMeiji era (1868-1912)], therewere many responsible military leaders, but this timemilitary leaders failed to see the wider context of the international situation and were drivento expansionism without any flexibility.78

Secondly, the relations between Hirohito and his subordinates were generallyinsecure. On many occasions, not only the military but also the civilian leaders

74Ito, Hirohashi and Katashima (eds.), Tojo naikaku sori-daijin kimitsu shiroku (Secret Documents ofPrime Minister Tojo), (Tokyo, 1990), p. 479.75Monologue, pp. 118-20, 145.76Monologue, pp. 101-2, 105; see also Britain's attitude towards the Manchurian crisis, Peter Lowe,Great Britain and the Origins of the Pacific War?A Study of British Policy in East Asia 1937-1941.(Oxford, 1977), pp. 6-8.77Monologue, p. 100.78Author's translation, quoted from H. Takahashi, Shoch? Tennou (The Emperor as a Symbol) (Tokyo,1988), pp. 2-3.


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either ignored Hirohito's instructions, policies and demands or dismissed them asimpossible to perform. Nor did Hirohito feel complete confidence in his position as

Emperor. The almost total confusion in Japan's administration and the bankruptcyof her decision-making apparatus during the years prior to Pearl Harbor was partlythe consequence of the fact that the system was founded upon a delicate politicalbalance between the Emperor and the civilian and military leaders, a balance whichscarcely existed after 1937.In 1179, 1221, and 1332, at least four Emperors who actively involved themselvesin politics were placed under house arrest or sent to uninhabited islands by thepowerful clans. After 1338, the Emperor seldom interfered in politics and the royalfamily resided quietly inKyoto and was isolated from the population of Japan until1868. The restoration of the throne was designed to create the appearance of a nationstate and to secure the position of the Meiji leaders, who came from the lowerranking Samurai class. Thereafter, Japanese leaders did their best to portray the

Emperor as a living god. The relationship between Japanese leaders and the Emperorwas one of the inter-dependence?because the Emperor's position was also dependentupon the protection of those leaders. Once Japan's leaders became divided amongstthemselves, and when the international problems Japan faced became more complex,the delicate balance between the Japanese leaders and the Emperor fractured under

Hirohito. Hirohito's position was an extremely delicate one. This is why his effortsto influence crucial decisions stopped half way?and as a result his attitude did notmake much difference to Japan's final decisions. He should be credited at least for hisefforts, however feeble, to avert war although this does not alter the fact that in thelast resort, he was responsible for the decision to go to war.