Editorial Print - Progressio · borders ofthe former British Somaliland Protectorate. To understand political trends in Somaliland and Somalia, it is also vital to appreciate that

EditorialAdom Brodbury

Ray AkangDesign/Maps:

Rich Cawley/Adom BrodburyCover photo: Homish Wilsan

Print: Habbs the Printer Ltd, Tattan, Hompshil-e 5040 3WX

Mark Bradbury

CIIR 1997Third printing 2001

ISBN 1 85287 187 3

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SOMALILAND

Contents

Maps

About ICD and the author

Introduction

Part I: The rise and fall of the Somali StateThe Somali people

Culture and conflict

The colonial legacy

Independence

Military rule

The Ogaden War and its aftermath

Economic transformation and underdevelopment

The 1980s - economic decline and war

Disintegration of the Somali State

The Somali civil war 1988-91

War with the Majeerteen

War with the Issaq

War with the Ogaden

War with the Hawiye

The Digil and Rahanweyne

The opposition proliferates

The Manifesto Group

The fall of Siad Barre

War and famine

International intervention

International reaction to the war

Military intervention

The Addis Ababa conference on national reconciliation

UNOSOM 11

The United Nations at war

Part 11: Somaliland 1991-96

The secession of Somaliland

The Tuur administration 1991-93

The Borama conference

The Peace Charter

CIIR COUNTRY REPORT

iv

vi

1

24556779

10

10

101111121212121313

14

1414151516

18

19

2122

SOMALILAND

The National Charter 22The Sanaag Peace Conference 22

The Egal administration 1993-95 22

The state of government 22Return to war 25Political factors 25The Burco factor 26The SNM factor 26Economic dimensions of the war 27Decentralisation and governance 28The role of the National Guurti 29International relations 29

Somaliland 1996: Make or break 31

Somaliland consolidates independence 31The Harshin conference and first moves towards reconciliation 31A progressive peace process 31Shir beeleedka 33Fission and fusion 34Reconsidering the role of elders and the National Guurti 34Future prospects 35

International assistance in Somaliland 36

War and humanitarian intervention 40

The impact of the Somali Civil War 40The UN's lost agenda 40

Epilogue: Understanding the Somali conflict 43

Notes and References 45

Abbreviations and glossary 48

--

Boxes1. Somali clans (and modern

politico-military movements)2. Security, law and order3. Frankincense and fishing4. Crop production5. Geography of Somaliland6. The people of Somaliland7. Primary Issaq lineages8. The Somali National Movement

3489

19202021

9. Demobilisation 2310. Mines'- a lasting legacy 2411. The new Somaliland shilling 2712. The limits of government 2813. The Peace Committee for Somaliland 3214. Local non-governmental organisations 3715. Capacity building in Somaliland 3816. Women in Somaliland 3917. Political fragmentation 41

CIIR COUNTRY REPORT

SOMALILAND

BARI

Regional boundary

International boundary

GULF OF ADEN

CIIR COUNTRY REPORT

ETHIOPIA

SOMALIA

it

<' AWDAL • I • Erigavo :

~Berberat ,

, ......,' ••••• "" SANAAG IBora • /WOQOYI ..J \. ,

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iv

SOMALlLAND

• Gardo $~;r

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(approxirflate)

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JOJIBOUTI

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,I./(•\I

SOMALIA/SOMALI LAN D

CIIR COUNTRY REPORT v

SOMALI LAND

International Cooperation for Development

International Cooperation for Development (ICD), the overseas programmeof the Catholic Institute for International Relations (CIIR), first worked inSomalia in 1978/79 during the refugee crisis that followed Somalia's warwith Ethiopia, in the Ogaden war. Between 1985 and 1990 ICD supported acountry-wide technical assistance programme. In 1990 insecurity forcedICD to withdraw. Since 1991 ICD has supported a number of initiatives inSomaliland (north-west Somalia), and with Somali refugees in Kenya and inthe UK. In 1995 ICD opened a technical assistance programme inSomaliland, placing a development worker in Hargeisa as a resource personfor Somali non-governmental and community-based organisations.

This Country Report is based on a consultancy undertaken for ICD inSomaliland in September 1995, and was updated following a visit toSomaliland in December 1996.

The authorMark Bradbury has worked extensively in Somaliland for non-governmental and development relief programmes. Country director for ActionAid inSomalia between 1988 and 1990 and in Somaliland in 1992, he has also carried out assignments in the region for Oxfam UKI, International Cooperationfor Development and VetAid. His publications include: The Somali Conflict:Prospects for peace (1994), published by Oxfam UKI; and BuildingPartnerships for Participatory Development (1996) and BuildingPartnerships for Peace and Development (1997), both published by CIIR.

Somalia/SomalilandUnless stated otherwise, 'Somalia' refers to the territories of the Republic ofSomalia, including the secessionist Somaliland, and 'Somaliland' refers tothe region otherwise known as north-west Somalia.

vi CIIR COUNTRY REPORT

.pt--------------~-----

Introduction

In 1991 the Somali state collapsed as civil warengulfed the capital Mogadishu and the military

regime of Mohamed Siad Barre was forced frompower. After more than a century in the making and 30years of independence, Somalia has ceased to functionas a unitary state. In May 1991 the north-west regionsseceded from Somalia to form the independent'Republic of Somaliland'. Here clan-based institutionsof elders, combined with fledgling governmental andnon-governmental organisations, have emerged to takeresponsibility for governance, security andreconstruction. Elsewhere, in the vacuum of statecollapse, various bodies have emerged: politicomilitary organisations and fragile civil structures,including councils of elders, the remnants of UNsponsored administrative councils and, in places,religious authorities which have instituted Islamic law(shari'a).

In 1992 a US diplomat described the situation inSomalia as 'the worst humanitarian crisis faced byany people in the world'. At the end of 1992 itwas estimated that more than 500,000 people haddied in the war and famine in Somalia (Prendergast,1997: 115). This included 300,000 children. Some1.5 million Somalis had fled the country. Many morehave since died. Even before the civil war Somaliawas considered one of the poorest countries in Africa.The war destroyed housing, urban industry,communications, social services and agriculturalinfrastructure. Government and public buildings wereransacked. Basic needs are greater now than ever.

No single factor can explain the causes of thewar. The legacies of European colonialism, the

Somali kinship system, contradictions between acentralised state and a pastoral culture, Cold Warpolitics, militarisation, marginalisation and unevendevelopment, ecological decline, lack of powersharing, corruption, oppression and the cumulativeimpact of decades of armed conflict have allcontributed. The common use of 'anarchy', 'chaos'and 'madness' to describe the war and state ofdisintegration in Somalia, demonstrate an ignorance ofSomali society and the nature of the civil war. Thisignorance was evident in the massively expensive andcontroversial UN military intervention in Somalia.

To understand Somaliland's claim to independence

SOMALlLAND

it is essential to recognise that Somaliland is a legacyof European colonialism: before the colonial partitionof the Horn of Africa region, Somalia did not exist.The present-day borders of Somaliland follow theborders of the former British Somaliland Protectorate.

To understand political trends in Somaliland andSomalia, it is also vital to appreciate that the

political constitution of Somali society lies not in thecentralised institution of a European state model, but ina system where notions of a 'social contract' havemore to do with regulating relationships betweenpastoral kinship groups than between a central polityand the individual citizen. Colonialism grafted asystem of centralised governance onto a decentralisedand egalitarian political system of a pastoral people.

The centralisation of governance reached its peakduring the repressive military regime of MohamedSiad Barre. The civil war that was unleashed in May1988, when the Somali National Movement (SNM)attacked the northern cities of Burco and Hargeisa, wasin part a struggle to overthrow a corrupt militarydictatorship, and to assert greater self-determination.The most dramatic example of this assertion of selfdetermination was Somaliland' s secession. In thecontext of general economic decline in the 1980s, andSomalia's marginalisation in the world economy, theSomali war has involved a violent struggle betweenfactions for control of Somalia's internal resources,and externally provided aid.

This report seeks to promote a better understandingof the Somali civil war, and the context of futuresocial, economic and political rehabilitation anddevelopment. The report falls into two parts: as abackground to Somaliland's secession, the first tracesthe history of the Somali state, the descent into civilwar and the impacts of international policies andinterventiorts and the second part chronicles the briefhistory of Somaliland between 1991 and 1996. Aftersix years Somaliland' s claims for independenceremain unrecognised internationally. Also largelyunrecognised are the efforts made by people there toreconstruct their livelihoods and institutions after yearsof war. The report analyses the impact of the conflict,and the local and international efforts in reconstructingcivil and governmental structures and institutions inSomaliland.

CIIR COUNTRY REPORT 1

SOMALlLAND

PART 1

The rise and fall ofthe Somali state

2

O n 18 May 1991 the Somali NationalMovement (SNM) and the people of

north-west Somalia seceded from Somalia andreclaimed their independent sovereignty as the'Republic of Somaliland'. By revoking the 1960Act of Union, which had united the colonialterritories of the British Somaliland Protectorateand Italian Somalia, 'Somalilanders' signalledthe demise of the Republic of Somalia.

The Somali state was the direct product of thedivision of the Horn of Africa and the lands ofthe Somali peoples by the 19th-century colonialpowers of Britain, Italy and France, and theAbyssinian empire. Through colonisation theSomali people were territorially, politically andeconomically integrated into an internationalsystem constructed on a nation-state model.

The history of state formation in Somaliafalls roughly into three periods. The first, andlongest, 1827 to 1960, covers the colonisationof the Horn of Africa and the division of theSomali people into five states: the BritishSomaliland Protectorate, Italian Somalia,French Somaliland (now Djibouti), theEthiopian Ogaden, and northern Kenya. Thesecond period (1960-69) covers the first nineyears of independence under civiliangovernment as the Somali Republic. In thethird period (1969-91) democratic governmentwas replaced by a military dictatorship underGeneral Mohamed Siad Barre. In 1991 theSomali state collapsed, as civil war engulfedthe capital Mogadishu and the militaryregime of Mohamed Siad Barre was forcedfrom power.

State formation in Somalia has not been apeaceful process: in 20 years of warfare(1900-20) between British and Italiancolonialists and the Dervish armies of thereligious nationalist leader Sayid MohamedAbdulla Hassan a third of the population of theSomaliland Protectorate died (Ahmed ISamatar, 1988: 33); in the 1920s and 1930s

CIIR COUNTRY REPORT

Somalia was subjected to Italian fascist rule;and during the Second World War Italy andBritain fought over the country. Sinceindependence the colonial boundaries of theSomali state have been a source of conflictbetween Somalia and its neighbours. Thenationalist effort to reunite the 'lost' Somaliterritories was a driving force in regionalconflicts, with Kenya and Ethiopia in the 1960s,and with Ethiopia over the Ogaden in 1977 (seepage 11). Between 1988 and 1991 Somalia,which had taken more than a century to formand which had enjoyed 30 years ofindependence, was dismantled in four years ofinternecine warfare. The country no longerfunctioned as a unitary state.

The Somali peopleAt independence Somalia was considered aunique state in Africa, being founded on a singleethnic group - the Somali - whose ethnicity wasdefined by a common language (af-somali), apastoral economy, an adherence to Islam(sunni), and a clan-based political system. It ispuzzling, therefore, why 30 years later anapparently homogeneous society should bewrecked by such internal strife. Explanationshave been sought in the nature of the Somalikinship system, and in a previously neglectedcultural diversity.

Somalia, in the north-eastern tip of the Hornof Africa, is in the main a semi-desert region,with 'an ecology best suited to a pastoralnomadic existence. The exception is in thesouthern Shabelle and Juba river valleys, wherethe environment can sustain agriculture andagro-pastoral production. Likewise the ecologyof Somaliland is best suited to nomadicpastoralism, although there is some sedentaryagriculture to the west of the capital Hargeisaand on the northern escarpment of the Gollismountains.

SOMALILAND

The colonialists who entered the Somaliregion in the 19th century encountered twodominant cultures - an interior populated bydispersed pastoral groups, and a coastal cityculture. In addition they found sedentaryagriculturalists along the southern rivers.Although the colonial and post-colonial statesincorporated a range of cultures, it is Somalipastoral culture that has been the dominantpolitical culture and the basis of Somalinationalism. Before the 1990s war more than60 per cent of Somalia's population engaged insome form of nomadic pastoralism.

The Somali-speaking people form one of thelargest ethnic groups in Africa, living dispersedthroughout the Horn, from the Awash Valley,through the Ethiopian Ogaden and into northernKenya as far as the Tana river.

Although Somalis are united throughcommon descent, the Somali 'nation' did notconstitute a unitary polity or state beforecolonialism. Political affiliation and identitywas based on kinship. The Somali people

belong to one of six kin-based 'clan families', aconfederation of genealogically related clans(Lewis, 1961). These are Dir, Issaq, Darod,Hawiye, Digil and Rahanweyne. These againdivide along the male line into smaller kingroups or sub-clans (see Box 1).

The Dir, Issaq, Darod, and Hawiye arepredominantly nomadic pastoralists. The Digiland Rahanweyne (also known as Digil-Mirifle)are mainly agro-pastoralists. Occupying therelatively fertile zone between the Juba andShabelle rivers, they have a political culture andlanguage (af-maymay) distinct from nomadicSomalis. All the Somali clans straddle theborders with neighbouring Ethiopia, Kenya andDjibouti.

Other ethnic groups in Somalia include Bantuagriculturalists settled along the banks of thesouthern rivers, and Arabs of Yemeni descentfound in the coastal towns of Mogadishu,Merca, Brava and Kismayo. Specialised 'castes'of blacksmiths, leather workers and hunters arealso closely integrated with the Somali.

SOMALI CLANS (AND MODERN POLITICO-MILITARY MOVEMENTS)

1.

See page 48 for acronyms

I Aqiil Abuu Ta'alib 1I I

I Sab I I Samaale II

I Irir I I Darod I

I II

~Marehan

Digil Rahanweyne Hawiye Issaq (SNF)

(SDM) (SDM) (USC) (SNM)

lI Harti I Ogaden

(SPM).

I I I IIssa Samaroon I Biyamale Majeerteen Warsengeli Dolbahunte

(USF)

I(SSNM) (SSDF) (USP) (USP)

Gadabursi

(SDA) Adapted from Lewis, 196


SOMALILAND

Culture and conflict

The war has led some Somalis and specialistson Somalia to deconstruct Somali nationalism,and to recognise the plurality of cultures withinSomalia's territories (Ali J Ahmed, 1995). Thisreinterpretation of the dominant political,cultural and academic discourse in Somaliaraises questions about the composition of any

SECURITY, LAW AND ORDER

Clan-families represent the highest level of politicalsolidarity in Somalia but are too large to act as

political units. The most stable political unit amongnorthern pastoralists is the diya-paying group, whosemembers are united through kinship and are collectivelyobliged to pay and receive diya ('blood compensation')for murder and other injuries (Lewis, 1961). Thediya-paying group is the focal unit for cooperation,political action and collective security.

In Somali pastoral society rights and obligations arelaid down in xeer 'contracts'. The xeer, which weretraditionally transmitted orally, enshrine the basic valuesand norms of Somali society. They provide a system ofsanctions and are the closest equivalent to the westernnotion of a 'social contract'. Traditionally, xeer arenegotiated by elders meeting in councils (shir). Amongthe most important xeer are those which governentitlements to water and pasture.

Somali pastoral society has no hierarchy of politicalunits or political and administrative offices, butemphasises consensus decision-making. All adult maleshave an equal right to speak in council as elders. Eldersare delegates of and for their clans, rather than leaders.Only at the level of the clan is there a post approximatingto a leader or chief, know as the suldaan (sultan) amongthe Issaq and by other names among different clans.

The suldaan enjoys respect but not reverence.However, he functions as an arbiter and peacemaker withother clans and within his own. The suldaan are said to beable to see 'beyond the fight' (Bradbury, 1994a: 92). In apeace meeting the elders undertake the negotiations,while the suldaan approves the results as head of theclan.

Through these collective institutions and rule-boundbehaviour social order is maintained and conflictmanaged. Warfare was traditionally bounded by ruleswhich conditioned the scale of conflict and, althoughviolent, disputes over grazing resources werecharacterised as much by negotiation and the formation ofalliances as by warfare. The Somali civil war, sponsoredby parties with interests in more than grazing resources,and with modern weaponry, has strained the traditionalinstitutions' ability to provide security, law and order.

new Somali state. It is no coincidence that theRahanweyne, Digil, Bantu and Arabs - the nonnomadic and the non-Somali groups who havealways been politically marginalised - died inthe greatest numbers in the war and famine of1991-93 (Mohamed H Mukhtar, 1996). Anypolitical solution in Somalia needs to recognisethis. However, this interpretation risks reducingthe Somali war to a simple clash of cultures. Amore conventional analysis of the Somali warhas focused on the seemingly schismatic andconflict-ridden nature of the Somali kinshipsystem which is entrenched in the Somalipeople's culture.

In Somali pastoral society there is anessential link between the semi-subsistenceeconomy and culture, political identity, rights,and economic security. Somali nomadicpastoralism entails transhumance between rainyseason grasslands and dry season pastures andwater points. The health, nutrition andproductivity of livestock and, therefore, thelivelihood and health of pastoralists is linked tothe quality of pasture and water and access tothem. Production is tied to the socialorganisation of pastoral groups. Social structuredetermines entitlement to resources, thedivision of labour and the exercise of authority.Social institutions and organisational strengthdetermine a group's ability to cope with changeand to secure a livelihood. Collective actionthrough kinship provides physical, political andeconomic security. Well-being andvulnerability are thus not just a measure ofrelative economic wealth, but of socio-politicalorganisation.

The Somali kinship system is a dynamic onein which kin group alliances form and divide inresponse to internal and external changes, suchas a specific threat to security. The shiftingalliances between military factions in the warare examples of this.

However, although the war in Somalia hasbeen fought along the fault lines of clan identity,it has not been a traditional clan war, contraryto popular media depiction. Rather it has beena War where where 'clanism' has beenmanipulated by powerful elites and backed byparties interested in more than grazingresources, and with modern weaponry. The warhas undermined traditional institutions'effectiveness in providing security andmanaging conflict (see Box 2). Socialinstitutions have adapted to these new politicalrealities. The interaction of the specific natureof Somali society with the impact of the

4 CIIR COUNTRY REPORT

•

political and economic intrusions of colonialismand state policies this century provide someexplanation of the Somali crisis.

The colonial legacyForeign strategic interest in Somalia has alwaysbeen commercial, due to its location. In 1839the British established a garrison in Aden toprotect its trade with India. In the 1880s Britain,France and Italy signed numerous protectiontreaties with Somali clans in a scramble forinfluence in the region (Lewis, 1988). By 1900the division of Somali territory had beenconsolidated in treaties between the Europeancolonial powers and Abyssinia.

These colonial intrusions left a legacy of asystem of centralised government grafted ontoan uncentralised political system of a pastoralpeople. This involved bringing pastoralists andtheir resources under state control.

The political treaties which divided the landof the Somalis created borders which did notrespect clan territories. Of particular importancewere the Haud grazing lands 1 ceded to Ethiopia__by Britain in 1954 (Lewis, 1988: 150). Thedemarcation of pastoral lands curbed themobility of pastoralists, leaving them morevulnerable to the vagaries of climate. Theallocation of pasture and water rights to certainlineages reinforced a notion of clan andterritorial identity, and upset the politicalequilibrium between clans. State developmentthus altered the way people participated in thelocal management of resources.

In the absence of formal political institutionsor offices, British rule in Somaliland wasadministered indirectly through the heads ofdiya-paying groups, known as akil, whoreceived government stipends. In practice,administration remained in the hands of colonialdistrict commissioners. In Italian Somalia asimilar system of selected clan chiefs wasintroduced. These administrative structures andother developments, such as the introduction ofa Western judicial system to replace diya,inevitably altered pastoral socio-politicalinstitutions.

As new forms of wealth accumulated in thestate, the mandate of political leadership alteredfrom regulating kin relations and entitlements topastoral resources, to regulating access to thepolitical and economic benefits of the state, thussowing seeds of disunity and conflict. Oneresponse of the colonial government to suchconflicts was to invest more in state security

SOMALlLAND

forces, thus setting a trend for the future.Finally, colonial state formation established

an urban bias in development that marginalisedthe rural pastoral and agro-pastoral populations.As cities became centres of the politicalbureaucracy, the commercial sector andeducation, the cadres of the nationalistmovements, such as the Somali Youth Leagueand northern Somaliland National League, thatled Somalia to independence, were largelydrawn from the new urban elite.

IndependenceOn 26 June 1960 Britain granted independenceto the Somaliland Protectorate. Four days laterthe Italian-administered UN TrusteeshipTerritory of Somalia achieved independence.On 1 July 1960 the two territories united to formthe Somali Republic.

The task of integrating the territories' legaland administrative infrastructure took threeyears to complete and did not go smoothly. InDecember 1961 northern dissatisfaction withthe process and the perceived bias towards thesouth led to an abortive coup by disaffectednortht>tn army officers.

D'Gring the first nine years of the newrepublic bureaucratic state structures wereexpanded and government further centralisedthrough centrally orchestrated developmentprogrammes. Failure to invest in and develop aproductive domestic economy led the state tobecome increasingly dependent on foreign aid.

The country officially adopted a non-alignedposition at independence, but Cold Wargeopolitics began to intrude as Somalia soughtforeign aid and support for its claims to the'lost' Somali territories in Kenya and Ethiopia.In 1963, for example, it turned down militaryaid from the West in return for aid from theSoviet Union (Lewis, 1988: 201). A legacy ofcolonialism was the development of the socialclasses that controlled the state (Abdi I Samatar,1989: 82).

Increasingly, the state and its resources,including foreign aid, became a focus forcompetition between those elite classes. As aresult, parliamentary democracy becameincreasingly opaque and, in the absence ofideological differences between politicalparties, ever more 'clanist' in orientation. Theincreasingly venal struggle for state control bythese elite, eventually led to the collapse ofparliamentary democracy and a military coup.


SOMALILAND

Military ru le

The centralisation of political and economicpower in the Somali state reached its zenithunder the military dictatorship of GeneralMohamed Siad Barre, who seized power inOctober 1969. Within a year the military coupwas turned into a 'bloodless revolution'.'Scientific Socialism' was adopted as theideological framework for the country's futuredevelopment. Weary of the debilitating effectsof 'clanism', and grappling with the shift from apastoral society to a modern nation state, theurban intelligentsia and technocrats initiallybacked this programme.

The first charter of the Somali revolutionproclaimed the central role of the state insociety, guaranteeing the right to work, socialjustice, 'popular participation' in nationaldevelopment and an end to 'tribalism'. Underthe guidance first of the Supreme RevolutionaryCouncil, and after 1976 the SomaliRevolutionary Socialist Party (SRSP), thepopulace was mobilised for nationalprogrammes, such as a 1973-74 literacycampaign. In the campaign against tribalism,effigies were ceremonially burnt, jaalle('comrade') replaced 'uncle' and 'cousin' asterms of address, the death sentence wasintroduced to replace diya, marriages werecelebrated at orientation centres and stripped ofclan significance, akils were replaced andrenamed 'peace-seekers' and integrated into thestate party, the country was reconstituted intonew regions renamed to exclude reference toclans, and place of settlement replaced lineageas the means of personal identification.

The intention was to turn this 'nation ofnomads' into a modern socialist state, to whichpeople could look for leadership, security andwelfare instead of to the clan. Embodying thenation was the president and 'father of thenation', Siad Barre.

Scientific Socialism's assault on the fabric ofSomali society was coupled with state control ofthe economy. Although the government'sdeclared policy was to decentralise stateauthority to enable grassroots participation indevelopment, the structures through whichdevelopment was instituted were subject to statecontrol (Abdi I Samatar, 1985). Administrationwas decentralised, but power remainedcentralised. District and provincial officialswere military or party functionaries appointedby the state. Mass participation was orderedfrom above rather than arising through

consensus from below. Far from being broughtinto the political process, the population wasalienated from it. Press censorship partiallynegated the benefits of a standardised Somalispelling system, introduced in 1972, and massliteracy campaigns in 1973 and 1975. Nongovernmental, civil forms of association wereundermined by the banning of trades unions andthe Party's manipulation of civil organisationssuch as the Somali women and youthassociations.

Militarisation

Mohamed Siad Barre seized and maintainedpower through the armed forces. For the regimenation-building largely consisted of creatinglabyrinthine security structures to maintainpolitical control, rather than investments insocial or economic development. The armybecame the most powerful institution in thecountry. By the early 1980s security accountedfor nearly three-quarters of governmentspending, and consumed more than half asmuch again as was earned from exports.(Ahmed I Samatar, 1985: 37)

Somalia's militarisation began in the 1960sduring border disputes with Kenya andEthiopia, and increased throughout the 1970sand into the late 1980s as a result of superpowerinterests in the Horn of Africa. Siad Barre wasparticularly adept at using Cold War tensions tosolicit a vast array of armaments for hisgovernment, initially courting support from theSoviet Union and later the United States. WithSoviet finance Somalia built one of the mostpowerful armies in sub-Saharan Africa. Withthis force, Barre took Somalia into a war withEthiopia over the Ogaden. Defeated in theOgaden when the Soviets switched theiralliance to Ethiopia, Barre turned to the UnitedStates. He was able to secure US$lOO million ayear in development and military aid, in returnfor US access to Soviet built facilities atBerbera port for use by its rapid deploymentforce, created to police the Persian Gulf. USpolicy towards Somalia, as summed up byPresident George Bush's administration, wasbased on wider geopolitical and economicconcerns:

By virtue of Somalia's strategic location atthe tip of the Horn of Africa, the UnitedStates has several security interests in thecountry. The US military has enjoyed accessto Somali air and port facilities. Access isimportant to support our security policies in


the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea and couldprove vital as a support area for US forcesresponding to contingencies in the PersianGulf. (Cited in Prendergast, 1991)

The United States and the Soviet Union werenot the only suppliers of military equipment toSomalia. Italy, Romania, East Germany, Iraq,Iran, Libya, South Africa, Saudi Arabia andChina all contributed at different times. Thelargesse of the superpowers during the ColdWar is demonstrated in the arsenals of weaponsbequeathed to Somali 'warlords' to fight thewar.

The Ogaden War and its aftermath

Since colonial treaties had allotted the Somalipopulated Ogaden to Ethiopia in 1948, theOgaden had figured as one of Somalia's 'lost'territories, and a constant source of tension inEthiopia-Somali relations. In 1974/75 Somaliaendured one of the worst droughts in its history,known in Somali as dabadheer (meaning'endless'). In Ethiopia the inadequate responseof the Haile Selassie government to the droughtled to its overthrow in September 1974. In 1977,taking advantage of a weakened Ethiopian state,Barre launched a war to reclaim the SomaliOgaden for Somalia. The war was a high pointof Somali nationalism and Siad Barre'spopularity. A year later the Somali army wasdefeated by the Soviet- and Cuban-backedEthiopian army.

Defeat was a turning point for the Barreregime, and the beginning of the demise that ledto the Somali civil war. Defeat ended any senseof national unity. Ethiopian Somalis who fledthe fighting sought refuge in Somalia, makingthe country host to the largest refugeepopulation in Africa. Estimated at 1.5 million,refugees amounted to some 40 per cent ofSomalia's population. A deluge of internationalaid, aid workers and aid organisations followed.

Internal dissent and the formation of militaryinsurgent groups began to threaten the regime.A failed coup attempt by Majeerteen officers in1978 led to the creation of the Somali SalvationDemocratic Front (SSDF), which launched aguerrilla campaign against Barre in the centralregions of Somalia. In 1981 disaffected Issaq ofthe northern regions formed the SomaliNational Movement (SNM) and took up armsagainst the regime. Both the SSDF and the SNMsought sanctuary in Ethiopia, illustrating thedisintegration within the Somali state.

SOMALI LAND

As the political and economic CrISIS

developed in the 1980s, and as Somalia becamemore indebted to military and financialassistance from the West, the regime's socialistrhetoric began to wear thin and the reality ofpolitical autocracy surfaced (Ahmed I Samatar,1988). Initially drawn from the Darod 'clanfamily' and dubbed the 'MOD alliance'(Marehan, Ogaden, Dolbahunte), in the face ofmounting insecurity it increasingly becamedominated by Barre's Marehan clan.

The Barre government had an appallinghuman rights record (Amnesty International,1988). In the regime's first seven years itstargets were individual opponents of the regime.After 1978, however, whole clans and economicgroups associated with the insurgencies weretargeted. Those who suffered most were theMajeerteen from Mudug region, the Issaq in thenorth-west, and the riverine communities in thesouth. The armed opposition movements thatemerged in the wake of the Ogaden war were adirect response to the lack of power sharing,corruption, human rights abuses, and what hasbeen described as a serious disjuncture betweenthe moral and coercive authority in the state(Said S Samatar, 1991). As the civil war becameprotracted, any ideological concerns of thepolitical movements evaporated.

Economic transformation andunderdevelopmenf2

Even before the war Somalia was consideredone of the poorest countries in Africa. It wasestimated that 70 per cent of the ruralpopulation lived below the absolute povertylevel. The gross national product (GNP) percapita was only US$280 a year, some 70 percent of which was income remitted by Somalisworking abroad. In 1990 Somalia'sinternational debt stood at US$2 billion andinflation was estimated to be running at 600 percent a year.

To comprehend Somalia's descent into civilwar and the battle for control of the Somalistate, it is necessary to trace the broad economictransformations in Somalia since colonial times.

Transformations in thepastoral economy

Colonisation laid the basis for a mixedeconomy. At independence this entailed a'traditional' agricultural sector consisting ofpastoralism and peasant cultivation, and a


SOMALI LAND

'modern' agricultural sector based on plantationagriculture of bananas and sugar cane.3 Otherproductive economic activities included fishingand frankincense (see Boxes 3 and 4). Inaddition there was an expanding entrepreneurialsector of shop owners and trading companies,and a public sector of salaried governmentofficials and civil servants. Broadly, ruraldevelopment policies since colonial times havesought to modernise the 'traditional' sector.

Since 1839, when Britain occupied Aden, andSomali sheep became the main source of meatfor the garrison there, livestock production hasunderpinned Somalia's economy. Before thewar more than 60 per cent of the populationwere said to be involved in some form ofnomadic pastoralism. Stock-rearing was also anintegral part of the economy for the 20 per centof the population engaged in sedentarycultivation. Before the war the export of sheep,goats, cattle and camel accounted for up to80 per cent of national exports.

The livestock trade expanded considerablybetween 1950 and 1980, stimulated by the oilboom in Saudi Arabia, to which Somaliasupplied 90 per cent of meat imports. Betweenthe late 1960s and 1980 the trade grew from 50to 76 per cent of export earnings. (Laitin andSamatar, 1987)

FRANKINCENSEThe northern Somali coast is thought by some scholars tobe the mythical 'Land of Punt', from where ancientEgyptians obtained frankincense. Before the war Somaliaclaimed to be the world's main exporter of frankincenseand myrrh. The trade was disrupted by the war, althoughsome export has resumed on a lower scale thanpreviously.

FISHINGWith the longest coastline in eastern Africa, Somalia hasrich fishing grounds. In the mid 1970s Somfish, a SomaliSoviet enterprise, embarked on production of industrialfisheries, but after the Soviet withdrawal in 1978 productionwas never sustained. After the 1974/75 drought manypastoralists were airlifted from their grazing lands tocooperative fishing settlements along the coast. However,Somalia's fishing industry never achieved its potential. Inthe 1970s and 1980s the Somali government sold fishingquotas to foreign companies and governments, and withthe political turmoil in the country, Somalia's fishinggrounds are now subject to piracy by foreign companies.

The commercialisation of the pastoraleconomy has had a profound impact onSomalia. It has affected the entire social,economic and political culture of pastoralists,their livelihood, security of food supplies andtheir relationship with the environment. Forexample, since the 1950s market demands haveled to more cattle being herded (Mohamoud andHashi, 1988). The sale of surplus stock to meetmarket demands and provide a livelihoodaffects pastoralists' ability to insure againstcrises and reduces the numbers of animalsavailable for traditional loans and marriagetransactions. This in turn leads to a loosening oftraditional social and economic networks.(Swift, 1979)

The volatility of market demand and priceshelps explain the vulnerability of pastoralists tothe 1974/75 drought which caused a famine andthe deaths of 20,000 pastoralists in northernSomalia (Simons, 1995:54). After 1984, whenSaudi Arabia banned imports from Somalia onthe grounds of alleged rinderpest, livestockexports declined substantially and forcedpastoralists into illicit trade with Yemen andKenya.

Commercialisation imposed a new tradingstructure and created new economicrelationships between pastoralists, merchantsand the state. With livestock trade the majorsource of revenue for the state, the socioeconomic functions of pastoralism have had toshift from supporting producers to supportingthe state and merchants. Commercialisationencouraged the growth of a wealthy urbanmercantile class. Somali pastoral society,politically egalitarian, became economicallydivided. Governments' failure to re-invest inpastoral development led, in the 1980s, topastoralism's declining capacity to support theneeds of producers, merchants and the state;poverty among pastoralists increased.

Despite its contribution to the nationaleconomy, since colonial times pastoralism hasbeen seen as an outmoded and unproductiveeconomic activity. Under Scientific Socialism,cooperative production was the cornerstone ofthe government's modernisation programme forthe rural sector. The Land Registration Act of1975 brought Somalia's rangelands under thecontrol of the state, and settling pastoralists andstate ranching was emphasised. A sedentarypopulation is easier to control and tax.

Although policies to settle pastoralists,promote agricultural production or stateranching were never fully realised - partly


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because of the vitality of livestock exports andthe strength of northern livestock traders - theyhad profound impacts on pastoralists. Forexample, the 1975 nationalisation of commonlands officially nullified customary treatiesbetween pastoralists over the use andmanagement of rangelands. It removedcustomary property rights and led to thealienation of the people from their land.Rangeland enclosures spread rapidly in the1980s, restricting pastoralists' movement andaccess to resources, and degrading theenvironment.

The commercialisation of pastoral productionhas not led to full-scale privatisation ofSomalia's rangelands. However, the integrationof pastoralism into a market economy creatednew inequalities of wealth within and betweenpastoral communities, merchants and the state.Revenues from the livestock trade wereappropriated by a small number of tradingfamilies and the state. Range management liesat the centre of the pastoral political economy,and therefore clan politics. Competitionbetween those pastoralists linked to themerchants and those linked to the governmentgenerated conflicts over rangelands. During the1980s the government rewarded its supporterswith investments in water supplies in their clanareas, thus disturbing the political balancebetween pastoralists (African Rights, 1994).Not surprisingly, water supplies weredeliberately targeted during the civil war.(Bradbury and Davies, 1991)

The experiments of Barre's government instate farm cooperatives proved disastrous. Statecontrol over producer prices favoured urbanconsumers and meant that farmers received lessthan the global market price. Coupled with anovervalued currency which subsidised imports,there was no incentive for the farmers toproduce. In the early years of military rule,while the service and industrial sectors grew tosome extent, agricultural productivity declined,increasing poverty among smallholders, importdependency, inflation, and the country'sexternal debt.

The 1980s - economic

decline and war

The Somali civil war marked the end of theCold War in the Horn of Africa. Changingsuperpower interests had a significant impact onthe timing of the war. However, changing

SOMALILAND

CROP PRODUCTION

Somalia has rarely been self-sufficient in crop production.At independence, crop cultivation was a small butexpanding sector largely concentrated among peasantfarmers in the riverine regions of the south and westernSomaliland. Introduced as recently as the 19th century intoSomaliland, agricultural production was limited to therelatively high rainfall highland areas in Awdal, WoqoyiGalbeed and Sanaag regions. However, until the war only2 per cent of land in Awdal and Woqoyi Galbeed wasfarmed.

Attempts by successive governments to modernise andexpand peasant crop production largely failed. Only 20 percent of the population of Somalia before the 1990-94 warwere said to be involved in crop production. Average yieldsfor the rain-fed sector were among the lowest in Africa. Theprincipal crops of sorghum and maize were grown almostentirely for home consumption and the urban markets.

Until banned in the mid 1980s, the narcotic plant qaat(Catha edulis) , which is chewed widely in Somalia andother countries in the Horn, was the most profitable cashcrop.

regional politics also obscured a growingeconomic and political crisis in Somalia duringthe 1980s.

In the 1970s Somalia was allied to the SovietUnion. Defeat in the Ogaden War broughtSomalia into the fold of the United States in the1980s. In coping with a massive influx ofrefugees from the Ogaden, Somalia reaped awindfall of humanitarian assistance from theWest, estimated at some US$120 million a year.This injection of aid helped to maintain theBarre regime in power. As the government andmany thousands of Somalis became dependenton refugees for income, humanitarian aidbecame a major public source of corruption(Simons, 1995: 52). As armed insurgenciesbrought hostility to the regime into the open, thedistribution of aid only exacerbated thosetensions.

After the Soviets' departure the United Statesbecame Somalia's largest donor. By 1982Somalia was the ij),ird largest recipient of UnitedStates aid in Africa (Simons, 1996: 76). By late1985 it was reported by the World Bank that,per capita, Somalia was one of the highestrecipients of official development assistance inAfrica. US influence steered Somalia towards aliberalisation of economic policies - althoughlittle change in political practice - and in 1981Somalia agreed to an International MonetaryFund (IMF) structural reform programme.


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Deregulation of the economy, and the ending ofmandatory deliveries to state marketing boardsboosted agricultural production (Abdi I Samatar,1994). This had a cost for the peasant producers.Land prices rocketed and a land rush ensued.Much of the irrigable land along the Shabellevalley was expropriated by wealthy urbanitesfor rice production.

Deregulation of the economy also stimulatedthe growth of an illicit parallel economy(Miller, 1981). In the mid 1980s low wagesforced civil servants and others to seek incomesoutside their official duties. For some the gapbetween wages and needs was filled by privateremittances of Somalis working abroad(estimated to number 250,000 people in 1980),others resorted to illicit trade and corruption.Following the drop in oil prices in the 1980s andsubsequent decrease in employmentopportunities in the Persian Gulf, remittancesbegan to decline. As the formal economy andbanking system atrophied, an informal andillicit economy emerged.

Access to, and control over, the formaleconomy was through the state. As state powerconsolidated among Barre's immediate kin,clan identity, proscribed in the 1970s, reemerged as the passport to political andeconomic security.

Clans allied with the regime receivedpreferential disbursements in development aidor political positions. Those not allied came todepend, in part, on the informal or illegaleconomy. At the end of the 1980s, in the contextof general economic decline, there was astruggle between the (largely urban) politicaland economic elite for control over economicresources in the formal and informal economy.

Disintegration of the Somali StateState formation in Somalia, from the colonialera to the Barre era, involved the transition froman uncentralised and egalitarian pastoral societyto a centralised, oppressive and predatory state.Backed by a coercive military force, the Barreregime was able to manipulate the delicatelybalanced clan system.

State formation in Somalia also involvedthe development of a 'national' economy,which drew Somalia into an expanding globaleconomic system. Somalia's externalmarginalisation in this world economywas matched by new internal inequalities ofwealth. Poverty, inequity and chronicunderdevelopment therefore form part of the


background to the war in Somalia. However, thelinks between poverty and conflict are complex.Somalia's infamous 'warlords' did not comefrom Somalia's poor. Underlying the Somalicivil war has been competition between elitesover a parallel economy and the diminishingresources of the state. This struggle becamemore violent, and was increasingly projectedalong the faultlines of 'clanism'. This, in part, iswhat emerges from the chronology of Somalia'scivil war. It goes some way to explaining whythe war has been so protracted, and the way inwhich humanitarian aid became an integral partof the conflict.

The SomaliCivil War1988-91

Since the Ogaden war Somalia and thoseareas of the Horn inhabited by the Somali

people have been in a virtually continuous stateof armed conflict. The 1988 peace accordbetween Somalia and Ethiopia that sought toend 10 years of hostility between thosecountries only precipitated another war. Thepeace accord, which signalled the end of panSomali unity by recognising Ethiopian controlover the Haud, triggered an assault by the SNMon the northern cities of Burco and Hargeisa inMay 1988. These proved to be the opening shotsto the Somali civil war.

War with the MajeerteenThe first organised armed opposition to Barrewas the Somali Salvation Democratic Front(SSDF) formed by Majeerteen officers whoescaped arrest following an abortive coup ofApril 1978. Led by Colonel Abdillahi Yusuf,and backed by the Ethiopian army, the SSDF inthe early 1980s managed to capture and controlsome border territory in Mudug region inSomalia's central rangelands, home ofAbdillahi Yusuf's sub-clan. The response of theregime was savage. In May and June 1979 morethan 2,000 Majeerteen were said to have died in

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Mudug region as the result of the regime'sscorched earth policy (Said S Samatar, 1991:18). The SSDF, however, retained possession oftheir border territory, and launched intermittentcross-border raids until 1986, including jointoperations with the SNM in 1983.

The SSDF insurgency collapsed in 1986 afterAbdillahi Yusuf was arrested by the Ethiopiangovernment, which was seeking a rapprochementwith Somalia. Although reconstituted in 1989, asthe civil war spread southwards and the north-eastbecame cut off, the SSDF took no part in Barre'sfinal overthrow. In 1990, however, the ManifestoGroup that sought Barre's peaceful removal frompower contained several prominent Majeerteen(see page 12).

War with the IssaqIn 1980 a second opposition front emerged tochallenge the regime in the form of the SomaliNational Movement (SNM). Founded inLondon by intellectuals, businessmen andreligious leaders, the SNM was primarily anIssaq-based organisation. Issaq disaffectionwith the regime arose from a number of sources:inadequate (and undemocratic) politicalrepresentation, unequal distribution ofdevelopment resources, and governmentregulation of business, particularly the livestockand qaat trade.

In British Somaliland the Issaq made up themajority of the population. Although thatposition changed when Somaliland united withItalian Somalia, the Issaq continued to have aninfluence in government. Somalia's last twocivilian governments of 1967 and 1969 wereheaded by an Issaq premier, Mohamed HajiIbrahim Egal. Under Barre several Issaqs heldcabinet posts. Nevertheless, after Somalia'sindependence there was a feeling that politicalrepresentation in Somalia's affairs favouredsoutherners.

Somalilanders' decision to unite with thesouth in 1960 had been controversial. At thetime, however, Somali nationalism wasvigorous. It was surmised that unity was the firststep towards the realisation of 'GreaterSomalia', combining all Somali territories, andre-establishing control over the Haud grazinglands in Ethiopia, a primary resource forSomaliland's pastoralists. The Issaq, along withother northerners, supported the war againstEthiopia to reclaim the Ogaden. Somalia'sdefeat, however, resulted in a mass influx ofOgadeni refugees into the north that posed a

SOMALlLAND

threat to their own lands. Government arming ofrefugees fuelled this fear. The 1988 peaceaccord between Somalia and Ethiopia finallyrecognised Ethiopian control over the Ogadenand Haud.

Issaq merchants were prominent in thelivestock trade, with the northern port ofBerbera a major outlet to the Persian Gulf. TheIssaq perceived government economic controlsand attempts to regulate a parallel market as anattack on their businesses and judged thegovernment's ban in 1983 on qaat cultivation,which flourished in the north-west, as furtherevidence of this. The Somali army's subsequentmonopoly of the qaat trade was early evidenceof an emerging economy controlled throughviolence.

Throughout the 1980s government policytowards the Issaq became increasinglyrepressive. A 'leaked' letter, allegedly from themilitary governor in the north to the head ofstate, raised fear among the Issaq that thegovernment had embarked on a genocidalprogramme against them. In May 1988 theSNM, fearful of losing its bases in Ethiopia as aresult of the peace accord, attacked and brieflycaptured the northern cities of Burco andHargeisa. In response Somali governmentforces launched a savage assault on the Issaqpopulation, forcing thousands to flee toEthiopia. Between May 1988 and March 1989some 50,000 people were estimated to havebeen killed (Africa Watch, 1990). Up to thispoint the SNM had not been widely supportedby civilians. These brutal attacks finally unitedthe Issaq behind the SNM for an all-out waragainst the regime.

War with the OgadenThe Ogaden, a sub-lineage of the Darod, is thelargest Somali clan confederacy. Its location inthe Ogaden (Ethiopia) and in Kenya, coupledwith the force of Somali irredentism, has giventhe clan a significant role in Somalia's politics.Under Barre the Ogadenis were prominent inthe army and h@ld key military posts. Ogadenrefugees who entered Somalia after the war withEthiopia by and large supported Barre. Manywere armed to fight the SNM.

Barre's rapprochement with the Ethiopianregime, and the growing power of the Marehanwithin the military, caused disaffection amongOgadeni soldiers. In April 1989 Barre sackedhis defence minister, an Ogadeni, sparking amutiny among Ogadeni soldiers in the southern


SOMALI LAND

port of Kismayo and leading to the fonnation ofthe Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM). Themutiny in Kismayo was also rooted in aprotracted dispute between Marehan andOgadeni pastoralists over the pastoral resourcesof the Juba region (Bradbury, 1994a: 54;African Rights, 1994). The emergence of anOgadeni opposition movement signalled thebreak up of the 'MOD (Darod) alliance' thathad dominated the ruling group in Somaliaunder Barre. A second Ogadeni front wasfonned in June 1989, when Colonel Omar Jessdefected with soldiers from the Somali armyin Hargeisa. For most of the war against BatTethe SPM constituted a 'southern front',destabilising the regions south of the capital.

War with the HawiyeBarre's downfall was finally precipitated by theemergence in 1989 of a Hawiye-based militaryforce, the United Somali Congress (USC), inSomalia's central rangelands. As the largestclan in southern Somalia, stretching from thecentral rangelands to Kenya and Ethiopia, itssize, geographical spread, and economicstrength within the capital, Mogadishu, havemade the Hawiye significant players in thecountry's politics. The first president ofSomalia was Hawiye and throughout the 1960sHawiye members held 20 per cent of cabinetposts in government.

During Barre's regime, although theirpolitical power was curtailed, they benefitedfrom the concentration of developmentprogrammes in the south, and were notmarginalised like the Issaq. An exception werethe Hawiye pastoralists, such as the Habr Gedir,who came into dispute with the Marehanpastoralists favoured by Barre over resources inSomalia's central rangelands. (African Rights,1994)

In October 1989 Hawiye soldiers mutinied inthe town of Galkaiyo. Fighting quickly spreadthrough the regions of Mudug, Galgadud andHiran. Government typically retaliated bybombing villages and massacring civilians. TheUSC was founded largely by individuals fromthe Habr Gedir sub-clan of the Hawiye, severalof whom had been members of the SNM centralcommittee. The USC's first leader, MohamedWardhigly, who died in June 1990, sought anegotiated settlement to Somalia's war. GeneralMohamed Farah Aideed, who succeeded him,favoured a military solution. The USC wassupported in its campaign by the SNM. In


December 1990, having agreed a jointcampaign with the SNM and SPM, the USCtook the war to Mogadishu.

The Digil and RahanweyneThe Digil and Rahanweyne, situated betweenthe Juba and Shabelle rivers, belong to the Saabbranch of the Somali people. As agriculturaliststhey are looked down on by pastoral Somalis.Their inferior status and smaller numbers havegiven them a marginal role in Somali nationalpolitics. In 1989 a Rahanweyne oppositionmovement was fonned, the Somali DemocraticMovement (SDM), calling for the removal ofSiad Barre. They played only a limited role inhis overthrow. However, after he was deposed,the Rahanweyne and Digil were unable towithstand the rampaging armies of Barre andthe USC. When their agriculture wasdevastated, the Rahanweyne and Digil becamethe main victims of the famine in the south.

The opposition proliferatesAnti-government groups proliferated as the warescalated. During 1989 a Dolbahunte-basedSomali United Liberation Front and theGadabursi-based Somali Democratic Alliancewere fonned. Neither took part in the militaryoverthrow of Barre. Their proliferationpresaged the fissures that would emerge afterBarre was overthrown. They reflected theconcern with self-preservation in the post-Barreera of mainly clan-based groups

The Manifesto GroupAs the war escalated, several attempts atpeaceful change were made internally bydifferent groups. In May 1989, for example,some prominent Marehan gave Barre anultimatum to change and reinstate democracy.However, it was the Manifesto Group whichmade the most impact.

Disaffection with the economic situation, arising tide of the displaced in the capital and thegovernment's handling of the conflict,eventually led to anti-government riots inMogadishu in July 1989. The riots were sparkedby the assassination of the Catholic bishop ofMogadishu, and the subsequent arrest of severalprominent religious leaders. Some 450 peoplewere killed during a day of rioting, followed bymass atTests and executions of civilians, manyof them Issaq.

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The ruthless suppression of the riots shatteredany remaining loyalty to the regime. In May1990 more than 100 prominent Somali citizenssigned an open letter (,Manifesto No 1')condemning the regime's policies and callingon it to accept a process of discussion withopposition groups to bring about a solution tothe political turmoil. Forty-five of thesignatories were arrested and charged withtreason. They were later released after massdemonstrations in Mogadishu and internationaldiplomatic pressure.

The fall of Siad BarreUnder attack on several fronts, the regimelamely tried to introduce some political reforms.In September 1989 the central committee of theSomali Socialist Revolutionary Party (SRSP)approved a change in the constitution to allowfor a return to a multi-party system. Qaat waslegalised and the laws giving equal inheritancerights to women revoked. In September 1990 anew constitution was ratified, the nationalsecurity laws were lifted and free elections werescheduled for February 1991. These movestowards liberalisation, coinciding with economicreforms, had the effect of dismantling many ofthe structures of state set up by the revolution,thus leaving the regime more exposed.

All offers of dialogue were rejected by theopposition groups, who saw the moves towardsliberalisation as the last-ditch efforts of a dyingadministration to hold on to power. Theconstitutional changes, they insisted, were onlycosmetic while power remained in the hands ofthe ruling family; to the end, eight of thepresident's sons and daughters held powerfulpositions within the administration.

On 6 August 1990, meeting in Ethiopia, theSNM, USC and SPM agreed to fmm a unitedfront against the Barre regime. Belated offers byItaly and Egypt to mediate were rejected by theopposition. On 3 December the USC, underGeneral Mohamed Farah Aideed, took the warto Mogadishu. The battle for Mogadishu lastedalmost two months, during which time furthermediation efforts by the Italians, Egyptians andthe Manifesto Group failed.

SOMALILAND

Barre fled Mogadishu on 26 January 1991 tohis home area in south-west Somalia. There hereconstituted his army under the banner of theSomali National Front (SNF), twice attemptingto recapture Mogadishu. In April 1992 Barrefled Somalia to Kenya and eventually moved toNigeria where he died in January 1995.

War and famineOnce Barre was deposed the loose coalition offorces that had defeated him collapsed. TheManifesto Group hurriedly appointed abusinessman, Ali Mahdi Mohamed, as 'interimpresident' and a politician, Omar Arteh Ghalib,as prime minister, thus precipitating anirrecoverable split within the USC. Attempts bythe Italian and regional governments toreconcile the factions at two conferences inDjibouti in May and June failed, and III

November 1991 fighting again erupted inMogadishu between General Aideed and AliMahdi.

The battle for Mogadishu lasted four monthsand cost the lives of as many as 25,000civilians. Two power blocs emerged, basedaround General Aideed and Ali Mahdi, bothfrom sub-clans of the Hawiye. The mostpowerful alliance, headed by Aideed, becameknown as the Somali National Alliance (SNA).Ali Mahdi had gathered around him theManifesto Group of businessmen andpoliticians.

For some 16 months, from December 1991 toMarch 1992, when the United Nationseventually brokered a ceasefire, there wasalmost continuous warfare in the south. Thecoastal towns of Merca, Brava and Kismayoand the inland towns of Baidoba and Bardheeresuffered waves of invasions by fighters of theUSC, SPM, SNF and others. Rape of women,particularly among the coastal Hamr andBravani populations, mass executions,destruction of agricultural land, looting of grainstores and livestock, and destruction of watersupplies and homes led to the massivedisplacement of. people into Kenya, Ethiopiaand Yemen, and mass starvation.


SOMALlLAND

Internationalintervention

International reaction to the war

The outbreak of the war in Somalia in 1988coincided with the Cold War thaw and

declining foreign interest in Somalia's strategiclocation, and so was allowed to developunchecked. The United States continued toprovide military assistance to the Siad BalTeregime even after war broke out in the north.However, by late 1989 it had began to distanceitself from the regime. This followed a criticalAmnesty International report in 1988 and areport by a consultant, Robert Gersony, to theUS State Department on the status of Somalirefugees (Gersony, 1989). After the riots inMogadishu in July 1989 the US envoy forAfrica declared that 'the people of Somaliawere tired with military rule' and urged theregime to restore democratic government.

Before the war official developmentassistance to Somalia amounted to aboutone-third of its GNP. As a result of theinternational refugee support programme, up tohalf the population was said to have had someaccess to food aid. When war broke out inHargeisa and Burco all foreign personnel wereevacuated and relief and development workeffectively stopped in the north. Some attemptwas made to resume food distribution torefugees there during 1990, notably through aUN Extraordinary Interim EmergencyProgramme, but foreign assistance to the northwas severely limited. Only the InternationalCommittee of the Red Cross (lCRC), throughits hospital in Berbera and a handful ofinternational non-governmental organisations(NGOs) running medical programmes on theSNM side of the lines worked in the northduring this period.

In January 1990 the US Congress halted nonhumanitarian aid to Somalia; bilateral aid wascut to US$740,000 for 1990, compared withUS$30 million in 1988. The Germans, Dutchand Finns suspended their bilateral aidprogrammes. Italy too, following the arrest of45 signatories of Manifesto 1, reduced its aid.Oil companies began to scale down theirresearch operations.


A tripartite agreement on 'Durable Solutionsfor the Ethiopian Refugees in Somalia' wassigned between the governments of Ethiopia,Somalia and the United Nations HighCommission for Refugees (UNHCR) in August1989. However, the programme had difficultiesraising the US$60 million needed for theoperation. The phasing out of the UNHCRprogramme increased armed banditry as localinhabitants saw a major source of income beginto dry up. As the conflict spread through thecountry NGOs withdrew to Mogadishu. ByDecember 1990 many international NGOs haddrastically cut back their programmes.

The reduction in Western aid forced theSomali government to turn elsewhere foreconomic and military aid. Military shipmentswere obtained from Libya, China, the UnitedArab Emirates and Iraq. Libya sent militaryadvisers and soldiers to Somalia in June 1990after the two governments signed an accord oncommercial cooperation; these three countries'embassies became targets of bombings.

While Western governments closed their aidprogrammes and embassies, little effort wasmade to prevent the impending catastrophe.This could be partly explained by the mountingcrisis in the Persian Gulf. However, the lack ofinternational will in Somalia contrastedmarkedly with the US mediation efforts inEthiopia six months later. On 4 and 5 January1992, while intense fighting in Mogadishucontinued, a US aircraft carrier was divertedfrom its duties in the Persian Gulf to evacuateremaining foreign nationals, NGOs, diplomaticmissions and UN agencies from the country. Inthe words of the US ambassador to Somalia, theUS then 'turned out the light, closed the doorand forgot about Somalia' .

M i lita ry intervent ion 4

As Somalia disintegrated into factional fightingand famine, international NGOs and the ICRCformed the first international response to thecrisis, establishing emergency medical andfeedinl} programmes as early as January andFebruary 1991. It took 18 months for the UnitedNations to respond in any meaningful way. Bythis time an estimated 300,000 people had diedof starvation and hunger-related diseases. Some500,000 people had fled to Ethiopia, Kenya andDjibouti, and as many as 3,000 people - mainlywomen, children and the old - were dying daily.(Mohamed Sahnoun, 1994)

In April 1992, having secured a ceasefire

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agreement from Aideed and Ali Mahdi, the UNSecurity Council, under Resolution 751 (24April 1992) authorised the establishment of theUnited Nations Operation in Somalia(UNOSOM). An Algerian diplomat,ambassador Mohamed Sahnoun, was appointedas the UN secretary-general's special envoy toSomalia. Conceived as an observer mission,UNOSOM initially comprised 50 unarmedmilitary observers, later increased to 500. A sixmonth Plan of Action was concurrentlymobilised by the United Nations to provideUS$23 million in humanitarian aid. BySeptember the promised peacekeepers had notarrived. When the UN secretary-generalBoutros Boutros-Ghali accused the West ofbeing more concerned with the 'rich man's war'in former Yugoslavia than with Somalia, theUN headquarters announced plans to deploy3,500 armed troops. In October 1992 Sahnoun,frustrated with the UN's response and at oddswith the secretary-general, publicly criticisedthe United Nations and resigned.

By this time inter-clan warfare had beenreplaced by the armed looting of food aid. Theprice agencies paid militia to protect reliefsupplies was equivalent to the cost of the fooddelivered. With the UN troops unable to controlthe ports and secure the aid deliveries, manyNGOs advocated international militaryprotection for the humanitarian operation.Others were more cautious. In December theUN Security Council endorsed Resolution 794(1992), which authorised an offer by theoutgoing US president George Bush to deploy30,000 US troops in Somalia. CodenamedOperation Restore Hope, the limited objectiveof the US-led UN International Task Force(UNITAF) was to 'create a secure environmentfor the delivery of humanitarian relief'throughout the country. On 9 December 1992US marines landed on Mogadishu's beaches.

At the time UNITAF intervened, Aideed andAli Mahdi had fought each other to a standstillduring the four-month battle for Mogadishu.Critics of Operation Restore Hope have arguedthat by the time the military intervened thefamine had already peaked (African Rights,1993). While delivery of food was improved,the underlying political conflict was just held inabeyance. No attempt was made to disarm thefactions, and UNITAF, concerned for thesecurity of its own forces, sought thecooperation of the warlords, thus conferring onthem a measure of legitimacy. The 'quick fix'solution of military intervention thus left a

SOMALlLAND

legacy of unresolved problems. The operation,initially welcomed by many Somalis, was toleave many feeling betrayed.

The Addis Ababa conferenceon national reconciliationMilitary intervention was followed by twohastily arranged national reconciliationconferences, as precursors to handing over to aUN-led operation. In January 1993 leaders ofthe southern factions meeting in Addis Ababaagreed on a ceasefire and the proceduresfor disarmament. This was followed on27 March 1993 by a 'Conference on NationalReconciliation'. Again this was held in AddisAbaba, and again involved the 15 factionalleaders.

The important agreements reached at AddisAbaba concerned the formation of aTransitional National Council (TNC) and othertransitional political and administrativestructures that would guide the country toelections in two years. However, the declarationthat the TNC would be the 'sole repository' ofSomali sovereignty angered the people ofSomaliland, involved at that time in their ownnational reconciliation conference at Borama(see page 21 below). The Addis Ababaagreement proved to be so full of otherambiguities that there was nothing to preventthe signatories from repudiating it.

The UN's approach to reconciliation throughthe Addis Ababa conferences enhanced theprestige of the warlords, strengthened theirpolitical role, and left little room for otherpotential leaders to emerge. The United Nationsmade little attempt to broaden the representationin the reconciliation process, and efforts byother peace advocates to do so had little impact.The warlords, who derived their power frombeing military leaders, in fact had most to losein resolving the war. As long as the UnitedNations was willing to continue to sponsor tripsto conferences, there was little incentive for thefactions to reconcile.

UNOSOM 11The March 1993 Addis Ababa conference wascritical to the international intervention inSomalia. The conference was to provide aframework for tackling Somalia's politicalproblems, and for the UN-led administrationthat would take over from UNITAF.

On 26 March the UN Security Council, by


SOMALILAND

Resolution 814 (1993), authorised theestablishment of UNOSOM II. Under thisresolution UNOSOM was reformulated as abroader civilian and military operation, withresponsibilities for the political, economic andcivil reconstruction of Somalia. With a two-yearmandate to expire in February 1995, theobjectives of UNOSOM II were to assist withproviding relief and economic rehabilitation,and to promote political reconciliation, peaceand stability through the re-establishment ofnational and regional political and civiladministrations, no small task. The USpermanent representative to the UN, MadelineAlbright, remarked at the time:

With this resolution, we will embark on anunprecedented enterprise aimed at nothingless than the restoration of an entirecountry as a proud, functioning and viablemember of the community of nations.(Cited in Ameen Jan, 1996)

In line with the Addis Ababa agreement to reestablish national and regional governmentalinstitutions, this was to involve the formation ofdistrict councils. The district council programmerepresented a second track, 'grassroots' processat nation building that was to complement thefirst track, 'top-down' approach pursued throughthe Addis Ababa conference and with thewarlords.

The programme, however, was problematic.The councils' representativeness was a matterof concern, given the large populationdisplacements, the lack of clarity and dialogue onthe councils' functions and authority, the speedwith which they were created, their relationshipwith indigenous councils of elders, theirrelationship with the warlords, the emphasis ondeveloping constitutional mechanisms in theabsence of revenue collection, and the lack ofreal financial backing from the United Nations.Finally, while placing some emphasis ondecentralised political structures, the state-centricleanings of the United Nations meant that theultimate aim of the programme was to rebuild anational body politic. This contradicted othertendencies in Somalia that thrived onstatelessness.

The means by which UNOSOM sought toimplement this programme were further at fault.Although Somalia was not made a UNtrusteeship, UNOSOM II, and individuals andinterested parties under the UN umbrella, weregiven de facto authority to make decisions forand on behalf of the Somali people. This


included expatriates, who often had little or noexperience in Somalia or their particularjob, being recruited as 'Zonal Directors', andpaid large salaries and given powers to matchthose of regional governors. Not surprisingly,Somalis began to accuse the United Nationsof imperialism, and foreigners of enrichingthemselves from Somalia's misery. Further,although UNOSOM II was supposed to be acivilian operation, it continued to be managed bythe military. This meant that military matters tookprecedence over other UN and NGO relief anddevelopment interventions. (Ameen Jan, 1996)

The contradictions between these twoapproaches at nation building, together with themeans of implementation, led the UnitedNations into a war with General Aideed, themost powerful of the faction leaders. In theprocess the UN lost its role as neutral arbiter inSomalia. Consequently the United States andthe UN were forced into an ignominiouswithdrawal from Somalia.

The United Nations at warTo support UNOSOM II in its task, the UNSecurity Council approved the expansion of themultilateral peacekeeping force to 28,000troops, plus 8,000 logistics personnel.In addition Resolution 814 invoked Chapter VIIof the UN Charter, giving UNOSOM IIpowers of 'peace-enforcement'. These powers,vastly superior to those assumed for UNITAF,permitted the UN to use force when'international peace and security' werethreatened, rather than normal rules ofengagement which limited UN military actionto self-defence.

With a six-month military budget ofUS$1.5 billion and with military forces from27 different countries, UNOSOM II was at thetime the most expensive and largest multilateralforce ever constituted for a peacekeepingoperation. It was the first time that the UnitedStates had placed its troops under the UN flagand command, and the first time Germansoldieis operated outside NATO. At the end ofthe Cold War, and in the wake of the Gulf War,Somalia became a testing ground for theinternational community's response to conflictand humanitarian crisis in the 'new worldorder'. UNOSOM II's policies were thus drivenmore by international political concerns than bythe situation in Somalia.

On 4 May 1993 UNITAF handed over toUNOSOM II. A month later, after 24 Pakistani

2

•

UN peacekeepers and 35 Somalis were killedduring a weapons search of Radio Mogadishu,the United Nations found itself at war withGeneral Aideed. Invoking Chapter VII,UNOSOM took an aggressive stance andordered his arrest. By mid-September 1993 atleast 56 UN soldiers and several hundredSomalis had died in clashes between the UnitedNations and Aideed's forces.

The UN's approach was widely condemned,and it was accused of human rights violations.In October two US helicopters were shot downin Mogadishu causing heavy US armycasualties, which led the United States toannounce its intention to withdraw fromSomalia and the United Nations to call off itshunt for Aideed.

The US presence in Somalia came to an endin March 1994 and UNOSOM was handed overto a Pakistani force. In November 1994 theSecurity Council ordered the United Nations towithdraw from Somalia by 31 March 1995. USmarines and Italians briefly returned to

SOMALI LAND

Mogadishu to protect the withdrawal of theremaining 1,500 Pakistani troops. By 2 Marchthe evacuation was completed. In UNOSOM'sthree-year operation, an estimated 6,000Somalis and 83 peacekeepers were killed inclashes between Somali military and the UnitedNations.

At the end of 1993, with the demise ofUNOSOM imminent, donor governmentsestablished a new forum for coordinatingrehabilitation assistance to Somalia. Known asthe Somali Aid Coordination Body (SACB),this took over much of the policy coordinationfunction that UNOSOM was intended toprovide in Somalia.

UNOSOM was one of a number ofinternational humanitarian interventions ininternal wars that occurred at the beginning ofthe 1990s. As such it was critical in thedevelopment of international political andhumanitarian policy. UNOSOM proved a costlyand flawed experiment. Some of the reasons forits failure are discussed in Part 11.


SOMALI LAND

PART 11

Somaliland 1991-96

GULF OF ADEN

•1Erigavo' ; &.

: I ••••••••• .!'tVARSENGELI, " ~orama •. .'• f. :

\.../;\~,i"O S'OB~A L/~ ANDf \ , __• ..,~ DOLBAHUNTE. . ......... -... ·t. ",.-

; ", .~~ Las Anod· '..."............., .",, ........-.

".

Thesecession ofSomaliland

W hen Mohamed Siad Barre was forcedfrom power in 1991 the Somali state

collapsed. In January that year, as the USC tookcontrol of Mogadishu, the SNM captured thenorthern cities of Berbera, Hargeisa and Burco.On 18 May 1991 the people of the north-westregions of Somalia revoked the 1960 Act ofUnion that joined the colonial territories ofBritish Somaliland and Italian Somalia, andannounced the secession of the 'Republic ofSomaliland'. The declaration of independencewas made without consulting Somalia'snumerous other political factions and

consequently Somaliland remains unrecognisedby the international community.

Secession had never been a stated aim of theSNM. The decision by the leaders of the SNMto reassert Somaliland's sovereignty was madeunder popular pressure during the 'GrandConference of the Northern Peoples' in May1991, held in the city of Burco (Drysdale,1992). The formation in February 1991 of aninterim government in Mogadishu by the USCwent against a previous accord between theSNM, USC and the SPM. The people of thenorthwest, particularly the Issaq who formedthe backbone of the SNM, feared that anyfurther relationship with Mogadishu would leadto a repeat of the persecution they had sufferedunder military rule. Secession was also apragmatic stance to distance the north from thefactional fighting in the south, and a recognitionthat northerners, the Issaq in particular, had noterritorial claims over the south. It was alsobelieved that security and stability in the northwould attract much-needed international aid.


-

•

The 1960 union with the south had beendriven by nationalistic aspirations to unite thefive Somali territories in a 'Greater Somalia'. Inthis the northerners stood to re-establish accessto the Haud grazing areas ceded by the Britishto Ethiopia in 1954. Somalia's defeat in theOgaden war of 1977 destroyed any pretence ofachieving that goal through a united Somalia.Years of conducting a guerrilla campaign fromwithin Ethiopia, and the mass movement ofIssaqs into refugee camps in the Haud in 1988,healed relations with Ethiopia. It may also havepersuaded northernel'S that pastoralists' needsfor unhindered access to the Haud could bebetter achieved through cooperation withEthiopia rather than unity with the south. It isperhaps relevant that, before Burco 1991, theprevious 'Grand Shir' of the northern clans wasin 1954, in response to the British decision tocede the Haud to Ethiopia.

In contrast to what happened in southernSomalia, the declaration of independenceushered in a period of relative stability inSomaliland. The SNM assumed a two-yearmandate as the single party in Somaliland andAbdulrahman Ahmed Ali 'Tuur', then chairmanof the SNM, was appointed interim president.The SNM resolved not to extend its militaryvictory beyond Issaq territories, and the clanswithin the north established a high degree ofcooperation. The first government had arelatively equitable balance of northern clansrepresented in cabinet posts.

SOMALILAND

The Tuuradministration1991-93

The 'Tuur' administration had the task ofbuilding a government from scratch, bereft

of any resources. In two years it failed todevelop a revenue base to support an effectiveadministration. Nor did it attract effectiveexternal support. Banditry and looting by armedmilitia mobilised during the war disruptedgovernment and inter-clan attempts atreconciliation, and international reliefprogrammes.

The initial euphoria of independence wasshattered by an outbreak of fighting in Burco inJanuary 1992 and in Berbera in March 1992.The conflict was brought to an end in October1992, through a political settlement and peaceconference in the town of Sheik, brokered bythe Somaliland elders. The Sheik 'Tawfiq'conference paved the way for a nationalreconciliation conference, held in the town ofBorama, in which all Somaliland's clansparticipated, and which adopted a 'PeaceCharter' and 'National Charter' as a frameworkfor governance.

THE GEOGRAPHY OF SOMALILANDThe territory of the 'Republic of Somaliland', which covers approximately 117,500 square kilometres,corresponds to that of the former British Somaliland Protectorate. It incorporates the five formerregions of north-west Somalia, Awdal, Woqoyi Galbeed, Togdheer, Sanaag and Sool, with its capitalin Hargeisa. Its neighbours are Djibouti in the west, Ethiopia in the south and the North-East Regionof Somalia to the east.

Inland from Somaliland's narrow coastal plain, known as the Guban (meaning 'scorched'), the landrises above 2,000 metres in the Gollis mountains before descending southward across the Ogoplateau to the west, the Saraar plain to east, and onto the wet season pastures of the Haud inEthiopia.

The north-east and south-west monsoons bring two rainy seasons (May to July and November toJanuary), and two lengthy dry seasons (January to April and August t~ October). Annual rainfallranges between 200 and 800 mm, with temperatures ranging between 25 and 35°C. The area issubject to periodic drought.

Somaliland's economy is dependent on trade in livestock. Cultivation is limited to rainfed areas tothe west of Hargeisa, and in the Gollis mountains. The economy is linked to those of neighbouringcountries. Livestock, agricultural produce and qaat are exported from Eastern Harerghe in Ethiopiaand Somaliland through Berbera and Djibouti in exchange for the import of food and manufacturedgoods. Somali refugee camps in Ethiopia, with their food aid, form an important part of the regionaleconomy. Insecurity in anyone of the countries can affect the neighbouring economies.


SOMALlLAND

THE PEOPLE OF SOMALILANDThe size and composition of Somaliland's population has altered considerably since 1988, when it was estimated atbetween 1.78 and 2.05 million, excluding Ethiopian refugees. Up to 600,000 people fled to Ethiopia when the warstarted in 1988. Others sought refuge in Djibouti or moved south. When the war ended in Somaliland, many refugeesand displaced people returned. This included people who had never lived in Somaliland, but were forced out of thesouth to seek security within their own clan territory. In January 1992 Somaliland's population was estimated to be1.35 million (Holt and Lawrence, 1992). When war broke out again in 1994 up to 150,000 people fled Hargeisa, manycrossing to Ethiopia (Bryden, 1994). At the end of 1995 there were said to be 300,000 people from Somaliland still in

Ethiopia (Bryden, 1995).The people of the region divide into five main clan groups. The Issaq are by far the most populous clan-family.

Their traditional lands fall within Woqoyi Galbeed, Togdheer and western Sanaag regions. The mainsub-clans of the lssaq are the Habr Yunis and lidagale (together the Garxajis), Habr Jeclo, Habr Awal (lsa Musa andSaad Musa), Arap and Ayub (Box 7).

PRIMARY ISSAQ LINEAGES

Sheik Issaq

Mohamed(Ibraan)

Ibrahim(Sambuur)

Ahmed(Toljecle)

Musa(HabrJeclo)

HabrYunis

SaadMusa

llidalale I

-------H-a-b-r-M-a-g-aa-d-o-t------.:L ----.---H-a-b-r-H-a-b-u-u-s-h-I-----

Adapted from Lewis, 1969.

The Gadabursi and lssa, sub-clans of the Dir, are found in Awdal region in the west. The Dolbahunte of Sool andthe Warsengeli of eastern Sanaag are sub-clans of the Harti Darod, related to the Majeerteen of north-east Somalia.Habr Magaado and Habr Habuush were wives of Issaq.


•

SOMALI LAND

THE SOMALI NATIONAL MOVEMENT

The SNM was founded in London in1981. It drew its early support fromthe Somali diaspora in westernEurope and the Persian Gulf states.It was primarily an Issaq movement,with its leaders coming from theurban elite. Several of them, such asAhmed Mohamed 'Silaniyo' andAbdulrahman Ahmed Ali 'Tuur', bothchairmen of the SNM, had heldposts in Barre's government.

The SNM was the mostorganised of the armed movements.Compared with the recently createdsouthern movements, the SNM hada clearer political manifesto(Compagnon, 1991). It alsopublished its policies. The SNMargued that the clan system lay atthe root of political stability, socialcohesion and economic activity.Thus they proposed:

a new political system builtupon Somali cultural values ofco-operation rather thancoercion; a system whichelevated the Somali concept ofxeer or inter-family social contractin which no man exercisedpolitical power over anotherexcept according to establishedlaw and custom, to the nationallevel. (Ahmed I Samatar, 1988:142)

Within the Somali traditions of socialorganisation, the SNM emphasisedthe role of the elders. Their proposalfor government in post-BarreSomalia was to integrate 'traditionalSomali egalitarianism and therequirements of good central

government' (ibid). The SNMconstitution called for atwo-chamber legislature, with anupper house of elders. A council ofelders (guurtl) was integral to theSNM's political and military strategy.Indeed, as early as February 1989Issaq elders met to discuss theformation of a provisionalgovernment in the north (Simons,1995: 75).

Like all political factions, the SNMrelied on a coalition of allied clans in this case within the Issaq - toprovide fighters for the war. SNMguerrillas fought in small units drawnfrom the same clan, and generallyfought within their own clan territory(Drysdale, 1992). While manyfighters laid down their arms oncethe war was over, disarming andintegrating these disparate unitsbecame a problem immediatelyafter the war.

Although the SNM produced apolitical manifesto for government,like the other movements itsstruggle generally lacked a unifying .ideology. Capitalism, c1anism,democratic socialism, Islam, andregional separation had their variousadherents within the SNM. Disputesarising from these internaldifferences weakened themovement. Primary among thesewas a clash between the civilian andmilitary wings and the 'right' and'left' leaning tendencies in the SNM.In 1983 the military wing ousted thecivilian component of the leadership(Ahmed I Samatar, 1988: 155). Ayear later a new civilian group was

installed, with 'Silaniyo' as chairman.The military wing was split

between two factions - a moreradical element nicknamed thea/an as ('red flag'), comprisingcolonels who had been trained inthe eastern bloc, and anotherknown as the shish ('snipers').These factions were roughly splitalong clan lines. Prominentpersonalities in the a/an as mainlycome from the Habr Awal (IssaMusa and Saad Musa) and HabrJeclo; the shish from the Habr Yunisand lidagale. A dispute is said tohave arisen between these wingsover the 1988 attacks on Burco andHargeisa. During the war, tensionsalso arose over perceptions thatsome clans were not contributingsufficiently, or that others weredominating the leadership. Theselatent tensions re-emerged inpost-independence Somali land.

In the first two years ofindependence the SNM was thesole official political party ofSomali land. However, internalweaknesses and the difficulty ofintegrating non-Issaq clans into themovement, meant that it did notplay a significant role as a politicalparty in post-independenceSomaliland. After the 1993 BoramaConference the SNM becamelargely defunct, although an attemptwas made to resuscitate it in 1994.SNM veterans, however, continue tocelebrate 'SNM day' (marking thefounding of the SNM, its victoriesand heroes), and continue to seekrecognition for their role in the war.

The Borama ConferenceThe Borama 'Grand Conference on NationalReconciliation' was described as a 'make orbreak event' in the creation of the Somalilandstate. The conference agenda had two items:reconciliation and security; and state formation.

The conference opened on 24 January 1993and lasted nearly four months. This gave timefor issues to be exhaustively debated and forflashpoints to be dealt with so that consensus

could be achieved. A national committee of 150Somaliland elders (the Somaliland NationalGuurti) comprised the official voting delegatesat the conference. However, during the fourmonths, an estimated 2,000 people attended andparticipated in some way in the meeting.S Theconference was mostly financed by Somalis, amajor factor in its success. Although someforeign donors did provide funds, UNOSOMdid not provide any support.


SOMALILAND

The Peace Charter

The outcome of deliberations on reconciliationand security was the 'Somaliland CommunitiesSecurity and Peace Charter' . This sought to rectifymistakes that had led to insecurity and ineffectualgovernment (Somaliland Peace Charter, 1993). Itaimed to promote 'the strengthening of securityand stability [and] peaceful co-existence among allthe communities of Somaliland' that had beenagreed at independence (ibid). The charterestablished a national security framework,detailing mechanisms for demobilisation, theformation of local police forces and judicialinstitutions and the securing of roads. The elderswere given responsibility for ensuring that thesesecurity arrangements were put in place. Thecharter also defined the responsibilities of elders inmediating and settling outstanding disputes andfuture conflicts. It set out a code of conduct for thepeople of Somaliland, in accordance with theirtraditions and with the principles of Islam. In effect,the Peace Charter represented a national xeer.

The National CharterDiscussions on state formation produced aNational Charter, which was to act as theconstitution for Somaliland for two years. Theincoming government was to be charged withdrafting a national constitution to be ratified byreferendum within two years. The NationalCharter established a government structure with abicameral legislature. This comprises anAssembly of Elders (guurti) as a non-electedupper house, and an Assembly of Representativesas an elected lower house. Together these makeup the parliament. The equivalent of a 'cabinet' isknown as the Executive Council.

In addition the charter separated the judiciary,auditor-general, and central bank as agenciesindependent of the government. The charterinstitutionalised the elders as peacemakers,defining their role as 'to encourage and safeguardpeace [and] creating new or enforcing existingCodes of Conduct [xeer] among the clans'(Bradbury, 1994a: 74). Their authority wasconfirmed by their right to appoint a president,vice-president and members of the Assembly ofRepresentatives. Within both the NationalCharter and the Peace Charter formulated atBorama, there is a clear link to the SNM'soriginal vision to reform radically systems ofgovernance in the post-Barre era (see Box 8).

In June 1993 the National Guurti appointedMohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal - Somaliland's


first prime minister in 1960 and Somalia's lastcivilian prime minister in 1969 - as the newpresident of Somaliland. Abdulrahman Aw Aliwas appointed vice-president.

The Sanaag Peace

Conference

The Borama conference was one of severalpeace processes under way in Somaliland at thattime. Of the others, the most significant andsuccessful was in Sanaag region, where eldersof the region's four main clans - Habr Yunis,Habr Jeclo, Dolbahunte and Warsengeli embarked on a lengthy process of reconciliation(Bradbury, 1994a; Ahmed Yusuf Farah, 1993).This culminated in the 'Sanaag Grand Peaceand Reconciliation Conference', whichconcluded in October 1993 with the adoption ofa regional Peace Charter. The charter allowedfor the free movement of trade, the return offixed assets, in particular land, and therestoration of reciprocal access to grazing lands.In August 1995 the elders in Sanaag oversawthe resettlement and return of land to those whohad been displaced during the war. Thisinvolved some 500 families. (Haroon AhmedYusuf, 1996)

The Egaladministration1993-95

The state of government

Egal took office on a wave of euphoriafollowing the su~cessful conclusion of the

Borama conference. During his first two yearsin office, Egal's achievements in creating afunctioning administration were considerable.Ministries were revitalised. Government officeswere refurbished. Regular morning andafternoon work hours were instituted. A civilservice commission was formed. Regularcoordination meetings were establishedbetween the planning ministry and international

NGOs and UN agencies. The central bank wasopened and a new Somaliland currencyintroduced. In Hargeisa, Borama and Berberapolice forces were equipped and organised.Customs officers were appointed and officesestablished. A justice system of regional anddistrict courts was re-established in places,utilising the 1960 penal code. In Hargeisa themayor embarked on a programme of townplanning and civil engineering, includingrepairs to government hotels. Ministerial andcivil service staff (estimated at around 2,500 in1995) were paid regular salaries, as werenational assembly members, the police, and

DEMOBILISATION

SOMALlLAND

army. The government even introduced aminimum wage. In November 1994 ministriesreceived their own budgets. Some 50 per centwas allocated to the defence ministry andpolice, with education and health combinedmaking up 17 per cent (Gilkes, 1995). All thiswas achieved with minimal external assistance.In the absence of such support, however, theseachievements have not been sustained.

Although the government's writ was largelyconfined to Hargeisa, Berbera and Borama, ithad a functional relationship with the regions,where none had existed under Tuur. Forexample, regional health plans in Sanaag were

\.

The militarisation of society is aconstant threat to security andstability in Somaliland. Before May1988 the SNM was said to comprisesome 3,000 fighters. When the warescalated in 1988 there was a rapidmilitarisation of society as the Issaqpopulation was mobilised for thewar. At the end of the war manySNM fighters laid down their armsand returned to civilian life. Someremained together as military units.Some turned to banditry and werejoined by others who had not foughtin the war. In 1993 the Somalilandgovernment estimated that therewere 50,000 armed militia inSomaliland (Niyathi, 1995: 27). Thiswas probably an over-estimation,but indicated the scale of the

problem.The first Somaliland government

had proposed to unify the militia in anational army (Drysdale, 1992: 30).It failed to do this and the hationalPeace Charter sought to establish aframework in which the communitieswould take responsibility forsecurity. Within four months oftaking office Egal reached anagreement with some militiacommanders and elders to collectmilitia in cantonment sites.Businessmen agreed to contributefood in the interests of keeping theroads safe. But events moved fasterthan anticipated. In September1993, 3,000 militia were encampedin Mandera, south of Berbera. With

clans anxious not to forgo thebenefits of retraining andemployment in the new securityforces envisaged, this had risen to6,000 by October.

Substantial assistance wasanticipated from UNOSOM, whichhad a mandate and a US$18 millionbudget for demobilisation (Bradbury1994a: 82). Despite severalassessment missions and theUnited Nations DevelopmentProgramme (UNDP) posting twoconsultants in Hargeisa to draw updemobilisation plans, the assistancewas never forthcoming. The failureto support demobilisation inSomali land is an indictment ofUNOSOM. The German governmentthrough GTZ, with CARE, Oxfamand the Swiss Group, have sincesupported demobilisation, but forthe most part international supporthas been meagre.

Somaliland has therefore largelybeen left to itself to orchestrate thedemobilisation and reintegration ofex-combatants. Formally twoorganisations exist to support thisprocess: a parastatal National •Demobilisation Commission (NDG)and SOOYAAL, a veteransassociation and NGO concernedwith SNM veterans and theirwidows. In February 1994 the NDCclaimed it had acquired threequarters of the weapons from fivebrigades, primarily in the Hargeisaarea and the west. No progress was

made in the east. Despite this, up to5,000 militia were estimated to havebeen disarmed (Niyathi, 1995: 27).Their reintegration was moreproblematic. The reintegrationprogrammes that existed were smalland run by SOOYAAL. Severalhundred of those encamped in1993 were recruited into the policeand customs forces. The remainderwere sent home unemployed.An informed estimate in early1995 suggested that some10,000 militia remained to be dealtwith. (Gilkes, 1995)

The outbreak of war in 1994politicised and set backdemobilisation. While thegovernment stated its intention tocontinue with the programme, theNDC was unacceptable inopposition areas. In 1993 thegovernment had pronounced that itdid not intend to form an army. Thatpolicy changed when the NationalArmy recruited militia into its ranks,giving rise to accusations that thegovernment had gone against thespirit of the Peace Charter.The 1st brigade of the new NationalArmy was operative by March 1994.By September 1995 estimates putthe National Army as high as 15,000soldiers uniformed and armed.Although the government has saidit intends to demobilise them oncethe war is over, the positiveenvironment that existed in 1993has dissipated.


SOMALlLAND

authorised by the central ministry, while regionalhealth workers and some education officialsreceived incentives through the government,although funded by international agencies.

The progress in establishing an administrationwas achieved by increasing the government'sresource base. In September 1995 governmentrevenue was estimated to be roughlyUS$lO million, rising towards US$15 million.6

Government revenue collection improved aftereffective customs and excise facilities wereestablished in Berbera and on the Djibouti borderat Zeila, and from taxing the qaat trade. In 1995it was estimated that the annual value of qaatimported into Hargeisa was equivalent toUS$137 million a year; for Somaliland as awhole it was put at US$250 million (Gilkes,1995). Government finances were also helped bya windfall received when the Somalilandcurrency was introduced and exchanged at apreferential rate for the Somali shilling.

Underlying the government's economicfortunes was Somaliland's buoyant economicgrowth from mid 1993. The foundation of thiswas growth in the livestock export trade and theopening of new external trading links. Since1993 the volume of Somaliland's trade hasincreased substantially. In particular, politicalchanges in Ethiopia and the opening of theSomali-Ethiopian border has created a vast newmarket for Somali traders. Some 65 per cent ofthe trade through Berbera is said to be destinedfor Ethiopia. Along with Assab in Eritrea,Berbera is challenging Djibouti as the main portfor eastern Ethiopia in terms of volume of trade.Berbera offers the benefits of lower customsdues than Djibouti. Some traders import theirgoods through Berbera and ship them overlandto Djibouti to avoid taxes. In addition, Djibouti

MINES - A LASTING LEGACYUnexploded ordnance remains a major hazard throughoutSomaliland, and Somalia. During the war with Siad Barre1.5 million mines were thought to have been laid inSomaliland alone by the Somali Armed Forces and theSNM. Most were laid against civilian or economic targets,

such as on farmland and records were not kept of theirpositions. The economic and social effects are long lasting.A two-year (1992-93) de-mining project by a British firmwith a team of trained Somalis cleared an estimated80,000 mines. Despite there being foreign troops inSomalia who could have done this, UNOSOM failed toinstitute a de-mining programme. When war broke out in1994 new mines were laid, particularly around Burco.

port has suffered technical problems, whileBerbera has developed a simple but well-runfacility, although still in need of improvement.Berbera has also benefited from the closure ofthe southern ports of Kismayo and Mogadishudue to the conflict there. Livestock from as farsouth as Beletweyne are exported throughBerbera. Expansion of the livestock trade hasalso been stimulated by the reopening of theSaudi Arabian market, which had been closed toSomali livestock since the 1980s. At least oneSaudi port is open, unofficially, to receiveSomali sheep and goats. In addition to trade,there has also been a gradual recovery of therural economy in Somaliland; in September1995, the main cause of food insecurity inHargeisa was inflation. In June 1995 privatecompanies re-established a functioningtelecommunications system in Hargeisa, withinternational lines. This has since been extendedto Berbera and Borama.

Underlying economic recovery was a greatlyimproved security situation. Banditry waswidespread during the Tuur administration butafter the Borama conference it diminishedsignificantly. With the support of the clans thegovernment was able to remove checkpointsfrom the main roads between Berbera, Hargeisaand Borama, thus facilitating the flow of tradeand food. In the towns the establishment ofpolice forces and a judicial system helped torestore some law and order. A short-liveddemobilisation campaign contributed to theimproved security situation (see Box 9). InHargeisa the security situation improved to theextent that the United Nations began to importits own vehicles and international NGOs scaleddown their investment in security.

Although considerable progress wasachieved in establishing the institutions ofgovernment, the new state remained politicallyfragile, and vulnerable to a shift in powerbetween the clans and politicians influencingthe situation. The boundaries of the Somalilandstate were unclear, as non-Issaq clansparticularly in the east remained ambiguoustowards Somaliland. Egal' s administrationbenefited from the port revenues from Berberain a way that Tuur was never able to, because itlay within Egal's clan territory. Another head ofstate may not have found people willing to passthat revenue to the government. At the sametime Egal's government was unable to secureand control Hargeisa airport, a strategic site onits doorstep which was held by Iidagale militia.


The fragility of the administration andsecurity was exposed 18 months after Egal wasmade president, when war returned toSomaliland.

Retu rn to WO rAfter a year of heady progress which included aconcerted attempt at demobilisation, and thestrengthening of government institutions andrevenue collection, fighting again broke out inNovember 1994 in Hargeisa, spreading toBurco in March 1995. The immediate reasonswere twofold: a struggle for control of Hargeisaairport and its revenue between the governmentand a militia of the Iidagale (Issaq) clan withinwhose territory the airport lies, and an attemptby the government to impose its authorityoutside Hargeisa (Bryden, 1994). The roots ofthe conflict, however, are more complex. Theprime catalyst was the manipulation of theairport confrontation and historical clananimosities by a political clique opposed to theEgal administration. Also important wereunresolved issues of power sharing, historicaldivisions within the SNM, competition overSomaliland's resources (particularly trade andcurrency), and interventions by General Aideedfrom Mogadishu and the internationalcommunity through the United Nations. Most ofthese have been threads throughout the previousbouts of fighting in Somaliland.7

At the time this report was written, hostilitieswere continuing. As in 1991 and 1992, the warhas been largely confined within the Issaq clans,(although insecurity affected Awdal in 1995when the Issaq, Gadabursi and Issa clashed onthe Djibouti-Somaliland border over control oftrade between Hargeisa and Djibouti, and overthe port of Zeila). For non-Issaq the conflict isseen primarily as an Issaq problem. As withprevious wars, fighting has concentrated aroundthe major urban and commercial centres ofHargeisa and Burco in the north-west andTogdheer regions, giving credence to claimsthat this is largely a war among an urbanpolitical elite.

The war has involved the heaviest and mostprotracted fighting since the end of the conflictwith Siad Barre in 1991. Tens of thousands ofcivilians fled Hargeisa and Burco, many goingto Ethiopia from where they had returned in1991. Some estimates put the number of peoplekilled in Burco alone as high as 4,000. Therehas been widespread destruction of propertyrehabilitated since 1991. Hargeisa and Burco

SOMALILAND

became divided towns. New arms flowed intothe region as the opposition received supportfrom Aideed and the government acquiredweapons from eastern Europe. The war harmeda rapidly expanding economy, causing currencydevaluation, inflation in the west and a retractionin international assistance programmes. In theeast trade was curtailed, hurting small businesses.Government budgets were also severely affected:the government allegedly spent US$4.5 millionre-equipping the army.

Perhaps the most immediate damage was theloss of confidence among Somalilanders whohad believed that fighting was over. The warcaused new social and political cleavages.There was a further rejection of centralgovernment and 'politicians', and the war threwSomaliland's viability into doubt. The differentlayers of the conflict are examined below.

Political factorsDespite the achievements in creating anadministration, politically things did not beginwell for the Egal administration. Egal's firstgovernment met with strong opposition fromthe Habr Yunis and Iidagale (collectivelyknown as Garxajis). The Habr Yunis andWarsengeli refused offers of two ministerialposts. In July 1993 the Habr Yunis meeting inBurco (the 'Liiban Congress') declared thatthey would not take up their seats in the Upperand Lower Houses, nor be bound by lawspassed by parliament.

The Habr Yunis' s grievances were threefold.First, they argued that the election whichselected Egal over Abdulrahman Tuur, a HabrYunis, was unfair. Second, they asserted thatseats in the upper and lower houses ofparliament should be allotted according toregion rather than clan, which would have giventhem a greater number. This dispute wassupposed to be settled by a constitutionalcommittee, but discussion on a new constitutiondid not start until 1995. Egal rejected calls foranother national conference to resolve the issue.

Third, the Habr Yunis and Iidagale accusedEgal of anti-Garxajis sentiments and of forminghis government from a 'single political wing'(Bradbury, 1994a). This referred to Egal's firstchoice of cabinet ministers who included someof the most aggressive opponents of Tuur'sadministration and members of the alan asfaction within the SNM who had opposed Tuurduring the conflict in Berbera in 1992. Theimpression given was that those who fought


SOMALILAND

against the Tuur administration won the war andso undermined the spirit of reconciliationachieved at Sheik.

In November 1994, after protractednegotiations with the Iidagale militia brokedown, the government took the Iidagale-heldHargeisa airport by force. The army then went onto attack the Iidagale town of Toon. Thisgovernment act of aggression forced the Garxajisto unite against the Egal administration.

The dispute over the airport was largelymanipulated by prominent politicians, includingformer President Tuur (Habr Yunis) andGeneral Jama Mohamed Qalib 'Yare'(lidagale). In April 1994 Tuur revived anacquaintance with General Aideed, formed whenthe SNM and USC agreed to coordinateoperations against Barre, and announced hisconversion to a united federal Somalia. In 1995he joined Aideed's self-proclaimed governmentin Mogadishu as a vice-president. Jama Yare hasconsistently opposed Somaliland' s independence. However, it was not until 1995 that hejoined Aideed's government as foreign minister.Tuur's change of heart occurred in part underinducements from UNOSOM, which wasdesperate to conclude a peace deal before leavingSomalia in March 1994 and invited him toparticipate in a UN reconciliation conference.(Bryden, 1994)

Once fighting broke out, the government and'opposition' disagreed about whether theconflict was about political or clan issues. Thegovernment sought to portray the war as beingbetween proponents and opponents ofindependence, and thus claimed the moral highground. These claims were reinforced byGeneral Aideed's material support for theGarxajis and public claims that his forces werefighting the Egal administration. Thegovernment initially rejected overtures for interclan negotiations from elders, on the groundsthat this was a 'political' rather than clanstruggle. There was some legitimacy in this, asthe government could claim to represent a broadcoalition of clans. At the same time, Egal'saggressive stance was not conducive tonegotiations.

For the opposition, the 'federalist' positionwas limited to the clique of political figuressuch and Tuur and Yare. The Habr Yunis'Liiban Congress' in July 1993 and again inDecember 1994 reaffirmed their commitment toSomaliland. It was not until July 1994, at'Liiban Congress 11', that Tuur received anysupport for his position from Habr Yunis elders.


Rejection of federalism and Tuur, however, didnot translate into support for Egal. InSomaliland the Garxajis were concerned withtheir under-representation in government, thepredominance of Habr Awal political andcommercial interests in government, theinclusion in the government of alan as officers,and alleged violations of the National Charter.(The last refers to the formation of a nationalarmy and government attempts to controlHargeisa airport.) On these grounds theGarxajis elders and leadership portrayed theconflict as being clan-based.

The Burco factorIn January 1995, with a newly equipped army,the government re-asserted control overHargeisa airport. Once the capital was secured,the government's policy was to establish itsauthority in the east. In March 1995 the warspread to Burco after the national army tried totake over checkpoints in the city.

The conflict in Burco is different from that ofHargeisa. The core of the conflict here is ahistorical struggle between elements of the HabrYunis and the Habr Jeclo for control of thetown, a major commercial centre. After thefighting in January 1992 between the HabrYunis and Habr Jeclo militia, the town wasdivided and only a fragile peace existed. Withthe renewal of conflict the population of Burcoevacuated the town, the Habr Yunis moving toOodweyne and Ethiopia or east to Sanaagregion. However, elders in neighbouring Sanaagregion managed to prevent the fightingspreading to that area.

The SNM factorIn renouncing Somaliland's independence, Tuurmade an unsuccessful attempt to resurrect theSNM as a political force in order to broaden hislegitimacy within Somaliland.

EcoDomic dimensions of the warThe 1991-92 war over Berbera was dubbed the'sheep war'. While directly referring to aspecific clash over a convoy of livestockdestined for export through Berbera, the namehighlighted the economic dimensions of thatconflict. Economic growth since 1993 has beena critical factor in Somaliland's survival andEgal's success in re-establishing governmentinstitutions. The clash over Hargeisa airport was

one element in a complex economic environmentwhich involves shifting monopolies on thelivestock and qaat trade, and control of theSomaliland currency.

There were claims by both sides that the otherwas profiting from continued instability. In1995 Egal asked the vice-president toinvestigate allegations that individuals had usedmoney meant for the war effort to enrichthemselves.

Economic tensions have a clan dimension.The Habr Awal have traditionally controlled thewealth in the urban centres of Hargeisa andBerbera, with a strong foothold in Djibouti.They were important financiers of the SNM.Their wealth is based on commodity trade. TheHabr Yunis have been prominent in the civilservice since colonial times, while the Garxajisand Habr Jeclo have been prominent in thelivestock trade.

On taking office Egal's priorities were torestore law and order and create a strongrevenue. The latter involved affirminggovernment authority over the ports andairports, including Hargeisa. Egal, from the IsaMusa sub-clan of the Habr Awal from Berbera,has been able to raise taxes on the port'srevenue. As it lies within their territory theIidagale claim Hargeisa airport as their asset, asBerbera is for the Isa MusalHabr Awal.Opposition leaders further justified this positionwith the National Charter, which provides forlocal security arrangements. By taxing andharassing passengers of commercial and aidflights, the Iidagale militia affected Hargeisa'seconomy. Habr Awal businessmen in Hargeisawere particularly aggrieved. The airport wasthus a focus for a range of competing economicinterests.

The government's relationship withprominent merchants was crucial to the progressEgal made in re-establishing governmentinstitutions. Egal's main financial backers werea group of Habr Awal importers andwholesalers based in Djibouti who held amonopoly on the trade between Berbera,Hargeisa, Ethiopia and Djibouti. Whengovernment revenue was insufficient to feed theNational Army, the merchants assisted withfood for the army and police. They alsofinanced the printing of Somaliland' s newcurrency, introduced on the eve of war inOctober 1994 (see Box 11).

Before the war Hargeisa market wasbooming. Much of the early fighting inHargeisa was around the central market, an area

SOMALI LAND

where the Garxajis own many buildings. As partof the Hargeisa municipality's rehabilitationprogramme the central market was divided intosmaller markets around the city, supposedly tospread the benefits of trade. The effect, in fact,was to undermine the economy of the Garxajisin Hargeisa. The city's livestock market,traditionally located in a Garxajis area, was alsomoved by the municipality, signalling to theGarxajis a change in the monopoly in livestocktrade. In the east the livestock trade has becomedominated by a single Habr Jeclo trader, whilethe Habr Awal have become dominant in theqaat trade to western Somaliland.

These changes in trade monopolies since1994 tend to support Garxajis grievances thatthe Egal administration has strengthened the

THE NEW SOMALILAND SHILLINGControl of currency has become integral to the war inSomaliland.8 A new currency was introduced in October

1994 at the rate of 54 Somaliland shillings to the US dollar,

a rate greatly preferential to the Somali shilling. When the

government bought old Somali shillings with Somaliland

shillings at a this rate it was accused of 'the greatest

robbery in Africa'.9 The government certainly made big

profits from changing the currency. Two years later, in

October 1996, the market rate was 4,500 Somaliland

shillings to one US dollar. The immediate cause of the

devaluation was a shortage of US dollars in Somaliland.Behind this lay the central bank's failure to control the

market, the strength of the Somaliland traders compared to

the bank, and the cost of the war. Failure to establish a

banking system throughout Somaliland meant the new

currency was only introduced in Hargeisa and the west.

The war prevented its circulation to eastern regions. Indeed,

money sent from Hargeisa to the army in Burco had to be

sent in US dollars or converted into old Somali shillings.

Throughout 1995 and 1996, the government introduced

increasingly draconian policies to prevent the circulation of

old Somali shillings in the west and to control the exchange

rate. These failed to stem the devaluation. By the end of

1996, in Borama, the Ethiopian bir became the favouredcurrency.

Frequent devaluations coupled with spiralling inflation

created insecurity about being able to afford food,

particularly among Hargeisa's poor. The devaluation also

eroded government salaries. In September 1995, for

example, the price of 50 kg of sugar rose from 6,600 to

9,000 Somaliland shillings in one day. Despite this, it

became politically impossible for the government to

re-introduce the old Somali shilling as legal tender or to

withdraw the Somaliland shilling. At the end of 1996 the

government was continuing to print new Somaliland notes.


SOMALILAND

role of the Habr Awal business community.Hargeisa, which traditionally lies in Habr Awalterritory, has prospered during Egal's tenure.The Habr Awal consequently fear the impactthat a non-Habr Awal presidency would have.At the same time opposition areas have sufferedgreater economic hardship as a result of the war.

The informal economy in Somaliland isextremely strong, stimulated by lack ofgovernment regulation. However, there is littleevidence of economic growth reaching the poor.While the merchants have been prepared tomake political investments in support of the

THE LIMITS OF GOVERNMENTThe case of Sanaag region raises interesting questionsabout the reconstruction of the state in post-warSomaliland. Since the war against Siad Barre ended in1991 Sanaag has had no functioning governmentadministration. A regional guurti consisting of 36 elders, anNGO committee delegated by the guurti to liaise withinternational and local NGOs, and an education committeeand regional health team, represent the only form of localadministration. No tax revenue is collected. Based in theregional centre, Erigavo, the remit of these committees at alocal district or village level is highly limited. Badhan districtin western Sanaag, for example, does not recognise theauthority of the regional guurti.

The region has consistently rejected central governmentappointment of regional governmental officials, or theestablishment of a national police force. Some sections ofthe community feel that there is an opportunity to developnew, more appropriate forms of governance that will mixthe traditional with the 'modern'; the modern is seen tohave failed. However, had Somaliland achievedinternational recognition, allowing bilateral funds to bechannelled to government, it might have provided sufficientincentive for Sanaag to form a local administration. It mightalso have created new conflicts and supported theformation of unfair structures.

Allegations of 'corruption' within government have beenmade by both the opposition and Egal himself, and arefurther constraints to creating government structures inSomaliland. Corruption and abuse of governmentresources were major grievances against the regime ofSiad Barre. As new government structures emerge there isa danger that, without checks and balances, the mutualdependence of politicians and their clan constituencies willbecome institutionalised and corruption and nepotism willflourish. This requires a change in attitude towardsgovernment as a means of wealth distribution rather than asource of enrichment. Without this there is a risk that thesame flawed state that people fought to overthrow will berecreated in Somaliland.


government, they do not appear to be interestedin investing in infrastructure or social services.One exception is the telecommunicationscompanies that have established themselvessince 1995. The only private investment insocial welfare services is being made byinternational agencies. Where the state is unableto regulate the market, redistribution of wealthdepends entirely on the clan system. Exclusionfrom the market, or other means ofaccumulation such as through government oreven aid agencies, is a source of ongoingtension. Any settlement of the conflict will haveto address wealth distribution and the economicimbalances created by the war in which not onlyhave the 'opposition' areas lost out to theadministration's, but also rural to urban areas,and the poor to the wealthy.

Decentralisation and

governance

The future political constitution of Soma1i1and and in particular decentralisation - has beencentral to the war. Article 21 of the SomalilandNational Charter promotes the principle ofdecentralisation through the creation of regionaland district councils. However, their preciseauthority was not defined, nor implementationcovered. For example, no guidelines wereestablished on the fiscal power of localcouncils, an issue at the heart of the conflictover Hargeisa airport.

Decentralisation was one issue on which theopposition could count for broad support. It isabout more than clanism or territoriality: it is apolitical issue about governance. It wasexpected that councils would be created withinthe government's two-year mandate, yet it wasonly in the later part of 1994 that thegovernment began to tackle the issue seriously,spurred on partly by the opposition's activities.

UNOSOM's support for the formation ofdistrict and regional councils in Somalia wasbased on establishing the constitutionaltechniQalities of decentralisation. The rationalewas to support grassroots representation in aregional and central government. In Somalilandthe Egal administration placed more emphasison developing functioning local governmentstructures, with responsibilities for revenuecollection and municipal administration;political representation was a secondary issue.Hargeisa municipality was an example of this.

In early 1995 the government attempted toredraft Article 21 of the National Charter, toestablish the legal basis for a relationshipbetween the centre and the regions. However,negotiations with parliament broke down. lO Thegovernment agreed to provide some finance forlocal councils, but local representatives did notagree to generate their own sources of revenue.For example, because the regions were unableor unwilling to raise revenue to support localpolice, it was agreed that a national police forcewould continue under government authority.This, however, was seen as an infringement oflocal autonomy. Further, while the parliamentaccepted centrally-appointed executive chairmenof regional and district councils, it stipulatedthat they had to be agreed by the NationalGuurti, the Lower house, akils and elders. In theend, Egal chose the same route as Tuur bymaking appointments centrally.

Egal was required by the National Charter todraft a constitution for Somaliland, for approvalby referendum. This turned out to be acontroversial process. A constitution may helpclarify some of the issues of decentralisation,but it cannot resolve them without resources andstructures in place, and political consensus.

The role of the National Guurti

The issue of governance is related to the role ofelders, in particular the National Guurti(Assembly of Elders). The 1993 Boramaconference was an impressive example of anindigenous Somali reconciliation process, inwhich the role of lineage elders as mediators inthe internal affairs of the communities wereclearly displayed. It provided an alternativemodel to the reconciliation process promoted bythe United Nations in Somalia after theresignation of Ambassador Sahnoun.

The authority of the Somaliland elders arosefrom the failure of the first SNM governmentand a country paralysed by the conflict inBerbera. The capacity of grassroots politicalstructures to provide a mechanism for conflictresolution was demonstrated when eldersinterceded to end the war and restore stabilitythrough the Borama Conference. In the absenceof credible government, committees of eldersbecame active in all regions of the country inresponse to particular crises. The origins ofthese committees are thus rooted in conflictmanagement. The question arises as to whetherthey can have any other role in government.

The Somaliland National Guurti has its

SOMALI LAND

origins in the war against Siad Barre, and theSNM's policy to integrate traditional andmodern systems of governance (see Box 8). TheNational Guurti was written into the firstconstitution of Somaliland - the NationalCharter - with a specific role to safeguard peaceand uphold the xeer among people. The divisionof the elders and politicians into two housessought to separate domestic clan politics fromnational (and international) politics. It identified'clanism' as a potential source of conflict, andthe need for a mechanism to manage it. Thechairman of the National Guurti, Sheik Ibrahim,remarked in 1993: 'Our task is to ensuresecurity and reconciliation. The government'sresponsibility is management, administrationand development.'(Rakiya Omaar, 1993).

The war brought to light the difficulties increating a council of elders as a permanentinstitution, and of integrating so-calledtraditional and modern forms of government.An immediate result of the war was that theNational Guurti split. Members who remainedin Hargeisa were seen to be allied to thegovernment. Members of the Guurti receivesalaries and accommodation costs, which hasindebted them to the administration and is seento have compromised their neutrality.

The view of the Guurti as a neutral body, andno more than a mechanism for conflictresolution, misjudges the role of elders. Eldersare not above day-to-day happenings andintrigues. Indeed, their knowledge is drawnfrom their daily involvement in matters of theclan. It is also misleading to view the institutionof elders as static. Since colonial times, whenakils were incorporated into the colonialadministration, the role of elders has beenchanging. During the Barre era their role waspoliticised. The failure of the National Guurtito intervene in the war raised doubts aboutwhether to integrate the institution of elders intomodern government, as it left little alternativespace for inter-clan dialogue.

International relations,A further element in Somaliland's internal crisishas been the international policy environment. TheUnited Nations and the international communityhave refused to recognise Somaliland'sindependence. In this, regional governments andthe Organisation for African Unity would have totake the lead, and none to date have done so.Somaliland today is of little strategic interest toNorthern or regional powers. Some Somalis


SOMALILAND

believe there are commercial quantities of oil inSomaliland, but no company has been preparedto invest in exploration while political instabilitycontinues. Ethiopia has an interest in Somalilandremaining stable, as events in its easternneighbour can affect Somali Region Five inEthiopia. The continuation of trade throughBerbera, and prevention of any Islamicfundamentalist threat, are of particular interest toEthiopia.

Independence did not bring the anticipatedinternational assistance to Somaliland. Theconcentration of humanitarian efforts insouthern Somalia, and the UN's refusal toacknowledge and underpin the achievements ofthe Borama peace process and demobilisationefforts, have left a legacy of mistrust towardsthe United Nations. UNOSOM was asked toleave Somaliland soon after Egal assumedoffice, when assistance for the police anddemobilisation failed to materialise. Whileencouraging the formation of stableadministrations elsewhere in Somalia, the UNhas consistently failed to accept the validity ofthe authorities in Somaliland. The view inSomaliland that the United Nations has soughtto destabilise Somaliland has some validity. Attimes UNOSOM openly supported otherpolitical parties in Somaliland and encouragedcertain regions to look to Somalia rather thanSomaliland for political alliances. Perhaps mostdamaging was UNOSOM's support for thefederalist positions of Tuur and Jama Yare,which raised doubts in the internationalcommunity over Somaliland's future status.

Since the demise of UNOSOM, policymakers such as the Somali Aid CoordinationBody (SACB) have continued to refuse toengage constructively with Somaliland and toreinforce principles of good governance anddisarmament. Egal' s relations with theEuropean Union and the SACB have beenfraught. One donor representative summarisedthe international community's attitude towardsSomaliland as follows:

The image of Somalia as a place in aperpetual state of anarchy does not apply toNorth West Somalia. This is the thinking thatdonor interventions from Nairobi are basedon. Since UNOSOM was thrown out of thearea, no-one is looking to see North WestSomalia succeed. In a sense, people are justwaiting for the collapse of the North WestSomalia state. (Cited in Boyden andGoodhand, 1995: 15)


Yet lack of recogmtIOn has forced thegovernment to develop its own capacity.Although this has not brought recognition, itachieved a certain 'acceptance' (Gilkes, 1995).The British and German governments have senthigh-level delegations to Somaliland and aresupporting aid programmes, although theGerman aid programme withdrew in 1996following the kidnapping of its field director.

Relationships with regional states have beenmore problematic. Since 1991, Somaliland'srelationship with Djibouti has been fragile.Since the war against Barre, Djibouti has hosteda significant number of refugees fromSomaliland. Commercial links between the twocountries are intricate, with Somaliland'swealthiest businessmen operating out ofDjibouti. The Somaliland-Djibouti borderdissects the land of the Isa clan of the rulingfamily in Djibouti. The Djibouti governmenthas been nervous about the possible impact ofan independent Somaliland on Djibouti' sinternal politics. Since 1991 there have beenintermittent clashes along the border area overcommerce and territory.

The current Ethiopian government came topower as the Somali state collapsed. In contrastto Somalia, the transfer of power in Ethiopiawas smooth, brokered and supported by theinternational community, in particular theUnited States. The presence of refugeepopulations in Ethiopia from Somaliland, andthe political regionalisation process in Ethiopiathat has created Somali Region Five, has left theSomaliland-Ethiopian border almost redundant.Somaliland and Region Five form part of asingle cultural and economic zone. People movedaily between Hargeisa and Hartisheik inEthiopia, and many Somalis hold Ethiopianpassports. Ethiopian traded goods pass throughBerbera, and Hargeisa and Borama areimportant commercial centres for easternEthiopia.

The Ethiopian government has becomeincreasingly concerned about the activities ofIslamic movements in the Horn of Africa, andthe growth of fundamentalism in Somalia. Thiswas demonstrated by Ethiopian attacks onIslamic communities in southern Somalia in1996, and threats to Somaliland. Ethiopia has aninterest in maintaining good relations with theSomaliland government in order to curtail anypotential threats from Islamic groups. However,recognition has not been forthcoming.

=

Somaliland1996: Makeor break

Somaliland consolidates

independence

It was generally assumed that the emergence ofa 'federalist' opposition from within Somalilandsignalled the end of Somaliland's ambitions forindependence. Ironically, the effect was, ifanything, to strengthen people's resolve forindependence. After 18 months of war thefederalists had not succeeded in convincingtheir clansmen to reunite with the south. Norhad they won the support of non-Issaq clanswho have less allegiance to Somaliland. Themajor cost of the war to Somaliland was inhuman lives and in setting back recovery. Thosewho suffered most were the opposition, andtheir people who were scattered throughoutSomaliland and across the Ethiopian border.

The Harshin conference and

fi rst moves towa rd s

reconciliationThe fact that a sizeable number of Garxajisremained in Hargeisa and opposed the oppositionillustrated that this was not just a clan war, but astruggle between politicians. This impeded earlyprospects of reconciliation through inter-clandialogue. The government rejected anotherBorama-style national conference of clans.Mechanisms for inter-clan dialogue were limitedbecause members of the Guurti were divided.

In June 1995 a reconciliation conference tookplace in the village of Harshin on the borderwith Ethiopia. Initiated by concernedindividuals within Hargeisa, it involved Iidagaleelders and members of the National Guurti.Iidagalle elders were under pressure tonegotiate, as 80,000 of their people weredisplaced to Ethiopia, and UNHCR had refusedto register them. Although the meetingconcluded optimistically with future talksscheduled to take place in Hargeisa, these werepre-empted in August when the Garxajis militiaattacked Hargeisa airport.

SOMALI LAND

In September 1995 there were some signs ofcompromise on both sides. Ministerialreshuffles in that month were seen as an attemptby Egal to reduce the influence of the alan aswithin the government. Within the Garxajisthere were also changes in the militaryleadership.

A progressive peace processBy December 1995 the war appeared to havereached a stalemate, but in the absence ofdialogue or a ceasefire the situation was fragile.It was this situation that concerned'Somalilanders' from the Somali emigrantdiaspora and from within Somaliland sought torectify through the intervention of the 'PeaceCommittee for Somaliland' (see Box 13).

From May 1996 a peace process began tounfold in Somaliland through a number of intraand inter-clan peace meetings. The processevolved along two fronts: one in the westbetween the Iidagale and the Hargeisa clans toresolve the Hargeisa conflict, the other in theeast involving Habr Jeclo and Habr Yunis toresolve the Burco conflict.

In July 1996 representatives of the Iidagaleand Hargeisa clans met in Camp Abokor inEthiopia and reached an agreement on 'peacefulcoexistence' (Ahmed Farah Yusuf, 1996b). TheCamp Abokor conference - Geedi-SocadkaNabadda ee Beelaha Hargeisa ('ProgressivePeace Process Initiated by the Clans inHargeisa') - was considered by many as abreakthrough, being the first substantive talksbetween the Iidagale and representatives of theHargeisa clans, in particular the SaadMusa/Habr Awal. The Peace Committee forSomaliland played a significant role in theorganisation and facilitation of this conference.It also garnered the support of the Ethiopianauthorities of Somali Region Five (AhmedYusuf Farah, 1996a). The Camp Abokormeeting resolved (ibid):• that local groups in Hargeisa area should live

together 'harmoniously' and collaborate inrestoring stability and peaceful coexistence• to conduct a follow-up meeting to continue thepeace dialogue, and to hold a second conferencein Somaliland on 15 August.

The Camp Abokor conference was to befollowed by a meeting in Baali Gubadle inSomaliland between elders of the Hargeisaclans and the Iidagale. However, thegovernment opposed the meeting and it wascancelled. Consequently, the Peace Committeedid not manage to turn the Abokor meeting into


SOMALlLAND

a wider peace process between the Garxajis andthe government. Egal's attitude towards thePeace Committee had been ambivalent from thebeginning. Rumour and speculation suggestedthat he was suspicious of its motives, and that heviewed the Camp Abokor meeting's success asa threat to his own authority and influence overforthcoming presidential elections (see below).

The peace process in the east proved moresuccessful. Since 1991 Burco has suffered twomajor wars. A peace settlement here would beof great significance for Somaliland. Thereconciliation process in Burco primarilyinvolved the Habr Yunis and Habr Jeclo whoare predominant in Burco, with the Arap and IsaMusa/Habr Awal who live in the area alsoparticipating. The peace process here in factevolved faster than that in the west. Its success

THE PEACE COMMITTEE FOR SOMALILAND

helped the check the war, and provided animpetus for the Camp Abokor meeting.

The first meeting between the Habr Jeclo andHabr Yunis came under pressure from theEthiopian authorities after fighting between theclans over a water tank on the Ethiopian side ofthe border threatened to spread. The two clansmet three times from May 1996. This, coupledwith a withdrawal of Somaliland governmentsoldiers from around Burco, appears to havecreated the opening for reconciliation. A peaceagreement was finalised in the town of Beer inOctober 1996. While the Peace Committee wasable to provide some financial support to thispeace process, it was the clans in the area whomade the largest investments.

Tensions between the Habr Yunis and HabrJeclo in Burco stretch back to colonial times.


The Peace Committee for

Somaliland has its origins in a

series of consultations within the

Somaliland diaspora during early

1995. In the absence of any

genuine moves towardsreconciliation between the

government and opposition, and

the apparent failure of the

Somaliland elders to intervene,

these consultations concluded that

there was a need to convene an

independent mission to try to broker

dialogue between the warring

parties.The Peace Committee defined

itself as a committee of

'intellectuals', and received its

mandate from a conference of

Somaliland intellectuals held in

London in April 1995 (Peace

Committee for Somaliland, 1995).

The committee relied heavily on

funding from the diaspora and its

members' individual efforts and

commitment, although some

external resources were raised.

The membership has changed

since 1995. This has enabled the

committee to remain adaptable and

maintain its independence.

The Peace Committee was first

convened in Addis Ababa in

September 1995. The initial goals

of the committee were (ibid):

• to achieve an immediate

ceasefire wherever armed conflict

prevails• to prepare a framework and

venue for dialogue and negotiation

• to prepare a report on lessonslearned that could be useful in

preventing similar conflicts in the

region.

In addition, the committee stated

that it would disband once a

ceasefire had been achieved, and

an agreement reached by the

parties to resolve their differences

through dialogue.

Those objectives later widened to

promote substantive discussions

that would address some of the

causes of the conflict. These

included discussions on what would

constitute a 'viable government' in

Somaliland and the relevance of

'traditional systems ofgovernance' .11

The strategy of the Peace

Committee was twofold. First, to

treat the Burco and Hargeisa

conflicts separately and encourage

dialogue between clans with vested

interests in those areas. Second, to

encourage dialogue at the level of

the grassroots political structures of

the clan, rather than 'government'

and 'opposition'. This strategy

involved promoting parallel dialogue

between the Habr Yunis and Habr

Jeclo to resolve the war in the east,

and between the lidagale and

Hargeisa over fighting in the west.\

Depending on the outcome, the

next step was to facilitate dialogue

between the government and

Garxajis opposition in Hargeisa,

followed by a constitutional

conference (Peace Committee for

Somaliland, 1996).

The Committee had to contend

with suspicion about its 'agenda'

and the ambitions of its members.

However, given that the traditional

mechanisms appeared not to be

working, the intransigence of the

government and opposition, and

the failure of those within the

country to break the deadlock, the

need for a 'third party' was

accepted by many people. The

Peace Committee managed to put

the issue of peace back on the

agenda in Somaliland (Ahmed

Yusuf Farah, 1996a). In the words of

one Somali:

The Peace Committee for

Somaliland introduced the word

'peace' at a time when non-one

was talking about peace. That

helped.12

The current rapprochement between theseprotagonists and other eastern clans at Beer wasinterpreted by some Somalis as an alliance ofconvenience to challenge Egal's government. 13

It was particularly significant that the HabrYunis agreed to negotiate at Beer within theframework of Somaliland, thus repudiating thefederalist position they once held. However,while united in Beer, both the Habr Yunis andthe Habr Jeclo were themselves divided alongsub-clan lines, with some allied to thegovernment. A concerted effort will be neededfrom all sides to ensure the long-term securityand peace of Togdheer.

It had been envisaged by the PeaceCommittee that a successful process in the eastand west would pave the way to a constitutionalconference, similar to the Borama conference of1993 (Peace Committee for Somaliland, 1996;Ahmed YusufFarah, 1996b). Plans to widen thediscourse, however, were interrupted by thecancellation of the Baali Gubadle conferenceand the National Guurti's announcement of itsintention to call a national congress.

Shir Bee/eedkaWhen President Egal's term of office wasextended by 18 months he was required to bringthe war to an end, introduce a constitution andprepare elections. By mid 1996 the government,parliament and National Guurti were perceivedby many Somalis to have failed on all thesecounts.

Two draft constitutions were produced, oneby a Sudanese lawyer contracted by thepresident, and a second by a parliamentarycommittee. In May 1996 heated discussionsover these constitutions led to a vote of noconfidence in the chair of the parliament, andthe boycott of parliament by some thirtyparliamentarians and Guurti members claiminginterference from the president. 14

The 18-month extension of Egal's term ofoffice was due to end on 4 November 1996. Inthe absence of an agreed constitution multiparty elections could not be held. In thissituation, it was understood that four monthsbefore the expiry of the government's mandatethe Guurti would announce the date for anational conference to select a new presidentand vice-president. In September the Guurtiannounced the date for a national congress (theShir Beeleedka or Congress of Clans).

The announcement, and subsequent openingof the Shir Beeleedka in Hargeisa on 15 October

SOMALlLAND

1996, raised political tensions in Somaliland.Concerns were raised about the timing, location,legitimacy and organisation of the Congress.

First, it was argued that the Congress couldnot proceed without a cessation of hostilitiesand a peace agreement; reconciliation was aprerequisite for a meaningful Congress. Thefact that the Congress in Hargeisa openedbefore the conference in Beer was concludedraised the possibility of there being twoconferences, leading to the selection of twopresidents. Given the precedent of southernSomalia, this was seen as extremely dangerous.Egal's supporters were more positive, arguingthat there would be room within the conferencefor reconciliation. Participants at Beer decidedto send a delegation to the Hargeisa Congressrather than holding a separate conference.However, when the Congress opened there waslittle indication that those Iidagale outsideHargeisa would participate.

Second, the appropriateness of makingHargeisa the venue for the congress wasquestioned. The eastern clans wanted theconference to take place in Sheik. This wasrejected by the Guurti.

Third, the legitimacy of the Congress wasquestioned. Many Somalis argued thatprocedures set out in National Charter werebeing ignored. People objected to the the Guurtigiving only 10 days' notice for the start of theCongress. The government and Guurti wereaccused of influencing the selection ofdelegates, rather than them being chosen bytheir clans. Furthermore, the legality of theexisting members of the Guurti and parliamenthaving voting rights in the Congress wasquestioned. The Congress was to comprise 300voting delegates, to include 150 from the Guurtiand parliament and 150 new delegates. Therewould also be 100 invited observers. Thoseopposed to the Congress argued that the currentGuurti should not automatically have votingrights unless chosen by their clans. Theopposition in particular viewed the Guurti asimpartial.

Finally, it was argued that it was unclearwhether the Congress's main purpose was tobring about reconciliation, to appoint a newpresident or decide on a constitution. In theopinion of some Somalis, time was required todiscuss the failures and successes of the pasttwo administrations before a new administrationwas selected or constitution introduced.

The government, however, gave little spacefor debate on these issues. Before the opening a


SOMALlLAND

petition signed by 79 Somaliland 'intellectuals'called on the Guurti to rethink its approach andto establish 'an independent neutral Guurti andpreparatory committee in order to have anational conference based on free, equitablerepresentation of the whole population' .15

However, all informal approaches and formalpetitions to the government and Guurtiregarding the Congress were rejected, theactivities of the Peace Committee wereproscribed and ministers suspected ofquestioning the government's actions weredismissed. The Guurti and government's refusalto countenance any debate on the Congressalarmed many people.

Fission and fusionDespite announcing earlier that he would notstand for re-election in November 1996, Egalannounced his candidacy. Several factorsfavoured his re-election. One was a fear amongpeople in western Somaliland of losing thebenefits accrued during his administration if anew president was selected. A second reasonhad to do with the influence Egal was able toassert over the Congress. A major differencebetween the 1996 Congress and the 1993Borama Conference was that in 1993 there wasno functioning government with any resourcesto guide the process.

As the opening of the Congress of Clansapproached, Somaliland appeared to be moredivided and fragmented than at any time sincesecession. Clan unity was no longer a given,with many divided in their attitude towards theEgal administration. For example, in October,the paramount suldaan of the Habr Yunisdecided to join the Congress, which was a majorcoup for the government. A second Habr Yunissuldaan, however, remained in Beer. Similarly,among the Iidagale, the suldaan remainedcritical of the government, while a leadingIidagale akil joined the Congress. Divisionsexisted within the Gadabursi who put forwardfive candidates for vice-president. Even Egal'sown sub-clan was divided. This fragmentationwas in part precipitated by the government'sappointment of new akils and suldaans.

Fragmentation among the clans, whilepossibly precipitating a move away from clanbased politics, was happening for the wrongreasons. The financial benefits of being ingovernment or allied to government wascreating competition within clans to fill the 150seats for delegates at the Congress. This


competItion caused one Somali observer tocomment: 'The clans do not work collectivelytogether any more.' 16

By December, 12 people had announced theircandidature for president. The criteria set by theGuurti for the president immediately ruled outseveral of them. The Congress also agreed on aconstitution and adopted a new flag. Given thatall these decisions went in Egal' s favour though not without some opposition - there wasevery indication at the end of 1996 that hewould be re-selected (see note 19).

Reconsidering the role of

elders and the National

GuurtiA knowledgeable observer on Somalilandsuggested that the series of inter-clan peaceconferences in Somaliland in 1996 was proofthat 'the traditional method of resolving conflictand political uncertainty in Somaliland nowoffer the best solution' for the country'sproblems (Ahmed YusufFarah, 1996b). In 1993the elders of Somaliland won plaudits frommany quarters for the way in which theyintervened to restore some semblance of peace.The 1993 Borama conference was described byone commentator as 'a triumph of discourseover armed conflict' (Rakiya Omaar, 1993).

The National Charter adopted at Boramadefined the role of the elders as safeguardingpeace. However, in the euphoria of Borama therole of the National Guurti was onlysuperficially specified. The mechanism forselecting the Guurti was poorly defined. Thosewho became the National Guurti in 1993 wereactive individuals, but were largely self-selectedrather than selected by their clans.

In the light of the war, the subsequent peaceprocesses, and the organisation of the shirbeeleedka, some Somalis were concerned thatthe Guurti had failed to follow the NationalCharter which they were responsible forintroducing. Elders were 'traditionally'expect~d to intervene in a conflict. According toone Somali the National Guurti had notperformed that role:

They will not go to an area of conflictbecause they fear for their lives. They firstask permission from the government. Theyask for a per diem to go anywhere. I?

The perceived failure of the elders led to theintervention of the Peace Committee forSomaliland.

Councils or committees of elders aretraditionally ad hoc institutions concerned withmanaging pastoral resources or local clandisputes. They form in response to a crisis anddissolve once it is resolved. Given the perceivedfailings of the Guurti, there is some doubt as towhether the it should be a permanent institutionrather than functioning as an independent adhoc, task-focused committee that responds toparticular crisis.

While much of the discussion around the ShirBeeleedka focused on the presidential election,there was only limited discussion about whatwould happen to the current members of theGuurti and parliament. The assumption ofvoting rights by the Guurti was seen by someSomalis as an attempt by its members to sustaintheir positions. People pointed to Egal'sstatement that 'those who extended my periodof office also extended their own'.

Somali social institutions are far from static.The traditional role of the suldaan is perceivedto have changed. The office once held onlysymbolic power (Lewis, 1961): the suldaanwere said to stand above the fight to maintain aimpartial role that enabled them to intervene ina conflict, but now they appear to be assuming apolitical role. The Iidagale suldaan who led hispeople to war in Hargeisa brandishing aKalashnikov goes against the traditional image.The suldaan in Somaliland are also increasingin number: there were twice as many in 1993 asthere had been at independence (Ahmed YusufFarah, 1993). In 1995 the Dolbahunte were saidto have six garaad (ie suldaan) compared withtwo before the war.

The role of religious leaders is also perceivedto have changed. One Somali commented: 'Ifyou see a Sheik entering the office of thegovernment, suspect his religion.' 18 There is asense that the activities of some of the elders,sultans and religious leaders have contributed toa perceived decline in values.

SOMALILAND

Future prospects

In mid 1996 the Peace Committee and othercommentators concluded that the opportunitiesfor restoring peace in Somaliland had 'neverbeen better' (Ahmed YusufFarah, 1996a; PeaceCommittee for Somaliland, 1996). This wasbased on a view that the Egal administration'sterm of office was ending. There was anopportunity for the transfer of power to a newadministration, in such a way as to avoiddemolishing of Egal's achievements. Inaddition, the opposition appeared to havesoftened their position on negotiations with thegovernment and had clarified their position onSomaliland. The influence of the federalistpoliticians had for the moment beenmarginalised. The possibility of negotiationswithin a single political framework thereforeexisted. However, by the end of 1996 thisoptimistic view was fading. Egal's ambivalencetowards the peace process, a public feeling thathe was intent on retaining power, and concernsover the Congress did not augur well for thefuture.

The Congress, however, offered theopportunity for compromise, and time toaddress some of the issues that couldconsolidate peace and stability in Somaliland.Having opened on 15 October 1996, formalbusiness was immediately suspended whilenegotiations were held with a delegation fromthe Beer conference. The concerted effort toavoid having two congresses resulting in twopresidential elections was a sign thatSomalilanders were tired of war. At the end of1996 Somaliland stood at a critical juncture.The outcome of the Shir Beeleedka will shapethe future of Somaliland and peace in theregion. 19


~----------------- -

SOMALILAND

International• •assistance In

Somaliland

Even before the civil -war Somalia wasconsidered one of the poorest countrIes III

Africa. Somaliland's development needs aregreater now than before. In 1991, immediatelyafter the war, there were no functioning townwater supplies, no sanitation infrastructure, onlybasic emergency health services and nofunctioning schools throughout Somali1and.Basic infrastructure banking, roads,communications, transport - required extensiverehabilitation. Urban unemployment was high.In 1996, despite strides in rehabilitatingeducation and health systems, basic welfareservices remained minimal, particularly forrural populations. Urban problems of sanitation,employment, home construction, and civicamenities are likely to rise as the urbanpopulations grow. Environmental issues ofrange management and changes in landownership are also likely to increase inimportance. The welfare of refugees and thedisplaced remains a critical issue, as doesdemobilisation and the clearing of land mines.Access to information, both historical andcontemporary, for government and NOOs in allthese areas is lacking. Indeed, needs exist inevery sector.

One informed observer described theinternational response to humanitarian needs inSomaliland as 'too little, too late, too slow, toobureaucratic' (Oilkes, 1993). Certainly comparedwith southern Somalia, Somaliland has receivedminimal assistance. The lack of internationalrecognition of Somaliland means that it does notqualify for bilateral aid and has been eligibleonly for humanitarian assistance. Although someof this help includes medium-term funding (ofone to two years) it is disbursed solely throughUN agencies and international non-governmentalorganisations. The numbers of internationalNOOs and UN agencies have fluctuated greatlydepending on the policy environment andfunding. Fragile security and the lack ofsubstantial funding for long-term assistancehave meant that emergency preparedness andresponse have remained a significant part ofinternational assistance programmes.


The progress in rehabilitating basic socialservices is all the more impressive .given thesmall amount spent by the internationalcommunity in Somaliland. The largestproportion of external assistance has been inhealth, education, water and sanitation. Somelimited investment has been made in theagricultural and veterinary sectors. With theexception of water supplies there has been littleinvestment in essential infrastructure, althoughthe European Union plans to invest in roadmaintenance and the rehabilitation of portfacilities at Berbera, and the United Nationsplans to upgrade the airfields. Overall, there is abias in international assistance programmestowards the major urban centres such asHargeisa. Evidence of increased poverty in ruralareas (Ahmed Mohamed Hashi, 1996) suggeststhat this bias needs to be rectified.

The war in Somalia and Somaliland has notonly devastated the physical and economic baseof the country, but also the human andinstitutional - government and civic structures. Little international assistance has beenchannelled through government institutions or hasbeen directed at strengthening them. In contrast,several agencies, have supported 'capacitybuilding' for local Somali non-governmentalorganisations (see Boxes 14 and 15).

After UNOSOM withdrew from Somalia, theUN Coordination Team for Somalia (UNCT)headed by the UNDP resident representative,and senior UN staff, established bases inNairobi along with the donors' forum, SACB,chaired by the European Union. Based inNairobi, their perspectives are influenced moreclosely by events in Somalia, to the detriment ofinformed decision-making on Somaliland.

Both the Tuur and Egal administrations havesought to regulate and exert some control overinternational assistance programmes, arguingthat international agencies often confuse therole of 'guidance' and 'assistance'. At differenttimes and through various means they havesought to tax the aid programmes, often whenthe government is in financial straits. In March1995 me government drafted new agreementsfor international agencies and issued a paperwith eight 'ground rules' for cooperation.20 Thesignificant rules were:

• acceptance of the 'reality of the existence ofthe Republic of Somaliland, and the authorityof its government'• the integration of assistance programmesinto a national development plan• a requirement that agencies bring all their

•

hard currency into the country and openaccounts with the National Bank

• a requirement that agencies inform theMinistry of the Interior of all movements, inreturn for which the government guaranteessecurity• the acceptance by agencies of 'accountabilityand transparency for funds allocated toSomaliland'• the recruitment of Somaliland nationals,unless required qualifications are locallyunavailable.

These ground rules would be minimalrequirements for international agencies workingin most countries. In Somaliland mostinternational agencies, bar the United Nationsowing to political constraints, had littleobjection to the demands. However, agenciesobjected to using the National Bank, given thefragility of governmental institutions. In 1992one agency lost all the funds raised from foodmonetisation that were deposited in the bankwhen war broke out in Berbera. There were noguarantees, and indeed much suspicion, thatfunds deposited in the bank would be used tosupport the government's war effort.Furthermore, agencies were concerned thatagreeing to these ground rules in a politicallydivided country could be interpreted as anovertly political act.

Although the Tuur and Egal administrations'motives for wanting to regulate internationalassistance more closely may be suspect, theyidentified the need for coordination andcoherence in assistance programmes. Indifferent regions of Somaliland internationalagencies with varied philosophies and interestsimplement very different kinds of developmentprogrammes, and there is little attempt tocoordinate or learn from each other, let aloneinvolve local communities and authorities. Theresult is fragmentation and competition ratherthan consensus. (Bradbury, 1996)

After UNOSOM withdrew, internationalfunding for Somalia and Somaliland declined.The six-month US$70 million, UNConsolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Somaliain December 1994 raised only US$13 million infive months (UN Department of HumanitarianAffairs, 1995). The reduction in emergencyfunding for Somalia and Somaliland resulted inseveral agencies scaling down their operations.Since 1996, possibly as a result of decliningresources, there has been a shift in donors'policy towards supporting areas of stability,rather than instability. Consequently, there has

SOMALlLAND

LOCAL NON-GOVERNMENTALORGANISATIONS (LNGOs)The indigenous NGO sector in Somalia goes back to theearly 1980s and the Ethiopian refugee crisis (MohamedSheikh Abdillahi, 1996: 39). World Bank structuraladjustment programmes in the late 1980s further stimulatedthe sector's growth. However, as a consequence of war, thecollapse of government, and the international intervention inSomalia, there has been a proliferation of local NGOsthroughout Somalia and Somaliland.

In Somaliland most were founded by Somaliprofessionals displaced by the war and living incommunities of their kin. Limited job opportunities and agenuine concern to meet urgent rehabilitation needs hasled to the creation of local NGOs as a means of gainingaccess to resources for their communities. The lack of aninternationally recognised government has meant thatinternational assistance agencies have also sought out localNGOs as indigenous partners to work through. In 1996, inHargeisa alone, the government had registered 80 localNGOs (Bradbury, 1997). In Somali land the rapidproliferation of local NGOs has led to fragmentation,competition and conflict, and done little to supportreconciliation, consensus building or the reconstruction ofaccountable community based structures or government.

The local NGO sector, however, is extremely fluid,reflecting the opportunistic nature of many of theorganisations. As government structures have grown inHargeisa, employment opportunities for professionals haveimproved, and the numbers of local NGOs declined. Anumber of local NGOs were also displaced and somedivided by the war.

The rich variety of LNGOs meets different local needs.Many represent particular sub-clans and the locality thatthey work in. However, it is possible to distinguish betweenthose with a genuine social concern and those which areineffectual or purely interested in getting access toresources. Since 1995 efforts among a number of localNGOs at self-definition and self-regulation have begun tobear fruit with the emergence of a more professional andcoherent local NGO community (Mohamed SheikhAbdillahi, 1997). Indeed, efforts at self-regulation andcoordination are in many ways in advance of internationalagencies.

The growth of NGOs and donor support for NGOs overthe past decade 'Parallels the dismantling of the statewelfare institutions in favour of privatised welfare (Riddell,1992; Duffield, 1994). International NGOs should reflect onthe implications of this in approaching capacity building orinstitutional strengthening in Somaliland. Openness to theseissues will mean that international NGOs are better able toevaluate whether or not they are helping to strengthen localinstitutions and contribute to a more stable, just andequitable environment.


SOMALlLAND

In politically stable environmentsdevelopment agencies have come

to see institutional development asan important 'empowering' strategy.Humanitarian interventions inwar-related disasters, such as inSomalia, however, have tended toneglect the institutional or structuralcauses of the crisis in favour ofdelivering commodities and basicservices. Civic and civil structuresare often neglected and allowed toerode. (Bradbury, 1996)

A community's vulnerabilityarises as much from organisational,institutional or political weakness, asfrom lack of material or physicalwell-being. Likewise, individualvulnerability arises as much fromthe breakdown of social structuresand groups (the family, community,village) as from lack of materialresources. During wars it isnecessary to support and maintaincivil and civic structures before theybreak down completely. 'Capacitybuilding' to maintain or strengthensuch structures should be anessential part of the humanitarianresponse to war-related disasters.

In civil wars where the state hascollapsed, it can be difficult toidentify 'legitimate' political and civicstructures to support and work with,and by what criteria. Programmesto build or strengthen institutional

capacity are often premised onexternal agencies' definitions ofwhat is legitimate. UNOSOM'sattempts to create civiladministrations in southern Somaliafoundered when communities failedto accept their legitimacy. In manyplaces clan-based councils of eldersproved more acceptable. InSomaliland the failure of international

donors and UN agencies to

recognise the legitimacy ofindigenous councils or their right toappoint their choice of governmenthas undermined recovery.

In war-related emergenciesefforts should be made to support

cope with disaster and recovery.In Somaliland the government

expressed concern that assistanceprogrammes through local NGOsare not reaching the mostvulnerable or marginalised groups such as the Gabooya ('outcastes').22Building the capacity of publicvoluntary organisations to providewelfare safety nets, or to undertakethe roles previously carried out bygovernment, does not have aparticularly successful history in theWest or elsewhere in Africa. There isno reason why it should be anymore effective in Somaliland.

To date, capacity building oflocal NGOs in Somaliland, hasinvolved little more thanstrengthening sub-contractingrelations. If other rationales exist such as strengthening civicinstitutions as a balance togovernment, improving theeffectiveness and sustainability ofdevelopment interventions,strengthening livelihood securitysystems, or enabling communitiesto cope with disasters - then theyare poorly articulated.

While some forms of capacitybuilding may enable communities todeal with the 'shocks' of a naturaldisaster, there is little understandingof how to build people's capacitiesto deal with the shocks of politicalinstability and conflict. War may befought to increase the material andpolitical capacity of one group atthe expense of another. Indeed,while the government of Somalilandhas welcomed capacity buildingprogrammes for local NGOs, therehas been apprehension that the neteffect may be to build the capacityof those constituencies which the

NGOs are associated with. At thesame time, the government isinterested in building the capacity ofits own institutions. In a politicallycharged environment, involvementin capacity building is thus fraughtwith dangers.

CAPACITY BUILDING IN SOMALILAND

indigenous forms of socialorganisation that offer alternatives topredatory military structures(Prendergast, 1995). Localauthorities - whether indigenouscommunity structures, civic orgovernmental structures - must beencouraged away from predatoryrelations with vulnerablepopulations, to relationships built onreciprocity. However, under therubric of strengthening civil societythis frequently involves internationalagencies, often ignorant of otherstructures to work with, encouragingthe growth of indigenous NGOs.Capacity building here oftenconsists of little more thanstrengthening organisations ofprofessionals to implement projectsdesigned by international agencies.

In Somaliland, capacity buildingprogrammes supported byinternational agencies to date havebeen primarily concerned with the'organisational development' oflocal NGOs. Training has focusedon management skills, strategicplanning, administration, andapproaches to participatorydevelopment. The impact of thismay be seen in the strength anddurability of some local groups thathave received this kind of support.However, it says little about theirimpact. The net effect may be thedevelopment of local organisationsin the image of international NGOs,but dependent on external support.In Somali land many localorganisations have adopted thelabel of NGO when in fact some aremore like businesses and should berecognised and supported as such.

Support to local NGOs and civil •society is considered a non-political

activity, and therefore easy to justifyin a politically charged environment.However, international agenciesneed to question the extent towhich building the capacity of suchorganisations actually helps tostrengthen communities' ability to


s

been new interest in Somaliland, and withit a move from relief to developmentalprogramming.22 The shift, however, begs manyquestions. Not least of these are: What kind ofdevelopment? And which institutions onthe ground are appropriate to implementdevelopment? One observer on Somalia noted:

Many of today's 'reconstruction' and'rehabilitation' programmes are designed todo little more than to repair, piecemeal, theruins of the former system; UN agencies andNGOs rarely consider to what extent theirprogrammes may replicate the profoundlyflawed and dysfunctional expansion of theold unsustainable, largely artificial, and aiddependent Somali state. (Bryden, 1995)

Given a largely unsatisfactory history of aidprogrammes in Somalia, some observers haveargued for a reduction of external assistance asthe best way forward (de Waal, 1995). The 'aiddependent' state will no longer be something tofight over. Foreign aid will no longer destabilisethe political process and fuel fighting in the waythat it has done in the south. It will also requirepeople to rely on their own resources.

It could be argued that the lack ofinternational intervention in Somaliland hasindeed provided a space for people to reestablish 'social contracts' without thedistractions of aid. However, it has also delayedthe process of recovery. A policy ofabandonment has left the region isolated andmarginalised, and its population vulnerable tothe machinations of political elites and regionaland international forces. The alternative toabandonment is to identify appropriate forms ofassistance that strengthen internal efforts torebuild a more stable social, political andeconomic order.

Here one might take the lead from Somaliswhose efforts through forums such as theBorama conference, if not totally successful,have focused on addressing the institutionaldimensions of the crisis. The Boramaconference was a missed opportunity for theinternational community in Somaliland. Timelyand appropriate international support to back upthe resolutions of that conference might havehelped to avert the crisis that erupted in 1994.

At the end of 1996 most donors and aidagencies had adopted a 'wait and see' positionon the National Congress. Given that this was acritical juncture in Somaliland, this waspotentially a very negative response.

SOMALI LAND

WOMEN IN SOMALILANDDuring the war against Siad Barre women werean invisible front for the SNM, working as nursesand medics. They were also a lifeline for thefamily, taking relatives out of the country. Asrefugees in Europe they remitted money back tothe country. Able to travel in Somalia more freelythan men, women maintained channels ofcommunication and were extremely important astraders. In the Ethiopian refugee camps Issaqwomen established trading networks that ranbetween the Persian Gulf, Djibouti andMogadishu.

During the Barre era women were politicallyactive in the north demonstrating against theregime. Many of the most active SomalilandNGOs are headed by women, and many womenare active in the new Islamic movements. In 1992and 1993 women played a significant role insupporting peace and reconciliation. Thisincluded exerting pressure on the elders tomediate in the Berbera conflict, organisingdemonstrations in Hargeisa in support of peace,petitioning Tuur's administration to sue for peace,and providing some logistics and financialsupport. This critical role was finallyacknowledged by the Guurti at the Boramaconference of 1993. Women were given greateropportunity than usual to recite poems at theconference.

In post-war Somaliland women are often thesole providers of family income as petty traders.Among pastoralist communities women havetaken on increased responsibilities for familylivelihoods. While men acknowledge this, it hasnot translated into increased decision-makingpowers for women (Ahmed Mohamed Hashi,1996). The roles and rights of women have notbeen recognised in the distribution of employmentopportunities. Men have had first priority in alljobs in government institutions and welfareservices. Although there was a woman in Egal'sfirst cabinet in 1993, the post proved temporary.

After the outbreak of war in November 1994the activities of NGOs headed by womendeclined. Like ttfe male organisations they weresubject to the political divisions in society. Manywomen leaders were displaced. By 1996 somewomen's NGOs had been revitalised, andwomen again began to be active in peace andreconciliation. For the first time women'sorganisations were invited to attendNational Conference as observers in 1996.(Bradbury, 1997)


l

SOMALlLAND

War andhumanitarianintervention

The impact of the Somali

Civil War

In 1992, at the height of the conflict and famine,the situation in Somalia was described by oneUS diplomat as 'the worst humanitarian crisisfaced by any people in the world'. By the end ofthat year more than 500,000 people had died(twice the number that perished in Bosnia), and1.5 million people, including the majority of thenon-Somali population, had sought refugeoutside the country. Many more Somalis havesince died.

The war has affected all parts of Somalia andSomaliland. Only the north-eastern regions ofSomalia and Sool and Awdal regions ofSomaliland escaped the worst of the violence.However, as the state collapsed, these areas, likeothers, were affected by the pressures ofdestitute and traumatised people displaced bythe war. Whole communities were uprooted.The majority of the non-Somali population leftthe country. The war destroyed housing, urbanindustry, communications, social services andagricultural infrastructure. In Hargeisa alone60,000 houses were destroyed. From Hargeisaand Galkaiyo to the Kenyan border, governmentand public buildings were ransacked.

Since 1990 there have been extensivemovements of people within the country. In1992 an estimated 2 million Somalis wereinternally displaced. Most populationmovements involved people fleeing from theviolence, although agricultural and othereconomic opportunities in the south, includingt1lQse provided by aid agencies, attractedaggressive clan expansion. In places thisinvolved 'clan cleansing' (Lewis and Mayall,1995: xvi). Traditionally in Somali pastoralsociety there are no fixed land rights. Oneconsequence of the war has been that clans havetended to assert territorial rights more generally,based on traditional or recently conqueredspheres of interest.

Within the broad political alliances that


developed during the war (see Box 17),Somalia, and to an extent Somaliland, has beenleft with a maze of localised polities. Theseinclude councils of elders, the remnants ofUNOSOM initiated district councils, and inplaces religious authorities which haveinstituted Islamic law (shari'a).

These varied polities represent new forms ofadaptation to the collapse of the state. In theabsence of state institutions they perform someof the essential functions of governance. Insome areas councils of clan elders haveestablished local security systems incooperation with militia. These councils areinvolved in negotiating external relations withaid agencies, and provide the main source oflocal authority and nascent administrations. Innorth Mogadishu, Islamic courts fill a vacuumin social control and security, although theemergence of Islamic fundamentalists is asource of concern for many Somalis. Thesevaried polities have become the first point ofcontact for international agencies. Theirlegitimacy and authority should be measured onthe basis of their local support, theirperformance and their standards of goodgovernance, rather than the bureaucratic needsof foreign donors and NGOs (Menkhaus andPrendergast, 1995).

Many Somali intellectuals, politicians, andthe international community generally, haveargued that regulation and security can beprovided only by re-establishing a strong stateauthority. However, doing so would have tocontest with political, social and economicforces that continue to promote statelessness.These include interests that profit from theeconomy of plunder, militia leaders whosepower base rests on mobilisation and fear, andentire clans that benefit from the occupation ofvaluable real estate in Mogadishu and theriverine valleys. It is acknowledged that therecan be no military victory for any Somalifaction. The reasons for the continuation of theconflict must therefore lie elsewhere. InSomaliland the incentive for reconciliation andpeac~ul coexistence must contest with, in thewords of Egal, the 'project' of war.

The UN's lost agendaIn 1993 UNOSOM 11, with a budget ofUS$1.5 billion, was at the time the mostexpensive UN peacekeeping operation in theworld; the next was Bosnia at US$222 million.Somalia was host to the greatest number of UN

s

troops ever deployed in a peacekeepingoperation. It was the first time the United Nationsinvoked powers of peace enforcement underChapter VII of the UN Charter. UNOSOM inSomalia was therefore an experiment for the UNin which the stakes were high (Bradbury, 1994a;Slim and Visman, 1994).

Coming at the end of the Cold War, theSomali civil war became a testing ground forthe international community's response toviolent conflict and humanitarian crises in a'new world order' . In particular it became a trialfor the United Nations's envisaged role as theinternational arbiter of conflicts (Boutros Ghali,1992). UNOSOM was one of a growing numberof humanitarian operations in the early 1990sthat sought to assist war-affected civiliansduring an on-going conflict (Karim et aI, 1996).It thus had international significance for theevolution of humanitarian policy and conflictmanagement. The United States, following itssuccess leading the allies in the Gulf War wasalso exercising its authority as the world'sremaining superpower. There was alsosuspicion that US military intervention inSomalia was a move to protect US oilinvestments (Parenti, 1996: 437).23

UNOSOM's policies and actions in Somaliawere thus dominated more by the politicalagendas of the United Nations and United Statesthan those of the Somali people. The vestedinterests of parties within UNOSOM impededits ability to respond adequately to the situation.Although humanitarian assistance undoubtedlyhelped to save thousands of lives in the southand restored some public services, the politicaland military sides of the operation wereignominious failures, which have had farreaching implications for UN missions inBosnia and Rwanda. Despite six internationallysponsored peace conferences, the UnitedNations failed to restore stability in the south.

Two schools of thought have dominatedapproaches to reconciliation and peacebuilding inSomalia. One advocates engaging with thewarlords, as the de facto political leaders in thesouth. The other advocates engaging with a'grassroots' constituency through localised,indigenous and democratic peacemakingprocesses in which the warlords are marginalised.UNOSOM pursued both tracks, engaging with thewarlords and their factions through internationallybrokered peace conferences, and a widerconstituency through the formation of districtcouncils. Both approaches were problematic. Thewarlords' participation in the political process

SOMALlLAND

through peace conferences helped legitimisethem and restrict the emergence of alternativeleaders. In some areas the district councils didprovide a vehicle for improved inter-clan

POLITICAL FRAGMENTATIONIn the course of the war the Somali state has fractured intosemi-autonomous regions, controlled by clan-based militaryorganisations and varied fragile forms of local administration.In 1995 the main political factions and alliances consisted ofthe following (Menkhaus and Prendergast, 1995):

Somali Patriotic Movement/Somali National Alliance: Analliance of Ogaden clans occupying the west bank of theriver Juba and Middle Juba region, and allied to Aideed.Somali Patriotic Movement: Primarily based on theMajeerteen clan in Kismayo, headed by Siad Barre'sson-in-law General Morgan.Somali Salvation Democratic Front: Primarily based on theMajeerteen in north-east Somalia, although they also havewider interests in the south, particularly Kismayo. Althoughthe north-east became virtually autonomous, the politicalelite still prefer a federal structure.United Somali Congress/Somali National Alliance(USC/SNA): Headed by General Aideed and based in southMogadishu, this is dominated by a fragile alliance of HabrGedir Hawiye clans. The alliance was weakened bydivisions between Aideed and his former financier OsmanAto. In March 1995 Aideed attempted to form a new interimgovernment, which included former Somali land presidentAbdulrahman Tuur as vice-president and Jama Yare asforeign minister. Aideed's failure to win support for hisgovernment led most analysts to assume that his powerwas waning. In September 1995, however, he capturedBaidoba. Initially, this united most of the other factionsagainst him. General Aideed was killed in fighting in August1996. His son Hussein Aideed has since taken his place ashead of the SNA.United Somali Congress (USC): Headed by Ali MahdiMohamed, based in north Mogadishu, and consisting of afragile alliance of Ali Mahdi's Hawiye Abgal and otherHawiye clans.Somali Democratic Movement: Based on a Oigil-Meriflealliance in Baidoba and the inter-riverine region, with someOir groups around Brava. Its aspiration for local autonomywithin Somalia was upset by Aideed's capture of Baidobaand splits within the SOM.Minority groups: Other alliances representing the interestsof minor groups in Somalia, and to some extent inSomali land, have asserted their separate identities. InHargeisa, for example, a party representing the 'Gabooya'(outcastes) has emerged to put its case of discrimination tothe government. Through the court they reclaimed some ofthe property they lost during the war. Many who had soughtrefuge in Ojibouti have since returned to Hargeisa.


---------

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relations, and intersected with traditionalauthority structures (Human Rights Watch,April 1995). However, they failed to provide thebuilding blocks for a restored Somaligovernment. UNOSOM concurrently failed torecognise and build on localised peaceprocesses that brought a measure of stability tosome areas. These included the Galkaiyo peaceconference in May 1993 which restored somestability to the central regions and opened traderoutes between Mudug, Galgadud andMogadishu, the August 1993 Jubalandconference which brought six months of peaceto Kismayo, and the June 1993 Boramaconference in Somaliland. (Bradbury, 1994a)

UN efforts at mediating the Somali conflictcontrast starkly with local peace initiatives inSomaliland in 1992 and 1993. The locallysponsored peace conferences in Sheikh andBorama were fundamentally different from theUN sponsored conferences in Addis Ababa. Thepeace process that has been unfolding inSomaliland since, while partially the result ofthe intercession of Somalilanders from thediaspora, has again sought to harness thelineage-based grassroots political structures.And yet neither the so-called 'top-down'approach to conflict resolution characterised bythe UN in Somalia, nor the 'bottom-up'approach adopted by elders in Somaliland hassecured lasting peace and stability.

The reasons for the failure of the UNapproach are clear. Among other things, theconferences were externally driven andsponsored. There was little incentive formilitary leaders and their militias, who wereprofiting from an economy of plunder andextortion, to implement any peace accord. Withthe peace conferences held outside Somaliathere was little pressure on the factional leadersto adhere to the agreements. UNOSOM was abureaucratic state-centric body. Constituted bygovernments, its mandate was to re-establish acentralised government, albeit withdecentralised regional and district structures.Here the United Nations failed to acknowledgegovernment as a source of conflict. The ineptattempts to cobble together a government setback opportunities for national reconciliation.

At the same time, local level reconciliationand grassroots peace accords, to date, have notprovided the foundations for lasting resolutionto conflict in Somaliland. The inherentdifficulties of melding customary institutions,concerned with managing pastoral resources orlocal clan disputes, with a modern


administration were exposed when theSomaliland National Guurti failed to avert orintercede to end the conflict in 1994.

While massive humanitarian aid helped stemthe tide of famine in Somalia, the UNintervention failed to comprehend the economicdimensions of the war. Estimates of the cost ofthe UNOSOM mission since 1992 run betweenUS$2 billion and US$3 billion; UNOSOM'sheadquarters alone cost US$160 million tobuild. By early 1994 UNOSOM was payingmore than US$40 million in salaries andcontracts, and was employing as many as17,000 Somalis, 11 ,000 in Mogadishu alone(Prendergast, 1997: 113). The concentration ofUN operations in Mogadishu meant that otherareas missed out on assistance. Humanitarianaid also also helped perpetuate Mogadishu as afocus of conflict. The financial payments madedirectly and indirectly to faction leaders helpedfund their political and military machines.Aideed, who controlled southern Mogadishu,where the largest part of the UN operation wasbased, probably benefited most. InternationalNGOs, through the hiring of armed guards toprotect their staff and operations, also bear someresponsibility. At one time the InternationalCommittee of the Red Cross was said to bespending US$100,000 weekly on protection inMogadishu (ibid: 113). But it was not justSomalis who benefited. International staff ofagencies had their salaries augmented withhardship post bonuses. It is said that twoWestern contractors to UNOSOM in two yearsearned the equivalent of more than one-third ofannual US development assistance to Africa(ibid: 113).

Following the withdrawal of UNOSOM,most factions' power bases eroded and theinternal struggle moved to other resources. InMarch 1995, for example, fighting broke outbetween clients of rival Italian and US fruitcompanies over the Somali banana trade(Menkhaus and Prendergast, 1995). Economicdecline in Somalia in the 1980s, as noted,hastened the end of the Barre regime, as aviolertt struggle emerged between elites forcontrol over Somalia's formal and informaleconomies, and southern Somalia's productiveresources. This struggle was later transferred tohumanitarian aid brought by internationalagencies. The UN humanitarian and militaryintervention and efforts at peacebuilding inSomalia did not begin to address the economiccrisis underlying the conflict.

EPILOGUE

Understandingthe Somaliconflict

The Somali state has collapsed. However,terms like 'anarchy', 'chaos' and 'madness'

to describe the disintegration and condition ofstatelessness in Somalia, indicate an inadequateunderstanding of Somali society and thedynamics of the conflict. They also serve toportray the conflict as intractable, beyondunderstanding and therefore resolution.

The legacies of European colonialism, aschismatic kinship system, the contradictionsbetween a centralised state and a pastoralculture, Cold War geopolitics, militarisation,underdevelopment and inequitable development,ecological degradation, the abuse of power,corruption and human rights violations, allprovide some explanation for the crisis inSomalia. In addition one must look at thecumulative effects of decades of protractedconflict within Somalia and between it and itsneighbours on the development of the Somalistate and the lives of the Somali people.

At independence Somalia was consideredunique in Africa, being a state founded on asingle ethnic group (Somali Government, 1962).Why a seemingly ethnically homogeneoussociety should be wrecked by such internalconflict is difficult for outsiders to comprehend.To understand current and future political trendsin Somalia and Somaliland it is important torevise Eurocentric notions of politicalformations. The political constitution of Somalisociety lies not in the centralised politicalinstitutions of a European model, but in aparticular social system where the notion of a'social contract' has more to do with regulatingpolitical and economic relationships betweenpastoral kinship groups, than with delegatingresponsibility to a central polity. Until thecolonial period the Somali nation did not form aunitary state. Colonialism grafted a system ofcentralised governance onto a decentralised andegalitarian political system of a pastoral people.

SOMALlLAND

Subsequent civilian and military governmentsattempted to create a unitary Somali state, byturning corporate responsibility away fromsectional kinship loyalties towards the state.The development of a centralised state reachedits peak, and nadir, in the repressive regime ofSiad Barre. From this perspective the civil warmay be seen as a conflict about governance, astruggle to overthrow a corrupt and oppressivestate in pursuit of greater self-determination anddemocracy. The most dramatic example of thisre-assertion of self-determination was thedeclaration of Somaliland's independence.

The most conspicuous feature of the Somaliconflict has been a reaffirmation of lineageidentity and territoriality over nationalconcerns. The civil war in Somalia, while thedirect legacy of the lack of power sharing,corruption, and human rights violations by theBarre regime, has manifestly been fought alongclan lines. The 'anarchy' today must, therefore,partly be understood in relation to thesegmentary nature of clans and their shiftingalliances. For the majority of Somalis, however,the reaffirmation of lineage identity has beenpredicated on the pursuit of security; and forothers the pursuit of economic and politicalgain. A singular focus on the internal, functionaldynamics of 'clanism' overlooks the externaleconomic, political and environmental factorsthat lie behind the war. A simple recitation ofhistoric anthropological analysis disregards thecontemporary political and economic changes.

The Somali civil war erupted as the Horn ofAfrica was undergoing social, political andeconomic transformations directly related toglobal political and economic changes at theend of the Cold War. Globally, and in the Horn,traditional definitions of sovereignty are underpressure to adapt (Boutros Ghali, 1992).Decades of civil war and natural catastrophehave left the region economically bankrupt. Thearming of governments by foreign powers overdecades has left the Horn awash with weapons.

While superpower geopolitics no longerdominate the region, the Somali war is morethan an 'internal war'. This is not a traditionalwar between pastoral clans, but one where'clanism' has been manipulated by powerfulelites struggling to control diminishingresources in a context of declining aid flowsand Somalia's (and Africa's) marginalisationin the world economy. It is, therefore, thespecific nature of Somali society and itsinteraction with global processes that accountfor the Somali civil war.


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For the future, an essential question is theextent to which fundamental social values, suchas expressed in the Somali xeer, have been lostduring years of military rule and war. Evidencesuggests that Barre's assault on the fabric ofSomali society ultimately did not manage toeliminate the traditional or historical Somalivalue systems. There is a strong sense inSomaliland of people looking to their culture,their religion and their politics, both forexplanations as to why Somalia has reached thestate it is in, and to the future. There is aconviction among many Somalis that futurepeace and stability can grow only as peoplerebuild trust, consensus and political andeconomic cooperation from the grassroots. Tothis end people in Somaliland and some areas inSomalia have put their faith in traditionalinstitutions and means of political conflictmanagement. The Borama Conference and theSanaag and Togdheer peace processes all attestto the strength of these. However, as noted,these 'grassroots' processes have yet to bearfruit in long-term stability. The war has had animpact on the lineage-based political structuresof Somali society. The internal and externalenvironment with which they must cope isvolatile.

The civil war's effect on the politicaleconomy of Somali society has scarcely beenanalysed. The current political formations inSomaliland and Somalia are a response andadaptation to an 'internal' political crisis historical political regimes and the civil war and 'external' political changes taking place inthe region and globally. The appearance ofsatellite television in Somaliland, where noneexisted before the war, is a simple example of


those external changes. Telecommunicationsthat make informal money transfers possiblebetween London and any part of Somalilandwithin 24 hours is another. The proliferation ofSomali non-governmental organisations, thegrowth of international NGGs and theresponsibilities delegated to them by donors toact in the Somali crisis is yet another.

The political constitution of Somali society isintricately linked to the pastoral economy. Thateconomy is changing in response to internal andexternal factors. The commercialisation of thelivestock sector in the past three decades hasaffected the social, economic and politicalrelations in Somali society. Since 1991 numbersof livestock exported from Somaliland haveincreased substantially. Growth in livestocknumbers puts pressure on rangeland resources.The amount of commercial feed being grown isincreasing. Cultivation is becoming morewidespread. Changes in the composition oflivestock herds affect the division of labour andsocial relations. A monetary economyencourages urban migration. The breakdown oftraditional pastoralism affects authoritystructures. Privatisation of land is increasing.The expansion of enclosures on rangelands has,in places, led to armed clashes. The war has alsocaused a considerable movement in population.

Transformations in the Somali politicaleconomy in the 1980s, linked to global changes,helped to precipitate the Somali war. Externalinterventions by aid organisations in Somaliaand Somaliland need to be aware of both thenature of these internal changes, and the impactof the external environment on the Somalipeoples.

Notes1. The 'Haud and Reserved Area' are theprincipal wet-season grazing grounds forSomaliland livestock. By the 1897 AngloEgyptian Treaty, clans of the SomalilandProtectorate had rights of access to the Haud.A second Anglo-Ethiopian Treaty in 1954 sawBritish military administration withdraw fromthe Haud and Reserved Area. Somalilanders'rights were reaffirmed, but abrogated atSomaliland's independence in 1960.2. This section draws on Bradbury, 1994b.3. Italian commercial interest in Somalia'sbanana trade continues today.4. This section draws on Bradbury, 1994a.5. Dr Aden Yousef Abokor, personalcommunication.6. John Drysdale, personal communication,September 1995.7. According to some observers, therecruitment of Gadabursi militia into the'national army' created deep resentmentamong the Garxajis, and a sense of grievancewhich will colour future clan relationships inSomaliland.8. Control of currency has also been asignificant factor in southern Somalia.9. Interview by author, Hargeisa, October1996.10. John Drysdale, personal communication,October 1995.11. Draft agenda for a 'Forum of SomalilandIntellectuals' (October 1996).

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Abbreviations and glossary

ABBREVIATIONS

EU European Union

GNP gross national product

ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross

IMF International Monetary Fund

LNGO local non-governmental organisation

NDC National Demobilisation Commission

NGO non-governmental organisation

ORH Operation Restore Hope

SACS Somalia Aid Coordination Body

SDA Somali Democratic Alliance

SDM Somali Democratic Movement

SNA Somali National Alliance

SNF Somali National Front

SNM Somali National Movement

SPM Somali Patriotic Movement

SRSP Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party

SSDF Somali Salvation Democratic Front

SSNM Southern Somali National Movement

TNC Transitional National Council

UNCT United Nations Coordination Team for Somalia

UNDHA United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs

UNDP United Nations Development ProgrammeUNITAF United Nations International Task ForceUNOSOM United Nations Operation in SomaliaUNHCR United Nations High Commission for Refugees

USC United Somali Congress

USF United Somali Front

USP United Somali Party

GLOSSARY

af-somali the Somali language qaat mild narcotic (catha edulis)akil headman of diya-paying shari'a Islamic law

groups, a position formalised shir council of eldersby the British shir beeleedka congress of clans

alan as red flag (SNM faction) shish snipers (SNM faction)

dabadheer drought (specifically of suldaan leader or chief in Issaq clan;1974/75 - means 'endless') often but not always

diya blood compensation , hereditary; also known in

garaad leader or chief different parts of Somalia as

guurti committee of elders boqar, garaad (among the

jaalle comrade, as form of address Dolbahunte) and ugas.under Scientific Socialism; sunni sect of Islamno longer acceptable usage xeer contracts

maymay language of Digil andRahanweyne clans


s

Other CIIR publications on Somaliland

Human Rights in Somaliland - Awareness and actionThe report of a workshop in Hargeisa, Somaliland, 17-19 October 1998

Amnesty International and International Cooperation for Development

In 1998 in Hargeisa civil society activists met with journalists, government representatives and lawyers to define the key human

rights issues in Somaliland. The workshop, organised jointly by Amnesty International and International Cooperation for

Development, provided an unprecedented opportunity to explore children's rights, human rights awareness, the rights of women

and minorities, justice and prison conditions. This report documents the workshop. It will be of value to anyone with an interest in

human rights promotion, education and training, and current developments in Somaliland.

52 pages £4.95 1999 ISBN 1852872225

Somaliland NGOs - Challenges and opportunitiesby Mohamed Sheik Abdillahi

The collapse of government and public services in Somalia as a result of the country's civil war left a vacuum that has seen a rapid

growth in the number oflocal non-governmental organisations. In the north-west regions, which seceded from Somalia in 1991 to

form the independent Republic of Somaliland, local NGOs have played a key role in rehabilitation, governance, security and

reconciliation. In this paper, Mohamed Sheik Abdillahi, an acrive member of the movement since its beginnings, outlines the

achievements of Somaliland's NGOs and the many challenges facing them, including strained relations with government and

international bodies. He sets out recommendations for local NGOs to realise their full potential in the vast and urgent task of

reconstructing their country virtually from scratch.

8 pages £1.50 1997 ISBN 1852871970

Building Partnerships for Participatory DevelopmentReport of a workshop held in Hargeisa, Somaliland

Sustained social and economic recovery in Somalia will depend on building a political consensus based on a common vision and

shared values. In December 1995 Somali development workers organised a pioneering workshop in Hargeisa with representatives

from local and international NGOs, community organisations and Somaliland's government to discuss the country's rehabilitation.

This report describes the workshop, its objectives and methodology. It is an invaluable resource for development workers and NGOs

interested in Somaliland and/or participatory development.

48 pages £9.95 1996 ISBN 1852871539

Building partnerships for Peace and DevelopmentReport of a workshop held in Borama, Somaliland

This report details a workshop held in late 1996 to equip local NGOs with skills in conflict analysis and strategy building for peace

and development. The workshop aimed to promote collaborative efforts between local NGOs as a means of fostering rehabilitation

and development in Somaliland. It also aimed to contribute to the building of a viable local NGO movement. It provides a practical

resource for local organisations planning similar initiatives. It traces the learning process of the workshop leaders, who took part in

conflict resolution training in the UK, and describes how they shared their new skills with workshop participants.

58 pages £4.95 1997 ISBNI852871962

A catalogue of CUR publications is available from the address below.

For more information or to place an order please contact:Publications Section, CUR, Unit 3 Canonbury Yard

190a New North Road, London NI 7BJ, UKPhone +44 (0)20 7354 0883 Fax +44 (0)20 7359 00 17

[email protected]

Other CIIR publicationson peace processes and democratisation

Peacebuilding from Below - Alternative perspectives on Colombia's peace processBriefing by Geraldine McDonald

Colombia is a country of increasing milirarisarion, violence and human rights abuse. Insread of trying to solve the conflier rh rough

negotiation, rhe Colombian government is relying on a milirary response, thus fuelling rhe violence. One reason why artempts ar

negotiated setrlements have failed is rhar rhe ralks were limited to political elires. This paper examines a number of peacebuilding

and peacemaking iniriatives by Colombian civil organisations at the grassroots, assessing their impact and potential contribution to

lasting peace in Colombia.

36 page £2.50 1997 English edition ISBN 1852871849 Spanish edition 1852871857

Peace in the Making - Gvil groups in GuatemalaBriefing by Tania Palencia Prado

The peace process in Guatemala, which began in the mid 1980s, reached a final agreement in December 1996. In this paper, Tania

Palencia Prado, a writer and researcher who has worked for a range of Guatemalan NGOs and institutions, examines the roots of

the conflict in Guatemala, traces rhe evolution of rhe peace process, and describes rhe shifting positions of the main actors. She details

the accords signed on human rights, the resetrlement of people uprooted by the war, a truth commission, indigenous peoples' rights

and socio-economic issues. The author argues that civil groups need to be strengthened and made an integral part of the peace

process, and that international support must continue if the final agreements are to bring about lasting peace.

44 pages £3.50 1996 English edition ISBN 1852871709 Spanish edition ISBN 1852872446

The People's Conscience? Gvil groups in the Guatemalan and South Mrican transitionsBriefing by Richard A Wilson

The active participation of civil groups in both Guatemala and South Africa holds important lessons for future peace processes in

other countries. Learning from the experiences of these groups is vital to discovering how best civil organisations can organise them

selves and influence change. This paper compares the experience of civil groups in both countries and assesses the contribution they

have made to the building of consensus, focusing in particular on their role in clarifying the truth about past human rights abuses.

40 pages £4.00 1997 ISBN1852871784

A catalogue of CUR publications is available from the address below.

For more information or to place an order please contactPublications Section, CUR, Unit 3 Canonbury Yard

190a New North Road, London NI 7BJ, UKPhone +44 (0)20 7354 0883 Fax +44 (0)20 7359 00 17

[email protected]

-----------------------&

The Catholic Institute for International Relations (CIIR) aims to contribute to the eradication of

poverty through a programme that combines advocacy at national and international level with

community-based development. International Cooperation for Development (ICD), CIIR's

technical assistance programme, recruits experienced professionals to share their skills in

development projects in Latin America and the Caribbean, Africa and the Middle East.

Founded in 1940 CIIR is an independent charity which works with people of all faiths and none.

CIIR, Unit 3 Canonbury Yard, 190a New North Road, London NI 78J, UK

CIIR has consultative status at the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations (ECOSOC)

Charity registration no. 294329

• • • C!I!·n:iJjiiJ!1d~7a

Editorial Print - Progressio · borders ofthe former British Somaliland Protectorate. To understand political trends in Somaliland and Somalia, it is also vital to appreciate that

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