Electronic Voting Machine - Copy

8/10/2019 Electronic Voting Machine - Copy

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ELECTRONIC VOTING MACHINE (EVM)

Electronic Voting Machine (EVM) has become a issue ofnational debate. Experts have been continuouslyexpressing their concern about the malfunctioning of EVMsince Lok Sabha 2004 results. Satinath Choudharyapproached the Supreme Court in 2004.

Development has taken place in the developed countriessince last couple of years and the issue of malfunctioningdemands healthy debate and corrective measures.

Leaders belonging to all major political parties BJP,Congress, CPM, TDP, ADMK, RJD, LJP, INLD, MDMK,Trinamool Congress have expressed concern about themalfunctioning of EVM.


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ELECTRONIC VOTING MACHINE (EVM)

Activists, NGOs, experts, authorities have expressedconcern about the present EVM system in India. Severalexamples have also been put forward regarding unusual /abnormality and also mal-functioning.

Developed countries like USA, Germany, Netherlands,Finland, Ireland, Brazil have either disposed of EVM orhave come out with fool-proof system.

We feel there is a necessity of national debate on Fool -

proof Ballot/EVM System in India. Here is the Presentation on the same.

Dr. Kirit Somaiya Ex MP All India Convenor BJP Committee on EVM


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ELECTRONIC VOTING MACHINE (EVM)History of EVM in India

Electronic Voting Machine (EVM) used / introduced in theworld since 1970s. During the 70s, Election Commission ofIndia consider to use EVM in India. An Expert Committeewas appointed in 1990 to review the designs, etc. An expertmoved the Supreme Court in 2005 about the mal-functioningof EVM system in India. It was referred to the ElectionCommission of India.

The Election Commission appointed the Expert Committeeon 29 th December 2005, which submitted Report in 2006. TheCommittee suggested major measures for security,

protection, upgradation. It also emphasized to use EVM onlyafter providing security measures suggested by theCommittee.


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Introduction, Progress of EVM in India

Introduction of the concept in India 1970

First use in 11 constituencies 1982-84

First Expert Committee 1990

Use of EVM in few Lok Sabha Constituencies 2004

Appointment of another Expert Committee 2005

Committee s Report with emphasis on

protection

2006

100% use of EVM Lok Sabha2009


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India concern

Lok Sabha 2009 elections Dr. Subramanian Swamy, former Law Minister, alleged in April 2009 that a group of people who had been convicted inthe US for hacking bank accounts and credit cards had beenrecruited by a certain political party to possibly rig the

elections The Shiv Sena alleged that EVM malfunction caused its

candidate Mohan Rawale to lose in South Mumbai. SaidRawale: I wonder how I got only five votes from an area thatis a Shiv Sena stronghold.

Journalist Cho Ramaswamy discussed how in MDMK leaderVaiko s constituency, Virudhunagar, Tamil Nadu, whilecounting, the votes increased by 23,000 more than the polledvotes.


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POLITICAL PARTIES & EVM

BJP L.K. Advaniji demanded transparent fool-proofballot/EVM system L.K. Advaniji demanded EVM with Paper Backup in

future elections CPM, TDP, ADMK, RJD, LJP, INLD, MDMK of Vaiko,

Trinamool Congress have raised issues aboutmalfunctioning of EVM Mr. Gulam Nabi Azad, Union Minister has charged EVM

malfunctioning in the recently held Orissa elections. Hemade the statement before the Press at Bhubaneshwarin JuneJuly 2009

Mr. Amrinder Singh, Punjab Congress President hasmade public demonstration with EVM and chargedmalfunctioning of EVM


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FORMER BUREAUCRATS / EXPERTSRAISE CONCERN

Omesh Saigal ex-Chief Secretary, Delhi Govt. & ex-Secretary, Govt. of India has submitted representationto the Election Commission

Issue raised is malfunctioning of EVM.

Other former bureaucrats Dr. Krishan Saigal ex-ChiefSecretary, Assam, Ravi Kathpalia Ex ControllerGeneral of Accounts, GOI, Ms Asha Das Ex Secretary,GOI, K.P. Fabian former Ambassador, S.K. Agnihotri

ex-Chief Secretary, Assam, A.R. Lall Advocate,Supreme Court have also raised this issue.


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Observations, objections regarding thepresent EVM system in India

2005 An IT Expert filed a Petition on EVM Supreme Court sent the Petition to the Election

Commission 2006 Expert Committee appointed by the Election

Commission submitted report with severalrecommendations to plug loopholes on manipulation,mal-functioning

BEL and ECIL were asked to make corrections EC has not implemented the recommendations, security

measures


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Observations, objections regarding thepresent EVM system in India (Contd)

Several instances found in Lok Sabha 2009 about mal-functioning of EVM

Various petitions in High Courts and Supreme Courtabout mal-functioning of EVM

Various technocrats, IT experts have expressed doubtabout the fool-proof EVM system in India Concern expressed by the experts and authority about

the mal-functioning of EVM used in India


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EXAMPLES OF ABNORMAL / UNUSUALFUNCTIONING/BEHAVIOUR OF EVM

Malfunctioning of EVM seen during the Lok Sabha 2009elections

EVM could not start EVM got jammed and did not open on counting day

EVM stopped functioning during the poll/in between thepolling process When button of one candidate pressed, light on another

candidate got flashed Polling staff was not at all updated or aware about the

security measures EVMs lying/ was used in previous elections in aparticular district were used in the same district in theLok Sabha 2009


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In a EVM, an independent candidate with no base/logic,got/shown 500+ votes and major political partiescandidate got 0 or 1 vote

EVM result in many booths shows 100% votes against

one candidate (more than 200 votes polled in that area) Differences between the polling figures declared by the

Election Commission in the booths and the outcome /result shown in EVM in those booths

State Election officials/Election Commission for reasonsknown to them, have not collected all such information /data, process, study, research them

No special follow up undertaken of EVM till todate.


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EXAMPLES OF ABNORMAL/UNUSUALFUNCTIONING / BEHAVIOUR OF EVM

Chandrapur Maharashtra

EVM in Booth No.176 Nutan School Votesgiven/button pressed for Candidate No.1 but vote/light

flashed against another candidate EVM replaced around 2.30 pm in between the polling

process on 16 th April 2009 No further study, action till today


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61 NOIDA ASSEMBLY An Independent candidate got 415 votes in Booth No.61.

He got 0 to 1 in other booths How it is possible for an Independent who has no

connection, concern with that area? Sector 25 Jalvayu Vihar, Noida In this area, main

contest observed between BJP, Congress In Booth 61, BJP and Congress got one vote each and

BSP 7 votes Is it not EVM mal-functioning?


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Booth No.

Name of theArea

BJP BSP Congress

SP Others No. ofvotespolled

60 Sector 25 282 7 145 2 1 437

61 Sector 25Jalvayu ViharBlock M

1 0 0 1 415 417

62 Sector 25Jalvayu ViharBlock L,K,M,N

264 19 158 3 5 449

63 Sector 25 BlockN,K,L,K,QJ

247 27 125 1 1 401

64 Sector 25 BlockN

241 24 102 3 9 379

ABNORMAL / UNUSUAL BEHAVIOUROF EVM 61 NOIDA ASSEMBLY


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INDEPENDENT TECHNICAL TEAM REVIEW REPORT

Few facts

Voting pattern in Parliament and Assembly elections inRellivalasa village is worth noting. Voting pattern shows

vast difference

Voting not recorded by the Electronic Voting Machineaccurately to which candidate voters voted.


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VOTING PATTERN PARLIAMENT RELLIVALASA VILLAGE

BoothNo.

Village TDP BSP

INC BJP PRP PyramidParty

LokSatta

BSSP

Independent

Totalvotespolled

70 Rellivasala 320 06 140 08 57 04 01 14 09 559

71 Do 289 14 169 16 50 09 07 08 07 569

72 Do 313 10 223 14 90 05 07 27 12 701

73 Do 133 07 11 319 71 07 02 03 03 556

74 Do 369 10 288 21 68 11 07 24 15 813

For the same booth, voting for Assembly is total contradiction (see next Table)


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VOTING PATTERN ASSEMBLY RELLIVALASA VILLAGE

Booth No.

INC BJP BSP

TDP PRP Pyramid Party

LokSatta

Ind.I

Ind. II IndIII

Ind.IV

Totalvotespolled

70 129 7 5 332 79 4 2 0 1 0 0 559

71 170 10 8 308 41 9 6 1 4 4 8 569

72 227 23 16 326 77 9 3 3 4 6 6 700

73 332 3 115 10 71 4 3 15 3 0 0 556

74 276 31 8 370 91 7 6 2 7 6 11 815


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In Pedakurapadu (Guntur Dist) Constituency BoothNo.2, 122 votes were polled in the First ElectronicVoting Machine. As the EVM malfunctioned and wasreplaced by a second EVM

Electronic Voting Machines are not stable

S.NO. PARTY VOTES

1 INC 186

2 TDP 176

3 PRP 34

4 IND 18

Total 414


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INDEPENDENT TECHNICAL TEAM REVIEW REPORTList of Booths where the machines could not read data

Assembly Code Booth Code Assembly Name Booth Name

23 60 Ramagundam Medipalli

23 61 Ramagundam Medipalli

70 197 Secunderabad Osmania University

80 60 Alampur (SC) Leeza

80 69 Alampur (SC) Leeza

84 128 Shadnagar Kesampet

104 185 Parkal Katrapally104 197 Parkal Nallabelly Yelugur

104 209 Parkal Semgem

104 212 Parkal Gavicharla

104 221 Parkal Bollikunta

104 224 Parkal Ramachandrapuram

112 198 Khammam Kothagudem

198 142 Vijayawada West Mallikarjuna Petta

231 31 Giddalur Kandulapuram

240 250 Sullurpeta (SC) MPP School RamapuramKuppam

257 44 Panyam Bollavaram257 45 Panyam Bollavaram


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INDEPENDENT TECHNICAL TEAM REVIEW REPORTTable showing polling booths where there was particular pattern of voting

SNo Assembly Mandal Panchayath Booth TOL TDP % INC %

1 Rajam (SC) Vangara Vangara 30 11 0 0 11 1002 Yerragondapalem Dornala Dornala 135 27 0 0 27 100

3 Jammalamadugu Jammalamadugu Gandikota 120 555 0 0 555 100

4 do do Goriganur 75 712 0 0 712 100

5 do do Dharmapuram 74 458 0 0 457 99.8

6 do do Devagudi 69 776 0 0 774 99.77 do do K. Sirigepalli 119 782 0 0 780 99.7

8 do do Devagudi 70 920 0 0 917 99.7

9 do do Peddandlur 118 822 0 0 818 99.5

10 do do Jammalmadugu 73 398 0 0 396 99.5

11 do do P.Sugumanchipalle 72 391 0 0 389 99.512 Mydukur Khajipet Khajipet 144 776 0 0 772 99.5

13 Punganur Sadam Yarrathivaripalle 166 640 0 0 635 99.2

14 Jammalamadugu Jammalamadugu Goriganur 76 695 0 0 685 98.6

15 Kamalapuram Kamalapuram Kokatam 3 445 0 0 437 98.2

The data suggests EVMs used in these booths have been manipulated.). Congress candidate gotalmost 100% votes in various booths


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Table showing difference between actual votes polled and votes counted by EVM

11 BHANDARA GONDIA LOK SABHALAC Total Voters Total Votes

polledVotes counted

on EVMDifference

60-Tumsar 251813 177786 177116 670

61-Bhandara 294139 201173 201171 2

62-Sakoli 265588 198450 198343 107

63- Arjuni/Morgaon

199932 154757 155037 280

64-Tiroda 195340 141411 141299 112

65-Gondi 241090 155496 155698 202

TOTAL 1447902 1029073 1028664 1373


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PETITIONS IN INDIA

Retired computer science professor Satinath Choudhary,producing doctored EVMs is child s play, as early as2004

Banwarilal B. Purohit vs. Election Commission of Indiafiled in 2004

Shailendra Pradhan filed a PIL in 2009 in the MadhyaPradesh High Court at Jabalpur

The PMK, which suffered a shock defeat in Virudhunagarconstituency in 2009 Parliamentary election, has filed anappeal to the Election Commission

The MDMK has filed a PIL in Madras High Court againstEVMs.


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PETITIONS IN INDIA

Various PILs have been filed at High Courts and SupremeCourt

Supreme Court Jana Chaitanya Vedika (NGO) has moved the Apex Court regarding authenticity and credibility of EVMsystem.In the Petition filed under Article 32 of the Constitution thePetitioners are seeking directions from the Hon ble Court toensure that the votes cast by the voters, which are part of theirconstitutional right of free expression under Article 19(1)(a), areregistered properly and without any tampering/manipulation ofthe Electronic Voting Machines (EVMs) which are used in theelection

Supreme Court - NetIndia, renowned Company in EVMtechnology, has submitted an affidavit in the Supreme Courtregarding lack of security measures, transparency and hackingof EVM in India


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PETITIONS IN INDIA

Supreme Court Mr. Mohan Rawale 5-time Shiv SenaMP has filed a Petition in the Supreme Court on EVMmalfunctioning

Mumbai High Court Dr. Jagtap and Dr. Jadhav havemoved the Mumbai High Court regarding malfunctioning

of EVM Orissa High Court Activists have moved the Orissa

High Court regarding malfunctioning of EVM Hyderabad Issues raised at Andhra Pradesh High

Court Tamil Nadu EVM malfunctioning issues raised at the

High Court


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IT SECURITYEXPERT VIJAY MUKHIS SUGGESTIONS

After spending years in the security industry, we believethat in principle all technology can be tampered with.

There is no such thing as 100%. As a EVM is a technology machine it can be tampered with

in principle. The world has realized that there is only one way to

prevent misuse of technology and that is by having a openprocess where the whole world can participate in trying tobreak security.

What we recommend to the Government and the ElectionCommission is to make public the entire EVM eco-system,which includes the hardware schematics and the softwarethat control the EVM.


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IT SECURITYEXPERT VIJAY MUKHIS SUGGESTIONS

(contd.)

Today, we cannot say that the EVM is safe or unsafe frombeing tampered with because like the rest of the country,as we have no information whatever on the EVM. Theentire EVM ecosystem is a state secretary inaccessible to

just a few. The GSM world introduced a SIM card that had a

password stored within it. Years ago, it would take hoursto clone a SIM card, today it takes about 15 minutes max.There is no way to undo the damage as there are over abillion users of GSM today.

We want EC/Government to follow international bestpractices in securing the technology used to publicgovernance and welfare.


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EVM around the world

There is a veritable tsunami of negative reports aboutElectronic Voting Machines from all over the world.There is no country in which EVMs have been welcomedso enthusiastically as they have been in India, andperhaps this is with good reason.

Hardly any major developed country uses EVMs to anyextent; indeed, despite the fuss over hanging chadsand other arcana in their 2000 elections, even

Americans who are partial to technological solutionshave resisted the siren-song of voting machines afterdue consideration.


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EVM around the world (Contd)

United States (California)

In April 2004, California banned 14,000 EVMs because themanufacturer (Diebold Election Systems) had installeduncertified software that had never been tested and then liedto state officials about the machines. The machines weredecertified and criminal prosecution initiated against themanufacturer.

EVM gadbad in US 2004 Presidential elections. In Gahanna,Ohio, only 638 votes were cast, but EVM result declared Bushreceived 4,258 votes to Kerry s 260.

A study by UC Berkeley s Quantitative Methods ResearchTeam reported that irregularities associated with EVMs mayhave awarded 130,000-260,000 votes to Bush in Florida in2004.


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United States

Various bills proposed in House/Senate HR 550: Voter Confidence and Increased

Accessibility Act of 2005

HR 774 and S 330: Voting Integrity and Verification Act of 2005HR 939 and S 450: Count Every Vote Act of 2005HR 533 and S 17: Voting Opportunity and Technology

Enhancement Rights Act of 2005HR 278: Know Your Vote Counts Act of 2005HR 5036: Emergency Assistance for Secure Elections

Act of 2008


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Germany (2009) The Federal Constitutional Court of Germany declared EVMsunconstitutional.

The Netherlands ( 2006) The Interior Ministry withdrew the licences of 1,187 votingmachines because it was proven that one could eavesdrop onvoting from up to 40 metres away. The suit was brought by aDutch citizen s group named We Do Not Trust VotingMachines . This group demonstrated that in five minutes, theycould hack into the machines with neither voters nor electionofficials being aware of it.


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Ireland (2006) Ireland embarked on an ambitious e-voting scheme, but

abandoned it due to public pressure.

Brazil (2006) There were serious discrepancies in the Diebold

systems predominantly used in Brazil s 2006 elections.


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EVM STORY

We understand very clearly the complete process ofdevelopment, manufacturing and rollout of EVMs acrossIndia. ECIL & BEL have done the research and developmentin-house and shipped the software to their vendors Renesasin Japan, Microchip in US respectively for the software to befused into the Chips. The mode of shipment goes throughmany layers before it reaches the vendor and similarly back tothe manufacturers. The security adopted in the transfer of thesoftware is not known, as well there is ambiguity on the Prof.Indiresan Expert Committee review report 2006 on whetheran OTP or a Masked ROM chips are used. As a laymanwecan consider OTP to be a Blank CD in which you can writewhat you want at your location and Masked ROM is likebuying a Movie CD which is pre-written.


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EVM STORY

A chance but still there exists the opportunity to swap thechips while shipment and the manufac-turers have no methodof verification. The only way to verify the EVMs is puttingthem to a Mock Poll, and we have already demonstrated howproperly functioning EVM while in Mock Poll can bemanipulated to favour a candidate in the actual poll.

Further as there is no precise verification tool to checkwhether the EVM is manipulated opens up several differentopportunities of tampering the EVM.


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CLARIFICATION EXPECTED FROMTHE ELECTION COMMISSION

Is it true EVM in the same area is repeatedly used in the same

area/periphery 2006 Indiresan Expert Committee Report

implemented partially Expert measures about security remain unaddressed Election Commission itself does not know what is

inside the EVM, chip, hardware, software Expert Committee of 1990 and 2006 had Prof.

Indiresan as member and Chairman No consultation with any other bright IT experts done


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90% of the Report of 1990 and 2006 is same including thelanguage

EVM used in India hardware, software is same since 1990 EC refused to share any information on software, hardware,

etc., with any political party, candidate or anybody else Non-transparency creates suspicion EC has never studied the issue of malfunctioning EC refused to accept modern technology, i.e. EVM with

paper back up

No audit pre-poll, during poll, post poll of EVM has beendone till today


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No records of when, how what about the failure of EVMmachines maintained, checked, studied

Repairs, maintenance, storage, transportation to befoolproof

The polling staff is purely temporary, on deputation for the

election day and counting day, has no knowledge andconcern or trained about the EVM technology, securitymeasures, etc.

No standard guideline, programme, procedure implementedby EC

EVM code is installed by a private company/MNC of aforeign country and not at a Government PSU, i.e.BEL/ECIL


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Observations about EVM Manufacturing faults

Manufacturing faults in the hardware may result inmalfunctions. More sinister issues arise from maliciousand intentional tampering. The programs used areproprietary and not open for inspection, unlike, say, open

source programs which any individual can test out.


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TROJAN HORSE

In-built Trojan Horse in software Programming code available to few selected No provision for checking, inspection of software,

hardware by anybody including the Election Commission Leakage, corruption can make hacking feasible

New EVMs purchases in January 2009 182,000 fromBEL and 78,000 from ECIL Coding, decoding of these new machines Imported chips are used No transparency about the chips, hardware, software


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TROJAN HORSE (Contd)

No political party or candidate taken into confidenceabout the software, hardware, etc.

Even the Election Commission do not have any systemto check the transparency and security

Chips can be corrupted EVM used can be corrupted Hacking, etc., can take place during transportation,

handling, Polling Station, storing places, repair,maintenance

So many individuals, private persons involved in EVMhandling


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Technical details about the EVMsused in India

2 PSUs BEL and ECIL are the suppliers of EVM in India Chip used in EVM imported from Japanese company Software designed in India and sent to Japanese company Transportation of EVMs, chips are handled by private

contractors/sub-contractors

Repairs and maintenance done by BEL/ECIL engineers BEL, ECIL is also outsourcing the work to private

people/contractors No system of control, security measures about

transportation, delivery, handling by private people /

contractors, persons involved in repair and maintenanceand also supervision on the day/eve of polling


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CO O C O


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EXPERT COMMITTEE OF ELECTIONCOMMISSION REPORT

OBSERVATION, RECOMMENDATION

2009 EC appointed an Expert Committee with reference tosuggest amendment and additional features

EC noted EVM of 1990 has become outdated to bereplaced Committee headed by Prof. P.V. Indiresan with Prof. A.K.

Agarwala and Prof. D.T. Shahani as Members.


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EXPERT COMMITTEE OF ELECTIONCOMMISSION REPORT

OBSERVATION, RECOMMENDATIONObservation It was agreed by the manufacturers that these could be

implemented and that it primarily involved some alterations inthe software, while hardware design would remain the same.Once the software was modified by the manufacturers to meetthe above recommendations, only a detailed check offunctional working of the modified EVM would be needed,which EC as the user could do on its own or get done before

inducting the upgraded EVMs The Committee notes with satisfaction that the entire cable is

in the public view with all the time, any such tamperingbecomes self-evident. Further, in case any such device


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EXPERT COMMITTEE OFELECTION COMMISSION REPORT

OBSERVATION, RECOMMENDATIONhas been attached to the cable, it will leave telltale punchmarks which can be recognized easily. Therefore, thisprobability also is ruled out by the Committee

Altering the results of the polls before, during and after thepoll duration provided, due security pre-cautions already inforce and additional modifica-tions suggested by thecommittee are enforced and the sealing at various stages isadhered to. In case for any reason the Unit has beentampered, it immediately gives an indication that the systemhas malfunctioned and this remain as a permanent record onthe Machine and this record can be checked at any time later.


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EXPERT COMMITTEE OF


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OBSERVATION, RECOMMENDATION Any system can be tested randomly by mock poll to prove this

performance. Further as each key press in EVM unitswhether valid or invalid is date-time stamped and recorded noactivation of a possible Trojan Horse during poll can possiblygo unnoticed.

EXPERT COMMITTEE OF


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OBSERVATION, RECOMMENDATIONRecommendation

Post-Poll Carrying out on a sample basis, recounting of votes in certain

booths post poll at an appropriate administrative level, to actas a deterrent against potential mischief-makers so as togenerate a climate of confidence about the infallible nature ofelectoral process

EXPERT COMMITTEE OF


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OBSERVATION, RECOMMENDATIONConclusion

The Committee after a review of the material presented to ithas felt it necessary to highlight certain very key conclusionsand recommendations as below :

(i) The basic Electronic Voting Machine developed byM/s. Bharat Electronics Ltd. (BEL) and M/s. ElectronicsCorporation of India Limited (ECIL) is a secure system. The

security emanates from two very important basic factors :(a) The fixed program nature of the software which is

fused into the processor and which is effectivelyunalterable

EXPERT COMMITTEE OF


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OBSERVATION, RECOMMENDATION(b) The faithful recording of all events in the processor

(electronically) and the possibility of recalling the samewith the added (manual) administrative procedures onBU, CU at various stages in public view prescribed bythe Election Commission which make available thesequence of voters voting rendering it possibletampering.

(ii) With the provision of non-volatile memory, any physicalinterruption leads to the retention of all voting information tillthat point.

EXPERT COMMITTEE OF


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(iii) With the system as designed by the above agencies havingbuilt-in security, the Election Commission and theGovernment only need to ensure the security of theequipment, to safeguard the sanctity of the electoral process.The procedural safeguards as stated in Section 6.0 should beimplemented

(iv) The Committee wishes to place on record the high level ofaccomplishments of the Engineers and Scientists of M/s.Bharat Electronics Ltd and M/s. Electronics Corporation ofIndia Ltd. In developing an Electronic Voting Machine usingthe latest technology.


OBSERVATION, RECOMMENDATION

EXPERT COMMITTEE OF


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OBSERVATION, RECOMMENDATION(v) The Committee unanimously recommends the use of the

upgraded EVMs in elections after due modifications stated inthis report

(vi) Committee also recommends strongly that bio-metric methodof voter identification is pursued by EC and tested forfeasibility in large population and integrating this sub-system

with EVM in future.


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INDEPENDENT

TECHNICAL TEAM REVIEW REPORT

INDEPENDENT TECHNICAL TEAM


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Independent Technical Committee has studied in depthand presented its report/observations Experts were requested by activists, NGOS to study

healthy EVM system in India The engineers were involved in developing a simulated

product in similar lines with the features of the ElectronicVoting machine with a Control Unit, and a Ballot Unit andhave performed extensive research to understand howvulnerable the Electronic Voting Machines are.



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The following questions are the outcome of theEvaluation done.

Questions On Process Questions On Expert Committee Report Questions Technical



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Issues on Expert Committee Report All through the executive committee report the majorissue raised by most of the people i.e. tampering ofthe Electronic Voting Machine has not beentechnically addressed. Further we have noted that

the answers provided to the abovementioned problemare not technical clearSource code was not fused in India at themanufacturer s premises under stringent security butit was sent over to the vendor outside the country anddelivered through various delivery channels to themanufacturer and so can be prone to any kind oftampering at various stages of the shipment



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Issues on Expert Committee Report (contd) As the entire lot shall have the same Unique ID andthis also has to be sent along with the source code tothe vendor for fusing into the Chip, there is always apossibility of Trojan being added into the chip with theID already existing. The E2PROM being replacedwhile polling operations being conducted due toE2PROM malfunctioning, this should have madeEVM inoperative.

No evidence of how many number of EVMs upgradedwith modifications suggested by the ExpertsCommittee and how many odl EVMs were reused forthis elections


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Issues on Expert Committee Report (contd)None of the Control Unit Circuit Boards were sealedand there is no mention of a modification to theexisting Ballot Units.Technically not clear how any embedded devicewithout any processor or micro controller or any chiptransfer data with encryptionThe Committee to the best of its ability has lookedinto all possibilities of tampering with the EVM andhas come to the conclusion that there is no way ofaltering the results of the polls before, during andafter the poll duration provide due to securityprecautions already in force and additionalmodifications suggested by the Committee areenforced



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Issues on Expert Committee Report (contd)No evidence to support the fact that the suggestionsmade by the expert committee were followedsubsequently

Suggestions are not completely followed by themanufacturers leaving enough room for securitybreach, which was the main cause of concernKnowing the time of the first voter from the EVM and

mapping to the register can actually bring out thedetail of vote cast by every citizen thus puttingdemocracy into a major threat



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Issues on Expert Committee Report (contd)There was no diagnostic check available forchecking the sanctity of the embedded programin the EVM. Neither the technicians, who preparethe EVMs for elections, understand therecommendations made by the technicalcommitteeNo evidence to support the fact that thesuggestions made the expert committee wereimplemented subsequently



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Possible ManipulationsSoftware developed for the EVM locally by themanufacture was either uploaded through inernet or sentthrough courier to the concerned distributor of the chip

vendor in form of CD. No secured methodology adoptedfor the transfer of developed source code/programmesoftware to be fused in to the chipChips delivered from warehouse picked by a courier, etc.provides grave opportunity of replacing and manipulatingthus procured chips at various levels of shipment.



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Possible Manipulations (contd)No verification program developed to cross check everychip for genuine code before mounting on to the circuitboard of EVM. No manufacturer in a position to define

whether chips are original due to lack of thoroughverification toolBallot unit can be swapped at any point of time as there isno encrption between Ballot Unit and Control Unit. A newBallot Unit can be attached to the Control Unit throwing

immense opportunity for running Trojans



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Possible Manipulations (contd)Pre-poll After the withdrawal of candidates for aconstituency, the allotment of keys on the Ballot Unit isdone through the Control Unit by pressing theCANDIDATE SELECTION button. Trojan can be

activated to favour a particular key by means of addingpercentage over other key or by deducting a set of votespolled for all other keys and adding to the favoured key. Itcannot be detected.While Poll Trojan can be activated by anybody going in

as a voter entering the sequential key code on the BallotUnit. This can go absolutely undetected as the buttonspressed in that sequence cannot be captured because ofthe functional behaviour of the Trojan.



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Remedies proposed Standard Verification tool can be developed A Printer added to the EVM can give print out of every

vote to the voter which he/she can verify whether the

vote was cast properly EVM should be part of E-governance of Government of

India


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Ways to reduce EVM Frauds (Contd )


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Ways to reduce EVM Frauds (Contd)

All EVMs which found malfunctioning in Lok Sabha 2009should be checke, verified and studied by independentmachinery/experts

BEL, ECIL and any Government person, staff of election dutyincluding the Election Commission should not be allowed totouch all these machines

Reason for malfunctioning should be studied by independentexperts and should be published

Logic and accuracy testing before elections Independent software verification and certification. Can use

code signatures to ensure software is identical. Open sourcemay also be a good idea.

Conclusion


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Conclusion

In light of all the above discussions, it is clear that there isreasonable doubt about the reliability of EVMs.

Given the poor experience with Electronic Voting Machinesworldwide, it is difficult to believe that India EVMs aresomehow far superior to those used elsewhere, and somehowimmune to fraud.

This has to be demonstrated. A priori, the evidence suggeststhat India s EVMs are susceptible to fraud in a number ofdimensions.


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Electronic Voting Machine - Copy

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