Francis Turretin - Institutes of Elenctic Theology - Sin

Turretin - Institutes of Elenctic Theology

NINTH TOPIC

SIN IN GENERAL AND IN PARTICULAR

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Question I. Whether the formal reason of sin may rightly be

said to consist in illegality (anomia). We affirm.

Question II. Whether the hekousion or voluntary (inasmuch as

it is of him who knowlingly and willingly does

anything) is of the essence of sin? We deny against

the papists and Socinians.

Question III. Whether guilt is the formal of sin, or its inseparable

adjunct, or only its effect. And whether it may well

be distinguished into guilt of culpability and of

punishment.

VENIAL AND MORTAL SINS

Question IV. Whether all sins are of themselves and in their own

nature mortal. Or whether any venial sin can be

granted. The former we affirm; the latter we deny

against the papists.

THE FALL OF THE ANGELS

Question V. What was the sin of the angels by which they are

said to have rebelled against God?

THE FALL OF ADAM

Question VI. What was the first sin of man - unbelief or pride?

Question VII. How could a holy man fall, and what was the true

cause of his fall?

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Question VIII. Whether Adam by his fall lost the image of God.

We affirm.

Question IX. Whether the actual disobedience of Adam is

imputed by an immediate and antecedent

imputation to all his posterity springing from him

by natural generation. We affirm.

ORIGINAL SIN

Question X. Whether any original sin or inherent stain and

depravity may be granted, propagated to us by

generation. We affirm against the Pelagians and

Socinians.

Question XI. Whether original sin has corrupted the very

essence of the soul. Also whether it is a mere

privation or a certain positive quality too.

THE PROPAGATION OF SIN

Question XII. How is original sin propagated from parents to

their children?

Question XIII. Actual sin and its various divisions.

Question XIV. In what consists the formal reason of the sin

against the Holy Spirit? Also why is it unpardonable?

Question XV. Whether sin can be the punishment of sin. We

affirm.

* * * * * * * * * *

FIRST QUESTION - Whether the formal reason of sin may rightly be said to consist in illegality

(anomia). We affirm.

I. We proceed to the state of sin into which man (by his voluntary defection from the

highest good) precipitated himself and became, at the same time, wicked and miserable.



II. Peccatum is commonly called in Hebrew hajx, which properly means "deflection" from a design. It is applied to slingers and archers who do not hit the mark.

A. a`marti,a in Greek answers to it - as if a`marpti,a ("a not reaching) as

`amarta,nein means "to miss a mark"

B. in Latin peccatum (cf. pecuatum, "from cattle") as peccare is to act irrationally

like beasts

III. Sin may be viewed in two aspects:

A. in the concrete and materially (with the subject in which inheres) - it is called an

inclination, action or omission at variance with the law of God, or lacking the

legal rectitude which ought to be in it

B. in the abstract and formally for depravity itself - it is nothing other and anomia or

"discrepancy from the law"

IV. By law here is meant the law of God alone by way of eminence, whether natural and

implanted or revealed and inwritten.

V. The formal reason of sin consists in anomia and privation, denoting the want of the

rectitude or goodness which ought to be in the rational creature according to the

prescription of the law.

A. this privation is not pure or simple, but corrupting; not idle, but energetic; not of

pure negation, but of depraved disposition, by which not only is the due rectitude

taken away, but also an undue unrectitude and a depraved quality laid down,

infecting all the faculties

B. sin is not only the negation of a good, but the position of a corrupt disposition

VI. Some attribute a certain positive being to sin, not absolutely and physically, but both

logically and ethically.

VII. What properly and in every way is positive (especially substantial) and which in its own

conception does not imply privation or defect, such also alone is from God and is

desirable. Yet there is not the same relation of that which is called positive only

relatively or logically or ethically, as is the case with sin.



VIII. Although sin in its conception involves privation, yet there does not cease to be a

distinction between sins of omission and commission.

A. sins of omission

1. assail the affirming precepts

2. privation takes away the whole substance of the act and its objective

goodness

3. the privation of omission immediately exists in the power by which man

was bound to have acted

B. sins of commission

1. assail the denying precepts

2. the substance of the act is not taken away, but only it actual goodness

3. the privation of commission is immediately in the action which is destitute

of the due morality

IX. Original sin is rightly said to be against the law because it is a privation of the original

rectitude which the law demands in man.

X. The virtues of the heathen can be according to the law with regard to the substance of

work; although against the law with regard to mode of operating (which in many ways

wanders from it).

* * * * * * * * * *

SECOND QUESTION - Whether the hekousion or voluntary (inasmuch as it is of him who

knowingly and willingly does anything) is of the essence of sin. We deny against the papists and

Socinians.

I. The papists and Socinians wish nothing to have the relation of sin except what is equally

voluntary (viz. what is done knowingly and from choice).

II. We clear the question by a twofold distinction:

A. voluntary may be taken either strictly or broadly

1. strictly - that which is done by an actual movement of the will

2. broadly - that which in any manner either affects the will and inheres in it



or depends upon it

3. we treat of voluntary strictly, which involves an act of choice and will; in

this sense, we deny that every sin is voluntary

B. involuntary may be taken in two ways: either positively or negatively

1. positively - the same as unwilling which is such by a positive notion; in this

sense, we grant that no sin can be involuntary

2. negatively - what is done when the will ought to have acted; in this sense,

every sin is not necessarily voluntary

IV. This requisite does not belong to every sin -

A. not to it alone, nor always

B. not to all because it cannot be said of original sin

C. not to "sins of ignorance and imprudence"

V. The very first motions of concupiscence do not cease to be sins, although they are

neither wholly voluntary nor in our power (cf. Rom. 7:7).

VI. Desire is contradistinguished from sin; not simply, but from a certain species of it which

is carried out by the external members (James 1:14-15).

VII. Ignorance can indeed excuse from so much, but not from the whole.

VIII. Augustine: "In vain do you suppose that on this account there is no fault in little children

because it cannot be without will, which they have not. For this is properly said on

account of each one's proper sin, not on account of the original contagion of the first

sin." (Against Julian 3.5).

IX. The voluntary is twofold:

A. either radically in the signified act

B. or actually in the exercised act

C. sin is not always voluntary actually and in the exercised act because original sin is

granted; but it can be called voluntary radically because the proper seat of sin is

the will in every sin



X. What is necessary by a physical necessity (or of coaction) cannot have the relation of sin;

but what is necessary by a hypothetical and rational necessity does not forthwith take

away sin.

* * * * * * * * * *

THIRD QUESTION - Whether guilt is the formal of sin, or its inseparable adjunct, or only its

effect. And whether it may well be distinguished into guilt of culpability and of punishment.

I. The effects of sin are commonly said to be two:

A. pollution

1. the spiritual and moral pollution with which the soul of man is tainted

2. inheres in man

3. makes man wicked

4. called "impurities," "diseases," "wounds"

5. answers to the grace of sanctification by which pollution is washed away

through the efficacy of the Holy Spirit

B. guilt

1. obligation to punishment from previous sin

2. adheres to him in the sight of God

3. makes man miserable

4. called "crimes," "offenses," "debts"

5. answers to the blessing of justification by which Christ takes away our

guilt by the imputation of his own righteousness

II. Guilt:

A. politically, it is nothing else than the state and condition in which the accused are

until they are either acquitted or condemned

B. theologically, it is called "the obligation to punishment arising from sin"

C. hence a twofold guilt arises:

1. potential

a. denoting the intrinsic desert of punishment inseparable from sin

b. and belongs to the demerit of sin and its condemnability

2. actual



a. separable from it by the mercy of God, which is properly the actual

removal of guilt

b. belongs to the judgment of demerit or the condemnation which is

taken away from those who sins are pardoned

III. Illegality (anomia) is one thing, but the condemnation attending it is another.

A. the former constitutes the nature of sin

B. the latter follows it and necessarily depends upon it

IV. Guilt follows sin -

A. partly from the natural and indispensable right of God

B. partly from the sanction of the divine law threatening sin with punishment.

V. Although the sanction of the law ought necessarily to be fulfilled, yet because a surety

can be substituted in the place of the sinner (who takes his guilt upon himself), it

happens that it can be separated from the person sinning (through the grace from the

gospel).

VI. Falsely is guilt distinguished by the papists into guilt of culpability and of punishment.

A. the guilt of culpability (reatus culpae) according to them is that by which the

sinner is of himself unworthy of the grace of God and worthy of his wrath and

condemnation

B. the guilt of punishment (reatus poenae) is that by which he is subject to

condemnation and obliged to it

C. the emptiness of the distinction appears from the nature of both: since

culpability and punishment are related and guilt is nothing else than the

obligation to punishment arising from culpability

VII. Some punishments are still visited by God upon believers after the remission of

culpability because they are only improperly so called (i.e., they are medicinal and

castigatory - for their correction); not indeed properly so called and satisfactory - for

their punishment. Yet it does not follow that, the culpability being remitted or its guilt

removed, there still remains any guilt of punishment.



* * * * * * * * * *

FOURTH QUESTION - Whether all sins are of themselves and in their own nature mortal. Or

whether any venial sins can be granted. The former we affirma; the latter we deny against the

papists.

I. Among the various divisions of sin, the papists distribute sin into mortal and venial.

A. their design in this is to curry favor for the perfection of righteousness,

supererogatory works, the merit of works and purgatory

B. this is confirmed in Session 6 of the Council of Trent.

II. According to them:

A. mortal sins are those which turn man entirely away from God to which eternal

punishment is due

B. venial sins

1. are those which do not indeed wholly turn away from God, yet hinder

progress to him and are easily expiated

2. or they are those which of themselves and in their own nature are so light

and minute as not be sufficient to deprive anyone of divine grace or make

him an enemy of God or render him worthy of eternal death

3. those which are judged to be venial on account of imperfection of work

are twofold:

a. from subreption, which are not perfectly voluntary (such as the

sudden motions of desire, anger, vengeance, etc. arising in the

mind before the reason can fully deliberate whether they are to be

entertained or not)

b. from the smallness of the matter, which are committed in a small

thing (for instance, the theft of a penny, which neither sensibly

injuries one's neighbor, nor is of such a kind as to take away

friendship among generous men)

III. The question does not concern the equality of sin or gradual inequality, but their

essential demerit; the question is not whether all sins are equal to each other, but the

question is only whether they are equally mortal.



IV. The question is not whether sins can be called mortal or venial from the event, but the

question is whether they are such per se and in their own nature, so that some are

mortal (deserving death), other venial (of themselves deserving pardon).

V. The question is not whether a distinction relative to the administration of divine

providence in the covenant of grace in punishing the sins of believers can be admitted,

but the question simply concerns the nature of sins in themselves according to the

strictness of the law. We think all are mortal, none truly venial.

VI. The question comes back to this - whether all sins per se and in their own nature are

mortal (not that they are always actually punished with death, but are worthy of it and

can justly be so punished); whether some are mortal and some venial (not from the

event and through grace, but in their own nature and according to the law). The latter

our opponents hold; we maintain the former.

VII. The reasons are:

A. "the wages of sin is death" (Rom. 6:23) and "the soul that sinneth, it shall

die" (Ezek. 18:20)

1. mention is made of sin indefinitely to mark sin of any kind

2. thus either venial sin is not sin or it deserves death and so is not venial

B. "cursed be he that confirmeth not all that words of this law to do them" (Deut.

27:26; Gal. 3:10)

1. if every deviation from the law deserves a curse

2. and every sin is illegality

3. therefore no sin can be granted (even the smallest) which does not bring

upon it the curse

C. "whosoever offends in one precept, he is guilty of all" (Jam. 2:10)

1. the apostle treats here not only of crimes, but of any sins indefinitely

2. a multiple reason can be given why man by violating one precept becomes

guilty of all:

a. from the author, because there is the same author of all the

precepts, so that in the violation of one the majesty of the lawgiver

is offended against



b. from the connection of sins, because all the precepts are summed

up in the one of love; this being violated the whole law is violated

c. from the end of the law which demands an obedience, not partial,

but universal; so that he who violates one precept is guilty of the

violation of the whole law and can no more obtain life from the

law

D. in the day of judgment account must be given even of the idle word (Matt. 12:36)

E. every sin is opposed to the glory of God and is injurious to his infinite majesty

1. thus it has in its measure infinite culpability

a. if not intensive and intrinsic, at least objectively (inasmuch as it is

committed against infinite good) and extensive (by reason of

duration)

b. because its stain or pollution continues forever (as far as the sinner

is concerned; for he of himself or by his own powers can never

wipe it out)

c. hence apart from the mercy of God condemning, it would exclude

the sinner forever from the heavenly kingdom and subject him to

infernal punishments

2. if, therefore, the culpability is infinite, the punishment also due to it must

be infinite

F. the very lightest sins cannot be remitted, since indeed pardon of the elect is

wholly gratuitous, therefore they can be eternally punished justly

G. Christ died for all sins, even the most trivial: therefore all are mortal

XIII. Mortal sin differs from sin producing death.

A. the former denotes what sin deserves

B. the latter whither sin leads us if we suffer ourselves to be led away and deceived

by it

C. every sin is mortal in its own nature

D. yet not every sin really and actually leads to death, on account of the

intervention of grace

XIV. Sin when it is finished is said "to bring forth death" (Jam. 1:15), not to the exclusion or

conceived or inborn sin, but as the proximate cause.



A. James does not distinguish the various species of sins, but the different degrees

of the same sin and the process of temptation in which an advance is made from

the first to the second act (from the internal to the external) and so to death

itself

B. The stages are:

1. first stage is placed in the temptation of lust or its first motion

2. second in the conceiving of lust by its imperfect consent

3. third in the bringing forth by a full and perfect consent

4. fourth in the consummation of sin by external work, which brings forth

death

XV. The "hay" and "stubble" in 1 Corinthians 3:12, do not denote venial sins, but new, vain

and curious doctrines.

A. although they do not overthrow the foundation, they are not homogeneous with

it

B. although those who build such things upon a solid foundation will not be

condemned, it does not therefore follow that their sins are not worthy of death;

but that the grace of God pardons them

XVI. The sin against the Holy Spirit is said to be unto death (1 John 5:16) by way of eminence,

not only because it deserves death, but since it is wholly unpardonable, death

necessarily and infallibly follows it. Others are not unto death; not because they are not

mortal per se and worthy of death, but because from God's grace they are pardonable

and often obtain remission.

XVII. Christ says nothing to favor venial sins, although seeming to consign some only to hell

fire (Matt. 5:22-23); sin consists in internal passion and irritating insults (but not that any

sins are venial, since even the smallest degree of punishment is capital, as the smallest

degree of sin is illegality).

XVIII. Luke 6:41 and Matthew 23:24 do prove that some sins are heavier or lighter than others,

but they do not prove that some are venial.

XIX. In Ephesians 5:4-5, Paul does not distinguish certain vices from others as mortal from



venial, but rather joins all together as homogeneous by the copulative; they also all

depend upon the same verb in construction; hence, verse 6 applies to them all.

XX. Although a formal and expressed aversion from God does not occur in every sin, yet

there is a virtual and implied aversion even in the lightest.

XXI. They who extenuate sin honestly estimate neither the majesty of God, nor the justice of

the law, nor the hideousness of sin, nor their own most humble condition in God's sight.

A. as no small thing is rebellion, no small crime is treason; so sin which is committed

against God cannot be considered an insignificant thing

B. although often it is a small thing about which sin occurs, yet the guilt does not

cease to be heavy; the latter is estimated not from the smallness of the object,

but from the majesty of the lawgiver

* * * * * * * * * *

FIFTH QUESTION - What was the sin of the angels by which they are said to have rebelled

against God?

I. We must speak briefly of the sin of the angels because Scripture tells us very little about

it.

II. To no purpose is it inquired how angels could sin and the time of their fall.

A. it general it is evident that their fall preceded the fall of man

B. it is not likely that they fell before the work of creation was finished because then

all that God had created was still very good (Gen. 1:31)

C. if the Devil is said to have sinned "from the beginning" (1 John 3:8), it does not

follow that he sinned from the very beginning of creation; for some movement of

time does not hinder us from saying a thing was done from the beginning

III. The question does not concern the manner and order of this sin, rather it concerns the

species of this sin.

IV. There are two principal opinions among the learned.

A. those who think it was envy and hatred of man arising from the decree revealed



to them concerning the advancement of the human nature in Christ above the

angelic

B. the other (more common among the Scholastics) is that of those who maintain it

was pride (Anselm and Lombard)

V. However, since Scripture was unwilling to define expressly the species of this sin and

only sets forth its genus when it asserts that they sinned, nothing certain can be

determined about it.

A. in Jude 6 they are said to have "kept not their first estate, and to have left their

own habitation"; by "estate" is meant God, their Creator, or the original holiness

and rectitude in which they were created; falling from this by their own voluntary

apostasy, they lost the happy mansions of heaven in which they had been placed

B. thus being hurled from it, they can never to all eternity return there (Luke 10:18)

VI. We cannot doubt that pride stood out above other things in that sin.

A. they wished not only to shake off the yoke of God, contemptuously rising against

him and his law impressed upon them, but also in affectation of equality with

God (1 Tim. 3:6)

B. since this has always been the special desire of the Devil (who bears himself as

God and prince in the world and wished to be regarded and worshiped as such [2

Cor. 4:4; John 12:31]), it is not without reason that he may be said to have fallen

into this sin

C. to this kind of sin he tempted Adam in the beginning and drives men to it every

day

VII. Still we think that pride so exercised itself here that a thoughtlessness and decreased

attention about the contemplation of God must have preceded it.

VIII. That this sin was most heinous, the very severest punishment following it sufficiently

proves.

IX. Although that fall did not happen without the intervention of divine providence, still its

true cause must be sought in the angels alone and by no means in God.

A. It must not be sought in God



1. with regard to prescience - which only foresees a thing as future, but does

not make it so

2. with regard to decree - which was permissive, not efficient

3. with regard to his actual permission - which is not moral, but physical by

not hindering to which he was not bound

4. with regard to a deficiency of sustentation - this grace is entirely

undeserved, which he owes to no on, but bestows upon whomsoever he

pleases from his good pleasure alone

B. the sole cause was the proper will of each devil by which individuals of their own

accord turned from good to evil

1. they fell because they willed to fall

2. they could fall because they were created mutable and capable of falling

* * * * * * * * * *

SIXTH QUESTION - What was the first sin of man - unbelief or pride?

I. The first sin of man (from which the others flow as from a fountain) is the voluntary

apostasy of the first man from God.

II. Two opinions concerning this are more common than the others:

A. referring it to pride (papists)

B. referring it to unbelief (held by us)

III. We must not regard that fall as any particular sin, such as theft or adultery, but as a

general apostasy and defection from God.

IV. The heinousness of this sin is easily gathered against those who assert that it was venial

and quite insignificant.

A. on the part of the object about which he sinned - there was a great iniquity in

sinning where it was so easy not to sin

B. on the part of the law violated - not special but universal

C. on the part of the act - the symbol of the covenant being trodden under foot and

a departure of thought, word and deed from duty



D. on the part of the place and time - because scarcely having issued from the hands

of the Creator and placed in a most delightful paradise, he immediately fell at the

onset of temptation

E. on the part of the most dire effects and punishments following it - under whose

weight even now at this day, nature universally groans

V. As to what the beginning or the first step of this sin theologians do not agree.

A. some place it in sensuality, others in will, and others in the intellect

B. we can safely assert that the first stage of this sin is not to be sought in external

acts or in the internal acts of appetite or the will

C. we must rise to the acts of the directive faculty (viz. of the intellect) to which

belongs the judgment of the truth and falsity of things and on which the error

and unbelief properly fall

D. although man made that judgment, it does not follow that it was an act of the

will and not of the intellect

VI. Hence it is evident that the beginning of sin is better referred to unbelief than to pride,

although in it both are joined.

A. there ought to be the same order in the sin that was in the temptation

1. by his interrogation, the tempter first urges him to doubt the word of God

(Gen. 3:1), then to deny it (v. 4)

2. before he incites to pride by the promise of divinity (v. 5)

B. pride could not have place in man except on the positing of unbelief

C. Scripture express the sin man by seduction (2 Cor. 11:3; 1 Tim. 2:14) and

mentions the cunning of the serpent, which wholly pertains to deceiving

D. the first man could not believe it to be virtuous and good thing for him not to

depend upon God, since this is the basest of all

E. if the Devil first tempted man to pride, he either believed his words or he did not

1. if he did, he erred by that very fact

2. if he did not, he could not aim at that which was proposed by the Devil

IX. But unbelief could not have place in man, unless first by thoughtlessness he had ceased

from a consideration of God's prohibition and of his truth and goodness.



X. Although in the fall of Adam pride is included, it does not follow that this was the first

stage; for pride never could have entered the heart of man if his faith in the words of

God had not before been weakened and overthrown.

XI. As in every motion, the point of commencement is prior to that of termination, so the

turning away from the uncreated good (unbelief) ought to precede the turning towards

the created good (pride).

XII. Although the act of pride was occupied with the end, it does not follow that unbelief had

the relation of means, but rather of cause (from which pride arose). For unless man

fluctuated in belief, the desire for deity (an act of pride) could not have entered his

heart.

XIII. The passage of the Son or Sirach, "the beginning of pride is departure from God" (10:12),

besides being apocryphal, is not repugnant to our opinion.

A. if apostasy is the beginning of pride, unbelief must necessarily have preceded

pride

B. nor does what is added ("pride is the beginning of all sin," v. 13) prove the

contrary because it must not be understood simply and absolutely of every sin,

but relatively concerning other beginnings which draw their origin for the most

part from pride

* * * * * * * * * *

SEVENTH QUESTION - How could a holy man fall, and what was the true cause of his fall?

I. Two questions are involved here:

A. the possibility of the fall

B. its true cause

II. As to the possibility of the fall - it is most difficult to imagine in what way at length man

in a state of integrity could fall.

III. In order to free themselves from this difficulty, the ancient and more modern Pelagians,

papists, Socinians, and Remonstrants attribute to innocent man (as created by God) a



headlong inclination to vice, from which arose the first sin.

A. this opinion is manifestly injurious to God and can easily be shown to be false

1. if an inclination to sin was in man by nature, God must be considered its

author; thus sin will be cast upon God himself

2. the inclination to love and worship God is incompatible with and

inclination to sin

3. all things were very good in man before the fall, since he was made in the

image of God

B. it is evident that the mutability which was in Adam without any stain is not to be

confounded with such an inclination to sin

IV. No other suitable method of removing the difficulty can be granted than by returning to

the mutability and liberty of the first man, as one who was created just and holy, but

mutably: thus he could stand if he wished, but could also if he wished become evil.

V. Although that mutability indicates the possibility of the fall and is the cause sine qua

non, still it cannot be considered its cause proper and of itself.

A. we must accurately distinguish here between the mutability itself (which is a

condition suitable to the creature) and the act of that mutability (by which man

inclined to a change)

B. the former denotes a power which could be inclined to evil, but was not yet

inclined; the latter designates the actual inclination to evil itself and the fountain

of all sin

VI. The proximate and proper cause of sin therefore is to be sought nowhere else than in

the free will of man (who suffered himself to be deceived by the Devil and, Satan

persuading though not compelling, freely departed from God).

VII. Although man fell, still he had the ability to stand if he wished. Hence a twofold help or

assistance is commonly distinguished:

A. help without which or the power of not sinning (auxilium sine qua non)

1. by which he had strength sufficient to stand if he wished

2. after the manner of a habit and faculty in man

3. necessary to his ability to persevere



4. never absent from Adam, not even in the very moment in which he sinned

B. the help by which or efficacious grace (auxilium quo)

1. which gave not only the ability if he wished, but to will what he could

2. after the manner of an action or efficacious motion to good

3. necessary to his actual perseverance

4. God withheld from him freely as he was not bound to give it

C. notwithstanding, neither can man be excused (because he sinned voluntarily and

was impelled by no force) nor God be accused (because as a most free dispenser

of his own goods, he was bound to the bestowal of that grace by no law)

VIII. Therefore man alone was the cause of his evil.

IX. Besides that internal moving cause, there was also another twofold external assisting

cause:

A. the principal cause - Satan who, envying the glory of God and the happiness of

man, instigated the first creatures to apostasy

B. the instrumental cause - the serpent, used by Satan for this work

X. That Satan was the author of the temptation, Scripture does not allow us to doubt.

A. it calls him

1. serpent and dragon (Rev. 12:9; 20:2)

2. a murder, and a liar from the beginning (John 8:44)

3. the tempter (1 Thess. 3:5; 2 Cor. 11:3)

4. he holds the empire of death (Heb. 2:14)

5. Christ came to destroy his works (1 John 3:8)

B. the punishment inflicted on the tempter, so bears upon the external serpent that

far more truly and fully it agrees with the Devil who was trodden under foot by

Christ (Heb. 2:14; Col. 2:15; Rom. 16:20)

XI. Now that the Devil was not only present here, but concealed and speaking under the

serpent, many things prove:

A. the simple and unadorned narrative of Moses (which is not rashly to be turned

into an allegory)

B. the description of the serpent as the most cunning of all the beasts of the field



C. the punishment inflicted upon it as the instrument of seduction, no less than

upon Satan

XII. This caution about serpents did not escaped notice by the Gentiles.

XIII. However because neither man nor Satan could have done anything without the

providence of God, it remains to be seen how it was most holily occupied still without

any causality of sin: God only permitted physically by not hindering, not morally by

approval and consent.

XIV. With permission here is involved the negation of the efficacious grace and help by which

man might actually stand.

XV. Some want to express this negation of grace by desertion; not privative (as if internal

and habitual grace already given were taken away), but negative (by which that not yet

given is suspended).

XVI. Here we meet the depth of the wisdom of God - rather to be wondered at than to be

pried into, far surpassing the reach of reason (viz., how God willed to deny that grace to

man yet undeserving, without which he foresaw he could not avoid that fall).

XVII. It is evident that man can well be said to have been able not to sin and yet not to be able

not to sin.

A. the former with respect to the habitual and internal grace of Adam and the

powers bestowed upon him by creation

B. the latter by reason of the decree and the suspension of actual external grace

C. God did not remove the grace which he had granted, he only did not bestow

grace effectual to the avoiding of sin

XVIII. Let us remember the ways of God are not our ways and that we must here be wise with

sobriety, lest searching into his majesty, we be overpowered by his glory. Let it be

sufficient to hold together these two things:

A. that this most dreadful fall did not happen without the providence of God (but its

causality, it contributed nothing)



B. and that man alone, moved by the temptation of Satan, was its true and proper

cause

* * * * * * * * * *

EIGHTH QUESTION - Whether Adam by his fall lost the image of God. We affirm.

I. The effects on the faculties of man can be distinguished into moral and physical:

A. the moral are guilt and pollution by which he incurred the curse and wrath of

God with his descendants

B. the physical are the miseries of all kinds and death itself by which he contracted

universal corruption and impurity for himself and his

II. Among the moral effects is usually placed the loss of the divine image (or original

righteousness). Concerning this the Remonstrants (following the Socinians) raise a

controversy with us.

III. By the image of God we do not mean generally whatever gifts upright man received

from God or specially certain remains of it existing in the mind and heart of man after

the fall; rather, we understand it strictly of the principal part of that image which

consisted in holiness and wisdom (usually termed original righteousness).

IV. The Socinians deny that image was lost in any way by the fall of Adam, maintaining it still

remains complete; however the Remonstrants confess that by his fall Adam deserved

that God should take original righteousness away from him, but they deny that he lost it

by the act itself. They assert this in order that they may not be compelled to

acknowledge that man lost all original righteousness and that free will no longer remains

in him.

V. We maintain that the loss of the divine image (or of original righteousness) followed the

fall of Adam doubly - both meritoriously and morally, and efficiently and really.

VI. The reasons are:

A. it was a total aversion and apostasy from God as the highest good and ultimate

end



B. that sin was not particular but universal, drawing after itself a violation of the

whole law, hence it could not but shake off every habit of rectitude and

devastate the conscience, so that no residuum was left

C. the nakedness of fallen men denoted the loss or privation of goods in which they

before rejoiced - this was not so much a nakedness of body as a nakedness of

soul

D. God threatened him with this privation, the death being no less spiritual than

temporal

E. as man is not born, so was Adam after the fall; for whatever he has by nature

takes its origin from Adam himself (universal corruption)

XI. The proposition "one act cannot destroy an entire habit" cannot be universally admitted

A. this is the desert of even the least sin - to remove man from communion with

God - now man excluded from communion with God, and altogether

unenlightened by the Spirit, is by this very thing most corrupt and can perform

nothing good

B. although the axiom my be granted as to other sins, yet there is a peculiar relation

of that by which the covenant was broken and all the blessings of the covenant

lost

C. it is confirmed by the parity in angels who by their sin so shook off the habit of

holiness and righteousness

D. the opponents themselves confess that the Holy Spirit can be lost by any very

heinous sin

XII. If in the renewed, the habit of holiness is not shaken off by their sins, this does not

depend upon the nature of sin, but upon the grace of perseverance. For believers have

the promise of perseverance, which Adam did not have.

* * * * * * * * * *

NINTH QUESTION - Whether the actual disobedience of Adam is imputed by an immediate and

antecedent imputation to all his posterity springing from him by natural generation. We affirm.

I. Although all Christians agree in acknowledging the sin of Adam, yet they differ as to its



effects; especially as to imputation.

II. This was the opinion of the old Pelagians who held that Adam's sin injured himself alone

and not his posterity.

A. hence they restricted Romans 5:12 to an example of imitation

B. they were followed by the Socinians

1. they deny that the whole human race sinned and fell in Adam

2. they deny that God willed that on account of that one fall the whole

human race should be guilty of sin

III. Others follow suit in these denials:

A. the Anabaptists do not differ from them - they deny that the posterity are guilty

on account of the fall of their first parents

B. the opinion of the Remonstrants is the same

1. they retain the name of imputation, but ignore the thing itself

2. Episcopius: "the sin of Adam is imputed by God to his posterity not as if he

really thinks them guilty of the same sin and fault with Adam, but

inasmuch as he willed them to be born liable to the same evil to which

Adam by sin had made himself liable" (Operum theologicorum [1665], pt.

II, p. 151)

IV. Some among our own men impugn imputation (Plancaeus).

V. The above were opposed by the decree of the National Synod which met at Charenton

in 1644, which sanctioned and confirmed the doctrine received in our churches

concerning the imputation of Adam's first sin and the hereditary corruption flowing

upon all.

VI. In order to escape the force of this Synodical decree, Plancaeus afterwards distinguished

imputation into

A. immediate and antecedent - that by which the action of Adam is imputed to all

his poserity proximately (immediately) for the very reason that they are the sons

of Adam, as much in reference to the privation of original righteousness as to

eternal death



B. mediate and consequent

1. that which follows the beholding of the hereditary corruption derived to

us from Adam and is made through it mediating

2. by participation of the latter corruption, he maintained that we share in

the sin of Adam and habitually consent to it and are worthy to be

reckoned with Adam

3. he wishes the Synod to assert the latter (his view), but not the former

VII. On the state of the question, it must be observed:

A. that we do not treat here of any sin of Adam, but of the first actual act by which

he violated the law and broke the covenant

B. the question does not concern all his posterity who in any way were to spring

from him, but only those who descend from him in the ordinary way of

generation (so that Christ may be excluded)

C. it is not inquired whether the sin of Adam may be said to be imputed to us

because (on account of original sin inherent in us) we deserve to be viewed as in

the same place with him; but it is inquired whether the actual sin of Adam is so in

fact imputed to all that on account of it all are reckoned guilty and either suffer

punishment or at least are considered worthy of punishment

X. Imputation is either of something foreign to us or properly ours.

A. sometimes that is imputed to us which is personally ours

B. sometimes that is imputed which is without us and not performed by ourselves

1. thus the righteousness of Christ is said to be imputed to us, and our sins

are imputed to him (neither has he sin in himself, nor we righteousness)

2. here we speak of the latter kind of imputation, because we are dealing

with a sin committed by Adam, not by us

XI. When we say that the sin of another is imputed to anyone, we are not to understand the

sin which is simply and in every way another's, but that which in some way belongs to

him to whom it is said to be imputed. No imputation of another's sin can be granted,

except on the supposition of some peculiar connection of the one with the other.

A. natural, as between a father and his children

B. moral and political, as between a king and his subjects



C. voluntary, as among friends, and between the guilty and his substitute

D. we here treat of the first two and not the last, for the bond between Adam and

his posterity is twofold:

1. natural, as he is the father and we are his children

2. political and forensic, as he was the prince and representative head of the

whole human race

3. hence the foundation of imputation is not only the natural connection,

but mainly the moral and federal (in virtue of which God entered into

covenant with him as our head)

4. hence Adam stood in that sin not as a private person, but as a public and

representative person - representing all his posterity in that action and

whose demerit equally pertains to all

XII. For Adam to be a public and representative person, it was not necessary that that office

should be committed to him by us; it is sufficient that there intervened the ordination of

God according to which he willed Adam to be the root and head of the whole human

race.

XIII. Many arguments prove this to have been the ordination of God:

A. the covenant made with Adam was not particular with Adam alone, but general

and public - entered into with the whole human race

B. the relation of the divine image and or original righteousness; so that Adam here

was like a beneficiary who, receiving from his master, receives it both for himself

and his posterity on this condition - that if he rebels against his master, he loses

the benefit not only for himself but also for his posterity

C. the communion of punishments (general as well as special) spreading abroad

among his posterity no less than in Adam (which could not justly be inflicted,

except on the supposition of a common law and a common guilt)

D. the comparison between Adam and Christ (Rom. 5:1; 1 Cor. 15) - this cannot be

sufficiently carried out, except on the supposition of the imputation of sin

answering to the imputation of righteousness

XIV. The punishment brought upon us by the sin of Adam is either privative or positive.

A. privative



1. the want and privation of original righteousness

2. the sin of Adam is imputed to us immediately for privative punishment

because it is the cause of the privation of original righteousness and so

ought to precede the corruption

B. positive

1. death both temporal and eternal and in general all the evils visited upon

sinners

2. it is imputed mediately as a positive punishment because we are liable to

that punishment only after we are born and are corrupt

C. although the second necessarily follows the first from the nature of the thing

(unless the mercy of God intervenes), still it ought not to be confounded with it

XV. The question returns to these limits - whether the sin of Adam (the first actual sin) is

imputed to all his posterity naturally springing from him, by and imputation, not mediate

and consequent, but immediate and antecedent (this the orthodox maintain)

XVI. The reasons are:

A. Paul clearly builds up this imputation: "as by one man sin entered into the world,

and death by sin, and so death passed upon all men, for that all have

sinned" (Rom. 5:12ff) and from these words various arguments are drawn

1. from the scope of the apostle, which is to prove by an illustrious type the

doctrine of justification by the imputation of Christ's righteousness

a. it might seem strange for one to be justified by another's

righteousness, thus the apostle proves the foundation of that

mystery from its opposite

b. therefore just as Adam was constituted by God the head and root

of the human race, and from his sin death was spread through all;

even so Christ, the second Adam, was made the head of all the

elect

2. he speaks of sin which "entered the word" and "by which death passed

upon all men"; this refers to the first actual sin (not inherent sin) by which

death pervaded both Adam and his posterity (n.b., "one transgression" v.

18)

3. the word hēmarton cannot properly be drawn to a habit of sin or to



habitual and inherent corruption, but properly denotes some actual sin,

and that, also past (which can be no other than the sin of Adam itself)

a. it is one thing to be born a sinner; another actually to sin

b. since they did not yet exist in the nature of things, they are said to

have sinned in another and must be considered to have also

themselves committed it

4. why should Paul so often mention the one man sinning (and the offense

and disobedience of one is the singular) whose guilt passed upon all men

unto condemnation, not once, but five times in a few verses (vv. 17-19),

unless this on disobedience was imputed to his posterity

5. the comparison between Adam and Christ for the sake of which he calls

"Adam the figure of him that was to come" (v. 14)

a. we are constituted sinners in Adam in the same way in which we

are constituted righteous in Christ

b. but in Christ we are constituted righteous by the imputation of

righteousness; therefore we are made sinners in Adam by the

imputation of his sin; otherwise the comparison is destroyed

6. the death which reigned by sin holds in its embrace spiritual death from

God's threatening

a. this is nothing else than a privation of original righteousness

together with hereditary corruption

b. hence besides this, some previous sin ought to be acknowledged

as its cause, which can be no other than the actual sin of Adam

7. it is no objection here that:

a. the eph' hō is not to be translated "in whom" relatively, but

causally for "in that" or "because"

1. but in whatever way eph' hō is translated, whether

relatively or causally, it amounts to the same thing

2. the apostle gives the reason why death passed upon each

and every one (viz. because all sinned); not as if actually and

personally in themselves because they were not yet in

existence, but in Adam sinning

b. the similitude between Adam and Christ is in the thing, but not in

the mode of the thing



1. but the scope of the apostle is to treat of the matter of

justification

2. not only of the communication of guilt or of righteousness

in general, but of the mode of that communication,

inasmuch as it is made by the offense or obedience of one, i.

e., by the imputation of it

c. sin is meant by the apostle which can be said to have entered into

the world and to have passed upon all men

1. but actual sin is said have entered the world and to have

passed upon men, no less than corruption

2. if not with relation to the act which passes over, still with

relation to the guilt which remains, inasmuch as on account

of that action, another is reckoned guilty and lies under

punishment

3. nor ought it to seem strange if the apostle meant this actual

sin rather than habitual sin because he proposed to treat

here of justification, not of sanctification

d. all are said to have sinned in the same way in which sin is said to

have been in the world from Adam until the law (v. 13) because he

proves the former from the latter; yet this sin which was in the

world cannot be said to be the imputed actual (since the apostle

adds that sin is not imputed when there is no law), but only

inherent

1. but the apostle is so far from wishing to deny that that sin

was imputed that he rather strives to prove the contrary

which he gathers from the dominion of death which

"reigned even over them that had not sinned after the

simitude of Adam's transgression" (viz., infants who cannot

be said to have sinned actually like Adam)

2. however because the imputation of sin for punishment

cannot be made where a law does not exist, Paul thence

elicits that some law was given before the written law of

Moses, according to which sin can be said to have been



imputed

3. this can be no other than the primordial law given Adam

and in him to all his posterity

e. "many" not all are said to "have been made sinners" (Rom. 5:19)

1. but the "many" are equivalent to all, as is taught by the

comparison of vv. 15 and 19 with vv. 12, 18 and 1 Cor.

15:22

2. they are called "many" not to restrict the subject and

contract the power of the sin, but to Adam himself who was

only one and to whom the many as well as the all are

properly opposed

B. "in Adam all die" (1 Cor. 15:22), that is, incur the guilt of death and

condemnation

1. therefore in the same one they also sinned and are held in a common

blameworthiness with him

2. no one can in anyone deserve the punishment of death unless he had with

him and in him a common sin, the cause of death

3. thus we are said to have sinned in him not only by reason of efficiency

(because he is the cause by which sin is propagated to us), but also by

reason of demerit (because his criminality drew guilt upon us)

C. by the just judgment of God, the sins of parents frequently pass over upon

children and are imputed to them

1. therefore much more can be said of the first sin, which was both more

serious than all which sprang from it and not particular to the person of

Adam, but universal of the whole nature

2. that such an imputation is granted is not only proved by the threatening

of the law (Exod. 20:5), but also various examples give evidence

a. Achan (Jos. 7:24-25)

b. the Amalekites (1 Sam. 15:2-3)

c. the sons of Saul (2 Sam. 21:6-9)

d. Jeroboam (1 Ki. 14:9-10)

e. Ahab (1 Ki. 21:21-22)

f. Lamentations 5:7

g. Matthew 23:35



3. it is not objection here:

a. that there are various differences between the imputation of

Adam's sin and that of other sins - but that they do not agree in all

respects, still it clearly appears that the imputation of another's sin

is neither unusual nor contrary to divine justice

b. that the sons who are punished on account of the sins of their

parents are not better than their parents; so it ought not to seem

surprising

1. but it is one thing to be punished on occasion of another's

sin; another however to bear his punishment

2. although not one (except he be guilty and corrupt in

himself) is smitten on account of another's sin, yet while he

endures the punishment of another's sin, he is not regarded

as guilty in himself, but in another person; nor is he said to

bear the punishment of his own but of another's sin

c. that it is no objection that not the sons properly, but the parents

are punished in the sons, who are a part of them

1. but although the fathers are punished in the children, this

does not hinder us from saying that the sons themselves

also are punished

2. he who bears the punishment of another's sin must

necessarily have had that sin imputed to him

D. the immediate imputation of the first sin being denied, the principal foundation

of the justice of the propagation of sin is removed

1. there is no punishment except from sin; for both sin alone is punished and

that only which is punished is sin

2. now it cannot be our proper and personal sin because we were not then

actually in existence

3. therefore it is the sin of Adam which is imputed to us

4. now that the privation of original righteousness and hereditary taint is not

only sin, but also holds the relation of punishment, is readily inferred from

the following arguments

a. the infliction of the greatest evil cannot be the infliction of



punishment

b. both these evils hold the same relation in us as in Adam

c. it held the relation of punishment in Adam, since indeed it was

spiritual death which flowed from his actual sin

E. Adam was the germ, root and head of the human race, not only in a physical

sense but morally and in a representative sense

1. he entered into covenant for himself and his posterity who just as he

received the gifts which he possessed for himself and his, so he lost them

for himself and his

2. for to whom the benefits pertain, to them also it is most just the burdens

and disadvantages should also pertain

F. the denial of the imputation of Adam's sin would not a little weaken the

imputation of Christ's righteousness

1. the descent from the negation of the former to the denial of the latter is

most easy

2. hence there is no one of the heretics who have denied the imputation of

sin who have not for the same reason opposed the imputation of Christ's

righteousness

G. the posterity of Adam be considered to have sinned in him, since they were in

him as branches in the root and the members in the head

XXVI. Purely personal sins differ from those which are common and public.

A. the former should not be imputed to posterity, however nothing prevents the

latter from being imputed, and such was the sin of Adam

B. the law imposed upon men differs from the law to which God binds himself;

barriers are placed to human vengeance because it might be abused, but not to

divine justice

XXVII. Ezekiel 18:20 is not to be absolutely and simply understood as it sounds, otherwise there

would be a contradiction to the law and a denial of the substitution of Christ in our

place. Rather it ought to be explained:

A. of adult suns who depart from the iniquity of parents and do not imitate them

B. of personal and particular sins, not of common and general, which can involve

many, such as the sin of Adam



C. there is not established here a general rule of providence and justice in

accordance with which God either before always acted or will hereafter conform

all his judgments

XXVIII. The act of one cannot be and be called that of the whole if it is a merely personal act.

XXIX. Adam in sinning bore the person of all.

XXX. He who was in Adam in no way, neither in power nor in act, cannot be said to have

sinned in him.

A. although we were not in act and personally in him, yet we were in power, both

seminally and representatively

B. although we were not actually in Christ when he died for us, still his death is

properly imputed to us on account of the union existing between us and him

XXXI. It is repugnant to divine justice to punish anyone for another's sin, but not which is yet

common in virtue of representation or some bond of union, by which its guilt may

involve many.

XXXII. Although the disobedience of Adam was imputed to us, it does not equally follow that

his death also should be imputed to us.

A. by his death (which was his personal punishment), he holds no charge for us, as

by his disobedience

B. thus it could not be communicated to us morally and by imputation as the latter,

but only by a real physical transmission

XXXIII. Although the fist sin was not really voluntary with respect to us, still it can be called

voluntary morally because the will of Adam is considered in a measure ours on account

of our union with him.

XXXIV. As the righteousness of Christ (which is unique) can still be communicated by

imputation to innumerable others; so nothing hinders us from saying that the guilt of

Adam's sin is unique and equal, passing upon all by imputation.

XXXV. God is the author of the covenant made with Adam, in accordance with which the



sharing and imputation of Adam's sin follows. On that account he can or ought not to be

regarded as the author of sin.

XXXVI. The other sins committed by Adam differ from the first which is imputed to us.

A. the others were personal sins simply

B. although after his first sin, Adam did not cease to be the head by way of origin,

yet he did cease to be the representative head by of covenant

XXXVII. The want of original righteousness can be viewed:

A. either passively (inasmuch as it is subjectively in man) or actively (inasmuch as it

is judicially sent by God)

B. either with respect to base evil (which it includes) or with respect to sad evil

(which it draws after itself by reason of the deformation of the creature and its

separation from God)

XXXVIII. Since imputation to punishment is only a moral act, it ought not to seem strange if, as

the first act of sinning is imputed to us, so the first act of generating should not in like

manner be imputed.

XXXIX. Although the act of Adam's disobedience could be imputed to us for condemnation, it

does not immediately follow that the act of his obedience ought to be imputed to us for

justification because guilt arises from the one act of disobedience, but righteousness

requires a full complement and perseverance of obedience.

XL. This doctrine concerning the imputation of Adam's sin was received in our churches.

XLI. Many thing prove that this was the opinion of Calvin. He does not mention imputation

whenever he speaks of original sin because it had not yet been called into controversy.

XLII. Beza followed and frequently confirmed this opinion of Calvin.

XLIII. Peter Martyr did not hold a different opinion.

XLIV. Chamier more clearly establishes this very thing.



XLV. Amyrald proves that another's sin can justly be imputed to those connected by some

bond with the author, although they have not participated in the criminality; likewise

Mestrezat and Testard.

* * * * * * * * * *

TENTH QUESTION - Whether any original sin or inherent stain and depravity may be granted,

propagated to us by generation. We affirm against the Pelagians and Socinians.

I. Original sin is a doctrine of the highest importance to the surer perception of the misery

of man and the necessity and efficacy of saving grace.

II. Original sin is sometimes used more broadly to embrace imputed and inherent sin,

sometimes it is used more strictly to denote inherent alone; the imputed, as the cause

and foundation. In this sense it is now used here by us.

III. There are three questions in reference to it:

A. as to its existence or whether it is

B. as to its nature or what it is

C. as to its propagation or how it passes over to us

IV. The term "original sin" was first brought into the church by Augustine (called into a

controversy concerning sin by the Pelagians) in order that he might have a certain term

to use in his disputes with them.

V. As to the question of its existence, various heretics err here who follow the negative.

A. the Pelagians denied original sin as to all its parts, maintaining that Adam's sin

hurt no one but himself

B. the Socinians deny expressly that any original sin can be granted

C. the Remonstrants hold that God willed to devote to eternal torment no infants of

whatever condition or birth, dying without actual and proper sins; or could justly

devote them on account of the sin called original; that this opinion is opposed to

the divine goodness and right reason

D. among the papists, Pighius and Catharinus restrict original sin to imputation



alone, denying propagation

E. the Anabaptists call original sin "the figment of Augustine"

VI. The question is whether there is any inherent depravity (called original sin) propagated

from Adam to all his posterity springing from him by natural generation. They deny; we

affirm.

VII. The reasons are:

A. Genesis 6:5; 8:21 - here occurs the judgment of God himself concerning his own

work

B. Genesis 5:3 - he could not be corrupted in generation in any other way than by

contracting original corruption; here we must notice the antithesis between the

image of God and the image of Adam

C. Job 14:4 - purity is removed from all men and uncleaness is ascribed to them (not

simply external of the body, which can easily be taken away, but internal of the

soul)

D. Psalm 51:5 - David confesses before God that he was corrupt even from the

womb and inclined to sin

E. John 3:5

1. the necessity of a supernatural regeneration, which supposes natural

generation to be corrupt

2. the universality of corruption infecting all because all are flesh

3. the universality of traduction, while flesh is born of flesh

F. Ephesian 2:3 - original sin because they are called "children of wrath" (i.e.,

exposed to divine wrath not by imitation and custom, but by nature to intimate

that the evil is inherent from the womb and not only comes upon us after actual

sins)

G. Romans 5:12 - here the apostle rises to the first taint of evil and unfolds the

origin of sin and of death

H. various reasons prove the same thing:

1. the universal necessity of death imposed upon all, even upon infants; for

it death reigns over all, sin ought necessarily to reign over them because

that is its wages

2. the necessity of redemption for all to be saved



3. the necessity of regeneration without which no one can see the kingdom

of God (John 3:3)

4. the necessity of the sacrament to be administered to infants recently

born, of circumcision in the old and of baptism in the new covenant

5. the common law that everything begotten is like the begetter

6. experience which teaches that depravity to be latent in infants

themselves, even before the use of reason

XV. What is involuntary by a positive volition cannot be sin; but what is not voluntary by a

positive volition does not cease to be sin, provided it is contrary to the law. Although

original sin is not voluntary in act,

A. still it is in origin

B. in his will from whom it is, although not properly in his will in whom it is

C. inherently and subjectively because it adheres to the will and impairs it, although

not elicitly because it is not drawn out by any act of the will

D. radically with regard to its principle, although not formally with regard to its

exercise

XVI. If innocence is at any time attributed to infants in Scripture (cf. Psa. 106:38; Jon. 4:11),

this is not to be understood absolutely and in itself, as if they were destitute of all sin;

otherwise neither would they be liable to death.

A. rather it is to be understood relatively as compared with adults who actually sin

B. the twins in Romans 9:11 had as yet done no good or evil, but still they were both

conceived in sin in the mass of corruption

XVII. Although the law prohibits no one to born with original sin because it supposes man to

be holy, yet it condemns as illegality the hereditary and inherent corruption of man.

XVIII. When Christ says that the man born blind had not sinned (John 9:3), he does not

absolutely assert that he was from all sin, but only comparatively denies that he sinned

more than other that he was so afflicted.

XIX. Although sin is pardoned in the parents, still it can be transmitted to their posterity

because the guilt being remitted, the taint always remains (the circumcised begets the



uncircumcised and the regenerated begets the unregenerated).

XX. The children of believers are holy (1 Cor. 7:14), not as to immunity from all sin, but as to

communion with the church. This holiness is relative and federal.

XXI. Although Mary was "highly favored" by God, still that distinguished position did not

hinder her from being conceived and born after the common manner of other mortals -

in and with original sin.

A. that taint is in Scripture predicated of all men universally, no one but Christ

excepted

B. she herself had need of a Savior, whom she celebrates as hers (Luke 1:47)

C. she is bound to offer the sacrifices of the old law, which could not be done

without the confession of sin

D. the effects of that sin are found in her, as are actual sins (John 2:4; Luke 2:35, 49;

8:18-21)

XXII. In the propagation of sin, an accident does not pass over from subject to subject.

A. the immediate subject of sin is not the person, but human nature

B. therefore as in Adam, the person corrupted the nature; so in his posterity, the

nature corrupts the person

XXIII. Although the mode of the propagation of sin is obscure and difficult to explain, the

propagation itself is not on that account to be denied.

* * * * * * * * * *

ELEVENTH QUESTION - Whether original sin has corrupted the very essence of the soul. Also

whether it is a mere privation or a certain positive quality too.

I. There are two extremes to be equally avoided about the nature of original sin:

A. in excess, of those who think original sin is placed in the corruption of the very

substance of the soul

B. in defect, of those who wish it to consist in the mere want and privation of

righteousness



II. Flacius Illyricus defended the first error in a former age, the more strongly to oppose

Victor Strigelius who extolled the free will of man in conversion and diminished

corruption. Illyricus maintained that sin corrupted the very essence of man.

III. The orthodox constantly maintain that sin is to be distinguished from the substance

itself, as an accident and quality from its subject

A. every substance was created by God and in this sense is good (Gen. 1:31; 1 Tim.

4:4)

B. Scripture makes a distinction between nature and the sin adhering to it when it

call the latter "that which easily besets us," "present with us," and dwelling in us

and a garment to be put off

C. thus it would follow that Christ in assuming our nature assumed also our sin and

corruption itself

D. sin cannot be predicated of man in the question What is it? but only the question

What is its quality?

IV. Human nature is called "lawless" (anomos), not that it is sin itself, but because having sin

in itself it is well called "sinful."

V. A "new heart" is said to be made in us by regeneration not physically, but morally.

A. the same substance which was corrupted by sin must be restored by grace

B. the same must be said of the other phrases connoting sin or grace - these are

taken morally, not physically; not so much in the abstract as in the concrete to

express more powerfully the magnitude of our corruption

VI. Original righteousness and sin are mutually opposed to each other, but the image of God

is sometimes used more broadly.

VII. The papists sin in defect who restrict the whole nature of original sin to the mere want

or privation of original righteousness.

A. they define corruption of nature by the loss alone of the supernatural gift

without the access of any evil quality

B. their design is to prove that man after the fall differs from man before the fall no

more than a weak or sick from a strong and healthy man

C. they do this in order to establish the will free to good; that there is not so much



impotency in it as a difficulty of acting rightly

D. however we think two things are here necessarily included

1. the privation of original righteousness

2. the positing of the contrary habit of unrighteousness

VIII. The reasons are:

A. Scripture describes that sin not only privatively and by way of negation (Rom.

3:23; 7:18; 1 Cor. 2:14; Eph. 4:18), but also positively and by way of affirmation,

when it calls it "flesh," "concupiscence," "the law of the members," "indwelling

sin," "body of death," "old man," etc. (John 3:6; Rom. 7:18, 20, 23-24; Eph. 4:22)

B. in act and subjectively, it inheres in man and continually excites evil desires in

him, and in fact passes over to posterity by generation, which cannot be said of

mere want or privation

C. men are not only destitute of righteousness, but also full of unrighteousness;

incapable of good, but also inclined to evil

D. it is not only privatively opposed to original righteousness, but also contrarily as

original unrighteousness

E. the effects of original sin are not only sins of omission, but also of commission

F. not a few papists hold this position (Aquinas, Cajetan, Bellarmine)

XIV. A positive physically differs from a positive morally and logically. Sin is called positive,

not in the former, but in the latter sense.

XV. Original sin is not a vicious habit because it is neither infused nor acquired.

XVI. Nothing prevent original sin from being a privation and at the same time a positive

quality.

XVII. That hereditary taint corrupts not only the inferior part of the soul, but also the superior

part (viz., the intellect and the will).

XVIII. The word "flesh" is sometimes taken strictly for the corruption of sensuality or of the

body (2 Cor. 7:1); other times it is taken broadly for the universal corruption of the soul

extending to the mind itself (Rom. 8:6; Col. 2:18).



XIX. Concupiscence is used either philosophically and means the same as concupiscible

appetite; or theologically and popularly, in which sense evil propensities of the will

belong to it (Gal 5:17).

XX. This concupiscence is sin not only in the unbelieving and unrenewed, but also in

believers and the renewed.

XXI. Although by regeneration we hold that the guilt and pollution of original sin is taken

away as to dominion, yet we deny that it is absolutely taken away as to existence and

whatever hold the relation of sin in it.

XXII. Although concupiscence is said to "bring forth sin" (James 1:15), it does not cease to be

sin (an evil effect necessarily argues an evil cause).

XXIII. It is one thing that there should be no condemnation in the renewed; another that they

are worthy of condemnation. As long as sin remains in us (as it does until our death), so

long does potential guilt remain).

* * * * * * * * * *

TWELFTH QUESTION - How is original sin propagated from parents to their children?

I. The wickedness of heretics and the eager curiosity of searching into all things started

this question.

II. Things can be brought forward from the word of God as can satisfy the humble mind so

that we may firmly hold the thing, although we cannot fully understand the mode. A

twofold answer can be given to the proposed question, either general or special.

A. generally, the mode of this propagation is the impure generation by which we are

born corrupt and sinners from those who are corrupt and sinners

1. sin is properly propagated neither in the soul nor in the body taken

separately, but in the man because neither the soul nor the body apart,

but man in Adam sinned so far as there was power in him

2. that hereditary taint is so moral objectively that it does not cease to be



natural originally because it is an inseparable attendant of th corrupt

nature

B. although this mode of general propagation is evident and is sufficient for

establishing the truth of the traduction of sin, let us see what can be said here

more particularly to untie the knot

1. some have thought that the difficulty can be gotten rid of in no better way

than by the traduction of the soul

2. others hold that the soul is vitiated by the body

3. in order therefore to explain this mode in the best way possible, we hold

three degrees of that propagation:

a. in the conception of the body from an unclean seed, for as the

material, such ought to be the product (Job 14:4; John 3:6)

b. in the creation of soul, although created without any stain by God,

still it is not created with original righteousness like the soul of

Adam

1. although souls are created by God destitute of original

righteousness, God cannot on that account be considered

the author of sin - it is one thing to infuse impurity, another

not to give the purity of which has rendered himself

unworthy in Adam

2. although souls were not in Adam as to origin of essence,

still they can rightly be said to have been in him as to origin

of subsistence

3. it ought not to be considered unworthy of the divine

goodness that the soul should be placed in a corrupt body

c. in the union of the soul with the body

1. it ought not to seem surprising if the soul is corrupted by

the body (Luke 21:34)

2. if it is inquired how the soul (which is spiritual) can be

corrupted by the body (which is material), the knot cannot

be untied by saying the soul needs an organized body and

cannot operate except through bodily organs

3. far more fitly is it maintained that this is not brought about

by any action of body upon the soul, rather the very strict



connection of soul and body in one person, the intimate

sympathy

4. since the soul is deprived of original righteousness it can no

longer govern the body and hold it in subjection, but the

image of God having been lost, the natural order is

disturbed so that the flesh

5. God cannot be considered the author, but the avenger of

sin - he unites the soul to the body to preserve the species;

he joins the soul deprived of righteousness to a corrupt

body for a punishment of sin

XIX. Although all difficulty occurring in the explanation of this mode of propagation may not

seem to be removed, still its truth must be retained with no less certainty. Nor is we

cannot understand the how, must we on that account deny the fact or call it in question.


Francis Turretin - Institutes of Elenctic Theology - Sin

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