Top Banner
EASA Verification Milen Dentchev ANS Standardisation Section Manager
16

EASA Verification

Feb 10, 2016

Download

Documents

tirzah

EASA Verification. Milen Dentchev ANS Standardisation Section Manager. Received data . Answers Justifications / comments Evidence / references ANSP evidence should be available at NSA level and will only be requested if needed . EoSM and JC verification data flow. - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
Welcome message from author
This document is posted to help you gain knowledge. Please leave a comment to let me know what you think about it! Share it to your friends and learn new things together.
Transcript
Page 1: EASA Verification

EASA Verification

Milen DentchevANS Standardisation Section Manager

Page 2: EASA Verification

Received data

AnswersJustifications / comments Evidence / references

ANSP evidence should be available at NSA level and will only be requested if needed

Page 3: EASA Verification

EoSM and JC verification data flow

22/04/23 EASA/PRB Workshop 3

Page 4: EASA Verification

22/04/23 4

EASA verification methodology

Three methods of Safety KPI verification:

1) Light verification through desktop audits based on available documentation (e.g. written evidences provided to EASA, information published on the Internet or available in ECTL) + clarification on the phone (interviews)

2) Thorough verification during Standardisation inspections using Checklists and based on Findings and UNCs

3) Trustful verification through desktop audits based on reports on closure of Corrective actions (further verified during follow-up inspections)

EASA/PRB Workshop

Page 5: EASA Verification

NSA verification first, followed by ANSP verification

Light verification

Page 6: EASA Verification

Sampling 3 to 5 answers from each questionnaire

If OK, then move to the next oneIf not, then thorough check

Thorough verification for some NSAs randomlyUse external information as far as practical Phone call / email if necessary

Light verification of NSA quest.

Page 7: EASA Verification

Verify the main ANSP for each State Sampling 3 to 5 answers from each questionnaire

If OK, then move to the next oneIf not, then thorough check

Verify at least one additional ANSP with the same method as above. Thorough verification for some ANSPs randomlyUse external information as far as practicalPhone call / email to NSA if necessary

Light verification of ANSP quest.

Page 8: EASA Verification

Verification during Standardisation inspections using Checklists

Structure of ANS checklist CA/NSA:LEG/REGORGInitial OversightOngoing OversightPELRSCMOR

Structure of ANS checklist Undertakings: ANSP (ATS/CNS/AIS/MET/TOs)

22/04/23 EASA/PRB Workshop 8

EASA thorough verification

Page 9: EASA Verification

Several steps are foreseen:

Step 1 – mapping ANS checklists with EoSM questions

Step 2 – adding reference to ANS ChecklistsStep 3 – on site auditingStep 4 – If finding is raised, checking

answers in EoSM

22/04/23 EASA/PRB Workshop 9

EASA thorough verification

Page 10: EASA Verification

1st step – mapping ANS checklist with EoSM questionsExamples of matching PQs with EoSM Q:MO1.1: Implement the EU safety legislative and regulatory framework, including where necessary, by aligning the national framework.Q1-3 There are national secondary regulations that address requirements stemming from primary legislation, international obligations and they are in line with the EU Regulatory Framework in relation to ATM/ANS. Question # 20 of LEG Checklist Has the State developed and promulgated ANS regulations to enable the implementation of the provisions related to ICAO Annexes?

22/04/23 EASA/PRB Workshop 10

EASA thorough verification

Page 11: EASA Verification

Examples of matching PQs with EoSM Q :MO2.1: Establish controls which govern how service providers’ safety management systems (SMS) will identify hazards and manage safety risks

Q2.1 The competent authority has established oversight procedures which aim to monitor compliance with the SMS requirements by the service providers in particular the requirements for hazards identification and risk assessment and mitigation.

Question # 100 of On-going Oversight Checklist Does the process address the implementation of safety objectives, safety requirements and other safety-related conditions identified in risk assessment and mitigation procedures required by safety regulatory requirements applicable to air navigation services, ATFM and ASM?

22/04/23 EASA/PRB Workshop 11

EASA thorough verification

Page 12: EASA Verification

22/04/23 EASA/PRB Workshop 12

# ICAORef.

EURef. Area Questions Statu

sExample of evidence (guidance to auditors) Implementation Comments CE

Adding reference to checklist

2nd step – adding reference to ANS Checklists

EASA thorough verification

Page 13: EASA Verification

22/04/23 EASA/PRB Workshop 13

Next step – on site audit If answer is not satisfactory, then auditor will check the answer in EoSM Questionnaire

Initiating The competent authority oversees the service provider’s risk assessment process on ad hoc basis.

Planning/ Initial Implementation

All of Initiating plus:A formal procedure for continuous oversight of the risk assessment processes of the service provider has been prepared but it has not been approved neither implemented.

Implementing

All of Planning/ Initial Implementation plus:A formal procedure for continuous oversight of the risk assessment processes of the service provider has been implemented. The service provider procedure for hazard identification and risk assessment and mitigation has been approved by the competent authority.

Managing & Measuring

All of Implementing plus:The procedure for overseeing the service provider’s risk assessment processes is systematically applied.

Continuous Improvement

All of Managing & Measuring plus:The procedure for overseeing the service provider’s risk assessment processes is constantly reviewing for continuous improvement and for introducing riskoversight approach.

E

A

B

C

D

Q2.1 The competent authority has established oversight procedures which aim to monitor compliance with the SMS requirements by the service providers in particular the requirements for hazards identification and risk assessment and mitigation.

Component 2 Safety risk managementElement 2.1 Safety requirements for the air navigation service provider’s SMS

MO2.1: Establish controls which govern how service providers’ safety management systems (SMS) will identify hazards and manage safety risks

A

B

C

D

E

In this case correction would be required

EASA thorough verification

Page 14: EASA Verification

The same as light verification, but taking into account

Corrective ActionsStatus of their closure

EASA trustful verification

Page 15: EASA Verification

Verification process: output

The overall computed scores as provided by the NSA will not change, but the process will verify them.

Page 16: EASA Verification

Verification results

Light / trustful verificationEASA may ask States for additional evidence to support the score provided EASA will inform PRB of the verification results when completed

Thorough verificationBased on evidence EASA asks the State to change the computed scores and reflects it in the EASA standardisation inspection report. EASA will inform PRB of the request to the State, after the FCC meeting.