Ethnic Yugoslavia

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Ethnic Enclaves and Intolerance: The Case of YugoslaviaAuthor(s): Garth Massey, Randy Hodson and Dusko SekulicSource: Social Forces, Vol. 78, No. 2 (Dec., 1999), pp. 669-693Published by: Oxford University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3005571 .

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Ethnic Enclaves and Intolerance:

The Case of Yugoslavia*

GARTHMASSEY,Universityof WyomingRANDY HODSON, Ohio State UniversityDUSKO SEKULIC,Flinders University,Australia

Abstract

Differencesn ethnictolerance mongmajority nd minority thnicgroupscanbeunderstoodnpartas theresult f structuralfactorsnvolving opulationrrangementsandthedistributionfpower, speciallys thesearemanifestn ethnicenclaves.Thecurrent rticlebuildsonAllport'sontact ypothesisncombination ithpropositionsfoundin Blalock'sheoryofminority-groupelations nd Blau's tructuralheoryofheterogeneityndinequalityoshowwhy patial rrangementsnd their orrespondingpowerrelationsnfluencentergroupeelingsof tolerance. modelof tolerance ithin

and outside nclavessproposed nd testedusing urveydata(N = 13,442) rom theformerYugoslaviaollectedn1989-90,ust before hecountry'sissolution.ntoleranceisgreatestnethnic nclavesorbothminority ndmajority roupmembers.Majoritygroup members ivingin enclavesdominatedbya minoritygroupare, throughacombinationfresentmentnd restraint n theirpower,more ntoleranthan nanyothersituation.Minoritygroupmembersiving n enclaves nd experiencing othnascentowerandanxietyn theirminoritytatus remore ntoleranthanwhen ivingdispersed mong majority opulations.Greater ttentionto the roleof enclavess

importantfor dvancingocial cienceunderstandingsfethnicand racial eparatism

andintegrationn multiethnicocieties. n thecaseof the ormerYugoslavia,oliciesthatseekharmonyby acceptingthnic eparationmaybesowingfutureonflict.

The turmoilof shifting political andscapes ollowingthe collapseof the Soviet

Union and the demise of CommunistPartyhegemony n EasternEuropeand the

Balkanshasraisedmany questionsaboutthesociologicalunderstandingf ethnic

*Wewould iketo thank woanonymouseviewersor theirusefulcommentsn earlierdrafts

of the article.Thisresearchwassupportednpart bygrants romtheNationalCouncilorEurasian nd EastEuropean esearch,heInternational esearchndExchanges oard,andtheMershonCenter t OhioStateUniversity.leasedirectcorrespondenceo GarthMassey,Department f Sociology,University f Wyoming, aramie,WY82071.

? The Universityof North CarolinaPress SocialForces,December1999, 78(2):669-691







670 / Social Forces 78:2,December 1999

conflict(Brubaker&Laitin1998;Connor 1994;Wiliams 1994).The 1991-95war

in the formerYugoslavia, s well as violent conflictsin severalrepublicsof the

formerSovietUnion,haspittednationality gainstnationality,ometimesresulting

in atrocities against noncombatants that seem explicable only in terms ofprimordialhatreds,historicalmemory'scall for retribution,and the search or

security hroughculturalexclusivity. ociologistsaregivingrenewedattention o

cultural nd historicalactorsn caseswhereconflictappearso be drivenbyethnic

animosities.In the face of these new realities,earlierapproaches ocusing on

economic dislocation,class nequality, nd neocolonialunderdevelopmenteem

insufficient o informefforts o mediateamongcompetinggroupsand to generate

negotiated ettlements o fractionalwarfare.

Basedon theirexamination f national olerancen the finalyearsof theformer

Yugoslavia,owever,Hodson,Sekulic,andMassey 1994)conclude hatthe claim

of widespreadatent ntolerances a weakexplanationor thedevelopment f war

inYugoslavia. his assessment as beensupported ythe workof Calhoun 1997),

Cohen (1995), Denitch (1994),Silberand Little(1996),Woodward 1995),and

otherswho haverecognized hat the manipulationof historicalresentmentsby

leaders was an essential contributor to rising fears and the development of

exclusionary political formulas.This is not to say that ethnic divisions and

intolerancewerenonexistent.Rather hanbeingwidely shared, ntoleranceand

receptivity o a volatile politicsof identityseem to have been greatest n ethnicenclaves(Anderson1991;Denitch 1994;Gilliland1996).It is these enclaves hat

providethe motivationandthe focus forthe currentanalysis.

Muchof the armed mobilizationandfightinginYugoslavia manated rom

and occurredaround enclaves.Enclaveswereoftenstrongholdsof politicaland

militaryauthorityn a war thatselectively argeted ivilianson the basisof ethnic

identity (Denitch 1994;Silber& Little1996).We recognize hat a complexityof

factorsinfluence the developmentof civil conflict(Calhoun&Pfaff1998)and

that the developmentof the warinvolvedmilitaryand strategicconsiderations

beyondlevels of animosity n localareas.Wenevertheless eek to address everal

importantquestionsaboutthe roleof ethnictolerance n enclavesas one factor

that facilitated he developmentandspreadof conflict:Can the distributionand

concentration of people and power based on national identity help explain

differencesntolerance or others?Areethnicenclaves omehowradically ifferent

frommore ethnicallymixed areaswith regard o levelsof tolerance?Can ageneral

model of intolerance n enclavescontribute o the understanding f intergroup

relations n ethnicallyheterogeneous egionsand nations?

Theanalysispresentedhere offersan alternativeo thepopularview of ethnicintoleranceas basedon primordialhatredsand latentresentments see Forbes

1997).We posit insteada structural asisfor intolerancehat focuseson enclaves

of ethnic minorities.We arguethat the concentrationor dispersalof similarly

identifiedpeoplecan be a foundation or sentimentsof prideand fear, orthe felt







EthnicEnclaves ndIntolerance 671

need forsecurity,nd forthe willingnesso mobilize o attainpolitical oals Hechter

1987).

Ouranalysis eeksto illuminate he situationof differentlydentifiedgroups

whosemembershavemore or less contactwith one another,whosepower s readilytied to national dentity,andthat recognizes imilarityof nationalityasa viable

basisforparticipationn politicalsociety.The dataprovidea measureof national

tolerancea short time before the civilwar in Yugoslavia, he analysisof which

suggestswhyleadersnthe warpursuedpolicies hatmadeenclaves central actor

in both military trategy nd long-termpoliticalagendas White 1996).

The Structural Basis for Intolerance

The past several decades of researchin the social sciences have laid a solid

foundation for a structuralmodel of intolerancein ethnic enclaves.Gordon

Ailport's(1954) original insightsinto group contact and prejudicestimulated

decadesof importantresearch ndthinking.HerbertBlumer's ssays n the 1950s

also pointed to the importanceof spatialarrangementshat couldgenerate ear

and athreat o [the] status,securityand welfareof the dominantethnicgroup

(Blumer [1958] 1988:190).HubertBlalock's ndPeterBlau'smacrosociological

approaches, mphasizing elativepower n termsof both numbersandcontrolofresources, lso contribute o an understanding f group fear,resentment, nd the

search orsecurity n waysthatgo beyondAilport'smoreinterpersonal pproach

(seealso Oberschali 993,1996).We utilize henotions of population omposition

andintergroup ontact, s well as relative ower, ompetition, ndgroupsolidarity,

to developa generalmodelappropriateo explaining ntolerance n and outside

enclave ituations.Wethenspecify hismodelin termsof testablehypothesesand

test it usingthe case of the formerYugoslavia.1

Thestudyof ethnicrelations equires careful xamination f the distribution

of ethnicgroupmembers n multiethnic ocieties.This is especialiyruein periodsof transitionwhenpoliticalarrangementsnd the distribution f powerare n flux,

when theeconomy sfaltering, ndwhenthedependabilityf political, conomic,

andsecurity tructures s uncertain.Allthese conditionspreceded he civil war of

the early1990sinYugoslavia.

CONTACTAND DOMINANCE

GordonAilport's(1954) contacthypothesis,an analysis hat focuses ontruly

structural eatures f ethnic relations(Pettigrew1986), begins by rejecting heseemingly impletruismthatfamiliarity reedscontempt.Rather,Allportargues,

contactand interactionbetweenmembers of differently dentifiedgroupsare

critical o recognizing imilarities nd to accurateknowledgeof theother, ence

to trustand tolerance(see also Hechter& Kanazawa1997).Levelsof prejudice








and tolerance n this model are largelya function of opportunities or contact,

which stem, in turn, from demographic circumstances (i.e., the population

composition of an areasharedbytwo or more groups).2Allport'sworksuggests

that wherepeople are isolated n enclaves here is lessopportunity o build trustand forgecrosscutting dentitiesand interests o mitigateethnic intolerance.

The natureof the contact s, of course, critical (Hewstone& Brown 1986;

Pettigrew1971).Tolerances fosteredwhen groupsare pursuingcommon goals,

when they are of roughly equal status, and when the interaction has wide

institutional upport Allport1954).SinceAllportproposedhis contacthypothesis

therehavebeen significant efinements e.g.,Amir1969),andseveralweaknesses

in the originalconceptualizationhave been recognized(Brewer& Miller1984;

Hardinget al. 1969),but thebasicmodelhasgeneratedan enormousamountof

supportive researchand continues to inform inquiries into prejudice and

intolerance e.g., Forbes1997).

Inmanyexisting ituationshelimitedamountof intergroup ndinterpersonal

contactand the natureof thatcontactwouldpredict trained thnicrelations.What

Allportdidnot explorentheseproblematicituationssthe constellation f power

and the social-psychologicalimensionsof humanrelationshipshatare illedwith

distrust, ear,and the search or security.Theworkof HerbertBlumer,PeterBlau,

and HubertBlalockhelpsfillthis gapin the analysisof ethnic relations.

Blalock 1967) andBlau(1977) both recognize,as didAilport, hattoleranceis greatestwhereheterogeneitys highest,barringa situationwherenumerically

similar ethnic groupsare in competitionover a zero-sumvalue (Olzak 1983).

Important, oo, is the role of official upport or intergroup ontact,as in socialist

Yugoslavia rior o thedeathof Tito.

Into an increasingly insecure and competitive environment, however,

distinctionscast as ethnicdifferences anbecomethebasisfor distrustand fear

(Blalock 1967;Hewstone&Brown 1986).This was particularly rue in prewar

Yugoslavia Bringa1995;Gilliland1996). Suchdistinctionsandfearscanfuelthe

experienceof feelingthreatened, speciallywhenone grouphas clearnumerical

superiority,sin anethnicenclave Blalock 967). t isthese arger tructuralactors

of intergroup relations and power that are missed by Allport's theory of

interpersonal ontact.And it is these factors hat becomeparticularlyalient at

timesof societalchange.

THE CONCEPTOF ETHNIC ENCLAVES

Individuals dentifiedas having specificethnic, racial,or national dentitiesareoften found in enclavesor communitieswith high concentrationsof similarly

identified individuals. In cities these may carry the suffix of town (e.g.,

Germantown ),nd in ruralareasheyare ownsorvillages, ftenwith distinctive

names reflecting he languageor dialectof the inhabitants.Such enclaves are







EthnicEnclavesndIntolerance 673

distinctareas n thattheyaresurroundedby people of anotherethnicity, ace,or

nationality.

The conceptof ethnicenclaves, ntering he sociologyexiconwith RobertParks

contributions o thestudyof cities (Faris1967),was latereclipsedby the idea of aghetto containinga high concentrationof a minoritypopulation,usuallyas the

consequenceof practicesof discriminationand exclusion and fostering both

geographicand social isolation (Massey& Denton 1993).While Portesand his

colleaguesdesignateethnic enclavesas places of ethnic employment (Portes&

Jensen1987;Portes&Manning 1986;Sanders&Nee 1987),we adopt the more

generalnotion of ethnic enclaveasaplaceof residencewithahigh concentration

of similarlydentified ndividuals nd families. nAmerican ociology,residential

ethnic enclaves have been nearly synonymous with urban neighborhoods

(Abrahamson 1996), although the concept is equally applicable to areas

encompassing everal owns andsurrounding uralareasand even one or more

cities.

POPULATIONARRANGEMENTSAND INTOLERANCE

The conceptualizationdevelopedin our analysisrequiresa refinementof the

definition f who isminority ndwhoismajority.Weretainhestandardociological

notion that majority/minority tatus is determinedby the relativepowerof aparticular roup (Feagin&Feagin1993).Inthiscasewe recognizepowerasbeing

exercised n a politicallyunified areaby people with a common identity.For

socialistYugoslavia hat areawas the republic, or example,Serbia,Croatia,or

Slovenia.. hus,forexample,Serbs n Serbiaaremajoritygroupmembers.Their

majority tatus does not changeso long astheyarelivingin Serbia,evenif theyreside n anenclave hatisnumerically ominatedby Croatsor BosnianMuslims.

Similarly, minoritysanynumericallynferior roupwithina republic ominated

byanothergroup,forexample,Serbs n Croatia.What doeschange s thelevel of

powerheldbyagroup.Themajoritye.g.,Serbs)are ndisputably ominantwhentheyarenumericallyuperiorn arepublic, utwhenthey ive in aminority non-

Serb)enclave, heyarecorrespondinglymuch weaker.

In our analysiswe investigate he average evel of toleranceseparately or

majorityandminoritygroups ivingin threedifferentocal situations: 1) where

the majoritygroup is numericallydominant, (2) where the majoritygroup is

numericallynferior ndaminoritygroup snumericallyuperior i.e.,in anethnic

enclave),and(3) whereno grouphasnumericaldominance i.e.,in anethnicallymixedarea).Correspondingly, minoritygroupcan be found where hemajority

is numericallydominant, n their own minorityenclaves,or in ethnicallymixed

areas.Ourprimaryocus sthecomparison f howeachgroup'sevelof intolerance

variesacross hesethreesituations.







674 / Social Forces 78:2, December 1999

We use the following terms to designate these different living situations. A

dominantmajority efers o the ethnicmajority hat is numericallydominantin

both the larger geopolitical region and the immediate locale, for example, whites

in Minnesota or ethnic Japanese in Kyoto. Minority group members living in a

region and locale that is numerically dominated by another group constitute a

localminority,uch asethnicAlbaniansivingin Croatian-dominatedagreb.An

enclavedmajority roup s madeupof members f thedominantgroup nthelarger

geopolitical areawho live locally as a numerical minority. This situation describes,

for example, Anglos in a predominantly Hispanic community in the United States.

An enclavedminority roupis aminoritygroupwhose membersarenumerically

dominant in their enclave. They form a numerically dominant group in the

immediate locale but not in the larger surrounding geopolitical area,as in the case

of Native Americans living within the boundaries of a reservation.

In the first of these situations, where a local majority holds clear numerical

superiority and its power is commensurate with this, the dominant population is

comfortable being intolerant toward a minority population with which it has little

contact. Especially in cases where ethnic stratification resigns a minority to

economic and political positions of subordination, any minority aspirations may

be ridiculed and dismissed by the majority. Normative barriers against majority

members having contact with minorities further heightens discrimination against

minorities (Blau 1977). A numerically dominant group may thus develop confidentintoleranceowardothergroupsaspartof thelegitimizationf itsprivileged osition

and discriminatory actions (Brass 1985).

As Allport recognized, members of a local minority, our second possible

demographic situation, will have high levels of interethnic contact. This may

facilitate a realistic appraisal of the other, but for the local minority it can also

lead to a sense of caution and well-reasoned acquiescence. Local minorities may

thus mix an appraisalof their less-than-equal treatment with a realistic evaluation

of their inabilityto alter the situation. They thus can be expected to hold relatively

tolerantattitudesandto displayaquiescentntoleranceoward hemajority roup.

Enclavedmajorities, residents of enclaves who belong to the ethnic group that

dominates the larger geopolitical area in which the enclave exists but who are

themselves a numerical minority in the enclave, present a third possible situation.

We hypothesize that intolerance will be most strongly manifest in such enclaves.

Majority group members living in minority enclaves may hold exaggerated

sentiments of victimization, based on the perception of being treated as a minority,

despite their political and economic dominance. Indeed, their majority status in

the wider area can be expected to give them a feeling of rightful power, but theirdaily recognition that they area numerically inferior (and often culturally solated)

group may fuel a sense of potential victimization. It is predicted that such enclave

residents will be fearful about their local status and will evidence higher levels of








defensiventolerancehan membersof their ethniccohort living outside minority

enclaves.

Though numericallyand often legally nferiorwithin the largergeopolitical

area,membersof anenclavedminority,hefourthpossible ituation, anharboracombinationof pridein numbersand potential,evenincipient,power. ncipient

power, uchas thatexperienced y minoritypopulationswho hold localnumerical

superioritynan enclave,mayfoster trong eelings f intoleranceoward theother.

Enclavedminorities may displaya potent mix of prideand local strengthwith

resentment, senseof injusticeabout imits on theirpower,andanxietyaboutthe

intentionsof the dominant groupin the surroundinggeopoliticalarea.The mix

of anxiety ndaspirationsanreinforceneanother,reating situation f expectant

power hat manifests tselfascontestingntoleranceoward he dominantmajority.

Threeotherpossiblesituationsalsoexist. Membersof a majoritygroup may

live n areaswhere here s no clearmajority. imilarly,members f minoritygroups

maylive in suchethnicallymixedareas.Finally,herearegroupsthatnowhere n

a countryhave a majority tatus.In the formerYugoslaviauchgroups ncluded

Roma(Gypsies),Jews,andRomanians.Levelsof ethnic tolerance orallbut the

lastof these situationsarepredicted n the followinghypotheses,whicharetested

in subsequentanalysis.

Hypotheses about StructurallyDetermined Intolerance

Theprinciple uiding heformulation fourhypothesess that he leveloftolerance

is structurallynfluenced n predictableways by the majority-minoritytatusof

groups. Eachhypothesis expressesthe more generalidea that the numerical

proportion fdifferentlydentified ersonsand theirspatial elation o othergroups

is a significantdeterminantof a group's evelof ethnic/national olerance.Our

generalmodel canbe stated n a seriesof hypotheses hat canbe testedwithdata

from the formerYugoslavia.Thedependentvariable, strengthf identity o aparticularacial,national,or

ethnicgroup, impliesfeelings hatracial,national,or ethnicidentitiesaresalient

(e.g.,thathomogamousmarriages repreferred rthatpoliticalrepresentations

bestprovidedby membersof one'sown racial,national,or ethnicgroup).Weuse

the term intoleranceo denotegreater upport orthis sentimentand toleranceo

denote lesssupport or this sentiment.3







676/ Social Forces 78:2,December1999

CONFIDENTAND QUIESCENTINTOLERANCEAMONG DOMINANT MAJORITIES

AND LOCALMINORITIES

If intergrouprelationshave these psychologicalconsequences extensiveassociations ith personswhohavedifferent ackgroundsndexperiencere

likelyomakepeoplemore olerant)he heoremsmplyhat tructuralonditions

promoteolerance, idenperspectives,ndstimulatentellectualctivitiesmong

members f smallminoritieswhilehavingoppositenfluences n members f

largemajorities.Blau1977:22)

Therewillbe a general endency ordominantgroupattitudes owarda minority

groupwithwhom theylive in close proximity o be more negative hanminority

groupmembers' ttitudes oward hosein themajority.Majority roupprejudiceand intoleranceagainstminoritiescangiveexaggeratedmportance o cultural

markers fromeatingcustomsand conversational abits o dialectandeyecolor)

that distinguishmajoritiesromminoritiesandthatfueltheirprejudicesBlalock

1967). This argument eadsto the hypothesisof moderate intoleranceamong

majorities,consonantwith havingthe dominantrole in a situationof clearly

recognizedunequalpower.

Hypothesis: Dominantmajoritiesillbemoderatelyntolerantowardminority

groups.

Blau'spropositions,followingAllport'searlier formulations,also apply to

minoritieswho liveamongthenumerically ominantmajority.Minoritiesn this

situationarelikelyto be quite tolerant.When minorities arewidely dispersed

amongthe dominantpopulation,onlywithgreatdifficulty antheybe solidaristic

with othergroupmembers.In order to survivethey must be accommodating,

deemphasize ifferences,ndemphasize imilarities etween hemselves nd those

amongwhomthey ive.FollowingCoser's1975)description f cosmopolitanole

sets, Blau(1977)seesmembersof minoritiesasbeing less oyaland committed

to their owngroups.... theyare alsoexpected o ... reduce heir ethnocentrismand increase heirtolerance 96).

Hypothesis: Minorities remore olerantwhen heyaredispersednmajority-

dominatedreashanwhen ivingnminority nclaves.

DEFENSIVEAND CONTESTING NTOLERANCE N ENCLAVES

In the aftermathof thewar in Bosnia,much has beenwrittenaboutthe Serbian

CCstrongholdsf Pale,BanjaLuka,and elsewhere Ignatieff1995;Zimmermann

1995).Croatian nclavesn Herzegovina nd Muslimenclavesn the Sandzak rea

were also knownas strongholds f nationalism. hese areaswere the sourceof

some of thestrongestesistanceo politicalnegotiations ndconcessionshatwould

have led to politicalaccommodationratherthan war. These enclaves,and the









678 / SocialForces 78:2,December 1999

tolerance.Though minoritygroup members'opportunities or contactwiththe

majority opulationwillbe somewhatdiminishednmixedareas han n majority-

dominatedareas,contactwill stillbe substantial, nd the level of toleranceamong

minority group members living in mixed areasshould be similar to that ofminorities n areasdominatedby a majoritygroup.Forpersonsof the majority

group, ivingand interacting n a regularbasiswithothers n mixed areas hould

tempertheirintolerance.Experiencesof shared ivingwill make both minority

andmajoritygroupmembers esssusceptible o the forcesof insecurity, nxiety,

and fearthat canencouragenegativeattitudes owardothers n less horizontally

differentiated reas Blau 1977).

Hypothesis: In nationallymixed areas toleranceamong majoritygroup

memberswillbe higherhan hat oundamongmajority roupmembersivingelsewhere.

Hypothesis: In nationallymixed areastolerance among minority group

memberswillbehigherhan hat oundamongminority roupmembersiving

elsewhere.

These ixhypothesesanbe testedby comparingoleranceevelsamongmajority

groupsand minoritygroups iving nvariouspartsof theformerYugoslavia. ather

than focusingon the particular ulturalcontent of a national, racial,or ethnic

identity,we treateachgroupsolely n termsof itsminority/majoritytatusandthenumerical relationship between groups in majority-dominatedareas, ethnic

enclaves, and nationally mixed areas. The six enumeratedhypotheses predict

differencesn tolerance mongmajority roupmembersacrossdifferent ituations

andamongminoritygroupmembersacrossdifferent ituations.Consistentwith

Ailport's ontacthypothesisand withBlalock's nd Blau's nalysesof intergroup

power, however,we also expect majorities o be consistently ess tolerant than

mmorities.

ResearchDesign and Measurement

Inthewinterof 1989-90 he Consortium f SocialResearchnstitutes fYugoslaviaconducted interviews in workplacesand households in all the republics of

Yugoslavia, tilizinga multistage andomcluster amplingdesign.Thecompleted

surveyincluded 13,422 adults age 18 or older distributedacrossrepublicsand

autonomousprovinces (KosovoandVojvodina) n accord with the size of the

population of each.The occupational,educational,andagedistributionsof the

sample closely approximate hose reported n the lastYugoslav ensusof 1981.

The sampling design, however,resulted n a disproportionatenumber of male

respondents.To adjust he sample o be representative f the genderdistribution

of Yugoslav dults,malerespondentswereweighted7691 and femalerespondents

wereweighted1.4007.Thequestionnaire athered widerangeof information nd








includedquestionsallowing heconstruction f indicesof concepts mportant or

the studyof toleranceand enclaves.

ETHNIC/NATIONALTOLERANCE

Respondentswere asked heir evel of agreementon a five-pointLikert calewith

sixpropositionsmeasuring thnicnationalism: 1) Nationality houldbe a central

factor n choosinga marriagepartner; 2) Nationallymixedmarriages re more

unstable hanothermarriages;3) Every ationshouldhave tsowin tate; 4) People

canfeel completely afeonlywhenthe majority elongto theirnation; 5) Among

nations t is possible o createcooperation,but not fulltrust; 6) Without eaders

everynationis like a manwithouta head.All items have item-totalcorrelations

above 4 exceptthe lastitem,which scalespoorly (61.5%of the responses o thisitemaregrouped n the strongly gree ategory).Accordingly,his temwas dropped

fromthe scale.The remainingtemswerereverse cored o thathigh scores ndicate

greater olerance.Theresulting ive-itemscale hasa reliabilityndexof .72.

REPUBLICDIVERSITY

Oursixhypotheses ocus on the geographicevel of the local area theopcaina

(roughly quivalento a U.S.countyor parish).To control or the effectof national

diversityat the republic evel,we use an indicatorof the nationaldiversityof the

republic,as measuredby the index of qualitative ariation Bohrnstedt& Knoke

1988:76-77):

k 2

i=1

(K -1)/K

where K = the number of categoriesand p = the proportion of casesin the ith

category.

The indexranges rom0, indicatinghatallcasesare n asingleethniccategory,

to 1, indicating hat the casesarespreadevenlyacrossethnicgroups.

MAJORITY/MINORITYTATUS

The majority/minority tatus of personsis measured n two ways.The first is a

continuousmeasureof thepopulationpercentage f nationalgroupswithin each

republic.The percentageof the population representedby a particulargroupmeasures hepotentialpowerbaseof thatnationalgroup n a republic see Blalock

1967). In ethnic competition theory, group size is consideredan important

determinant f thepotential orgroupmobilization Nielsen 1985;Olzak&Nagel








1986;Olzak &West 1991). Republic-level umericaldominance hus represents

potentialpowerwhichmayinfluencea group's evelof tolerance.

A group's population percentagewithin each republic, however, does not

differentiate etween he situation n therepublicasa wholeandlocal situations.In the followingdiscussionwe treat he opcina(pluralopcine)as the local unit of

measurementor potential thnicenclaves.Test ituations ncludeareasof majority

numericaldomination,enclaveswhereminoritiesarenumerically ominant,and

mixed regionswhere there are no clear numerical majorities.To depict these

situations, we classifysix mutually exclusive situations of possible majority/

minoritystatus.We alsospecifya seventh esidual ategory epresentingecondary

minoritieswhohaveno homerepublicnwhich heyare hemajority. hiscategory

servesas a baselineandincludessuchgroupsas Roma,Jews,Romanians, talians,andHungarians.The seven ivingsituationsare as follows: 1) republicmajority/

opcinamajority dominantmajority), 2) republicminority/opcinaminority local

minority), 3) republicmajority/opcina inority enclavedmajority), 4) republic

minority/op6inamajority enclavedminority), 5) republicmajority/op6ina ixed,

(6) republicminority/opcinamixed, (7) secondaryminority not amajority n

any republicor opcina.

The cutoffpointfordeterminingmajority rminoritydominancenanopcina

is 50%of the population n anyone ethnicgroup. Opcinewith lessthan50%of

the populationin any one ethnicgroupare consideredethnicallymixed.Eachsituationis treatedasa dummyvariable n the followingregressionanalysis see

Table2) with the sum of the meansof thesesevenvariables qualing1.

ADDITIONAL STRUCTURALFACTORS

Fouradditionalets of characteristicsanbeexpectedo influenceoleranceoward

othernationalities:demographic actors,socialstatus,socialparticipation,and

religiosity.Demographicactors nclude ex,age,birthresidence,urrent esidence,

andnationallymixedparentage ndmarriage.Modernizationheorysuggestshat

olderpeopleandruralresidentsare lesstolerant,whileyoung peopleand urban

residentsaremore cosmopolitan i.e.,involved n the processof modernism).

(For a contrasting view based on the ethnic competition model, see Olzak

1983:367-68.)

Respondentswereasked f theyhad been bornin avillage,ocalvillagecenter,

opcinacenter, egional enter,macroregionalenter, rrepublic rprovincecenter,

and they werealso asked a similarquestionabouttheircurrentresidence.The

modalbirthresidencesvillage,with themedianbeingbetweenocalvillagecenterandopcinacenter.The modal current esidencesalsoavillage,but thepercentage

currently ivingin opcinacenters s higherand thepercentage urrently ivingin

macroregionalenterssdramaticallyreater,ivaling illageas the modalcategory.








Nationallymixed familystructures re predictedby modernization heory o

lead to greater olerance(Bonacich& Model 1980). Our measureof nationally

mixed parentage s based on comparing he nationalitiesof each respondent's

mother and father.A nationallymixed marriage s ascertainedby comparingarespondent's ationalitywith the nationalityof his or her spouse.Approximately

8%of respondentsare the offspringof nationallymixedfamilies,and8%arein

nationallymixed marriages.Genderand maritalstatusare includedas controls;

these are coded as dummy variables, with male = 1 and married= 1.4

Approximately 1%of respondents re marriedor cohabiting.

Twoaspectsof socialstratification education nd employment arecentral

to modernization nd ethnic competition heories.More highlyeducatedpeople

areexpected o be moretolerant,according o modernization heory.Education s

codedas yearsof schooling ompleted nd averagesustover 10years.Occupational

position s coded as fourbinaryvariablespecifyinghe categories f unemployed

persons, employed persons, peasants,and retiredpersons.According o ethnic

competitionheory,personswho areunemployed anbe expected o have ncreased

intolerance owardothernationalgroupsbecauseof intensifiedcompetitionfor

jobs: Economic ontraction n combinationwithhigh immigration lows raises

levelsof ethnic competition,which in turn increasesrates of ethnic collective

action Olzak 1992:37).Direct measuresof economic competitionbetween the

various thnicgroupsnYugoslaviaver abormarketpositionsorpolitical r socialresourceswerenot available.ngeneral, uchdirectmeasures f ethniccompetition

havebeen difficult o operationalize see Belanger& Pinard1991).

Participationn politicalorganizationsnd involvementn thebroader ocietythroughreading he news are predictedby modernization heoryto increase he

levelof national oleranceanddiluteallegiances uilt narrowly n ethnic dentity.

Weusethreesourcesof information n political nvolvement:membershipn the

Leagueof YugoslavCommunists LYC), fficeholdingn workplace rganizations,

and officeholding n community organizations.Membershipn the LYC an be

expected o implya greater ommitmentto explicitlyarticulatednationalgoals,amongwhich wastolerance or differentnationalities ndsupport orapluralist,

multinational tate.TheCommunistPartymembershipvariables coded yes=

1 orthosewho reporteithercurrently eingmembersof the LYC rhavingbeen

members n thepast.About34%of respondents eported itherbeingin the LYC

currently 1989-90)or havingbeen members n the past.

The othertwo measures f political nvolvementarebasedon participationn

politicalorganizationsntheworkplace rcommunity.n 1952,Yugoslaviadopted

acomplexpolitical ystemwhereby ll citizenswereto berepresentedothat their

workplaces nd in theirneighborhoods.Thoughthe CommunistPartyremained

hegemonic, local governmentand workerself-managementwere the sites of

political involvement for millions of Yugoslav citizens (Rusinow 1977).

Respondentswere asked f they occupiedan electedpositionattheirworkplace.








Positiveanswerswerecoded 1.Workplace rganizationsncludedboth tradeunions

and workerself-management ouncils.Respondentswerealso asked f theyheld

an electedpositionin a communityorganization.Later n the interview heywere

asked f theywere active n anycommunityorganizations.A positive response oeitherquestion esultedna codeof 1forparticipationncommunity rganizations.

Communityorganizationsncludeyouth organizations,he SocialistAlliance,and

electedparliamentary odies fromthe commune to the federation.About 18%

and 20%of respondents,respectively, eportedactive participation n workor

communityorganizations.

Literacy ndnewspaper eadingprovidegreater ontactwiththeworldand are

expectedto increasenationaltolerance,according o modernization heory.In

addition,newspapers ndtelevisionweredirectlyunderLYC ontrolprior o 1989,andthe officialpositionof the LYCwasto support oleranceamongnationalities.

Other media such as radio and magazineswere only slightlyless controlled.

Regularly eading he news canthus be expected o increasenationaltolerance.

Respondentswere asked whetherthey read a newspaperdaily (4), weekly(3),

monthly (2), or never(1). Later n the questionnaire, espondentswereasked o

identify heir hreemostcommon eisureactivities. ome dentified reading ews

as their most importanteisureactivity 4), andothersreportedt as theirsecond

or thirdmost importantactivity(coded 3 and 2, respectively)or not at all (1).

Responsesto thesetwo questionswere summed to createa scale of reading henewsranging rom 2 to 8.

Levelof religiositys consideredanimportantnegative nfluenceon tolerance

by modernization heorists.Respondentswere askedquestionson a three-point

scaleindicating heir evelof belief in God,life afterdeath,andthe ideathat God

createdpeople. Theywerealsoaskedhow oftenthey attendedreligiousservices

(never,monthly,weekly,ordaily)andif theirchildrenattendedreligious chools.

All items scaledpositivelywith item-totalcorrelations bove 4. Theresultingive-

item standardized calehasa reliabilityndex of .86.

Results

Table1reportsthe aggregateolerance evelsfor eachrepublicandautonomous

province n the formerYugoslavia. osniaandVojvodinawere he unitsof greatest

tolerance,with levels of toleranceapproaching4 on a 5-point scale.The range

betweenrepublics s considerable,withthenadiroccurringn Kosovoat 1.71.

Tolerance lsovariesbynationalitywithinrepublics.Personswho identifiedasYugoslavsreamong hemost tolerant f allpeople (see Sekulic,Massey& Hodson

1994),with tolerance scores above 4.00 everywhere xcept in Serbia.Minority

populationsin republicsalsoevidencerelativelyhigh levels of tolerance,adding

support o the ideathat smallnumbersresult nproportionallymorecontactwith







EthnicEnclavesand Intolerance 683

TABLE : ToleranceLevelsby RepublicandNationality:Yugoslavia,1989-1890

RepublicsMonte- Mace-

Nationality Croatia Bosnia SerbiaVojvodinaKosovo Slovenia negro donia

Croatian 3.46 3.62 4.05 3.28(1,921) (332) (77) (43)

Muslim 3.67 3.84 3.22 3.42

(37) (830) (191) (60)Serbian 4.05 3.88 3.23 3.74 1.91 3.50 3.38

(304) (522) (2,793) (797) (91) (39) (35)

Albanian 1.67 2.66 1.68(863) (30) (167)

Slovenian 2.59

(1,158)

Montenegran 3.42 3.43

(76) (715)Macedonian 2.74

(718)Yugoslav 4.27 4.25 3.85 4.07 4.16

(244) (312) (180) (189) (60)

Hungarian 3.81(147)

Other 3.92 2.10

(35) (55)Al 3.62 3.88 3.29 3.83 1.71 2.67 3.45 2.53

nationalities (2,588) (2,020) (3,317) (1,314) (983) (1,294) (909) (973)

(N= 13,422)

Note.Numbersnparenthesesre ample izes.Onlycellswith30 or morerespondentsre

reported.

majoritiesand,in terms of power relations,greateroleranceby wayof reasoned

timidity.Such olerancestypicalof Serbsn Croatia4.05)andCroatsnVojvodina

(4.05).The lowest evelsof tolerance reevidenced n Kosovo or both themajority

Albanians ndthe minoritySerbs.Herethe regionalhistoryof ill will andconflict

appears ominantoverconsiderations f minority/majoritytatus.Even n Kosovo,

however,minoritySerbs resomewhatmore olerant1.91)thanmajorityAlbanians

(1.67). Relativelyow levelsof tolerancealsoprevailn Macedonia. nMacedonia,however,majorityMacedonians remore tolerant 2.74) than minorityAlbanians

(1.68).Thismaybe a consequence f the fact hatAlbanians o not feelthemselves

to be a minoritybut see themselvesas members of the dominantgroup in an

ethnicallyhomogeneous erritory hat spreads romAlbania hroughKosovo nto










TABLE : Regression f Tolerance n Demographic,SocialStatus,Participa-tion, Religiosity, ndNationalCompositionVariables: ugoslavia,1989-1990

Unstandardizedoefficients

Independent ariables Mean S.D. (1) (2) (3)

DemographicvariablesAge 40.63 14.56 .003*** .003*** .003***Married .71 .45 -.092*** -.074*** -.074***Male .49 .50 -.160*** -.162*** -.164***Urbanismorigins) 2.30 1.62 -.005 -.003 -.006

Urbanismcurrent) 3.30 1.81 .033*** .031*** .031***

Mixedparentage .08 .28 .166*** .105*** .118***Mixedmarriage .08 .28 .479*** .360*** .357***

Social tatus

Education 10.07 3.96 -.001 .002 .004

Employedbaseline) .60 .43 .000 .000 .000Unemployed .12 .32 -.295*** -.294*** -.296***

Peasant .15 .36 .060* .072* .077*Retired .13 .34 -.038 -.035 .031

Social articipation

Communistarty .34 .45 .030 .017 .016Work rganization .20 .40 .089*** .090*** .084***Civic rganization .18 .38 .053* .047 .051*Read ews 4.56 1.30 -.028*** -.025*** -.023***

ReligiosityReligiositycale .00 1.00 -.308*** -.308*** -.306***

NationalompositionDiversityndex .48 .19 1.365*** 1.062*** 1.033***

Majoritytatus 57.67 30.48 -.004***

Dominantmajority .64 .48 -.260***Localminority .06 .23 .134**

Enclaved ajority .01 .10 -.390***Enclavedminority .07 .26 -.127**

Majorityn mixedarea .01 .12 -.162*

Minorityn mixedarea .06 .25 .129**

Secondary inorities

(baseline) .14 .35 .000

Constant 2.621 2.947 2.889

R2 .2326*** .2394*** .2456***

(N= 13,422)

* p < .05 ** p < .01 * p < .001 (two-tailed-tests)







686 I Social Forces 78:2, December 1999

reported in the lower right-hand corner of Table 2 and in Figure 1. True or

secondaryminoritieshavingno republics ropcina n whichthey aredominant

serveas thereference ategory or thisanalysis.Theincrease n explained ariance

betweenmodel2 and model 3 is statisticallyignificant t the .001level, ndicatinga better fit with the data. Moreimportant, he categoricalmeasureof majority/minority tatusallowsusto examinepatterns f tolerance crossdifferent tructural

settings, ncluding enclavesandnationallymixed locales.

Aspredictedby hypothesis1,majoritygroups iving as majorities dominant

majorities)are intolerantof other nationalities -.260). Conversely, ssuggested

by hypothesis2, local minoritiesliving in majority-dominated reas are fairlytoleranttowardother nationalities .134). Wherea minority ives in a minority-

dominated ndave(asanenclavedminority),minority olerance f othersslowest(-.127), supportinghypothesis4. Hypothesis3,predictinghe condition nwhich

majoritygroupmemberswillbe leasttolerant, s alsosupported.Specifically,he

toleranceof majoritygroupmembers ivingasanenclavedmajorityn an opcina

dominatedby anothergroupis evenlower(-.390) than wherethe majority ives

locallyas a dominantmajority contrastsignificantat the .001level).

Hypothesis5 predicts hatrepublic-levelmajoritiesiving n mixedopcinewill

be more tolerantthan when living elsewhere.Consistentwith this hyjothesis,

majoritygroupmembersaremost tolerant n nationallymixedopcine.Pepublic-

level minoritiesliving in nationallymixed opcineare about equallyas tolerant(.129) as local minorities(.134).Average olerance evelsin both situationsare

considerably reaterhanamongminoritiesivingasenclavedminorities contrasts

significant at the .001 level). This pattern provides only partialsupport for

hypothesis6, whichpredicts hatminority olerancewill be greatestn ethnically

mixed areas. nstead,weobservehatminorityolerancesequally igh n ethnicallymixed areasand where minority members live in majority-dominatedareas.

Conversely,minoritytolerance s lowestin minorityenclaves.

Table 3 presents standardizedtolerance levels for the sevenstructurallydifferentiatediving arrangements valuated eparately y republic.These mean

tolerancelevelshave been standardizedby adjusting olerance evels to reflect

averagepopulationcharacteristics cross the formerYugoslaviaas specifiedin

model 1 of Table2. Theregion-specificoefficientsn Table3 reinforcehepatternsfound in model 3 of Table2. Majority tatus n a republic essenstolerance,and

this effect s amplified mean figures ortolerancearesmaller)wherethemajority

lives as a numeric minority in an opcina dominatedby another nationality.

Minority groupmembersare most tolerantwhenlivingin majority-dominated

opcineor in nationallymixedareas;whenconcentratedn localeswherethey arethe dominantgroup,theirtolerance owardothersdecreases.







EthnicEnclavesndIntolerance687

FIGURE1: ToleranceCoefficientsorMinorityandMajorityPopulations nOpcinewithVariousDemographicConditions:Yugoslavia, 989-1990

0.3 -

0.2 REPUBLICMINORITYOPULATIONS

0.134 0.129

0.1 -Local MixedMinority Opcine \

0-\

0) 1 127

_-1 REPUBLICMAJORITYOPULATIONSo -0.162 Enclave

3 M yMinority-0.2 xed

-0.260 Opcine \

Dominant\-0.3 Majority \

-0.4- -

~~~~~~~~~EnclavedMajority

-0.5DemographicConditions

Note.Thetolerance oefficientsre rommodel3 of Table .











690/ Social Forces 78:2,December 1999

Condusions

Socialist ugoslavian thebrink fwarprovidesnunprecedentedpportunityo

examinehe structuralasesof nationalolerance.t is a troublingxample f thechallengesacing state ystemhat riesboth o recognizeationalitysa culturalidentityandto prohibit ationalitys abasis orpolitical ction see Greenfeld1992).

Slavnationalityroupsnarodi)hafed t restraintsnengagingn a politicsof identity whileharboring rievancesn being reated quallywith nationalminoritiesnarodnosti),sspecifiedn the constitutions f socialistYugoslavia.More mportant,heyexperiencedear nd/orhatredoward thernationalitiessdetermined,t least npart,by the demographictructure f their haredivingarrangements.

Yugoslaviaost tspoliticalenter ndbeganheplungentoeconomicuin nthe lastyearsof Tito's eignandin the decade ollowing isdeath.The ossofsuperordinateoalsweakenedhepositiveffects f contact mong thnic roupsfosteredyearlieroliticalnd ocial eformsndworkerelf-managementesigns.Grievancesccumulated,ndpeoplebecamemorecognizant f othergroupmembers'eelings f resentmentndaggravation.nenclaves uch eelingswereseizeduponby eaders rging oliticalmobilizationoth o seekredressor heir

group's wn resentmentsndin fearof resentments eldby others.Thishelpsexplainwhy,oncefighting ommenced,onflict ftenescalatedmostquicklynthespecific reaswe have dentifieds enclaves.

DuringandfollowingYugoslavia'sarof dissolution, reviously ispersedminoritiesave ought ecuritynenclavesnwhich heyfeelafebut nwhich he

potentialor intolerancenda divisive politicsf identity regreatest. houghpolicymakersnd hoseresponsibleor heimplementationf theDaytonPeaceAccordsmayhope hat hehundreds f thousandsfrefugees illreturno theirprevious omes,heprovisionsormakinghishappen reextremelyeak nd tsimplementationsprovingo belargelympossible. tbest, he accords roposecompensationndrestitutionor osthomes, arms,ndbusinesses. any efugeeswillnotinthe foreseeableuture ereturningo theethnically ixedopcineromwhich hey ledorweredriven.nBosnia,Croatia,ndSerbiahewarhasmade tmore ikely hatpeoplewillhenceforthiveamong o-ethnics.

In the states ndregions f theformerYugoslavia,heprevalencefdispersedminoritiesndnationallymixedregions,hetworesidentialituationseadingothe greatest ntergroupolerance, as beenconsiderablyeduced.Remaining

endaves re eekingo beincorporatedithin errymanderedationaloundariesor, rustratednthiseffort,ontinueo fester sdestabilizingntities. heresultingincreasen localresidentialomogeneitysa formulaorgreaterntolerancendmaywork o sow heseedsof future onflicts.One essonof theYugoslavragedymaywellbethat trongerntegrationistolicies revital orcreatinghe ong-termconditions fpoliticaltabilityn modern tates.







EthnicEndaves ndIntolerance691

Notes

1. Forthe developmentof similararguments boutthe role of populationconcentrations

in determining acialattitudesamongAmericans, ee Quillian(1996) and Taylor 1998).

2. Pettigrew 1986) cautions hat racial ompositionandgrouppercentagesn an area ..

cannot be used as surrogatemeasures for actual intergroupcontact and interaction

(189). Researchon racial integrationin the U.S., however, suggeststhat changes in

neighborhood omposition,and not interpersonal ontactper se, are critical o changing

attitudestoward others (see Hamilton & Bishop 1976).

3. The tolerancescalefor this articlemeasures oyaltyto one'sown group and distrust

of other groups. Other possible indicatorsof intolerance,such as respect for minority

rights,were not available n the surveydata.

4. People currently unmarriedbut cohabiting are also coded as married under the

assumption hat their living arrangements remore consequential or theirattitudesof

tolerance han the legaldistinctionbetweenmarriageand cohabitation.

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