Greece 2ii 2nd Military Revolution

ANCIENT GREECEvii-The Second Military Revolution

PRINCIPAL TOPICS

I. Thrasybulos

II. Epaminondas

III. The Second Military Revolution, 362-336

ΘρασύβουλοςThrasybulos

ΘρασύβουλοςThrasybulos

Thrasybulus receiving an olive crown for his successful campaign against the Thirty Tyrants. From Andrea Alciato's Emblemata, 1531

born c.440s

died 388 BC

411-after an oligarchic coup in Athens, the pro-democracy sailors at Samos elected him navarch, making him a primary leader of the successful democratic resistance

411-410-commanded along with Alcibiades and others at several Athenian victories

404-after Athens’ defeat he led the resistance to the Spartan-imposed oligarchic government known as the Thirty Tyrants

he commanded a small force of democratic exiles which invaded Attica:

first they defeated the Spartan garrison

next, the forces of the oligarchy, killing the leading tyrant Critias, Plato’s uncle

403-he restored the democracy and made a conciliatory peace, no bloody reprisals

“Thrasybulus’ call for peace and union between the two camps was rejected by

the oligarchs, who expected Spartan aid. In Sparta, however, the murderous

arrogance of Lysander...was making many powerful men nervous, including the

kings Agis and Pausanius. Marching into Attica, Pausanius took the lead and

masterminded...the reconciliation of the various Athenian parties…. Under his

aegis the Athenians agreed on the first recorded amnesty in history. Under its

terms, only the Thirty and their chief officers could be brought to justice for

crimes committed before 403; all others were compelled to renounce the many

bitter grievances that had accumulated. In September Thrasybulus led his men

unopposed to the Acropolis, where they sacrificed to Athena in gratitude for the

salvation of the city and their own safe return. The work of reestablishing the

democracy then began.

Pomeroy et al., p.352

The Athenians came close to respecting the terms of the amnesty…. nonetheless,

the decades of war followed by months of terror under the Thirty had taken a

heavy toll, and there was no lack of people eager to assign blame for Athens’

problems. The colorful Socrates had annoyed jealous parents whose young sons

had lionized him….three Athenians...zeroed in on the eccentric old philosopher

who haunted the public spaces of Athens confuting the careless in argument.

Socrates (470-399) had been quick to identify the drawbacks of democracy, and

he had also been the teacher of (at least) two men who in different ways had

harmed Athens: Alcibiades and Critias. The amnesty prevented his accusers from

charging him with inciting his pupils with treason, so instead they brought...an

accusation [ 1] he did not believe in the gods of the state [2] he taught new gods;

and [3] he corrupted the young.

Pomeroy et al., pp.352-353

THE CRISIS OF THE POLIS AND THE AGE OF SHIFTING HEGEMONIES

Pomeroy et al. chapter title

“Years of futile warfare, accompanied by economic difficulties and attendant civil strife, led

many people to question their relationship to the world around them. Already around the

middle of the fifth century Greek thinkers had begun to ask key questions about the human

community. What was the purpose of civic life? Why had people come together in communities

in the first place? Were the laws of the polis in accord with nature [κατα φυσις] or in conflict

[αντι] with it? Why were some people free and others slaves? How were Greeks different from

non-Greeks? Should Greeks war with other Greeks and enslave them when victorious?

To these questions others came to be added. Why should some have so much more than

others? Did the autonomous city-state provide the best way of life? Did the exclusion of women

from decision making go without saying? Was warfare worth the sacrifices it entailed? A

smaller group debated larger questions---the nature of justice, of piety, of courage, of love.

op. cit. p. 361

“ Spartans were noble in death but insufferable in victory….a graceless diplomacy

regularly led the Spartans to lose the peace after winning the war….

“Jubilant after bringing Athens to its knees in 404, Sparta housed significant

imperialist factions supporting the aggressive policies of Lysander and King

Agesilaus. In 395 Sparta’s alienated allies combined against it. The resulting

[Corinthian] war ended in 387 [with Spartan victory], but continued high-handed

behavior on Sparta’s part caused existing resentments to fester. In 377 Agesilaus’

provocative policies resulted both in the formation of a new Athenian naval

confederacy [the Second Athenian Confederacy] and in the alliance of Athens and

Thebes. By 371 Thebes was strong enough to defeat Sparta on the battlefield and the

years that followed saw Thebes cripple Sparta still further by the liberation of

Messenia. The Theban ascendancy died, however, when their charismatic leader

Epaminondas was killed in battle, and revolts during the 360s and 350s gradually

weakened the Athenian confederacy. The resulting vacuum would be filled by

Macedon under the resolute leadership of Philip.”

Pomeroy et al., pp.363-364

In the revived democracy established in 403 BC, Thrasybulus became a major and prestigious leader.... Thrasybulus seems to have advocated a more radically democratic policy than the populace was willing to accept at the time; he called for reinstating pay for political service, and sought to extend citizenship to all the metics and foreigners who had fought alongside him against the Thirty. He was initially cautious about offending Sparta, but, when Persian support became available at the start of the Corinthian War, he became an advocate of aggressive action, and about this time seems to have regained his preeminence in Athenian politics. He initiated the rebuilding of the long walls, which had been demolished at the end of the Peloponnesian War, and commanded the Athenian contingents at Nemea and Coronea; these two defeats, however, damaged his political stature, and he was replaced at the head of the state by Conon, whose victory at Cnidus had ended Sparta's dreams of naval empire.

Wikipedia

The tactics were similar to all other Greek hoplite battles, except that when the armies were arrayed, with the Spartans having the customary honor of being on the right, the army drifted right as it advanced. This was not good for the Spartan allies, as it exposed the soldiers to a flanking attack, but it gave the Spartans the opportunity to use their superior coordination and discipline to roll up the flank of the Athenians, who were stationed opposite. The result of the battle was a victory for Sparta, even though her allies on the left suffered significant losses.

Hercules slaying the Nemean lion. Detail of a Roman mosaic from Llíria (Spain).

In 394 BC The Battle of the Nemea River was fought between Sparta and her allies the Achaians, Eleians, Mantineians, and the Tegeates against a coalition of Boetians, Euboeans, Athenians, Corinthians, and Argives. This was to be the last clear-cut victory that Sparta enjoyed. It was also the largest hoplite battle the Greeks ever fought.

This willingness to accept losses on the left flank for flanking position on the right was a dramatic change from typical conservative hoplite military tactics.

Throughout his career, Thrasybulus defended democracy at Athens against its opponents. He was one of the few prominent citizens whom the Samians trusted to defend their democracy, and whom the fleet selected to lead it through the troubled time of conflict with the 400. Later, in his opposition to the Thirty Tyrants, Thrasybulus risked his life when few others would, and his actions were responsible for the quick restoration of democracy. In the words of Cornelius Nepos,

Modern historian John Fine points to the clemency shown by Thrasybulus and other democrats in the wake of their victory over the Thirty as a key contribution towards reestablishing stable government in Athens. While many city-states throughout the Greek world broke down into vicious cycles of civil war and reprisal, Athens remained united and democratic, without interruption, until near the end of the third century, and democracy, albeit interrupted several times by conquest or revolution, continued there until Roman times, several centuries later.

Wikipedia

This most noble action, then, is entirely Thrasybulus's; for when the Thirty Tyrants, appointed by the Lacedaemonians, kept Athens oppressed in a state of slavery, and had partly banished from their country, and partly put to death, a great number of the citizens whom fortune had spared in the war, and had divided their confiscated property among themselves, he was not only the first, but the only man at the commencement, to declare war against them.

Increasingly, the Greeks’ service as mercenaries was eagerly sought and just as willingly offered. During this period, for example, one of the great epics of military history was enacted by 10,000 Greek mercenaries who were in the employ of a Persian satrap, Cyrus. In a battle for control of the throne of Persia, Cyrus was killed and his Asiatic troops panicked and fled. The 10,000 Greeks stood alone, undefeated, but over 1,500 miles from friendly territory. Their march out (ἀνάβασις) under the leadership of Xenophon [a noble student of Socrates] was a remarkable feat, and served as a prologue to the later conquests of Alexander.

Thomas E. Griess, ed., West Point Military History Series, p. 15

ΑΝΑΒΑΣΙΣANABASIS

One Athenian general made a significant contribution to the art of war. Iphicrates organized bodies of lightly armed infantry, calling them peltasts from their pelta or small round shields. Actually they were a lighter version of the hoplites---smaller shield, lighter spear, less armor, but greater freedom of movement. Through drill, they perfected their discipline, preserving their mobility and firepower with the javelin while maintaining cohesion and defensive power, so that they no longer feared to encounter hoplites. This development was only possible under a mercenary system with professional soldiers. The old citizen soldier could fight in a phalanx, but the new peltast required long hours of detailed training and competent leadership. In essence, the peltast served as a tactical link between the hoplite and the irregular forces.

Ibid.

LIGHT INFANTRY

LIGHT INFANTRY

Agrianian Peltast by Johnny Shumate

The Agrianians were especially prized by

Alexander the Great. Peter Green calls them his Gurkhas.

LIGHT INFANTRY

Agrianian Peltast by Johnny Shumate

The Agrianians were especially prized by

Alexander the Great. Peter Green calls them his Gurkhas.

In the case of Sparta, the [Peloponnesian War], although resulting in victory, brought about a peculiar predicament. A people trained exclusively for war with their neighbors now found themselves compelled to exercise their lead in nonmilitary relations. The role was one for which the Spartans’ peculiar institutions had not only left them unprepared, but also positively unfitted. In a way, therefore, her victory was Sparta’s undoing, although she dominated events for another 30 years. The wars also had a direct and personal impact on the Spartan warrior, the key to the state’s success. The years of fighting reduced the body of superbly trained hoplites from about 5,000 (in 479 BC) to about 2,000 (in 371 BC). By then, another city-state was contesting the supremacy of Sparta.

Ibid.

ἘπαµεινώνδαςEpaminondas

ἘπαµεινώνδαςEpaminondas

Epaminondas, an idealized figure in

the grounds of Stowe House

V.D. Hanson, The Soul of Battle, p. 30

Boeotia, “the dancing ground of war”

The ... tactical breakthrough of the general Epaminondas at the battle of Leuctra in

371 was not merely that he put his best on the left to a depth of 50 shields to ensure

a slugfest with the Spartan elite right, but that by doing so he ensured to his own

allies---and Sparta’s confederates across the battlefield as well---that neither

weaker side would have to face their betters and play the role of sacrificial lambs.

The next winter Epaminondas invaded Laconia with a unified army and

encountered Peloponnesian states that appreciated his past magnanimity and were

now eager to join him. How odd that the basic idea that a leader should bear the

greatest risk in battle by putting his men on the left of the phalanx waited until the

twilight of the hoplite age.

Hanson, A War Like No Other, p.159

The ... tactical breakthrough of the general Epaminondas at the battle of Leuctra in

371 was not merely that he put his best on the left to a depth of 50 shields to ensure

a slugfest with the Spartan elite right, but that by doing so he ensured to his own

allies---and Sparta’s confederates across the battlefield as well---that neither

weaker side would have to face their betters and play the role of sacrificial lambs.

The next winter Epaminondas invaded Laconia with a unified army and

encountered Peloponnesian states that appreciated his past magnanimity and were

now eager to join him. How odd that the basic idea that a leader should bear the

greatest risk in battle by putting his men on the left of the phalanx waited until the

twilight of the hoplite age.

Hanson, A War Like No Other, p.159

Griess, ed., West Point Military History Series,

text, p. 15; map, after p. 19

King Kleombrotus led a Spartan force of 11,000 into Southern Boeotia to fight a Theban force of 6,000 commanded by Epaminondas

the latter was “one of the very rarest of generals, a great leader who was also an innovator

“he realized that ‘the Spartans would never change their traditional shock tactics, the success of which depended on an advance in perfect order, all spears...striking the enemy’s front simultaneously’--JFC Fuller

accordingly, he devised a tactic that would...throw them into disorder

Until now, tactical success had depended primarily on preventing one opponent from overlapping another’s force, a situation that would endanger the flanks and rear of a phalanx. Normally, when two forces advanced toward another in phalangial formation, there was a tendency for each force to drift to its right.

Ibid.

Griess, ed., West Point Military History Series, after p. 19

Until now, tactical success had depended primarily on preventing one opponent from overlapping another’s force, a situation that would endanger the flanks and rear of a phalanx. Normally, when two forces advanced toward another in phalangial formation, there was a tendency for each force to drift to its right. Accordingly, most commanders put their best men on their right, which later be came known as the position of honor. In many cases, battles resulted in each force’s right defeating its opponent’s left; victory or defeat then depended upon which force could recover soon enough to bring its right around to the flank or the rear of the opponent’s right. Naturally, the force that was better trained and drilled and could accomplish this more rapidly than the other. because in all of Greece no force was better drilled than the Spartan army, it retained a distinct advantage in the traditional battle.

Ibid.

At Leuctra, instead of drawing up his troops in parallel lines opposite the Spartan forces, Epaminondas formed the Thebans into an oblique order.

Ibid.

At Leuctra, instead of drawing up his troops in parallel lines opposite the Spartan forces, Epaminondas formed the Thebans into an oblique order. The idea was to concentrate heavily on the left and push this flank ahead so as to defeat the enemy’s formidable right, while at the same time the reduced-strength Theban center and right advanced more slowly and in echelon. The threat of the Theban center and right served to prevent the Spartans from reinforcing their own right. Simply stated, the object was to meet shock with supershock. Epaminondas put his best troops on the left, not the right, and arranged them in a formation at least 50 ranks deep. He took the risk that his weakened center and right would be able to pin...the Spartan forces to their front, until the massed formation on the left could be driven home. This novel formation, however, had a weakness on the flanks.... To protect [there], Epaminondas stationed an elite group of Theban warriors (The Sacred Band) on the left flank, while on the right flank, ahead of his withdrawn center, he placed the Theban cavalry.

Ibid.

The battle plan worked to perfection. Epaminondas led the attack on the left, which crushed the opposing Spartan right. He then wheeled against the flank of the remaining Spartan troops at the moment his center and right threatened to engage them in front. The result was an overwhelming Theban victory.

Ibid.

Epaminondas’ ability to seize the initiative and, at a critical point, to bring to bear on the battlefield a striking force superior to the defender’s was the crucial factor in his success. That he was able to do this in spite of total numerical inferiority is a tribute to his reasoning and tactical acumen….The oblique order of Epaminondas fixed the entire enemy line in position and enabled him to drive home his main thrust before the weakness in his own center and right had been detected by the Spartans. No finer illustration of the principles of Mass and Economy of Force* is to be found in ancient military history.

op. cit., p. 16*These two principles of war are defined as follows:

Mass: Concentrate superior combat power at the critical time and place.

Economy of Force: Emphasize the principle effort and restrict the strength of secondary efforts

The ... tactical breakthrough of the general Epaminondas at the battle of Leuctra in

371 was not merely that he put his best on the left to a depth of 50 shields to ensure

a slugfest with the Spartan elite right, but that by doing so he ensured to his own

allies---and Sparta’s confederates across the battlefield as well---that neither

weaker side would have to face their betters and play the role of sacrificial lambs.

The next winter Epaminondas invaded Laconia with a unified army and

encountered Peloponnesian states that appreciated his past magnanimity and were

now eager to join him. How odd that the basic idea that a leader should bear the

greatest risk in battle by putting his men on the left of the phalanx waited until the

twilight of the hoplite age.

Hanson, A War Like No Other, p.159

op. cit., p. 98

T h e f i n a l c a r d o f Epaminondas was now on the table; in the past Helot insurrections had failed not out of a shortage of manpower… but simply because there was no initial window of protection for the revolutions to c o n s o l i d a t e t h e i r t o e h o l d . N o w h i s Thebans would provide that critical breathing space...

370

369

Throughout Greece there is evidence that homosexual relationships were a

contributing factor to unit morale. In Sparta, for example, the separation of the

sexes at an early age, together with attitudes peculiar to other Greeks on the role of

women, resulted in overtly homosexual relationships centering on life in the

barracks. No doubt such strong ties extended to the battlefield and must help

explain Spartan heroism, most notably in defeats from Thermopylai (480) to

Leuktra (371), where men chose annihilation rather than the shame of flight. Yet the

most extreme example was not among the Dorians but rather in Thebes. There the

Sacred Band, composed of 150 homosexual couples (something unknown even at

Sparta), for some fifty years fought heroically in the city’s most desperate battles

and were wiped out to a man at Chaironeia (338); Philip was struck by the

appearance of the huddled masses of their paired corpses. (Plut. Pel. 18-19; Mor.

761 a-d; Xen. Symp. 8.32)

Hanson, Western Way of War, pp.124-125

Mantinea is, in fact, full of ghosts. The voices of Greece’s greatest statesmen,

generals, and writers once echoed off these hills before their speakers fell in the

alluvial mud of the battlefield. Well off to the distance there is the small hillock of

Skopê (“Lookout Hill), where the greatest military man Greece ever produced, the

liberator Epaminondas died in 362---his retainers pulling out a spear from his guts

as he gazed down at his retreating Theban army, which had broken on the news that

its beloved general had been carried off and was bleeding to death on the hill above

them.

Hanson, A War Like No Other, pp.154-155

Mantinea is, in fact, full of ghosts. The voices of Greece’s greatest statesmen,

generals, and writers once echoed off these hills before their speakers fell in the

alluvial mud of the battlefield. Well off to the distance there is the small hillock of

Skopê (“Lookout Hill), where the greatest military man Greece ever produced, the

liberator Epaminondas died in 362---his retainers pulling out a spear from his guts

as he gazed down at his retreating Theban army, which had broken on the news that

its beloved general had been carried off and was bleeding to death on the hill above

them.

Hanson, A War Like No Other, pp.154-155

THE SECONDMILITARY

REVOLUTION

THE SECONDMILITARY

REVOLUTION

N i k e t e r i o n ( v i c t o r y medallion) bearing the effigy of king Philip II of Macedon, 3rd century AD, probably minted during the reign of Emperor Alexander Severus.

this “friend of horses” was born son of King Amintas iii and Queen Euridice i

368-365--a hostage in Thebes, at the home of Epaminondas, became the eromenos of Pelopidas

359-the deaths of his elder brothers, King Alexander ii and Perdiccas iii, allowed him to take the throne

appointed regent for his infant nephew Amyntas iv, he brushed him aside and began his reignΦίλιππος Β' ὁ Μακεδών

Philip II of Macedōn382-359-336

The royal army of Macedon was Philip’s, not [his son] Alexander [the Great]’s. It had been formed and led for more than twenty years by Philip, while Alexander was at its head for little more than half that period. It was King Philip who crafted a grand new army; Philip who supplied it, led it, and organized it differently from anything in past Greek practice---in order to kill other Greeks. As it turned out, Alexander found his inheritance even more useful for killing Persians.

Hanson, Carnage and Culture; Landmark Battles in the Rise of Western Power, p. 74

THE MACEDONIAN MILITARY MACHINE

phalanx-mercenary, not free farmer hoplitai; hand-picked “tallest & strongest”

the spear-lengthened from 8 to 16-18 feet, a sarissa, a true pike; little or no body armor. “They could always rely on making their first strike before the enemy got to grips…”-Green

the first four or five rows, not three were thrusting--40% more spearheads in the killing zone--”a storm of spears”-Polybius

Companion Cavalry (hetairoi)-elite body of aristocratic horsemen, heavily armored on strong mounts. “...adept at spiking their opponents through the face”-Green

“shield bearers” (hypaspists)-another infantry with more armor and shorter spears. Green uses the British term, “Guards regiment”

professional corps of light infantry, slingers, archers and javelineers [peltasts] rounded out the composite army group, supplying preliminary bombardment and reserve support

Op. cit., pp. 74-75

Philip brought to Western warfare an enhanced notion of decisive war. True, the Macedonian’s face-to-face, stand-up fighting was reminiscent of the shock assaults of the Greek phalanxes of the past. The running collisions of massed infantry, the spear tip to the face of the enemy, were still the preferred creed of any Macedonian phalangite. But no longer were Macedonians killing merely over territorial borders. Battle was designed predominantly as an instrument of ambitious state policy. Philip’s destructive mechanism for conquest and annexation was a radical source of social unrest and cultural upheaval, not a conservative

Greek institution to preserve the existing agrarian community….the centerpiece of a new total war of brutal annihilation which the world had not yet seen.

0p.cit., p. 77

Philip and his son

knew only two

ways to acquire

gold: to dig it out

of the ground or to

steal it from

someone weaker

than themselves--Green

φιλιππου

Philip’s men, too, were a completely different breed from the Greek hoplites of the city-state. In his lost comedy Philip, the playwright Mnesimachus (ca. 350 BC.) makes his characteristic Macedonian phalangites brag:

0p.cit., p. 77

Do you know against what type of men you’ll have to fight?We who dine on sharpened swords,and drink down blazing torches as our wine.Then for dessert they bring us broken Cretan dartsand splintered pike shafts. Our pillows are shieldsand breastplates…

(Mnesimachus frg. 7 [cf. Athenaeus 10.421b]

Warriors who wore cords around their waists until they had killed a man in battle, who could not even sit at meat with their fellows until they had speared a wild boar single-handed, who drank from cattle horns like Vikings---such men were not the stuff of which a cultural renaissance is made.

Most Macedonian nobles preferred the more manly pleasures of hunting, carousing, and casual fornication. Sodomy---with young boys or, at a pinch, with each other---they also much enjoyed; but they had no intention of letting it be contaminated with decadent Platonic notions of

spiritual uplift. The simultaneous presence in Alexander’s headquarters of tough Macedonian officers and Greek civilian intellectuals was to produce untold tension and hostility….

Peter Green, Alexander of Macedon, p. 11

Griess, ed., West Point Military History Series, p.22

Griess, ed., West Point Military History Series, p.23

DIRECTION

the Phalanx was made up of 6

Taxeis, infantry battalions, 1,536

soldiers each

the Taxis was made up of 6

Syntagmai, 256 soldiers each

358-Arymbas, the new king of Molossia (a tribe in Epirus) sealed an alliance with Philip, also new to the throne of Macedonia, with his sister Myrtale

she was Philip’s fourth wife, mother to his first son Alexander

356-Philip’s race horse won at Olympia, so she took that name

the night before she became pregnant with Alexander she dreamed a thunderbolt entered her (Zeus) and a great fire was kindled--Plutarch

her fierce personality, claim of descent from Achilles, mysticism, devotion to Dionysus’ snake-worshiping cult all would influence her son, Alexander

OlympiasὈλυμπιάς

ca. 375–316 BC

358-Arymbas, the new king of Molossia (a tribe in Epirus) sealed an alliance with Philip, also new to the throne of Macedonia, with his sister Myrtale

she was Philip’s fourth wife, mother to his first son Alexander

356-Philip’s race horse won at Olympia, so she took that name

the night before she became pregnant with Alexander she dreamed a thunderbolt entered her (Zeus) and a great fire was kindled--Plutarch

her fierce personality, claim of descent from Achilles, mysticism, devotion to Dionysus’ snake-worshiping cult all would influence her son, Alexander

OlympiasὈλυμπιάς

ca. 375–316 BC

Zeus seduces Olympias. Fresco by Giulio Romano between 1526 and 1534, in Palazzo del Te, Mantua, Italy.

Philip brought many Athenians to his capital to add luster to his court

343/2-he secured Aristotle as a tutor for Alexander and his companions

this formative relationship deeply inspired Alexander. Intellectually curious, he would bring Greek scholars on his campaigns

he would send back specimens of flora and fauna to his tutor from as far away as India

323-this link continued until their deaths in the same year

core area early 4th c.

added by 359

added by 336 added after 336

Corinthian League 337

other Greek statesPersian empire

when viewing amap always

begin with thekey, scale &orientation

Philip was the beneficiary of almost two centuries of patient state building

fifth century collaboration with Persia shielded Macedon from its neighbors

grain and timber financed Hellenizing

359-Philip ii faced a severe crisis, threats from Greeks and non-Greeks

but his new army and shrewd leadership led to expansion, first northward, over “barbarians”

then southward, into Thessaly, famous for its horses (and cavalry)

core area early 4th c.

added by 359

added by 336 added after 336

Corinthian League 337

other Greek statesPersian empire

when viewing amap always

begin with thekey, scale &orientation

A WARY EYE TO THE NORTHTwo Athenian politicians, rivals, both famous for their oratory, cast

nervous glances toward the new Macedonian army. Philip first expanded

his state to the east, conquering Chalcidice and Thrace; then southward

towards the Greek heartland.

Isocrates tried to distract him, urged Philip to “free the Greeks” of Asia

Minor, most of whom were once again vassals of a renewed Persian

Empire. Demosthenes was the more implacable enemy. He warned his

fellow Athenians in a famous series of attacks, the Philippics. They have

added a word to our vocabulary for a hard-hitting political tirade.

Demosthenes Practising Oratory

by Jean-Jules-Antoine Lecomte du Nouy (1842–1923).

Demosthenes used to talk with pebbles in his mouth and recited verses while running. To strengthen his voice, he spoke on the seashore over the roar of the waves.

A modern collage representing Demosthenes’ Third Philippic

the chairs are on the Πνύξthe acropolis and Mount Υµηττός

form the backdrop

A View of the Speaker’s Platform (βεµα)on the Πνύξ

“I am told that in those days [431-404] the Spartans and all our other enemies

would invade us for four or five months---during, that is, the actual summer---

and would damage Attica with infantry and citizen troops, and then return home

again. And so old fashioned were the men of that day---nay rather, such true

citizens…but their warfare was of a legitimate and open kind. But now, as I am

sure you see, most of our losses are the result of treachery, and no issue is

decided by open conflict or battle; while you are told that it is not because he

leads a column of heavy infantry that Philip can march wherever he chooses, but

because he has attached to himself a force of light infantry, cavalry, archers,

mercenaries, and similar troops. And whenever, with such advantages, he falls

upon a State which is disordered within, and in their distrust of one another no

one goes out in defense of its territory, he brings up his engines and besieges

them. I pass over the fact that summer and winter are alike to him---that there is

no close season during which he suspends operations.

Demosthenes, Third Philippic, quoted in Kagan, ed., Problems in Ancient History, p. 429

It is probably true that Philip excited rivalries between the Greek states, having as a goal the exploitation of opportunities for Macedonian penetration of the south. It is also probably true that… Demosthenes, having earlier decided that Philip was a grave threat… trifled with the facts while marshaling Athenian resistance to Macedonia, and gave less than due credence to Philip’s several conciliatory overtures to Athens. At any rate,...relations between Athens and Macedonia grew increasingly strained, as Philip consolidated his position in Thrace and Thessaly, and, on one occasion, penetrated as far southward as Thermopylae. This strained

relationship reached the point of open break in 340 B.C., when Philip unsuccessfully laid siege to...Byzantium, and coincidentally seized most of the Athenian grain fleet. In response, Athens declared war.

Griess, ed., pp.25-26

“bypassing Thermopylae in emulation of an earlier Persian army”--Griess

h a v i n g e x h a u s t e d diplomacy, Phi l ip i n v a d e d i n t h e summer of 338 BC

“bypassing Thermopylae in emulation of an earlier Persian army”--Griess

h a v i n g e x h a u s t e d diplomacy, Phi l ip i n v a d e d i n t h e summer of 338 BC

Next, he advanced to Elatea and captured it

“bypassing Thermopylae in emulation of an earlier Persian army”--Griess

h a v i n g e x h a u s t e d diplomacy, Phi l ip i n v a d e d i n t h e summer of 338 BC

Diversionary attack

Next, he advanced to Elatea and captured it

he sends part of his forces back around Mt. Parnassos

“bypassing Thermopylae in emulation of an earlier Persian army”--Griess

h a v i n g e x h a u s t e d diplomacy, Phi l ip i n v a d e d i n t h e summer of 338 BC

Diversionary attack

Next, he advanced to Elatea and captured it

His main force now attacks the Thebans and Athenians at Chaeronea (Χαιρώνεια)

he sends part of his forces back around Mt. Parnassos

Since the well-chosen position of the allies prevented Philip

from using his favorite strategy he had to provoke a gap in their position. This he accomplished by withdrawing his right. As the

Athenians advanced, the gap opened and 18-year-old

Alexander, riding at the head of the Companions, began his

charge to glory.

...that fatal gap at last opened between the Greek centre and

the Theban brigades on their right. Superior discipline, ironically, had sealed the fate of the Sacred Band. They held

their formation; the troops at the centre did not. Into the gap

thus opened, at the head of Macedonia’s finest cavalry division,

thundered the young crown prince...while a second mounted

brigade attacked the Sacred Band from the flank. Very soon the

Thebans were completely surrounded.

Green, pp. 75-76

[The Sacred Band were]

wiped out to a man at

Chaironeia (338); Philip

w a s s t r u c k b y t h e

appearance of the huddled

masses of their paired

corpses.

Hanson, vide supra

“the chains of Greece”

The Thebans...drew the conclusion [at Coronea] that they [like the Spartans] must drill also. When, at Leuctra, they came to confront the Spartans again, their drilled

phalanx overmassed the Spartan’s right and won the day.

It was thus that the principles of drill and manoeuvre infiltrated the Greek world

at large. But there was another infiltrator: hierarchy….

Once the practice of drill and manoeuvre took root outside the egalitarian army of Sparta, officer rank acquired a different status….The mercenary had been a

familiar figure in the Greek military world from early times and in Alexander’s day was...a mainstay of both his own and of the Persian army. By definition the

mercenary was a man under authority….In the mercenary, a master of drill and manoeuvre (Alexander always rated them highest among his opponents), and at

the same time an instrument of purely military hierarchy, we encounter the separation of citizenship from warriordom in its most extreme form.

John Keegan, The Mask of Command, pp. 124-125

With the emergence of the mercenary, and his near-relation the full-time professional soldier, ancient armies completed the transformation both of their

nature and of their relationship with the state. They also, as it happened, rehearsed and anticipated identical transformations to those that the armies of

Western Europe would undergo when they emerged from warriordom at the end

of the Middle Ages, passing for the second time through the heroic stage, which resurrected itself after imperial rule by the Romans. And Europe’s early modern

armies were to display exactly that mixture of soldier-types so characteristic of those of the Mediterranean world before Roman power beat all into the same

shape on its legionary anvil. Mercenaries and professionals, officered by warrior aristocrats, formed the backbone of French and Habsburg armies from the

sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries. Town militias, equivalents of the city-state armies of Greece, succeeded in surviving for much of the same period.

op. cit., pp. 125-126

It was not until the 1790s that these mutiform bodies were to encounter, in the conscript levies of the Revolution, a military model which first challenged and

then overcame their dominance. Wellington was to prove himself one of the very few ancien régime officers with the talent to meet Revolutionary armies on their

own terms and defeat them in battle.

op. cit., p. 126

It was not until the 1790s that these mutiform bodies were to encounter, in the conscript levies of the Revolution, a military model which first challenged and

then overcame their dominance. Wellington was to prove himself one of the very few ancien régime officers with the talent to meet Revolutionary armies on their

own terms and defeat them in battle.

op. cit., p. 126

But, that’s a story that’s already been told...