Digest Leg Cou

G.R. No. L-27072; July 31, 1968

SURIGAO MINERAL RESERVATION BOARD and the EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,

petitioners, vs.HON. GAUDENCIO CLORIBEL, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila

and MAC-ARTHURINTERNATIONAL MINERALS CO., respondents.

FACTS OF THE CASE:

This is an original action for certiorari and prohibition, with preliminary injunction, to restrain the

Honorable Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Gaudencio Cloribel, from continuing with the

hearing of Civil Case involving herein Petitioners, and from enforcing a restraining order issued therein,

as well as to annul an order of respondent Judge in the same case. It appears in the narrative of the case

that respondent Judge ruled in favor of Respondent Company (MacArthur), which lost in a bid for

the exploration and development of mineral deposits in a portion of the Surigao Mineral

Reservation. The Petitioner did not award the contract to private respondent, which became the

latter’s basis for filing an action against the former for the issuance of are straining order against

the continuation of the bidding process. Respondent Judge thereby granted the private

respondent’s request on the ground that there was a perfected contract when the Petitioners

accepted their proposals as an answer in the Invitation to Bid.

ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT JUDGE HAD COMMITTED A GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION,AMOUNTING TO EXCESS OF JURISDICTION, IN ISSUING THE RESTRAINING

ORDER AGAINSTTHE PETITIONERS.

HELD: It was held by the Court that respondent Judge committed a grave abuse of discretion, amounting

to excess of jurisdiction, in issuing its restraining order.

The Private respondent (MacArthur) had no cause of action against petitioners herein because contrary to

the conclusions made in the pleadings of Mac Arthur, it has not adhered faithfully to the terms and

conditions of the Invitation to Bid, which was a mere invitation, and not a contract. As the Invitation

explicitly declared that "bids not accompanied by bid bonds will be rejected", the bid of the Mac Arthur

had been submitted without the requisite bond which led to its disqualification. Since there is no contract

(which is Mac Arthur’s basis) to speak about, there is no cause of action on its part, and that the Judge

cannot issue a restraining order on such ground.

In Re Gutierrez 5 SCRA 661

Conditional Pardon will not bar disbarment

Facts:

Attorney Gutierrez was convicted for the murder of one Filemon Samaco in 1956. He was sentenced to

the penalty of reclusion perpetua. In 1958, after serving a portion of the penalty, he was granted a

conditional pardon by the President. He was released on the condition that he shall not commit any crime.

Subsequently, the widow of Samaco filed a disbarment case against Gutierrez by reason of the latter’s

conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. Murder, is without a doubt, such a crime.

ISSUE: Whether or not Gutierrez may be disbarred considering the fact that he was granted pardon.

HELD: Yes. The pardon granted to Gutierrez is not absolute but conditional. It merely remitted his

sentence. It does not reach the offense itself. Gutierrez must be judged upon the fact of his conviction for

murder without regard to the pardon (which he invoked in defense). The crime was actually qualified by

treachery and aggravated by its having been committed in hand, by taking advantage of his official

position (Gutierrez being municipal mayor at the time) and with the use of motor vehicle. The degree of

moral turpitude involved is such as to justify his being purged from the profession.

QUINGWA VS. PUNO (19 SCRA 439)

FACTS: Flora Quingwa filed a verified complaint charging Armando Puno, a member of the Bar, with

gross immorality and misconduct. Complainant is an educated woman, having been a public school

teacher for a number of years. The respondent took her to the Silver Moon Hotel on June 1, 1958, signing

the hotel register as "Mr. and Mrs. A. Puno," and succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her on the

promise of marriage. Complainant submitted to respondent's plea for sexual intercourse because of

respondent's promise of marriage and not because of a desire for sexual gratification or of voluntariness

and mutual passion. Complainant gave birth to a baby boy supported by a certified true copy of a birth

certificate and to show how intimate the relationship between the respondent and the complainant was,

the latter testified that she gave money to the respondent whenever he asked from her.

The respondent denied all the material allegations of the complaint, and as a special defense averred that

the allegations therein do not constitute grounds for disbarment or suspension under section 25, Rule 127

of the former Rules of Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Puno should be disbarred/suspended.

HELD: YES. One of the requirements for all applicants for admission to the Bar is that the

applicant must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character

(Section 2, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court). It is essential during the continuance of the practice and

the exercise of the privilege to maintain good moral character. When his integrity is challenged by

evidence, it is not enough that he denies the charges against him; he must meet the issue and overcome

the evidence for the relator and show proofs that he still maintains the highest degree of morality and

integrity, which at all times is expected of him. With respect to the special defense raised by the

respondent in his answer to the charges of the complainant that the allegations in the complaint do not fall

under any of the grounds for disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar as enumerated in section

25 of Rule 127 of the (old) Rules of Court, it is already a settled rule that the statutory enumeration of the

grounds for disbarment or suspension is not to be taken as a limitation on the general power of courts to

suspend or disbar a lawyer. The inherent powers of the court over its officers cannot be restricted. Times

without number, our Supreme Court held that an attorney will be removed not only for malpractice and

dishonesty in his profession, but also for gross misconduct, which shows him to be unfit for the office and

unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law confer upon him. Section 27, Rule 138 of the

Rules of court states that:

A member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for

any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason

of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is

required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilfull disobedience of any lawful order of a

superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority

so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid

agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.

The respondent has committed a grossly immoral act and has, thus disregarded and violated the

fundamental ethics of his profession. Indeed, it is important that members of this ancient and

learned profession of law must conform themselves in accordance with the highest standards of

morality. As stated in paragraph 29 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics:

The lawyer should aid in guarding the bar against the admission to the profession of candidates unfit or

unqualified because deficient in either moral character or education. He should strive at all times to

uphold the honor and to maintain the dignity of the profession and to improve not only the law but the

administration of justice.

Wherefore, respondent Armando Puno is hereby disbarred and, as a consequence, his name is ordered

stricken off from the Roll of Attorneys.

NOMBRADO v. Hernandez

Facts:

Disbarment case charging respondent with malpractice on two counts namely for having appeared

as counsel for Crispin Nazareno in a civil case for forcible entry against Aresenio Pansaon, his

former client and for having appeared as counsel for the accused and also for the complaining

witness in a criminal case.

With respect to the first count, respondent was engaged by Arsenio Pansaon as his counsel in the

prosecution of a criminal case against Crispin Nazareno.

However, the case was dismissed due to the absence of complainant during trial.

Years later, Nazareno filed a complaint for forcible entry against Pansaon through Atty.Hernandez.

Pansaon moved for the disqualification of Hernandez as counsel but the motion was withdrawn.

When the disbarment case was heard, Pansaon testified for petitioner and said that he perhaps lost the

case since respondent Atty was privy to valuable information from Pansaon.

Respondent denied the claim and averred that he did not receive any valuable document from Pansaon in

connection with the case.

Under the second count, respondent was counsel for Storeo Pontawe and and Teofilo Aumida in a

criminal case.

Before the hearing, respondent was asked by complaining witness Ramon Morales to file a motion to

dismiss on the ground that the real accused in this case are not the persons mentioned above.

During the hearing, a heated exchange of arguments arose between respondent and the

private prosecutor Atty. Danao because of the latter’s insistence on calling Morales to the

witness stand despite expressed desistance to prosecute the criminal case.

Respondent manifested his intention to intervene in behalf of the complaining party in connection with

the action of Atty. Danao in this case.

Issue: WON respondent was guilty of malpractice

Held: First Count:

The Court made mention of their remarks in Hilado vs. David.

In that particular case, the court held that communication between attorney and client area complicated

affair consisting of entangled relevant and irrelevant secret and well known facts.

In the complexity of what is said in the course of dealings between an attorney and client, inquiry of the

nature suggested would lead to the revelation, in advance of the trial, of other matters that might only

further prejudice the complainant's cause.

Whatever may be said as to whether or not respondent utilized against his former client

information given to him in a professional capacity, the mere fact of their previous relationship

should have precluded him from appearing as counsel for the other side in the forcible entry case.

This stern rule is designed not alone to prevent the dishonest practitioner from fraudulent conduct,

but as well to protect the honest lawyer from unfounded suspicion of unprofessional practice.... It is

founded on principles of public policy, of good taste.

Second Count:

Respondent's act of preparing the motion to dismiss and stating in the course of the hearing thereof

that he was intervening "in behalf of the complaining party", did not constitute simultaneous

appearance in behalf of the contending parties since there was no longer any conflict to speak of,

the complainant having desisted from prosecuting the case against the accused. Consequently, there

was nothing improper in respondent's conduct.

Upon the facts established in connection with the first count the Solicitor General has

recommended that the penalty of reprimand and warning be administered.

Berenguer vs. Carranza, 26 SCRA 210

FACTS:

Atty. Pedro B. Carranza was filed a complaint against his acts of deception practiced in the Court of First

Instance of Sorsogon. The alleged deception was the introduction of an Affidavit of Adjudication and

Transfer of Title subscribed and sworn in Pasay City, which later turned out to be a falsity. Atty. Carranza

claimed that he took no part in the said falsified document. It was contested that due to the said falsehood,

whether or not a lawyer took part from, must still be held liable for lack of prudence and meticulous take

on the matter, and as it had caused unnecessary delays in the administration of justice.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Atty. Carranza should be held responsible of the said falsehood committed in court.

HELD:

YES. Respondent was reprimanded.

RATIO:

There was a finding that there was nothing willful in the conduct pursued by the respondent in

introducing the document that turned out to be false. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court reminded that the

lawyer’s oath is one impressed with utmost seriousness and should not be taken lightly. In its decision to

issue reprimand, the respondent is warned that a more severe penalty will be imposed if the offense of the

same character is repeated again.

Cobb-perez vs Lantim

Counsel’s Assertiveness

Facts:

A civil case was filed by Ricardo Hermoso against Damaso Perez for the latter’s failure to pay a debt of

P17k. Hermoso won and a writ of execution was issued in his favor. The sheriff was to conduct a public

sale of a property owned by Damaso worth P300k. This was opposed by Damaso as he claimed the

amount of said property was more than the amount of the debt. Judge Lantin, issuing judge, found merit

on this hence he amended his earlier decision and so he issued a second writ this time directing the

sheriff to conduct a public sale on Damaso’s 210 shares of stock approximately worth P17k.

Subsequently, Damaso and his wife filed five more petitions for injunction trying to enjoin the public

sale. The case eventually reached the Supreme Court where the SC ruled that the petition of the

Perez spouses are without merit; that their numerous petitions for injunction are contemplated for

delay. In said decision, the Supreme Court ordered petitioners to pay the cost of the suit but said cost

should be paid by their counsels. The counsels now appeal said decision by the Supreme Court as

they claimed that such decision reflected adversely against their professionalism; that “If there was

delay, it was because petitioners’ counsel happened to be more assertive . . . a quality of the lawyers

(which) is not to be condemned.”

ISSUE: Whether or not the counsels for the Spouses Perez are excused.

HELD: No. A counsel’s assertiveness in espousing with candor and honesty his client’s cause must be

encouraged and is to be commended; what is not tolerated is a lawyer’s insistence despite the patent

futility of his client’s position, as in the case at bar. It is the duty of a counsel to advise his client,

ordinarily a layman to the intricacies and vagaries of the law, on the merit or lack of merit of his case. If

he finds that his client’s cause is defenseless, then it is his bounden duty to advise the latter to acquiesce

and submit, rather than traverse the incontrovertible. A lawyer must resist the whims and caprices of his

client, and temper his client’s propensity to litigate. A lawyer’s oath to uphold the cause of justice is

superior to his duty to his client; its primacy is indisputable.

Zubiri vs Zubiri 18 scra 1157

Facts:

The appellant's petition to set aside judgment, which was verified and duly supported by two

affidavits of merit, was grounded on very serious allegations, to wit: that it was the plaintiff's

counsel who prepared and induced the defendant to sign all the pleadings upon which the assailed

decision was based, including and particularly the said defendant's answer, that the dismissal of the

same, in the absence of the petitioner and without affording him the chance to be heard thereon,

indeed was incompatible with the exercise of sound judicial discretion. This Court is gravely

concerned with the truth of the above accusation — something which, on account of the lower court's

precipitate dismissal of the appellant's petition to set aside judgment is now hidden and undeterminable —

particularly because the very face, tenor, and form of the appellant's alleged answer established a prima

facie case, so to speak, for the petitioner.

Issue:

WON the active participation of a lawyer in one party's affairs relating to a pending case in which the said

lawyer is the counsel for the opposing party is brazenly unethical

Ruling:

The Canons of Legal Ethics very explicitly declare that "it is unprofessional to represent conflicting

interests" (No. 6), and command that —

A lawyer should not in any way communicate upon the subject of controversy with a party

represented by counsel; much less should he undertake to negotiate or compromise the matter with

him, but should deal only with his counsel. It is incumbent upon the lawyer most particularly to

avoid everything that may tend to mislead a party not represented by counsel and he should not

undertake to advise him as to the law. (No. 9)

A mere glance at the Answer should have prompted the trial court to wonder and inquire if the defendant

was aware of what he was committing thereby. The admission was so total and unqualified a repudiation

of the defendant's own interest that indeed, especially as it was avowed in the said pleading that the

defendant was unassisted by counsel, the trial court should have insisted upon some assurance that the

defendant was solely and fully accountable therefor. After the defendant represented under oath that the

plaintiff's counsel was the principal author of the same, and the one who talked him into participating in

it, the intervention of the lower court became an absolute necessity.

Rubias v. Batiller

Facts:

Before the war with Japan, Francisco Militante filed an application for registration of the parcel of land in

question. After the war, the petition was heard and denied. Pending appeal, Militante sold the land to

petitioner, his son-in-law. Plaintiff filed an action for forcible entry against respondent. Defendant claims

the complaint of the plaintiff does not state a cause of action, the truth of the matter being that he and his

predecessors-in-interest have always been in actual, open and continuous possession since time

immemorial under claim of ownership of the portions of the lot in question.

Issue:

Whether or not the contract of sale between appellant and his father-in-law was void because it was made

when plaintiff was counsel of his father-in-law in a land registration case involving the property in

dispute

Held:

The stipulated facts and exhibits of record indisputably established plaintiff's lack of cause of

action and justified the outright dismissal of the complaint. Plaintiff's claim of ownership to the

land in question was predicated on the sale thereof made by his father-in- law in his favor, at a time

when Militante's application for registration thereof had already been dismissed by the Iloilo land

registration court and was pending appeal in the Court of Appeals.

Article 1491 of our Civil Code (like Article 1459 of the Spanish Civil Code) prohibits in its six

paragraphs certain persons, by reason of the relation of trust or their peculiar control over the

property, from acquiring such property in their trust or control either directly or indirectly and

"even at a public or judicial auction," as follows: (1) guardians; (2) agents; (3) administrators; (4)

public officers and employees; judicial officers and employees, prosecuting attorneys, and lawyers;

and (6) others especially disqualified by law.

Fundamental consideration of public policy render void and inexistent such expressly prohibited purchase

(e.g. by public officers and employees of government property intrusted to them and by justices, judges,

fiscals and lawyers of property and rights in litigation and submitted to or handled by them, under Article

1491, paragraphs (4) and (5) of our Civil Code) has been adopted in a new article of our Civil Code, viz,

Article 1409 declaring such prohibited contracts as "inexistent and void from the beginning."

Indeed, the nullity of such prohibited contracts is definite and permanent and cannot be cured by

ratification. The public interest and public policy remain paramount and do not permit of compromise or

ratification. In his aspect, the permanent disqualification of public and judicial officers and lawyers

grounded on public policy differs from the first three cases of guardians, agents and administrators

(Article 1491, Civil Code), as to whose transactions it had been opined that they may be "ratified" by

means of and in "the form of a new contact, in which cases its validity shall be determined only by the

circumstances at the time the execution of such new contract. The causes of nullity which have ceased to

exist cannot impair the validity of the new contract. Thus, the object which was illegal at the time of the

first contract, may have already become lawful at the time of the ratification or second contract; or the

service which was impossible may have become possible; or the intention which could not be ascertained

may have been clarified by the parties. The ratification or second contract would then be valid from its

execution; however, it does not retroact to the date of the first contract."

DAVID P. FORNILDA, JUAN P. FORNILDA, EMILIA P. FORNILDAOLILI, LEOCADIA P.

FORNILDA LABAYEN and ANGELA P. FORNILDAGUTIERREZ,

petitioners,vs.

THE BRANCH 164, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IVTH JUDICIALREGION, PASIG, JOAQUIN

C. ANTONIO Deputy Sheriff, RTC, 4JR Tanay, Rizal and ATTY. SERGIO I. AMONOY

respondents.

G.R. No. 72306 October 6, 1988

FACTS:

•

The Controverted Parcels were part of the estate of the late JulioM. Catolos subject of intestate estate

proceedings, whereinRespondent Amonoy acted as counsel for some of the heirs from1959 until 1968 by

his own admission.

•

These properties were adjudicated to Alfonso Fornilda andAsuncion M. Pasamba in the Project of

Partition approved by theCourt on 12 January 1965

•

On 20 January 1965, or only eight (8) days thereafter, and whilehe was still intervening in the case as

counsel, these propertieswere mortgaged by petitioners' predecessor-in-interest toRespondent Amonoy to

secure payment of the latter's attorney'sfees in the amount of P27,600.00

•

Since the mortgage indebtedness was not paid, RespondentAmonoy instituted an action for judicial

foreclosure of mortgageon 21 January 1970

•

The mortgage was subsequently ordered foreclosed and auctionsale followed where Respondent Amonoy

was the sole bidder forP23,600.00

•

Being short of the mortgage indebtedness, he applied for andfurther obtained a deficiency judgment.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the mortgage constituted on the ControvertedParcels in favor of Respondent Amonoy

comes within the scope of theprohibition in Article 1491 of the Civil Code.

HELD: YES

•

The pertinent portions of the said Articles read:Art. 1491.

The following persons cannot acquire by purchase

even at a public or judicial or auction, either inperson or through the mediation of another:xxx xxx xxx(5)

Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, ...

the property and rights in litigation

or levied upon onexecution before the court within whose junction orterritory they exercise their

respective functions; thisprohibition includes the act of acquitting by assignmentand shall apply

to lawyers with respect to the property and rights which may be the object of any litigation inwhich they

may take part by virtue of their profession

.(Emphasis supplied)

•

Under the aforequoted provision

, a lawyer is prohibited fromacquiring either by purchase or assignment the property or rights

involved which are the object of the litigation inwhich they intervene by virtue of their profession.

Theprohibition on purchase is all embracing to include not only salesto private individuals but also

public or judicial sales

•

At the time the mortgage was executed, therefore, therelationship of lawyer and client still existed,

the very relation of trust and confidence sought to be protected by the prohibition,when a lawyer

occupies a vantage position to press upon ordictate terms to a harassed client. From the time of the

executionof the mortgage in his favor, Respondent Amonoy had alreadyasserted a title adverse to

his clients' interests at a time when therelationship of lawyer and client had not yet been severed.

•

Considering that the mortgage contract, entered into incontravention of Article 1491 of the Civil Code is

expresslyprohibited by law, the same must be held inexistent and void

abinitio.

Cuaresma vs Daquiz 63 scra 257

A lawyer owes candor to the court

Facts:

An order to demolish the property where Cuaresma was staying was issued by a trial judge pursuant to a

civil case filed by Daquis. Cuaresma’s lawyer, Atty. Macario Directo, filed a petition for certiorari before

the Supreme Court where he alleged that they had no knowledge of the said civil case hence the order of

demolition is unjust. The Supreme Court however later found out that Cuaresma and his lawyer in fact

knew of the existence of said civil case. The Supreme Court then directed Directo to show cause why he

should not be disciplined.

In his explanation, Directo stated that what he meant was that he and his client belatedly learned of the

civil case; that had there been a mistake committed, “it had been an honest one, and would say in all

sincerity that there was no deliberate attempt and intent on his part of misleading this Honorable Court,

honestly and totally unaware of any false allegation in the petition.”

ISSUE: Whether or not Directo should be subject to disciplinary actions.

HELD: No. But he was reprimanded by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court gave Directo the benefit

of the doubt although it did say that Directo’s reasoning could very well be just an afterthought. The

Supreme Court also stated that Directo is presumed to be in good faith especially so that the

misstatements in his petition could be attributed either to his carelessness or his lack of English

proficiency. The Supreme Court admonished Directo to prepare pleadings carefully in the future so that

the least doubt as to his intellectual honesty cannot be entertained. Every member of the bar should

realize that candor in the dealings with the Court is of the very essence of honorable membership in the

profession.

ANDRES v CABRERA

Facts:

Stanley R. Cabrera (Cabrera) was a successful bar examinee in 1977.

Atty. Emilia Andres was a legal officer in the Ministry of Labor. She dismissed a case filed by

Cabrera’s motheragainst a certain Atty. Perez.

Because of the dismissal, Cabrera filed with the city fiscal of Manila criminal charges against

Andres (graft andcorruption, falsification of public documents)

Andres then filed a case of disqualification against Cabrera. Cabrera apparently used in his

affidavit vile, inciviland uncouth language (e.g. moronic, unparalleled stupidity, idiotic)

Cabrera’s oath-taking was therefore postponed. The SC required him to file an answer to why he should

not bedisqualified. In Cabrera’s reply he still used unfit language (e.g. calling Atty. Andres a moron). In

subsequentmotions by Cabrera, he used the words “a victim of the court’s inhuman and cruel punishment

through itssupreme inaction”

1979: The court thereafter deferred his oath-taking until he has shown that he has changed his ways.

Cabrerathen filed a motion for contempt of court. And guess what, he still used unfit language (e.g.

supreme stupidity,degradation of the administration of justice)

Napikon yata yung SC, they required Cabrera to file a reply to why he should not be held in contempt.

Cabrerafiled an apology but guess what, the language he used were still unfit and even insincere.

Issue:

W/N Cabrera should be held in contempt

Held:

Yes! Fine of P500 and imprisonment for 50 days.

The duty to observe and maintain the respect due the courts devolves not only upon lawyers but also

upon thosewho will choose to enter the profession. Their failure to discharge such duty may prevent them

from beinginducted into the office of attorney.

B. R. SEBASTIAN ENTERPRISES, INC.,

petitioner,

vs.

HO

N. C

OU

RT

OF

APPEALS, E

U

L

OG

I

O

B. REYES, NICAN

O

R

G

. SALAYSAY, in his capacity asProvincial Sheriff of Rizal; and ANT

O

NI

O

MARINAS, in his capacity as DeputySheriff,

respondents.

F

acts of the case:

In a case of the Eulogio B. Reyes vs. the DPWH and the petitioner, the regional trial court heldthe

petitioner liable for damages while absolving DPWH. Thus, the petitioner appealed to theCourt of

Appeals (CA) through its counselor Baizas, Alberto and Associates (BAA for brevity).However, BAA

failed to file an Appellants Brief and failed to comply with CAs resolution toshow cause why the

appeal should not be dismissed.On 9 September 1974, the CA issued another resolution dismissing

petitioners appeal.The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on the account of their

counselorspartnership dissolution (due to untimely death of Atty. Crispin D. Baizas) and change

of management. The motion was later denied, hence, the resolution is final and executory.A writ of

execution for auction sale of petitioners properties was apprehended. Consequently,the petitioner

filed a Motion to Reinstate Appeal; however, the CA denied the same.Hence, the petitioner filed

this case against the respondent, but was eventually amended sinceEulogio B. Reyes is already

dead.This court denied the petition due to lack of merit. Petitioners filed a motion

forreconsideration.

Issues:

Whether or not CA gravely abused its discretion in denying petitioners motion to reinstate itsappeal,

previously dismissed for failure to file the appellants brief Whether or not the death of a partner

extinguishes the client-lawyer relationship as was a validcause for not filing an appellants brief

H

eld:

If the appellate court has not yet lost its jurisdiction, it may exercise its discretion in reinstatingan appeal,

having in mind the circumstances obtaining in each case and the demands of substantial justice.But even

if it has already lost jurisdiction over the appeal by reason of the remand of the

record to the lower court, it, nevertheless, has the inherent right to recall the

remittitur

or theremand of the record to the lower court if it had rendered a decision or issued a resolutionwhich was

induced by fraud practiced upon it.However, in this instant case, no fraud is involved; what obtains is

simple negligence on thepart of petitioner's counsel, which is neither excusable nor unavoidable.

Petitioner thus failedto demonstrate sufficient cause to warrant a favorable action on its plea.Moreover,

the death of Attorney Baizas was not a valid excuse on the part of his associates fornot attending to

the first resolution. Undoubtedly, there was inexcusable negligence on thepart of petitioner's

counsel in failing to file the Appellant's Brief.The "confusion" in the office of the law firm following

the death of Atty. Crispin Baizas is not avalid justification for its failure to file the Brief. With

Baizas' death, the responsibility of

Atty. Alberto

and his

associates

to the petitioner as counsel remained until withdrawal by the formerof their appearance in the

manner provided by the Rules of Court.The petition is hereby dismissed.

VICTORIA LEGARDA vs. CA, NEW CATHAY HOUSE, INC.

Petitioner was the owner of a parcel of land and the improvements thereon. Petitioner enteredinto a leased

agreement with the respondent thru its representative, Roberto Cabrera, Jr. of the property for a period of

five years that the rental is 25K per month with 5% escalation per year.Respondent deposited the down

payment but petitioner failed and refused to execute and sign thesame despite demands of the respondent.

Respondent suffered damages due to the delay in therenovation and opening of its restaurant business.

Respondent filed a complaint against petitioner for specific performance. Petitioner engaged the

services of the counsel to handle her case. Buther counsel failed to take any action for the case. So

the property was sold by the sheriff thru public auction. After one year redemption period expired

w/out the petitioner redeeming the property and the sheriff issued a final deed of sale.Upon

learning of this unfortunate turn of events, petitioner prevailed upon her counsel to seek the

appropriate relief.

ISSUE:

WON the petitioner can recover his property WON the counsel is negligent in handlingthe case of her

client

HELD:

The Court finds that the negligence of the counsel in this case appears to be so gross and

inexcusable. This was compounded by the fact , that after petitioner gave said counsel another

chance to make up for his omissions by asking him to file a petition for annulment of the judgment

in the appellate court, again counsel abandoned the case of petitioner in that after hereceived a

copy of adverse judgment of appellate court, he did not do anything to save thesituation or inform

his client of the judgment. He allowed the judgment to lapse and becomefinal. Such reckless and

gross negligence should not be allowed to bind the petitioner. Petitioner was thereby effectively

deprived of her day in court.Because of the gross negligence of the counsel for the petitioner, she

lost the case as well as thetitle and ownership of the property, which is worth millions. The mere

lessee then now becamethe owner of the property. The Court cannot allow such a grave injustice to

prevail. It cannottolerate such unjust enrichment of the respondent at the expense of the petitioner.As

member of the Phil Bar he owes complete fidelity to the cause of his client. He should giveadequate

attention, care and time to his cases. This is the reason why a practicing lawyer shouldaccept only so

many cases he can afford to handle. And once he agrees to handle a case, heshould undertake the task

with dedication and care. If he should do any less, then he is not true tohis oath as a lawyer.In this case,

the Sheriff¶s Cert of Sale and the subsequent final deed of sale covering the same property are null and

void. Respondent is directed to reconvey said property to the petitioner andthe register of Deeds is

ordered to cancel the registration of the said property in the name of respondent and issue a new one in

the name of the petitioner. The said counsel for petitioner isrequired to show cause w/in ten days from

notice why he should not be held administrativelyliable for his acts and omissions.

ROQUE V. CLEMENCIO

Facts:

Myrna Roque and Roberto Cruzado against attorney Feliciano Clemencio. Gross misconduct and

oppression. Respondent was a LegalOfficer of the Commission on Audit appointed to investigate

the charges filed by complainant Myrna D. Roque against COA officialJovencio Panelo. He was

eventually relieved of this duty upon motion by Roque. He is now being charged for gross

misconduct (byroque) since: a) he was seen in a beerhouse with Panelo's lawyer, b) he had "sat on" the

complaint for almost a year, c) he hadconspired with his replacement investigator Atty. Tablang, and d)

he drafted the decision against Panelo even though he had beenrelieved as investigator in the case. He is

charged with oppression (by cruzado) since: He summoned complainant Roberto P.Cruzado (a lowly

CoA employee) to the Office of the Chief, Security Affairs Service Unit, COA, and threatened him. After

hearing,the IBP dismissed the complaints for lack of merit.

Issue: won ibp is correct

Ruling:

The SC rejected the findings of the IBP. 1. Although what Clemencio preparedwas a draft decision and

not a final one, the SC decided that the manner in which a draft is prepared can influence the

reviewingauthority; in fact, in this case, the final decision was substantially identical to the prepared draft.

Also, although drinking withPanelo's lawyer does not mean automatically that he is favoring him, a

lawyer should avoid even the appearance of impropriety. 2.We take into serious account the fact that

respondent is a lawyer, a superior who threatened a subordinate complainant withdismissal and a court

suit. A man of the law should never use his legal expertise and influence in order to frighten or coerce

anyone,especially the ordinary man who looks up to him for justice. The excuse of respondent that a

threat to prosecute is no intimidationdeserves scant consideration. Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of

Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer shall not engagein unlawful, immoral or deceitful

conduct. He is required not only in fact to be of good moral character, but must also be seen to beleading

a life in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. CENSURED and WARNED.

PEOPLE v. RENEGADO

May 31, 1974 (G.R. No. L-27031)

FACTS:

Mamerto de Lira was a math teacher in Tiburcio Tancinco Memorial Vocational School which is run by

the national government. Loreto Renegado was a clerk in the same school. De Lira asked Renegado to

type his exam questions but the latter refused. They had a small argument which left the accused fuming

with anger. The accused told several people that he’ll gonna kill the deceased. They pacified him and told

him the possible consequences that may happen. After a few days, while the deceased was in the canteen

sitting with his back towards the accused, without warning the accused stabbed the deceased with a knife

which later caused the latter’s death. The counsel of the accused pleads for an acquittal on the ground that

the accused should be exempt from criminal liability because at the precise time he stabbed de Lira, the

accused lost his senses and he simply did not know what he was doing. His counsel claimed that after

Renegado was clubbed on the forehead, he suffered from head injury which produced “ill-effects”.

ISSUE:

(1) WON the accused is exempt from criminal liability on the ground of insanity.

(2) What are the mitigating and aggravating circumstances present in the case.

HELD:

(1) No. Insanity exists when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing act, that is, the

accused is deprived of reason, he acts without the least discernment because there is a complete absence

of the power to discern, or that there is a total deprivation of freedom of the will, mere abnormality of the

mental faculties will not exclude imputability. In the case at bar, it just shows that Renegado is a man of

violent temper who can be easily provoked to violence for no valid reason at all. Thus in People vs. Cruz,

this Court held that breaking glasses and smashing dishes are simply demonstrations of an explosive

temper and do not constitute clear and satisfactory proof of insanity; they are indications of the passionate

nature of the accused.

In the absence of proof that the defendant had lost his reason or became demented a few moments prior to

or during the perpetration of the crime, it is presumed that he was in a normal condition of mind.

(2) The killing of Mamerto de Lira is qualified by evident premeditation. Here, the accused has more or

less sixty-four hours to ponder over his plan and listen to the advice of his co-employees and of his own

conscience, and such length of time was more than sufficient for him to reflect on his intended revenge.

There is treachery committed. There is treachery where the victim who was not armed was never in a

position to defend himself or offer resistance, nor to present risk or danger to the accused when assaulted.

The accused killed the deceased while he was eating and his back faced towards him.

There was an assault upon a person in authority. A teacher either of a public or of a duly recognized

private school is a person in authority.

The mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender was offset by the aggravating circumstance of

treachery.