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Economic Value AddedFrom Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
business will be valued. The premise of value relates to the assumptions, such as assuming that the
business will continue forever in its current form (going concern), or that the value of the business lies in the
proceeds from the sale of all of its assets minus the related debt (sum of the parts or assemblage of
business assets).
[edit]There are two premises of Value
Going Concern - Value as an ongoing operating business enterprise.[2] Liquidation – Value when business is
terminated.
Premise of value for fair value Calculation
•In use – If the asset would provide maximum value to the market participants principally through its use in
combination with other assets as a group. •In Exchange – If the asset would provide maximum value to the
market participants principally on a stand alone basis. Business valuation results can vary considerably
depending upon the choice of both the standard and premise of value. In an actual business sale, it would
be expected that the buyer and seller, each with an incentive to achieve an optimal outcome, would
determine the fair market value of a business asset that would compete in the market for such an
acquisition. If the synergies are specific to the company being valued, they may not be considered. Fair
value also does not incorporate discounts for lack of control or marketability.
Note, however, that it is possible to achieve the fair market value for a business asset that is being
liquidated in its secondary market. This underscores the difference between the standard and premise of
value.
These assumptions might not, and probably do not, reflect the actual conditions of the market in which the
subject business might be sold. However, these conditions are assumed because they yield a uniform
standard of value, after applying generally accepted valuation techniques, which allows meaningful
comparison between businesses which are similarly situated.
[edit]Elements of business valuation
[edit]Economic conditions
The examples and perspective in this article deal primarily with the United States and do not represent a worldwide view of the subject.Please improve this article and discuss the issue on the talk page. (March 2011)
A business valuation report generally begins with a description of national, regional and local economic
conditions existing as of the valuation date, as well as the conditions of the industry in which the subject
business operates. A common source of economic information for the first section of the business valuation
report is the Federal Reserve Board’s Beige Book, published eight times a year by theFederal Reserve
Bank. State governments and industry associations also publish useful statistics describing regional and
- Net Capital Expenditure(CAPEX) Current Income Statement
- Net changes in Working Capital Prior & Current Balance Sheets: Current Assets and Liability accounts
- Tax shield on Interest Expense Current Income Statement
= Free Cash Flow
where,
Net Capital Expenditure(CAPEX) = Capex - Depreciation & Amortization
Tax Shield = Net Interest Expense X Effective Tax Rate
When PAT and Debit/Equity ratio is available:
Element Data Source
Profit after Tax (PAT) Current Income Statement
- Changes in Capital expenditure X (1-d)
Balance Sheets, Cash Flow Statements
+ Depreciation & Amortization X (1-d) Prior & Current Balance Sheets: Current Assets and Liability accounts
- Changes in Working Capital X (1-d) Balance Sheets, Cash Flow Statements
= Free Cash Flow
where d - is the debt/equity ratio. e.g.: For a 3:4 mix it will be 3/7.
Element Data Source
Earning Before Interest and Tax x (1-Tax)
Current Income Statement
+ Depreciation & Amortization Current Income Statement
- Changes in Working CapitalPrior & Current Balance Sheets: Current Assets and Liability accounts
= Cash Flows from Operations same as Statement of Cash Flows: section 1, from Operations
Therefore,
Element Data Source
Cash Flows from Operations Statement of Cash Flows: section 1, from Operations
- Capital Expenditure Statement of Cash Flows: section 2, from Investment
= Free Cash Flow
There are two differences between Net Income and Free Cash Flow: The first is the accounting for the
consumption of capital goods. The Net Income measure uses depreciation, while the Free Cash Flow
measure uses last period's net capital purchases.
Measurement Type
Component Advantage Disadvantage
Free Cash Flow
Prior period net investment spending
Spending is in current dollars
Capital investments are at the discretion of management, so spending may be sporadic.
Net Income Depreciation charge
Charges are smoothed, related to cumulative prior purchases
Allowing for typical 2% inflation per year, equipment purchased 10 years ago for $100 would now cost about $122. With 10 year straight line depreciation the old machine would have an annual depreciation of $10, but the new, identical machine would have depreciation of
$12.2, or 22% more.
The second difference is that the Free Cash Flow measurement deducts increases in net working capital,
where the net income approach does not. Typically, in a growing company with a 30 day collection period
for receivables, a 30 day payment period for purchases, and a weekly payroll, it will require more and more
working capital to finance the labor and profit components embedded in the growing receivables balance.
The net income measure essentially says, "You can take that cash home" because you would still have the
same productive capacity as you started with. The Free Cash Flow measurement however would say, "You
can't take that home" because you would cramp the enterprise from operating itself forward from there.
Likewise when a company has negative sales growth it's likely to diminish its capital spending dramatically.
Receivables, provided they are being timely collected, will also ratchet down. All this "deceleration" will
show up as additions to Free Cash Flow. However, over the longer term, decelerating sales trends will
eventually catch up.
Net Free Cash Flow definition should also allow for cash available to pay off the company's short term debt.
It should also take into account any dividends that the company means to pay.
Net Free Cash Flow = Operation Cash flow – Capital Expenses to keep current level of operation –
dividends – Current Portion of long term debt – Depreciation
Here Capex Definition should not include additional investment on new equipment. However maintenance
cost can be added.
Dividends - This will be base dividend that the company intends to distribute to its share holders.
Current portion of LTD - This will be minimum Debt that the company needs to pay in order to not create
defaults.
Depreciation - This should be taken out since this will account for future investment for replacing the current
PPE.
If the Net Income category includes the income from Discontinued operation and extraordinary income
make sure it is not be part of Free Cash Flow.
Net of all the above give Free Cash available to be reinvested on operation without having to take more
debt.
Contents
[hide]
1 Alternative Mathematical formula
2 Uses of the metric
3 Problems with capital expenditures
4 Agency costs of free cash flow
5 See also
6 References
7 External links
[edit]Alternative Mathematical formula
FCF measures
operating cash flow (OCF)
less expenditures necessary to maintain assets (capital expenditures or "capex")but this does not
include increase in working capital.
less interest charges
In symbols:
where
OCBt is the firm's net operating profit after taxes (Also known as NOPAT) during period t
It is the firm's investment during period t including variation of working capital
Investment is simply the net increase (decrease) in the firm's capital, from the end of one period to the
end of the next period:
where Kt represents the firm's invested capital at the end of period t. Increases in non-cash current
assets may, or may not be deducted, depending on whether they are considered to be maintaining
the status quo, or to be investments for growth.
Unlevered Free Cash Flow (i.e., cash flows before interest payments) is defined as EBITDA -
capex - changes in net working capital - taxes. This is the generally accepted definition. If there are
mandatory repayments of debt, then some analysts utilize levered free cash flow, which is the
same formula above, but less interest and mandatory principal repayments.
Investment bankers compute Free Cash Flow using the following formula:
FCFF = After tax operating income + Noncash charges (such as D&A) - Capex - Working capital
expenditures + Interest*(1-t)= Free Cash Flows to the Firm (FCFF)
FCFE = Net income + Noncash charges (such as D&A) - Capex - Change in Non Cash Working
Capital + Net Borrowing = Free Cash Flows to the equity (FCFE)
Or simply:
FCFE = FCFF + Net borrowing - Interest*(1-t)
[edit]Uses of the metric
Free cash flow measures the ease with which businesses can grow and pay dividends to
shareholders. Even profitable businesses may have negative cash flows. Their requirement for
increased financing will result in increased financing cost reducing future income.
According to the discounted cash flow valuation model, the intrinsic value of a company is
the present value of all future free cash flows, plus the cash proceeds from its eventual sale. The
presumption is that the cash flows are used to pay dividends to the shareholders. Bear in mind the
lumpiness discussed below.
Some investors prefer using free cash flow instead of net income to measure a company's
financial performance, because free cash flow is more difficult to manipulate than net income. The
problems with this presumption are itemized at cash flow and return of capital.
The payout ratio is a metric used to evaluate the sustainability of distributions from REITs, Oil and
Gas Royalty Trusts, and Income Trust. The distributions are divided by the free cash flow.
Distributions may include any of income, flowed-through capital gains or return of capital.
[edit]Problems with capital expenditures
The expenditures for maintenances of assets is only part of the capex reported on the Statement
of Cash Flows. It must be separated from the expenditures for growth purposes. This split is not a
requirement under GAAP, and is not audited. Management is free to disclose maintenance capex
or not. Therefore this input to the calculation of free cash flow may be subject to manipulation, or
require estimation. Since it may be a large number, maintenance capex's uncertainty is the basis
for some people's dismissal of 'free cash flow'.
A second problem with the maintenance capex measurement is its intrinsic 'lumpiness'. By their
nature, expenditures for capital assets that will last decades may be infrequent, but costly when
they occur. 'Free cash flow', in turn, will be very different from year to year. No particular year will
be a 'norm' that can be expected to be repeated. For companies that have stable capital
expenditures, free cash flow will (over the long term) be roughly equal to earnings
[edit]Agency costs of free cash flow
In a 1986 paper in the American Economic Review, Michael Jensen noted that free cash flows
allowed firms' managers to finance projects earning low returns which therefore might not be
funded by the equity or bond markets. Examining the US oil industry, which had earned substantial
free cash flows in the 1970s and the early 1980s, he wrote that
[the] 1984 cash flows of the ten largest oil companies were $48.5 billion, 28 percent of the
total cash flows of the top 200 firms in Dun's Business Month survey. Consistent with the
agency costs of free cash flow, management did not pay out the excess resources to
shareholders. Instead, the industry continued to spend heavily on [exploration and
development] activity even though average returns were below the cost of capital.
Jensen also noted a negative correlation between exploration announcements and the market
valuation of these firms - the opposite effect to research announcements in other industries.
[edit]See also
Weighted average cost of capitalFrom Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
The weighted average cost of capital (WACC) is the rate that a company is expected to pay on average
to all its security holders to finance its assets.
The WACC is the minimum return that a company must earn on an existing asset base to satisfy its
creditors, owners, and other providers of capital, or they will invest elsewhere. Companies raise money from
a number of sources: common equity, preferred equity, straight debt, convertible debt, exchangeable
debt, warrants, options, pension liabilities, executive stock options, governmental subsidies, and so on.
Different securities, which represent different sources of finance, are expected to generate different returns.
The WACC is calculated taking into account the relative weights of each component of the capital structure.
The more complex the company's capital structure, the more laborious it is to calculate the WACC.
Companies can use WACC to see if the investment projects available to them are worthwhile to undertake.
[1]
Contents
[hide]
1 Calculation
2 See also
3 References
4 External links
[edit]Calculation
In general, the WACC can be calculated with the following formula:[2]
where is the number of sources of capital (securities, types of liabilities); is the required rate of return
for security ; is the market value of all outstanding securities .
Tax effects can be incorporated into this formula. For example, the WACC for a company financed by one
type of shares with the total market value of and cost of equity and one type of bonds with the
total market value of and cost of debt , in a country with corporate tax rate is calculated as:
Actually carrying out this calculation has a problem. There are many plausible proxies for each element. As
a result, a fairly wide range of values for the WACC for a given firm in a given year, may appear defensible,
see Frank and Shen (2012).[3]
Beta (finance)From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
(Redirected from Beta coefficient)
For other uses, see Beta (disambiguation).
In finance, the Beta (β) of a stock or portfolio is a number describing the correlated volatility of an asset in
relation to the volatility of the benchmark that said asset is being compared to. This benchmark is generally
the overall financial market and is often estimated via the use of representative indices, such as the S&P
500.[1]
An asset has a beta of zero if its moves are not correlated with the benchmark's moves. A positive beta
means that the asset generally follows the benchmark, in the sense that the asset tends to move up when
the benchmark moves up, and the asset tends to move down when the benchmark moves down. A
negative beta means that the asset generally moves opposite the benchmark: the asset tends to move up
when the benchmark moves down, and the asset tends to move down when the benchmark moves up.[2]
It measures the part of the asset's statistical variance that cannot be removed by the diversification provided
by the portfolio of many risky assets, because of the correlation of its returns with the returns of the other
assets that are in the portfolio. Beta can be estimated for individual companies using regression
A CFO may also logically assume that a business line earning a higher return may be a better candidate
than another for further investment and growth – assuming past results can be replicated. A higher
projected return also provides assurance that a given decision or plan is more secure. Key assumptions
can slip, yet value can still be added or at least preserved when the expected return is higher going in.
And as an analytical tool, RONA can be traced to operating margins and asset turns, in accord with the
classic DuPont formula, and used to give line teams a rounded view of operating performance and
balance-sheet asset management. For many reasons, return measures like RONA have earned a
prominent role in financial management over the years. But I come not to praise RONA. I come to bury
it.
RONA and its variants actually are highly misleading and incomplete performance indicators, for reasons
I will explain. And the deficiencies are far from academic. As you will see, companies that have aimed
to increase RONA or maintain a high one have committed major blunders in strategy and resource
allocation. And when RONA is judged from the bird’s eye view of how well it performs as an element in
a firm’s overall financial system, it fails, or at least, it is far inferior to another approach which is based
on using economic profit, or EVA as I like to call it (for economic value added), as I shall also elaborate.
RONA fundamentally fails because it is inconsistent with what is – or should be – the main mission of
every firm, which is to maximize the wealth of its owners by maximizing the net present value of all
existing and projected investments. The goal, in short, is to maximize the difference between the capital
that investors have put or left in the business and the present value of the cash flow that can be taken
out of it, a difference I call MVA, standing for market value added.
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Take an example. A company that trades for a total market value or “enterprise value” of $1 billion, and
where $600 million of capital has been invested in its net business assets, has created an MVA of $400
million, the difference. That measures how much wealth the firm has created for the owners by
comparing what they have put in with what they can get out. Put another way, it is “franchise value,”
the value of the business above just putting the assets in a pile. It is also, mathematically, the market’s
assessment of the net present value, or NPV, of all investments, those already in place plus those
expected to materialize down the road. Increasing MVA – or maximizing corporate NPV, if you will – is
therefore every company’s most important financial goal, as any corporate finance text will remind us,
for it not only maximizes the owner’s wealth but at a macro level it generally leads to an optimal
allocation of scarce resources and the greatest possible growth in the standard of living.
Here’s the problem in a nutshell. RONA tells us about the ratio of market value-to-invested capital, but
that is not the same thing as maximizing the spread between market value and invested capital, which is
the real goal. A company that aims to maximize RONA will always tend to hold back and underinvest,
under-innovate, under-scale, and under grow. It will leave value and growth on the table, and become
vulnerable to a hostile takeover or a toppling by upstart rivals, as I will demonstrate.
The glaring deficiency of RONA first became apparent to me in the early 1980s, when I had the privilege
of advising The Coca-Cola Company. The company at the time was fabulously profitable, earning about
a 25% return on its capital, but the company was reluctant to put the Coke name on growth products –
Cherry Coke, Diet Coke, Caffeine-Free Coke – because those products were reckoned to earn only a 20%
return, not 25%, and would dilute the rate of return on the Coke brand. Worse, the company had made
a mistake 100 years before. The founders had granted perpetual franchise licenses to bottlers that by
1980 were in economically undersized territories, and in many cases run by lackadaisical third
generation owners. Coke needed to buy them up, consolidate contiguous regions, install hungry
operators, and revise its pricing formula. But again, the capital to be invested in that vital strategy could
not approach the phenomenal return from one of the world’s most valuable brands. So Coke was stuck,
because management was stuck on maintaining its high RONA.
The solution for Coke, as it is for every other company, was to let go of RONA and instead to define
success as growth in economic profit or EVA. EVA replaces RONA’s percent ratio with a money measure
of total value added. EVA is equal to the percent spread of RONA less the cost of capital, multiplied by
the amount of capital invested in the business, which means that EVA is the dollar spread of the return
versus the cost of capital. Put another way, EVA is the dollar economic profit after deducting all costs,
including the cost of capital. The distinction may appear subtle and effete. After all, EVA uses the same
data as RONA – to measure profit less the cost of capital instead of profit divided by the capital. I’ve
even had CFO’s tell me they are using EVA when they are actually using RONA or return on capital. But
in fact, the two are not the same at all, and the difference is quite profound and incredibly far reaching.
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Let’s go back to Coke. At the time that management was confronted with the decision to expand or
punt, Coke’s weighted average cost of capital was about 10%, so it was earning a RONA return about
15% above that cost. Coke was thus earning an EVA profit of $150 for every $1,000 of invested capital.
Suppose to roll out the new products and acquire bottlers, Coke would double its invested capital, while
only earning a 20% return on the new money put into the business. Then its RONA would fall half way,
from 25% to 22.5%, and its spread over the cost of capital would narrow from 15% to 12.5%. But the
spread would be multiplied by twice the amount of capital, by $2,000, for an EVA of $250, an increase of
$100. This is a classic example of where RONA goes down and yet EVA and share price go up.
Coke’s managers wisely decided to go for more EVA and let their focus on RONA lapse, which is always
the right decision, at least in principle. By setting aside the cost of capital, EVA automatically deducts
the profit that must be earned to recover the amount of capital that has been or will be invested, and
so, a projection for EVA always discounts to the exact same net present value you get by discounting the
projected cash flow.
I say this with great conviction and emphasis because we have developed a software tool that
automatically calculates NPV by discounting both cash flow and EVA, and it always gives the same
valuation answer for a given forecast. Please understand that the equality is not a theory or something
you might or might not “believe.” It is a mathematical truth, just as 2 + 2 = 4. And so, everything that
validates cash flow or discounted cash flow as a management tool automatically validates EVA as well.
Discard EVA, and you might as well discard discounted cash flow, for they come to the same thing. But
putting the math aside, which need not trouble us here, consider the implications.
If a company or business line or business project is forecast to just break even on EVA, to just earn the
cost of capital, then that business or investment is just worth the book value of its invested capital.
There is no franchise value, there is no owner wealth, and there is no NPV if the profit only but covers
the cost of capital. But once EVA turns positive, then the greater it is, the faster it grows, and the longer
and more surely it endures, the greater is the NPV and MVA. For this reason, Fortune magazine dubbed
EVA “the Real Key to Creating Wealth” in a cover story article that first introduced EVA to the business
world, way back in September 1993.
Recognizing this, Coke decided in the early 1980s to expand its product portfolio and acquire its bottlers
– which it might not have been done had RONA remained the measure that mattered. The decision led
the company to such a phenomenal improvement in its EVA profit that by 1996 Coke was producing the
most MVA wealth of any American firm, as Fortune chronicled in a story titled “America’s Best and
Worst Wealth Creators” featuring Coke’s legendary CEO, Roberto Goizueta, on its cover.
Other companies were not so lucky, Anheuser-Busch among them. For years the beer behemoth had
opportunities to invest, acquire and grow globally, but turned all of them down, leaving the firm ring-
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fenced and vulnerable to a hostile takeover. On November 18, 2008, the company reluctantly
succumbed to the Brazilian-Belgian brewing company InBev. A-B became a target because its CEO,
August Busch, refused to dilute the RONA the firm was garnering in its U.S. beer business by entering
more competitive overseas markets. As one advisor close to the company explained it:
“When you have a business that was as profitable as his [August Busch III, CEO] was, where the
returns were as strong as his were, I’m not sure anyone would be so smart to say, “We’ve got to
take over the world,” said one A-B adviser. “We understand now why he should have, but it
would have diluted his margins and his returns.”
Dethroning the King
By Julie Macintosh
As a sidebar, InBev, the buyer, grew out of Brahma Beer, the first Brazilian company to adopt EVA. I
helped Brahma to adopt EVA in 1996 after I got a call from the CEO, Marcel Telles, who became aware
of EVA after First Boston published an analyst report on Brahma using EVA. Marcel was so intrigued he
asked the analyst, “Where can I learn more about EVA,” which led to me. We spent about 6 months
developing a program to measure EVA throughout the company, and it became a key asset and
capability of the firm that helped it to successfully gobble up many other brewers and eventually
become the world’s largest and most successful.
Coke and Anheuser-Busch are not isolated examples. You probably know that Steve Jobs and Intel’s
Andrew Grove’s favorite business book is The Innovator’s Dilemma by Harvard Professor Clayton
Christensen. The book chronicles how established industry leaders almost always cede their top spot to
upstarts that start small, in the low-margin end of the business, and then over time take over the whole
business. It led Andrew Grove to coin the expression, “Only the paranoid survive,” which is perhaps
one solution. But Christensen thought there must be another more fundamental reason why this
happens over and over, and which would lead to a different remedy than paranoia to cure the
Innovator’s Dilemma. It is, unsurprisingly, to give up on a “finance orthodoxy” that worships at the
RONA church:
After puzzling over this mystery for a long time, he finally came up with the answer: it was owing to the
way the managers had learned to measure success. Success was not measured in numbers of dollars but
in ratios. Whether it was return on net assets, or gross margin percentage, or internal rate of return, all
these measures had, in the past forty years, been enshrined in a near-religion (he liked to call it the
Church of New Finance), by partners in hedge funds and venture-capital firms and finance professionals
in business schools. People had come to think that the most important thing was not how much profit
you made in absolute terms but what but what percentage profit you made on each dollar you put in.
And that belief drove managers to shed high-volume but low margin products from their balance
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sheets… this is why he called it a church-- it was an encompassing orthodoxy that made it impossible for
believers to see that it might be wrong.
“When Giants Fail – What Business Has Learned From Clayton Christensen”
By Larissa MacFarquhar
The New Yorker, May 14, 2012
RONA is simply not conducive to corporate health. The bottom line is this: EVA is additive, but RONA is
not. Add something good to something great and EVA is greater still. Add a low margin business to a
strong one, and EVA increases so long as the cost of capital is covered. EVA is a measure to maximize,
because more is always better than less, because more EVA is more NPV is more owner wealth. But
that’s just not true of RONA. There is literally no way to tell whether a company or division is better off
reporting a higher or lower RONA, taken by itself. Of course, you can always bring in other factors like
growth and combine them with RONA, but all you are really doing is trying to recreate EVA by imperfect
proxy. Why not make it simpler and more accurate and just go for the real thing? Why not focus on a
single measure that accurately scores the actual total value added by a business, by a plan, or by a
decision, which is exactly what EVA does?
RONA is not only a misleading and incomplete measure at the corporate or line of business level, as I
have discussed so far. It also fails to provide reliable insights concerning the configuration of individual
projects, particularly when questions of how big, how fast, how many, and how much come into play.
Most investments, and most strategies for that matter, are characterized by increasing and then
decreasing returns to scale. As more money is plowed in, the return initially grows larger and larger as
unavoidable fixed costs are covered and market traction is gained. But at some point diseconomies set
in and the returns begin to tail off as investment spending is stepped up even further. This dynamic
causes companies that focus on RONA to almost always undersize their investments and leave profitable
growth and added value on the table.
As an example of this general phenomenon, consider the decision of how high to build a building.
Suppose analysis shows a 10-storey building won’t even cover the cost of capital. Its internal rate of
return (IRR), or RONA (assuming for simplicity that the returns are even), is only 5% when the cost of
capital is 10%. The building is so small that the rental income cannot even cover the full fixed cost of the
land. It’s a negative NPV project, and not worth considering except as a stepping stone.
On the next step up the ladder, a 20-storey building costs $20 million, let’s say, and it generates an 18%
RONA, and an NPV of $16 million. The return climbs because the additional rental income and higher
rental rates that management can charge for the higher floors is gravy to cover fixed costs. This is an
example of “increasing returns to scale.”
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But now it gets complicated. A 30 storey building costs $40 million, or twice as much to construct. It’s
more expensive per floor, and generates a RONA of only 15%. Extra elevator banks must be added,
which cuts into rentable space on all floors. The building requires sturdier reinforcement and takes
significantly longer to construct, which delays the start of revenues. All these elements conspire to
reduce the overall RONA of the proposed 30-storey building to less than the rate of return projected on
the 20-story building. This is an example of “diseconomies of scale” creeping in. Nevertheless, the 30-
story building does show a higher NPV. The NPV is estimated to be $20 million, or $4 million more than
for the 20-storey building.
The final candidate is a gleaming 40-storey tower, costing a whopping $70 million to construct, and
generating a RONA of just 10%, and NPV of $0, as even more diseconomies of scale set in. It is however
a magnificent structure and it generates gushers of cash flow and EBITDA– after the investment has
been made – neither of which are important in the question of allocating scarce resources.
So what’s the correct decision – the 20-storey edifice that maximizes RONA, the 30-story one that
maximizes NPV, or the 40-story tower that maximizes EBITDA? True, the 20 and 30 storey projects are
both acceptable, being that both earn returns more than the cost of capital and generate positive NPV.
But the 30-storey project is the best project, because it’s the one that maximizes NPV. It maximizes the
spread between capital put in and the value gotten out. It maximizes corporate MVA, owner wealth,
franchise value, and societal well-being by using scarce resources up to the point where incremental
value added still exceeds the incremental resource cost.
There are two ways to see this. Compared to the 20-storey project, the 30-storey project costs another
$20 million in investment, but generates an extra $4 million in net present value on top of that. Simply
put, the incremental project to build from 20 to 30 stories is attractive in its own right. Why turn that
down just to maximize RONA? And the same reasoning applies to why management should NOT build a
40-storey tower, for that is the same as taking on the 30-storey building, for a positive NPV, and then
adding another project to build to the 40
th
floor, which is a negative NPV use of the added capital.
The 30-storey project is also distinguished by its larger EVA. The annual EVA profit of the 20-story
building is (18% - 10%) x $20 million, or $1.6 million. The EVA of the 30-storey building is considerably
higher, actually 25% higher – it is (15% -10%) x $40 million, or $2 million. True, it’s a lower rate of
return, but it is earned on more capital. Size matters, too. The right answer is always to choose more
EVA, since that always translates into more NPV, which is why it is so important to use EVA not just to
judge the performance of whole lines of business but also to use it for judging – and actually helping to
improve -- the value of individual projects. And the best way to make sure that happens is to stop using
discounted cash flow to measure NPV, and instead to get business managers and finance professionals
to start projecting, analyzing and discounting EVA to measure and improve the NPV of plans, projects
and acquisitions! By using EVA to make the decisions and set the plans that will maximize NPV, and also
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to use it to monitor and analyze actual performance after the fact, the finance process is fundamentally
simpler and more cohesive – the same measure matters in both directions. It also makes managers
more accountable for delivering the value they promised by realizing the EVA they projected.
Companies that use cash flow and RONA may think they are doing the right thing, and the simple thing,
but that is just not true. EVA is easier, and better, once you get there.
But do not just take my word for it. The pitfalls of IRR and by extension RONA are well recognized in the
finance literature. Scholars with no axe to grind join me in recommending that corporate managers stop
using IRR and RONA. Consider this excerpt from world’s best-selling corporate finance textbook,
Principles of Corporate Finance, by Stewart C. Myers (MIT Sloan), Richard A. Brealey (London Business
School) and Franklin Allen (Wharton):
Many firms use internal rate of return (IRR) in preference to net present value. We think that is a
pity….Financial managers never see all the possible projects. Most projects are proposed by
operating managers. A company that instructs non-financial managers to look first at project
IRR’s prompts a search for those projects with the highest IRR’s rather than the highest NPVs. It
also encourages managers to modify projects so their IRR’s are higher. Where do you typically
find the highest IRR’s? In short lived projects requiring little up-front investment. Such projects
may not add much value to the firm.
The bottom line is this: When there are decisions about how many SKUs to carry, how much advertising
to do or research to perform, how big to build a warehouse, plant, or building, how many stores to open
and how much working capital to stock, whenever questions of scaling and growing must be weighed
against margins and returns, or even, how should a product be configured and priced, or a production
function fulfilled, then RONA- and IRR-minded managers are always apt to under-scale and under-invest
and under-innovate compared to managers that are aiming to maximize EVA and NPV.
I was going over all this recently with Mike Archbold, the President and Chief Operating Officer of the
up-and-coming specialty retailer, Vitamin Shoppe, where he was instrumental in establishing a financial
focus on EVA. “Bennett,” Mike said, “your building example resonates with me, but we call it the “S”
curve. We see it all the time. Declining returns, followed by ramping returns, followed by cresting
returns. When I was CFO at Autozone, we got EVA so embedded as a financial discipline that even the
marketing department got quite sophisticated at projecting the “S” curve on marketing campaigns and
we’d always look for the point to maximize the EVA profit.
“And here at Vitamin Shoppe, we’ve used an outside vendor to help us with automatic inventory
restocking, which is actually a complicated problem, or at least we think so, because we look for the
solution that maximizes our EVA, taking account all the tradeoffs. You’ve got to balance lead times,
order size, inventory investment, warehouse and shipping costs, and the risk you are stocked-out and
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lose a sale and disappoint a customer, which means that cost is more than just the lost sales, but a bad
customer experience. But we told our vendor, we want to put a price on everything and solve the
program to maximize the expected net EVA profit, and it worked fabulously for us.
“The vendor, though, was quite surprised by our request, because their clients almost always ask them
to just maximize the in-store stocking rate, to make sure they have the product on the shelves to never
miss a sale. But that uni-dimensional focus is just as wrong as focusing on the return on capital or
RONA. I mean, if RONA was the answer, it would really discourage us from ever making labor saving
capital investments. Why invest capital, even if it’s cheaper than the labor it replaces, when the capital
goes into the denominator of the RONA computation and labor doesn’t. That’s nuts. And that’s how I
can tell if a business operator is really business savvy. If they get EVA, they get value, and I can trust
them to get the right decisions done. And if they don’t get EVA, what does that say?”
RONA can also be severely criticized for a number of mundane but very practical deficiencies. For
example, RONA critically depends on how management decides to define the “net assets” in the
denominator. Should excess cash or retirement “assets” or deferred tax accounts be left included? How
about off-balance-sheet-leased assets? Should assets be measured net of impairment charges or at
original value? Should assets be revalued or at historic costs? Should capital include all debt and equity
or just equity? The answers to these questions can profoundly swing a RONA or ROI computation, and
while EVA is not totally immune from these choices, it is far more resilient because capital is a cost, and
not a denominator. For instance, EVA is essentially the same whether leases are capitalized or
expensed or whether capital is defined as debt plus equity or just equity alone. You can either pay for
capital explicitly, by deducting rent expense or interest expense from the profit, or implicitly, as part of
the weighted average capital charge deducted from EVA, and the resulting EVA is the same either way,
whereas the RONA would be very different. And besides, the emphasis should always be on the change
in EVA, and not EVA per se, which also makes it even more immune to how the capital base is defined.
RONA is also highly distorted and essentially meaningless for new economy companies that tend to
employ trivial amounts of capital. Apple’s RONA, for instance, has been phenomenally high and
extremely volatile and basically useless as a performance indicator over the past decade, because its
new-economy capital base is so lean and variable. By contrast, its EVA steadily increased, from 4% of
sales to 18% of sales, as a clear indication of the increasing productivity and profitability of the firm’s
business model. Another example is Blue Nile, the discount internet jeweler, which effectively has
negative capital. Cash from sales and trade funding is so prodigious it exceeds the firm’s meager
investment in inventories and fixed assets. And with negative capital, its RONA is truly meaningless.
Under EVA, though, negative capital simply counts as a profit rebate. EVA is credited with the value of
investing the capital float at the firm’s cost of capital. As a result, Blue Nile’s EVA has been positive and
generally increasing, and as a percent of sales typically runs in the range of 3% to 4.5%, which puts Blue
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Nile’s business model around the 65
th
to 75
th
percentile in terms of how capable it is of driving EVA
profit to the bottom line per dollar of sales.
The key point once again is that EVA makes capital a cost, an understandable charge to earnings just like
cost of goods sold, and not into a ratio denominator, so once you’ve computed EVA, and accounted for
the cost of capital, you are no longer obliged to divide by capital to bring capital into the picture; that
would be redundant. You can instead divide EVA by sales, say, to compute an “EVA Margin,” and then
say that EVA is our EVA Margin multiplied times our sales. You can make the management and
maximization of value into a profit-margin and sales-based system, which is a heck of a lot more
understandable to operating folk than a return on capital times capital approach.
And while we are on the subject, the EVA profit margin turns out to be generally a far better, more
comparable and more universally applicable summary measure of business model productivity and
profitability than RONA. You’ll see this in an outsourcing question I discuss a little later on, for instance.
Also, when you take the EVA Margin apart and trace it to the underlying performance drivers that
explain it, to indicators like gross margin, working capital days, plant turns, tax rates and the like, as we
do on the so-called EVA Margin schedule, you end up with an analytical tool that is way better than the
Du-Pont ROI formula. The EVA Margin schedule puts all costs, operating costs and capital costs, on the
same footing, as a percent of sales charge to the margin. It uses simple plus and minus math to measure
the impact of all performance drivers, where DuPont ROI is multiplicative -- you multiply the operating
margin times the asset turns -- which is fuzzy logic indeed. The incremental impact of improving the
margin depends on the asset turns, and vice versa, which confounds all but the mathematicians.
Understandably, CFO’s are now moving in droves to using custom EVA Margin schedules as their main
analytical tool to replace DuPont ROI analysis, because it makes it easier for them and their line teams to
size up the relative significance of individual performance drivers, to make decisions involving tradeoffs,
to spot notable trends, gaps and opportunities, and to benchmark with peers.
Another practical problem with RONA is that it is very tricky to apply to internal divisions that must be
assigned assets. The knee jerk reaction of line operators is to reject the allocation of assets to their
business units in order to keep their RONA up. But when the emphasis is instead placed on increasing
EVA, managers shift gears and want to be assigned all the assets that they can legitimately manage. An
initial assignment of assets reduces their division’s initial EVA, but that does not matter. What matters
is whether they are able to better manage the assets they are assigned and by so doing to improve their
EVA going forward. EVA depoliticizes the management of the assets, and focuses on performance at the
margin, ignoring irrelevant sunk costs. RONA by contrast is inherently based on an accumulation of
irrelevant sunk costs, and it encourages endless arguing over the internal allocation of assets.
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I must toss one last grenade in the RONA direction before discussing “what’s better” (I did come to bury
it, after all). RONA is so inherently biased against integration and generally so in favor of outsourcing it
pushes activities out that should stay in.
Let’s take a company that is considering moving computer systems and services from in-house
management to the cloud. The company currently has $1000 in capital, and is earning $150, for a 15%
15% return. With a 10% cost of capital, its EVA is $50. Suppose the company is able to remove $200 in
computer assets to the cloud for the same total cost, so that the firm’s EVA and the EVA/Sales Margin
remain the same. It’s a pure break even exchange. The outside cost and the inside cost, including the
cost of capital, are identical, let’s say.
Even so, the firm’s RONA automatically and misleadingly increases to 16.25% (because 16.25% - 10%,
times $800 in capital, is the firm’s $50 EVA, which has not changed, by definition). In other words, the
outsourcing maneuver leads to a higher rate of return, but on less capital, for the same EVA. It’s truly
value neutral, but RONA was tricked into paying the decision a compliment it did not deserve.
RONA is so biased in favor of outsourcing that it motivates firms to go bulimic, to become so lean and
hollowed-out they eventually cut beyond the fat and into muscle, giving up essential long run sources of
competitive advantage, and really paying more for services they could perform more cheaply in house,
all costs included. EVA, by contrast, favors outsourcing only where a third party partner has clear
advantages that enable it to perform a function at such a truly lower total cost that it overcomes the
disadvantages of having to contract and deal with an outside vendor.
I’ll give you an example. One of my EVA clients in the early 1990s was Equifax, the credit reporting
bureau. It was then run by Jack Rogers, a former IBM senior officer who was intimately familiar with
IBM’s computer capabilities, so he thought that outsourcing Equifax’s extensive computer operations to
IBM could make sense, if properly structured, even though the move would be quite counter-cultural.
But to his credit, rather than mandating the decision, or asking his team to simply trust his business
judgment, which was by the way considerable, he said, “we have to run the EVA on it -- It could be
good, it could be bad, it’s EVA that will tell us.” As it happened, the facts and figures clearly showed an
EVA advantage to turning over the company’s computers and operations to IBM, while Equifax retained
its real franchise value in its hold on personal credit statistics and market presence. That was the very
first large outsourcing transaction of its kind (which is why IBM for years used Equifax’s decision to
showcase the merits of its outsourcing solution, based on the EVA analysis). As Equifax demonstrates,
moving assets into the cloud or offshore for that matter can make sense -- if it generates more EVA, but
never because it increases RONA. An improved RONA is at best a by-product of making the right
NPV/EVA decision, but should never be the prime motivator.
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To say it one last time, only EVA always gives the right answer, to sourcing decisions or any other,
because it’s the only measure that literally discounts to the net present value of discounted cash flow.
There is no a priori reason to expect RONA to give the right answer, and it frequently doesn’t, and there
is every reason to think EVA will give the right, value maximizing answer, and in my experience, it does,
and it does with more clarity, simplicity and accountability than any other approach.
So then, why do so many CFOs persist in using RONA and related rate-of-return metrics, when they are
so bad? I think there are two reasons. For one, RONA’s a ratio. It permits performance comparisons
and investment rankings regardless of size. Its very defect is an advantage in giving CFOs a way to rate
performance across divisions that differ in scale and to compare projects that vary in investment
commitment. It “common-sizes” the comparisons. Another reason is that a ratio replacement for
RONA has not existed. For all its shortcomings, it was the best ratio kid on the block for ranking
performance and investments. What was better?
Until recently, nothing. But now, a set of new ratio metrics developed by EVA Dimensions offer CFOs all
the advantages of size-adjusted performance indicators without sacrificing the critical link to maximizing
the money value of NPV and owner wealth and overall corporate profit performance. The new ratios
are, unsurprisingly, all based on EVA. The very good news is that the new EVA ratios can completely
replace RONA and IRR and even operating margins with a management framework that is fundamentally
more accurate, simpler to use and understand, more informative, and considerably more effective as a
practical framework for value-based corporate planning and decision making. Accept my premise, and
there is no longer a reason ever to look at RONA, or ROI, ROE, or IRR, ever again.
I explain this “second-generation” EVA framework in companion papers, and I’ve already alluded to one
of them, the EVA Margin, in this discussion. But the most important new EVA ratio is a real
breakthrough in the art of value-based corporate financial management, superseding even EVA Margin
as the key metric that matters. It is called EVA Momentum. It is the change in EVA divided by priorperiod sales. It is the size-adjusted growth rate in EVA, scaled to sales. It can be measured quarter to
quarter, year to year, over multiple years as a trend, and even better, over the life of a business plan. It
is a statistic. However viewed, it is the only ratio where bigger is always better, because it gets bigger
when EVA gets bigger, which means NPV and MVA are getting bigger too.
It is the sole ratio measure that totally and correctly summarizes the performance of any business in all
ways that add value or that subtract from it. It solves the innovator’s dilemma, and correctly guides all
decisions by correctly incorporating all tradeoffs. Most important, it can serve as every company’s most
important financial goal, applicable to all lines of business, regardless of their capital intensity and
inherited performance conditions.
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For example, it gives managers in turnaround businesses the opportunity to shine by making their
negative EVA less negative. At the same time, it does not reward managers in stellar businesses that
just tread water and maintain a positive EVA profit. Instead, it puts a Bunsen burner under the behinds
of managers in those well-endowed businesses to keep scaling, growing and innovating rather than just
resting on their laurels, and perhaps to even reduce their margins and returns if that is what it takes to
increase EVA and maximize value.
The point is, unlike all other ratio indicators, managers can legitimately aim to maximize EVA
Momentum without being misled into making dumb decisions. It can be used instead of RONA as the
key measure of performance and the arbiter of the quality and value of business plans. Put simply, a
business plan is better if it can credibly generate a greater EVA Momentum growth rate over the 3-5
year plan horizon, for the greater the planned Momentum, the greater the NPV of the plan and
contribution to the firm’s share price. CFO’s are now using EVA Momentum to help their line teams
develop better, more valuable plans, by seeing how they can generate more EVA Momentum. And they
are tracing EVA Momentum to underlying metrics and milestones, including the EVA Margin, and Margin
schedule, to end up with scorecards that are more comprehensive, value-based, and topped with an
actual score.
When you pull together the complete set of new EVA ratio metrics, and use them as the key
performance statistics, financial goals, plan targets, and financial analytical tools, and, when you stop
discounting cash flow and instead forecast, analyze and discount EVA to measure and improve the value
of plans, projects, acquisitions and decisions, you have the simplest and most effective way to run a
business for maximum performance and added market value. And with new software tools, data bases,
and training and support services from EVA Dimensions, you can get there faster and more effectively,
and at a lower price point, than ever before possible.
Bennett Stewart is Chairman and CEO of EVA Dimensions, a financial technology firm that provides EVA -
based software, data -bases and training and support services to its corporate clients, and EVA-based
equity research services to major institutional investors. www.evadimensions.com