Essay - Henri Bergson Dualism Considered From the Perspective of Paul Churchland Eliminative Materiali

8/13/2019 Essay - Henri Bergson Dualism Considered From the Perspective of Paul Churchland Eliminative Materiali

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The Problem with Bergsonian Dualism

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Introduction

Both Bergson and Churchland believe that they have overcome the traditional

philosophical mind-body problem which has its roots in Descartes dualism.

Bergsonian dualism attempts to circumvent the difficulties of ordinary dualism by

offering a modified dualistic account. Churchlands eliminative materialism position

does not confront the mind-body problem in its traditional formulation, that is, it

does not acknowledges any domain of properties that are ...metaphysically distinct

from the obective physical properties addressed by orthodo! science."#s such, in

the language of the mind-body problem, what we term mind is essentially reducible

to body. $t maintains, contra-Bergson, ...that consciousness, with all its functions, is

born out of the interplay of material elements.%&atter and &emory p.'()

*his essay will argue that Bergsons dualistic solution to the mind-body problem

is problematic. $t will do so on the basis that many of his e!amples, and much of his
mailto:[email protected]:[email protected]


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argumentation, do not necessarily lead to a dualistic solution but are e+ually well

catered for form the perspective of eliminative materialism.

$t might be asked, why, in order to establish the obective of the essay, bring the

work of Churchland to bear upon Bergsons dualistic hypothesis, rather than that of

any other materialist *he answer to this revolves around the issue of the brain, and

the severe demolition of its functional importance it receives at the hands of Bergson

in order to establish a workable dualistic solution. Bergsons attempt to circumvent

the problems of original dualism has drastic conse+uences for the office of the brain

which is reduced to the position of being purely ...an intermediary between sensation

and movement...%&&"'').$ will argue that this relegation of the brain is unacceptable

to the twentieth-century philosophy of mind debate.

*his is precisely the point at which the work of Churchland is so forceful since in

its impact on Bergson. Churchlands theory of the brain not only demonstrates how

completely inade+uate Bergsons brain-model is, but it smoothly integrates with his

eliminative materialistic position making much progress in providing a naturalistic

understanding of the mind. $n re-establishing the functional importance of the brain

Churchlands account goes much of the way in e!plaining perception, representation

sensory +ualia and, implicitly, memory.

*he organisation of this essay will be as follows chapter one will provide a critical

e!plication of Bergsons dualistic account in his attempts to circumvent the problems

inherent in original dualism. $n doing so the key issues will be clearly drawn out in

order to allow chapter two to engage with them in the most fruitful way. Chapter two


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will then e!amine how Churchlands eliminative materialist position, with its

importing of the latest findings from neuroscience %empirical study of the brain) and

artificial intelligence, provides a materialistic account which is able to absorb and

answer the arguments and proofs Bergson uses to establish his dualistic hypothesis.

Chapter 1 : Bergsonian Dualism - A circumvention the problematic nature of

original dualism?

hat is the nature of Bergsonian dualism #t first glance Bergson appears to

tackle the traditional Cartesian formulation of the mind-body problem head on, in that

he tries to establish how two radically different substances - matter and spirit -

interact. #s Bergson writes in the introduction to &atter and &emoryhe affirms the

reality of both matter and of spirit. /aturally this implies the irreducibility of one to

the other, or the irreducibility of spirit.

0owever, a closer comparison between Cartesian and Bergsonian dualism reveals

differences. Descartes substance dualism posits a total cleavage between what a

human essentially is, a thinking thing or a mind, and the body $ am a being whose

whole essence or nature is to think, and whose being re+uires no place and depends on

no material thing(. *he term substance is usefully defined by #rmstrong as

...something which is logically capable of independent e!istence...1. $n the Cartesian

frame-work mind and body have this independence. Descartes, however, was unable


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to resolve how the two components of dualism combine other than by notoriously

unsatisfactory recourse to the pineal gland as the point of ...psychophysical

transactions...2. But, in Bergson we seemingly have a dualistic account which

surmounts the difficulties

Bergson selects for his starting point, a different dualistic dichotomy3 one which he

believes will allow a circumventing of the problems of the Cartesian formulation.

&emory, he says, ...is ...the intersection of mind and matter.%&atter and &emory p."1)

and the ...the classical problem of the relations of soul and body ...4centre5 upon the

subect of memory.%&&"1). &emory then is one aspect of Bergsonian dualism. #s

6ilkington notes *he independence of mind 4has been5 narrowed down to ... the

independence of memory...7. *his move of narrowing down cannot be passed over

without comment. *he significance becomes apparent in what constitutes our real

e!perience in our real e!perience, ...there is no perception which is not full of

memories.%&& 11)- memory is posited as one component of our real e!perience.

8ssentially, the second part of the dualism is matter, but as can be seen from the

previous +uote, perception has somehow been shifted to e+uate with matter3

something which Bergson achieves through his unusual definition of matter, which is

a new .. way of looking at matter%&&"").

$t could be said then, that Bergson attempts to forge a workable dualism by

utilising two theories3 one of memory which was against the notion of the

...nineteenth-century orthodo!y...4of5... associationism9, and one of matter which is

mid-way between idealism and realism %&&:). ;urthermore, Bergson writes that in a

dualism starting from pure perception, where ...subect and obect coincide...


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%&&(("), the difficulties for understanding the link between mind and body are less

formidable. 0ow so #s mentioned, our real e!perience is a composite of perception

and memory - this is Bergsons choice of dualistic dichotomy. 0e understands

perception and memory to be separated by a difference in kind and that to confuse and

mi! pure perception with memory is a metaphysical error %&&2


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substance. But we are still left with a difference in kind, which still implies an

irreducibility of memory to matter.

hat is it that Bergson has to prove then, in order for his dualism to be tenable

;irst it is necessary to show how perception is so closely related to matter as not to be

different in kind from it3 then, since there is a difference in kind between perception

and memory their mechanisms of interaction need to be e!posed and e!plained.

*o summarise the import of this we can say that, along with his two new theories of

matter and memory, the notion of pure perception becomes the key to the

reconciliation of mind and body e can understand that spirit can rest upon matter,

unite with it, in the act of pure perception. %&&((?)

$t is important to consider the Bergsonian material universe, since from this he

derives an account of the act of perceiving. *his universe is supposedly one of

common sense where matter is an ...aggregate of images %&&:). *he term image

here shuns the philosophical notions of reality in favour of so called common sense. $t

reects both the idea that matter is an idealist construct of the mind, and also that there

is anything more to it, or standing behind it, than meets the eye - as in @ants

phenomenonAnoumenon division. *he common-sense image e!ists ...as we perceive

it... %&& "?)with its primary and secondary +ualities undifferentiated and e+ually real

%although this definition of image slips to one of vibrationsAmovements3 an issue

which will be tackled later). *his holds for all matter including the body, brain and

nervous system etc. they are all images. #ll these images act and react upon one

another in a predictable law like manner as in, for instance, two billiard balls striking

one another if their mass, velocity and angle of incidence are known the collision is a


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predictable out come. iving matter, however, at the level of the macro-unity of the

entity, is different in this regard. # stimulus does not necessarily lead to an

instantaneous and predictable output, movement or action, or any response at all3

there is no necessity of reaction as in the billiard ball case. Bergson, here introduces

the notion of indetermination of response or action as ...a true principle... or, as

Dewey states, ...indeterminateness is introduced as a specifying feature...:. $ would

propose that, in the conte!t of the notion of a one of indetermination, we could say

that inanimate matter and living matter are differentiated by the former having a one

of indetermination of radius ero, and the latter having a radius dependent upon its

comple!ity %&&1(). *he indetermination of the being, which is itself ...suggested by

the structure of the nervous system... %&&11)allows for an ever greater sophisticated

response the more comple! it is. *here is a sliding scale of difference in degree only

between inanimate and animate %living) matter. #s the centre of indetermination of a

being is diminished, as in the lower orders of life for e!ample, the reaction to a

stimulus becomes more immediate, and ...the more immediate the reaction is...the

more perception becomes a mere contact...the process of perception ...

4approaching5 ...mechanical impulsion followed by a necessary movement %&&1().

e can now see why a billiard ball doesnt perceive - it has no centre of

indetermination 0ere, Bergson is e+uating the nervous system of a being with action3

between perception and reaction there e!ists only a difference in degree and not kind.

*his is further borne out in Bergsons distinction between the refle!ive function of

the spinal cord and perceptive function of the brain, where he posits only a difference

in degree and not kind.


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hat is Bergsons pure perception, how is it e+uated with matter and how does it

arise Briefly outlining Bergsons overall suggestion first. 0e states that the material

universe is awash with already e'istingrepresentations, but they are virtual, not actual

i.e. unactualised %&&19) . Eirtual would seem to suggest that, in terms of a visual

representation, the light rays which can potentially form a picture or actualised

representation, have not yet struck a screen so to speak, and formed an image. *his

has some credibility if we consider that Bergson talks of a one of indetermination as

playing in some part a screen %&&1:). 6erception itself is a kind of cut-out or detached

picture %&&19)3 a reduced component part of the virtual representation which has

been isolated and halted i.e. made actual %struck the screen of indetermination)3

effectively turned into a perception. Fo, as 0arward notes ...perception itself, in so

far as it is an image, 4is5 posited ... to begin with. "?

6erception arises ... when a stimulation received by matter is not prolonged into a

necessary action%&&1(), and this is achieved by living matter having a one of

indetermination. *his, Bergson e!plains, is to do with utility. 6erception has a pure

utilitarian origin %&&"7


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obects or e!ternal obects on itself i.e. possible or virtual action. 6erception shows, in

the image world, the eventual or possible action of my body %&&((). *hus the filtering

phenomenon is effected by a beings centre of indetermination, which is itself a

measure of the fle!ibility, in terms of sophistication, of what stimulus can be put into

contact with what motor apparatus.

Fo nothing is added to perception by the brain, rather, the reverse happens

6erception is ...a problem of selection and elimination..."(or, as already mentioned, a

filtering. *o clarify this point still further, we can say that perception is not a cognitive

creation of the brain. Bergson believes this is an important point, since in passing

from the unactualised representation %imageApresence) to the actualised %perception)

we have a diminution %&&17) which allowsperception to be linked with matter and

made e!ternal. $t is e!ternal in the sense that Bergson understands perception as no

longer being a mental creation occupying an inner realm. 6erception is not within us

or in the brain3 that is, it is not a cognitive creation of the brain. #lthough the brain is

obviously a material thing and, as such, it forms a link in the chain of perception as

Bergson describes it. 0e states that the whole of the mechanism of perception can be

described as follows e!ternal images reach organs of sense, modify nerves,

propagating their influence to brain...*he movement will pass through cerebral

substance and e!pand into voluntary action. %&&2?).6erceptions do not depend on

the molecular movements of the cerebral mass %&&(7) and in this sense only are they

e!ternal 6erception, in its pure state ... is a part of things. %&&92). *his makes sense

of the idea that ...subect and obect combine... %&&((")in a dualism starting from

pure perception. 6erception is effectively shifted to be e+uated with matter, with no

difference in kind e!isting between them. Dewey neatly sums up Bergsons position


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on perception. 6erception, he writes, ...is concerned directly with physical things...4it

has5...no mental states intervening...#bove all, perception is primarily a fact of action,

not cognition."1.

*he idea of diminution being the pivot to allow perception to be made e!ternal is

a hard one to swallow. $n making perception e!ternal and part of matter, Bergson is

opposing all tradition of theories of mind-body in materialism and original dualism3

and theories of reality in idealism and realism - all of which situate perception in the

inner realm or associate it with the mental. $t has important conse+uences for what we

are to take as the function of the brain, which will provide an important point of

contention for the validity of his dualistic solution of the mind-body problem, from

the perspective of eliminative materialism. *he reason being that, the function of the

brain is relegated to central telephone e!change the purpose of which is to ... allow

stimulation to choose its effect...to allow communication or delay it... its office is

limited to the transmission and division of movement.%&&1?). $t is the brain that

allows a wide centre of indetermination of movements of the body image. 6erception

does not come from the brain, it only appears like it %&&2"), i.e. the brain is not an

organ of representation3 a stimulus may travel to the brain but, once there, it does not

change itself into a representationAperception %&&1")but it is routed to a motor

mechanism by law of utility. Fo, on this understanding, we have no inner

representations of the outer world upon which processing work of any kind is done.

0aving seemingly established within his own theoretical frame-work, that

perception ... is really a part of matter... %&&((()and not in the brain, in the form of

a cognitive construction or mental creation, and therefore, that the brain is not an


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organ of representation, the brain suffers further marginalisation in Bergsons theory

of memory as memory is banished from the brain along with perception. Gbviously

this is a crucial step for Bergsons dualistic hypothesis3 he has to show that memories

cannot be stored in the brain, since the brain is part of the material universe - an image

- and ...images do not create images... %&&(1). #s 0arward states, he has to show

that ...our e!perience is the meeting of two 4independent5 reals, spirit in the form of

memory and matter resolved into motion."2.

Bergson differentiates between two different ways in which the past is preserved

i.e. two different forms of memory in motor mechanisms and independent

recollections%&&'


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$t will be useful to e!amine what proofs Bergson uses to establish the differences

between these two pure forms of memory, especially true memory in its

independenceAdifference in kind. #lso, a tracing of the full evolution of the two ways

in which this latter from of memory interacts with perception, which is different in

kind, will be attempted. $n proceeding in this way the nature of true memory as

Bergson understands it can be drawn out3 why it is posited as being different in kind

from matter and, given this difference in kind, how it is supposed to interact with

matterAperception to constitute our e!perience. #lso, the following analysis will assist

in ascertaining if Bergsons whole proect cannot also be interpreted and fitted into a

materialistic position3 one which has the advantage of unifying contemporary

understanding of the brain. *his will be attempted in chapter two.

Bergson instances the idea of learning a lesson %&&':), such as playing the guitar,

to draw a distinction between the two forms of memory. $ can have ten lessons in

playing a particular melody. 8ach time $ become more proficient, until after the final

one $ have mastered it. $ now have two things the ac+uired skill of playing the

melody and a memory of each of the successive lessons. *he former he suggests as

being stored in the body in the form of a mechanism, perhaps by a particular

connection or arrangement of neurones3 but the point is it has been materially

registered and stored. $t is a habit or action lived and acted not represented, %&&


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*his being the case it immediately +uashes the obviously tempting +uestion,

where are they, as this is a +uestion that only makes sense in spatial terms. $t might

be more appropriate to ask when were they. *his is precisely one aspect of

Bergsons method which is to state problems in terms of time rather than of space."9

#s 6ilkington notes, Bergson considers all the events of ones life to be stored up

4preserved5 and it is essential to his theory that he regards the totality of ones past as

being preserved..."'. $ndeed Bergson regards the past which we are unaware of as

being ust as real as the space beyond our immediate visual vicinity which we can not

see 4*here is no5 reason to say the past effaces itself as soon as perceived than to

suppose material obects cease to be when we cease to perceive them %&&"2().

ithin this conte!t the idea that Because it has been shown that one thing is within

another, the preservation is not thereby made any clearer.%&&"2:) makes sense.

Deleue notes"


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%&&"(7). Fecondly, although Bergson opens up a difference in kind between the two

forms of memory, securing the independence of pure memory, the latter is dependent

upon the former in terms of its actualisation ..memories need, for their actualisation,

a motor ally...%&&"(?). *his allows Bergson to maintain that, in instances of psychic

blindness, deafness etc.%defects of recognition) caused by brain damage, no memories

have been destroyed, rather, their actualisation has been interfered with due to

damaged motor mechanisms. ;inally, in auditory recognition, %&&""')if there is an

associated image for the recognition of each word ...you must assume that there are

as many auditory images of the same sound as there are pitches of sound and +ualities

of each voice.%&&""'), in other words an almost infinite amount.

*he two ways in which Bergson forges an operational link between pure memory

and pure perception - which are different in kind - resulting in concrete perception,

will now be traced and pieced together by way of an e!ample. %i) recollection memory

covers ...with a cloak of recollections a core of immediate perceptions....%ii)

contraction memory...contracts a number of e!ternal moments into a single internal

moment... or, it is a ...synthesising act of absorbing data into consciousness and

binding them together with memories...":3 the latter leading to the ...subectivity of

sensible +ualities...%&&12). *hese will now both be considered separately.

*aking point %i) first recollection memory covers (...with a cloa" of recollections a

core of immediate perceptions...). et us assume $ have a perception which is diluted

to the point of being pure. *his fulfils this criterion of pure memory needing a motor

ally to attain actualisation, since perception is virtual action %nascentAsketched out).

Certain pure recollections or pure memories which e!ist in the virtual state and are


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attached to the past, therefore une!tended and powerless, spontaneously go out to

meet %&&::) the perception. 6ure memory ...attains to a realised image as it

e!pands... %&&"12)3e!pansion indicating there is no abrupt transition in terms of

une!tendedAe!tended %&&("1). 8ven at this point of actualisation from pure memory

to memory image there is a profound difference i.e. a difference in kind %&&"2?). By

the term memory image Bergson seems to mean a literal image %if we are considering

visual images), one which has become conscious. *his is obviously the case when we

note that memory images ...go out to meet the perception, and feeding on its

substance, ac+uire sufficient vigour and life to abide with it in space %&&"?1)3 and that

...a memory image can interpret out perception so thoroughly that we cant discern

what is perception and what is memory.%&&"?1) in other words a memory image

could stand in for a perception, as in a hallucination. *hese memory images become

...more and more capable of inserting themselves into the motor diagram... %&&"(9)

allowing concrete perception which is ... only defined and distinguished by its

coalescence with a memory image... %&&"('). Fo that is the full process, but what is

it that is actually happening 6ure memory is virtual - a genuinely e!isting

psychological state which is unconscious and une!tended3 the perception is e!tended.

Bergson appears to be positing a smooth transition from the ine!tensive virtual state

to the actualised e!tensive state whereby the two e!ist compounded together. *his is

confirmed by the case of sensation %different in kind to perception)3 the dawning

memory of a sensation %une!tended) is itself the sensation coming to be, and

sensation is e!tended and localised, being of the body.

hat about point %ii) contraction memory (...contracts a number of e'ternal

moments into a single internal moment...) or is a ...synthesising act of absorbing data

into consciousness and binding them together with memories...(?

which supposedly


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leads to our subectivity of sensible +ualities hat is meant here by an e'ternal

momentor, more vaguely, an item of data $t is referred to variously as ...a plurality

of moments...%&&12), ...the real..%&&12)- as in contraction of the real, ...billions of

vibrations... %&&(?1), ...the continuous flow of things...%&&("?). #ll these are

certainly suggestive of vibrations. But 0arward draws attention to the fact that an

e!ternal moment is also a pure perception("and, Bergson does indeed refer to concrete

perception as ...a synthesis, made by memory, of an infinity of pure perceptions...

%&&"


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*here is no consciousness without memory, and no continuation of a

state without the addition, to the present feeling, of the memory of past

moments. $t is this which constitutes duration. $nner duration is the

continuous life of the memory which prolongs the past into the

present((

$f this is the case there seems to be an odd lacuna in the theory. Fuccessive

vibrations from what ever source, and collected by what ever sense, go through an

electrochemical reduction or encoding. *hat is, memory does not effect contraction

on, say, light vibrations directly in order to form the +uality of any particular colour3

the vibrations upon reaching the eye are encoded in the form suitable for the nervous

system sets of electrochemical spiking fre+uencies(1. But perhaps Bergson posits

contractions in terms of this natural medium of communication of the nervous

system Hust what contraction memory is contracting and how it gets a handle on it,

since pure memory is different in kind, is very unclear. $f we allow vibrations then the

problem is, are these vibrations the vibrations of the physicists - the light vibrations,

sound vibrations etc. #s already said, they cannot be. $f the vibrations being

contracted are the electrochemical signals of the nervous system then we could say

the original vibrations of the physicist have already been contracted by the bodys

nervous system before pure memory can get its hands on them, so to speak. *his

ambiguity in

the contraction mode of memory is critical for Bergson dualistic hypothesis, since it is

the meeting between matter and memory, and it does not appear to be satisfactorily

resolved. 0arward, in reference to Bergsons analysis of perception, describes it as

being more of a metaphorical description than analysis, ...intended rather to stimulate

the readers imagination than convey precise ideas.(2. 6erhaps the same could be said


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of the way theoretically pure memory supposedly interacts with theoretically pure

perception.

$n the preceding paragraphs we have seen how Bergson tries to outer perception

from the brain, to make it part of the material universe, already present but in a virtual

state. *he brain is said not to create it, as such, but make it actual by virtue of the fact

that the brain constitutes a centre of indetermination of action. $n this way the

functionality of the brain is greatly reduced. ith memory Bergson attempts a similar

move he differentiates between two forms of memory - motor and pure, to the e!tent

he avers they are different in kind. *hen through a series of apparent proofs and

arguments he seemingly establishes that pure memory cannot be attributed to a

cerebral condition of the brain. $n a consideration of the two ways in which this pure

memory is supposed to come together with perception a serious difficulty became

apparent in contraction memory, in terms of what was supposed to be contracted and

the e!act mechanism of the contraction. $t was seen how this difficulty also drew

another one with it, in that Bergson duplicitously oscillates between two alternative

definitions of matter to suit his thesis.

$n the following chapter $ will consider if Bergsons proofs for establishing pure

memory as being independent from matter %and which conse+uently lead him to adopt

a dualistic stance) cannot actually be e!plained away by Churchlands eliminative

materialist account with its sophisticated theory of the material brain. ;rom this it

naturally follows to consider if perception also might be able to be absorbed back

into the brain, that is, to make the brain wholly responsible for in terms of a

mentalAcognitive construction. #nd, since Churchlands position incorporates a


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empirically detailed theory of the brain, $ will consider how ustified Bergson has

been in minimising the functional importance of the brain. ;ollowing on the

reinstation of the functional importance of the material brain by Churchland, his

e!planation of our sensory +ualia will be considered as a model superior to the

apparently flawed contraction memory suggested by Bergson.

Chapter 2 - The liminative !aterialist response to Bergsonian Dualism

*he following +uestions, all of which arise naturally from the termination of

chapter one, will be set as a guide in probing Bergsonian dualism from the

eliminative materialists perspective3 the ultimate obective being to establish firm

answers %i) Can we really allow Bergson to limit the office of the brain as being

nothing more than a central telephone e!change the purpose of which is to ... allow

stimulation to choose its effect...to allow communication or delay it... its office

4being5 limited to the transmission and division of movement %ii) $s Bergsons


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e!planation of our sensible +ualities in terms of the contraction of pure perceptions or

vibrations credible %iii) $s the banishment of both perception and memory from the

material brain tenable ith this +uestion we have to be careful not to turn Bergson

into a Cartesian dualist in terms of implying separate domains3 as discussed in

chapter ", Bergson maintains that perception is not ...in the brain-matter...%&&1


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and necessary for normal daily life(7, but is inade+uate and distorting in discoursing

upon mental life in general.

0owever, this is where the similarity ends, since, for Bergson language is

completely inade+uate but Churchland is implying that we need a different language.

Churchland, from his eliminative materialist position, holds that the everyday

language we use - what he refers to as folk psychology %;6) - for e!plaining

psychologicalAmental phenomena constitutes a false theoryAconceptual framework,

and that this language, will be eliminated or superseded by an alternative conceptual

frame-work %/C6")allowing a profoundly deeper, more accurate rendition in mutual

understanding and introspection. *his view is e!tremely radical since it means that

...mental processes as traditionally conceived do not e!ist. (93 they do not e!ist in the

sense that, ;6 talk about mental states is similar to talk about the suns rising and

setting, when the real scientific e!planation is the rotation of the earth.('*he new

framework, he argues, will be realised by empirical science - neuroscience in

particular3 essentially a materialistic account of the functioning of the brain. ;rom this

perspective, the traditional mind-body problem is an illusory construct due to the

misleading conceptual framework of ;63 thus it does not deserve a direct answer

since it is a badly formulated +uestion. Iather, what does need to be provided is a

materialist account of the working of the mind. *his eliminative materialist account

turns out to be essentially +uantitative and scientific3 it is therefore in complete

opposition to Bergsons methodology of holding the mind to be +ualitative and not

addressable in +uantitative terms. $t could be said that Bergsons problem with

language is that it is +uantitative in nature and for that reason inappropriate to


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discourse upon mind, whereas for Churchland, ;6 is too vague in its +uantitative

terms and needs to be more rigorously +uantitative.

#s we have seen already, Bergsons attempt to affirm the reality of both matter and

spirit has, from the contemporary point of view, resulted in an unpalatable

marginalisation of the brain.Churchland holds no such affirmation of spirit and matter

- +uite the opposite3 the idea that there can be any domain of properties that are

...metaphysically distinct from the obective physical properties addressed by

orthodo! science.(


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Churchland writes that,

...sensorimotor coordination is the most fundamental problem that any

animal must solve, a means of solution...must surely arouse our

curiosity... different creatures will have different means of locating

obects, and different motor systems to effect contact with them, but all

of them will face the same problem of coordinating positions...

%/C6'


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representation here, this does not imply a kind of subect-obect stance, whereby the

subect regards the obect which is the dataArepresentation. Iather, the subect or self

is constituted by the dataArepresentation and the processing performed on it i.e.

representation J computation K self. hat kind of representation and computation

does Churchland suggest for a biological life form though 0e proposes %/C6:()

neural state-space representation and coordinate transformation computation3 and this

on the basis of hard empirical evidence derived from studying the small scale

architecture of the brain, and subse+uent successful modelling of the neural network

structures found, in non-biological substrates such as electronic and software.

Ftate-space representation and coordinate transformation need a little e!planation.

Ftate-space representation is the method of modelling ..various aspects of

reality..%/C6':). $n Churchlands sensorimotor two-dimensional crab e!ample

%/C6


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be seen that we are already talking about an internal representation that is

approaching what constitutes a cognitive construction of perception. ;urthermore,

Churchland pushes the idea of this form of representation and computation way

beyond the case of simple two-dimensional sensorimotor coordination. *his is made

clear in Churchlands consideration of the various peripheral input transducers of the

senses which are highly suggestive of utilising state space representation. *hese

transducers such as the eye, tongue, olfactory bulb etc. respond to the various aspects

of reality, in a way which can be seen as a +uantitative breaking up of the input

continuum in +uestion, rather like a kind of spectrum analysis3 this is followed by a

recombination in a suitable n-dimensional state space, thus constituting our +ualitative

sense of a particular input. ;or instance, in terms of the colour aspect of vision, the

eye has three sets of colour receptors that respond to three different key wavelengths

of light. *hese three input channels, so to speak, can be, Churchland suggests,

internally represented in a three-dimensional state space. hat bears this idea out is

that, assuming similar discrimination along each a!is of the different sensory state

spaces, then for every e!tra channel the input transducer in +uestion has - such as the

four channels for taste in comparison to the three for colour - ...the variety of

different taste sensation will be greater that the variety of different colour sensations

by roughly an order of magnitude... %/C6"?7)and Churchland notes that this is the

case. *hus a ...genuinely reductive account of one domain of sensory +ualia... has

been provided. %/C6"?7)

0ow does this account of sensory +ualia for colour compare to Bergsons #s

discussed in chapter ", Bergson talks of sensory +ualities in vague metaphorical terms

as being a contraction of the real3 and when Bergson slips into his secondary mode of


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treating matter as vibrations this becomes a contraction of vibrations, where vibrations

are the ...matter resolved into the numberless vibrations of physical science... - as

referred to by 0arward in chapter ". *his has a strange, perhaps coincidental,

resonance with Churchlands state space schema, in that we e!perience the three-

dimensional colour state space +ualitatively the state space is a comple! three-

dimensional +uantitative representation, but our e!perience of it is +ualitative. *he

+ualitative here could perhaps be seen as a contraction or compression of the

comple! +uantitative representation. But what is important is that Churchland has

effectively put a +uantitative and reductive e!planation behind the mental state of the

sensation of colour - something Bergson is generally against, that is, talking about the

inner +ualitative mental states in +uantitative terms. 0owever, when Bergson talks

about contractions of vibrations, is he too, not really putting a +uantitative

e!planation behind a +ualitative inner mental state $t would seem so.

$t will be noted that in the state space e!amples given so far, there is an important

difference. $n the sensorimotor e!ample two state spaces were connected by a

functional relationship and their inputs and outputs were derived from, and in, the

e!ternal world respectively. $n the state space e!planation for colour the input is from

the e!ternal world and the output effectively ends in the brain. Fo we can say that the

inputs to and outputs from functionally interrelated state spaces can take three modes

e!ternalAe!ternal %sensorimotor e!ample)3 e!ternalAinternal %colour vision)3 and,

importantly internalAinternal. *he importance of the latter arises from Churchlands

e!trapolation that this form of representation and computation may be responsible for,

...the higher cognitive activities...%/C6:"). $n positing this Churchland is now

pushing his processing schema even further, e!tending it beyond the sensorimotor


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coordination and sensory +ualia e!amples already given. #s he writes, in any

...creature of comple!ity, we can e!pect a long chain or hierarchy of internal systems

interacting with one another, systems that are the maps of other internal systems and

whose outputs drive the activities of further internal systems....%/C6:9).*he higher

cognitive activities are listed as language use and propositional knowledge3 should

the representational and computational modes suggested by Churchland be

responsible for these areas then the +uest for a fully reductive account of mind in

neurobiological terms would be achieved.

#rguably this account of Churchlands, in terms of e!tending state space

representation and coordinate transformation to the heights of all higher cognitive

activity is admirably plausible and awaits only the progress of empirical science to

confirm it. *he plausibility can be based upon evolutionary grounds. Fuch an elegant

biological representational and computational solution has ample evidence for being

an evolutionary solution for the sensorimotor coordination problem. ;urthermore, as

the biological implementation, has no dimensional limitations %/C6"??) in its

...mathematical operation or physical realisation... - which suggests potentially

phenomenal representational and processing power - it is difficult to see how

evolutionary forces of natural selection would not seie upon this schema of

sensorimotor coordination and develop it into something which accounts for human

intelligence and possibly consciousness3 a high level of intelligence being an e!cellent

faculty for survival, in terms of the evolutionary notion of survival of the fittest.

#nother pertinent factor conspires to give this reading the ...massively parallel

nature... %/C6:?)of the representationalAcomputational model suggested. *his gives

rise to two evolutionary favourable factors in terms of survival. ;irstly, great speed of


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operation is achieved, even in a biological substrate, which is far from ideal in this

respect %/C6:?)3 and secondly, great redundancy is effectively built into the system,

thus allowing for the failure of a great many neurones that implement the structures

with little loss in performance %/C6:?). *his last point could be said to be a necessity

for any biological life which is to be evolutionary successful.

hen we consider the issue of memory, so important in Bergsons work, we find

little mention of it by Churchland. ;or Churchland it is not a focus of concern, but it is

obviously implicit in any schema of processing data - the data has to be held whilst

processing3 also, those state spaces - implemented by connections of neurones - which

effectively process it have been organically grown, and must in some manner count as

a form of memory. e have with Churchland, contrary to Bergson, a model of

memory which is materialistic and suggestive of being distributed throughout the

entire brain.

/ow, Bergson is adamant that memory is not in the brain and that it does not have

a cerebral condition to it, %&&21) instancing various proofs and arguments, %chapter"

p.'A


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considered) if there is a memory image for each word then the +ualities of pitch and

sound of each voice would re+uire an almost infinite amount of storage.

#s far as auditory recognition is concerned, Churchland too is against the idea that

this could be achieved by matching against a simple list or set of store memory

images. *he range of acoustic variation among acceptable and recognisable vowel

sounds, for instance, %/C6"91) is enormous and defies analysisArecognition by a

simple list. But after having said this Churchland does provides us with a physical

system, based on the brain architecture, in the form of a multi-layered neural network

which can ...recognise such intricacies.%/C6"92) #n e!ample being the trained neural

network for the discrimination of echoes between mines and rocks. *his network is

effectively using state space representation and coordinate transformation as discussed

above, and once trained can perform a discriminatoryArecognition task whose

comple!ity is on a par with word recognition, without recourse to huge lists or

previously stored memory images. *his network, once trained, effectively embodies

"nowledgeabout certain aspects of its environment, and this knowledge is stored as

...a carefully orchestrated set of connection weights... between the synapses of the

neurones that make up the network3 and, it might be added, it is also distributed

throughout the network and not to be found located in one place. *his effectively

answers Bergsons point %1). ;or recognition to take place we do not have to have a

store of all possible images, auditory, visual or otherwise, and yet recognition or

memory can still be implemented by a physical or material system.

hat about point " individual memories not being able to be located in the brain

and being resistant to brain damage. Could we perhaps say that memories are


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effectively stored materially in the brain, but in a distributed sense, i.e. materially

stored but not spatially located *hat is, they are not to be located anywhere as such,

but are effectively embodied in the ...connection weights...of large populations of

neurones. *his would account for memories being resistant to destruction of areas of

the brain. # suitable analogy of storage is suggested by idea of holographic

photography if we take a plate-glass holographic representation of, say, an orange,

and break it into numerous fragments, each fragment retains the whole image but in

reduced +uality. 0owever this analogy must be immediately discounted since we are

back in the position of suggesting ready made and stored memory images, and both

Bergson and Churchland are against this. Churchland has said of his trained neural

network that it only embodies "nowledgenot memory images.

# distinction between memory and memories needs to be opened up. $n the

above network memory has a material foundation but memories do not. Bergsons use

of the virtual and actual in relation to memories or memory images seems to have

some useful e!planatory power. $n the preceding paragraph $ said that memories are

effectively stored, materially, in the brain3 there is no getting beyond this for a

materialist position. ;or effectivelywe could say virtuallyorpotentially, that is, they

are stored as Churchlands informationor "nowledgein brain like networks, but not as

ready made things.

hat then enables this materially stored information or "nowledge %potential or

virtual memories) to actualise itself from this virtual state into memory images in

consciousness ;irst of all we could say that it does take a consciousness3 for a

Bergsonian virtual recollection to change form virtual to actual it needs consciousness


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to become actualised in. Lnfortunately consciousness would count as one of the

higher cognitive functions Churchland makes reference to, and in this area his schema

is only speculative. #lso we are considering only a simple model of a neural network

which cannot be said to be conscious.

But bearing this limitation in mind the following passage is helpful

...the whole problem of how to retrieve relevant information is

transformed by the realisation that it does not need to be retrieved.

Information is stored in brain-li"e networ"s in the global pattern of

synaptic weights. #n incoming vector activatesthe relevant portions....

of the trained network by virtue of its own vectorial make up...

%/C6":7-$talics added)

/ow we are still trying to answer point " individual memories not being able to be

located in the brain and being resistant to brain damagebut we must also consider

point ( at the same time memories! for their actualisation! need a motor ally! and

that memories apparently lost can be accounted for in terms of damaged motor

mechanisms interfering with their actualisation. Churchlands notion of an incoming

vector activating relevant portions of a trained network is akin to Bergsonian

actualisation via a motor ally3 in Bergsons schema the incoming vector would be a

motor stimulusAally but in Churchlands schema this can be a motor ally or an internal

stimulus - as in the stimulus of state spaces already mentioned, either e!ternal or

internal. Continuing with the analysis, we could suggest that various areas of the brain

are activated by incoming vectors - motor, e!ternal, internal or otherwise - and the

result of all the component parts of the stimulation is responsible for forming a


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memory image in consciousness. $n other words individual memories are actively

created or recreated out of the information or "nowledge stored in Churchlands

...brain like networks... as a result of the particular pattern of stimulation.

*o sum up the import of this idea it can be said that Bergsons notions of virtual

and actual as applied to memory images or recollection can be left standing, since

they are +uite insightful3 and that memory does have a material basis or cerebral

condition to it in the form of informationor "nowledge, but that memories, as such,

have only a very tenuous material foundation they could not e!ist apart from the

material brain but would seem to be a creation of its dynamic activity. *his answers

point " and point ( since within Churchlands schema memories do not necessarily

need a motor ally for the actualisation - they could be actualised internally - but in

some instances they may well have.

$t would seem that Bergson latches onto the simplistic and essentially false notion

of memories being stored as ready made images, only to easily knock it down and

then use this to suggest that memory and memories are independent from the brain, or

not stored in the brain, or do not have a cerebral basis. $t has been clearly shown that

a purely materialistic account with a little more sophistication than a naive simplicity

can amply deal with Bergsons obections when it comes to memory. &emories

however must be considered as outlined above, i.e. as active creations of a functioning

human brain through stimulation of "nowledge containing networks, and in this

respect Bergsons virtualAactual schema is metaphorically insightful3 but this

stimulation does not need to be considered as onlya motor ally when we consider

Churchlands schema.


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Conclusion

$ have attempted to show how Bergsons dualism of difference in kinds attempts

to divorce both perception and memory from the material brain - it is not the brain

that is responsible for them - in a way which is contemporarily unacceptable,

especially in the professional community associated with the philosophy of mind. e

have seen how he needed to fabricate the idea of pure perception in order to collapse

the distinction between perception and reactionAmechanical impulsion3 thus siding

perception with matter in terms of there being no difference in kind between

perception and matter. *his he does in order to demonstrate how pure memory -

posited as different in kind from matter - then combines with perception in order to

produce our e!perience. *his is his dualistic hypothesis.

*he obective of this essay was e!pose Bergsons dualistic solution to the mind-

body problem as problematic in that much of his argumentation and evidence can

e+ually well be interpreted from the eliminative materialistic position. Churchlands

brand of eliminative materialism also has the added advantage in that his theory of

the brain, which fully integrates with his eliminative materialist position, is superior to

Bergsons inade+uate model. $t incorporates the latest findings from the research of

neuroscienc - the empirical study of the brain - and feed back from #$ research which

has successfully modelled many of the structures found by neuroscience in the

material brain. Churchland effectively reinstates the importance of the material brain


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"otes and #eferences


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"

Churchland, op.cit., p.'2.

( ;lew, #.* Dictionary of Philosophy ": >&ind, (" no.

&ind, (


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"

Essay - Henri Bergson Dualism Considered From the Perspective of Paul Churchland Eliminative Materiali

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