Consti1 Digest (1)

PRELIMINARIES

ANGARA V ELECTORAL COMMISSION

ABAKADA GURO V ERMITA

METHOD AND INTERPRETATION

“ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING, LEGAL REALISM, AND THE INTERPRETATION OF THIS CONSTITUTION”

ROBERT CLINTON (1987)

“CONSTITUTIONAL EMPIRICISM: QUASI-NEUTRAL PRINCIPLES AND CONSTITUTIONAL TRUTHS”

TIMOTHY ZICK (2003)

ART XVII: REMAKING THE CONSTITUTION

“MALOLOS: THE CRISES OF THE REPUBLIC”TEODORO AGONCILLO (1997)

“FROM MCKINLEY’S INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NEW CONSTITUTION: DOCUMENTS ON THE PHILIPPINE

CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM”VICENTE MENDOZA

(SEE LEGAL HISTORY REVIEWER)

MABANAG V LOPEZ VITO

GONZALES V COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; November 9, 1967

TOLENTINO V COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; October 16, 1971

PLANAS V COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; January 22, 1973

JAVELLANA V EXECUTIVE SECRETARY; March 31, 1973

SANIDAD V COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; October 12, 1976

MITRA V COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; April 4, 1981

LAWYERS’ LEAGUE FOR A BETTER PHILIPPINES V AQUINO

EN BANC; May 22, 1986

FACTS/ISSUES- Petitioners questioned legitimacy of Aquino government.- Her gov’t was said to be illegal since it was not established pursuant to 1973 Consti. - Proclamation No. 3- “…Aquino gov’t is installed through direct exercise of power of the Filipino people, in defiance of the provisions of 1973 Consti.”- April 10- Court already voted to dismiss.- April 17- Atty. Lozano withdrew petitions and said that they would pursue it by extra-judicial methods.

HELDPetitions have no merit.(1) Petitioners have no personality and no cause of action.(2) Legitimacy of gov’t is NOT justiciable, and is a political question where people are the only judge.(3) People have already accepted such gov’t, which is in effective control of the country, making it a de jure gov’t. (4) Community of nations has also accepted it.(5) Eleven members of SC have sworn to uphold law under her gov’t.

IN RE: SATURNINO BERMUDEZ;October 24, 1986

DE LEON V ESGUERRA; August 31, 1987

SANTIAGO V COMMISSION ON ELECTIONSDAVIDE; March 19, 1997

FACTSAtty. Jesus Delfin filed to the COMELEC a petition to amend the Constitution through a people’s initiative. In his petition, he wanted to amend Sec 4 and 7 of Article 6, Sec 4 of Article 7 and Sec 8 of Article 10 in order to lift the term limits of all elective government officials. He asks the COMELEC to assist them in gathering the sufficient number of signatures by setting up signature stations all over the country, as required by COMELEC Resolution No. 2300. The COMELEC took cognizance of their petition and set the case up for hearing. Senator Raul Roco then filed a motion to dismiss before the COMELEC, stating that it was not the initiatory petition properly cognizable before the COMELEC. Sen. Miriam Defensor Santiago, on the other hand, filed a special civil action for prohibition, saying that RA 6735 is deficient insofar as the initiative for amending the Constitution is concerned. She further alleges that what the petitioners are willing to propose are not amendments, but revisions. Thereafter, LABAN, DIK and MABINI filed their motions for intervention, arguing on the same points.

ISSUES

1. WON the court can take action of this case despite there being a pending case before the COMELEC2. WON RA 6735 is an adequate enabling law for people’s initiative3. WON the COMELEC resolution no. 2300 is valid4. WON the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or in grave abuse of discretion in entertaining the Delfin petition

HELD1. Yes. Comelec’s failure to act on roco’s motion to dismiss and its insistence to hold on to the petition rendered ripe and viable the instant petition under sec 2 rule 65 of rules of court- Case may be treated as a special civil action for certiorari since delfin didn’t come up with the minimum number of signatures- Court may brush aside technicalities in cases of transcendental importance.2. No. The law is inadequate.- First, in Sec 2 of the Act (Statement and Policy), it seems that the word Constitution was a delayed afterthought. The word Constitution was neither germane nor relevant to the said section. It only proves that it is silent to amendments in the constitution. - Second, in the Act does not provide for the contents of a petition for initiative on the constitution. - Third, there is no separate subtitle for initiative for the Constitution. - Therefore, it seems that the main thrust of the act is on initiative and referendum of national and local laws. It failed to provide for details in implementation of initiative on amendments to the Constitution. - Comelec cannot be delegated power, since the law is incomplete as it fails to provides a sufficient policy and standard for the delegated power.3. No. It only follows that since the RA 6735 is incomplete, it does not have the power to prescribe rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution.4. Yes. There was insufficient number of signatures. Also, comelec acquires jurisdiction upon filing of the petition. The delfin petition was only in its initiatory pleading.Decision Petition granted

SEPARATE OPINION

PUNO [concur and dissent]

RA 6735 is not defective. The intent of the framers was to provide for a law for initiative on amendments to the Constitution. (he cited the sponsorship remarks of Roco)

VITUG

The COMELEC should have dismissed the petition, since it did not have the required number of signatures.

FRANCISCO [concur and dissent]

looking at the definition of terms in the said RA, the law clearly intends to include amendments to the Constitution.

PANGANIBAN

RA 6735 is not perfect but taken together with the Constitution and COMELEC Res. No. 2300, it is sufficient to implement Constitutional initiatives.

RESOLUTION;

ESTRADA V DESIERTOPUNO;

FACTS

- Nature: Writ of Preliminary Injunction against complaints against him until his term is over- May 11, 1998 ~ Estrada was elected President; Arroyo was VP; some 10 million Filipinos voted for Estrada and both Estrada and Arroyo were to serve a 6-year term.- Oct. 4, 2000 ~ Estrada's "sharp decent from power" began; Chavit Singson, Estrada's long time friend, publicly accused Estrada, Estrada's family and friends of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords.- Oct. 5, 2000~ Sen. Teofisto Guingona Jr. delivered a speech entitled "I ACCUSE" wherein he accused Estrada of receiving 220 million pesos worth of jueteng money from Gov. Singson from November 1998 till August 200 and obtained another 70 million peson on excise tax still from Gov. Singson - The privilege speech was referred by Sen. Drilon to the Blue Ribbon Committee and the Committee on Justice for joint investigation- The House of Reps also decided to investigate the expose of Gov. Singson.- Reps. Heherson Alvarez, Ernesto Herrera and Michael Defensor spearheaded the move to impeach Estrada.- Oct. 11, 2000 ~ Archbishop Jaime Cardinal Sin issued a pastoral statement asking Estrada to step down from the presidency as he had lost the moral authority to govern- Oct. 13, 2000~ CBCP also cried out for Estrada's resignation- Oct. 17, 2000~ Former Pres. Aquino joined the calls for resignation and former Pres. Ramos joined the chorus as well.- But before that, on Oct 12, Arroyo already resigned as DSWD Secretary and also asked for Estrada's resignation but Estrada really held on to his office and refused to resign. (According to J. Puno: "The heat is on.")- November ended with a "big-bang" because on November 13, House Speaker Manuel Villar transmitted the Articles of Impeachment (which was based on the grounds of bribery, graft and corruption, betrayal of public trust and culpable violation of the Constitution) signed by 115 representatives to the Senate.- Nov. 20, 2000~ Senate finally opened the impeachment trial. 21 senators took their oath as judges with SC Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr, presiding.- Dec. 7, 2000~ The impeachment trial started.- Dramatic point of the December hearings was the testimony of Clarissa Ocampo, the SVP of Equitable-PCI BANK. Ocampo testified that she was one foot away from Estrada when he affixed the signature "Jose Velarde" on documents involving a 500 million pesos investment account with their bank on Feb 4 2000.- Impeachment trial was adjourned in the spirit of Christmas and when January came, more bombshells were exploded.

> Sec. of Finance Atty. Espiritu testified that Estrada jointly owned BW Resources Corporation with Mr. Dante Tan who was facing charges of insider trading.> Jan. 16, 2001~ with a vote of 11-10, the Senator judges ruled against opening the 2nd envelope which allegedly contained evidence showing that petitioner held 3.3 billion pesos in a secret bank account under the name "Jose Velarde."> In short, this resulted to what we know as "EDSA II"

- January 19, 2001~ withdrawal of support from the Armed Forces, PNP and mass resignations ensued- Jan 20, 2001~ Estrada surrendered. At 12 nn, CJ Davide administered the oath to Arroyo as the President of the Philippines.

> Estrada left Malacañang and issued a press statement saying that he now leaves Malacañang Palace for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation.> He also wrote a letter saying that the VP shall be the acting president and said letter was transmitted to former Speaker Fuentebella and Sen. Pres. Pimentel.

- Jan 21, 2001~ Arroyo discharged the powers and duties of the Presidency. The SC issued a resolution, which confirmed the authority given by the 12 members of the Court then present to the Chief Justice to administer the oath of office to GMA.

- Jan. 24, 2001~ Despite the receipt of Estrada's letter, House of Reps. passed House Resolution No. 175 experiencing full support to GMA's administration and also HR no. 176- Feb 7, 2001~ Despite receipt of Estrada's letter claiming inability, Senate passed Resolution No. 82 confirming GMA's nomination of Teofisto Guingona as VP and the Senate's support of the new gov't. and also in the same date, Senate passed Res. No. 83 recognizing that the impeachment court is functus offictio.- Feb. 8, 2001~ Senate passed Res. No. 84 certifying vacancy in the Senate.- Feb 15, 2001- CJ Davide and J. Panganiban inhibited themselves from participating in this case as per Saguisag's motion. They of course debunked his charge "that they have compromised their weight on one side" but nonetheless recused themselves.

ISSUES1. WON the petitions present a justiciable controversy2. WON the petitioner resigned as president3. WON the petitioner is only temporarily unable to act as president4. WON the petitioner enjoys immunity from suit (and assuming he enjoys immunity, the extent of the immunity)5. WON the prosecution of petitioner Estrada should be enjoined due to prejudicial publicity.

HELD1. The Court shall consider as justiciable the issue of WON the change in the presidency was done in the manner prescribed by the 1987 Constitution. (In this part, the ponente differentiated EDSA I from EDSA II saying that EDSA I was a revolution, change of presidency was done extra-constitutionally whereas EDSA II was not a revolution, the change was done to an element of the government only and it was done intra-constitutionally because GMA swore to uphold or protect the 1987 Constitution. Read it if u want a better understanding. Also, the Court is interpreting ART II sec 1, ART VII Sec 8 and ART VII Sec 11 in this case so look at those provisions too.)2. The Court held that resignation shall be determined from the totality of prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue. (In relation to this, see Art. VII, Section 8)3. The Court held that the question WON it may review and revise the decision of both Houses of Congress recognizing GMA as the de jure President of the Philippines is a political one. (Congress has laid Estrada's claim of inability to rest because of its recognition of GMA as president. The issue is a political question and the Court cannot review Congress' decision without violating the principle of separation of powers.)4. The Court held (shall rule) that the President enjoys immunity only during his tenure. (Reasoning in the In Re: Bermudez case that the incumbent President is immune from suit or from being brought to court during his period of his incumbency and tenure but not beyond.)5. The Court shall rule that to warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity, there must be allegation and proof that the judges have been unduly influenced by the barrage of publicity. Deicison The petitions of Joseph E. Estrada challenging the respondent Gloria Macapagal- Arroyo as the de jure 14 th President of the Republic are DISMISSED.

GONZALES V NARVASAGONZAGA-REYES; August 14, 2000

FACTS- Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform or PCCR was created by then President Joseph Estrada on Nov 26, 1998 by virtue of Executive Order No. 43 in order to “study and recommend proposed amendments and/or revisions to the 1987 Constitution, and the manner of implementing the same.”

> The PCCR was instructed to complete its task on or before June 30, 1999. On Feb 19, 1999, the President issued Executive Order No. 70 which extended the time frame of the PCCR’s work until Dec 31 1999.> The PCCR submitted its recommendations to the President on Dec 20, 1999 and was dissolved by the President on the same day.

- Ramon Gonzales, in his capacity as citizen and taxpayer, filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus, assailing the constitutionality of the creation of the PCCR on two grounds:

> it is a public office which only the legislature can create by way of law> by creating the PCCR, the President is intervening in a process from which he is totally excluded by the Constitution, i.e. the amendment of the fundamental charter.

- In this regard, Gonzales: > seeks to enjoin the PCCR and the presidential consultants, advisers and assistants from acting as such> seeks to enjoin Exec Sec Ronaldo Zamora from enforcing their advice and recommendations> seeks to enjoin the Commission on Audit from passing in audit expenditures for the PCCR and the presidential consultants, advisers and assistants> prays for an order compelling respondent Zamora to furnish petitioner with information on certain matters.

ISSUES1. WON the case has become moot and academic2. WON petitioner has standing as a citizen3. WON petitioner has standing as a taxpayer4. WON the President has power to create positions (70) in the Office of the President and appoint presidential consultants (20), advisers (22) and assistants (28)5. WON the Court may issue a writ of mandamus ordering Exec Sec Ronaldo Zamora to provide petitioner with names of executive officials holding multiple positions in government, copies of their appointments, and a list of the recipients of luxury vehicles seized by the Bureau of Customs and turned over to Malacañang.

HELD1. Ratio An act is considered moot when it no longer presents a justiciable controversy because the issues involved have become academic or dead. It is beyond the scope of judicial power to give advisory opinion.Obiter The case has already become moot and academic as the PCCR has already ceased to exist. Relief prayed for by Gonzales (prohibition) is impossible to grant and is an inappropriate remedy as body sought to be enjoined no longer exists. Any ruling regarding the PCCR would only be in the nature of an advisory opinion. 2. Ratio A citizen has standing only if he can establish that he has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.Obiter The interest of a person assailing the constitutionality of a statute must be direct and personal. He must be able to show that the law is invalid, but also that he has sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way.1

3. Ratio A taxpayer has standing to raise a constitutional issue when it is established that public funds have been disbursed in alleged contravention of the law or the Constitution, the action of which is properly brought only when there is an exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending power.Obiter Under Sec 7 of EO No 43 which created the PCCR, the amount of P3 million is “appropriated” for its operational expenses “to be sourced from the funds of the Office of the President.” The appropriations were authorized by the

1 in Kilosbayan v Morato citing Valmonte v Phil Charity Sweepstakes Office

President, not by Congress. In fact, there was no appropriation at all since appropriation has been defined ‘as nothing more than the legislative authorization prescribed by the Constitution that money may be paid out of the Treasury.’ The funds for the PCCR was taken from the funds intended for the Office of the President, in the exercise of the Chief Executive’s power to transfer funds pursuant to Sec 25 (5) Art VI of Constitution. 4. Appointment is not synonymous with creation.- Petitioner does not have the personality to raise this issue as he has not proven that he has sustained or is in danger of sustaining any injury as a result of the appointment, and he has not alleged the necessary facts to enable the Court to determine if he possesses a taxpayer’s interest.5. As enshrined in Sec 7 of the Bill of Rights, “the right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.”- The right to information is a public right, and the requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that petitioner is a citizen and therefore part of the general public which possesses the right.- “matters of public concern” is a term which “embrace(s) a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know, either because these directly affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen. In the final analysis, it is for the courts to determine in a case to case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or importance, as it relates to or affects the public.”Decision Petition is dismissed, with the exception that respondent Zamora is ordered to furnish petitioner with information requested.

THE PHILIPPINES AS A STATE(ART I, II, IV, V)

STATE DEFINED

COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE V CAMPOS RUEDAFERNANDO; October 29, 1971

FACTS- Collector of Internal Revenue held Antonio Campos Rueda, as administrator of the estate of the late Estrella Soriano Vda. de Cerdeira, liable for the stun of P 161,974.95 as deficiency estate and inheritance taxes for the transfer of intangible personal properties in the Philippines, the deceased, a Spanish national having been a resident of Tangier, Morocco from 1931 up to the time of her death in 1955. - Rueda’s request for exemption was denied on the ground that the law of Tangier is not reciprocal to Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code.- Rueda requested for the reconsideration of the decision denying the claim for tax exemption. However, respondent denied this request on the grounds that there was no reciprocity [with Tangier, which was moreover] a mere principality, not a foreign country.- Court of Tax Appeals ruled that the expression 'foreign country,' used in the last proviso of Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code, refers to a government of that foreign power which, although not an international person in the sense of international law, does not impose transfer or death taxes upon intangible personal properties of our citizens not residing therein, or whose law allows a similar exemption from such taxes. It is, therefore, not necessary that Tangier should have been recognized by our Government in order to entitle the petitioner to the exemption benefits of the last proviso of Section 122 of our Tax Code.

ISSUEWhether or not the requisites of statehood, or at least so much thereof as may be necessary for the acquisition of an international personality, must be satisfied for a "foreign country" to fall within the exemption of Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code

HELD- Supreme Court affirmed Court of tax Appeal’s Ruling.- If a foreign country is to be identified with a state, it is required in line with Pound's formulation that it be a politically organized sovereign community independent of outside control bound by ties of nationhood, legally supreme within its territory, acting through a government functioning under a regime of law. - it is thus a sovereign person with the people composing it viewed as an organized corporate society under a government with the legal competence to exact obedience to its commands.- The stress is on its being a nation, its people occupying a definite territory, politically organized, exercising by means of its government its sovereign will over the individuals within it and maintaining its separate international personality.- State is a territorial society divided into government and subjects, claiming within its allotted area a supremacy over all other institutions. Moreover, similarly would point to the power entrusted to its government to maintain within its territory the conditions of a legal order and to enter into international relations. With the latter requisite satisfied, international law does not exact independence as a condition of statehood.- Collector of Internal Revenue v. De Lara: There can be no doubt that California as a state in the American Union was lacking in the alleged requisite of international personality. Nonetheless, it was held to be a foreign country within the meaning of Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code.

- This Court did commit itself to the doctrine that even a tiny principality, that of Liechtenstein, hardly an international personality in the traditional sense, did fall under this exempt category.

SOVEREIGNTY AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

ART II DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES

Sec 1: The Philippines is a democratic and republican state. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates form them.

ART V SUFFRAGE

Sec 1: Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines, not otherwise disqualified by law, who are at least 18 years of age, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place wherein they propose to vote, for at least six months immediately preceding the election. No literacy, property, or other substantive requirement shall be imposed on the exercise of suffrage

Sec 2: The Congress shall provide a system for securing the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot as well as a system for absentee voting by qualified Filipinos abroad.

The Congress shall also design a procedure for the disabled and illiterates to vote without the assistance of other persons. Until then, they shall be allowed to vote under existing laws and such rules as the Commission on Elections may promulgate to protect secrecy of the ballot.

TANADA V ANGARAPANGANIBAN; May 2, 1997

FACTS- Petition for Certiorari- DTI secretary Rizalino Navarro signed the Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Negotiations. (Final Act). By signing it, he agreed on behalf of the Philippines

o To submit the WTO agreement to competent authorities for their approval

o Adopt the ministerial declarations and decisions(Basically, the final act aims to liberalize and expand world trade and strengthen the interrelationship between trade and economic policies affecting growth and development.)- The president then sent to the senate a letter which submits the Uruguay Round Final Act for their concurrence- Another letter was sent by the president. This time, he submits the Uruguay Final Round Act, the Agreement Establishing the WTO, the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions and the Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services to the Senate for its concurrence.- The Senate adopted Resolution number 97, which expresses their concurrence in the ratification of the president of the Agreement Establishing the WTO.- The President signed the Instrument of Ratification of the Agreement Establishing the WTO and the agreements and associated legal instruments of that agreement.- The final act signed by Secretary Navarro, on the other hand, embodies not only the WTO agreement but also the ministerial declarations and decisions and the understanding on commitments in financial services.- Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the treaty. They also claim that since the Senate only concurred with the WTO agreement and not on all the contents of the Final act, they impliedly rejected the Final act.

ISSUES1. WON the case is justiciable.2. WON the parity provisions and national treatment clauses in the WTO

agreement violates Sec. 19 Article 2, Sec. 10 and 12 Article 12 of the Constitution (“economic nationalism” clauses).

3. WON the WTO agreement unduly limits, restricts and impairs legislative power of the Congress.

4. WON the WTO agreement intrudes on the power of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedures.

5. WON the concurring of the senate only in the WTO agreement and not in the final act implies rejection of the final act.

HELD- Petition dismissed.1. Yes. - The judiciary has the duty and power to strike down grave abuse of discretion on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government including Congress2. No - The declaration of principles are not intended to be self-executing, rather, they are just aid and guides by the judiciary in judicial review, and by the legislature in enacting laws. These broad principles need legislative enactments to implement them.

- The economic nationalism provisions should be read with other constitutional mandates, especially Sec 1 and 13 of Article 12.- The WTO protects the weak economies. There are specific provisos in the agreement with respect to tariffs, domestic subsidies and protection from unfair competition which are intended to help developing economies.

- The Constitution does not rule out foreign competition. Independence refers to the freedom from undue foreign control of the national economy.- The Constitution has not really shown any unbalanced bias in favor of any business or enterprise, nor does it contain any specific pronouncement that Filipino companies should be pampered with total prescription of foreign competition.- Constitutions are designed to meet not only the vagaries of contemporary events. They should be interpreted to cover even future and unknown circumstances.3. No - Sovereignty is not absolute because it is subject to restrictions and voluntarily agreed to by the Philippines.- The Constitution did not envision a hermit type isolation of the country.- By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or restrict the absoluteness of sovereignty- There are certain restrictions to the Constitution

- Limitations imposed by the very nature of membership in the family of nations.

- Limitations imposed by treaty stipulations- When the Philippines join the UN, it consented to restrict its soverign rights under the concept of auto-limitation. (Reagan vs Commission of Internal Revenue)- The underlying concept in the partial surrender of sovereignty is the reciprocal commitment of the other contracting states granting the same privilege and immunities to the Philippines, its officials and its citizens.4. No.- The burden of proof is not transferred in cases of patent infringement. It is still on the patent owner to introduce evidence of the existence of the alleged identical product.- The new rule should not really present any problem in changing the rules of evidence as the present law on the subject, RA 165 (Patent Law), provides a similar presumption in cases of infringement of patent design.- Conclusion in the third issue also applies.5. No.- The final act need not be ratified. It is not the treaty itself. Rather, it is just a summary of the proceedings. The final act only required that the senate concur with the WTO agreement, which they did.- The Senate was well-aware of what it was concurring to as shown by the member’s deliberations.

REAGAN V COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUEFERNANDO; December 27, 1969

FACTSAPPEAL from a decision of the Court of Tax AppealsPetitioner: William Reagan –civilian employee of an American corporation providing technical assistance to the United States Air Force in the PhilippinesRespondent: Commissioner of Internal RevenueJuly 7, 1959 –Reagan was assigned at the Clark Field Air BaseApril 22, 1960 –He imported a tax-free Cadillac with accessories valued at $6,443.83July 11, 1960 –petitioner asked Base Commander for permit to sell the car which was granted provided that he sell it to a member of the US Armed Forces or a US citizen employed in the Philippine military bases. On the same date, he sold his car for $6,600.00 to Willie Johnson, Jr. of the US Marine Corps.- As a result of the transaction, respondent, after deducting the landed cost of the car as well as petitioner’s personal exemption, fixed his net taxable income arising from the sale at P17,912.34 rendering him liable for P2,979.00 income tax. After paying the sum, petitioner sought a refund claiming that he was exempt, but pending action on his request, he filed the case with the Court of Tax Appeals which denied his petition.

- Petitioner asserts that he is exempt from paying the income tax. He contends that in legal contemplation the sale was made outside Philippine territory and therefore beyond its jurisdiction to tax.- Petitioner relies on a statement of Justice Tuason in Co Po v. Collector of Internal Revenue: “While in army bases or installations within the Philippines those goods were in contemplation of law on foreign soil.” The court resolved this by pointing out that the statement was merely obiter dictum in that case and therefore, cannot be invoked in this case.

ISSUEWON the Clark Field Air Base is Philippine territory

HELDYes. Bases under lease to the American armed forces by virtue of the Military Bases Agreement of 1947 remain part of Philippine territory.- The Philippines being independent and sovereign, its authority may be exercised over its entire domain. Within its limits, its decrees are supreme, its commands paramount. Likewise, it has to be exclusive. If it were not thus, there is a diminution of its sovereignty.- Concept of auto-limitation: Any state may, by its consent, express or implied, submit to a restriction of its sovereign rights. It is not precluded from allowing another power to participate in the exercise of jurisdictional right over certain portions of its territory. If it does so, it by no means follows that such areas become impressed with an alien character. They retain their status as native soil. They are still subject to its authority. Its jurisdiction may be diminished, but it does not disappear. So it is with the bases under lease to the American armed forces by virtue of the military bases agreement of 1947. They are not and cannot be foreign territory.- Therefore, the Philippines’ jurisdictional rights over the bases, certainly not excluding the power to tax, have been preserved. As to certain tax matters, an appropriate exemption was provided for.- Judgment (7 concur, 2 concur in the result, 1 did not take part)The decision of the Court of Tax Appeals denying the refund of P2,979.00 as the income tax paid by petitioner is affirmed.

REPUBLIC V SANDIGANBAYANCORONA; July 15, 2003

FACTS- Special Civil Action in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.- Dec 17 1991, the Republic, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government or PCGG, filed a petition for forfeiture before the Sandiganbayan, entitled Republic of the Philippines vs. Ferdinand E. - Marcos, represented by his Estate/heirs and Imelda R. Marcos, pursuant to RA 13792.

- PCGG was created by virtue of Executive Order No. 1 issued on February 28, 1986 by then President Corazon Aquino, and was charged with the task of assisting the President in the “recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates, whether located in the Philippines or abroad, including the takeover or sequestration of all business enterprises and entities owned or controlled by them during is administration, directly or through nominees, by taking undue advantage of their public office and/or using their powers, authority, influence, connections or relationship.”

- In said case, petitioner Republic, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) sought:

a. the declaration of the aggregate amount of US$356 million (estimated to be US$658 million inclusive of interest as of the time

2 An Act Declaring Forfeiture In Favor of the State Any Property To Have Been Unlawfully Acquired By Any Public Officer or Employee and Providing For the Procedure Therefor.

of decision) deposited in escrow3 in the Philippine National Bank (PNB), as ill-gotten wealth.*The ff account groups, using various foreign foundations in certain Swiss banks, previously held the funds:

1. Azio-Verso-Vibur Foundation accounts2. Xandy-Wintrop: Charis-Scolari-Valamo-Spinus-

Avertina-Foundation accounts3. Trinidad-Rayby-Palmy Foundation accounts4. Rosalys-Aguamina Foundation accounts5. Maler Foundation accounts

b. the forfeiture of US$25 million and US$5 million in treasury notes which exceeded the Marcos couple’s salaries, other lawful income as well as income from legitimately acquired property. These treasury notes are frozen at the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas by virtue of freeze order issued by PCGG.

- Oct 18, 1993, respondents Imelda R Marcos, Ma. Imelda M Manotoc, Irene M Araneta and Ferdinand R Marcos, Jr. filed their answer.

The General Agreement/Supplemental Agreements- Before case was set for pre-trial, a General Agreement and the Supplemental Agreements dated Dec 28, 1993 were executed by the Marcos children and then PCGG Chairman Magtanggol Gunigundo for a global settlement of the assets of the Marcos family- The General Agreement/Supplemental Agreements sought to identify, collate, cause the inventory of and distribute all assets presumed to be owned by the Marcos family under the conditions contained therein.- It was stated in one of the “whereas clauses” the fact that petitioner Republic “obtained a judgment from the Swiss Federal Tribunal on Dec 21 1990 that the US$356 million belongs in principle to the Republic of the Philippines provided certain conditions are met….” The decision of the Swiss Federal Supreme Court affirmed the decision of Zurich District Attorney Peter Cosandey granting legal assistance to Republic. Cosandey declared the various deposits in the name of the foundations to be of illegal provenance and ordered that they be frozen to await the final verdict in favor of the parties entitled to restitution.- Sandiganbayan conducted hearings on the motion to approve the General/Supplemental Agreements.

- Oct 18 1996 petitioner filed a motion for summary judgment and/or judgment on the pleadings. Respondents filed their opposition.- Nov 20 1997 Sandiganbayan denied petitioner’s motion for summary judgment and/or judgment on the pleadings on the ground that the motion to approve the compromise agreement “(took) precedence over the motion for summary judgment”- May 26 1998 Mrs. Marcos filed manifestation claiming she was not a party to the motion for approval of the Compromise Agreement and that the owned 90% of the funds with the remaining 10% belonging to the Marcos estate.

The Fund Transfer- Aug 10 1995 petitioner Republic filed with the District Attorney in Zurich, Switzerland an additional request for the immediate transfer of the deposits to an escrow account in PNB. This was granted.- Marcoses appealed, Swiss Federal Supreme Court affirmed ruling of District Attorney of Zurich, and funds were remitted to the Philippines in escrow in 1998.

The Petition for Summary Judgment- Mar 10 2000 petitioner filed another motion for summary judgment “pertaining to the forfeiture of the US$356 million, based on ff grounds:

3 Money or a deed or other instrument deposited with a third person for a delivery to a given party upon the

fulfillment of some condition. While in the keeping of the third party, the money or instrument is said to be “in escrow”. (Random House Webster’s Legal Dictionary, Random House, New York, 1996)

a. essential facts which warrant the forfeiture of the funds are admitted by respondents in their pleadings and other submissions made in the course of the proceeding

b. respondents’ admission made during pre-trial that they do not have any interest or ownership over the funds tenders no genuine issue or controversy as to any material fact in the present action

- Mrs. Marcos filed her opposition, which was later adopted by co-respondents Marcos children.- Mar 24 2000 hearing on motion for summary judgment was conducted - Sep 19 2000 Sandiganbayan granted petitioner’s motion for summary judgment, stating that there is no issue of fact which calls for the presentation of evidence, and declared the funds, which were deemed unlawfully acquired as ill-gotten wealth, forfeited in favor of the State.- Mrs. Marcos filed motion for reconsideration on Sep 26 2000; Marcos children followed.- In Jan 31 2002 resolution, Sandiganbayan reversed its Sep 19 2000 decision, stating that “the evidence offered for summary judgment of the case did not prove that the money in the Swiss Banks belonged to the Marcos spouses because no legal proof exists in the record as to the ownership by the Marcoses of the funds”, and thus denied petitioner’s motion for summary judgment. Hence, the present petition. - Petitioner asserts in the main that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in reversing the decision on the ground that the original copies of the authenticated Swiss Federal Supreme Court decisions and their “authenticated translations” have not been submitted to the Court, when in fact the Sandiganbayan quoted extensively a portion of the Swiss decisions in denying a previous motion dated July 29 1999. Petitioner adds that nowhere in the respondents’ motions for reconsideration and supplemental motion for reconsideration were the authenticity, accuracy and admissibility of the Swiss decisions ever challenged.- Respondents, of course, assert that the petition should be denied.

Analysis of Respondents’ Legitimate Income- the Marcoses reported P16,408,442.00 or US$2,414,484.91 in total income over a period of 20 years from 1965 to 1984. - This amount includes Ferdinand Marcos’ salary as Senate President in 1965, (P15,935) and as President from 1966 to 1985 (1966-1976 at P60,000/year; 1977-1985 at P100,000/year), Imelda Marcos’ salary as Minister of Human Settlements from 1976 to 1986 (P75,000/year), income from legal practice (P11,109,836), plus other sources.- Ferdinand Marcos made it appear that he had an extremely profitable legal practice before he became President, and that he was still receiving payments almost 20 years after

- Computations establish the total net worth of spouses Ferdinand and Imelda, for the years 1965 to 1984, in the amount of US$957,487.75. (assuming income from legal practice is valid)- The five group accounts have a total balance of US$356 million.

ISSUES1. WON petitioner Republic’s action for certiorari is proper.2. WON respondents raised any genuine issue of fact which would either justify or negate summary judgment.3. WON petitioner Republic was able to prove its case for forfeiture in accordance with Sections 2 and 3 of RA 1379.

HELD1. Ratio Where the case is undeniably ingrained with immense public interest, public policy and deep historical repercussions, certiorari is allowed notwithstanding the existence and availability of the remedy of appeal.Obiter Almost two decades have passed since the government initiated its search for and reversion of ill-gotten wealth. The definitive resolution of such cases on the merits is long overdue.

2. Ratio Mere denials, if unaccompanied by any fact which will be admissible in evidence at a hearing, are not sufficient to raise genuine issues of fact and will not defeat a motion for summary judgmentObiter Court held that respondent Marcoses failed to raise any genuine issue of fact in their pleadings. Summary judgment should take place as a matter of right.- a genuine issue is an issue of fact which calls for the presentation of evidence, as distinguished from an issue which is fictitious and contrived, set up in bad faith or patently lacking in substance.- Respondents failed to specifically deny each and every allegation contained in the petition for forfeiture in the manner required by the rules (Sec 10 Rule 8 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure). Their answers include “they have no sufficient knowledge” or “they could not recall because it happened a long time ago” or “the funds were lawfully acquired” without stating the basis of such assertions. - Question: Whether the kind of denial in respondents’ answer qualifies as the specific denial called for by the rules. No. The Court holds that if an allegation directly and specifically charges a party with having done, performed or committed a particular act which the latter did not in fact do, perform or commit, a categorical and express denial must be made. - The allegations for forfeiture on the existence of the Swiss bank deposits, not having been specifically denied by respondents in their answer, were deemed admitted pursuant to Sec 11 Rule 8 of 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure.

a. Propriety of Summary Judgment- Summary judgment is proper when there is clearly no genuine issue as to any material fact in the action. The Court is justified in dispensing with the trial and rendering summary judgment if it is demonstrated by affidavits, depositions or admissions that the issues are not genuine but sham or fictitious.

- motion for summary judgment is premised on the assumption that the issues presented need not be tried either because these are patently devoid of substance or that there is no genuine issue as to any pertinent fact.

- It is a procedural device for the prompt disposition of actions in which the pleadings raise only a legal issue, not a genuine issue as to any material fact.

b. Whether petitioner Republic had bound itself to go to trial and had legally waived right it had to move for summary judgment.

- Court rules that petitioner could validly move for summary judgment any time after the respondents’ answer was filed or, for that matter, at any subsequent stage of the litigation. The fact that petitioner agreed to proceed to trial did not in any way prevent it from moving for summary judgment. c. Whether by the time motion for summary judgment was filed on

Mar 10 2000, estoppel by laches had already set in against petitioner.

- Doctrine of estoppel or laches does not apply when government sues as a sovereign or asserts governmental rights. Nor can estoppel validate an act that contravenes law or public policy.

- estoppel by laches is the failure or neglect for an unreasonable or unexplained length of time to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier, warranting a presumption that the person has abandoned his right or declined to assert it.

- in invoking doctrine of estoppel by laches, respondents must show not only unjustified inaction but also that some unfair injury to them might result unless the action is barred.

3. Ratio The prima facie presumption raised by the law that a property is unlawfully acquired when the amount or value is manifestly disproportionate to the official salary and other lawful income of the public officer who owns it stands as proved unless defendant shows, and proves, that these were lawfully acquired and that there are other legitimate sources of income.

Obiter burden of proof was on respondents to dispute presumption and show by clear and convincing evidence that the Swiss deposits were lawfully acquired and that they had other legitimate sources of income. A presumption is prima facie proof of the fact presumed, and, unless the fact thus prima facie established by legal presumption is disproved, it must stand as proved. - the Court not only took into consideration that respondents themselves made admissions in their pleadings and testimonies, but that petitioner was able to present sworn statements of witnesses who had personal knowledge of the Marcoses’ participation in the illegal acquisition of funds.

RESOLUTIONCORONA; November 18, 2003

- SC: Respondents in their motions for reconsideration do not raise any new matters for the Court to resolve.

Is summary judgment in forfeiture proceedings a violation of due process?- Respondents: RA 1379 is penal in substance and effect, hence they are entitled to constitutional safeguards enjoyed by accused.- SC: Due process of law has two aspects: substantive and procedural. There must be a compliance with both substantive and procedural requirements in order that a particular act may not be impugned as violative of the due process clause.

- substantive due process refers to intrinsic validity of a law that interferes with the rights of a person to his property

- there is no showing that RA 1379 is unfair, unreasonable or unjust. Respondents were not deprived of their property through forfeiture for arbitrary reasons.

- procedural due process means compliance with procedures or steps, even periods, prescribed by the statute, in conformity with the standard of fair play and without arbitrariness on the part of those who are called upon to administer it.

- forfeiture proceedings are actions in rem, thus civil in nature, contrary to respondents’ contention that they are penal in character. The proceedings under RA 1379 do not terminate in the imposition of penalty but merely in the forfeiture in favor of the State of properties illegally acquired.

- Civil suits to recover unlawfully acquired property under RA 1379 may be proven by preponderance of evidence. The Government is required only to state the known lawful income of respondents for the prima facie presumption of illegal provenance to attach. Petitioner Republic having established this presumption, burden of proof shifted to respondents to show by clear and convincing evidence that the Swiss deposits were lawfully acquired and that they had other legitimate sources of income. Respondents failed on this part.

- essence of due process is found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit one’s evidence in support of his defense

- Respondents were repeatedly accorded full opportunity to present their case, defenses and pleadings. They obstinately refused to do so and have tried to confuse the issues and the Court and to delay the disposition of the case

- “the people and the State are entitled to favorable judgment, free from vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays, the salutary objective being to restore the ownership of the Swiss deposits to the rightful owner – that is, the Republic of the Philippines – in the shortest possible time.”

Motions for reconsiderations denied with finality.

DOMINIUM AND IMPERIUM

CARINO V INSULAR GOVERNMENTHOLMES; February 23, 1909

FACTS- Mateo Carino, an Igorot from the Province of Benguet, contests dismissal of application of registration of their ancestral land through writ of error.- Carino’s ancestors maintained fences for cattle, cultivated some parts, and pastured parts for cattle for more than 50 years before the Treaty of Paris (April 11, 1899). This land is also used for inheritance in accordance to Igorot custom. - Although the plaintiff applied in 1893-1894 and 1896-1897, no document of title was issued by Spanish Crown. In 1901, plaintiff alleged ownership under mortgage law and the lands were registered to him but it only established possessory title. - Procedure - Court -– application of land registration granted (March 4, 1904 ) - CFI of Benguet – appeal on behalf of Government of the Philippines and US having taken possession of property for military and public purposes; application dismissed - Philippine SC – affirmed decision of CFI Benguet - Federal SC – writ of error reviewing judgment of Philippine SC - Respondents argue: - Given that - Spain assumed and asserted that they had title to all the land

in the Philippines except to permit private lands to be acquired - No prescription against the Spanish Crown

- Decree of June 25, 1880 required registration within a limited time to make the title good

- And US succeeded the title of Spain (through Treaty of Paris)

- Plaintiff’s land not registered and he had lost all rights and a mere trespasser

- Also, Benguet never brought under civil or military government of the Spanish Crown, so it is not certain whether registration granted was under Spanish laws

- Plaintiff argues: - Argument seems to amount to denial of native titles throughout

an important Island of Luzon

ISSUEWON Carino owns the land

HELDRatio Prescription, mentioned in the royal cedula of 1754 states: “Where such possessors shall not be able to produce title deeds, it shall be sufficient if they shall show that ancient possession, as a valid title by prescription.”- Decree of June 25, 1880 states: possession for certain times shall be deemed owners; cultivated land 20 years, uncultivated 30 years. Plaintiff’s father was owner of land by the very terms of this decree.- By Organic Act of July 1, 1902, all the property and rights acquired there by the United States are to be administered “for the benefit of the inhabitants thereof.”Obiter Writ of error is the general method of bringing cases to this court (Federal SC), and appeal the exception, confined to equity in the main.

- Every presumption is and ought to be against the government in a case like present.- The reason for taking over the Philippines was different (compared to occupation of white race against Native Americans). Our first object in the internal administration of the islands is to do justice to the natives not to exploit their country for private gain. - The effect of proof was not to confer title but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law. Decision REVERSED- Applicant should be granted what he seeks and should not be deprived of what by the practice and belief of those among whom he lived, was his property, through a refined interpretation of an almost forgotten law of Spain.

KRIVENKO V REGISTER OF DEEDS OF MANILAMORAN; November 15, 1947

FACTS- Appeal from a judgment of the CFI of Manila- December, 1941-Krivenko, alien, bought a residential lot from the Magdalena Estate. Inc- The registration of the lot was interrupted by the war.- May, 1945-Krivenko sought to accomplish said registration but the Register of Deeds of Manila (RDM) denied on the ground that he is an alien and cannot acquire land in this jurisdiction.- Krivenko filed as suit in the CFI of Manila by means of a consulta.- CFI affirmed RDM's refusal hence this appeal.- After the briefs have been presented, Krivenko filed a motion to withdraw the appeal.- The case was already voted upon and the majority decision was being prepared.- Rule 52, section 4 of the Rules of Court: Court's discretion to grant a withdrawal of appeal after the briefs have been presented.- The motion for withdrawal stated no reason whatsoever and the Solicitor General was agreeable to it.- While the motion was pending, a new circular of the Department of Justice (Circular No. 128) dated August 12, 1947 was issued, instructing all register of deeds to accept for registration all transfers of residential lots to aliens.- RDM naturally obeyed the circular.

ISSUEJurisdiction: WON the Court should grant the motion withdrawing an appeal with the issuance of the said circular of the DOJPrimary Issue: WON an alien under our Constitution may acquire residential land.

HELDThe Court denied the motion withdrawing the appeal. Granting a withdrawal of appeal is discretionary upon the Court after the briefs have been presented.- It cannot grant appellant's motion withdrawing his appeal only because the constitutional issue should be avoided.- Also, the withdrawal was denied because under the circumstances, particularly (1) the circular of the Dept. of Justice issued while this case was pending before the Court and ordering all registers of deed to accept for registration all transfers of residential lots to aliens, together with the circumstance that (2) probably a similar question may never come up again before the Court, the effect of the withdrawal would be offensive to the opinion reached by a majority of the members of the Court after long and exhaustive deliberations on the constitutional question.- To allow the withdrawal under such circumstances is equivalent to tolerating an offense to the constitution, offense that may be permanent.

- The Court held that NO, aliens may not acquire private or public agricultural lands, including residential lands. (The votes were: 8-3)- The case was decided under section 5 of Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution which is more comprehensive and more absolute in the sense that it PROHIBITS THE TRANSFER TO ALIENS OF ANY PRIVATE AGRICULTURAL LAND INCLUDING RESIDENTIAL LAND WHATEVER ITS ORIGIN MIGHT HAVE BEEN.- This provision closes the only remaining avenue through which agricultural resources may leak into aliens' hands.- This provision should be read in connection with section 1 of Article XIII "natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated" and with respect to public agricultural lands, their alienation is limited to Filipino citizens.- This provision secures the policy of nationalization in Sec. 1 of Art. XIII.- It would be futile to prohibit the alienation of public lands to aliens if, after all, they may be freely so alienated upon their becoming private agricultural lands in the hands of the Filipino citizens.- Ratio The Court shall rule that it cannot grant a motion withdrawing an appeal if such a withdrawal would result to a permanent offense to the Constitution.- The Court shall rule that under the provisions of the Constitution, aliens are not allowed to acquire the ownership of urban or residential lands in the Philippines and as a consequence, all acquisitions made in contravention of the prohibitions since the Constitution became effective are null and void per se and ab initio.

LEE HONG HOK V DAVIDFERNANDO; December 27, 1972

FACTS- Pedro, Simeon, Rosita and Leoncio LEE HONG HOK, petitioners- Aniano DAVID, the Hon. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, the Director of Lands and Court of Appeals- APPEAL by certiorari from a decision of the Court of Appeals.- Petitioners wanted to declare null and void David’s Torrens Title (OCT No. 510) because they alleged to own the disputed lot (226 m22 Lot 2892, which is a portion of Lot 2863 of the Naga Cadastre) through accretion.- Jun 18, 1958 – Director of Lands issued David a sales patent of the lot- Aug 26, 1959 – Undersecretary of Agricultural and Natural Resources issued David a Miscellaneous Sales Patent No. V-1209- Oct 21, 1959 – Naga City Register of Deeds issued David OCT No. 510 ISSUES1. WON Lot 2892 came into being not by reclamation but by accretion, therefore a private – not public - domain (this court says it does not warrant any further consideration)2. WON authoritative doctrines do not preclude a party other than the government to dispute the validity of a grant (this court says it does)3. WON the indefeasible character of a public land patent after one year should not be recognized (this court says it should be).

HELD1. Imperium is the government authority possessed by the state which is appropriately embraced in the concept of sovereignty, and dominium is the state’s capacity to own or acquire property. Dominium enables the state to provide for the exploitation and use of lands and other natural resources, including their disposition, except as limited by the Constitution. The present Constitution adopts the modified concept of jure regalia, in which all lands – in Spain and its earlier decrees – were held by the Crown, and the present Constitution holds that it is the state which possesses ownership (Cariño v Insular Government). In Valenton v Murciano (1904), all lands held without proper and true deeds of grant be restored to us (the Spanish state) according as they belong to us, in order that after reserving before all what to us or to our

viceroys, audiencias, and governors may seem necessary for public squares, ways, pastures and commons in those places which are peopled, taking into consideration not only their present condition, but also their future and their probable increase, and after distributing to the natives what may be necessary for tillage and pasturage, confirming in them in what they now have and giving them more if necessary, all the rest of said lands may remain free and unencumbered for us to dispose of as we may wish. In Montano v Insular Government, unappropriated public lands constituting the public domain the sole power is vested in Congress. The land in question is not private property; the Director of Lands and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources have always sustained the public character thereof by virtue of reclamation (and not by accretion which the petitioners claim). Therefore, the only remedy for the appellants is an action for reconveyance on the ground of fraud committed by respondents. There was no fraud; everything was done in the open – notices were published, sale and awarding of land to David were public official acts of a Government officer.

The disputed lot is a result of reclamation, therefore a public land.

2. Only the government, represented by the Director of Lands, or the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, can bring an action to cancel a void certificate of title issued pursuant to a void patent. Plaintiffs are private parties and not government officials, and therefore cannot institute for the nullification of David’s Torrens Title, since they are not the registered owners of the land and they had not been declared as owners in the cadastral proceedings of Naga Cadastre after claiming it as their private property. Maninang v Consolacion states that “[t]he fact that the grant was made by the government is undisputed. Whether the grant was in conformity with the law or not is a question which the government may raise, but until it is raised by the government and set aside, the defendant (in this case, the respondents) cannot question it. The legality of the grant is a question between the grantee and the government.”

Only the government can question the validity of the title which it gave.

3. Since the filing of the sales application of David and during all the proceedings in connection with said application, up to the actual issuance of the sales patent in his favor, the appellants did not put up any opposition or adverse claim thereto. This is fatal to them because after the registration and issuance of the certificate and duplicate certificate of title based on a public land patent, the land covered thereby automatically comes under the operation of RA 496 subject to all the safeguards provided therein.

After registration and issuance of the certificate and duplicate certificate of title based on a public land patent, the land is automatically covered by RA 496 --- RA 496 § 48 says that any question concerning the validity of the certificate of title based on fraud should be raised within one year from the date of the issuance of the patent. Thereafter the certificate of title based thereon becomes indefeasible.

In Aquino v Director of Lands (1919), “[t]he proceedings under the Land Registration Law and under the provisions of Chapter VI of the Public Land Law are the same in that both are against the whole world, both take the nature of judicial proceedings, and for both the decree of registration issued is conclusive and final. In Cabacug v Lao, “a holder of a land acquired under a free patent is more favorably situated than that of an owner of registered property. Not only does a free patent have a force and effect of a Torrens Title, but in addition the person to whom it is granted has likewise in his favor the right to repurchase within a period of five years.”

David’s application was a renewal of his deceased wife’s application, wherein his deceased wife occupied Lot 2892 since 1938.

The decision of Court of Appeals of January 31, 1961 and its resolution of March 14, 1969 are affirmed

GONZALES V MARCOSFERNANDO; July 31, 1975

FACTS - Gonzales assailed the validity of EO 30 as an impermissible encroachment by the President on the legislative prerogative- EO 30 has the creation of a trust for the benefit of the Filipino people under the name and style of the Cultural Center of the Philippines to awaken our people’s consciousness in the nation’s cultural heritage and encourage its preservation, promotion and development- In the Court of First Instance, stress was laid on the funds administered by the Center as coming from donations and contributions and not a single centavo raised by taxation- Respondents argue EO 30 as: 1) legitimate exercise of executive power and that 2) this is supplementary to rather than a disregard of RA 4165 creating the National Commission on Culture and that 3) petitioner Gonzales did not have the requisite personality to contest as a taxpayer the validity of EO 30 as the funds held by the Cultural Center came from donations and contributions and not one centavo came from taxation- Later, PD 15 was issued creating the Cultural Center of the Philippines

ISSUES1. WON petitioner has standing2. WON EO 30 encroached on the legislative prerogative 3. WON the issue on the validity of EO 30 became moot and academic

HELD1. The court shall rule that taxpayer has no legal standing to question executive acts that do not involve the use of public funds2.The court shall rule that the President had the power to administer a trust created by an agreement with a foreign country3.EO 30 was superseded by PD 15, hence the suit has assumed a moot and academic character

Obiter(1)-The funds administered by the President of the Philippines came from donations and contributions and not by taxation-There was that absence of the requisite pecuniary or monetary interest (2) –As head of State, as Chief Executive, as spokesman in domestic and foreign affairs, in behalf of the estate as parens patriae, the President has authority to implement for the benefit of the Filipino people by creating the Cultural Center consisting of private citizens to administer the private contributions and donations given not only by the US government but also by private persons-Creation of rules governing the administration of a trust may be concurrently exercised by the President and CongressDecision DISMISSED, No standing and even if there was, still no encroachment and that it is already moot and academic

CRUZ V SECOF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESPER CURIAM; 6 December 2000

FACTS- Republic Act No. 8371 (Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997)- Indigenous peoples/cultural communities (IP/ICC)-Group of people identified by self-ascription and ascription by others, who

have continuously lived as organized community on communally bounded and defined territory;- Ancestral lands (sec.3b IPRA)- Land occupied by members of the ICC/IP since time immemorial, by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, under claims of individual or traditional group ownership,... including residential lots, rice terraces or paddies, private forests, swidden farms, and tree lots.- Ancestral domains (sec.3a IPRA)- Areas generally belonging to ICC/IP comprising lands, inland waters, coastal areas and natural resources therein, held under a claim of ownership, occupied or possessed by ICC/IP, by themselves or through their ancestors, communally or individually since time immemorial continuously to the present... including ancestral lands, forests, pasture, residential, agricultural, and other lands individually owned, hunting grounds, burial grounds, worship areas, bodies of water, mineral and other resources, and lands no longer occupied exclusively by ICC but to which they had traditional access, particularly the home ranges of ICC who are still nomadic or shifting cultivators.- Procedure: CRUZ and EUROPA, as citizens and taxpayers (upon the plea that questions raised are of "transcendental importance"), filed for PROHIBITION (directing NCIP to cease from implementing IPRA and its IR; DENR Secretary to cease from implementing Circular 2; DBM Secretary to cease from disbursing public funds) and MANDAMUS (commanding DENR Secretary to comply with his duty of carrying out the State's constitutional mandate) assailing certain provisions of RA8371 (IPRA) as UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

ISSUESThe following provisions of RA8371 and its Implementing Rules were questioned -(1) Sections 3a, 3b, 5, 6, 7, 8, 57, 58 amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State's ownership over LANDS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN (including the minerals and other natural resources therein) in violation of the REGALIAN DOCTRINE.(2) Sections 3a and 3b violate the RIGHTS OF PRIVATE LANDOWNERS.(3) Sections 51, 52, 53, 59, 63, 65, 66 which define the powers and jurisdiction of the NCIP and make customary law applicable to the settlement of disputes involving ancestral domains and lands, violate the DUE PROCESS clause of the Constitution.(4) Rule 7, Part 2, Section 1 of the NCIP Admin. Order No.1, which provides that "the administrative relationship of the NCIP to the Office of the President is characterized as a lateral but autonomous relationship for purposes of policy and program coordination", is invalid as it infringes upon the President's power of control over executive departments.

HELDThere was NO MAJORITY VOTE reached as the Justices were equally divided at 7-7. The case was then redeliberated upon, but the voting still remained the same. Accordingly, the petition is DISMISSED pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. - Those in favor of dismissing petition: J. Kapunan, J. Davide Jr., J. Bellosillo, J. Quisumbing, J. Santiago, J. Puno, J. Mendoza- Those in favor of granting petition:J. Panganiban, J. Vitug, J. Melo, J. Pardo, J. Buena, J. Gonzaga-Reyes, J. De Leon

SEPARATE OPINIONS

PUNO [dismiss]- Development of the Regalian Doctrine in the Philippine Legal SystemA. Laws of the Indies: All lands became the exclusive patrimony and dominion of the Spanish Crown.

B. Valenton vs. Murciano (1904): "While the State has always recognized the right of the occupant to a deed if he proves a possession for a sufficient length of time, yet it has always insisted that he must make that proof before the proper administrative officers, and obtain from them his deed, and until he did that the State remained the absolute owner."C. Public Land Acts (PLA) and the Torrens System: Under the PLA, "public land" referred to all lands of the public domain whose title still remained in the government. The Torrens system requires that the government issue an official certificate of title attesting to the fact that the person named is the owner of such property described. The certificate of title is indefeasible and imprescriptible.D. Philippine Constitutions: The Regalian Doctrine was established 1935 Constitution, and it was reiterated in the 1973 and 1987 Consti.-Provisions of IPRA do NOT contravene the Constitution(1) AD and AL are the private property of the IP and do not constitute part of the land of the public domains, as they have acquired such properties by NATIVE TITLE (AD/AL) and TORRENS TITLE (AL).a. Native title presumes that the land is private and was never public. Carino is the only case that specifically and categorically recognizes native title. b. For purposes of registration under the PLA and the Land Registration Act, the IPRA expressly converts AL into public agricultural land which may be disposed of by the State. The necessary implication is that AL is private. (2) The right of ownership and possession by the ICC/IP to their AD is a LIMITED form of ownership and does not include the right to alienate such AD.a. It is private because it is not part of the public domain. But the AD is owned in common by the ICC/IP and not by one particular person. Communal rights to the land are held not only by the present possessors but extends to all generations of the ICC/IP.b. Lands may be transferred only to the members of the same ICC/IP; in accord with customary laws; and subject to the right of redemption of IP for a period of 15 years if transferred to a non-member of IP. c. The indigenous concept of ownership exists even without a paper title. (3) The Regalian Doctrine has not been violated as the right of ICC/IP to develop lands and NR within the AD does not deprive the State of ownership over the NR, and of control and supervision in their development and exploitation.a. Sec.7a limits the right of ownership of the IP. But the Implementing Rules of IPRA included the term "natural resources" in such rights of ownership which is CONTRARY to Sec.2 Art.12 of the 1987 Consti.b. The small-scale utilization of NR in Sec.7b of the IPRA is allowed under par.3, Sec.2 Art.12 of the 1987 Consti. Managing and conserving these resources, by their very nature, necessarily reject utilization in a large-scale. c. The large-scale utilization of NR in Sec.57 of IPRA may be harmonized with par.1 and 4, Sec.2 Art.12 of the 1987 Consti. The grant of priority rights implies that there is a superior entity that owns these resources and who has the power to grant such preferential rights. (4) IPRA is a recognition of our active participation in the International Indigenous Movement.

VITUG [grant](1) IPRA effectively withdraws from the public domain the ancestral domains, as the notion of community property involves matters of proprietary interest AND also some forms of self-governance over the property.(2) The decision of the US Court in Carino vs. Insular Government cannot override the collective will of the people expressed in the Constitution.(3) Art.12 sec.5 par.2- "The constitutional aim is to get Congress to look closely into the customary laws and, with specificity and by proper recitals, to hew them to, and make them part of the stream of laws." There should be a balancing of interests between specific need of IP and imperatives of national interest.

KAPUNAN [dismiss] ~Preliminary issues-(1) The petition presents an actual controversy. (2) Petitioners have the requisite standing. As citizens, they possess the public right to ensure that the national patrimony is not alienated and diminished in violation of the Constitution. As taxpayers, they possess the right to restrain officials from wasting public funds through the enforcement of an unconstitutional statute. (3) The petition for prohibition and mandamus is not an improper remedy.(4) Notwithstanding the failure of petitioners to observe the hierarchy of courts, (petition should have been filed in the lower court first) the Court assumes jurisdiction in view of the importance of the issues raised.~Substantive issues-(1) The provisions recognizing ownership of IP over the ancestral lands and domains are not unconstitutional.a. The Regalian theory does not negate native title to lands held in private ownership since time immemorial. b. Sec.1 Art.12 of 1935 Constitution does not state that certain lands which are "absolutely necessary for social welfare and existence," shall then be owned by the State. c. Sec.5 Art.12 expresses sovereign intent to "protect the rights of IP to their AL." Framers did not intend Congress to decide whether AD shall be public or private property, as they have acknowledged that AD shall be treated as private property. (2) The provisions of RA8371 do not infringe upon the State's ownership over the natural resources within the ancestral domains.a. Sec.3a merely defines coverage of AD; its purpose is definitional and not declarative of a right or title. It does not ipso facto convert the character of such natural resources as private property of the IP.b. The concept of native title to natural resources, unlike native title to land, has NOT been recognized in the Philippines. (3) The provisions of IPRA pertaining to the utilization of natural resources are not unconstitutional.a. Sec.2(3) Art.12 of the 1935 Consti allows small-scale utilization of natural resources by its citizens. The State retains full control over such activities, through the imposition of requirements and conditions for the exploration, development and utilization of the NR.b. Under sec.7b, rights given to IP are duly circumscribed and are limited:

to manage and conserve NR within territories; to benefit and share the profits from allocation and utilization of NR; to negotiate the terms and conditions for exploration of NR in the

area (refers only to the preliminary activity of search and prospecting of mineral resources);

to an informed and intelligent participation in the formulation and implementation of any project that will affect AD;

to receive just and fair compensation for any damages sustained by such projects;

to effective measures by the government to prevent any interference with these rights

c. Priority rights do not mean exclusive rights. The grant of said priority rights is not a blanket authority to disregard pertinent laws and regulations. ~Corollary issues- (1) IPRA does not violate the Due Process clause.a. The property rights referred to in Sec.56 ("Existing property regimes should be protected") belong to those acquired by individuals, whether indigenous or non-indigenous. Where the law does not distinguish, the courts should not distinguish.b. The fact that NCIP shall be composed exclusively of members of IP does not mean that the NCIP is incapable, or will appear to be so incapable, of delivering justice to the non-IP.c. The application of customary law is limited to disputes concerning property rights or relations in determining the ownership and extent of the AD, where

ALL parties involved are members of IP. (2) Implementing Rules of IPRA does not infringe upon the President's power of control over the Executive Department.Although NCIP is independent to a certain degree, it was placed by Congress "under the Office of the President" and as such, is still subject to the President's power of control and supervision under Sec.17 Art.7 of the Consti.

MENDOZA [dismiss](1) It is not a justiciable controversy. Judicial power cannot be extended to matters which do not involve actual cases or controversies without upsetting balance of power.(2) Petitioners do not have legal standing. In Tanada v. Tuvera, when the question is one of public right and the object of mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest. But in this case, “what public right is there for petitioners to enforce when the IPRA does not apply to them except in general and in common with other citizens??”

PANGANIBAN [grant]- RA8371 is unconstitutional in that- A. It recognizes and grants rights of ownership over "lands of the public domain which are owned by the State."B. It lessens the authority of the State to oversee the "exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources" which should under be the full control and supervision of the State."(1) All Filipinos, whether indigenous or not, are subject to the Constitution. Because of the State's implementation of policies considered to be for the common good, all those concerned have to give up, under certain conditions, even vested rights of ownership.(2) The concept of ownership of ICC/IP, even if it is a collective right, still perpetually withdraws such property from the control of the State and from its enjoyment by other citizens of the Republic. Ownership of NR is in ALL the Filipino people.(3) Sec.3 Art.12 of the Consti provides that Filipino citizens may acquire no more than 12 hectares of alienable public land, but RA8371 speaks of no area or term limits to ancestral lands and domains. Based on ethnographic surveys, solicitor general estimates that AD cover 80% of our mineral resources and between 8 and 10 million of the 30 milion hectares of land in the country. (4) Sec.2 Art.12 of the Consti provides that the State may directly undertake exploration, development and utilization of NR or it could enter into co-production, joint venture or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens or entities at least 60% Filipino-owned (and such agreements shall not exceed 25 years). RA 8371 relinquishes this power in favor of ICC/IP and they may even exercise such right without any time limit.(5) Yes, ICC/IP should be given priority in the use of their AD and AL but they should not be granted perpetual ownership and control of the nation's substantial wealth to the exclusion of other law-abiding Filipino citizens.

SUITS AGAINST THE STATE

ART XVI GENERAL PROVISIONS

Sec 3: The State shall not be sued without its consent

SHAUF V COURT OF APPEALSREGALADO; November 27, 1990

FACTSPetitioner Loida Q. Shauf, a Filipino by origin and married to an American who is a member of the United States Air Force, applied for the vacant position of

Guidance Counselor, GS 1710-9, in the Base Education Office at Clark Air Base, for which she is eminently qualified. She had functioned as a Guidance Counselor at the Clark Air Base at the GS 1710-9 level for approximately four years at the time she applied for the same position in 1976. her application was forwarded to Anthony Persi, who had some reservations regarding Shauf’s work experience. Persi then requested the Civilian Personnel Office to initiate immediate inquiry to the Central Oversea Rotation and Recruiting Office (CORRO). Persi was then informed by CORRO that an Edward B. Isakson was selected for the position. Isakson was placed on the rolls at Clark Air Base on January 1977.

By reason of her non-selection to the position, Loida Shauf filed an equal employment opportunity complain against respondents for alleged discrimination against the former by reason of her nationality and sex. Trial court held in favor of Shauf, while Court of Appeals reversed decision.

ISSUES1. WoN the officers of the US Armed Forces performing official

functions in accordance with the powers vested in them under the Philippine American Military Bases Agreement are immune from suit (even w/o consent of the State).

2. WoN the respondents are guilty of discrimination against petitioner Shauf.

3. WoN Shauf should be awarded compensatory damages.

HELDAs expressed in Art. XVI, Section 3 of the 1987 Consti, the state may not be sued without its consent. This is a generally accepted principle of International law under Art II, Section 2. The case at hand may be construed as a suit against the US, since the damages to Shauf will be taken from funds of the US. However, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. Unauthorized acts of government officials are not acts of the State, and an action against the officials by one whose rights have been invaded by such offenses, is not a suit against the State covered by the rule of immunity. The respondents are being sued in their private and personal capacity. The rationale for this ruling is that the doctrine of state immunity cannot be used as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice. A public official may be liable in his personal private capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with malice and in bad faith, or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction.

Doctrine Yes. Regalado is concurred with by Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla, and Sarmiento.

1. The US officers are NOT IMMUNE from suit even without the consent of the State.

2. Yes the petitioners are guilty of discrimination against Shauf. Despite Shauf’s qualifications, Persi did not even consider the former’s application. Since the petitioner was able to prove the discrimination in the non-consideration of her application, the burden shifted to the respondents. The respondents however answered with mere denials of the charges.

3. Shauf need not be awarded compensatory damages. There was no proof that she really was to earn $39,662 if she was employed at the time. Damages which are merely possible are speculative. There must be an actual proof of loss.

WYLIE V RARANGGUTIERREZ; May 28, 1992

FACTSPetitioners Wylie and Williams were the assistant administrative officer and commanding officer, respectively, of the US Naval base in Subic. Respondent

Aurora Rarang was an employee in the Office of the Provost Marshal assigned as the merchandise control guard. Wylie, as one of his duties, supervised the publication of the “Plan of the Day” a daily publication that featured among others, an “action line inquiry”. On feb.3,1978, an inquiry was published saying that confiscated goods were being consumed/ used for personal benefit by the merchandise control inspector and that a certain “Auring” was, in herself, a disgrace to the office. Rarang, being the only person named Auring in the said office, went to press an action for damages against Wylie and Williams and the US Naval Base. (That Rarang was indeed the Auring mentioned in the inquiry was proven by the apology letter issued by Wylie for the inadvertent publication.)She alleged that the article constituted false, injurious, and malicious defamation and libel tending to impeach her honesty, virtue and reputation exposing her to public hatred, contempt and ridicule.Defendants alleged that (1) defendants acted in performance of their official functions as officers of the US Navy and are thus immune from suit (2) US Naval Base is immune from suit being an instrumentality of the US Government and (3) the RTC has no jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties involved. Lower court ruling: defendants pay damages because acts were not official acts of the US government, but personal and tortious acts (which are not included in the rule that a sovereign country can’t be sued without its consent). Suit against US Naval Base was dismissed.

ISSUES1. WON officials of the US Naval Base inside Philippine Territory, in discharge of their official duties, are immune from suit.2. Are US officers who commit a crime or tortious act while discharging official functions still covered by the principle of state immunity from suit?

HELD1. Yes, they are immune. Ratio Officers of the US Navy as instrumentalities of the US government are immune from suit (but only when they are acting/ discharging their official functions. this is part of the second issue) Art.XVI, sec.3 of 1987 consti provides that state may not be sued without its consent. But even without this affirmation, court is still bound by the doctrine of incorporation4. The doctrine is applicable not only to suits against the state but also to complaints filed against officials for acts allegedly performed by them in discharge of their official duties. The traditional rule of immunity excepts a State from being sued in the courts of another State without its consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of the principles of independence and equality of States.Because the activities of states have multiplied, it has been necessary to distinguish them –– between sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) and private, commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis). The result is that State immunity now extends only to acts jure imperii.There is no question, therefore, that the petitioners actively participated in screening the features and articles in the POD as part of their official functions. Under the rule that U.S. officials in the performance of their official functions are immune from suit, then it should follow that the petitioners may not be held liable for the questioned publication.It is to be noted, however, that the petitioners were sued in their personal capacities for their alleged tortious acts in publishing a libelous article.

2. No.Ratio Our laws and, we presume, those of the United States do not allow the commission of crimes in the name of official duty. The general rule is that public officials can be held personally accountable for acts claimed to have

4 principles are deemed incorporated in the law of every civilized state as a condition and consequence of its membership in the society of nations. Upon its admission to such society, the state is automatically obligated to comply with these principles in its relations with other states

been performed in connection with official duties where they have acted ultra vires or where there is showing of bad faith. Immunity from suit cannot institutionalize irresponsibility and non-accountability nor grant a privileged status not claimed by any other official of the Republic. Under Art. 2176 of the civil code, whoever by act or omission, causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.Indeed the imputation of theft contained in the POD dated February 3, 1978 is a defamation against the character and reputation of the private respondent. Petitioner Wylie himself admitted that the Office of the Provost Marshal explicitly recommended the deletion of the name Auring if the article were published. The petitioners, however, were negligent because under their direction they issued the publication without deleting the name "Auring." Such act or omission is ultra vires and cannot be part of official duty. It was a tortious act which ridiculed the private respondent. The petitioners, alone, in their personal capacities are liable for the damages they caused the private respondent.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA V GUINTOCRUZ; February 26, 1990

FACTS- Petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction to review the decision of the RTC of Angeles City- This case is a consolidation of four separate cases, all involving state immunity.

G.R. No. 76607- Private respondents Valencia, Tanglao and del Pilar sued officers of the U.S. Air Force in Clark Air Base in connection with the bidding conducted by them for contracts for barbering services in the said base.- Respondents sought to compel the Philippine Area Exchange (PHAX) and individual petitioners to cancel the award to defendant Dizon, to conduct rebidding and to allow respondents by a writ of preliminary injunction to continue operating concessions pending litigation.- Respondent court issued an order directing petitioners to maintain the status quo.- Petitioners filed motion to dismiss and opposition to the petition for preliminary injunction on the ground that the action was a suit against the United States, which has not waived its non-suability, and that as officials/employees of the U.S. Air Force, defendants were also immune from suit.- Trial Court denied the application for a writ of preliminary injunction as well as the motion to dismiss.- Petitioners filed for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction in the SC.

G.R. No. 79470- Genove filed a complaint for damages against Lamachia, Belsa, Cartalla and Orascion for his dismissal as cook in the U.S. Air Force Recreation Center at John Hay Air Station in Baguio City. After investigation, the ff: facts were ascertained: - Genove poured urine into the soup stock used in cooking vegetables

served to club customers. - Lamachia, as club manager, suspended Genove and referred the case

to the Board of Arbitrators, which found him guilty and recommended his dismissal.

- Defendants, joined by the United States of America, moved to dismiss the complaint, alleging that Lamachia, as an officer of the U.S. Air Force,

was immune from suit, and that the suit was in effect against the United States, which has not given its consent to be sued.- Said motion was denied.- Petitioners filed for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction in the SC.

G.R. No. 80018- Luis Bautista, was employed as barracks boy in Camp O’ Donnel, an extension of Clark Air Base.- He was arrested following a buy-bust operation conducted by individual petitioners King, Dye and Bostick, officers of the United States Air Force and special agents of the United States Air Force Office of Special Operations, for violating R.A. 6425, or the Dangerous Drugs Act.- Bautista was dismissed from employment.- He then filed a complaint for damages against individual petitioners.- Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the defendants were acting in their official capacity when they did the acts complained of and that the suit was against the United States without its consent. - Motion was denied by respondent judge.- Petitioners filed for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction in the SC.

G.R. No. 80258- Private respondents filed a complaint for damages for injuries sustained as a result of the acts of herein petitioners.- According to plaintiffs (herein respondents), defendants (herein petitioners) beat them up, handcuffed them and unleashed dogs on them which bit them and caused them extensive injuries.- According to defendants, the plaintiffs were arrested for theft and were bitten by the dogs because they were struggling and resisting arrest.- The United States of America and the individually named defendants moved to dismiss the case and argued that the suit was in effect a suit against the United States which has not given its consent to be sued. The defendants also claimed immunity for acts done by them in the performance of their official functions. - Trial court denied the motion to dismiss, as well as the motion for reconsideration.- Petitioners filed for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction in the SC.

ISSUES1. WON the cases against the petitioners were suits against the United States, to which it has not consented2. WON the individual petitioners may invoke immunity from suit by mere assertion that the acts were done by them in the performance of their official functions as officers or agents of the United States

HELD1) Ratio If the case involves the state entering into a contract in the discharge of its commercial, proprietary and private function, then the state will be deemed to have impliedly consented to the suit.Reasoning - The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent now expressed in Article XVI, Section 3, of the 1987 Constitution, is one of the generally accepted principles of international law.- All states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over the other.- The rule says that a state may not be sued without its consent, which clearly imports that it may be sued if it consents.- Consent may be express or implied.- Express-embodied in a general or special law- Implied-when the state enters into a contract or it commences litigation

- However, not all contracts operate as a waiver of non-suability—a distinction must be made between contracts entered into in a state’s governmental and sovereign capacity or private, proprietary and commercial capacity- The latter implies waiver of non-suability, the former does not.* If it is not proven that the acts were done by the individual petitioners in the performance of their official functions as officers or agents of the United States, then they may not invoke immunity form suit. - The doctrine of state immunity is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. - The fact that the acts were done by the individual petitioners in the performance of their official functions as officers or agents of the United States is a matter of evidence, and charges against them may not be dismissed just by mere assertion. If the individual petitioners are found liable for personal torts in which the US itself is not involved, then they alone must satisfy the judgment.2) Ruling: (Application of ratio in the different cases)G.R. No. 76607- Barbershops subject of the concessions granted by US are commercial enterprises operated by private persons. The contracts being decidedly commercial, petitioners cannot plead any immunity. - Petition is dismissed.G.R. No. 79470- Restaurant services offered at the John Hay Air Station partake of the nature of a business enterprise undertaken by the US government in its proprietary capacity. Petitioners cannot invoke the doctrine of state immunity to justify the dismissal of the damage suit against them.- However, notwithstanding these considerations, complaint in the court below must still be dismissed. Although suable, the petitioners are not liable because of the strength of evidence that they acted properly in terminating Genove for his disgusting offense.- Petition is granted, case against petitioners is dismissed.G.R. No. 80018- Individually-named petitioners were acting in the exercise of their official functions, and not in their private or unofficial capacity. - It follows that for discharging their duties as agents of the United States, they cannot be directly impleaded for acts imputable to their principal, which has not given its consent to be sued.- Petition is granted, case against petitioners is dismissed.G.R. No. 80258- The court hesitates to make a conclusion because the record is too meager to indicate if the individual petitioners were acting in the discharge of their official functions, or had actually exceeded their authority.- Only after needed inquiry in the lower court shall have determined in what capacity the individual petitioners were acting will the Court determine if the doctrine of state immunity is applicable.- Petition is dismissed and the respondent court is directed to proceed with the hearing and decision.

JUSMAG PHILIPPINES V. NLRCPUNO; December 15, 1994

FACTS- Florencio Sacramento was one of the 74 security assistance support personnel (SASP) working at JUSMAG Phils.; he had been with JUSMAG for more than 20yrs (1969-1992); was dismissed on April 27, 1992- He filed a complaint with the Dept. of Labor and Employment (March 31, 1992) on the ground that he was illegally suspended and dismissed; asked for reinstatement- JUSMAG filed a Motion to Dismiss invoking its immunity from suit as an agency of US; also alleged lack of employer-employee rel’p and it has no juridical personality to sue and be sued

- Labor Arbiter Daniel Cueto dismissed complaint for want of jurisdiction- NLRC reversed—JUSMAG had lost its right not to be sued based on: 1) estoppel- JUSMAG failed to refute the employer-employee rel’p under the control test and 2) it has waived its right to immunity from suit when it hired Sacramento’s services.

- NLRC relied on Harry Lyons vs. USA (“US Govt waived its immunity from suit by entering into a contract of stevedoring services, and thus, it submitted itself to the jurisdiction of local courts”)- JUSMAG now contends that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in reversing the labor arbiter’s decision, in saying that JUSMAG waived its immunity from suit, in finding an employer-employee relp between JUSMAG and Sacramento, and in considering JUSMAG estopped from denying that respondent is its employee for failure to present proof.

ISSUEIs the Joint United States Military Assistance Group to the RP (JUSMAG-PHIL) immune from suit?

HELDRatio As it stands now, the application of the doctrine of immunity from suit has been restricted to sovereign or governmental activities. The mantle of state immunity cannot be extended to commercial, private and proprietary acts. Reasoning- When JUSMAG took the services of Sacramento, it was performing a governmental function on behalf of the US pursuant to the Military Assistance Agreement. The suit is, in effect, one against the US and, considering that the US has not waived or consented to the suit, the complaint cannot prosper.- Immunity of State from suit is one of the universally recognized principles of international law that the Phils. Recognizes and adopts as part of the law of the land. This is anchored on the principle of sovereign equality of states (an equal has no power over an equal).Discussion- Historical Background of JUSMAG

- was created pursuant to the Military Assistance Agreement dated March 21, 1947 between the Philippines and the US; primary task was to advise and assist the Philippines on air force, army and naval matters- in 1991, US manifested its preparedness to provide funds to cover the salaries of SASP and security guards, the rent of bldgs, and housing, and cost of utilities- Memorandum of Agreement between AFP and JUSMAG-Phils

- Salaries- for security guards and SASP- SASP are employees of the AFP; under the total operational control of the Chief JUSMAG-Phils; AFP to assume the severance/retirement pay liability for all appointed SASP

- It is apparent that when JUSMAG took the services of private respondent, it was performing a governmental function on behalf of the US. Hence, the suit is, in effect, one against the US Government.- In this jurisdiction, Immunity of State is a universally accepted principle. Immunity is understood as the exemption of the state and its organs from the judicial jurisdiction of another state.- A state cannot be sued in the courts of another state, without its consent or waiver. An exception to the doctrine, however, was recognized in Santos, et al vs. Santos, et al: “the state itself may be sued, even without its consent, because by entering into a contract, the sovereign state has descended the level of the citizen and its consent to be sued is implied from the very act of entering into such contract.”- it was in this light that the state immunity issue in Harry Lyons vs. USA was decided- Exception evolved: existence of contract does not, per se, mean that sovereign states may, at all times, be sued in local courts.- US vs. Ruiz: “...does not apply where the contract relates to the

exercise of its sovereign functions”

- US vs. Hon. Rodrigo, et al: “petitioners cannot invoke the doctrine of state immunity...the reason is that by entering into the employment contract with Genove in the discharge of its proprietary functions, it impliedly divested itself of its sovereign immunity from suit.”

- SASP are employees of the AFP as consistently contended by JUSMAG, thus it is not estopped from denying employer-employee relationship

Dispositive Petition for certiori is granted, resolution of NLRC is reversed and set aside

PNB V CIRFERNANDO; January 31, 1978

FACTS- Petitioner PNB received a notice of garnishment which was served upon its branch on QC by an authorized deputy sheriff of the court*** What was sought to be garnished was the money of the People’s Homesite and Housing Corporation deposited at the petitioner’s branch in QC in order to satisfy the decision of the respondent court- PNB filed a motion to quash the notice based on 2 grounds:1. the appointment of respondent Gilbert Lorenzo as authorized deputy sheriff to serve the writ of execution was contrary to law*** PNB contends that the service of notice by the authorized deputy sheriff of this court contravenes Sec. 11 of Commonwealth Act No. 1055

*** It argues that it is the sheriff of QC and not the Clerk of this court who is its Ex-officio Sheriff, that has the authority to serve the notice of garnishment and that the actual service of the latter officer of said notice is therefore not in order2. the funds subject of the character “may be public in character”- COIR denied PNB’s motion to quash a notice of garnishment

ISSUEWON an order of Court of Industrial Relations (COIR) denying, for lack of merit, petitioner PNB’s motion to quash a notice of garnishment6 can be stigmatized as a grave abuse of discretion.

HELDNo. There’s no grave abuse of discretion.Ratio1. RA No. 4201 has already repealed Commonwealth Act No. 103, and under this law, it is now the Clerk of this Court that is at the same time the Ex-Officio Sheriff. Therefore, the Clerk of this Court has the authority to issue writs of execution and notices2. First, the tone in asserting this argument was even irresolute. And 2nd, the People’s Homesite and Housing Corporation had a juridical existence enabling it to sue and be sued. The premise that the funds spoken of are public in character may be accepted in the sense that it was government-owned. However, it does not follow that they were exempt from garnishment.

SSS v CA

MELENCIO-HERRERA; February 21. 1983

FACTS- In March 1963, spouses David B. Cruz and Socorro Cancio Cruz applied for and were granted a real estate loan by the SSS with their residential lot located

5 “All writs and processes issued by the court shall be served and executed free of charge by provincial

sheriffs or by any person authorized by this court, in the same manner as writs and processes of Courts of First Instance6

Garnishment – a legal warning concerning the attachment of property to satisfy a debt -- also the attachment of such property

at Lozada Street, Sto. Rosario, Pateros, Rizal covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 2000 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal its collateral. Pursuant to this real estate loan said spouses executed on March 26, 1963 the corresponding real estate mortgage originally in the amount of P39,500.00 which was later increased to P48,000.00 covering said property.- On July 9, 1968, defendant SSS filed an application with the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal for the foreclosure of the real estate mortgage executed by the plaintiffs on the ground, among others that the conditions of the mortgage have been broken since October 1967 with the default on the part of the mortgagor to pay in full the installments then due and payable on the principal debt and the interest thereon, and all of the monthly installments due and payable thereafter up to the present date. Notice of the Sheriff's Sale of the mortgaged property was initially published in the Sunday Chronicle in its issue of July 14, 1968 announcing the sale at public auction of the said mortgaged property. Despite plaintiff’s letter to defendant demanding the latter to withdraw foreclosure and discontinue the publication of the notice of sale of their property claiming that plaintiffs were up-to date in the payment of their monthly amortizations, defendant SSS still went on to publish second and third publications of foreclosure.- On July 24, 1968, the plaintiff Cruz spouses instituted before the Court of First Instance of Rizal an action for damages and attorney's fees against the SSS and the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal alleging, among other things, that they had fully and religiously paid their monthly amortizations and had not defaulted in any payment. Trial Court rendered judgment against defendant SSS. Court of Appeals affirmed Trial Court’s decision. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUES(1) WON the Cruz spouses had, in fact, violated their real estate mortgage contract with the SSS as would have warranted the publications of the notices of as would have foreclosure(2) WON the SSS is immune from suit(3) WON SSS can be held liable for damages.

HELD(1) Ratio On questions of appreciation of evidence, factual findings of the lower court are not subject to review by this Court.Reasoning The reasoning used precedence to arrive at this ratio. Applying the rule, it can be said therefore, that the findings of the Court of Appeals that the mortgage-debtors have not in fact violated their contract because SSS accepted their installment payments although given late will not be disturbed on appeal.(2) Ratio An entity performing governmental functions, by virtue of the explicit provision of an enabling law, is deemed to have waived immunity from suit, although it does not thereby concede its liability. Reasoning Again, the leg of reasoning is ratio by precedence, citing Rayo v. Court of First Instance of Bulacan, (110 SCRA 457), which involved the National Power Corporation as an entity performing governmental functions. In that case it said, “It is sufficient to say that the government has organized a private corporation, put money in it and has allowed it to site and be sued in any court under its charter.” The enabling law is R.A. No. 6395. Applying this rule in the present case, the SSS’ own organic act specifically provides that it can sue and be sued in Court, the enabling law being R.A. 1161 and P.D. 24. Hence, there’s a statutory consent by the SSS to waive right of immunity from suit.(3) Ratio No moral and/or temperate damages is to be adjudged against a party which commenced foreclosure proceedings in view of the irregular payments of the debtor of his installments.Decision (1) The ruling of the lower courts remain. While it is true that the payments of the monthly installments were previously not regular, it is a fact that as of June 30, 1968 the appellee, David B. Cruz and Socorro Concio-Cruz were up-to-date and current in the payment of their monthly installments. Having accepted the prior late payments of the monthly installments, the

appellant could no longer suddenly and without prior notice to the mortgagors apply for the extra-judicial foreclosure of the mortgage.(2) SSS is deemed to have waived its immunity from suit.(3) SSS cannot be held liable for damages. Voting 10 justices concur, 1 dissent, 3 took no part.

SEPARATE OPINION

MAKASIAR [dissent] What was committed in this case was a tortious act (grossly negligent

bordering on malice or bad faith) of the employees of the SSS in foreclosing the mortgage of the wrong mortgage-debtor

SSS cannot be held liable for the damages caused by the tortious acts of its employees in the performance of their regular functions

SSS as a public instrumentality for social welfare is immune from suit despite its Charter provision that it can sue and be sued.

SSS exercises purely governmental functions and cannot be sued without its consent for the tortious acts of its personnel

COMMISIONER OF PUBLIC HIGHWAYS V BURGOSDE CASTRO; March 31, 1980

FACTS- Appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu - The facts of the case is as per above except that the compensation determined is now the issue. The value of the property was pegged at P 2.37 per square meter based on the price used in the conveyance of several pieces of property in the same area at about the same time. However, the court a quo in determining due compensation, considered the value of the pesos to the dollar at the time the case was being decided. So instead of just P14,615.79 the amount awarded became P49,459.34. (the original amount of 14,615.79 divided by 2 {the exchange rate at the time of the taking to be P2.00 to US$1.00} and the product being multiplied by 6.775). Based on this amount, the court determined interest to be P145,410.44. Total due from the government, including attorney’s fee of ten percent amounted to P214,356.75.- Apparently, the court a quo, in revising upward the compensation, relied on Article 1250 of the New Civil Code which provides for payment of an obligation in an amount different from what has been agreed on because of the supervention of extra-ordinary inflation or deflation.- The government, through the Solicitor General, appealed the decision contending that the court a quo erred in applying its method and violated the high court’s order to make as a basis of compensation the price or the value of the land when it was taken. The Solicitor General also took issue with the award of ten percent as attorney’s fees as exhorbitant considering that Amigable only sought P5,000.00.

ISSUES1. WON the compensation awarded by the court is proper2. WON the attorney’s fees awarded were exorbitant

HELD1) In a review of the relevant Article of the New Civil Code, the Court noted that the provision applies only if there was a contract or agreement. Using the precedent, Velasco vs Manila Electric (L-19390 December 29, 1971), the court expressed the view that the taking of private property by the government in the exercise of its eminent domain does not give rise to a contractual obligation. Since there is no contract to speak of because the obligation of the government sought to be enforced does not originate from contract, then Article 1250 does not apply. The just compensation is the value of the property at the time it was taken.

- Amigable is still entitled to interest on the price of the land as there was no motion of reconsideration from the Solicitor General before the decision became final.2) The Court noted that Amgable only sked for P5,000 attorney’s fees and hence the amount requested is reasonable.

Dispositive Judgment appealed is reversed as to the basis of determining the price of the land. And the price of P2.37 per square meter or total amount is P14,615.79 plus six percent per annum interest reckoned from the time the property was taken to the time the compensation is paid.

GOVERNMENT

UNITED STATES V DORRLADD; May 19, 1903

FACTSThe defendants, Fred Dorr et al., have been convicted upon a complaint charging them with the offense of writing, publishing, and circulating a scurrilous libel against the Government of the United States or the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands. The complaint is based upon section 8 of Act No. 292 of the Commission7. The alleged libel was published as an editorial in the issue of “Manila Freedom” of April 6, 1902. Virulent attacks on the Civil Commission and its members, for instance the appointment of one Tecson as justice of the peace and the branding of Trinidad H. Pardo de Tavera as a coward and a rascal, were explicitly raised among others. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUES1. What is meant in section 8 of Act No. 292 by the expression “the Insular Government of the Philippines”?8 2. Whether the article constitutes an offense under section 8 of Act No. 292?

HELD1. Ratio The term “government” as employed in Act No. 292 of the United States Philippine Commission is used in the abstract sense of the existing political system as distinguished from the concrete organism of the Government – the Houses of Congress and the Executive. Reasoning There are two admissible meanings of the term “government” provided: a. in a general and abstract sense, the existing laws and institutions of the Islands, or b. the aggregate of the individuals by whom the Government of the Islands is, for the time being, administered. The first admissible definition is derived from the act of (the U.S.) Congress on July 14, 1798, commonly known as the Sedition Act)9

2. Ratio The publication of an article can not be punished under Act No. 292 of the United States Philippine Commission as having seditious tendencies unless it has a tendency to produce disaffection or a feeling incompatible with a disposition to remain loyal to the Government and obedient to its laws.

7 “Every person who shall utter seditious words or speeches, write, publish, or circulate scurrilous libels

against the Government of the United States or the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands, or which tend to disturb or obstruct any lawful officer in executing his office, or which tend to instigate others to cabal or meet together for unlawful purposes, or which suggest or incite rebellious conspiracies or riots, or which tend to stir up the people against the lawful authorities, or to disturb the peace of the community, the safety and order of the Government, or who shall unknowingly conceal such evil practices, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand dollars or by imprisonment not exceeding two years, or both, in the discretion of the court.” (Italics mine) 8

N.B. We need to answer this question first in order to be able to resolve the next issue.9

“It is made an offense to write, print, utter, publish or cause to procure to be written, printed, uttered, or published or to knowingly and willingly assist or aid in writing, printing, uttering, or publishing any false, scandalous, and malicious writing or writings against the Government of the United States, or the President of the United States, with intent to defame the said Government, or either House of said Congress, or the said President, or to bring them, or either of them, into contempt or disrepute, or to excite against them or either any of them the hatred of the good people of the United States…"

- The publication of an article abusive of the United States Philippine Commission and its members is not a libel upon the Government and does not fall within said Act No. 292 of the United States Philippine Commission.Reasoning The article in question contains no attack upon the government system of the U.S., and though grossly abusive as respects both the Commission as a body and some of its individual members, it contains no attack upon the governmental system by which authority of the U.S. is enforced in these Islands. Furthermore, it is the character of the men who are intrusted with the administration of the government that the writer is seeking to bring into disrepute by impugning the purity of their motives, their public integrity, and their private morals, and the wisdom of their policy. The publication of the article therefore, no seditious tendency being apparent, constitutes no offense under section 8 of Act No. 292)Dispositive The judgment of conviction is reversed and the defendants are acquitted.

TERRITORYART I NATIONAL TERRITORY

The national territory comprises the Philippine archipelago, with all the islands and water embraced therein, and all other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction, consisting of its terrestrial, fluvial and aerial domains, including its territorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the insular shelves, and other submarine areas. The waters around, between, and connecting the islands of the archipelago, regardless of their breadth and dimensions, form part of the internal waters of the Philippines.

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3046An Act to Define the Baselines of the Territorial Sea of the

Philippines

- Approved: 17 June 1961Whereas clauses – 1. The following form part of territorial sea of the Phils:

All waters within limits set forth in Treaty of Paris (1898), US-Spain treaty (1900), and US-Britain treaty (1930).

All waters around, between and connecting the various islands of the archipelago.

All waters beyond outermost islands of archipelago but within limits of boundaries set forth in such treaties.

2. The baselines from which the territorial sea of Philippines is determined consist of straight lines joining appropriate points of the outermost islands of the archipelago.Section 1 – It defines and describes the baselines for the territorial sea of the Phils. Section 2 – All waters within the baselines provided in sec1 are considered inland or internal waters of the Phils.

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 5446

R.A. 5446 is simply an Act to correct typographical errors in Section 1 of R.A. 3046 defining the baselines of the territorial sea of the Philippines. It further says that the definition of the baselines of the territorial seas of the Philippine Archipelago as provided in this Act is without prejudice to the delineation of the baselines of the territorial sea around the territory of Sabah, situated in North Borneo, over which the Republic of the Phils. has acquired dominion and sovereignty. Approved September 18, 1968.

PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1596

June 11, 1978 - Pres. Marcos issued P.D. 1596 declaring certain area (the Kalayaan Island Group or more commonly known as the “Spratly Islands”) as Philippine territory as well as providing for its Government and Administration.

said area is vital to the security and economic survival of the Philippines and much of it is part of the continental margin of the Phil. archipelago

the area does not legally belong to any state or nation and by reason of history, indispensable need, effective occupation and control established in accordance with international law, said area (including its sea-bed, subsoil, continental margin and air space) must be deemed to belong to and subject to the sovereignty of the Phil.

other states’ claims to some of the area cannot prevail over the claims of the Philippines on legal, historical, and equitable grounds

named it “Kalayaan” and constituted it as a distinct and separate municipality of Palawan

administration and government shall be vested in the Secretary of National Defense or in other Civil govt. or AFP officers as may be designated by the Pres.

PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1599Establishing an Exclusive Economic Zone and for Other

Purposes

- Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) is a seazone over which a state has special rights over the exploration and use of marine resources – Wikipedia- It extends from two hundred nautical miles beyond and from the baselines from which the territorial sea- when it overlaps another EEZ, the common boundaries shall be determined by countries- What can be exercised in EEZ?

o Sovereignty rights for the purpose of exploration and exploitation, conservation and management of the natural resources

o Exclusive rights and jurisdiction with respect to the establishment and utilization of artificial islands, off-shore terminals, installations and structures, the preservation of the marine environment, including the prevention and control of pollution, and scientific research

o Other rights recognized by international law or state practice- It also restricts other countries from exercising the rights above in our EEZ.- Recognizes that other countries have EEZs- The President may authorize a government agency to promulgate rules for the purposes of this decree- Anyone who violates any provision of the decree shall be subject to a fine (P2,000-P100,000) or imprisonment (6 mos – 10 yrs) or both. Vessels and other equipment or articles used shall be confiscated.

PEOPLEPREAMBLE

We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of Almighty God, in order to build a just and humane society and establish s Government that shall embody our ideals and aspirations, promote the common good, conserve and develop our patrimony, and secure to ourselves and our posterity, the blessings of independence and democracy under the rule of law and a regime of truth, justice, freedom, love, equality, and peace, do ordain and promulgate this Constitution.

ART II DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES

Sec 1: The Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them. Sec 4: The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people. The Government may call upon the people to defend the State and, in the fulfillment thereof, all citizens may be required, under conditions provided by law, to render personal, military or civil service. Sec 15: The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among them.

Sec 16: The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful

ART III BILL OF RIGHTS

Sec 2: Sec 7:

ART VII EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

Sec 4:

ART XVI GENERAL PROVISIONS

Sec 2:

ART XVIII TRANSITORY PROVISIONS

Sec 25:

TECSON V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONSVITUG; March 3, 2004

FACTS- On December 31, 2003, FPJ filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of President of the Philippines under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP).

- In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ represented himself to be a natural-born citizen.- His real name was stated to be “Fernando, Jr.” or “Ronald Allan” Poe, born in Manila on August 20, 1939.

- On January 9, 2004, Victorino X. Fornier filed a petition before the COMELEC to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy on the ground that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen.

- According to Fornier, FPJ’s parents were foreigners – his mother Bessie Kelley Poe was an American and his father Allan F. Poe was a Spanish national being a son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject.- Even if Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ because FPJ was illegitimate.

- Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before marrying Bessie Kelley according to an “uncertified” copy of a supposed certification of the marriage in July 5, 1936.- Even if no such prior marriage existed, Allan F. Poe married Bessey Kelley only a year after the birth of FPJ. The marriage certificate of their marriage reflected the date of their marriage to be on September 16, 1940 where Allan

was 25, unmarried and Filipino, and Bessie was 22, unmarried and American.

- FPJ’s earliest established ascendant was his grandfather Lorenzo Pou.- No birth certificate for Lorenzo but his death certificate issued upon his death in September 11, 1954 at age 84 identified him as a Filipino residing in San Carlos, Pangasinan.- Lorenzo married Marta Reyes and their son Allan was born on May 17, 1915. The birth certificate of Allan showed that his father was an Español father and to a mestiza Español mother.

Procedure- In the January 19, 2004 hearing before the COMELEC, Fornier presented the following pieces of evidence:

- Copy of the certificate of birth of FPJ- Certified photocopy of an affidavit by Paulita Gomez-Poe attesting that she had filed a bigamy case against Allan F. Poe because of his relationship with Kelley (in Spanish)English translation of (b)- Certified copy of the certificate of birth of Allan F. Poe- Certification from the director of the Records Management and Archives Office stating that a Lorenzo Poe/Pou resided in the Philippines before 1907- Certification from OIC of the Archives Division of the National Archives stating that there was no available information regarding the birth of Allan F. Poe

- FPJ presented the following pieces of evidence among others:- Certification that there was no available information regarding the birth of Allan F. Poe in the registry of births for San Carlos, Pangasinan- Certification by the OIC of the Archives Division of the National Archives that there was no available information about the marriage of Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez- Certificate of birth of Ronald Allan F. Poe- Original Certificate of Title if the Registry Deeds of Pangasinan in the name of Lorenzo Pou,- Copies of tax declarations under the name of Lorenzo Pou- Copy of certificate of death of Lorenzo Pou- Copy of marriage contract of Fernando Pou and Bessie Kelley- Certification issued by the City Civil Registrar of San Carlos, Pangasinan stating that the records of the birth of the said office from 1900 to May 1946 were destroyed during World War II

- January 23, 2004 – COMELEC dismissed the Fornier petition for lack of merit and Fornier filed a motion for reconsideration on January 26, 2004. The motion was denied by the COMELEC en banc on February 6, 2004.- February 10, 2004 – Fornier filed a petition before the Supreme Court, praying for TRO, a writ of preliminary injunction or any other resolution that would stay the finality and/or execution of the COMELEC resolutions.- The two other petitions (Tecson and Desidero v. COMELEC and Velez v. Poe) challenge the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and assert that only the Supreme Court has original and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue on the case.

ISSUES1. Does the Court have jurisdiction over the three cases filed?2. Can FPJ be disqualified as a presidential candidate on the ground that he materially misrepresented in his certificate of candidacy that he was a natural-born Filipino?

HELD1. Ratio Jurisdiction issue

- The COMELEC’s decision on disqualified cases involving a presidential candidate could be elevated to and could be taken cognizance by the Supreme Court.

- The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court would not include cases directly brought before it questioning the qualifications of a candidate for the presidency or vice-presidency before the elections are held.

Reasoning- Does the Court have jurisdiction over the three cases filed?

- Fornier petition - Yes- In seeking the disqualification of FPJ before the COMELEC, Fornier relied on the following:

- “A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 is false…” (Omnibus Election Code, Sec. 78)- “…the Commission shall have exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections for the purpose of enduring free, orderly and honest elections…” (Sec. 52, same)- “any interested party” authorized to file a verified petition to deny or cancel the certificate of candidacy of any nuisance candidate (Art. 69, same)

- Decisions of the COMELEC on disqualification cases may be reviewed by the Supreme Court under the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure (Rule 65). Aside from that, according to Art. 9, Sec. 7 of the Constitution, “any decision, order or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt thereof.”- Judicial power is vested in the Supreme Court which includes the duty of the courts to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch of instrumentality of the government. (Art. 8, Sec. 1, Constitution).

- Tecson petition and Velez petition - No- The Tecson and Velez petitions make use of Art. 7, Sec 4(7) of the Constitution in assailing the COMELEC’s jurisdiction when it took cognizance of the Fornier petition because the “Supreme Court sitting en banc shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the President or Vice President and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.”- A “contest” refers to a post-election scenario. Election contests are either election protests or a quo warranto which would have the objective of dislodging the winner from office. The Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal state:

- “Tribunal shall be the sole judge of all contests…relating to qualifications of the President or Vice-President of the Philippines.” (Rule 12)- “An election contest is initiated by the filing of an election contest or a petition for quo-warranto against the President or Vice-President.” (Rule 13)- “Only the registered candidate for President or Vice-President who received the second or third highest number of votes may contest the election of the President or the Vice-President…by filing a verified petition…within 30 days after the proclamation of the winner.” (Rule 14)

- The rules speak of the jurisdiction of the tribunal over contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the President and the Vice President and not candidates for President or Vice-President.

2. Ratio FPJ’s citizenship issue (Voting 6 concur, 7 dissent, 1 abstention and 1 separate opinion)

- The distinctions between legitimacy and illegitimacy should only remain in the sphere of civil law and should not unduly impinge on the domain of political law.- The 1935 Constitution confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino regardless of whether such children are legitimate of illegitimate.

Reasoning- Can FPJ be disqualified as a presidential candidate on the ground that he materially misrepresented in his certificate of candidacy that he was a natural-born Filipino?

- Concept of citizenship- Aristotle described a citizen as a man who shared in the administration of justice and in the holding of an office and the state would be composed of such individuals in order to achieve a self-sufficient existence.- Citizenship deals with rights and entitlements on the one hand and with concomitant obligations on the other.- Citizenship underwent changes in the 18th to 20th centuries.

- In the 18th century, the concept was civil citizenship which established the rights necessary for necessary for individual freedom (eg. Rights to property, personal liberty and justice)- In the 19th century, it expanded to include political citizenship which encompassed the right to participate in the exercise of political power.- In the 20th century, there was the development of social citizenship which laid emphasis on the right of the citizen to economic well-being and social security.- Internationalization of citizenship is an ongoing development.

- Citizenship in the Philippines from the Spanish times to the present- During the Spanish period, no such term as “Philippine citizens,” only “Spanish subjects.” In church records, natives were identified as “indios.”

- Spanish laws on citizenship included:- Order de la Regencia of 1841- Royal Decree of 23 August 1868 (defined the political status of children born in the Philippines)- Ley Extranjera de Ultramar of 1870

- The 1876 Spanish Constitution was not extended to the Philippines because the colony was to be governed by special laws.- According to the Civil Code of Spain, the following were Spanish citizens:

- Persons born in Spanish territory- Children of a Spanish father or mother even if they were born outside Spain- Foreigners who have obtained naturalization papers- Those who, without such papers, may have become domiciled inhabitants of any town of the Monarchy

- Article 10 of the Treaty of Paris stated that the civil and political status of the native inhabitants would be determined by the US Congress. Spanish subjects and natives who choose to remain in the territory may preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain by making a declaration of their decision within a year from the date of the ratification of the treaty. If no such declaration is made, their allegiance shall be held renounced and they would have adopted the nationality of the territory in which they reside.

- Upon ratification of the treaty, the native inhabitants of the Philippines became Spanish subjects.- They did not become American citizens but were issued passports describing them to be citizens of the Philippines entitled to protection of the US.

- Philippine Organic Act of 1902 – first appearance of the term “citizens of the Philippine islands.” A citizen of the Philippine islands under this Act was:

- An inhabitant of the Philippines and a Spanish subject on April 11, 1899.- An inhabitant meant:

- A native born inhabitant- An inhabitant who was a native of Spain- An inhabitant who obtained Spanish papers on or before April 11, 1899.

- Controversy as to the citizenship of a child born between April 11, 1899 and July 1, 1902 as there was no citizenship law in the Philippines. The common law principle jus soli (principle of territoriality) was said to govern those born in the Philippines during this time.

- Philippine Autonomy Act (Jones Law) – A native born inhabitant of the Philippines was deemed to be a citizen of the Philippines as of April 11, 1899 if:

- A Spanish subject on April 11, 1899- Residing in the Philippines on the said date- Since that date, not a citizen of another country

- 1935 Constitution – provided that jus sanguinis (blood relationship) be the basis for citizenship, as stated in Sec. 1, Art. 3:

- Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of the Constitution- Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption of this Constitution, had been elected to public office in the Philippine Islands- Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines- Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and upon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship- Those who are naturalized in accordance with law

- 1973 Constitution – Corrected Sec. 1, Art. 3 (4) of the 1935 Constitution, which, when taken together with the existing civil law provisions would provide that women would automatically lose their Filipino citizenship and acquire that of their foreign husbands. This was deemed discriminatory in that it incapacitated the Filipino woman from transmitting her citizenship to her legitimate children and required illegitimate children of Filipino mothers to still elect Filipino citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. The provisions of Sec. 1, Art. 3 of the 1973 Constitution state that the following are citizens of the Philippines:

- Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution- Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines- Those who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the 1935 Constitution- Those who are naturalized in accordance with law- Add Sec. 2 of the same article which provided that a female citizen of the Philippines who marries an alien retainers her Philippine citizenship unless by her act or omission she is deemed to have renounced her citizenship under the law.

- 1987 Constitution – aimed to correct the irregular situation generated by the questionable proviso in the 1935 Constitution which outlines in Article 4, Sec. 1 that the following are Filipino citizens:

- Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution- Those whose fathers and mothers are citizens of the Philippines- Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority- Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

- The Constitution requires that the President of the Philippines should be, among the many requirements, a natural-born citizen of the Philippines (Art. 7, Sec. 2).

- Natural born citizen – citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship- Citizenship of FPJ in relation to grandfather Lorenzo Pou’s citizenship and father Allan F. Poe’s citizenship

- Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen because his father Lorenzo was also Filipino.

- Conclusions with some degree of certainty to be drawn from the documents presented:

- The parents of FPJ were Allen Poe and Bessie Kelley.- FPJ was born to them on August 20, 1939.- Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were married to each other on September 16, 1940.- The father of Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo Pou.- At the time of his death on September 11, 1954, Lorenzo Poe was 84 years old.

- The public documents submitted are deemed trustworthy.- The three documents (birth certificate of FPJ, marriage certificate of Bessie and Allan and the death certificate of Lorenzo) were certified true copies of the originals.- The Rules of Court (130, Section 3) state that when the subject of the inquiry is the content of the document, no evidence shall be admissible except the original document itself. One of the exceptions however is when the original is a public record in the custody of a public office is recorded in a public office.- As public documents, the three documents are prima facie proof of their contents as stated in the Rules of Court (130, Section 44) that the entries in official records made by a public officer in the performance of his duty are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. This is grounded on:’ of official duty in the preparation of the statement made. The penalty affixed to a breach of that duty. Routine and disinterested origin of most such statements. Publicity of the record which makes more likely the prior exposure of such errors as might have occurred

- It is safe to assume that Lorenzo Pou’s place of residence at the time of death was the same as his residence before death in the absence of evidence that would attest otherwise. In that case, Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the “en masse Filipinization” that the Philippine Bill effected in 1902. This citizenship would then extend to his son Allan F. Poe, FPJ’s father.

- Lorenzo born sometime in 1870 during the Spanish colonization period.- Fornier argues that Lorenzo was not in the Philippines during the crucial period of 1898 to 1902 but there is no existing record to attest to that claim.- Fornier failed to show that Lorenzo was out of the country during that same time period.- Lorenzo’s residence at the time of death was in San Carlos, Pangasinan.

- For proof of filiation or paternity, the mandatory rules of civil law would not apply in this case. The duly notarized declaration by Ruby Kelley Mangahas, FPJ’s maternal aunt and sister of his mother Bessie, proving the acts of Allan F. Poe, recognizing

his own paternal relationship with FPJ (living with Bessie and the children in one house as one family) would be accepted.- Fornier argues that the mandatory rules under civil rule should apply because FPJ was an illegitimate son.

- Acknowledgement needed to establish paternity (eg. Acknowledgement in the birth certificate by signing name)- In the FPJ case, there was no signature of Allan F. Poe in the birth certificate of FPJ.- 1950 Civil Code – acknowledgement of illegitimate children of three types which had to be done during the lifetime of the presumed parent:

- Voluntary (expressly made in record birth, will or a statement before the court in authentic writing)- Legal (in favor of full blood brothers and sisters of an illegitimate child who was recognized as natural)- Compulsory (demanded generally in cases when the child had in his favor any evidence to prove filiation)- The Family Code has liberalized the rules as stated in Articles 172, 173 and 175 and the rules have retroactive effect (Article 255). These provisions are there to govern the private and personal affairs of the family. There is little indication that this should also govern his political rights.

- This should be taken in the context of civil law, being that branch of law which is concerned with the organization of the family and regulation of property. The relevance of citizenship is exemplified in Art. 15 of the Civil Code.- The proof of filiation for purposes of determining citizenship status should be deemed independent from those prescribed for civil code purposes. The ordinary rules should govern.- DNA testing to prove paternity could also be resorted to.

- There is no jurisprudence to prove that an illegitimate child cannot inherit his father’s citizenship.

- Fornier argues that even if Allan F. Poe were Filipino, Allan’s citizenship would not have been transmitted to FPJ because FPJ was illegitimate.- FPJ was alleged to be illegitimate because of the bigamous marriage between his parents Allan and Bessie for the reason that Allan allegedly had a prior existing marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez. The Court held that the veracity of this marriage between Paulita and Allan is doubtful.- Fornier also contended that even if Allan and Bessie’s marriage was not bigamous, FPJ was still illegitimate because his parents were married after he was born. Fornier based his arguments on the cases of Morano v. Vivo, Chiongbian v. de Leon and Serra v. Republic.

- In the cases cited above, it is important to note the lis mota in each case. If the pronouncement of jus sangunis was in the lis mota, it would constitute doctrine courtesy of stare decisis. If not, it is mere obiter dictum.- In all of the mentioned cases, there was no jus sanguinis in the lis mota of the cases. If there was jus sangunis mentioned, it was mere obiter dictum.

- The pronouncement that an illegitimate child cannot inherit the father’s citizenship has no textual basis in the Constitution and violates the equal protection clause.

- For jurisprudence that regarded an illegitimate child to inherit the mother’s citizenship, it was there to ensure a Filipino nationality for the child with the assumption that the mother would gain custody.- The 1935 Constitution applies to FPJ since he was born during that time period and it states that Filipino citizens include those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.

Decision1. The evidence does not establish conclusively FPJ’s citizenship but the evidence preponderates in his favor to hold that he could not be guilty of misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy. Fornier v. COMELEC DISMISSED for failure to show grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC for dismissing the original petition.2. Tecson v. COMELEC and Velez v, Poe DISMISSED for want of jurisdiction.

SEPARATE OPINION

PUNOJurisdiction - SC is unanimous on the issue of jurisdiction

- Tecson and Valdez petitions – petitioners cannot invoke Art VII S4 of the Constitution because the word “contest” means that the Court can only be invoked after the election and proclamation of a President or Vice President. There can be no “contest” before a winner is proclaimed. - Fornier petition – as a review under R64 in relation to R65 of the RoC, Court has jurisdiction.

- COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it ruled that petitioner failed to prove by substantial evidence that FPJ deliberately misrepresented that he is a natural-born Filipino citizan in his CoC- Certiorari power of the SC to review COMELEC decisions is a limited power

- Can only reverse or change the COMELEC decision on the ground that COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion (despotic, arbitrary or capricious)

- The ruling of the COMELEC denying the petition to disqualify respondent Poe is based on substantial evidence, hence is not despotic, whimsical or capricious

- Romualdez-Marcos v COMELEC – misrepresentation must not only be material but also deliberate and willful- Petitioner has burden to prove evidence to show that (1) respondent made misrepresentation in his CoC, (2) that misrepresentation is material to the position to which he is candidate and (3) that material misrepresentation was made deliberately and willfully

- Analysis of petitioner’s evidence- Certificate of birth – only proved the date of birth of FPJ, not that he is not a natural-born citizen- Sworn statements of Paulita Gomez charging Allan Poe with bigamy and marriage license of between Allan Poe and Paulita Gomez, presented thru Dir. Manapat – pulled out because they were fabricated

- Respondent submitted affidavits that show that the files submitted by the petitioner are fabricated by Manapat’s instructions- Petitioner claims that the affidavits must not be considered because of technical grounds - SC ruled that the COMELEC is a quasi-judicial body and are not bound by the technical rules of evidence.

- Birth certificate of Allan Poe – also fabricated; does not prove anything besides birth

- Certification of Dir. Manapat that the National Archives has no record that Lorenzo Pou entered or resided in the Philippines before 1907 – manufactured- Certification of Estrella Domingo, OIC Archives Div that the Register of Births that there is no information on the National Archives on the birth of Allan Poe to the spouse Lorenzo Pou and Marta Reyes – lack of information is not proof- Poe from the time of his involuntary birth has always conducted himself as Filipino - “For failure of the petitioner to discharge the burden of proof, Poe is entitled to an outright dismissal of the Fornier petition.” Poe does not need to present contrary evidence for the burden of proof is not shifted to him.

- Assuming that COMELEC gravely abused its jurisdiction and the issue of whether respondent Poe is a natural-born citizen Filipino should now be resolved, the Fornier petition need not be remanded to the COMELEC for further reception of evidence- Remand to the COMELEC to give the petitioner a second opportunity to prove his case is a palpable error

- “In light of these erudite opinions of our amici curae, it is daylight clear that petitioner Fornier is not only wring with his facts but also wrong with his law. - Remand means a new round of litigation in the COMELEC when its proceedings have long been closed and terminated; to give another chance to prove facts which he failed to prove before- Favors of remand cannot be extended to the litigant because of political neutrality

- Remand will change the nature of a Sec 78 proceeding by judicial legislation, hence, unconstitutional

- Principal issue: whether respondent deliberately made a material misrepresentation in his CoC when he wrote that he is a natural-born Filipino citizen- Remanding the case to COMELEC will change the character of a S78 proceeding (WON FOJ is a natural-born Filipino citizen will be the main issue and not just an issue incidental to the issue of material misrepresentation)- SC cannot engage in judicial legislation as it is something only legislature can change by another law

- Remand will violate respondent Poe’s right to due process, hence, unconstitutional

- If case were remanded to the COMELEC, the body is no longer an impartial tribunal is there are three of the seven members of the commission that have given firm view that Poe is not a natural-born Filipino citizen

- Remand will delay the resolution of the issue of whether respondent Poe is qualified. Delay will also prejudice his candidacy and will favor his political opponents.

- “The right to run for public office includes the right to equal chance to compete. The right to run is empty if the chance to win is diminished of denied a candidate.

- To avoid delay, the court should itself decide the issue and declare respondent Poe as a natural-born citizen on the basis of the evidence adduced before the COMELEC - Whether respondent Poe is illegitimate is irrelevant in determining his status as natural-born citizen --- that is the law.

- The law does not make any distinction in applying jus sanguinis to illegitimate children. - Morano v Vivo – WON the stepson was to file the natural cerebral house. - Chiongbian v de Leon – a legitimate son whose father became Filipino because of election to a public office before the 1935 constitution

- Serra v Republic – an illegitimate son of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother - Paa v Chan – Quintin claims that his father is Filipino because his grandmother is a Filipina. The court ruled that since there is no proof that his grandmother is Filipino then his father is not Filipino thereby not making him Filipino as well. The court’s ruling should have stopped here but the SC followed with an obiter dictum that even if Quintin’s father were Filipino, he would not be Filipino because he was illegitimate.

- The statements on the illegitimate child were unnecessary and were just obiter dicta and not ratio decidendi, therefore do not constitute stare decisis.- Obiter dicta do not establish doctrine even if repeated endlessly.

- Reasons why court should create new doctrine:- There is no textual foundation - It violates the equal protection clause

- People v Cayat – established the doctrine on constitutionally allowable distinctions. Such distinction must be germane to the purpose of the law.- Tan Chong v Secretary of Labor – “The duty of this Court is to forsake and abandon any doctrine or rule found to be in violation of the law in force.”- Ubi les non distinguit ne nos distinguere debemus, especially if the distinction has no textual - Merlin Magallona – transmissive essence of citizenship

- To establish that respondent Poe is a natural-born citizen, all that is needed is proof of his filiation to his father Allan Poe, a Filipino citizen --- that is the critical fact.- Filipino citizenship of Allan Poe, respondent’s father is well established.- To disqualify respondent Poe because he is illegitimate will violate our treaty obligation.Dispositive Whether respondent Fernando Poe, Jr. is qualified to run for President involves a constitutional issue but its political tone is no less dominant. The Court is split down the middle on the citizenship of respondent Poe, an issue of first impression made more difficult by the interplay of national and international law. Given the indecisiveness of the votes of the members of this Court, the better policy approach is to let the people decide who will be the next President. For on political questions, this Court may err but the sovereign people will not. To be sure, the Constitution did not grant to the unelected members of this Court the right to elect in behalf of the people.IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 161434, 161634 and 161824 are DISMISSED.

DAVIDEFACTS- January 9, 2004 – Fornier filed petition to disqualify FPJ and to cancel his certificate of candidacy for the May 10 elections because of he is not a natural-born Filipino citizen- January 23, 2004 – COMELEC dismissed the case declaring that its jurisdiction is limited to all matters relating to election, returns and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial and city officials, but not those of national officials like the president.

- but it has jurisdiction to pass upon the issue of citizenship of national officials under sec 78 of OECon petitions to deny due course or cancel certificates of candidacy on the ground of false material representation.- Findings:

- Fornier evidence is not substantial- FPJ did not commit any falsehood in material representation when he stated that he is a natural-born Filipino citizen

- Tecson and Desiderio, Jr prayed special civil action of certiorari under R65 RoC to challenge jurisdiction of COMELEC over the issue of FPJ’s citizenship. They claim that only the Sc has jurisdiction (ArtVII S4, consti)- January 29, 2004 - Velez filed petition with the ff issues:

- Whether COMELEC has jurisdiction over the petitions to deny due course or cancel certificated of candidacy of Presidential candidates- Whether SC has jurisdiction over the petitions of Tecson, Velez and Fornier- Whether FPJ is a Filipino citizen, and if so, if he’s a natural-born Filipino citizen

Jurisdiction- Tecson and Velez petitions

- The provision in the constitution only refers to past-election remedies, they should have resorted to pre-election remedies in the OEC which are implemented by the COMELEC Rules of Procedure- Pre-election remedies are not within the jurisdiction of the SC- Under the OEC, COMELEC has original jurisdiction to determine whether a candidate for an elective office ineligible for the office for which he filed his certificate of candidacy because of any of the recognized grounds for disqualification.

- Fornier petition - SC has jurisdiction over the case under (Art IX-A S7 Consti )- SC can take cognizance of issue of WON COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in the challenged resolution by virtue of (ArtVIII S1 Consti)

WON FPJ is a natural-born Filipino CitizenFacts: 1. FPJ was born on 20 August 1939 in Manila, Philippines.2. FPJ was born to Allan Poe and Bessie Kelley.3. Bessie Kelley and Allan Poe were married on 16 September 1940.4. Allan Poe was a Filipino because his father, Lorenzo Poe, albeit a Spanish subject, was not shown to have declared his allegiance to Spain by virtue of the Treaty of Paris and the Philippine Bill of 1902.

Ratio For the purposes of citizenship, an illegitimate child whose father is Filipino and whose mother is an alien, proof of paternity or filiation is enough for the child to follow the citizenship of the fatherCOMELEC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in holding that FPJ is a Filipino citizen pursuant to Art IV S1 per 3 consti. The provision did not make any distinction between legitimate and illegitimate children of Filipino fathers.Petitions are dismissed.

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZMay court exercise judicial power to disqualify a candidate before the election?- Court may not. It will wreck the constitutional right of the people to choose their candidates.Romualdez-Marcos v COMELEC- Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, a retired member of this Court, in his Separate Opinion said, “In my view, the issue in this case is whether the Commission on Elections has the power to disqualify candidates on the ground that they lack eligibility for the office to which they seek to be elected. I think that it has none and that the qualifications of candidates may be questioned only in the event they are elected, by filing a petition for quo warranto or an election protest in the appropriate forum.”- Ruling of COMELEC is the same as Mandoza opinion.- Disqualifying respondent Poe will be viewed as directed against the “masses,” a situation not allowed by the Constitution. The SC may become like the Iranian Guardian Council.This Court, as the last guardian of democracy, has the duty to protect the right of our nation to a genuine, free and fair election.

Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissinG Fornier’s petition for disqualification against respondent- Salcedo v COMELEC – the only instance when a petition raising the qualifications of a registered candidate is before election (S78 OEC)

- To justify the cancellation of CoC, false representation mentioned must pertain to material matter - There must be deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide fact which would render a candidate ineligible

- Fornier petition brought under R65 RoCP – where COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion in Jan 23 and Feb 6 resolutions holding that “considering the evidence presented by the petitioner is not substantial, we declare that the respondent did not commit any material misrepresentation when he stated in his CoC that he is a natural born Filipino citizen”Allegations in the COMELEC petition:

1. Respondent Poe committed false material representation by stating in his Certificate of Candidacy that he is a natural born Filipino citizen; and

2. He knowingly made such false representation.- FPJ is not a citizen because both his parents are aliens.- Director Manapat of the National Archives falsified the marriage contract of FPJ’s parents and his father’s birth certificate.- Ei incumbit probation qui decit, non que negat. – he who asserts, not he who denies, must prove; S1 R131 RroE; Borlongan v Madrideo – burden of proof is on the party asserting the affirmative of an issue- Fornier failed to prove allegations; writ of certiorari can only be granted if it can be proven that COMELEC committed a grave abuse of discretion;

-Grave abuse of discretion – capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment so patent and gross that it amounted to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law

- We cannot discern from the records any indication that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in dismissing Fornier’s petition. Indeed, his availment of the extraordinary writ of certiorari is grossly misplaced.Whether the respondent committed a material and false representation when he declared in his CoC that he is a natural-bron Filipino citizen- COMELEC held that the FPJ did not commit any material misrepresentation in his CoC because his father is a Filipino by virtue of jus sanguinis and under the 1935 constitution.- Valles v COMELEC – Philippine law on citizenship adheres to jus sanguinis

- FPJ is Filipino citizen, having been born to a Filipino father- Petitioners claim that Allan Fernando Poe is a citizen of Spain because his- Marriage Contract with Paulita Gomez shows that his parents are citizens of Spain.- The marriage certificate was shown to have been falsified.- Fornier did not dispute that Allan Fernando Poe is the father of FPJ- Allan’s father, Lorenzo Pou is a Spanish subject and an inhabitant of the Philippines on April 11, 1899 when Spain ceded the Philippines (Treaty of Paris, Phil Bill 1902 and Jones Law)

- In re Bosque – expiration of the term of 18 months without making an express declaration of intention to retain their Spanish nationality resulted in the loss of the latter and thereby becoming subjects of the new sovereign in the same manner as the natives of these islands- Palanca v Republic –

- “A person, who was an inhabitant of the Philippine Islands and a naturalized subject of Spain on the 11th day of April 1899, is a Filipino citizen, by virtue of the provisions of Sec. 4 of the Act of Congress on 1 July 1902 and of Sec. 2 of the Act of Congress of 29 August 1916. Under the Constitution, he is also a citizen of the Philippines because he was such at the time of the adoption of the Constitution.”

- Constitution did not specify in referring to those whose fathers are Filipino citizens as to whether this only applies to legitimate children or not. - Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus, especially if the distinction has no textual foundation in the Constitution, serves no state interest, and even imposes an injustice on an innocent child. (Fr Bernas)- To introduce a distinction between legitimacy or illegitimacy in the status of the child vis-à-vis the derivation of his citizenship from the father defeats the transmissive essence of citizenship in blood relationship. (Dean Merlin Magalona)

In fine, I reiterate that the COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion in rendering its assailed Resolutions dated January 23, 2004 and February 6, 2004.WHEREFORE, I concur with Justice Jose C. Vitug in his ponencia and with Senior Justice Reynato S. Puno in his Separate Opinion DISMISSING Fornier’s petition

CARPIO-MORALESIssues for Resolution:1) Whether this Court has original and exclusive jurisdiction to pass upon the qualifications of presidential candidates;2) Whether the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion when it issues its Resolutions of Jan. 23, 2004 and Feb. 6, 2004, dismissing the Petition for Disqualification;3) Whether FPJ is a natural-born Filipino and therefore qualified to seek election as President.

1) Jurisdiction:- Petitions in G.R. Nos. 161464 and 161634

- Petitioners Tecson et al. and Velez assert that this Court has exclusive original jurisdiction to determine whether FPJ is qualified to be a candidate for President: paragraph 7, Section 4 of Article VII of the Constitution:

- The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.- refers to this Court’s jurisdiction over electoral contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the President, and not to the qualifications or disqualifications of a presidential candidate. FPJ is still just a candidate; petition: premature.

- Petitioners Tecson et al. and Velez claim that the issue of FPJ’s qualification for the Presidency may also be brought directly to this Court on the basis of Section 1 of Article VIII of the Constitution through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, specially considering that the instant case is one of transcendental importance.

- a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is not available where there is another plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law—like in this case: (to intervene in the Petition for Disqualification)- in determining whether procedural rules, such as standing, should be relaxed on the ground of “transcendental importance,” the following should be considered: the lack of any other party with a more direct and specific interest in raising the questions being raised. Considering that the substantive issues raised by petitioners Tecson et al. and Velez in G.R. Nos. 161434 and 161634, respectively, are virtually identical to those raised by petitioner Fornier in G.R. No. 161824, this Court is not convinced that the

“transcendental importance” of the issues raised herein justifies a direct resort to this Court under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court or the exercise of its expanded certiorari jurisdiction under Sec. 1, Article VIII of the Constitution.

- Petition in G.R. No. 161824- this Court definitely has jurisdiction over the petition for Certiorari questioning the Resolutions of Jan. 23, 2004 and Feb. 6, 2004, issued by COMELEC: Section 7 of Art. IX-A of the Constitution vests this Court with the power of review over decisions, orders, or rulings of the COMELEC.

- COMELEC’s Jurisdiction Over the Subject Matter of the Petition for Disqualification Under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code.

- not really a constitutional question…2) Whether The COMELEC Acted with Grave Abuse of Discretion in Dismissing the Petition for is qualification for Lack of Merit. - the COMELEC did indeed act with grave abuse of discretion in issuing them:

- By resolving to dismiss the petition in the Petition for Disqualification without stating the factual bases therefore:

- Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution provides that “[n]o decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.”

- By resolving to dismiss the Petition for Disqualification without ruling categorically on the issue of FPJ’s citizenship.

- To justify its evasion of the duty to rule squarely on the issue of citizenship, the COMELEC relies on this Court’s ruling in Salcedo II v. Commission on Elections, and held that held that Fornier should have presented “proof of misrepresentation with a deliberate attempt to mislead” on the part of FPJ— confined the issue in the Petition for Disqualification to whether FPJ “must have known or have been aware of the falsehood as [allegedly] appearing on his certificate.”- Carpio-Morales: it is impossible for the COMELEC to determine whether FPJ was aware of a false material representation in his Certificate of Candidacy without first determining whether such material representation (in this case, his claim of natural-born citizenship) was false. The fact alone that there is a public document (i.e., his birth certificate) which FPJ might have relied upon in averring natural-born citizenship does not automatically exclude the possibility that (a) there is other evidence to show that such averment is false, and (b) that FPJ was aware of such evidence.

3) Whether FPJ is a natural-born Filipino - Five crucial factual questions

(1) Whether Lorenzo Pou has been established to be a Filipino citizen at the time of the birth of his son, Allan F. Poe;

- the evidence presented does not show that Lorenzo Pou acquired Philippine citizenship by virtue of the Treaty of Paris or the Organic Acts covering the Philippine Islands. (no evidence as to his residence, only prima facie evidence.)

(2) Whether Allan F. Poe, the putative father of FPJ was a Filipino at the time of the birth of the latter;

- Claim: Allan F. Poe acquired Filipino citizenship independently of his father’s by virtue of jus soli, Allan F. Poe having been allegedly born in the Philippines on November 27, 1916.- even assuming arguendo that Allan F. Poe was born in the Philippines on November 27, 1916, such fact, per se, would not suffice to prove that he was a citizen of the Philippine Islands absent a showing that he was judicially declared to be a Filipino citizen: In Tan Chong v. Secretary of Labor, this Court ruled that the principle jus soli or acquisition of citizenship by place of birth was never extended or applied in the Philippine Islands:

(3) Whether FPJ is a legitimate or illegitimate child;

- FPJ’s birth certificate indicates that his parents were married, and that he is a legitimate child. However, the Marriage Contract of his putative parents, Fernando R. Pou and Bessie Kelley, is dated September 16, 1940, thereby indicating that he was born out of wedlock. Since, in the Marriage Contract, the two contracting parties, Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley, participated in its execution, the entry therein with respect to the date of their marriage should be given greater weight than the birth certificate, which was executed by a physician who had to rely on hearsay as regards FPJ’s legitimacy.- FPJ was born out of wedlock, and was thus an illegitimate child at birth.

(4) Whether Allan F. Poe has been legally determined to be the father of FPJ (Assuming arguendo that Allan F. Poe has been shown to have acquired Philippine citizenship)

- As proof of his filiation, FPJ relies upon (1) the stipulation by petitioner Fornier, both before the COMELEC and this Court that Allan F. Poe is indeed the father of FPJ; (2) the declaration of Ruby Kelley Mangahas; and (3) a certified copy of an affidavit of “Fernando R. Poe” for Philippine Army Personnel.- none of the proofs supplied are sufficient proofs of filiation under Article 172 of the Family Code.

(5) Whether FPJ is a natural-born Filipino Citizen.- Carpio-Morales adopts the rule that an illegitimate, child of an alien-mother who claims to be an offspring of a Filipino father may be considered a natural-born citizen if he was duly acknowledged by the latter at birth, thus leaving the illegitimate child with nothing more to do to acquire or perfect his citizenship (nothing more to do to acquire citizenship = natural born).- no evidence has been submitted to show that Allan F. Poe did indeed acknowledge FPJ as his own son at birth- Since FPJ then was born out of wedlock and was not acknowledged by his father, the only possible Filipino parent, at the time of his birth, the inescapable conclusion is that he is not a natural-born Philippine citizen.

Conclusion WHEREFORE, I vote to: (1) DISMISS the petitions in G.R. Nos. 161434 and 161634 for being premature, (2) DECLARE COMELEC Resolutions dated January 23, 2004 and February 6, 2004, rendered in COMELEC SPA No. 04-003 NULL AND VOID, and (3) DIRECT the COMELEC to cancel the Certificate of Candidacy of Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, a.k.a. Fernando Poe Jr., for containing a false material representation.

IN RE: CHINGKAPUNAN; October 1, 1999

FACTS- Petition for Admission to the Phil Bar- April 1964: Vicente D Ching born as the legitimate son of sps Tat Ching, Chinese citizen, and Prescila Dulay, Filipina, in La Union. Since birth, Ching has resided in the Phils

- During this time, the governing charter is the 1935 Constitution. Father’s citizenship is followed, with a right to elect citizenship upon reaching the age of majority

- July 1998: Ching, after graduating from St. Louis University in Baguio City, filed an application to take the ’98 Bar Examinations.- Sept 1998: Court allowed Ching to take the exams provided he must submit proof of his Phil citizenship- Nov 1998: Ching submitted certification that he is CPA, Voter Cert from COMELEC, and Cert as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Tubao, La Union also from COMELEC.- April 1999: results of Bar Exams were released and Ching passed. He was further required to submit more proof of citizenship.

- July 1999: Ching filed Manifestation w/ Affidavit of Election of Phil Citizenship and his Oath of Allegiance.- OSG commented that Ching being the “legitimate child of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother and born under the 1935 Consti was a Chinese citizen and continued to be so, unless upon reaching the age of majority he elected Phil citizenship. If Ching formally elects Phil citizenship, it would already be beyond the reasonable time allowed by present jurisprudence- Two conditions of an effective election of Phil citizenship (from OSG):

1st – the mother of the person making the election must be a Phil citizen2nd – election must be made upon reaching the age of majority (w/c means a reasonable time interpreted by the Sec of Justice as 3 yrs, from the Velayo case; in Cuenco, noted that this pd not inflexible, however, held in the same case that 7 yrs not reasonable time)

- Ching, to support his cause, invokes these special circumstances: continuous and uninterrupted say in the Philippines, being a CPA, a registered voter, and elected public official

ISSUE1. WON Ching has elected Phil citizenship w/in a reasonable timeand if so, WON his citizenship has retroacted to the time he took the bar.2. WON Ching’s special circumstances entitle him to citizenship

HELD1. No, Ching’s election was clearly beyond, by any reasonable yardstick, the allowable pd w/in which to exercise the privilege. Being born in April 1964, he was already 35 yrs old when he complied w/ the requirements of C.A. No 625 in June ’99. He was already more then 14 yrs over the age of majority.Although the Court is sympathetic of his plight, controlling statues and jurisprudence compel the Court in its decision. Also, Ching has offered no reason why he delayed his election of Phil citizenship, the latter not being a tedious and painstaking process.Philippine citizenship can never be treated like a commodity that can be claimed when needed and suppressed when convenient. It should be availed of with fervor, enthusiasm and promptitude.2. No, the abovementioned special circumstances cannot vest in him Philippine citizenship as the law specifically lays down the requirements for acquisition of Philippine citizenship by election.Decision Court denies Vicente D Ching’s application for admission to the Philippine Bar

BENGZON III V HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNALKAPUNAN; May 7, 2001

FACTS- Constitutional requirement for members of the House of Representatives: “no person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural born citizen.”- Teodoro Cruz is a natural born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in Tarlac on April 27, 1960. On November 5, 1985 he enlisted in the US Marine Corps without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines. He took an oath of allegiance to the US and as a consequence he lost his Filipino Citizenship because under the Commonwealth Act no. 63 a Filipino may lose his citizenship by rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country. Any doubts as to his citizenship at the time was settled by his naturalization as a US citizen on June 5, 1990.- May 17, 1994 he reacquired his citizenship through repatriation under RA 2630.- He was elected as the Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in 1998 and his opponent was Bengson.

- Bengson filed a case Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with HRET claiming Cruz, not being a natural-born citizen by the contention that Aricle IV, Sec 2 of the Consti defines natural-born citizens as “citizens from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect such citizenship, was not eligible to be member of the House.

ISSUES1. WON Cruz, a natural born Filipino who became an American citizen, can still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship via Repatriation, so that the question of WON he is eligible to be a member of the House might be addressed2. - WON the HRET committed serious erros and grave abuse of discreation amounting to excess of jurisdiction in ruling in favour of Cruz as natural-born citizen

HELD1. Yes.Ratio Two ways of acquiring Filipino citizenship

o By birth – natural born citizenso Naturalization – Naturalized citizens (those who become

Filipino citizens through naturalization, generally under the Commonwealth Act no. 473. To be naturalized, an applicant has to prove that he possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications

- 1987 Constitution only provides for 2 classes of citizens:o Natural borno Naturalized

- Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may reacquire it by naturalization, repatriation or by direct act of Congress.

o Naturalization – mode for acquisition and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.

o Repatriation – available for those who have lost their citizenship due to desertion of the armed forces, service in the armed forces of the allied forces in WWII, service in the armed forces of the US at any other time, marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien, and political and economic necessity. Process: taking an oath of allegiance to the RP and registering it in the Local Civil Registrar of the place where the person concerned resides or last resided.

- Repatriation would result in the recovery of the original nationality. He will be restored to his former status as a natural-born citizen. Cruz recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen because of his repatriation.

Note: As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply consists of taking an oath of allegiance to the RP and registering said oath with the Local Civil Registry

- 1987 Constitution does not provide a separate category for persons who after losing Philippine citizenship, subsequently reacquires it because they are either natural born or naturalized depending on the reason for the loss of their citizenship and the mode prescribed by the applicable law for reacquisition.- Cruz was not required by law to go through naturalization proceedings in order to reacquire his citizenship, he is perforce a natural-born Filipino.2. No.Ratio HRET has been empowered by the Consti to be the “sole judge” of all contests relating to the elction, returns and qualifications of the members of the House. Court’s jurisdiction is merely to check WON there has been grave abuse; absent such showing, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective power

SEPARATE OPINION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ

Additional Facts:- In the 1995 local elections, Cruz filed his certificate of candidacy for Mayor declaring himself to be a naturalized Filipino citizen- Thereafter, Cruz ran for Congres, this time declaring himself as natural-born- Petitioner and respondent present opposing interpretation of the phrase “from birth” in Art IV, Sec 2 of the Consti

- Petitioner avers: means starting from a definite point and must be continuous, constant and without interruption- Respondent contends: refers to the innate, inherent and inborn characteristic of being a “natural-born”

- J. Sandoval-Gutierrez holds:- Natural-born citizens are so by virtue of birth without performing any acts. To repatriate, Cruz had to perform certain acts before he could again become a Filipino citizen. Therefore, he does not reaquire natural-born citizenship- The history of the Consti shows that the meaning and application of the requirement of being natural-born have become more narrow and qualified over the years, more stringent; and the decision of HRET in the case at bar reverses the historical trend and clear intendment of the Consti, a matter which can only be accomplished through consti amendment; clearly, HRET has acted with grave abuse of discretion.

COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 473An Act to Provide for the Acquisition of the Citizenship by

Naturalization, and to repeal Acts 2927 and 3448

Sec 1: Title: “Revised Naturalization Law” Sec 2: Qualifications: Who may become citizens of the Philippines by naturalization?1. >21 years old at the day of the hearing of the petition2. resided in the Philippines for CONTINUOUS period of >10yrs3. of good moral character + believes in principles underlying the Philippine Constitution (1935 Consti) + conducted himself in proper and irreproachable manner during entire period of residence in the Philippines in relation with constituted government and community with community in which he is living4. (must own real estate in the Philippines > P5000) or Philippine currency or lucrative trade/profession/lawful occupation5. able to speak and write English/Spanish + any one of the principal Philippine language6. enrolled his MINOR children of school age in any of the public schools/private schools during the entire period of residence in the Philippines required of him prior to the hearing of his petition…School:

- recognized by the Office of Private Education of the Philippines- teaches Philippine history, government and civics and prescribes it as part of the school curriculum

Sec 3: Special qualifications: when the 10 year qualification required in Sec2(2) could be reduced to a continuous 5 years?1. had honorably held office under the Government of the Philippines/ under that of any of the provinces, cities, municipalities, or political subdivisions thereof [aliens, particularly American citizens, were the ones who were governing the country prior to the Commonwealth]2. established new industry/ introduced a useful invention in the Philippines3. married to a Filipino woman4. engaged as a teacher in the Philippines for >2 yrsschool: public/recognized private school + not established for exclusive instruction of children of persons of particular nationality/race5. born in the PhilippinesSec 4: Who are disqualified? Persons…a. opposed to organized government/affiliated with any association or group of persons who uphold and teach doctrines opposing organized gov’t

b. defending/teaching the necessity or propriety of violence/personal assault/assassination for the success and predominance of their ideasc. Polygamists/believers of polygamyd. Convicted of crimes (moral turpitude)e. Suffering from mental alienation/incurable contagious diseasef. Not mingled socially w/ Filipinos, have not evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace customs, traditions, and ideals of Filipinosg. Citizens/subjects of nations w/whom US and the Philippines are at war – during such warh. Citizens/subjects of foreign country [OTHER THAN US!] whose laws don’t grant Filipinos right to become naturalized citizens/subjectsSec 5. Declaration of intention: file declaration that it is his bona fide intention to become a citizen of the Philippines - under oath - 1 year prior to the filing of petition for admission to Philippine citizenship of the Bureau of Justice

-contents+ name+ age+ occupation + personal description + place of birth+last foreign residence and allegiance+date of arrival+name of vessel/aircraft (if any) in which he came to the Philippines+place of residence in the Philippines at the time of making the declaration *to be valid: establish lawful entry for permanent residence + issued certificate showing date, place, and manner of arrival

*also state that he had enrolled his minor children in school (see sec2(6)) *2 pictures of himselfSec 6. Widow and minor children of aliens dying after declaration of intention not required to file declaration of intentionSec 7. Petition for citizenship: requirements filed with competent court *a petition in triplicate contents of petition: +name and surname

+present and former places of residence+occupation+place and date of birth+status; if married and the father, include name, age, birthplace and

residence of wife and each child+approximate date of his/her arrival in the Philippines+name of the port of debarkation + name of ship (if remembered)+declaration of qualifications and non-disqualification +declaration that he has complied with sec. 5+declaration of continuous residence in RP from date of filing petition to

admission as RP Citizen *2 photographs of petitioner *petition signed by applicant + supported by affidavit of at least 2 credible persons (see provision for requirements)Sec 8. Competent court: CFI of province in w/c the petitioner has resided for at least 1 yr immediately preceding the filing of the petitionSec 9. Notification and appearance. Tasks of clerk of court …publish petition for 3 consecutive weeks in OG and in one of gen circulation newspapers in the province where petitioner resides …post copies of petitions in conspicuous places (contain name, birthplace and residence of petitioner, date and place of arrival, names of witnesses, date of hearing the petition) *hearing shall not be held w/n 90 days from date of last publication of notice …forward copies of the petition, sentence, naturalization certificate and pertinent data to Department of the Interior, Bureau of Justice, Provincial Inspector of the Philippine Constabulary of the province, and justice of peace of the municipality where petitioner residesSec 10. Hearing of the petition.

*no hearing w/n 30 days preceding any election *public hearing *Solicitor-General/representative/provincial fiscal appear for Commonwealth at all proceedings *upon belief of court of qualifications and non-disqualification of petitioner, court order proper naturalization certificate in proper civil registry (required in Sec. 10, Act No. 3753)Sec 11. Appeal: to the SCSec 12: Issuance of the Certificate of Naturalization: 30 days after and from date of notice to the parties (in case of appeal, SC confirmed deci), clerk of court issue naturalization certificate contents of certificate of naturalization” *file no. of petition *number of naturalization certificate *signature of the person naturalized affixed in the presence of the clerk of court *personal circumstances of the person naturalized *dates of filing of declaration of intention and petition *date of decision granting petition *name of the judge who rendered deci *photograph of peti with dry seal of court w/c granted petition *oath declared in open court [refer to the original]Sec 13. Record Books: clerk of court keep 2 books: (1) record of petition and declarations of intentions in chronological order; (2) record of naturalization certificateSec 14. Fees. *P30.00 (for recording of petition and for proceedings + issuance of certificate) *P24.00 (for each appeal and for connected services rendered)sec 15. Effect of naturalization on wife and children *on wife: shall be deemed a citizen of Philippines (if just married or also naturalized) *on minor children:

…if born in the Philippines: Filipino…if foreign-born but dwelling in the Philippines during

naturalization of parent: Filipino…if foreign-born, not dwelling in the Philippines during

naturalization of parent: Filipino during minority, unless resides in the Philippines permanently and still a minor, then legally Filipino upon age of majority

…if foreign-born after naturalization of parent: Filipino unless fails to register and take oath 1 yr after age of majority

Sec 16. Right of widow and children of petitioners_who_have_died: continue proceedings, same legal effectSec 17. Renunciation of title or orders of nobility: unless w/ express consent of the National AssemblySec 18. Cancellation of naturalization certificates issued *upon motion made in proper proceedings by Solicitor-General/representative/proper provincial fiscal *cancelled by competent judge on the ff. grounds:

a. naturalization certificate obtained fraudulently/illegallyb. person naturalized establishes permanent residence outside Philippines w/n 5 yrs after issuance of naturalization certificatec. petition made on invalid declaration of intentiond. minor children shown to have failed to graduate from school in sec 2 (6) through fault of parents either by neglect to support or by transferring them to another school(s)e. naturalized citizen only used as a dummy to violate constitutional or legal provision requiring Philippine citizenship

Sec 19 Penalties for violation of this Act: fine < P5,000.00 or imprisonment< 5 yrs or both, naturalization cancelledSec 20. Prescription: file complaint w/n 5 yrs from detection/discovery of commission of offenseSec. 21. Regulation and blanks.

*Secretary of Justice: issue necessary regulations *Solicitor-General, subject to approval of Secretary of Justice: naturalization certificate blanks, etc.Sec 22. Repealing clause: Repeals Act. No. 2927 as amended by Act No. 3448 [Naturalization Law]

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 530An Act Making Additional Provisions for Naturalization

- Requires the publication of petitions for citizenship (also required by previous law, prob. Act 423, below)- Court will hear petitions for citizenship 6 months after the publication- Decisions granting the application become executory only after 2 years, and- The Solicitor General or his representative finds that during the intervening time, applicant has:

NOT left the Philippines Dedicated himself continuously to lawful calling or profession NOT been convicted of any offense or violation of govt. rules NOT committed any act prejudicial to the interest of the nation or

contrary to any govt. announced policies- After the finding, the order of the court granting citizenship will be registered and the oath taken by the applicant before he will be entitled to the privileges of citizenship.- Repealed inconsistent parts of Act No. 423.- Approved, June 16, 1950.

COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 63An Act Providing for the Ways in which Philippine

Citizenship may be lost or reacquired

Section 1. How citizenship may be lost.(1) naturalization in a foreign country;(2) express renunciation of citizenship;(3) subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support constitution or laws of

foreign country upon +21y.o.: a Filipino may not divest himself of Philippine citizenship while the RP is at war;

(4) rendering services to/accepting commission in, the armed forces of foreign country: rendering of service to/the acceptance of such commission in, the armed forces of foreign country, and the taking of an oath of allegiance incident thereto, with the consent of RP, shall not divest a Filipino of his Philippine citizenship if either of the ff. is present:

(a) RP has defensive and/or offensive pact of alliance with the said foreign country; or

(b) said foreign country maintains armed forces on Philippine territory w/ consent of RP: Filipino citizen concerned, at the time of rendering said service/or acceptance of said commission, & taking the oath of allegiance incident thereto, states that he does so only in connection with his service to said foreign country: & provided that any Filipino citizen who is rendering service to/or is commissioned in, the armed forces of foreign country under (a) or (b), shall not be permitted to participate nor vote in any election of RP during period of service to/commission in, the armed forces of said foreign country. automatically entitled to full enjoyment of civil and political rights as a Filipino citizen upon his discharge;

(5) cancellation of certificates of naturalization;(6) having been declared by competent authority, a deserter of the AFP in time

of war, unless pardon or granted amnesty; &(7) woman: marriage to a foreigner if, by virtue of the laws in force in her

husband's country, she acquires his nationality. *** Sec 1 amended by RA 106, section 1, approved June 2, 1947*when dual citizenship was allowed at that time:

…acquisition of citizenship by natural born Filipino citizen from Iberian/democratic Ibero-American countries/ United Kingdom if the law of that country grants same privilege to its citizens –agreed upon by treaty between the Philippines and foreign country from which citizenship is acquired.

Section. 2. How citizenship may be reacquired.(1) naturalization: applicant possess none of the disqualification's prescribed in

sec 2, Act No. 2927 (repealed by CA 473 – so sec 4)(2) repatriation of deserters of the Army, Navy or Air Corp: Provided, woman by

sec 1(7) may be repatriated in accordance with the provisions of this Act after the termination of the marital status;(see PD 725 for more details)

(3) direct act of the National Assembly.Section 3. Procedure incident to reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. Apply Act No. 2927 (now CA 473) to the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship by naturalization provided for in the next preceding sec: Provided, qualifications and special qualifications prescribed in sec 3 & 4 of Act 2927 shall not be required (sorry guys, I can’t find a copy of Act 2927 in the net so I don’t know what these sections are in CA 473): further, applicant…(1) at least 21 y.o. + resided in RP at least 6 mos. before he applies for naturalization;(2) have conducted himself in proper and irreproachable manner during

+the entire period of his residence in RP+in his relations with the constituted government +with the community in which he is living; and

(3) subscribes to an oath declaring his intention to renounce absolutely and perpetually all faith and allegiance to the foreign authority/state/sovereignty of which he was a citizen or subject.Section 4. Repatriation: effected by merely taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the Commonwealth of the Philippines (RP) and registration in the proper civil registry. (used in the Bengzon Case)Section 5. Similar to Sec 21 of CA 473

YU V DEFENSOR-SANTIAGOPADILLA; January 24, 1989

FACTS- Petition for Habeas Corpus- 1971 – Yu was issued a Portuguese passport in 1971 valid for 5 years & renewed for same period upon presentment before Portuguese consular officer- Feb. 10, 1978 – He was naturalized as a Phil. citizen- April 1980 – signed commercial documents in Hong Kong (Companies Registry of Tai Shun Estate, Ltd.) and he declared his nationality as Portuguese - July 21, 1981 – He applied & was issued another Portuguese passport in Tokyo. Passport will expire July 20, 1986. Procedural Facts: - July 4, 1988 – He filed for a petition for habeas corpus. He was detained because the Commission on Immigration & Deportation was processing his deportation. CID claims that his acts are tantamount to an express renunciation of his Philippine citizenship. - July 20, 1988 – oral arguments- Nov. 10, 1988 – SC resolution denied petition for habeas corpus & resolved issued on jurisdiction of CID over naturalized Filipino citizen & validity of warrantless arrest & detention. Yu filed MFR, denied w/finality. Filed urgent motion for issuance of restraining order, denied. - Dec. 5, 1988 – Yu filed motion for clarification w/prayer for restraining order.- Dec. 7, 1988 – SC issued TRO. CID ordered to cease & desist from deporting Yu pending conclusion of hearings before Board of Special Inquiry of CID. - Dec. 13, 1988 – Respondent commissioner filed motion to lift TRO saying the commission already issued a summary judgment of deportation against Yu on Dec. 2, 88.

- Dec. 13, 1988 – Yu filed an urgent motion for release from arbitrary detention. Opposed vigorously to lifting of TRO. - Yu ordered to explain why he should still be considered a Phil citizen. He complied. His reply revealed aforementioned substantive facts.

ISSUEWON the acts of Yu constitute an express renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.

HELDYes. Motion for release from detention denied. TRO lifted. Ratio - Renunciation – made known distinctly & explicitly and not left to interference or implication (BI Commissioners vs. Go Gallano). His resumption/reacquisition of his Portuguese citizenship and passport and representation as a Portuguese even after he has acquired Filipino citizenship are proof enough of his renunciation. - He does not dispute the facts. He was given the opportunity to show proof of continued Philippine citizenship but he failed. There is no denial of due process. - Trial court should have jurisdiction over this case. But due to petitioner’s insistence, SC had to do it. - Philippine citizenship is not a commodity or were to be displayed when required and suppressed when convenient.

SEPARATE OPINION

CRUZ [concur]Yu has failed to overcome presumption that he has forfeited his status as naturalized Filipino by obtaining Portuguese passport. Passports are generally issued only to nationals. No proof of Yu’s unequivocal & deliberate renunciation of Phi. Citizenship w/ full awareness of its significance & consequences as provided for in CA No. 63. Commercial documents signed are not proof enough of renunciation.

FERNAN [dissent]Summary procedure & pieces of documentary evidence are not enough to reach such decision. Evidence must be clear & express w/o room for interference or implication. In a deportation proceeding where alien claims citizenship w/substantial evidence, he’s entitled to have his status determined by judicial & not an executive tribunal. He deserves a full-blown trial under more rigid rules of evidence in a court proceeding. SC is not a trier of facts.

GUTIERREZ [dissent]Summary procedure would not suffice. Something as important as denaturalization should be filed & prosecuted in proper trial court in accordance w/the due process clause. When a person pleads vigorously that he has not renounced his citizenship, he should at least be given a full trial where his actions may be explored & the facts fully ascertained. Dangerous precedent to allow administrative officials to rule that one has renounced his citizenship based on informal evidence. Mere use of a foreign passport is not express renunciation. He may have passport for other purposes (employment, convenience). Some high gov’t officials have done acts w/c are more indicative of express renunciation than mere use of passport or different citizenship has been signed. SC is not a trier of facts. Yu’s morality is beside the point. He deserves his full day in court.

CORTES [dissent]CID findings are subject to judicial review. Loss of Yu’s Filipino citizenship has not been established. Evidence presented were not authenticated by proper Philippine consul, thus not substantial and are inadequate.

PEOPLE V AVENGOZARELOVA; December 7, 1982

FACTS- Criminal Case; Appeal from Decision of CFI of Camarines Sur- Anselma Avengoza and husband Go Gam, a Chinese, together with the former’s mother Gavina Avengoza and Rafaela Anfante are being charged with violation of the Anti-Dummy Law on transactions for the spouses to own agricultural lands in the Philippines.- Anselma Avengoza, upon marriage to Go Gam, acquired Chinese citizenship- The Anti-Dummy Law provides that only Filipino citizens may own local agricultural land.- Pending litigation, Go Gam and Gavina passed away.- Upon Go Gam’s passing, Anselma executed an oath of allegiance to the RP and filed it with the Office of the Municipal Treasurer for the purpose of reacquiring her citizenship by repatriation, averring by reason whereof that her criminal liability is thereby extinguished; and that the issue of the criminal case is rendered moot and academic- Trial court dismissed case principally predicated on its opinion that Anselma had validly reacquired Philippine citizenship

ISSUES1. WON Anselma reacquired citizenship after executing an oath of allegiance to the RP and filing it with the Municipal Treasurer2. if so, WON such reacquisition of citizenship exempted her from liability for the violation of the Anti-Dummy Law

HELD1. No.Ratio Mere taking of oath of allegiance insufficient for reacquisition of Filipino citizenship. Would-be repatriate should show conclusive proof that she has the qualifications to be so repatriated. Anselma became an alien by reason of her lawful marriage to a Chinese citizen; however this does not necessarily mean that she was a Filipino citizen prior to such marriage.2. No.Ratio Even had she been considered repatriated, like an alien who became a naturalized Filipino citizen, her repatriation will not exempt her from criminal liability for violation of the Anti-Dummy Law.

JAO V REPUBLICVASQUEZ; March 29, 1983

FACTS- Modesta Jao claims to be a Philippine citizen because she was born of a Chinese father and an illiterate Filipina mother who were not legally married. - She married a Chinese man and therefore lost her Philippine citizenship but he is now dead. - Her handicapped mother erroneously registered her as an alien and she was issued an Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR). - She is claiming back her Phil. citizenship, by way of a petition for repatriation filed in CFI of Davao.- CFI issued an order declaring petitioner as “judicially repatriated,” and ordered cancelled her ACR.- Provincial Fiscal in behalf of the Republic, appealed the case.

ISSUEWON the judicial decree by the RTC was necessary for repatriation.

HELD

Ratio Proceedings to declare a person as “judicially repatriated” are a complete nullity. There is no law requiring or authorizing that repatriation should be effected by a judicial proceeding. Reasoning In Lim v. Republic, 37 SCRA 783, it was held that “there is no proceeding established by law or the rules by which any person claiming to be a citizen may get a declaration in a court of justice to that effect or in regard to his citizenship.” All that is needed for a female citizen of the Phil. who lost her citizenship to an alien to reacquire her Phil. citizen, upon the termination of her martial status, “is for her to take necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Phil. and to register the said oath in the proper civil registry.” Disposition Decision appealed from is revoked and set aside. 5 Justices concur. Obiter Petitioner’s claim of Phil. citizenship prior to her marriage for being allegedly an illegitimate child of a Chinese father and a Filipina mother may not be established in an action where the mother or her heirs are not parties. It is the consistent rule in this jurisdiction that Phil. citizenship may not be declared in a non-adversary suit where the persons whose rights are affected by such a declaration are not parties, such as an action for declaratory relief, petition for judicial repatriation, or an action to cancel registration as an alien.

VILLAVICENCIO V LUKBANMALCOLM; March 25, 1919

FACTS- Manila Mayor, Justo Lukban, wanting to exterminate vice, ordered the closing of the city’s red light district. The brothels were closed and the workers (170 women) were rounded up and kept confined to their houses in the district by the police for a little more than a week. On the night of Oct.25, 1918, the women were forcibly hustled aboard the steamers Corregidor and Negros and sent off to Davao to work as laborers without their consent, without opportunity to consult with friends/family or to defend their rights. They reached Davao 4 days later and were met by Francisco Sales, governor of Davao and by hacendero Feliciano Yñigo and Rafael Castillo, etc. - During their voyage, the women’s relatives and friends initiated an application for habeas corpus, alleging that Justo Lukban, along with Anton Hohmann (the police chief), and others deprived the women of their liberty. The court awarded the writ of habeas corpus (w of hc) and ordered Lukban and co. to bring the women before the court. Although they returned with none of the women, they were given another chance. The court issued another order this time calling for the respondents to produce all of the women not in Manila. The respondents were only able to bring forward 8 women and challenged the issuance of the writ.

ISSUES1. Re: the proper granting of the writ:

a. WON the petitioners had standing b. WON the S.C. erred in assuming jurisdiction c. WON the women were actually restrained of their liberty

2. WON there was compliance with the court orders 3. On contempt of court

HELD1a. YesRatio When it is is impossible for a party to sign an application for the w of hc, another person may submit it in his/her behalf.Reasoning It was impossible for the women to have signed a petition for habeas corpus with the way their expulsion was conducted. They were first isolated from society and then shipped. It was consequently proper for the writ to be submitted by persons in their behalf.1b No

Ratio The w of hc may be granted by the Supreme Court or any judge thereof enforcible anywhere in the Philippines. The SC can decide upon where the writ shall be made returnable to (whether before the SC or before a lower court).Reasoning The CFI of Davao was not in session. The case involves parties from different parts of the country. Habeas Corpus was devised as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint.1c. YesRatio The forcible taking, isolation, and transfer of the women is constitutive of deprivation of freedom of locomotion.Reasoning The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary and to relieve a person from such restraint if it is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient.

2. 1st order: No. Respondents were not able to bring the women before the court on the day named. The court could have sent the respondents to jail however, the court forebore drastic action because it did not want the public to see a clash between executive officials and the judiciary and because it wanted to give the respondents another chance to demonstrate their good faith and to mitigate their wrong.2nd order: Yes. Respondents (through better effort) were able to produce 8 women. The mandate called for all of the women not in Manila. However, the court decided that there was substantial compliance, noting the effort (placards were posted, police helped, free shipping to Manila was provided) and the fact that they had a sincere desire to see the unhappy incident finally closed.

3. Ratio Only Lukban is guilty of contempt. His intentions were commendable, his methods were unlawful. An officer’s failure to produce the body of a person in obedience to a writ of habeas corpus, when he has power to do so, is contempt committed in the face of the court.Reasoning He was primarily responsible for setting forth this whole chain of events and had under his power as head of the city government to facilitate the return of the women to Manila but failed. The rest of the respondents other than Lukban are not guilty of contempt. Some were merely following the orders of their superiors or merely fulfilling a duty. Another was merely drawn into the case through miscommunication. Disposition No further action on the w of hc. Lukban found in contempt of court and shall pay Php 100 within 5 days. Rest of respondents found not to be in contempt of court.

KURODA JALANDONIMORAN; March 26, 1949

FACTSKuroda, a high ranking Japanese army official is being charged by the Military Commission with failure to perform duties as commander in preventing crimes/atrocities against civilians, and POWs. In defense, he is alleging that Executive Order No. 68 (EO68) which established a Natl. War Crimes Office is unconstitutional and that 2 prosecuting attorneys, Hussey and Port (both American) have no authority to practice law in the country. As such, the respondents should be prohibited from proceeding with this case.

ISSUES1. WON EO68 is unconstitutional2. Re: Attys. Hussey and Port A. WON they are qualified to practice in accordance with the Rules of CourtB. WoN their appointment as prosecutors is violative of the Constitution

HELD1. Ratio The President as Commander in Chief is fully empowered to consummate an unfinished aspect of war which is the trial and punishment of war criminals through the issuance and enforcement of EO68.

Reasoning EO68 was issued by the President to establish a Natl. War Crimes Office and provide for rules and regulations in trying accused war criminals. It conforms to the generally accepted principles/policies of international law, including the Hague Convention and the Geneva Convention, which are part of the law of the nation. Its promulgation was an exercise of the President of his powers as Commander in Chief of the whole armed forces. Iin Yamashita v. Tyer, the court held that “the power to create a military commission for the trial and punishment of war criminals is an aspect of waging war. A military commission has jurisdiction so long as a technical state of war continues.”2A. Ratio The Military Commission is special military tribunal governed by a special law and not by the Rules of Court. Reasoning There is nothing in EO68 which requires that counsel appearing before said commissions must be attys. qualified to practice law in the Phil. in accordance with the Rules of Court.2B. NoRatio The appointment of the 2 American attorneys is not violative of our national sovereignty.Reasoning It is only fair and proper that the US, which has submitted the vindication of crimes against her govt. and her people to a tribunal of our nation, should be allowed representation in the trial of those very crimes. Disposition The Military Commission having been convened by virtue of a valid law, with jurisdiction over the crimes charged which fall under the provisions of Executive Order No. 68, and having jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner by having said petitioner in its custody, this Court will not interfere with the due processes of such Military Commission. Petition denied. With costs de oficio.

ICHONG V HERNANDEZ AND SARMIENTOLABRADOR; May 31, 1957

FACTS- Injunction and Mandamus- The Legislature enacted RA 1180 entitled ”An Act to Regulate the Retail Business.” It prohibits aliens and associations, partnerships, or corporations, which are not wholly owned by citizens, to engage directly or indirectly in the retail trade. In effect it nationalizes the retail business. - Procedure Lao Ichong, in his own behalf and in behalf of other alien residents, corporations, and partnerships adversely affected by RA 1180 filed a petition for Injunction and Mandamus against Jaime Hernandez, Secretary of Finance and Marcelino Sarmiento, City Treasurer of Manila. - Preliminary consideration of legal principles involvedA. Police Power- the most positive and active of all governmental processes, the most essential, insistent and illimitable- necessary esp. in a modern democratic frameworkB. Equal Protection Clause- against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality; it requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions- is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exists for making distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not.- Criteria for Test of EPC

1. presence of public interest and welfare2. existence of reasonable relation between purposes and means3. existence of reasonable basis for distinction and classification made

C. Due Process clause- has to do with reasonableness of legislation enacted in pursuance of the police power- Questions for test:

1. Is there is a public interest/purpose?

2. Is the Act is reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the legislature’s purpose; is it not unreasonable, arbitrary or oppressive?3. Can the aims conceived be achieved by the means used or is it merely an unjustified interference with private interest?

ISSUES1. WON RA 1180 denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws.2. WON RA 1180 deprives alien residents of their liberty and property without due process of law.3. WON the title of the Act is misleading or deceptive, as it conceals the real purpose of the bill, which is to nationalize the retail business and prohibit aliens from engaging therein.4. WON RA 1108 violates international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the Philippines.

HELD1. No. The act does not transcend the limit of equal protection established by the Constitution if there is a question of public interest involved or pursued and the classification or distinction used by the legislature, in this case between nationals and aliens, is actual, real and reasonable, and all persons of one class are treated alike, and as it cannot be said that classification is patently unreasonable and unfounded. Reasoninga. Based on experience of the country, alien retailer has shown disregard for his customers and the people on whom he makes his profit. Aliens lack spirit of loyalty and enthusiasm for the country. Alien participation in the retail trade has been attended by intolerable practices like the ff:

- hoarding essential commodities- violating price control laws- boycotting honest merchants and traders who would not cater or yield to their demands- believed to have evaded tax laws- bribing public officials

b. Economic reason – alien retailer never really makes a genuine contribution to national income and wealth since the gains and profits he makes are not invested in industries that would help the country’s economy and increase national wealth.c. precedents Smith Bell & Co. vs. Natividad, Gibbon vs. Ongden Commonwealth vs. Hana, Anton vs. Van Winkle, Templar vs. Michigan State Board of Examiners

- Essentially held that the difference in status between citizens and aliens constitutes a basis for reasonable classification in the exercise of police power.

Takahashi vs. Fish and game Commission, Fraser vs. McConway & Tarley- held that the distinction between aliens and citizens is not valid because the laws were found to be arbitrary, unreasonable or capricious, or were the result or product of racial antagonism and hostility, and there was no question of public interest involved or pursued.

2. No. There is due process if the laws passed are seen to have reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose, the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.Reasoninga. legitimacy of the purpose of the law- Its purpose is to prevent persons who are not citizens of the Philippines from having a strangle hold upon our economic life\- Freedom and liberty are not real and positive if the people are subject to the economic control and domination of others, especially if not of their own race or country.b Nationalistic protective policy laid down in the Constitution

- Section 8 of Article XIV provides that “no franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines”c. Provisions of law not unreasonable- The legislature is primarily the judge of the necessity of an enactment or of any of its provisions, and every presumption is in favor of its validity, and though the Court may hold views inconsistent with the wisdom of the law, it may not annul the legislation if not in excess of the legislative power.

3. No. The provisions of the law are clearly embraced in the title. The general rule is for the use of general terms in the title of the bill and the title need not be an index to the entire contents of the law.Reasoninga. The term regulate is a broader term than either prohibition or nationalization. Both of these have always been included within the term regulation.

4. No treaty has actually been entered into on the subject and the police power may not be curtailed or surrendered by any treaty or any other conventional agreement.

GONZALES V HECHANOVACONCEPCION; October 22, 1963

FACTS- Respondent Exec. Sec. authorized importation of foreign rice and created rice procurement committee. Gonzales, a rice planter and President of Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association, filed petition. Procedure Case is an original action for prohibition with preliminary injunction to restrain implementation of decision of Exec. Sec. to import rice. Respondents were required to file answer and hearing was set.- on WON respondents are acting without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdictionPetitioner’s stand:- Yes, bec. RA 3452 explicitly prohibits importation of rice and corn by Rice and Corn Administration and any other gov’t agency.Respondents’ stand:- Petitioner has no sufficient interest to file petition.- Petitioner has not exhausted all administrative remedies available before coming to court.- Petitioner’s action is not sufficient and not governed by RA 3452 because importation was authorized by President as Commander in Chief for military stock pile purposes. As such, Pres must prepare for threats without waiting for any special authority.- Also, they say it’s not under RA 3452 bec. the RAs prohibit importation of rice and corn by “government agency” and not the government itself.- Even if the proposed importation violated the RAs, it can still be permitted because it is for the benefit of the people.- The Phils is already under executive agreements with contracts for purchase of rice with Vietnam and Burma. In case of conflict between the RAs and the contracts, the contracts should prevail because it came later. These contracts have been consummated bec. the Phils. has already paid.

ISSUEWON respondents are acting without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction

HELD- RA 3452 says that the gov’t policy is to purchase basic foods directly from farmers in Phils. Petitioner has sufficient interest.- Case at bar involves question which is a purely legal one. It falls under the exemption from the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.- The proposed importation is governed by RA 2207 and RA 3452 bec it covers “all importations of rice and corn into the Phils.”

- RA 2207 and 3452 also applies to importations of the government itself bec. RA 2207 talks about imports authorized by the President, by and on behalf of government. RA 3452 also indicates that only private parties may import rice under its provisions. These RAs are only in addition to Commonwealth Act No. 138 which says that in all purchases by gov’t, incl. those for armed forces, preference is given to materials produced in the Phils.- The “benefit of the people” argument can’t be accepted because there is no local rice shortage. And the importation is said to be for stockpile of Army, not for the civilian population.- The contracts w/ Vietnam and Burma are not executive agreements. Even if they were, they are unlawful, being against the RAs. The alleged consummation does not render this case academic. The contracts may have already been entered into and the payment may have been made but the actual importation has not yet taken place.Disposition- For lack of requisite majority, injunction prayed for is DENIED.- It is declared that Exec. Sec. has no power to authorize importation in question and he exceeded jurisdiction in granting authority. The importation is not sanctioned by law and is contrary to its provisions.

ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS V SECRETARY OF DAR

CRUZ; July 14, 1989

FACTS- The Constitution in 1935 mandated the policy of social justice to "insure the well-being and economic security of all the people," especially the, less privileged.- In 1973, the new Constitution affirmed this goal adding specifically that "the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, enjoyment and disposition of private property and equitably diffuse property ownership and profits. Significantly, there was also the specific injunction to "formulate and implement an agrarian reform program aimed at emancipating the tenant from the bondage of the soil."- The 1987 Constitution, besides echoing these sentiments, also adopted one whole and separate Article XIII on Social Justice and Human Rights. One of its sections:- SEC. 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof To this end, the State shall encourage and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands, subject to such priorities and reasonable retention limits as the Congress may prescribe, taking into account ecological, developmental, or equity considerations and subject to the payment of just compensation. In determining retention limits, the State shall respect the right of small landowners. The State shall further provide incentives for voluntary landsharing.- R.A, No. 3844, otherwise known as the Agricultural Land Reform Code, had already been enacted by the Congress of the Philippines on August 8, 1963, in line with the above-stated principles. This was substantially superseded almost a decade later by P.D. No. 27, which was promulgated on October 21, 1972, along with martial law, to provide for the compulsory acquisition of private lands for distribution among tenant-farmers and to specify maximum retention limits for landowners.- On July 17, 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino issued E.O. No. 228, declaring full land ownership in favor of the beneficiaries of P.D. No. 27 and providing for the valuation of still unvalued lands covered by the decree as well as the manner of their payment. This was followed on July 22, 1987 by Presidential Proclamation No. 131, instituting a comprehensive agrarian reform program (CARP), and E.O. No. 229, providing the mechanics for its implementation.- With its formal organization, the revived Congress of the Philippines (formally convened on July 27, 1987) took over legislative power from the President and

started its own deliberations, including extensive public hearings, on the improvement of the interests of farmers. The result, after almost a year of spirited debate, was the enactment of R.A. No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, which President Aquino signed on June 10, 1988. This law, while considerably changing the earlier mentioned enactments, nevertheless gives them suppletory effect insofar as they are not inconsistent with its provisions.

ISSUES1. WON petitions are justiciable.2. WON P.D. No. 27, Presidential Proclamation No. 131, E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 and R.A. 6657 contravene the Constitution on the grounds inter alia of separation of powers, due process, equal protection and the constitutional limitation that no private property shall be taken for public use without just compensation. Sub issuesa. The determination of just compensation may be made only by a court of justice and not by the President of the Philippines.b. The just compensation contemplated by the Bill of Rights is payable only in money or in cash but not in the form of bonds or other things of value.c. In considering rentals as advance payment on the land, E.O. No. 228 deprives the petitioners of their property rights as protected by due process.d. The equal protection clause is violated when the burden of solving the agrarian problems is placed on the owners only of agricultural lands.e. In declaring the beneficiaries under P.D. No. 27 to be the owners of the lands occupied by them, E.O. No. 228 ignored judicial prerogatives and so violated due process.f. The power to provide for a Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program as decreed by the Constitution belongs to Congress and not the President. Although petitioners agree that the President could exercise legislative power until the Congress was convened, they contend that she could do so only to enact emergency measures during the period.g. The money needed to create the P50 billon special fund under Proc. No. 131 is in futuro, not in esse, i.e., it has yet to be raised and cannot be appropriated at that time.h. The sugar planters argued that they are a separate group with problems exclusively their own and by being lumped in the same legislation with other farmers, their right to equal protection has been violated.i. There was a failure to establish by clear and convincing evidence the necessity for the exercise of the powers of eminent domain, and the violation of the fundamental right to own property.j. The petitioners also decry the penalty for non-registration of the lands, which is the expropriation of the said land for an amount equal to the government assessor's valuation of the land for tax purposes. On the other hand, if the landowner declares his own valuation, he is unjustly required to immediately pay the corresponding taxes on the land, in violation of the uniformity rule.10

k. E.O. No. 229 violates the constitutional requirement that a bill shall have only one subject, to be expressed in its title.

HELD1. RD: Yes. The Court will assume jurisdiction over a constitutional question only if it is shown that the essential requisites of a judicial inquiry into such a question are first satisfied but even if they are not covered by the definition, it is still within the wide discretion of the Court to waive the requirement and so remove the impediment to its addressing and resolving the serious constitutional questions raised.2a. The determination made by the DAR is only preliminary unless accepted by all parties concerned. Otherwise, the courts of justice will still have the right to review with finality the said determination in the exercise of what is admittedly a judicial function. (Sec. 16f)

10 This was not discussed directly but may be construed as being under No. 1 above. It will still be the

courts who will decide what just compensation would be.

2b. It cannot be denied that the traditional medium for the payment of just compensation is money and no other. And so, conformably, has just compensation been paid in the past solely in that medium. However, we do not deal here with the traditional exercise of the power of eminent domain.11 This is not an ordinary expropriation where only a specific property of relatively limited area is sought to be taken by the State from its owner for a specific and perhaps local purpose. What we deal with here is a revolutionary kind of expropriation.2c. When E.O. No. 228, categorically stated in its Section 1 that:All qualified farmer-beneficiaries are now deemed full owners as of October 21, 1972 of the land they acquired by virtue of P.D. No. 27.It was obviously referring to lands already validly acquired under the said decree, after proof of full-fledged membership in the farmers' cooperatives and full payment of just compensation. Hence, it was also perfectly proper for the Order to also provide in its Section 2 that the "lease rentals paid to the landowner by the farmer-beneficiary after October 21, 1972 (pending transfer of ownership after full payment of just compensation), shall be considered as advance payment for the land.2d. Equal protection simply means that all persons or things similarly situated must be treated alike both as to the rights conferred and the liabilities imposed. The argument that not only landowners but also owners of other properties must be made to share the burden of implementing land reform must be rejected. There is a substantial distinction between these two classes of owners that is clearly visible except to those who will not see.12

2e. The CARP Law conditions the transfer of possession and ownership of the land to the government on receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or the deposit by the DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an accessible bank. Until then, title remains with the landowner. No outright change of ownership is contemplated either.2f. The power of President Aquino to promulgate Proc. No. 131 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 was authorized under Section 6 of the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution. It is not correct to say that these measures ceased to be valid when she lost her legislative power for, like any statute, they continue to be in force unless modified or repealed by subsequent law or declared invalid by the courts. A statute does not ipso facto become inoperative simply because of the dissolution of the legislature that enacted it. Significantly, the Congress she is alleged to have undercut has not rejected but in fact substantially affirmed the challenged measures and has specifically provided that they shall be suppletory to R.A. No. 6657 whenever not inconsistent with its provisions.2g. Proc. No. 131 is not an appropriation measure even if it does provide for the creation of said fund, for that is not its principal purpose. An appropriation law is one the primary and specific purpose of which is to authorize the release of public funds from the treasury. The creation of the fund is only incidental to the main objective of the proclamation, which is agrarian reform. Section 24 and Section 25(4) of Article VI, are not applicable. With particular reference to Section 24, this obviously could not have been complied with for the simple reason that the House of Representatives, which now has the exclusive power to initiate appropriation measures, had not yet been convened when the proclamation was issued. The legislative power was then solely vested in the President of the Philippines, who embodied, as it were, both houses of Congress.2h. No evidence has been submitted to the Court that the requisites of a valid classification have been violated. Classification has been defined as the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain particulars and different from each other in these same particulars. To be valid, it must

11 The power of eminent domain is one of the three inherent powers of the State. It is the power “to

forcibly acquire private lands intended for public use upon payment of just compensation to the owner.” It is inherent because it exists without need for legislation, i.e., even if it is not sanctioned by any law or even the Constitution, the State may exercise it. Why? Because these powers are necessary for a state to exist. The other two are police power and taxation.12

Frankly, I don’t like the way this ponente argues. He’s like saying, now I don’t want to explain why. If you can’t see the reasoning it’s your fault. Anyway, we’re infallible remember? His next sentence: There is no need to elaborate on this matter. Tsk…

conform to the following requirements: (1) it must be based on substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it must apply equally to all the members of the class. The Court finds that all these requisites have been met by the measures here challenged as arbitrary and discriminatory.2i. The power of expropriation is by no means absolute. The limitation is found in the constitutional injunction that "private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation" and in the abundant jurisprudence that has evolved from the interpretation of this principle. Basically, the requirements for a proper exercise of the power are: (1) public use and (2) just compensation.13

Some of the petitioners invoked their right of maximum retention under Art. XIII, Sec. 4 of the Constitution and under P.D. 316 which was promulgated in implementation of P.D. 27.2j. R.A. No. 6657 does provide for such limits now in Sec. 6 of the law, which in fact is one of its most controversial provisions. (Sec 6: Max per landowner is 5 hec. 3 hec may be awarded to each child at least 15 yrs old and actually tilling or directly managing the land)2k. It is settled that the title of a bill does not have to be a catalogue of its

contents and will suffice if the matters embodied in the text are relevant to each other.

DecisionWHEREFORE, the Court holds as follows:1. R.A. No. 6657, P.D. No. 27, Proc. No. 131, and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 are SUSTAINED against all the constitutional objections raised in the herein petitions.2. Title to all expropriated properties shall be transferred to the State only upon full payment of compensation to their respective owners. 3. All rights previously acquired by the tenant-farmers under P.D. No. 27 are retained and recognized.4. Landowners who were unable to exercise their rights of retention under P.D. No. 27 shall enjoy the retention rights granted by R.A. No. 6657 under the conditions therein prescribed.5. Subject to the above-mentioned rulings, all the petitions are DISMISSED, without pronouncement as to costs.SO ORDERED. (Unanimous court)

LUZ FARMS V SECRETARY OF DARPARAS; December 4, 1990

FACTS- Petition for prohibition to review the decision of the Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform- 6/10/88: Pres. Aquino approved RA 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law which includes the raising of livestock, swine and poultry 1/2/89: Sec. of Agrarian Reform (SAR) promulgated Guidelines and Procedures Implementing Production and Profit Sharing for RA 6657 (S13 & S32)- 1/9/89: SAR promulgated Rules and Regulations implementing S11 (commercial farms)-Luz Farms, petitioner, is a corporation engaged in livestock/poultry, adversely affected by RA 6657-petition prays that RA be declared unconstitutional; it is also prayed that a preliminary injunction be issued to enjoin the enforcement of the said law (injunction denied)8/24/89: court granted motion for reconsideration on injunctive relief-Luz Farms questions the following provisions of RA 6657:

S3(b): includes raising of livestock in definition of “Agricultural Enterprise/Activity”

13 There was a shift in subject after this. He tackled the argument on why the State did not distribute

public lands only by pointing out the Constitution’s “the just distribution of all agricultural lands” clause. Then he plays the political question card on the issue of why the distribution would be private lands first.

S11: defines “commercial farms” as “agricultural lands devoted to commercial livestock, poultry and swine raising

S13: calls for production-sharing plan (distribute 3% of gross sales & 10% of gross profits to workers as additional compensation)

S16(d) & 17: vests in DAR authority to determine compensation to be paid for lands covered by RA 6657

S32: spells out production-sharing plan in S13-the constitutional provision under consideration is A13, S4, “Agrarian and Natural Resources Reform” which grants farmers and farm-workers who are landless, the right to directly or collectively own the land they are tilling-livestock and poultry raising is different from crop farming in that land is not a primary input in the former

ISSUEWON S3(b), 11, 13 & 32 of RA 6657 are constitutional insofar as said law includes the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage as well as in its Implementing Rules and Guidelines

HELDInstant petition GRANTED. S3(b), 11, 13 & 32 of RA 6657 are constitutional insofar as said law includes the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage as well as in its Implementing Rules and Guidelines are hereby declared null and void for being unconstitutional and the writ of preliminary injunction issued is hereby made permanentRatio the question raised is one of constitutional construction; in construing any ambiguous provisions, the courts may look to the debates of the concon-the transcripts of the 1986 concon clearly show that the meaning of the word “agricultural” (its dictionary meaning aside) was never meant to include livestock and poultry industries in its coverage;there is no reason to include livestock and poultry lands in agrarian reform-S13 & 32 calling for production-sharing is confiscatory and is thus violative of due process

SEPARATE OPINION

SARMIENTO-agrees that petition be granted but not that main issue is one of consti construction and interpretationA13, S4: “..in case of other farm workers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof…”—this phrase provides a possible coverage of livestock, poultry and swine -every presumption should be indulged in favor of the constitutionality of a statuteISSUE: WON assailed provisions violate equal protection clause of the consti-clearly, livestock & poultry lands and crop & tree farms are not similarly situated, hence the inclusion of the former in CARP would be violative of the equal protection clause

GARCIA V EXECUTIVE SECRETARYCRUZ; December 2, 1991

FACTSPetitioner challenges RA7042 on the ground that:- It defeats the constitutional policy of developing a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos and the protection of Filipino enterprises against unfair foreign competition and trade practices- He claims that the law abdicates all regulation of foreign enterprises in this country and gives them unfair advantages over local investments which are practically elbowed out in their own land with the complicity of their own government

- Under Section 5 of the said law a foreign investor may do business in the Philippines or invest in a domestic enterprise up to 100% of its capital without need of prior approval

o All that it has to do is register with the Securities and Exchange Commission or the Bureau of Trade Regulation and Consumer Protection in the case of a single proprietorship

o “The SEC or BTRCP, as the case may be, shall not impose any limitations on the extent of foreign ownership in an enterprise additional to those provided in the Act”

- Under Section 7, “non-Philippine nationals may own up to one hundred percent (100%) of domestic market enterprises unless foreign ownership therein is prohibited or limited by existing law or the Foreign Investment Negative List under Section 8 hereof."- However, the system of negative list under Section 8 abandons the positive aspect of regulation and exercise of authority over foreign investments. In effect, it assumes that so long as foreign investments are not in areas covered by the list, such investments are not detrimental to but are good for the national economy.

o List A – merely enumerate areas of activities already reserved to Philippine nationals by mandate of the Constitution and specific laws

o List B - contain areas of activities and enterprises already regulated according to law and includes small and medium-sized domestic market enterprises or export enterprises which utilize raw materials from depleting natural resources with paid-in equity capital of less than the equivalent of US$500,000.00; meaning, SMEs are for Filipinos. Or even, Filipinos are not encouraged to go big.

o List C - contain areas of investment m which "existing enterprises already serve adequately the needs of the economy and the consumers and do not need further foreign investments."; However, existing enterprises must be qualified as Filipino, if not, it shall protect foreign enterprises too

- Section 9 is also attacked, because if a Philippine national believes that an area of investment should be included in list C, the burden is on him to show that the criteria enumerated in said section are met- Articles 2, 32, & 35 of the Omnibus Investments Code of 1982 are done away with by RA 7042.- By repealing Articles 49, 50, 54 and 56 of the 1987 Omnibus Investments Code, RA No. 7042 further abandons the regulation of foreign investments by doing away with important requirements for doing business in the Philippines.- The Transitory provisions of RA 7042, which allow practically unlimited entry of foreign investments for three years, subject only to a supposed Transitory Foreign Investment Negative List, not only completely deregulates foreign investments but would place Filipino enterprises at a fatal disadvantage in their own country.Sol-Gen answers:- phrase "without need of prior approval" applies to equity restrictions alone

o prior to the effectivity of RA 7042, Article 46 of the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987 (EO No. 226), provided that a non-Philippine national could, without need of prior authority from the Board of Investments (BOI), invest in: (1) any enterprise registered under Book I (Investments with Incentives); and (2) enterprises not registered under Book I, to the extent that the total investment of the non-Philippine national did not exceed 40% of the outstanding capital

o On the other hand, under Article 47 thereof, if an investment by a non-Philippine nationals in an enterprise not registered under Book I was such that the total participation by non-Philippine nationals in the outstanding capital thereof exceeded 40%, prior authority from the BOI was required.

- With the introduction of the Negative List under Sections 8 & 15, the areas of investments not open to foreign investors are already determined and outlined; hence, registration with the SEC or BTRCP, as the case may be, is now the initial step to be taken by foreign investors.

- This registration constitutes regulation and exercise of authority over foreign investments. Under SEC and BTRCP rules and regulations, foreign investors must first comply with certain requirements before they can be issued a license to do business in the Philippines.- Section 7 of RA 7042 allows non-Philippine nationals to own up to 100% of domestic market enterprises only in areas of investments outside the prohibitions and limitations imposed by law to protect Filipino ownership and interest.- The Foreign Investment Negative List under Section 8 reserves to Filipinos sensitive areas of investments. List C prohibits foreign investors from engaging in areas of activities where existing enterprises already serve adequately the needs of the economy and the consumer.

o The Act opens the door to foreign investments only after securing to Filipinos their rights and interests over the national economy.

o List A – The provisions of the Constitution and other specific laws regulate or limit the extent of foreign ownership in enterprises engaged in areas of activity reserved for Filipinos

o List B - contains areas already regulated pursuant to law already makes it clear that it is regulatory. It channels efforts at promoting foreign investments to bigger enterprises where there is an acute lack of Filipino capital; scheme is for foreign investments to supplement Filipino capital in big enterprises.

o List C - to allow healthy competition, Activities which do not adequately meet-the needs of the consumers should not be included in list C; if not, consumers would be at the mercy of unscrupulous producers

o Foreign Corporations under a valid license prior to the enactment of RA 7042 necessarily come within the protection of the law.

- Section 9 provides for the criteria to be used by NEDA in determining the areas of investment for inclusion in List C

o Petition for inclusion therein requires "a public hearing at which affected parties will have the opportunity to show whether the petitioner industry adequately serves the economy and the consumers."

o Provision is designed to protect the consumers as not all existing enterprises satisfy the criteria inclusion in List C.

- Regarding the repealing of provisions of the Omnibus Investment Codeo purposely removed because the determination of the areas of

investment open to foreign investors is made easy by the Foreign Investment Negative List formulated and recommended by NEDA following the process and criteria provided in Sections 8 & 9 of the Act

- Re the Transitory Foreign Investment Negative Listo it practically includes the same areas of investment reserved to

Filipino under Section 5", and the “SEC shall disallow registration of the applying non-Philippine national if the existing joint venture enterprises, particularly the Filipino partners therein, can reasonably prove they are capable to make the investment needed for the domestic market activities to be undertaken by the competing applicant.

Senator Paterno as Intervenor:- the over-all strategy embodied in the Act to develop a self-reliant economy, as well as the provisions designed to promote full employment for Filipinos- suggests that the constitutional challenge should be rejected outright for noncompliance with the requisites of a judicial inquiry into a constitutional question, to wit: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy; (2) the constitutional question must be raised by a proper party; (3) the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the resolution of the constitutional question must be necessary to the decision of the case.

ISSUES1. WON there is actual controversy2. WON petitioners have legal standing

3. WON constitutionality lis mota of the case4. WON this entails a political question

HELD1. There is at this point no actual case or controversy, particularly because of

the absence of the implementing rules that are supposed to carry the Act into effect

a. A controversy must be one that is appropriate or "ripe" for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory

2. The petitioner, as a citizen and taxpayer, and particularly as a member of the House of Representatives, comes under the definition that a proper party is one who has sustained or is in danger of sustaining an injury as a result of the act complained of.

3. The constitutional question has not been raised tardily but in fact, as just remarked, prematurely.

- The constitutional challenge must be rejected for failure to show that there is an indubitable ground for it, not to say even a necessity to resolve it.

a. Policy of the courts is to avoid ruling on constitutional questions and to presume that the acts of the political departments are valid in the absence of a clear and unmistakable showing to the contrary. To doubt is to sustain.

b. based on the doctrine of separation of powers which enjoins upon each department a becoming respect for the acts of the other departments

c. theory is that as the joint act of Congress and the President of the Philippines, a law has been carefully studied and determined to be in accordance with the fundamental law before it was finally enacted.

- the cause of unconstitutionality has not been proved by the petitionerd. Act does not violate any of the constitutional provisions the petitioner

has mentioned4. What we see here is a debate on the wisdom or the efficacy of the Act, but

this is a matter on which we are not competent to rule.a. In Angara v Electoral Commission: "the judiciary does not pass upon

questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation."b. allowed only "to settle actual controversies involving rights which are

legally demandable and enforceable," 5 and may not annul an act of the political departments simply because we feel it is unwise or impractical.

c. There is no irregularity also, that shows that there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

Decision Petition dismissed.

CALALANG vs. WILLIAMSLAUREL; December 2, 1940

FACTS- The Secretary of Public Works and Communications (PWC) approved with modification the recommendation that originated from the National Traffic Commission (NTC), which was favorably indorsed by the Director of Public Works (PW), that Rosario Street and Rizal Avenue be closed to traffic of animal-drawn vehicles, between the points and during the hours from 7 a.m. to 11 p.m., for a period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic; that the Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and caused to be enforced the rules and regulations thus adopted; that as a consequence of such enforcement, all animal drawn vehicles are not allowed to pass and pick up passengers in the places above-mentioned to the detriment not only of their owners but of the riding public as well.- Commonwealth Act No. 548 gives the Director of Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of the Public Works and Communications the

authority to promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic on national roads.

Procedure Maximo Calang, in his capacity as private citizen and as a taxpayer of Manila, filed a petition for a writ of prohibition against the Chairman of NTC, Director of PW, Acting Secretary of PWC, Mayor of Manila and Acting Chielf of Police of Manila.

ISSUES1. WON Commonwealth Act No. 548 is unconstitutional because it constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power.2. WON the rules and regulations promulgated constitute an unlawful interference with legitimate business or trade and abridge the right to personal liberty and freedom of locomotion.3. WON the rules and regulations complained of infringe the upon the constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being of all the people.

HELD1. No.The Legislature cannot delegate power to make law; but it can make a law to delegate a power to determine some fact or state of things upon which the law makes, or intends to make, its own action depend.Reasoning1. adherence to precedentRubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro, Wayman vs. Southard – it was held here

that discretion may be delegated to executive departments or subordinate officials the execution of certain acts, final on questions of fact.

2. textual interpretation of Commonwealth Act No. 548The provision that “….the Director of Public Works, with the approval of the

Secretary of the Public Works and Communications, shall promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic on national roads…”, is an administrative function which cannot be directly discharged by the National Assembly.

3. practicality The complexities of modern governments, the multiplication of the subjects of

govt’l regulations, and the increased difficulty in administering the law give rise to the adoption, within certain limits, the delegation of greater powers by the legislative and vesting a larger amount of discretion in administrative and executive officials, not only in the execution of the laws, but also in the promulgation of certain rules and regulations.

2. No. The state may enact laws that may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupation if the said laws are intended to promote the welfare of the public. (police power of the State)Reasoning1. precedents (US vs. Gomez, Dobbins vs. Los Angeles & People vs. Pomar)2. Paradox - The apparent curtailment of liberty is precisely the very means of

insuring its preservation

3. No. Social justice is promoted if the greatest good is brought about to the greatest number.

BASCO V PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION

PARAS; May 14, 1991

FACTS- PAGCOR was created by virtue of PD 1067-A and was granted franchise under PD 1067-B to establish, operate and maintain gambling casinos. PAGCOR proved to be a potential source of revenue. Thus, PD 1399 was passed for PAGCOR to fully attain its objectives. PD 1869 was passed later on

to enable PAGCOR/government to regulate and centralize all games of chance, giving it territorial jurisdiction all over the Philippines.PAGCOR became 3rd largest source of gov’t revenue, next to BIR and Bureau of Customs. It sponsored socio-cultural and charitable projects and at that time employed 4,494 employees in its 9 casinos.Procedure This is petition seeking to annul the PAGCOR charter – PD 1869

ISSUESProcedural IssueWON petitioners, as taxpayers and practicing lawyers can question and seek the annulment of PD 1869Substantive Issue/sWON PD 1869 should be annulled based on the ff grounds:1. it is allegedly contrary to morals, public policy and order2. it waived and intruded into the Manila City government’s right to impose taxes and license fees3. it violates equal protection clause in that it legalizes PAGCOR but outlaws other forms of gambling and vices4. it violates trend of government away from monopolistic and crony economy

HELDProcedural Issue:- Considering transcendental public interest and the Court’s duty to check on limits of other branches of gov’t, SC brushed aside technicalities of procedure and took cognizance of the petition.Substantive Issues:1. Gambling, unless allowed by law, is prohibited. But prohibition does not mean that gov’t can’t regulate it in exercise of police power. Police power is “state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote general welfare.” PAGCOR has been beneficial, not just to gov’t, but to society as well.2. Manila, being a mere municipal corporation, has no inherent right to impose taxes, its power to tax must always yield to a legislative act. Municipal corporations are mere creatures of Congress, therefore Charter of Manila is subject to control by Congress. If Congress can grant a municipal corporation the power to tax, it can also provide exemptions or even take back the power. Also, Manila’s power to impose license fees on gambling has long been revoked. The power is now vested exclusively on national government. Local governments, too, have no power to tax instrumentalities of national government, such as PAGCOR. PAGCOR is exempt from local taxes.The power of local gov’t to impose taxes and fees is always subject to limits w/c Congress may provide. It can’t be violative, but consistent with principle of local autonomy.Local autonomy doesn’t make local gov’t sovereign w/in state; it simply means decentralization. The local gov’t has been described as a political subdivision of state constituted by law and has substantial control of local affairs. It can only be an intra sovereign subdivision of a sovereign nation, it can’t be an imperium in imperio. 3. Equal protection doesn’t preclude classification of individuals who may be accorded diff. treatment as long as classification is not unreasonable/arbitrary. The fact that some gambling activities (e.g. sweepstakes, lottery, races, cockfighting, etc.) are legalized while others are prohibited does not render applicable laws such as PD 1869 unconstitutional. Whether or not PD 1869 is a wise legislation is up for Congress to determine. But as of now, every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. For a law to be nullified, there must be a showing of clear and unequivocal breach of Constitution.4. If PD 1869 runs counter to gov’t policies, it is for Executive to recommend to Congress its repeal or amendment. Judiciary does not settle policy issues. Disposition Petition is DISMISSED.

OPOSA V FACTORAN

DAVIDE; July 30, 1993

FACTS- The overarching theme of the case deals with the prevention the misappropriation or impairment of Philippine rainforests and arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country’s vital life support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth.- In 1991 a case was filed by minors (represented by their parents) and the Philippine Ecological Network (PENI) against the then Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Fulgencio Factoran, Jr. who was substituted by the new secretary, Angel Alcala. The complaint was instituted to be a taxpayer’s class suit as it alleges that all citizen’s of the Philippines are entitled to benefit, use and enjoyment of the country’s virgin tropical rainforests. The suit also alleges that this suit represents people who are sharing the same sentiment towards the preservation of our natural resources (since not all of them could go before the court). Furthermore, this was also asserted to be representative of the current generation and generation that are yet to be born. - The suit calls for two primary actions that orders the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), its agents, representatives, and those acting on its behalf to, 1. Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country and 2. to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, and renewing or approving new timber license agreements. - The suit starts off with statement of facts regarding the country, the country’s islands, its natural resources, and scientific evidences pointing to the requirement for the country to maintain a balanced and healthful ecology (54% should be use for forest cover and 46% for agricultural, residential, industrial, commercial, and other uses). They asserted that deforestation resulted in, a. water shortages b. salinization c. massive erosion and loss of soil fertility d. extinction of some of the countries flora and fauna e. disturbance and dislocation of indigenous cultures f. siltation of rivers and seabed g. drought h. increasing velocity of typhoon winds i. flooding of lowlands j. siltation and shortening of the life span of dams k. reduction of earth’s capacity to process carbon dioxide. - Initially the petition was dismissed on the grounds of lack of cause of action, of being political question, and of causing the impairment of contracts. The petitioners filed for certiorari hence this case. They contend that there is a cause of action using articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code (the right to a sound environment), Section 4 of Executive Order No. 192 that calls for the creation of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) to safeguard the people’s right to a healthful environment, Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1151 ( Philippine Environmental Policy), and Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution that recognizes the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology. As well as the concept of generational genocide in Criminal Law and the concept of man’s inalienable right to self-preservation and self-perpetuation in natural law.

ISSUES1. Locus Standi: WON the case is a class suit?2. WON minors can assert that they represent other generations and those succeeding theirs? 3. Merits: WON the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction by declaring the petitioners to have no legal right?4. Whether or not granting the petition would violate the non-impairment clause found in the Constitution?

HELD1. Yes it is a class suit because the subject matter of the complaint is of common and general interest to all citizens of the Philippines and that it would be impracticable to bring them all to court. The plaintiffs in this case are numerous and representative enough to ensure that all interests is protected.

2. Yes they can, following the concept of intergenerational responsibility. Every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve the rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful environment.3. Yes respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction because it failed to recognize the legal right of the petitioners which is the right to a balanced and healthful ecology that is incorporated in the 1987 Constitution under Section 16 Article II. - Moreover, this rights need not be written in the Constitution for this deals with rights that are assumed from the very inception oh humankind. The reason why it was written was because the framers feared that without a mandate as stated in the state policies future generations would inherit nothing to sustain life. It is clear then that there is a legal right for a balanced healthful ecology and the right to health. Given that it could also be said that this right is further supported by Executive Order No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 making the cause of action existent.4. No it does not violate the non-impairment clause because licenses are not contracts, properties or a property right that is protected by the due process clause of the Constitution. As the court held in Tan v. Director of Forestry, a license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful and is not a contract. It is not irrevocable. The Chief Executive may validly amend, modify, replace, or rescind licenses when national interests so require. Given that it is not a contract, the non-impairment clause cannot be invoked.- Even if the licenses are contracts, the action stated in the case still does not affect it given that no law or action by the Chief Executive to amend, modify, replace, or rescind licenses so it is could not as of the moment be invoked. And furthermore, if there would be a law passed it would not be considered as a violation of the non-impairment clause as the very nature of the law deals with the exercising of the police power of the state to advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology. The non-impairment clause yields to the police power of the state. Decision Petition is granted. Petitioners may amend complaint to implead as defendants the holders or grantees of the questioned timber license agreements.

DECS V SAN DIEGOCRUZ; December 21, 1989

FACTS - decided en banc, unanimous decision- Respondent Roberto Rey C. San Diego is a BS Zoology graduate from UE. He has taken the NMAT four times and flunked it as many times. His application to take a fifth examination was denied by petitioner DECS on the basis of the “three-flunk rule” under MECS Order #12, Series of 1972.San Diego filed a petition for mandamus at the Valenzuela RTC, invoking his constitutional rights to academic freedom and quality education. In an amended complaint, he raised the additional grounds of due process and equal protection and also challenged the constitutionality of the aforementioned order.- Pendente lite, with the agreement of both parties, he was allowed to take a fifth attempt at NMAT. This attempt he also failed.- RTC decision released 4 July 1989 granted the petition and declared the challenged order invalid. It held that the petitioner had been deprived of his right to pursue a medical education through an arbitrary exercise of the police power.

ISSUEWON a person who has thrice failed the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) is entitled to take it again.Or, WON the three-flunk rule is a proper exercise of the police power of the State

HELD

Ratio Measures, such as admission exams and the three flunk rule, designed to gauge the academic preparation of an applicant fall within the valid exercise of the police power of the State.

Reasoning1. use of precedent: In Tablarin v. Gutierrez, unanimous Court upheld the constitutionality of the NMAT as a measure intended to limit the admission to medical schools only to those who have initially proved their competence and preparation for a medical education.

- analogy: Tablarin case & case at bar – issue is academic preparation of the applicant. Admission test and the three-flunk rule are both valid measures in the regulation of the medical profession. The regulation of the practice of medicine in all its branches is a reasonable method of protecting the health and safety of the public. This power to regulate and control the practice of medicine also includes the power to regulate admission to the ranks of those authorized to practice medicine.

2. The police power of the State is validly exercised if- (a) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference of the State <lawful subject>; &(b) the means employed are reasonably necessary to the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished, not unduly oppressive upon individuals <lawful method>- The case at bar complies with this requisites... <subject> It is the right and indeed the responsibility of the State to insure that the medical profession is not infiltrated by incompetents to whom patients may unwarily entrust their lives and health. <method> The three-flunk rule is intended to insulate the medical schools and ultimately the medical profession from the intrusion of those not qualified to be doctors.

3. The right to quality education is NOT absolute. The Constitution also provides that "every citizen has the right to choose a profession or course of study, subject to fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic requirements."

- It is not enough to simply invoke the right to quality education as a guarantee of the Constitution: one must show that he is entitled to it because of his preparation and promise.

4. What the equal protection clause requires is equality among equals. A law does not have to operate with equal force on all persons or things to be conformable to Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution.

- A substantial distinction exists between medical students and other students who are not subjected to the NMAT and the three-flunk rule. The medical profession directly affects the very lives of the people, unlike other careers which, for this reason, do not require more vigilant regulation. The accountant, for example, while belonging to an equally respectable profession, does not hold the same delicate responsibility as that of the physician and so need not be similarly treated.- There would be unequal protection if some applicants who have passed the tests are admitted and others who have also qualified are denied entrance.

Note While every person is entitled to aspire to be a doctor, he does not have a constitutional right to be a doctor. The Court suggests the notion of appropriate calling. It is time indeed that the State took decisive steps to regulate and enrich our system of education by directing the student to the course for which he is best suited as determined by initial tests and evaluations.Decision Petition is granted. Decision of Valenzuela RTC reversed. Costs against private respondent San Diego.

CARINO V INSULAR GOVERNMENTMALCOLM; February 23, 1909

FACTS

- An appeal to review the judgment of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands which affirmed a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the Province of Benguet, dismissing an application for the registration of certain land.- Mateo Carino, an Igorot, filed an application for the registration of a certain land in the Province of Benguet. For more than 50 years before the Treaty of Paris, in 1899, the applicant and his ancestors had held the land as owners. His grandfather had lived upon it and maintained fences sufficient for the holding of cattle. His father had cultivated parts and had used parts for pasturing cattle. He had received the land from his father in accordance with Igorot customs and had used it for pasture. They all had been recognized as owners of the land by the Igorots. No document of title, however, had issued from the Spanish crown and although I, in 1893-1894, and again in 1896-1897, he made application for one under the royal decrees then in force, nothing has come of it. In 1901, he filed a petition, alleging ownership, under the mortgage law, and the lands were registered to him, that process establishing only a possessory title.- Applicant claims that he now owns the land, and is entitled to registration under the Philippine Commission’s Act No,496 of 1902, which established a court for that purpose with jurisdiction throughout the Philippine Archipelago, and authorized in general terms applications to be made by persons claiming to own the land.- The government claims that Spain had title to all the land in the Philippines except so far as it saw fit to permit private titles to be acquired; that there was no prescription against the crown and that, if there was, a decree of June 25, 1880, required registration within a limited time to make the title good; that the applicant’s land was not registered, and therefore became public land; that he United States succeeded to the title of Spain, and that the he has no rights that the Philippine government is bound to respect.

ISSUEWON the applicant owns the land

HELD- Yes. By the Organic Act of July 1, 1902, all the property and rights acquired by the United States are to be administered for the benefits of the inhabitants of the Philippines. Thus, when, as far back as testimony or memory goes, the land has been held by individuals under a claim of private ownership, it shall be presumed to have been held in the same way before the Spanish conquest, and never to have been public land. - Under the laws of Spain, there is no clear proof that he does not own the land. Spain did not assume to convert all the native inhabitant of the Philippines into trespassers or even into tenants at will. The fact was that titles were admitted to exist that owed nothing to the powers of Spain.- Royal Cedula of October 15, 1754 – Where such possessor shall not be able to produce title deeds, it shall be sufficient if they shall show that ancient possession, as valid title by prescription. As prescription, even against the Crown, was recognized by the laws of Spain, the court sees no sufficient reason to admit that it was recognized in the Philippines in regard to lands over which Spain had only a paper sovereignty. - Decree of June 25, 1880 – For private ownership, there must have been a grant by competent authority. For all legal effects, those who have been in possession for certain times shall be deemed owners. For cultivated land, 20 years; for uncultivated, 30 years. When this decree went into effect, the applicant’s father was owner of the land by the very terms of the decree. This being the case and the fact that his possession was not unlawful (no attempt at any such proceedings against him or his father was ever made), the regulation for the registration of royal land wrongfully occupied does not apply to him. Moreover, the decree was not calculated to the mind of an Igorot Chief the notion that ancient family possessions were in danger, if he had read every word of it.

Disposition Judgment reversed. Law and justice require that the applicant should be granted what he seeks, and should not be deprived of what by practice and belief of those among whom he live, was his property.

RUBI V PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDOROMALCOLM; February 28, 1919

FACTS- Rubi and various other Manguianes in the Province of Mindoro were ordered by the provincial governor of Mindoro to remove their residence from their native habitat and to establish themselves on a reservation at Tigbao in the Province of Mindoro and to remain there, or be punished by imprisonment if they escaped. This reservation, as appears from the resolution of the provincial board, extends over an area of 800 hectares of land, which is approximately 2,000 acres, on which about three hundred Manguianes are confined. One of the Manguianes, Dabalos, escaped from the reservation and was taken in hand by the provincial sheriff and placed in prison at Calapan, solely because he escaped from the reservation. The Manguianes sued out a writ of habeas corpus in this court, alleging that they are deprived of their liberty in violation of law.- The return of the Solicitor-General alleges that on February 1, 1917, the provincial board of Mindoro adopted resolution No. 25 signed by the provincial governor, Hon. Juan Morente, jr.. The law’s primary objective is the advancement of the welfare of the non-Christian people of Mindoro. In one of the Whereas clauses, it was stated that the provincial governor is of the opinion that the sitio of Tigbao on Lake Naujan is a place most convenient for the Mangyanes to live on. Pursuant to the Governor’s powers under section 2077 of the Administrative Code, 800 hectares of public land in the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake was selected as a site for the permanent settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro subject to the approval of the Honorable Secretary of the Interior. Under the resolution of the Provincial Board, any Mangyan who shall refuse to comply with this order shall upon conviction be imprisoned not exceeding sixty days in accordance with section 2759 of the revised Administrative Code. The resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro copied in paragraph 1 and the executive order of the governor of the same province copied in paragraph 3, were necessary measures for the protection of the Mangyanes of Mindoro as well as the protection of public forests in which they roam, and to introduce civilized customs among them.

ISSUES1. WON the Mangyan’s were deprived of due process when their liberty to choose their homes were limited by the law.2. WON the Legislature exceeded its authority in enacting the law mandating the forcible transfer of the Mangyanes.

HELD1. NO. None of the rights of the citizen can be taken away except by due process of law. Daniel Webster, in the course of the argument in the Dartmouth College Case before the United States Supreme Court, since a classic in forensic literature, said that the meaning of "due process of law" is, that "every citizen shall hold his life, liberty, property, and immunities under the protection of the general rules which govern society." To constitute "due process of law," as has been often held, a judicial proceeding is not always necessary. In some instances, even a hearing and notice are not requisite, a rule which is especially true where much must be left to the discretion of the administrative officers in applying a law to particular cases. (See McGehee, Due Process of Law, p. 371.) Neither is due process a stationary and blind sentinel of liberty. "Any legal proceeding enforced by public authority, whether sanctioned by age and custom, or newly devised in the discretion of the legislative power in furtherance of the public good which regards and preserves these principles of liberty and justice must be held to be due process of law." (Hurtado vs. California [1883], 110 U. S., 516.) "Due process of law" means simply * * *

"first, that there shall be a law prescribed in harmony with the general powers of the legislative department of the Government; second, that this law shall be reasonable in its operation; third, that it shall be enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and fourth, that it shall be applicable alike to all the citizens of the state or to all of a class." (U. S. vs. Ling Su Fan [1908], 10 Phil., 104, affirmed on appeal to the United States Supreme Court.1) "What is due process of law depends on circumstances it varies with the subject-matter and necessities of the situation." (Moyer vs. Peabody [1909], 212 U. S., 82.)- There is no doubt in my mind that this people has not a right conception of liberty and does not practise liberty in a rightful way. They understand liberty as the right to do anything they will-going from one place to another in the mountains, burning and destroying forests and making illegal caiñgins thereon. Not knowing what true liberty is and not practicing the same rightfully, how can they allege that they are being deprived thereof without due process of law?- But does the Constitutional guaranty that no person shall be deprived of his liberty without due process of law apply to a class of persons who do not have a correct idea of what liberty is and do not practice liberty in a rightful way?- To say that it does will mean to sanction and defend an erroneous idea of such class of persons as to what liberty is. It will mean, in the case at bar, that the Government should not adopt any measures looking to the welfare and advancement of the class of persons in question. It will mean that this people should be let alone in the mountains and in a permanent state of savagery without even the remotest hope of coming to understand liberty in its true and noble sense. In dealing with the backward population, like the Manguianes, the Government has been placed in the alternative of either letting them alone or guiding them in the path of civilization. The latter measure was adopted as the one more in accord with humanity and with national conscience.- The Mangyans will ultimately become a heavy burden to the State and on account of their ignorance they will commit crimes and make depredations, or if not they will be subjected to involuntary servitude by those who may want to abuse them.. They understand liberty as the right to do anything they will-going from one place to another in the mountains, burning and destroying forests and making illegal caiñgins thereon. To allow them to successfully invoke that Constitutional guaranty at this time will leave the Government without recourse to pursue the works of civilizing them and making them useful citizens. They will thus be left in a permanent state of savagery and become a vulnerable point of attack by those who doubt, may challenge the ability of the nation to deal with our backward brothers.- Further, one cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered with when the degree of civilization of the Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their own good and the general good of the Philippines. Nor can one say that due process of law, has not been followed. To go back to our definition of due process of law and equal protection of the laws, there exists a law; the law seems to be reasonable; it is enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and it applies alike to all of a class.

2. NO. Considered, therefore, purely as an exercise of the police power, the courts cannot fairly say that the Legislature has exceeded its rightful authority. It is, indeed, an unusual exercise of that power. But a great malady requires an equally drastic remedy.- As a point which has been left for the end of this decision and which in case of doubt, would lead to the determination that section 2145 is valid, is the attitude which the courts should assume towards the settled policy of the Government. In a late decision with which we are in full accord, Gamble vs. Vanderbilt University (200 Southwestern Reporter, 510) the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Tennessee writes:

We can see no objection to the application of public policy as a ratio decidendi. Every really new question that comes before the courts is, in the last analysis, determined on that theory, when not determined by differentiation of the principle of a prior case or line of cases, or by the aid of analogies furnished by such prior cases. In balancing conflicting solutions, that one is perceived to tip the scales which the court believes

will best promote the public welfare in its probable operation as a general rule 2145 of the Administrative Code does not deprive a person of his liberty without due process of law and does not deny to him the equal protection of the laws, and that confinement in reservations in accordance with said section does not constitute slavery and involuntary servitude. We are further of the opinion that section 2145 of the Administrative Code is a legitimate exertion of the police power, somewhat analogous to the Indian policy of the United States. Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is constitutional.

Decision Petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberty. Habeas corpus can, therefore, not issue.

SEPARATE OPINION

CARSON- The legislative and administrative history of the Philippine Islands clearly discloses that the standard of civilization to which a specific tribe must be found to have advanced, to justify its removal from the class embraced within the descriptive term "non-Christian," as that term is used in the Philippine statute-book, is that degree of civilization which results in a mode of life within the tribe, such that it is feasible and practicable to extend to, and enforce upon its membership the general laws and regulations, administrative, legislative, and judicial, which control the conduct of the admittedly civilized inhabitants of the Islands; a mode of life, furthermore, which does not find expression in tribal customs or practices which tend to brutalize or debauch the members of the tribe indulging in such customs or practices, or to expose to loss or peril the lives or property of those who may be brought in contact with the members of the tribe.- So the standard of civilization to which any given number or group of inhabitants of a particular province in these Islands, or any individual member of such a group must be found to have advanced, in order to remove such group or individual from the class embraced within the statutory description of "non-Christian," is that degree of civilization which would naturally and normally result in the withdrawal by such persons of permanent allegiance or adherence to a "non-Christian" tribe had they at any time adhered to or maintained allegiance to such a tribe; and which would qualify them whether they reside within or beyond the habitat of a "non-Christian" tribe, not only to maintain a mode of life independent of and apart from that maintained by such tribe, but a mode of life as would not be inimical to the lives or property or general welfare of the civilized inhabitants of the Islands with whom they are brought in contact.- The contention that in this particular case, and without challenging the validity of the statute, the writ should issue because of the failure to give these petitioners as well as the rest of the fifteen thousand Manguianes by the reconcentration order an opportunity to be heard before any attempt was made to enforce it, begs the question and is, of course, tantamount to a contention that there is no authority in law for the issuance of such an order.

MOIR- I realize that a dissenting opinion carries little weight, but my sense of justice will not permit me to let this decision go on record without expressing my strong dissent from the opinion of Justice Malcolm, concurred in by a majority of the court. I shall not attempt to analyze the opinion or to go into the questions in detail. I shall simply state, as briefly as may be the legal and human side of the case as it presents itself to my mind.- The Manguianes are not a separate state. They have no treaty with the Government of the Philippine Islands by which they have agreed to live within a certain district where they are accorded exclusive rights. They are citizens of the Philippine Islands. Legally they are Filipinos. They are entitled to all the rights and privileges of any other citizen of this country. And when the provincial governor of the Province of Mindoro attempted to take them from their native habitat and to hold them on the little reservation of about 800 hectares, he deprived them of their rights and their liberty without due process

of law, and they were denied the equal protection of the law. The majority opinion says "they are restrained for their own good and the general good of the Philippines." They are to be made to accept the civilization of the more advanced Filipinos whether they want it or not. They are backward and deficient in culture and must be moved from their homes, however humble they may be and "brought under the bells" and made to stay on a reservation. Are these petitioners charged with any crime? There is no mention in the return of the Solicitor-General of the Philippine Islands of any crime having been committed by these "peaceful, timid, primitive, semi-nomadic people."- It has been said that this is a government of laws and not of men; that there is no arbitrary body of individuals; that the constitutional principles upon which our government and its institutions rest do not leave room for the play and action of purely personal and arbitrary power, but that all in authority are guided and limited by these provisions which the people have, through the organic law, declared shall be the measure and scope of all control exercised over them. In particular the fourteenth amendment, and especially the equal protection clause, thereof, forbids that the individual shall be subjected to any arbitrary exercise of the powers of government; it was intended to prohibit, and does prohibit, any arbitrary deprivation of life or liberty, or arbitrary spoliation of property.- As we have seen, a statute which makes a purely arbitrary or unreasonable classification, or which singles out any particular individual or class as the subject of hostile and discriminating legislation, is clearly unconstitutional as being opposed to the fourteenth amendment and especially to the equal protection clause thereof. This is a plain case, and requires no further discussion." (Vol. 4, Encyclopedia of U. S. Supreme Court Reports, p. 366.) When we consider the nature and the theory of our institutions of government, the principles upon which they are supposed to rest, and review the history of their development, we are constrained to conclude that they do not mean to leave room for the play and action of purely personal and arbitrary power. Sovereignty itself is, of course, not subject to law, for it is the author and source of law; but in our system, while sovereign powers are delegated to the agencies of government, sovereignty itself remain with the people by whom and for whom all government exists and acts. And the law is the definition and limitation of power. It is, indeed, quite true, that there must always be lodged somewhere, and in some person or body, the authority of final decision; and, in many cases of mere administration the responsibility is purely political, no appeal lying except to the ultimate tribunal of the public judgment, exercised either in the pressure of opinion or by means of the suffrage. But the fundamental rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, considered as individual possessions, are secured by those maxims of constitutional law which are the monuments showing the victorious progress of the race in securing to men the blessings of civilization under the reign of just and equal laws, so that, in the famous language of Massachusetts Bill of Rights, the Government of Commonwealth 'may be a government of law and not of men.' For the very idea that one man may be compelled to hold his life, or the means of living, or any material right essential to the enjoyment of life, at the mere will of another, seems to be intolerable in any country where freedom prevails, as being the essence of slavery itself." (Yiek Wo vs. Hopkins, 118 U. S., 374.)- It is said that the present law is an old Act being in substance Act No. 547 of the Philippine Commission. But it has never been brought before this court for determination of its constitutionality. No matter how beneficient the motives of the lawmakers if the law tends to deprive any man of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, it is void. In my opinion the acts complained of which were taken in conformity with section 2145 of the Administrative Code not only deprive these Manguianes of their liberty, without due process of law, but will in all probability deprive them of their life, without due process of law. History teaches that to take a semi-nomadic tribe from their native fastnesses and to transfer them to the narrow confines of a reservation is to invite disease and suffering and death.- From my long experience in the Islands, I should say that it would be a crime of little less magnitude to take the Ifugaos from their mountain homes where they have reclaimed a wilderness and made it a land of beauty and fruitfulness

and to transfer them to the more fertile, unoccupied, malaria infested valleys which they look down upon from their fields-than it would be to order their decapitation en masse. There can be no denial that the Ifugaos are "non-Christians," or "wild tribes" and are in exactly the same category as the Manguianes. If the Manguianes may be so taken from their native habitat and reconcentrated on a reservation-in effect an open air jail-then so may the Ifugaos, so may the Tinguianes, who have made more progress than the Ifugaos, and so may the Moros.- There are "non-Christian" in nearly every province in the Philippine Islands. All of the thirty-nine governors upon the prior approval of the head of the department have the power under this law to take the non-Christian inhabitants of their different provinces from their homes and put them on a reservation for "their own good and the general good of the Philippines," and the courts will grant them no relief. These unfortunate citizens of the Philippine Islands would hold their liberty, and their lives, may be subject to the unregulated discretion of the provincial governor. And who would be safe? After the reservation is once established might not a provincial governor decide that some political enemy was a non-Christian, and that he would be safer on the reservation. No matter what his education and culture, he could have no trial, he could make no defense, the judge of the court might be in a distant province and not within reach, and the provincial governor's fiat is final.- There can be no denial that the Ifugaos are "non-Christians," or "wild tribes" and are in exactly the same category as the Manguianes. If the Manguianes may be so taken from their native habitat and reconcentrated on a reservation-in effect an open air jail-then so may the Ifugaos, so may the Tinguianes, who have made more progress than the Ifugaos, and so may the Moros.- I think this Court should declare that sections 2145 and 2759 of the Administrative Code of 1917 are unconstitutional, null and void, and that the petitioners are illegally restrained of their liberty, and that they have been denied the equal protection of the laws, and order the respondents immediately to liberate all of the petitioners.

PIT-OG V PEOPLEFERNAN; October 11, 1990

FACTS- Appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals- There was a communal land in Laog, Mainit, Mt. Province called the tayan. It was owned by the tomayan group whose members were descendants of the original owners thereof named Jakot and Pang-o. One of their descendants, Pel-ey Cullalad, was requested by the tomayan to act in their behalf in selling the 400-sqm residential portion of the tayan, in order that the tomayan would have something to butcher and eat during a celebration called ato. The sale was made in consideration of P1,500 and was made in favor of Edward Pasiteng, whose house had been built thereon. It was agreed that the unregistered property would be registered under Sec. 194 of the Revised Administrative Code as amended by Act No. 3344. Besides Cullalad, several members of the tomayan affixed their signatures or thumb marks on the notarized deed of sale. Thereafter, Pasiteng declared the property as his own for taxation purposes and paid taxes thereon.- In 1983, while Pasiteng was out hunting, Erkey Pit-og (aka Mary Pit-og) and her companions destroyed the fence erected by Pasiteng and cut down and took away the sugarcane worth P1,000 and the banana fruits valued at P100 found in the area. Pasiteng reported the matter to the police. Three days later, the police filed a complaint for theft against Erkey Pit-og in the Municipal Trial Court of Bontoc.- Pit-og pleaded not guilty of theft on the ground that the tayan belonged to her, her father Lobchoken being a descendant Jakot. She did not declare the land for taxation purposes because no one in the tomayan was allowed to declare the land as his own. However, any member of the tomayan could make improvements on the land and claim them as his own. Anyone who abandoned

the land would be succeeded only by other members. No person outside the tomayan could succeed to the cultivation of the tayan.- Lobchoken, planted sugarcane in the tayan in Loag and when he died, his widow Pidchoy and their children continued cultivating the land. They also built a granary thereon. The land was later given to Pit-og by Pidchoy for cultivation. Thereafter, the family allowed Pasiteng to build a house behind the place where Pit-og and her family used to have a house because Edward was Erkey's uncle being the brother of her father. Erkey planted the bananas and avocado trees in the area and harvested the sugarcane. No one had ever prevented her from cutting the sugarcane and the other plants. The municipal trial court discredited Pit-og's story emphasizing that her claim of continuous occupation and possession of the land was baseless as she had "no papers to show" or prove such claim. It found that an the elements of theft under Article 308 of the RPC were present and accordingly rendered the judgment of conviction.- On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower courts with the following findings and observations: - Pasiteng’s claim of ownership is documented by a Deed of Conveyance, a public document which was executed between him and the members of the tomayan group. The validity of this public document has never been questioned by any one of the previous owners belonging to the tomayan group. Furthermore, the tax declarations in the name of and the realty tax payments by, Pasiteng, although not conclusive proofs of ownership, are, nevertheless, prima facie evidence of his possession of the land in question. In contrast to these documentary evidence, petitioner offers nothing better than her bare claim. The personal property taken by accused-petitioner not being hers but those of Pasiteng, and she gained from the taking thereof without the consent of the owner, accused-petitioner is guilty of the crime of theft. ISSUES1. WON Pit-og had criminal intent in taking the sugarcane and the bananas.2. WON the present case is criminal or civil in nature.

HELD1. Erkey Pit-og could not have had criminal intent because she took the sugarcane and bananas believing them to be her own.- Edward Pasiteng relied heavily on his documentary evidence to prove ownership over the sugarcane and bananas. A careful study of these documents, in conjunction with the testimonial evidence extant in the record, however, discloses matters which put a cloud of doubt upon Pit-og’s culpability. The deed of sale describes the property as containing an area of 400 sqm, while the tax declarations show that the property contains an area of 512 sqm. The testimonies presented by the prosecution and the defense show that the areas cultivated by Pasiteng and Pit-og were adjacent and so close to each other that the possibility of confusion as to who planted which plants is not remote. In fact, before the filing of this case, Pit-og had sued Pasiteng's son, Donato, who allegedly cut down bananas she had planted in the area. The fact that Edward had built a fence around the area he claimed as his does not necessarily prove that he enclosed only the 400 square meters he had purchased from the tomayan. After all, he had declared as his own for taxation purposes 112 square meters more than the area he bought. - There is on record a survey plan of the 512 square-meter area claimed by Edward but there are no indications therein of the exact area involved in this case. Proof on the matter, however, is important for it means the Identification of the rightful owner of the stolen properties. It should be emphasized that to prove the crime of theft, it is necessary and indispensable to clearly Identify the person who, as a result of a criminal act, without his knowledge and consent, was wrongfully deprived of a thing belonging to him.

2. The legal issues that must be ironed out with regard to claims of ownership over the tayan should be threshed out in an appropriate civil action. - Obiter dicta related to Article II Section22 re Indigenous Community

- We see this case as exemplifying a clash between a claim of ownership founded on customs and tradition and another such claim supported by written evidence but nonetheless based on the same customs and tradition. when a court is beset with this kind of case, it can never be too careful More so in this case, where the accused, an illiterate tribeswoman who cannot be expected to resort to written evidence of ownership, stands to lose her liberty on account of an oversight in the court's appreciation of the evidence. Disposition Erkey Pit-og is ACQUITTED for lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt that she committed the crime of theft. No costs.

KILOSBAYAN, INC V MORATOMENDOZA; November 16, 1995

FACTS- Petitioners seek reconsideration of our decision in this case

Petitioners contend that the decision in the first case has already settled (1) whether petitioner Kilosbayan, Inc. has a standing to sue and (2) whether under its charter (R.A. No. 1169, as amended) the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office can enter into any form of association or collaboration with any party in operating an on-line lottery, and these questions can no longer be reopened.

- Petitioners argue that the two justices who changed their votes did not act according to law and that the two new appointees regardless of the merits of the case must of necessity align themselves with all the Ramos appointees who were dissenters in the first case and constitute the new majority in the second lotto case.- SC said the decision in the first case was a split decision: 7-6. With the retirement of one of the original majority (Cruz, J.) and one of the dissenters (Bidin, J.) it was not surprising that the first decision in the first case was later reversed. - SC cited the case of Feliciano v. Aquinas (also a split decision) which was overturned in People v. Yang.

ISSUES1. WON the constitutional policies and principles (Art II Sec 5 ,Sec 12, Sec 13, Sec 17) invoked by the petitioners may be resorted to for striking down laws or official actions which are inconsistent with them2. WON the petitioners have standing to sue on constitutional grounds, given that the Constitution guarantees to people’s organizations “effective and reasonable participation at all levels of social, political and economic decision making (Art XIII Sec 16).3. WON, as settled in the first case, the PCSO under its charter (R.A. No. 1169, as amended) cannot enter into any form of association or collaboration with any party in operating an on-line lottery.

HELD1. NO. As already stated, however, these provisions are not self-executing. They do not confer rights which can be enforced in the courts but only provide guidelines for legislative or executive action. By authorizing the holding of lottery for charity, Congress has in effect determined that consistently with these policies and principles of the Constitution, the PCSO may be given this authority. That is why we said with respect to the opening by the PAGCOR of a casino in Cagayan de Oro, "the morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per se. . . . It is left to Congress to deal with the activity as it sees fit." (Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp., Inc., 234 SCRA 255, 268 [1994]).2. NO. It is noteworthy that petitioners do not question the validity of the law allowing lotteries. It is the contract entered into by the PCSO and the PGMC which they are assailing. This case, therefore, does not raise issues of constitutionality but only of contract law, which petitioners, not being privies to the agreement, cannot raise.

- Kilosbayan's status as a people's organization does not give it the requisite personality to question the validity of the contract in this case. The Constitution provides that "the State shall respect the role of independent people's organizations to enable the people to pursue and protect, within the democratic framework, their legitimate and collective interests and aspirations through peaceful and lawful means," that their right to "effective and reasonable participation at all levels of social, political, and economic decision-making shall not be abridged." (Art. XIII, §§ 15-16)- These provisions have not changed the traditional rule that only real parties in interest or those with standing, as the case may be, may invoke the judicial power. The jurisdiction of this Court, even in cases involving constitutional questions, is limited by the "case and controversy" requirement of Art. VIII, §5. This requirement lies at the very heart of the judicial function. It is what differentiates decision-making in the courts from decision-making in the political departments of the government and bars the bringing of suits by just any party.- Petitioners' right to sue as taxpayers cannot be sustained because this case does not involve illegal disbursement of public funds. Nor as concerned citizens can they bring this suit because no specific injury suffered by them is alleged. As for the petitioners, who are members of Congress, their right to sue as legislators cannot be invoked because they do not complain of any infringement of their rights as legislators.3. Indeed in the first case it was held that the PCSO under its charter (R.A. No. 1169, as amended) cannot enter into any form of association or collaboration with any party in operating an on-line lottery HOWEVER THE QUESTIONS RAISED IN THIS CASE ARE LEGAL QUESTIONS AND THE CLAIMS INVOLVED ARE SUBSTANTIALLY DIFFERENT FROM THOSE INVOLVED IN THE PRIOR CASE BETWEEN THE PARTIES. AS ALREADY STATED, THE ELA IS SUBSTANTIALLY DIFFERENT FROM THE CONTRACT OF LEASE DECLARED VOID IN THE FIRST CASE.

Also, the Court noted in its decision that the provisions of the first contract, which were considered to be features of a joint venture agreement, had been removed in the new contract.

VALMONTE V BELMONTE, JRCORTES; February 13, 1989

FACTS- Petitioners are media practitioners who wish to confirm reports that certain members of the Batasang Pambansa, including some members of the opposition, were granted “clean” loans from the GSIS before the February 1986 elections. Petitioner Valmonte filed a special civil action for mandamus with preliminary injunction, praying that respondent Belmonte, in his capacity as GSIS General Manager, be directed to:1. Furnish petitioners with a list of the names of the members of the defunct Batasang Pambansa who were able to secure “clean” loans from the GSIS immediately prior to the February 7, 1986 elections through the intercession of then-First Lady Imelda Marcos.2. Furnish petitioners with certified true copies of the documents evidencing said loans.3. Allow petitioners access to public records for the subject information.

ISSUESProcedural: Have petitioners failed to exhaust administrative remedies?Substantive:1. Does the information sought by petitioners fall under “matters of public concern”?2. Does a confidential relationship exist between GSIS and its borrowers?3. Are loan transactions of the GSIS, being merely incidental to its insurance function, private in nature?

HELD

Procedural: No. The principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies is subject to settled exceptions, among which is when only a question of law is involved. The issue raised by petitioners, which requires the interpretation of the scope of the constitutional right to information, can be passed upon by the court more competently than GSIS or its Board of Trustees.Substantive:1. Yes. The public nature of GSIS funds and the public office held by the alleged borrowers make the information sought clearly a matter of public interest and concern.2. No. The right to privacy belongs to the individual in his private capacity and not to public and governmental agencies like the GSIS. The right cannot be invoked by juridical entities, as a corporation has no right to privacy in its name. The entire basis of the right to privacy is an injury to the feelings and sensibilities of the party and a corporation would have no such ground for relief. However, even the concerned borrowers themselves may not succeed if they chose to invoke this right. Public figures, most especially those holding responsible positions in government, enjoy a more limited right to privacy as compared to ordinary individuals, their actions being subject to closer public scrutiny.3. No. The “constituent-ministrant” dichotomy characterizing government function has long been repudiated. The government, whether carrying out its sovereign attributes or running some business, discharges the same function of service to the people. That the GSIS was exercising a proprietary function in granting the loans would not justify the exclusion of the transactions from the coverage and scope of the right to information. Transactions entered into by the GSIS, a government-controlled corporation created by special legislation, are within the ambit of the people’s right to be informed pursuant to the constitutional policy of transparency in government dealings. Petitions are entitled to access to the documents subject to reasonable

regulations. The petition is held to be meritorious as to the 2nd and 3rd

alternative acts sought by petitioners. The same cannot be said, however, of the 1st act sought. Although

citizens are entitled to “access to official records”, the Constitution does not accord them a right to compel custodians of public records to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like in their desire to acquire information on matters of public concern. It is essential for a writ of mandamus to lie that the applicant has a well-defined, clear and certain right to the thing demanded and that it is the imperative duty of the defendant to perform the act required.

CHAVEZ V PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT

PANGANIBAN; December 9, 1998

FACTS- These are the main questions raised in this original action seeking (1) to prohibit and “enjoin respondents [PCGG and its chairman] from privately entering into, perfecting and/or executing any agreement with the heirs of the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos x x x relating to and concerning the properties and assets of Ferdinand Marcos located in the Philippines and/or abroad – including the so-called Marcos gold hoard”; and (2) to “compel respondents to make public all negotiations and agreement, be they ongoing or perfected, and all documents related to or relating to such negotiations and agreement between the PCGG and the Marcos heirs.”- Petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, former solicitor general, brought this action in response to news reports in September 1997 referring to (1) the alleged discovery of billions of dollars of Marcos assets deposited in various coded accounts in Swiss banks, and (2) the reported execution of a compromise between the government (through PCGG) and the Marcos heirs, on how to split or share these assets. Acting on a motion of petitioner, the Court issued a temporary restraining order dated March 23, 1998, enjoining respondents, their agents and/or representatives from “entering into, or perfecting and/or

executing any agreement with the heirs of the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos relating to and concerning their ill-gotten wealth. On August 19, 1998, Gloria, Celnan, Scarlet and Teresa, all surnamed Jopson, filed before the Court a motion for intervention. They aver that they are “among the 10,000 claimants whose right to claim from the Marcos family and/or the Marcos estate is recognized by the decision in In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos”.

ISSUESProcedural:1. WON the petitioner has the personality or legal standing to file the instant petition; and2. WON this Court is the proper court before which this action may be filed.Substantive:1. WON this Court could require the PCGG to disclose to the public the details of any agreement, perfected or not, with the Marcoses; and2. WON there exist any legal restraints against a compromise agreement between the Marcoses and the PCGG relative to the Marcoses’ ill-gotten wealth.

HELDProcedural:1. Yes. When the issue concerns a public right and the object of mandamus is to obtain the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real parties in interest; and because it is sufficient that petitioner is a citizen and as such is interested in the execution of the laws, he need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result of the action.2. Yes. Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution expressly confers upon the Supreme Court original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto and habeas corpus. The argument of respondent that petitioner should have properly sought relief before the Sandiganbayan in which enforcement of the compromise agreements was pending resolution seems to have merit, if petitioner was merely seeking to enjoin the enforcement of the compromise and/or to compel the PCGG to disclose to the public the terms contained in said Agreements. However, petitioner is here seeking the public disclosure of “all negotiations and agreement, be they ongoing or perfected, and documents related or relating to such negotiations and agreement between the PCGG and the Marcos heirs”. In other words, the petition is not merely confined to the Agreements that have already been drawn, but likewise to any other ongoing or future undertaking towards any settlement on the alleged Marcos loot. The core issue boils down to the precise interpretation, in terms of scope, of the twin constitutional provisions on “public transactions”.Substantive:1. Yes. There is no doubt that the recovery of the Marcoses’ alleged ill-gotten wealth is a matter of public concern and imbued with public interest. “Ill-gotten wealth”, by its very nature, assumes a public character. The assets and properties referred to supposedly originated from the government itself. To all intents and purposes, therefore, they belong to the people. Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution that “transactions” contemplates inclusion of negotiations leading to the consummation of a transaction, it is incumbent upon the PCGG and its officers, as well as other government representatives, to disclose sufficient public information on any proposed settlement they have decided to take up with the ostensible owners and holders of ill-gotten wealth.2. Yes. A cursory perusal of the General and Supplemental Agreements between the PCGG and the Marcos heirs reveals serious legal flaws.i) While a compromise in civil suits is expressly authorized by law, there is no similar general sanction as regards criminal liability. The authority must be specifically conferred. In the present case, the power to grant criminal immunity was conferred on PCGG by Section 5 of EO No. 14 as amended by EO No. 14-A. However, the Agreements do not conform to the requirements of EO Nos. 14 and 14-A. Criminal immunity cannot be granted to the Marcoses, who are the principal defendants in the spate of ill-gotten wealth cases now

pending before the Sandiganbayan. The provision is applicable mainly to witnesses who provide information or testify against a respondent, defendant or accused in an ill-gotten wealth case.ii) Under Item No. 2 of the General Agreement, the PCGG commits to exempt from all forms of taxes the property to be retained by the Marcos heirs. This is a clear violation of the Constitution. The power to tax and to grant tax exemptions is vested in Congress and, to a certain extent, in the local legislative bodies. The PCGG has absolutely no power to grant tax exemptions, even under the cover of its authority to compromise ill-gotten wealth cases. Even granting that Congress enacts the law exempting the Marcoses from paying taxes on their properties, such law will definitely not pass the test of the equal protection clause under the Bill of Rights. Any special grant of exemption in favor only of the Marcos heirs will constitute class legislation. It will also violate the constitutional rule that “taxation shall be uniform and equitable”.iii) The government binds itself under the General Agreement to cause the dismissal of all cases against the Marcos heirs, pending before the Sandiganbayan and other courts. This is a direct encroachment on judicial powers, particularly in regard to criminal jurisdiction. Well settled is the doctrine that once a case has been filed before a court of competent jurisdiction, the matter of its dismissal or pursuance lies within the full discretion and control of the judge. Jurisdiction, once acquired by the trial court, is not lost despite a resolution, even by the justice secretary, to withdraw the information or to dismiss the complaint. Thus, the PCGG cannot guarantee the dismissal of all such criminal cases against the Marcoses pending in the courts, for said dismissal is not within its sole power and discretion.iv) The government also waives all claims and counterclaims, “whether past, present, or future, matured or inchoate,” against the Marcoses. This all-encompassing stipulation is contrary to law. Under the Civil Code, an action for future fraud may not be waived. This is a palpable violation of the due process and equal protection guarantees of the Constitution. It effectively ensconces the Marcoses beyond the reach of the law.v) The Agreements do not provide for a definite or determinable period within which the parties shall fulfill their respective prestations. It may take a lifetime before the Marcoses submit an inventory of their total assets.vi) The Agreements do not state with specificity the standards for determining which assets shall be forfeited by the government and which shall be retained by the Marcoses. While the Supplemental Agreement provides that the Marcoses shall be entitled to 25 per cent of the $356 million Swiss deposits (less government recovery expenses), such sharing arrangement pertains only to the said deposit. No similar splitting scheme is defined with respect to the other properties. Neither is there, anywhere in the Agreements, a statement of the basis for the 25-75 percent sharing ratio.vii) The absence of then-President Fidel Ramos’ approval of the principal Agreement, an express condition therein, renders the compromise incomplete and unenforceable. Nevertheless, even if such approval were obtained, the Agreements would still not be valid.

RESOLUTIONPANGANIBAN; May 19, 1999

FACTSMa. Imelda Marcos-Manotoc, Ferdinand R. Marcos II and Irene Marcos-Araneta filed before the court a motion for leave to intervene and a motion for partial reconsideration, alleging that they were parties and signatories to the General and Supplemental Agreements which this Court declared “NULL AND VOID for being contrary to law and the Consitution.” They claim to “have a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties or an interest against both as to warrant their intervention.” They add that their exclusion from the instant case resulted in a denial of their constitutional rights to due process and to equal protection. They also the raise the “principle of

hierarchical administration of justice” to impugn the Court’s cognizance of petitioner’s direct action before it.

ISSUESProcedural:WON the Motion for Leave to Intervene should be allowed.Substantive:1. WON the exclusion of the movants from the proceedings regarding the Agreements to which they were parties and signatories was a denial of “their property right to contract without due process of law”;2. WON the Court violated the principle of hierarchical administration of justice by ruling upon the validity of the Agreements;3. WON the issue of right to information raised by petitioner was rendered moot and academic by the submission by the movants of the Motion for Approval of Compromise Agreements to the Sandiganbayan;4. WON there was ratification of the Agreements by partial implementation; and5. WON the issue raised by petitioner presented an actual case and a justiciable question.

HELDProcedural:No. Section 2, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court, provides that a motion to intervene should be filed before rendition of judgment. Intervention can no longer be allowed in a case already terminated by final judgment.Substantive:1. No. A contract that violates the Constitution and the law is null and void ab initio and vests no rights and creates no obligations. In legal terms, the movants have really no interest to protect or right to assert in this proceeding. Moreover, the movants are merely incidental, not indispensable, parties to the instant case. The petition of Francisco I. Chavez sought to enforce a constitutional right against the PCGG and to determine whether the latter has been acting within the bounds of its authority.2. No. The principle of hierarchy of the courts generally applies to cases involving factual questions, since the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. Inasmuch as the petition at bar involves only constitutional and legal questions concerning public interest, the Court resolved to exercise primary jurisdiction on the matter.3. No. The Chavez petition was not confined to the concluded terms contained in the Agreements, but likewise concerned other ongoing and future negotiations and agreements, perfected or not. It was therefore not rendered moot and academic simply by the public disclosure of the subject Agreements.4. No. The PCGG’s grant to the claimants’ mother of access rights to one of their sequestered properties cannot ratify the Agreements. Being null and void, they are not subject to ratification.5. Yes. Mandamus, over which this Court has original jurisdiction, is a proper recourse for a citizen to enforce a public right. There is no political question involved. The power and authority of the PCGG to compromise is not the issue. But, clearly, by violating the Constitution and the laws, the PCGG gravely abused its discretion.

BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN (BAYAN) V ZAMORA

BUENA; October 10, 2000

FACTS- This is a consolidation of 5 petitions assailing the constitutionality of the Visiting Forces Agreement. (Trivia: Si Prof Te ang counsel para sa ibang petitioners)- March 14, 1947 – The Philippines and USA forged a Military Bases Agreement, formalizing, among others, the use of installations in the Philippine territory by US military personnel.

- August 30, 1951 – The Philippines and USA entered into a Mutual Defense Treaty. Under the treaty, the parties agreed to respond to any external armed attack on their territory, armed forces, public vessels and aircraft.- 1991- RP-US Military Base Agreement expired. Senate rejected proposed RP-US Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Security. (Goodbye… but Mutual Defense Treaty still in effect.)- February 10, 1998 – President Ramos approved Visiting Forces Agreement, after a series of conferences and negotiations.- October 5, 1998 – President Estrada, through Secretary of Foreign affairs, ratified VFA.- May 27, 1999- Senate passed Resolution No. 18, concurring with the ratification of the VFA. (Who concurred: Fernan, Ople, Drilon, Biazon, Tatad, Cayetano, Aquino-Oreta, Barbers, Jaworski, Magsaysay Jr, Osmeña, Flavier, Defensor-Santiago, Ponce-Enrile, Sotto, Revilla, Coseteng, Honasan. Total=17. Who rejected: Guingona, Roco, Osmeña III, Pimentel, Legarda-Leviste. Total=5)- The VFA provides for the mechanism for regulating circumstances and conditions under which US Armed Forces and defense personnel may be present in the Philippines. The VFA is an agreement which defines treatment of US troops and personnel visiting the Philippines. It also defines the rights of the US and the Phil government in the matter of criminal jurisdiction, movement of vessel and aircraft, importation and exportation of equipment, materials and supplies.

ISSUES1. WON the petitioners have legal standing as concerned citizens, taxpayers, or legislators to question the constitutionality of the VFA.2. WON the VFA is governed by the provisions of Sec 21, Article VII (concurrence of 2/3 of the members of the Senate) or Sec 25 Art XVIII of the Constitution (foreign military bases, troops, or facilities not allowed in the Phils except under a treaty duly concurred in by Senate, and when Congress requires, ratification by a majority of votes cast by the people in a national referendum, and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State)3. WON VFA constitute an abdication of Philippine sovereignty.

a. WON the Philippine Courts will be deprived of their jurisdiction to hear and try offenses committed by the US Military personnel.b. WON the Supreme Court will be deprived of its jurisdiction over offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua or higher.

4. Was there grave abuse of discretion on the part of the President, and of the Senate in ratifying/concurring with the VFA?5. WON the VFA violates Sec 1 Article III (equal protection clause), Sec 8 Article II (prohibition against nuclear weapons), and Sec 28(4) Article VI (taxation) of the 1987 Constitution.

HELD1. No (and Yes). As taxpayers, petitioners have NO legal standing as there are no public funds raised by taxation in the case. Also, petitioner-legislators do not possess the requisite locus standi as there is absence of clear showing of any direct injury to their person or to the institution to which they belong. HOWEVER, the issues raised in the petitions are of paramount importance and of constitutional significance. It is of TRANSCENDENTAL importance, so the Court brushes aside procedural barriers and takes cognizance of the petitions.2. It is governed by BOTH provisions. Section 25 Article XVIII applies as it specifically deals with treaties involving foreign military bases, troops, or facilities. (The ‘or’ is important to take note as it signifies independence of one thing from the others. Thus, it can just be an agreement covering only troops – not bases—like the VFA. Also, Section 25 Article XVIII makes no distinction whether the troops or facilities will be “transient” or “permanent”, so the VFA is covered by this provision). On the other hand, Section 21 Article VII find applicability with regard to the issue and for the sole purpose of determining the number of votes required to obtain the valid concurrence of the Senate

(Sec 21 Art VII requires 2/3 of the members of the Senate, while Sec 25 Art XVIII just says “duly concurred in by the Senate” with no specified number).

- Were the requirements of Section 25 Art XVIII complied with?Section 25 Art XVIII requires the following conditions:

a) it must be under a treaty. -- Complied with. We treat VFA as a treaty.b) the treaty must be duly concurred in by the Senate, and so required by the Congress, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum. -- Complied with. 17 of 23 Senators concurred (Senator Gloria Arroyo was elected VP). Requirement of ratification in a national referendum unnecessary since Congress has not required it.c) recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State (US).-- Complied with. Ambassador Hubbard’s letter states that the VFA is binding on the US gov’t and that in international legal terms such agreement is a ‘treaty’.

- A ‘treaty’, as defined by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, is an “international instrument concluded between States in written form and governed by the international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments.”- In international law, there is no difference between treaties and executive agreements in their binding effect upon states concerned, as long as the negotiating functionaries have remained within their powers.3. Section 2 Article II of the Constitution declares that the “xxx Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land xxx” (this doesn’t really answer the issue above, but the ponente didn’t really discuss an answer WON the VFA is an abdication of sovereignty.. oh well… here goes…)

- With the ratification of the VFA, it becomes obligatory and incumbent on our part to be bound by the terms of the agreement. As a member of the family of nations, the Philippines agrees to be bound by generally accepted rules for the conduct of its international relations. We cannot readily plead the Constitution as a convenient excuse for non-compliance with our obligations, duties and responsibilities under international law.

- Article 13 of the Declaration of Rights and Duties of States adopted by the International Law Commision 1949 provides that every state has a duty to carry out in good faith its obligations. Article 26 of the Convention: pacta sunt servanda.

4. Was there grave abuse of discretion on the part of the President, and of the Senate in ratifying/concurring with the VFA? No. - Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or, when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despostic manner.- The Constitution vests the power to enter into treaties or International agreements in the President, subject only to the concurrence of the members of Senate. The negotiation of the VFA and the ratification of the agreement are exclusive acts of the the President, in the lawful exercise of his vast executive and diplomatic powers granted by the Constitution.- As to the power to concur with treaties, the Constitution lodges the same with the Senate alone. Thus once the Senate performs that power, or exercises its prerogative within the boundaries prescribed by the Constitution, the concurrence cannot be viewed to constitute an abuse of power.

Decision Petitions Dismissed11 concurring, 3 dissenting, 1 take no part.

SEPARATE OPINION

PUNO [dissent]- Most significant issue is whether the VFA violates Sec 25 Art XVIII of the Constitution (see requirements above).- POINT 1: Respondents claim that the requirements do not apply as the VFA contemplates a temporary visit of the troops, while the provision applies to a permanent presence of foreign troops.The said temporary nature of the VFA cannot stand. Neither the VFA nor the Mutual Defense Treaty between RP and US provides the slightest suggestion on the duration of the visits. VFA does not provide for a specific and limited period of effectivity.

- POINT 2: The requirement that it be “recognized as a treaty by the other contracting state” is crystal clear and was put there by the framers inorder not to repeat the anomalous asymmetry of the 1947 Military bases agreement where we recognized it as a treaty but the US treated it as an executive agreement. - The VFA is equivalent to a sole executive agreement in the US. The Court will be standing on unstable ground if it places a sole executive agreement like the VFA on the same constitutional plateau as a treaty, as there are still questions on the constitutional basis and legal effects of sole executive agreements under the US law. - “With the cloud of uncertainty still hanging on the exact legal force of sole executive agreements under the US constitutional law, this Court must strike a blow for the sovereignty of our country by drawing a bright line between the dignity and status of a treaty in contrast with a sole executive agreement. However we may wish it, The VFA as a sole executive agreement cannot climb to the same lofty height that the dignity of a treaty can reach. Consequently, it falls short of the requirement set by Sec 25 Art XVIII of the 1987 Constitution that the agreement allowing the presence of foreign military troops on Phil soil must be ‘recognized as a treaty by the other contracting state’. I vote to grant the petitions.”

KILOSBAYAN, INC. V GUINGONA, JR.DAVIDE; May 5, 1994

FACTSNature: Special civil action for prohibition and injunction, praying for a TRO and preliminary injunction, to prohibit and restrain implementation of "Contract of Lease" between PCSO and PGMC in connection with on-line lottery system a.k.a. "lotto".1. Pursuant to Section 1 of its charter (RA 1169), PCSO decided to

establish an online lottery system for the purpose of increasing its revenue base and diversifying its sources of funds. Sometime before March 1993, after learning that PCSO was interested in operating an on-line lottery system, Berjaya Group Berhad, a multinational company in Malaysia, became interested to offer its services and resources to PCSO and organized with some Filipino investors in March 1993 a corporation known as the Philippine Gaming Management Corporation (PGMC).

2. Before August 1993, PCSO finally formally issued a Request for Proposal (RFP) for the Lease of Contract of an on-line lottery system for PCSO. Considering the citizenship requirement in the RFP ("Lessor shall be a domestic corporation, with at least 60% of its shares owned by Filipino shareholders"), PGMC claims that Berjaya Group undertook to reduce its equity stakes in PGMC to 40%, by selling 35% out of the original 75% foreign stockholdings to local investors.

3. Aug. 15, 1993, PGMC submitted its bid to PCSO. The bids were evaluated by the Special Pre-Qualification Bids and Awards committee (SPBAC) for the on-line lottery and its Bid Report was thereafter submitted to the Office of the President. (This was preceded by complaints from the Committe's Chairperson, Dr. Mita Pardo de Tavera.)

4. Oct. 21, 1993, the Office of the President announced that it had given

PGMC the go-signal to operate the countr's on-line lottery system. Announcement was published in Manila Times, PDI, and Manila Standard on Oct. 29.

5. Nov. 4, 1993, KILOSBAYAN sent an open letter to President Ramos strongly opposing the setting up of an on-line lotttery system on the basis of serious moral and ethical considerations. KILOSBAYAN reiterated its vigorous opposition to “lotto” at the meeting of the Committee on Games and Amusements of the Senate on Nov. 12, 1993

6. Nov. 19, 1993, the media announced that despite the opposition, Malacanang will push through with operation of lotto, that it is actually PCSO which will operate the lottery while winning corporate bidders merely lessors.

7. Dec. 1, 1993, KILOSBAYAN requested copies of all documents pertaining to the lottery award from Executive Secretary Teofisto Guingona, Jr., who informed KILOSBAYAN that the documents will be transmitted before the end of the month. However on the same date, an agreement denominated as “Contract of Lease” was finally executed by PCSO and PGMC.

8. Considering the denial by the Office of the President of its protest and the statement of Assistant Executive Secretary Renato Corona that "only a court injunction can stop Malacañang," and the imminent implementation of the Contract of Lease in February 1994, KILOSBAYAN, with its co-petitioners, filed on 28 January 1994 this petition.

PETITIONERS' CLAIM- Petitioners claim that PCSO cannot validly enter into the assailed Contract of Lease with the PGMC because it is an arrangement wherein the PCSO would hold and conduct the on-line lottery system in "collaboration" or "association" with the PGMC, in violation of Section 1(B) of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42, which prohibits the PCSO from holding and conducting charity sweepstakes races, lotteries, and other similar activities "in collaboration, association or joint venture with any person, association, company or entity, foreign or domestic." And that there are terms and conditions of the Contract "showing that respondent PGMC is the actual lotto operator and not respondent PCSO." - The petitioners also point out that the Contract of Lease requires or authorizes PGMC to establish a telecommunications network that will connect all the municipalities and cities in the territory. However, PGMC cannot do that because it has no franchise from Congress to construct, install, establish, or operate the network pursuant to Section 1 of Act No. 3846, as amended. - Moreover, PGMC is a 75% foreign-owned or controlled corporation and cannot, therefore, be granted a franchise for that purpose because of Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. Furthermore, since "the subscribed foreign capital" of the PGMC "comes to about 75%, as shown by paragraph EIGHT of its Articles of Incorporation," it cannot lawfully enter into the contract in question because all forms of gambling — and lottery is one of them — are included in the so-called foreign investments negative list under the Foreign Investments Act (R.A. No. 7042) where only up to 40% foreign capital is allowed.- Finally, the petitioners insist that the Articles of Incorporation of PGMC do not authorize it to establish and operate an on-line lottery and telecommunications systems.RESPONDENTS' COMMENTS- Private respondent PGMC asserts that "(1) [it] is merely an independent contractor for a piece of work and (2) as such independent contractor, PGMC is not a co-operator of the lottery franchise with PCSO, nor is PCSO sharing its franchise, 'in collaboration, association or joint venture' with PGM.- Finally, it states that the execution and implementation of the contract does not violate the Constitution and the laws; that the issue on the "morality" of the lottery franchise granted to the PCSO is political and not judicial or legal, which should be ventilated in another forum; and that the "petitioners do not appear to

have the legal standing or real interest in the subject contract and in obtaining the reliefs sought." - Executive Secretary Teofisto Guingona, Jr., Assistant Executive Secretary Renato Corona, and the PCSO maintain that the contract of lease in question does not violate Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42, and that the petitioner's interpretation of the phrase "in collaboration, association or joint venture" in Section 1 is "much too narrow, strained and utterly devoid of logic" for it "ignores the reality that PCSO, as a corporate entity, is vested with the basic and essential prerogative to enter into all kinds of transactions or contracts as may be necessary for the attainment of its purposes and objectives." What the PCSO charter "seeks to prohibit is that arrangement akin to a "joint venture" or partnership where there is "community of interest in the business, sharing of profits and losses, and a mutual right of control," a characteristic which does not obtain in a contract of lease." They further claim that the establishment of the telecommunications system stipulated in the Contract of Lease does not require a congressional franchise because PGMC will not operate a public utility- They also argue that the contract does not violate the Foreign Investment Act of 1991; that the Articles of Incorporation of PGMC authorize it to enter into the Contract of Lease; and that the issues of "wisdom, morality and propriety of acts of the executive department are beyond the ambit of judicial review."

Finally, they allege that the petitioners have no standing to maintain the instant suit.

ISSUES Procedural: WON the petitioners have locus standi.Substantive: WON the Contract of Lease is legal and valid in light of RA 1169 as amended by BP Blg. 42, which prohibits PCSO from holding and conducting lotteries "in collaboration, association, or joint venture with any person, association, company, or entity, whether domestic or foreign."

HELD1. The preliminary issue on the locus standi of the petitioners should, indeed, be resolved in their favor. A party's standing before this Court is a procedural technicality which it may, in the exercise of its discretion, set aside in view of the importance of the issues raised. In the landmark Emergency Powers Cases, this Court brushed aside this technicality because "the transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure.'- The Court found the instant petition to be of transcendental importance to the public. The ramifications of such issues immeasurably affect the social, economic, and moral well-being of the people even in the remotest barangays of the country and the counter-productive and retrogressive effects of the envisioned on-line lottery system are as staggering as the billions in pesos it is expected to raise. The legal standing then of the petitioners deserves recognition and, in the exercise of its sound discretion, this Court hereby brushes aside the procedural barrier which the respondents tried to take advantage of2. Contract of Lease is void for being contrary to law. PGMC is not only a Lessor, PCSO in the least will be conducting lotteries “ in collaboration or association” and in the most “in joint vernture” with PGMC. The manegerial and technical expertise of PGMC are indespensible to the operation of the on-line lottery system, whereas PCSO only has its franchise to offer.- By the exception explicitly made in paragraph B, Section 1 of its charter, the PCSO cannot share its franchise with another by way of collaboration, association or joint venture. Neither can it assign, transfer, or lease such franchise. - It is a settled rule that "in all grants by the government to individuals or corporations of rights, privileges and franchises, the words are to be taken most strongly against the grantee .... [o]ne who claims a franchise or privilege in derogation of the common rights of the public must prove his title thereto by a grant which is clearly and definitely expressed, and he cannot enlarge it by

equivocal or doubtful provisions or by probable inferences. Whatever is not unequivocally granted is withheld. Nothing passes by mere implication."- Whether the contract in question is one of lease or whether the PGMC is merely an independent contractor should not be decided on the basis of the title or designation of the contract but by the intent of the parties, which may be gathered from the provisions of the contract itself. Animus hominis est anima scripti. The intention of the party is the soul of the instrument.- A careful analysis and evaluation of the provisions of the contract and a consideration of the contemporaneous acts of the PCSO and PGMC indubitably disclose that the contract is not in reality a contract of lease under which the PGMC is merely an independent contractor for a piece of work, but one where the statutorily proscribed collaboration or association, in the least, or joint venture, at the most, exists between the contracting parties. (Collaboration is defined as the acts of working together in a joint project. Association means the act of a number of persons in uniting together for some special purpose or business. Joint venture is defined as an association of persons or companies jointly undertaking some commercial enterprise; generally all contribute assets and share risks. )- The contemporaneous acts of the PCSO and the PGMC reveal that the PCSO had neither funds of its own nor the expertise to operate and manage an on-line lottery system, and that although it wished to have the system, it would have it "at no expense or risks to the government." Because of these serious constraints and unwillingness to bear expenses and assume risks, the PCSO was candid enough to state in its RFP that it is seeking for "a suitable contractor which shall build, at its own expense, all the facilities needed to operate and maintain" the system; exclusively bear "all capital, operating expenses and expansion expenses and risks."

SEPARATE OPINION

CRUZ [concurring]- PGMC is plainly a partner of PCSO in violation of the law no matter how the assistance is called or the contract denominated.

PADILLA [concurring]- Contract of Lease between PCSO and PGMC is a joint venture because each part contributes its share in the enterprise project. PGMC contributes the facilities, technology and expertise, while PCSO contributes the market through the dealers and in the totality the mass of Filipino gambling elements. PGMC will get its 4.9% of gross receipts; the residue of the whole exercise will go to PCSO, this is a joint venture plain and simple.

MELO [dissenting]- This case does not involve a challenge on the validity of a statute nor an attempt to restrain expenditure of public funds. The contract involves strictly corporate money.- By considering this case as a taxpayer's suit could not cure the lack of locus standi on the part of the petitioners. The contract does not involve an illegal disbursement of public funds. No public fund raised by taxation is involved.

PUNO [dissenting]- Courts are neither free to decide all kinds of cases dumped into their laps nor are they free to open their doors to all parties or entities claiming a grievance.- It is clear that the requirement of locus standi has not been jettisoned by the Constitution for it still commands courts in no uncertain terms to settle only “actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable”/- Rationale for the standard of locus standi is to assure a vigorous adversary presentation of the case, and perhaps more importantly to warrant the judiciary's overruling the determination of a coordinate, democratically elected organ of government.

KILOSBAYAN, INC., ET AL. VS. MORATOMENDOZA; July 17, 1995

FACTS - As a result of our decision in G.R. No. 113375 (Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Guingona, 232 SCRA 110 (1994) invalidating the Contract of Lease between the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and the Philippine Gaming Management Corp. (PGMC) on the ground that it had been made in violation of the charter of the PCSO, the parties entered into negotiations for a new agreement that would be "consistent with the latter's [PCSO] charter . . . and conformable to this Honorable Court's aforesaid Decision."- On January 25, 1195 the parties signed an Equipment Lease Agreement (thereafter called ELA) whereby the PGMC leased on-line lottery equipment and accessories to the PCSO in consideration of a rental equivalent to 4.3 % of the gross amount of ticket sale derived by the PCSO from the operation of the lottery which in no case shall be less than an annual rental computed at P35,000.00 per terminal in Commercial Operation. The rental is to be computed and paid bi-weekly. In the event the bi-weekly rentals in any year fall short of the annual minimum fixed rental thus computed, the PCSO agrees to pay the deficiency out of the proceeds of its current ticket sales. (Pars. 1-2)Under the law, 30% of the net receipts from the sale of tickets is alloted to charity. (R.A. 1169, § (B) )The term of the leases is eight (8) years, commencing from the start of commercial operation of the lottery equipment first delivered to the lessee pursuant to the agreed schedule. (Par. 3)- In the operation of the lottery, the PCSO is to employ its own personnel. (Par. 5) It is responsible for the loss of, or damage to, the equipment from any cause and for the cost of their maintenance and repair. (Pars. 7-8) Upon the expiration of the leases, the PCSO has the option to purchase the equipment for the sum of P25 million.- A copy of the ELA was submitted to the Court by the PGMC in accordance with its manifestation in the prior case. On February 21, 1995 this suit was filed seeking to declare the ELA invalid on the ground as the Contract of Leases nullified in the first case. Petitioners seek the declaration of the amended ELA as null and void.- The PCSO and PGMC filed a separate comments in which they question the petitioners' standing to bring suit. The Kilosbayan, In. is an organization described in its petition as "composed of civic-spirited citizens, pastors, priests, nuns and lay leaders who are committed to the cause of truth, justice, and national renewal." Its trustees are also suing in their individual and collective capacities as "taxpayers and concerned citizens." The other petitioners (Sen. Freddie Webb, Sen. Wigberto Tañada and Rep. Joker P. Arroyo) are members of the Congress suing as such and as "taxpayer and concerned citizens."- Respondents question the right of petitioners to bring this suit on the ground that, not being parties to the contract of lease which they seek to nullify, they have no personal and substantial interest likely to be injured by the enforcement of the contract. Petitioners on the other hand contend that the ruling in the previous case sustaining their standing to challenge the validity of the first contract for the operation of lottery is now the "law of the case". and therefore the question of their standing can no longer be reopened.- Petitioners likewise invoke the following Principles and State Policies set forth in Art. II of the Constitution:The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property, and the promotion of the general welfare are essential for the employment by all the people of the blessings of democracy. (§5)]The natural and primary right and duty of the parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government. (§12)The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation building and shall promote their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social well-being. It

shall inculcate in the youth patriotism and nacionalism, and encourage their involvement in public and civic affairs.The state shall give priority to education, science and technology, arts, culture, and sports to foster patriotism and nationalism, accelerate social progress, and promote total human liberation and development. (§17)(Memorandum for Petitioners, p. 7)

ISSUES1. Does Kilosbayan et. al. have standing to sue?2. Does the decision in Kilosbayan v. Guingona constitute the “law of the case”, thus precluding respondents from assailing the legal standing of petitioners? 3. May the provisions under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies be readily invoked by any person in the absence of Congressional legislation (i.e., self-executing)?

HELDRatio1. A ruling in a previous case is binding only insofar as the specific issue in that case is concerned. Parties may be the same but cases are not.2. Provisions under the Declaration of Principles and States are not self-executing. General Reasoning- Neither the doctrine of stare decisis nor that of "law of the case", nor that of conclusive of judgment poses a barrier to a determination of petitioners' right to maintain this suit. - Stare decisis is usually the wise policy. But in this case, concern for stability in decisional law does not call for adherence to what has recently been laid down as the rule. The previous ruling sustaining petitioners' intervention may itself be considered a departure from settled rulings on "real parties in interest" because no constitutional issues were actually involved. Just five years before that ruling this Court had denied standing to a party who, in questioning the validity of another form of lottery, claimed the right to sue in the capacity of taxpayer, citizen and member of the Bar. (Valmonte v. Philippine Charity Sweepstakes, G.R. No. 78716, Sept . 22, 1987) Only recently this Court held that members of Congress have standing to question the validity of presidential veto on the ground that, if it true, the illegality of the veto would impair their prerogative as members of Congress. Conversely if the complaint is not grounded on the impairment of the powers of Congress, legislators do not have stnding the question the validity of any law or official action (Philippine Constitution Association v Enriquez, 235 SCRA 506 (1994))- There is an additional reason for a reexamination of the ruling on standing. The voting on petitioners' standing in the previous case was a narrow one, with seven (7) members sustaining petitioners' standing and six (6) denying petitioners' right to bring the suit. The majority was thus a tenuous one that is not likely to be maintained in any subsequent litigation. In addition, there have been changes in the members of the Court, with the retirement of Justices Cruz and Bidin and the appointment of the writer of this opinion and Justice Francisco. Given this fact it is hardly tenable to insist on the maintenance of the ruling as to petitioners' standing.Specific Reasoning1. NO. The question whether the petitioners have standing to question the Equipment or ELA is a legal question. As will presently be shown, the ELA, which the petitioners seek to declare invalid in this proceeding, is essentially different from the 1993 Contract of lease entered into by the PCSO with the PGMC. Hence the determination in the prior case (G.R. No. 113375) that the petitioner had standing to challenge the validity of the 1993 Contract of Lease of the parties does not preclude determination of their standing in the present suit.- Not only is petitioners' standing a legal issue that may be determined again in this case. It is, strictly speaking, not even the issue in this case, SINCE STANDING IS A CONCEPT IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND HERE NO

CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION IS ACTUALLY INVOLVED. 14 The issue in this case is whether petitioners are the "real parties in interest" within the meaning of Rule 3, §2 of the Rules of Court which requires that "Every action may be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party in interest."- Noting this distinction, petitioners have not shown that they are the real party in interest. They have not demonstrated that the Contract entered into by the PCSO would directly injure or affect their rights.

2. NO. Petitioners argue that inquiry into their right to bring this suit is barred by the doctrine of "law of the case." We do not think this doctrine is applicable considering the fact that while this case is a sequel to G.R. No. 113375, it is not its continuation: The doctrine applies only when a case is before a court a second time after a ruling by an appellate court. - The law of the case, as applied to a former decision of an appellate court, ,merely expresses the practice of the courts in refusing to reopen what has been decided. It differs from res judicata in that the conclusive of the first judgment is not dependent upon its finality. The first judgment is generally, if not universally, not final, It relates entirely to questions of law, and is confined in its questions of law, and is confined in its operation to subsequent proceedings in the same case . . . ." (Municipality of Daet v. Court of Appeals, 93 SCRA 503, 521 (1979) )- It follows that since the present case is not the same one litigated by he parties before in G.R. No. 113375, the ruling there cannot in any sense be regarded as "the law of this case." The parties are the same but the cases are not.- Nor is inquiry into petitioners; right to maintain this suit foreclosed by the related doctrine of "conclusiveness of judgment." According to the doctrine, an issue actually and directly passed upon the and determined in a former suit cannot again be drawn in question in any future action between the same parties involving a different of action. (Peñalosa v. Tuason , 22 Phil. 303, 313 (1912); Heirs of Roxas v. Galido, 108. 582 (1960))- It has been held that the rule on conclusiveness of judgment or preclusion of issues or collateral estoppel does not apply to issues of law, at least when substantially unrelated claims are involved. (Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 162, 59 L. Ed. 2d 210 , 222 (1979); BATOR, MELTZER, MISHKIN AND SHAPIRO, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1058, n. 2 (3rd Ed., 1988)) Following this ruling it was held in Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 92 L. Ed. 898 (1947) that where a taxpayer assigned to his wife interest in a patent in 1928 and in a suit it was determined that the money paid to his wife for the years 1929-1931 under the 1928 assignment was not part of his taxable income, this determination is not preclusive in a second action for collection of taxes on amounts to his wife under another deed of assignment for other years (1937 to 1941). For income tax purposes what is decided with respect to one contract is not conclusive as to any other contract which was not then in issue, however similar or identical it may be. The rule on collateral estoppel. it was held, "must be confined to situations where the matter raised in the second suit is identical in all respects with that decided in the first preceding and where the controlling facts and applicable legal rules remain unchanged." (333 U.S. at 599-600, 92 L. Ed. at 907) Consequently, "if the relevant facts in the two cases are separate even though they may be similar or identical, collateral estoppel does not govern the legal issues which occur in the second case. Thus the second proceeding may involve an instrument or transaction identical with but in a form separable form, the one dealt with in the first proceeding. In that situation a court is free in the second proceeding to make an independent examination of the legal matters at issue. . . ." (333 U.S. at 601, 92 L. Ed. at 908)

14 COMMENT OF BRYAN_SJ: The logic of the Court in this case now becomes clearer: The

concept of legal standing is a constitutional law concept which is INAPPLICABLE IN CASES WHERE THERE ARE NO CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES RAISED. In cases where no constitutional issues are raised the governing principle should be the concept of “real party in interest” in the Rules of Court.

3. NO. These are not, however, self executing provisions, the disregard which can give rise to a cause of action in the courts. - They do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights but guidelines for legislation. Thus, while constitutional policies are invoked, this case involves basically questions of contract law. More specifically, the question is whether petitioners have legal right which has been violated.

SEPARATE OPINION

FELICIANO [dissent]- I find myself regretfully quite unable to join the majority opinion written by my distinguished brother in the Court, Mendoza, J.- I join the penetrating dissenting opinions written by my esteemed brothers Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ. In respect of the matter of locus standi, I would also reiterate the concurring opinion I wrote on that subject in the first Kilosbayan case.1 All the factors which, to my mind, pressed for recognition of locus standi on the part of petitioners in the first Kilosbayan case, still exist and demand, with equal weight and insistence, such recognition in the present or second Kilosbayan case, I fear that the Court may well have occasion in the future profoundly to regret the doctrinal ball and chain that we have today clamped on our own limbs.

PADILLA [concur]- I join the majority in voting for the dismissal of the petition in this case. It is the duty of the Supreme Court to apply the laws enacted by Congress and approved by the President, (unless they are violative of the Constitution) even if such laws run counter to a Member's personal conviction that gambling should be totally prohibited by law.- In my separate concurring opinion in the first lotto case (G.R. No. 113375), expressed the view that the rule on locus standi, being merely a procedural rule, should be relaxed, as the issue then was of paramount national interest and importance, namely, the legality of a lease contract into by PCSO with PGMC whereby the former sought an "on-line high-tech" lottery, undeniably a form of gambling, the terms of which clearly pointed to an "association, collaboration or joint venture" with PGMC.

REGALADO [dissent]- Be that as it may, since the majority opinion has now evolved other adjective theories which are represented to be either different from or ramifications of the original "standing to sue" objection raised in the first lotto case. I will hazard my own humble observations thereon.1. There is, initially, the salvo against the adoption of the "law of the case" doctrine in the original majority ponencia. It is contended that this doctrine requires, for its applicability, an issue involved in a case originating from a lower court which is first resolved by an appellate court, that case being then remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings and with the prior resolution by the higher court of that issue being the "law of the case" in any other proceeding in or a subsequent appeal from the same case. It is insinuated that said doctrine exists only under such a scenario.- It may be conceded that, in the context of the cited cases wherein this doctrine was applied, two "appeals" are generally involved and the issue resolved in the first appeal cannot be reexamined in the second appeal. If so, then what is necessarily challenged in the first recourse to the higher court is either an interlocutory order of the court a quo elevated on an original action for certiorari or an appealable adjudication which nonetheless did not dispose of the entire case below because it was either a special proceeding or an action admitting of multiple appeals.- That is the present reglementary situation in the Philippines which, unfortunately, does not appear to have been taken into account when the double-appeal procedure involved in one particular American concept was cited as authority in the majority opinion. No attempt was made to ascertain whether in the American cases cited the lex fori provided for identical or even

substantial counterparts of our procedural remedies of review by a higher court on either an appeal by certiorari or writ of error, or through an original action of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus. Yet on such unverified premises, and without a showing that the situations are in pari materia, we are told that since the case at bar does not posses the formatted sequence of an initiatory action in a lower court, an appeal to a higher court, a remand to the lower court, and then a second appeal to the higher court, the "law of the case" doctrine cannot apply. I have perforce to reject that submission as I cannot indulge in the luxury of absolute espoused by this majority view.- I fear that this majority rule, has unduly constricted the factual and procedural situations where such doctrine may apply, through its undue insistence on the remedial procedure involved in the proceedings rather than the juridical effect of the pronouncement of the higher court. Even in American law, the "law of the case" doctrine was essentially designed to express the practice of courts generally to refuse to reopen what has been decided 5 and, thereby, to emphasize the rule that the final judgment of the highest court is a final determination of the rights of the parties. 6 That is the actual and basic role that it was conceived to play in judicial determinations, just like the rationale for the doctrines of res judicata and conclusiveness of judgment.- Accordingly, the "law of the case" may also arise from an original holding of a higher court on a writ of certiorari, 7 and is binding not only in subsequent appeals or proceedings in the same case, but also in a subsequent suit between the same parties. 8 What I wish to underscore is that where, as in the instant case, the holding of this highest Court on a specific issue was handed down in an original action for certiorari, it has the same binding effect as it would have had if promulgated in a case on appeal, Furthermore, since in our jurisdiction an original action for certiorari to control and set aside a grave abuse of official discretion can be commenced in the Supreme Court itself, it would be absurd that for its ruling therein to constitute the law of the case, there must first be a remand to a lower court which naturally could not be the court of origin from which the postulated second appeal should be taken.

2. Obviously realizing that continued reliance on the locus standi bar to petitioner's suit is not an ironclad guaranty against it, the majority position has taken a different tack. It now invoked the concept of and the rules on a right of action in ordinary civil actions and, prescinding from its previous positions, insists that what is supposedly determinative of the issue of representation is contract law and not constitutional law. On the predicate that petitioners are not parties to the contract, primarily or subsidiarily, they then are real parties in interest, and for lack of cause of action on their part they have no right of action. Ergo, they, cannot maintain the present petition.As a matter of a conventional rule of procedure, the syllogism of the majority can claim the merit of logic but, even so, only on assumed premises. More importantly, however, the blemish in its new blueprint is that the defense of lack of a right of action is effectively the same as lack of locus standi, that is, the absence of the remedial right to sue. As the commentators of Castille would say, the objection under the new terminology is "lo mismo perro con distinto collar." That re-christened ground, as we shall later see, has already been foreclosed by the judgment of the Court in the first lotto case.It is true that a right of action is the right or standing to enforce a cause of action. For its purposes, the majority urges the adoption of the standard concept of a real party in interest based on his possession of a cause of action. It could not have failed to perceive, but nonetheless refuses to concede, that the concept of a cause of action in public interest cases should not be straitjacketed within its usual narrow confines in private interest litigations.Thus, adverting again to American jurisprudence, there is the caveat that "the adoption of provision requiring that an action be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest does not solve all questions as to the proper person or persons to institute suit, although it obviously simplifies procedures in actions at law. . . There is no clearly defined rule by which one may determine who is or is not real party in interest, nor has there been found any concise definition of the term. Who is the real party in interest depends on the peculiar facts of

each separate case, and one may be a party in interest and yet not be the sole real party in interest." 9 (Emphasis supplied.)The majority opinion quotes the view of a foreign author but unfortunately fails to put the proper emphasis on the portion thereof which I believe should be that which should correctly be stressed, and which I correspondingly reproduce:It is important to note. . . that standing because of its constitutional and public policy underspinnings, is very different from questions relating to whether a particular plaintiff is the real party in interest or has the capacity to sue. Although all three requirements are directed towards ensuring that only certain parties can maintain an action, standing restrictions require a partial consideration of the merits, as well as of broader policy concerns relating to the proper role of the judiciary in certain areas. 10 Indeed, if the majority would have its way in this case, there would be no available judicial remedy against irregularities or excesses in government contracts for lack of a party with legal standing or capacity to sue. This legal dilemma or vacuum is supposedly remediable under a suggestions submitted in the majority opinion, to wit:Denial to petitioners of the right to intervene will not leave without remedy any perceived illegality in the execution of government contracts. Questions as to the nature or validity of public contracts or the necessity for a public bidding before they may be made can be raised in an appropriate complaint before the Commission on Audit or before the Ombudsman. . . In addition, the Solicitor General is authorized to bring an action for quo warranto if it should be thought that a government corporation . . . has offended against its corporate charter or misused its franchise. . .- The majority has apparently forgotten its own argument that in the present case petitioners are not the real parties, hence they cannot avail of any remedial right to file a complaint or suit. It is, therefore, highly improbable that the Commission on Audit would deign to deal with those whom the majority says are strangers to the contract. Again, should this Court now sustain the assailed contract, of what avail would be the suggested recourse to the Ombudsman? Finally, it is a perplexing suggestion that petitioners ask the Solicitor General to bring a quo warranto suit, either in propria persona or ex relatione, not only because one has to contend with that official's own views or personal interests but because he is himself the counsel for respondents in this case. Any proposed remedy must take into account not only the legalities in the case but also the realities of life.

3. The majority believes that in view of the retirement and replacement of two members of the Court, it is time to reexamine the ruling in the first lotto case. A previous judgment of the Court may, of course, be revisited but if the ostensible basis is the change of membership and known positions of the new members anent an issue pending in a case in the Court, it may not sit well with the public as a judicious policy. This would be similar to the situation where a judgment promulgated by the Court is held up by a motion for reconsideration and which motion, just because the present Rules do not provide a time limit for the resolution thereof, stays unresolved until the appointment of members sympathetic thereto. Thus, the unkind criticisms of "magistrate shopping" or "court packing" levelled by disgruntled litigants is not unknown to this Court.- I hold the view that the matter of the right of petitioners to file and maintain this action - whether the objection thereto is premised on lack of locus standi or right of action - has already been foreclosed by our judgment in the first lotto case, G.R. No. 113375. If the majority refuses to recognize such right under the "law of the case" principle, I see no reason why that particular issue can still be ventilated now as a survivor of the doctrinal effects of res judicata. 11 It is undeniable that in that case and the one at bar. there is identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action. Evidently, the judgment in G.R. No. 113375 was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction, it was an adjudication on the merits, and has long become final and executory. There is, to be sure, an attempt to show that the subject matter in the first action is different from that in the instant case, since the former was the original contract and the latter is the supposed expanded contract. I am not persuaded by the proffered distinction.The removal and replacement of some objectionable terms of a contract, which nevertheless continues to operate under the same basis, with on the property,

fore the same purpose, and the same contracting parties does not suffice to extinguish the identity of the subject matter in both cases,. This would be to exalt form over substance. Furthermore, respondents themselves admitted that the new contract is actually the same as the original one, with just some variants in the terms of the latter to eliminate those which were objected to. The contrary assumption now being floated by respondents would create chaos in our remedial and contractual laws, open the door to fraud, and subvert the rules on the finality of judgments.- Yet, even assuming purely ex hypothesi that the amended terms in the expanded lease agreement created a discrete set of litigable violations of the statutory charter of the Philippines Charity Sweepstakes Office, thereby collectively resulting in a disparate actionable wrong or delict, that would merely constitute at most a difference in the causes of action in the former and the present cases. Under Section 49(c). Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, we would still have a situation of collateral estoppel, better known in this jurisdiction as conclusiveness of judgment. Hence, all relevant issues finally adjudged in the prior judgment shall be conclusive between the parties in the case now before us and that definitely includes at the very least the adjudgment therein that petitioners have the locus standi or the right to sue respondents on the contracts concerned.In their case - whether of res judicata, on which I insist, or of conclusiveness of judgment, which I assume arguendo - what is now being primarily resisted is the right of petitioners to sue, aside from the postulated invalidity of the contract for the government-sponsored lottery system. It does seem odd, if not arcane, that petitioners were held to have the requisite locos standi or right of action on said G.R. No. 113375 and, for that matter, were likewise so recognized in the expanded value added tax (EVAT) case, 12 but are now mysteriously divested of the "place of standing" allegedly due to, for legal purposes, a compelling need for reexamination of the doctrine, and, for economic reasons, an obsession for autarky of the nation.

4. I repeat what I said at the outset that this case should be decided on the merits and on substantive considerations, not on dubious technicalities intended to prevent on inquiry into the validity of the supposed amended lease contract. The people are entitled to the benefit of a duly clarified and translucent transaction, just as respondent deserve the opportunity, and should even by themselves primarily seek, to be cleaned of any suspicions or lingering doubts arising from the fact that the sponsors for jail alai and, now, of lotto are different.- On the merits, to obviate unnecessary replication I reiterate my concurrence with the findings and conclusions of Mr. Justice Davide in this dissenting opinion, the presentation whereof is completely devoid of strained or speculative premises, and moreover has the virtue of being based on his first-hand knowledge as a legislator of the very provisions of the law now in dispute. In this instance and absent any other operative data. I find the same to be an amply sufficient and highly meritorious analysis of the controversy on the contract.- One concluding point. I am not impressed by their stance of the majority that our taking cognizance of this case and resolving it on the merits will hereafter invite others to unduly overburden this Court with avoidable importunities. This sounds like a tongue-in-riposte since the Court has clearly indicated that it sets aside objections grounded on judge-made constitutional theories only under cogent reasons of substantial justice and paramount public interest.On the contrary, to pay unqualified obedience to the beguiling locos standi or right of action doctrines posited by the majority in this case would only not be an abdication of a clear judicial duty. It could conceivably result in depriving the people of recourse to us from dubious government contracts through constitutionally outdated or procedurally insipid theories for such stultification. This is a contingency which is not only possible, but probable under our oligarchic society in esse; and not only undesirable, but repugnant within a just regime of law still in posse.

DAVIDE [dissent]- I register a dissenting vote.- I am disturbed by the sudden reversal of our rulings in Kilosbayan, Inc., et al. vs. Guingona, et al. 1 referred to as the first lotto case) regarding the application or interpretation of the exception clause in paragraph B, Section 1 of the Charter of the PCSO (R.A. No. 1169), as amended by B.P. Blg. 442, and on the issue of locus standi of the petitioners to question the contract of lease involving the on-line lottery system entered into between the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and the Philippine Gaming Management Corporation (PGMC). Such reversal upsets the salutary doctrines of the law of the case, res judicata, and stare decisis. It puts to jeopardy the faith and confidence of the people, specially the lawyers and litigants, in the certainly and stability of the pronouncements of this Court. It opens the floodgates to endless litigations for re-examination of such pronouncements and weakens this Court's judicial and moral authority to demand from lower courts obedience thereto and to impse sanctions for their opposite conduct.- It must be noted that the decision in the first lotto case was unconditionally accepted by the PCSO and the PGMC, as can be gleaned from their separate manifestations that they would not ask for its reconsideration but would, instead, negotiate a new equipment lease agreement consistent with the decision and the PCSO's charter and that they would furnish the Court a copy of the new agreement. The decision has, thus, become final on 23 May 1994. 2 - As the writer of the said decision and as the author of the exception to paragraph B, Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as amended, I cannot accept the strained and tenuous arguments adduced in the majority opinion it justly the reversal of our rulings in the first lotto case. While there are exceptions to the aforementioned doctrines and I am not inexorably opposed to upsetting prior decisions if warranted by overwhelming considerations of justice and irresistible desire to rectify an error, none of such considerations and nothing of substance or weight can bring this case within any of the exceptions.- In the said case, we sustained the locus standi of the petitioners, and in no uncertain terms declared:We find the instant petition to be of transcendental importance to the public. The issues it raised are of paramount public interest and of a category even higher than those involved in many of the aforecited cases. The ramifications of such issues immeasurably affect the social, economic, and moral well-being of the people even in the remotest barangays of the country and the counter-productive and retrogressive effects of the envisioned on-line lottery system are as staggering as the billions of pesos it is expected to raise. The legal standing than of the petitioners deserves recognition and, in the exercise of its sound discretion, this Court hereby brushes aside the procedural barrier which the respondents tried to take advantage of.- In this concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Florentino P. Feliciano further showed substantive grounds or considerations of importance which strengthened the legal standing of the petitioners to bring and maintain the action, namely: (a) the public character of the funds or other assets involved in the contract of lease; (b) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or legal provision by the public respondent agency; (c) the lack of any other party with a more direct and specified interest in raising the questions involved therein; and (d) the wide range of impact of the contract of lease and of its implementation.Only last 6 April 1995, in the decision in Tatad vs. Garcia, 3 this Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Camilo D. Quiason who had joined in the dissenting opinions in the first lotto case the petitioners, locus standi therein, invoked and applied the ruling on locus standi in the first lotto case. He stated:The prevailing doctrines in taxpayer's suits are to allow taxpayers to question contracts entered into by the national government or government-owned or controlled corporations allegedly in contravention of the law (Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Guingona, 232 SCRA 110 [1994] and to disallow the same when only municipal contracts are involved (Bugnay Construction and Development Corporation v. Laron, 176 SCRA 240 [1989].

For as long as the ruling in Kilosbayan on locus standi is not reversed, we have no choice but to follow it and uphold the legal standing of petitioners as taxpayers to institute the present action.- Mr. Justice Santiago M. Kapunan, who had also dissented in the first lotto case on the issue of locus standi; unqualifiedly concurred with the majority opinion in Tatad. Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, the writer of the ponencia in this case, also invoked the locus standi ruling in the first lotto case to deny legal standing to Tatad, et al. He said:- Nor do petitioners have standing to bring this suit as citizens. In the cases in which citizens were authorized to sue, this Court found standing because it though the constitutional claims pressed for decision to be of "transcendental importance," as in fact it subsequently granted relief to petitioners by invalidating the challenged statutes or governmental actions. Thus in the Lotto case [Kilosbayan, Inc. vs. Guingona, 232 SCRA 110 (1994)] relief by the majority for upholding petitioner's standing, this Court took into account the "paramount public interest" involved which "immeasurably affect[ed] the social, economic, and moral well-being of the people . . . and the counter-productive and retrogressive effects of the envisioned on-line lottery system." Accordingly, the Court invalidated the contract for the operation of the lottery.- Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa and Associate Justice Abdulwahid A Bidin, Jose A.R. Melo, Reynato S. Puno, Jose C. Vitug, and Ricardo J. Francisco, joined him in his concurring opinion. Except for the Chief Justice who took part in the first lotto case and Justice Francisco who was not yet a member of this Court at the time, the rest of the Justice who joined the concurring opinion of Justice Mendoza had dissented in the lotto case on the said issue.- Under the principle of either the law of the case of res judicata, the PCSO and the PGMC are bound by the ruling in the first lotto case on the locus standi of the petitioners and the application or interpretation of the exception clause in paragraph B, Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as amended. Moreover, that application or interpretation has been laid to rest under the doctrine of stare decisis and has also become part of our legal system pursuant to Article 8 of the Civil Code which provides: 'Judicial decisions applying interpreting the laws or the constitution shall from part of the system of the Philippines."- These doctrines were not adopted whimsically or capriciously. They are based on public policy and other considerations of great importance and should not be discarded or jettisoned in a cavalier fashion. Yet, they are now put to naught in this case.- The principle of the law of the case "is necessary as a matter of policy to end litigation. There would be no end to a suit if every obstinate litigant could, by repeated appeals, compel a court to listen to criticism on their opinions, or speculate on chances from changes in its members." 7 - It is, however, contended that the law of the case is inapplicable that doctrine applies only when a case is before an appellate court a second time after its remand to a lower court. While indeed the statement may be correct, it disregards the fact that the case is nothing but a sequel to and is, therefore, for all intents and purposes, a continuation of the first lotto case. By their conduct, the parties admitted that it is, for which reason the PGMC and the PCSO submitted in the first lotto case a copy of the ELA in question, and the petitioners commenced the instant petition also in the said case. Our resolution that the validity of the ELA could not be decided in the said case because the decision therein had became final does not detract from the fact that this case is but a continuation of the first lotto case or a new chapter in the raping controversy between the petitioners, on the one hand, and the PCSO and the PGMC, on the other, on the operation of the on-line lottery system.Equally unacceptable is the majority opinion's rejection of the related doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment of the ground that the question of standing is a question, as this case involves a different or unrelated contract. The legal question of locus standi which was resolved in favor of the petitioners in the first lotto case is the same in this case and in every subsequent case which would involve contracts relating or incidental to the contract or holding of lotteries by the PCSO in collaboration, association; or joint venture with any person, association, company or entity. And, the contract in question is not different from or unrelated to the first nullified contract, for it in nothing but a

substitute for the latter. Respondent Morato was even candid enough to admit that no new and separate public bidding was conducted for the ELA in question because the PCSO was of the belief that the public bidding for the nullified contract was sufficient.Its reliance on the ruling in Montana vs. United States 8 that preclusion or collateral estoppel does not apply to issues of law, at least when substantially unrelated claims are involved, is misplaced. For one thing, the question of the petitioners' legal standing in the first lotto case and in this case is one and the same issue of law. For another, these cases involve the same and not substantially unrelated subject matter, viz., the second contract between the PCSO and the PGMC on the operation of the on-line lottery system.The majority opinion likewise failed to consider that in the very authority it cited regarding the exception to the rule of issue preclusion (Testament of the Law, 2d Judgments $ 28), the second illustration stated therein is subject to this NOTE: "The doctrine of the stare decisis may lead the court to refuse to reconsider the question of sovereign immunity," which simply means that stare decisis is an effective bar to a re-examination of a prior judgment.The doctrine of stare decisis embodies the legal maxim that a principle or rule of law which has been established by the decision of a court of controlling jurisdiction will be followed in other cases involving a similar situation. It is founded on the necessity for securing certainty and stability in the law and does not require identity or privity of parties. 9 This is explicitly fleshed out in Article 8 of the Civil Code which provides that decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the constitution shall form part of the legal system. Such decisions "assume the same authority as the statute itself and, until authoritatively abandoned, necessarily become, to the extent that they are applicable, the criteria which must control the actuations not only of those called upon to aside thereby but also of those in duty bound to enforce obedience thereto."10 Abandonment thereof must be based only on strong and compelling reasons - which I do not find in this case - otherwise, the becoming virtue of predictabiity which is expected from this Court would be immeasurably affected and the public's confidence in the stability of its solemn pronouncements diminished.The doctrine of res judicata also bars a relitigation of the issue of locus standi and a re-examination of the application or interpretation of the exception clause in paragraph B, Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as amended. Section 49 (b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court on effects of judgment expressly provides:(b)In all other cases the judgment or order is, with respect to the matter cases the judgment or order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to other matter that could have been parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action or special proceedings, litigating for the same thing in the same title and in the same capacity.This doctrine has dual aspects: (1) as a bar to the prosecution of a second action upon the same claim, demand, or cause of action; and (2) as preclusion to the relitigation of particular facts of issues in action between the same parties on a different claim or cause of action. 11 Public policy, judicial orderliness, economy of judicial time, and the interest of litigants as well as the peace and order of society, all require that stability should be accorded judgments: that controversies once decided on their merits shall remain in repose; that inconsistent judicial decisions shall not be made on the same set of facts; and that there be an end to litigation which, without the said doctrine, would be endless. It not only puts an end to strife, but recognizes that certainty in legal relations must be maintained. It produces certainty as to individual rights and gives and respect to judicial proceedings. 12 The justifications given in the majority opinion to underrate the ruling locus standi and to ultimately discard it are unconvincing. It is not at all true, as the majority opinion contends, that "[t]he previous sustaining petitioners intervention may in fact be considered a departure from settled ruling on real party in interest because no constitutional issues were actually involved."It must be pointed out that the rule in ordinary civil procedure on real party in interest was never put in issue in the previous case. It was the clear understanding of the Members of the Court that in the light of the issues raised and the arguments adduced therein, only locus standi deserved consideration. Accordingly, the majority opinion and the separate dissenting opinions therein

dwelt lengthily on locus standi and brought in the process a vast array of authorities on the issue. Moreover, as explicitly stressed in the concurring opinion of Justice Feliciano, both constitutional and legal issues were involved therein. Finally, as shall hereafter be discussed, in public law the rule of real party in interest is subordinate to the doctrine of locus standi.- Equally unconvincing is the majority opinion's contention that the ruling locus standi in the first lotto case may not be preserved because the majority vote sustaining the petitioners' standing was a "tenuous one" that may not be maintained in a subsequent litigation, and that there had been changes in the membership of the Court due to the retirement of Justices Isagani A. Cruz and Abdulwahid A. Bidin and the appointment of Justices Vicente V. Mendoza and Ricardo J. Francisco. It has forgotten that, as earlier stated, the ruling was reiterated in Tatad vs. Garcia. Additionally, when in his concurring opinion in the Tatad case, Justice Mendoza denied locus standi to Tatad, et al., because their case did not have the same importance as the lotto case, he thereby accepted the concession of standing to the petitioners in the lotto case. I wish to stress the fact that all the Justices who had dissented in the first lotto case on the issue of locus standi were either for the majority opinion or for the concurring opinion in the Tatad case. Hence, I can say that the Tatad case has given vigor and strength to the "tenuous" majority in the first lotto case.The majority opinion declares that the real issue in this case is not whether the petitioners have locus standi but whether they are the real parties-in-interest. This proposition is a bold move to set up a bar to taxpayer's suits or cases invested with public interest by requiring strict compliance with the rule on real party in interest in ordinary civil actions, thereby effectively subordinating to that rule the doctrine of locus standi. I am not prepared to be a party to that proposition.- The downgrading of locus standi and its subordination to the restrictive rule on real party in interest cannot be justified by the claim that is involved here is contract law, not constitutional law. True, contract law is involved. We are not, however, dealing here with an ordinary contract between private parties, but a contract between a corporation wholly owned by the government - hence, an instrumentality of the government - and a private corporation for the contract of the lotto, which is invested with paramount and transcendental public interest and other public policy considerations because the lotto has counter - productive and retrogressive effects which are as staggering as the billions of pesos it is expected to raise and provokes issues that immeasurably affect the social, economic, and moral well-being of the people. We said so in the first lotto case.

GARCIA V BOARD OF INVESTMENTSGUTIERREZ; November 9, 1990

FACTS- A petition to annul and set aside the decision of the Board of Investments (BOI)/ Department of Trade and Industry approving the transfer of site of the proposed petrochemical plant from Bataan to Batangas and the shift of feedstock for that plant from naphtha only to naphtha and/or liquefied petroleum gas (LPG). - P.D. No. 1803 reserved 576 hectares of public domain in Lamao, Libay, Bataan for the Petrochemical Industrial Zone under the administration, management and ownership of the Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC).- Taiwanese investors in a petrochemical project formed the Bataan Petrochemical Corporation (BPC) and applied with BOI for registration as a new domestic producer of petrochemicals. It specified Bataan as plant site, and one of the terms and conditions for registration was the use of naphtha cracker and naphtha as feedstock for fuel for its plant, which was to be a joint venture with PNOC. BPC was issued a certificate of registration on Feb. 24, 1988.- BPC was given pioneer status ands accorded fiscal and other incentives, like, (1) exemption from taxes on raw materials, (2) eliminating the 48% ad valorem tax on naphtha if and when it is used as raw materials for the petrochemical plant.

- In February 1989, A.T. Chong, Chairman of USI Far East Corporation, the major investor in BPC expressed to DTI Secretary his desire to amend the original registration certification of its project by changing the job site from Bataan to Batangas because of the insurgency and unstable labor situation in Bataan and the presence in Batangas of a huge LPG depot owned by Philippine Shell Corporation. Other requested amendments are as follows: (1) increasing the investment amount from $220 million to $320 million; (2) increasing the production capacity of its naphtha cracker, polythylene plant and polypropylene plant; (3) changing the feedstock from naphtha only to naphtha and/or LPG. - On May 25, 1989, BOI approved the revision stating that, The BOI recognizes and respects the principle that the final choice is still with the proponent who would in the final analysis provide the funding or risk capital for the project. - In the petition entitled “Congressman Enrique T. Garcia v. The Board of Investments”, this court ordered BOI as follows: (1) to publish the amended application for registration of the Bataan Petrochemical Corporation, (2) to allow the petitioner to have access to its records on the original and amended applications for registration, as a petrochemical manufacturer, of the respondent Bataan Petrochemical Corporation, excluding, however, privileged papers containing its trade secrets and other business and financial information, (3) to set for hearing the petitioner’s opposition to the amended application in order that he may present at such hearing all the evidence in his possession in support of his opposition to the transfer of the site of the BPC petrochemical plant to Batangas.- Garcia filed motion for reconsideration asking the Court to rule on whether or not the investor given the initial inducements and other circumstances surrounding its first choice of plant site may change simply because it has the final choice on the matter. The Court merely ruled that the petitioner appears to have lost interest in the case by his failure to appear in the hearing that was set by BOI.- A motion for reconsideration of said resolution was filed, asking that the Court resolve whether or not the foreign investor has the right of final choice of plant site; that the non-attendance of the petitioner at the hearing was because the decision was not yet final and executory, and therefore petitioner has not waived his right. Court resolution stated that BOI, not the investor has final choice on the matter and that even a choice approved by BOI may not be ‘final’ for supervening circumstances and changes in the conditions of a place may dictate a corresponding change in the choice of plant site in order that the project will not fail. However, petition was denied.- Instant petition relies on the ruling that investor has no right of final choice.

ISSUES1. WON the petrochemical plant should remain in Bataan or should be transferred to Batangas2. WON its feedstock originally of naphtha only should be changed to naphtha and/or LPG the approved amended application of the BPC, now Luzon Petrochemical Corporation (LPC)3. WON the categorical admission of the BOI that it is the investor who has the final choice of the site and the decision on the feedstock constitutes a grave abuse of discretion for the BOI to yield to the wishes of the investor, national interest notwithstanding

HELD1. On Justiciablity: There is an actual controversy. The Court has constitutional duty to step into this controversy to determine the paramount issue.2. The decision to transfer to Batangas and to shift the use of feedstock is unjustified.- The Bataan site is ideal, the result of careful study.- The respondents have not shown nor reiterated that the alleged peace and order situation in Bataan or unstable labor situation warrant a transfer to the plant site in Batangas.- The Bataan Refining Corporation, a government owned Filipino corporation, can provide the feedstock requirement of the plant in Bataan, whereas the

country is short of LPG and there is a need to import for the use of the plant in Batangas. Transfer will divert scarce dollars unnecessarily. - R.A. 6767 exempted naphtha as feedstock from ad valorem tax but excluded LPG from the exemption. This law was specifically for the petrochemical industry. Neither BOI nor a foreign investor should disregard or contravene expressed policy by shifting the feedstock from naphtha to LPG. - Capital requirements would be greatly minimized if LPC does not have to buy the land for the project and its feedstock shall be limited to naphtha.- With the plant site in Bataan, the PNOC shall be a partner, thus giving the government participation in the management of the project instead of a firm which is a huge multinational corporation.3. BOI committed a grave abuse of discretion in approving the transfer of the petrochemical plant from Bataan to Batangas and authorizing the change of feedstock from naphtha only to naphtha and/or LPG for the main reason that the final say is in the investor all other circumstances to the contrary not withstanding.- The government has already granted incentives for this particular venture. Through the BOI decision, it surrenders even the power to make a company abide by its initial choice, a choice free from any suspicion of unscrupulous machinations and a choice which is undoubtedly in the best interests of the Filipino people.- This is a repudiation of the independent policy of the government expressed in numerous laws (i.e. Art. 2, 1987 Omnibus Investments Code) and the Constitution (Sec. 1 and 10, Art. XII; Sec. 19, Art. II) to run its own affairs the way it deems best for the national interest.Disposition: Petition granted. Decision set aside as null and void.

SEPARATE OPINION

GRINO-AQUINO [dissenting]- There is no provision in the 1987 Investments Code prohibiting the amendment of the investor’s application for registration of its project, neither does the law prohibit the BOI from approving the amended application.- The matter of choosing an appropriate site for the investor’s project is a political and economic decision which only the executive branch, as implementer of policy formulated by the legislature, is empowered to make. It is not for this Court to determine what is, or should be, the BOI’s “final choice” of plant site and feedstock.- The petitioner’s recourse against the BOI’s action is by an appeal to the President (Sec. 36, 1987 Investments Code), not to this Court.

MELENCIO-HERRERA [dissenting]- [The majority Decision] has made a sweeping policy determination and has unwittingly transformed itself into what might be termed a “government by the Judiciary,” something never intended by the framers of the Constitution when they provided for separation of powers among the three co-equal branches of government and excluded the Judiciary from policy-making.

ART VI: LEGISLATURE

TOLENTINO V SECRETARY OF FINANCEMENDOZA; August 25, 1994

FACTS- These are original actions in SC. Certiorari and prohibition, challenging the constitutionality of RA 7716.- RA 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system by amending National Internal Revenue Code.

- Bet Jul 22, 1992 and Aug 31, 1993, bills were introduced in House of Reps to amend NIRC relative to VAT. These were referred to House Ways and Means Committee w/c recommended for approval H No 11197.- H No. 11197 was considered on second rdg and was approved by House of Reps after third and final rdg.- It was sent to Senate and was referred to the Senate Committee on Ways and Means. The Committee submitted report recommending approval of S No 1630, submitted in substitution of S No 1129, taking into consideration PS Res No 734 and H No 11197- Senate approved S No 1630 on second rdg, and on third rdg by affirmative votes of 13 and 1 abstention.- H No 11197 and S No 1630 were referred to conference committee w/c after meeting 4 times, recommended that HB in consolidation w/ SB be approved in accordance w/ bill as reconciled and approved by the conferees.- The Conference Committee Bill was approved by House of Reps and Senate. The enrolled bill was presented to President who, on May 5, 1994 signed it. It became RA 7716. On May 12, it was published in 2 newspapers of gen circulation and it took effect on May 28.- RA 7716 amended § 103 and made print media subject to VAT in all aspect of operations. However, Sec of Finance issued Revenue Regulations No. 11-94 exempting circulation income of print media. Income fr advertisements are still subject to VAT.- Implementation was suspended until Jun 30 to allow time for registration of businesses. Implementation was stopped by TRO fr Court, by vote of 11 to 4.- Petitioners contend:Re: Art VI Sec 24

1. Although H No 11197 originated fr House of Reps, it was not passed by Senate but was consolidated w/ Senate version in the Conference Committee to produce the bill. The verb “shall originate” is qualified by the word “exclusively”.2. The constitutional design is to limit Senate’s power in revenue bills to compensate for the grant to the Senate of treaty-ratifying power.3. S No 1630 was passed no in substitution of H No 11197 but of another Senate bill (S No 1129). Senate merely took H No 11197 into consideration in enacting S No 1630.

Re: Art VI Sec 26(2)1. The second and third rdgs were on the same day, Mar 24, 1994.2. The certification of urgency was invalid bec there was no emergency. The growing budget deficit was not an unusual condition in this country.3. Also, it was S No 1630 that was certified urgent, not H No 11197.

Re: BCC acted within its power 1. RA 7716 is the bill which the BCC prepared. BCC included provisions not found in the HB or SB and these were “surreptitiously” inserted. BCC met behind closed doors.2. Incomplete remarks of members are marked in the stenographic notes by ellipses.3. The Rules of the two chambers were disregarded in preparation of BCC Report because Report didn’t contain “detailed and explicit statement of changes”4. It is required that the Committee’s report undergo three rdgs in the two houses.

- Petitioner Philippine Airlines Inc contends:Re: Art VI Sec 26(1)

1. Neither H No 11197 nor S No 1630 provided for removal of exemption of PAL transactions fr payment of VAT and this was made only by the BCC. This was not reflected in the title.2. Besides, amendment of PAL’s franchise may be made only by special law which will expressly amend the franchise (§24 of PD 1590).

- Petitioner Cooperative Union of the Philippines contends:Re: Art III Sec 1

1. Withdrawal of exemption of some cooperatives while maintaining that granted to electric cooperatives not only goes against policy to promote cooperatives but also violate equal protection of law.

Petitioner Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Association contends:2. VAT will reduce mark up of its members by as much as 90%.Petitioner Philippine Press Institute contends:3. VAT will drive some of its members out of circulation.

- Petitioner Philippine Press Institute contends:Re: Art III Sec 4

1. It questions law bec exemption previously granted to press under NIRC was withdrawn. Although exemption was subsequently restored, PPI says there’s possibility that exemption may still be removed by mere revocation by Secretary of Finance.Also, there is still unconstitutional abridgment of press freedom because of VAT on gross receipts on advertisements.2. RA 7716 singled out press for discriminatory treatment, giving broadcast media favored treatment.3. Imposing VAT only on print media whose gross sales exceeds P480,000 but not more than P750,000 is discriminatory.4. The registration provision of the law is invalid when applied to the press.

- Petitioner Philippine Bible Society contends:Re: Art III Sec 5

1. Secretary of Finance has no power to grant tax exemption because that power is vested in Congress and the Secretary’s duty is to execute the law and the removal of exemption of religious articles violates freedom of thought/conscience.

- Petitioner Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Association contends:Re: Art III Sec 10

1. Imposition of VAT violates constitutional provision on no law impairing obligation of contracts

- Petitioner Philippine Educational Publishers Association contends:Re: Art II Sec 17

1. Increase in price of books and educ materials will violate govt mandate to prioritize education

ISSUESProcedural1. WON there’s violation of Art VI § 24 of Consti (revenue bill originating exclusively fr House of Reps)2. WON there’s violation of Art VI § 26(2) of Consti (three readings on separate days)3. WON the Bicameral Conference Committee acted within its power4. WON there’s violation of Art VI § 26(1) of Consti (only one subject which is expressed in title) / WON amendment of § 103 of NIRC is fairly embraced in title of RA 7716 although no mention is made thereinSubstantive: 5. WON Art III § 1 (deprivation of life/liberty/property; equal protection) is violated6. WON Art III § 4 (freedom of speech/expression/press) is violated7. WON Art III § 5 (free exercise of religion) is violated8. WON Art III § 10 (no law impairing obligation of contracts) is violated9. WON Art VI § 28(1) (uniform/equitable; evolve progressive system of taxation) is violated10. WON Art VI § 28(3) (church/parsonage etc. for religious purpose exempt) is violated11. WON Art II § 17 (gov’t priority on education, science and tech) is violated

HELD- Not all are judicially cognizable, bec not all Consti provisions are self executing. Other govt depts. are also charged w/ enforcement of Consti.

ProceduralWhatever doubts there may be as to the formal validity of the RA must be resolved in its favor. An enrolled copy of a bill is conclusive not only of its provisions but also of its due enactment. This is not to say that the enrolled bill doctrine is absolute. But where allegations are nothing more than

“surreptitiously” inserting provisions, SC declines going behind enrolled copy of bill. SC gives due respect to other branches of gov’t.

1. NO there is no violation of Art VI Sec 24a. It’s not the law but the revenue bill which is required to originate exclusively in the House of Reps. A bill originating in House may undergo extensive changes in Senate. To insist that a revenue statute (and not the bill) must be the same as the House bill would deny the Senate’s power to concur with and propose amendments. It would violate coequality of the legislative power of the two houses.b. Legislative power is issue here. Treaty-ratifying power is not legislative power but an exercise of check on executive power.c. There’s no difference bet Senate preserving house bill then writing its own version on one hand and on the other hand, separately presenting a bill of its own on the subject matter. Consti simply says that it’s the initiative for filing the bill that must come fr House of Reps. The Reps are expected to be more sensitive to the local needs. Nor does Consti prohibit filing in Senate of substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of bill fr House so long as action by Senate is withheld pending receipt of House bill. It was only after Senate rcvd H No 11197 that legislation in respect of it began w/ referral to Senate Committee on Ways and Means.

2. NO there is no violation of Art VI Sec 26(2)a. It was because Pres certified S No 1630 as urgent. This certification dispensed w/ printing and rdg the bill on separate days. The phrase “except when the President certifies to the necessity…” qualifies two stated conditions: (1) the bill has passed 3 rdgs on separate days and (2) it has been printed in final form and distributed 3 days before finally approved. To construe that the “except” clause dispenses only with printing would violate grammar rules and would also negate the necessity of the immediate enactment of the bill.Example is RA 5440 which had 2nd and 3rd rdgs on the same day after bill had been certified urgent.b. No Senator controverted factual basis of the certification and this should not be rvwd by the Court.c. It was S No 1630 that Senate was considering. When matter was before the House, Pres likewise certified H No 9210 then pending.

3. YES the BCC acted within its powera. “Give and take” often marks the proceedings of BCC. There was also nothing unusual in the executive sessions of the BCC.Under congressional rules, BCCs are not expected to make material changes but this is a difficult provision to enforce. The result could be a third version, considered an amendment in nature of substitute, the only requirement that the 3rd version be germane to subject of the HB and SB. It is w/in power of BCC to include an entirely new provision. After all, report of BCC is not final and still needed approval of both houses to be valid.b. This could have been caused by stenographer’s limitations or to incoherence that sometimes characterize conversations.c. Report used brackets and capital letters to indicate the changes. This is standard practice in bill-drafting.Also, SC is not proper forum for these internal rules.d. If this were the case, there would be no end to negotiation since each house may seek modifications of the compromise bill. That requirement must be construed only to mean bills introduced for the first time in either house, not the BCC report.

4. NO, there is no violation of Art VI Sec 26(1)a. Since the title states that the purpose is to expand the VAT system, one way is to widen the base by withdrawing some exemptions. To insist that PD 1590 in addition to § 103 of NIRC be mentioned in title, would be to insist that title of a bill be a complete index of its content.

b. That was just to prevent amendment by an inconsistent statute. And under Consti, grant of franchise for operation of public utility is subject to amendment, alteration, repeal by Congress when common good requires.

Substantive- as RA 7716 merely expands base of VAT as provided in the orig VAT law, debate on wisdom of law should be in Congress.

5. NO there is no clear showing that Art III Sec 1 is violated- When freedom of the mind is imperiled by law, it is freedom that commands respect; when property is imperiled, lawmakers’ judgment prevails.

a. This is actually a policy argument.b. This is a mere allegation.c. This is also short of evidence.

6. NO Art III Sec a is not violateda. There’s no violation of press freedom. The press is not immune fr general regulation by the State.b. It’s not that it is being singled out, but only because of removal of exemption previously granted to it by law. Also, the law would be discriminatory if the only privilege withdrawn is that to the press. But that is not the case. The statute applies to a wide range of goods and services.c. It has not been shown that the class subject to tax has been unreasonably narrowed. This limit does not apply to press alone but to all sales.d. The fixed amount of P1000 is for defraying part of the cost of registration. Registration is a central feature of the VAT system. It is a mere administrative fee, not a fee on exercise of privilege or right.

7. NO Art III Sec 5 is not violateda. Consti does not prohibit imposing generally applicable sales and use tax on sale of religious materials by religious org.

8. NO Art III Sec 10 is not violateda. Parties to a contract can’t fetter exercise of taxing power of State. Essential attributes of sovereign is read into contracts as a basic postulate of legal order.

9. VAT distributes tax burden to as many goods and svcs as possible, particularly to those w/in reach of higher income grps. Business establishments with annual gross sales of < P500,000 are exempted.Also, regressivity is not a negative standard. What is required is that we “evolve” a progressive taxation system.10. Consti does not prohibit imposing generally applicable sales and use tax on sale of religious materials by religious org.11. NO there is no violation of Art II Sec 17

a. Same reason/ratio under issues on free speech/press.

Decision Petitions are dismissed.Notes VAT is levied on sale, barter/exchange of goods and svcs. Then, it’s equal to 10% of gross selling price

Narvasa, Separate OpinionCruz, Separate OpinionPadilla, Separate OpinionVitug, Separate OpinionRegalado, Dissenting OpinionDavide, Dissenting OpinionRomero, Dissenting OpinionBellosillo, Dissenting OpinionPuno, Dissenting Opinion

ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST V ERMITAAUSTRIA-MARTINEZ; September 1, 2005

FACTS- The increasing budget problems of the government in the form of fiscal problems, revenue generation, and fiscal allocation inadequacy prompted the congress to create a law to address such problems. This gave way to the Expanded Vat Law (E-Vat Law) otherwise known as Republic Act No. 9337. The case revolves around the constitutionality of the Republic Act 9337 that increased the Value-Added Tax percentage from 10% to 12%. In this case there were 4 different petitioners: Abakada Guro Party List, Association of Pilipinas Shell Dealers/Petron/Caltex, Senators Pimentel/ Estrada, L./ Estrada, J. / Lacson/ Lim/ Madrigal/ Osmeña, Congressman Escudero, and Governor Garcia. All of them question the constitutionality of RA 9337.- Backgrounder on Value-Added Tax (VAT):

> VAT is a tax on spending or consumption. It is levied on the sale, barter, exchange, or lease of goods or properties and services. > It is an indirect tax on expenditure. The seller of goods or services may pass on the amount of tax paid to the buyer. VAT is intended to fall on the immediate buyers and end-consumers.

- RA 9337’s legislative history is as follows:It originated from House Bill 3555 that was approved on the 27th of January 2005 and House Bill 3705 that was approved on the 28th of February 2005 and Senate Bill 1950 that was approved on the 13th of April 2005. This was later consolidated the Bicameral Conference Committee. The Bicameral Conference Committee inserted and deleted some of the original provisions. The Bill was approved on the 11th of May 2005 by the Senate and 10 th of May 2005 by the House of Representatives.

ISSUESProcedural1. WON the Bicameral Conference Committee has strictly complied with the rules of both houses thereby remaining within the jurisdiction conferred upon it by congress.2. WON the Bicameral Conference Committee violated Article VI Sec 26 that states that no amendment would be done after three readings.3. WON there was a violation of the Origination Clause as stated in Art VI Sec 24.Substantive4. WON there was undue delegation to the President and Secretary of Finance.5. WON a VAT law such as that of RA 9337 is in violation of the Constitutional provision Art VI Sec 28 (1) that requires taxation to be uniform, equitable and that the Congress shall evolve a progressive system of taxation.

HELD1. The Supreme Court decided that it would not rule on the violation of the senate and house rules unless there is a showing that it is in clear violation of a constitutional provision or of the rights of private individuals. (favorite ratio Ü)2. No, because the amendment rule refers only to the procedure to be followed by each house of Congress with regard to bills in each of the said respective houses before the bill is transmitted to the other house for its concurrence and amendment.3. No, the Senate within the said provision only proposed amendments after the House Bills were approved. The Bill still originated through the House of Representatives.4. No, because the President is just executing the law and is still working within the standard and policy of the law. The Secretary of Finance is also not given undue delegation as he is considered as an alter ego of the president thus following the same logic, he is only executing the law. 5. While the VAT is currently not yet progressive it still is directed towards a goal of a progressive taxation.

SEPARATE OPINION

PANGANIBAN

Sections 1, 2, and 3 of RA 9337 is unconstitutional as 1) the increase of tax rates on domestic, resident foreign and nonresident foreign corporations, 2) the increase of tax credit against taxes due from nonresident foreign corporations on intercorporate dividends, and 3) the reduction of the allowable deduction for interest expense were not really part of the House version of the E-VAT Law therefore in violation of the origination clause in Article VI Section 24.

BENGZON V SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEEPADILLA; November 20, 1991

FACTS- Petition for prohibition to review the decision of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee- 7/30/1987: RP, represented by the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), filed w/ the Sandiganbayan the civil case no. 0035, “RP vs. Benjamin ‘Kokoy’ Romualdez, et al.” -The complaint alleges that defendants Benjamin and Juliette Romualdez took advantage of their relationship w/ Defendants Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos to engage in schemes to enrich themselves at the expense of the Plaintiff and the Filipino People, among others:-obtaining control over Meralco, Benguet Mining Co., Shell, PCI Bank, etc., selling interests to PNI Holdings, Inc. (corporators, Bengzon Law Offices), the concealment of the assets subject to the complaint from the PCGG under the veil of corporate identity, etc.8/2-6/1988: reports circulate of the sale of the Romualdez companies for 5M (far below market value) without PCGG approval to the Ricardo Lopa Group, owned by Pres. Aquino’s brother-in-law, Ricardo Lopa–Sen. Enrile called upon the Senate to investigate a possible violation of S5 of RA 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act w/c prohibits any relative of the President by affinity or consanguinity up to the 3rd civil degree, to intervene in any transaction w/ the government-the matter was referred to the Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers (Blue Ribbon Committee)-the Committee subpoenaed the petitioners and Ricardo Lopa to testify on “what they know” about the sale of the 36 Romualdez corporations-at the hearing, Lopa and Bengzon declined to testify, the former invoking the due process clause, and both averring that such testimonies would “unduly prejudice” the defendants of civil case no.0035-petitioners thus filed the present petition for prohibition, praying for a temporary restraining order and/or injunctive relief, claiming that the Committee acted in excess of its jurisdiction and legislative purpose-the Committee claims that the Court cannot enjoin the Congress or its committees from making inquiries in aid of legislation, under the doctrine of separation of powers (quoting Angara v. Comelec)-the Court finds this contention untenable and is of the view that it has the jurisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries and determine the scope and extent of the power of the Blue Ribbon Committee

ISSUES1. WON the Blue Ribbon Committee’s inquiry is in aid of legislation. 2. WON Congress is encroaching on the exclusive domain of another branch of government.3. WON the inquiry violates the petitioners’ right to due process.

HELD1. NO Blue Ribbon Committee’s inquiry is not in aid of legislation- Sen. Enrile’s inquiry merely intended to find out WON Ricardo Lopa had any part in the alleged sale of the Romualdez corporations—there was no intended

legislation as required by A6 S21 of the constitution. As held in Jean L. Arnault v. Leon Nazareno et al., the inquiry must be material or necessary to the exercise of a power vested in the Committee by the Constitution. In Watkins v. US it was held that Congress’ power of inquiry is broad but limited, that is, it may not pry into private affairs if such actions are not in furtherance of a legitimate task of congress—no inquiry is an end in itself.2. YES Congress is encroaching on the exclusive domain of another branch of government- Since the issue had been pre-empted by the Sandiganbayan, any further investigation by Congress would only serve to complicate matters and produce conflicting opinions—as held in Baremblatt v. US, Congress cannot inquire into matters w/c are exclusively the concern of the Judiciary.3. YES the inquiry violates the petitioners’ right to due process- It has been held that “a congressional committee’s right to inquire is subject to all relevant limitations placed by the Constitution on governmental action, including…the Bill of Rights”. As held in Hutcheson v. US, it can’t be assumed that legislative purpose is always justified by public need; Congress cannot tread on private rights. The doctrine in Cabal v. Kapunan states that the Constitutional right against self-incrimination extends to all proceedings sanctioned by law and in cases in w/c the witness is an accused. Disposition the petitioners may not be compelled by the Committee to appear, testify, and produce evidence before it because such inquiries would not be in aid of legislation and if pursued, would be violative of the principle separation of powers between the legislative and the judicial departments, as ordained by the Constitution. The petition is GRANTED.

SEPARATE OPINION

GUTIERREZ [dissent]

Re: WON the Blue Ribbon Committee’s inquiry is in aid of legislation.-the power of Congress to conduct investigations is inherent and needs no textual grant—even so, it is expressly granted by A6 S21.Barsky v. US: the possibility that invalid as well as valid legislation might ensue from an inquiry does not limit the power of inquiryUS v. Deutch: Congress has the right to secure information in order to determine WON to legislate on a particular subject matter on w/c it is w/in its constitutional powers to act.US v. Orman: where the information sought concerns what Congress can legislate, a legitimate legislative purpose must be presumed.-the requirement that an inquiry be “in aid of legislation” is easier to establish here where Congress’ legislative field is unlimited unlike in the US. Also, it is not necessary that every question be material to the proposed legislation, but directly related to the subject of the inquiry.-the legislative purpose is distinctly different from the judicial purpose; Congress may investigate for its own purposes even thought the subjects of the investigation are currently under trial.

Re: WON the inquiry violates the petitioners’ right to due process.-A6 S21 provides that “the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.”However, such a restriction does not call for the complete prohibition of such investigations where a violation of a basic right is claimed, but rather only requires that such rights be respected. -the right against self-incrimination may only be invoked when incriminating questions are posed, but the witness may not refuse to take the witness stand completely. In the case at bar, no incriminating questions had been asked, hence the allegation of violation of rights is premature.

CRUZ [dissent]

Re: WON the Blue Ribbon Committee’s inquiry is in aid of legislation.

Arnault v. Nazareno: the Court is bound to presume that an action of a legislative body is w/ legitimate object if it is capable of being so construed, and It has no right to assume the contrary.-an inquiry into the expenditure of all public money, in this case, the possible violation of RA 3019 in the disposition of the Romualdez corporations, is an indispensable duty of the legislatureMcgrain v. Daugherty: it is not necessary that the resolution ordering an investigation …expressly state that the object of the inquiry is to obtain data in aid of proposed legislation

Re: WON the inquiry violates the petitioners’ right to due process.-the petitioners are not facing criminal charges; as ordinary witnesses, they may only invoke the right against self-incrimination only when such a question is posed, and cannot refuse taking the witness stand outright.

SENATE V ERMITACARPIO-MORALES;

FACTS- this is a consolidation of various petitions for certiorari and prohibition challenging the constitutionality of E.O. no. 46415 issued Sept. 28, 2005- Consti Provisions allegedly violated: Art. VI Sec. 1, 21, 22,; Art. III Sec. 4, 7; Art. II Sec. 28; Art. XI Sec 1; Art. XIII Sec. 16- Between Sept. of 2005 to Feb. 2006, various Senate Investigation Committees issued invitations to various officials of the Executive Dept. including the AFP and PNP for them to appear in public hearings on inquiries concerning mainly: (A) The alleged overpricing in the NorthRail Project (B) the Wire-Tapping activity (C) the Fertilizer scam (D) the Venable contract - The respective officials of the Executive Dept. filed requests for postponement of hearings for varying reasons such as existence of urgent operational matters, more time to prepare a more comprehensive report, etc. Sen. Drilon, however, did not accede to their requests because the requests were sent belatedly and that preparations and arrangements have already been completed. - On Sept. 28, 2005, Pres. Arroyo issued E.O. 464 which took effect immediately. Citing E.O. 464, the Executive Dept. officials subject to Senate investigations claimed that they were not allowed to appear before any Senate or Congressional hearings without consent (written approval) from the President, which had not been granted unto them; their inability to attend due to lack of appropriate clearance from the Pres. pursuant to E.O. 464. Thereafter, several cases were filed challenging E.O. 464 and praying for the issuance of a TRO enjoining respondents from implementing, enforcing, and observing the assailed order. Respondent Executive Secretary Ermita et al., prayed for dismissal of petitions for lack of merit.

ISSUESPrimary Issue 1. WON E.O. 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in the Congress Secondary Issues2. Justiciability of the case:

a. Legal standing of petitioners:G.R. 169777 Senate of the Phils.G.R. 169659 BAYANMUNA, COURAGE, CODALG.R. 169660 Francisco ChavezG.R. 169667 Alternative Law Groups (ALG) G.R. 169834 PDP-Laban G.R. 121246 Integrated Bar of the Phils. (IBP)

b. Actual Case or Controversy

15 E.O. 464 “Ensuring observance of the principle of separation of powers, adherence to the rule on

executive privilege and respect for the rights of public officials appearing in legislative inquiries in aid of legislation under the Constitution, and for other purposes.”

3. WON E.O. 464 violates the right of the people to information on matters of public concern.4. WON respondents have committed grave abuse of discretion when they implemented E.O. 464 prior to its publication in a newspaper of general circulation. HELDPrimary Issue1. Ratio It is impermissible to allow the executive branch to withhold information sought by the Congress in aid of legislation, without it asserting a right to do so, and without stating reasons therefor.- Although the executive Dept. enjoys the power of executive privilege, Congress nonetheless has the right to know why the executive dept. considers requested information privileged. E.O. 464 allows the executive branch to evade congressional requests for information without the need of clearly asserting a right to do so and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By mere expedient of invoking provisions of E.O. 464, the power of Congress is frustrated. Resort to any means by which officials of the executive branch could refuse to divulge information cannot be presumed to be valid. Reasoning Executive Privilege-The power of the President and other high-level executive branch officers to withhold certain types of information of a sensitive character from Congress, the courts and the public.- The Power of Inquiry (in aid of legislation) Art. VI Sec.21This is the power of the Legislature to make investigations and exact testimony that it may exercise its legislative functions advisedly and effectively. It gives the Congress the power to compel the appearance of executive officials to comply with its demands for information. - Inquiry in Art. VI Sec. 22 (question hour) As determined from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, this provision was intended to be distinguished from inquiries in aid of legislation, in that attendance here is merely discretionary on the part of the department heads. - Sec. 1 of E.O. 464Its requirement to secure presidential consent, limited only to executive dept. heads and to appearances in the question hour (because of its specific reference to sec. 22 of art VI) makes it valid on its face. - Sec. 2 (a) of E.O. 464 It merely provides guidelines binding only on the heads of office mentioned in section 2(b), on what is covered by the executive privilege. It does not purport to be conclusive on the other branches of government. It may be construed as a mere expression of opinion by the Pres. regarding the nature and scope of executive privilege.- Sec. 2 (b) of E.O. 464Provides that once the head of office determines that a certain info. is privileged, such determination is presumed to bear the President’s authority and has the effect of prohibiting the official from appearing before Congress, only to the express pronouncement of the Pres. that it is allowing the appearance of such official. It allows the Pres. to authorize claims of privilege by mere silence, and such presumptive authorization is contrary to the exceptional nature of the privilege. Due to the fact that executive privilege is of extraordinary power, the Pres. may not authorize its subordinates to exercise it. Such power must be wielded only by the highest official in the executive hierarchy.- Sec. 3 of E.O. 464 Requires all public officials enumerated in section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress. The enumeration is broad. It is invalid per se. In so far as it does not assert but merely implies the claim of executive privilege. It does not provide precise and certain reasons for the claim. Mere invocation of E.O. 464 coupled with an announcement that the President has not given her consent, is woefully insufficient for Congress to determine whether the withholding of information is

justified under the circumstances of each case, severely frustrating its power of inquiry.

Secondary Issues 2. a. Regarding Legal Standing of petitioners:

Rule 1: Legislators have standing to maintain inviolate the prerogative, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in their office and are allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action which they claim infringes upon their prerogatives as legislators. Rule 2: To be accorded standing on the ground of transcendental importance there must be a showing of: 1. the character of the funds (public)/assets involved 2. a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition 3. lack of a party with a more direct and specific interest in raising the questions raised.

The Senate of the Philippines- The Senate, including its individual members, by virtue of their fundamental right for intelligent public decision-making and sound legislation is the proper party to assail an executive order which allegedly stifles the ability of the members of Congress to access information crucial to law-making. It has a substantial and direct interest over the outcome of such a controversy.Party List (BayanMuna, COURAGE, CODAL) - The party-list representatives have standing, it is sufficient that a claim is made that E.O. 464 infringes on their constitutional rights and duties as members of Congress to conduct investigations in aid of legislation and conduct oversight functions in the implementation of laws. IBP, Chavez, ALG (invoking right to info. on matters of public concern) - When suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner in assailing the constitutionality of laws must be direct and personal. The Court held in Francisco v. Francisco that when a proceeding involves assertion of a public right, the mere fact that the person filing is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal interest.PDP-Laban (claiming standing due to the transcendental importance of issue)- There being no public funds involved and there being parties with more direct and specific interest in the controversy (the Senate and BayanMuna), gives PDP-Laban no standing. b. Actual case or controversy (was not taken up by the Court) - A challenged order which has already produced results consequent to its implementation and where such results are the subject of questions of constitutionality, is ripe for adjudication. - The implementation of E.O. 464 has resulted in the officials excusing themselves from attending the Senate hearings. It would be sheer abandonment of duty if the Court would refrain from passing upon the constitutionality of E.O. 464.3. Yes. Congressional investigations in aid of legislation are presumed to be a matter of public concern, therefore, it follows that any executive issuance tending to unduly limit disclosures of information in such investigations deprives the people of information. 4. Yes. Although E.O. 464 applies only to officials of the executive branch, it has a direct effect on the right of the people to information on matters of public concern therefore it is not exempt from the need of publication. Due process requires that the people should have been apprised of the issuance of E.O. 464 before it was implemented. Decision Petitions are PARTLY GRANTED. Sections 2(b) and 3 of E.O. 464 are declared void while sections 1 and 2(a) are VALID.

GUINGONA V CARAGUEGANCAYCO; April 22, 1991

FACTS- The 1990 budget consisted of P98.4B in automatic appropriation (86.8 going to debt service) and P155.3 from the General Appropriations Act or a total of

P233.5B; only P27B was allotted for DECS. Petitioners, as members of the Senate, question the constitutionality of the automatic appropriation for debt service in the said budget as provided for by Presidential Decrees 81, 117, and 1967. - Petitioners allege that the allotted budget runs contrary to Sec. 5(5), Art. XIV of the Constitution. And as provided by Art. 7 of the Civil Code, when statutes run contrary to the Constitution, it shall be void. - They further contend that the Presidential Decrees are no longer operative since they became functus oficio after President Marcos was ousted. With a new congress replacing the one man-legislature, new legislation regarding appropriation should be passed. Current appropriation, operating on no laws therefore, would be unenforceable.- Moreover, they contend that assuming arguendo that the said decrees did not expire with the ouster of Marcos, after adoption of the 1987 Constitution, said decrees were inconsistent with Sec. 24, Article VI of the Constitution which stated that:

Sec. 24. All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.

whereby bills have to be approved by the President, then a law must be passed by Congress to authorize said automatic appropriation. Further, petitioners state said decrees violate Section 29(1) of Article VI of the Constitution which provides as follows

Sec. 29(1). No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.

They assert that there must be definiteness, certainty and exactness in an appropriation, otherwise it is an undue delegation of legislative power to the President who determines in advance the amount appropriated for the debt service.- SolGen argues, on the other hand, that automatic appropriation provides flexibility: ". . . First, for example, it enables the Government to take advantage of a favorable turn of market conditions by redeeming high interest securities and borrowing at lower rates, or to shift from short-term to long-term instruments, or to enter into arrangements that could lighten our outstanding debt burden debt-to-equity, debt-to-asset, debt-to-debt or other such schemes. Second, the automatic appropriation obviates the serious difficulties in debt servicing arising from any deviation from what has been previously programmed. The annual debt service estimates, which are usually made one year in advance, are based on a mathematical set or matrix or, in layman's parlance, `basket' of foreign exchange and interest rate assumption's which may significantly differ from actual rates not even in proportion to changes on the basis of the assumptions. Absent an automatic appropriation clause, the Philippine Government has to await and depend upon Congressional action, which by the time this comes, may no longer be responsive to the intended conditions which in the meantime may have already drastically changed. In the meantime, also, delayed payments and arrearages may have supervened, only to worsen our debt service-to-total expenditure ratio in the budget due to penalties and/or demand for immediate-payment even before due dates.- Clearly, the claim that payment of the loans and indebtedness is conditioned upon the continuance of the person of President Marcos and his legislative power goes against the intent and purpose of the law. The purpose is foreseen to subsist with or without the person of Marcos."

ISSUES1. WON appropriation of P86.8B for debt service as compared to its appropriation of P27.7B for education in violation of Sec. 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution.

The State shall assign the highest budgetary priority to education and ensure that teaching will attract and retain its rightful share of the best available talents through adequate remuneration and other means of job satisfaction and fulfillment.

2. WON the Presidential Decrees are still operative, and if they are, do they violate Sec. 29 (1), Article VI of the Constitutional.3. WON there was undue delegation of legislative power by automatic appropriation.

HELD1. The Court disagrees that Congress’ hands are hamstrung by the provision provided. There are other imperatives of national interest that it must attend to; the amount allotted to education, 27.8B, is the highest in all department budgets thereby complying with the mandate of having the highest priority as stated above. The enormous national debt, incurred by the previous administration, however, still needs to be paid. Not only for the sake of honor but because the national economy is itself at stake. Thus, if Congress allotted more for debt service such an appropriation cannot be considered by this Court as unconstitutional.

2. Yes, they are still operative. The transitory provision provided in Sec. 3, Article XVIII of the Constitution recognizes that:

All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions and other executive issuances not inconsistent with the Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed or revoked.

- This transitory provision of the Constitution has precisely been adopted by its framers to preserve the social order so that legislation by the then President Marcos may be recognized. Such laws are to remain in force and effect unless they are inconsistent with the Constitution or are otherwise amended, repealed or revoked. - Well-known is the rule that repeal or amendment by implication is frowned upon. Equally fundamental is the principle that construction of the Constitution and law is generally applied prospectively and not retrospectively unless it is so clearly stated.

3. No. The legislative intention in R.A. No. 4860, as amended, Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177 and P.D. No. 1967 is that the amount needed should be automatically set aside in order to enable the Republic of the Philippines to pay the principal, interest, taxes and other normal banking charges on the loans, credits or indebtedness incurred as guaranteed by it when they shall become due without the need to enact a separate law appropriating funds therefore as the need arises. The purpose of these laws is to enable the government to make prompt payment and/or advances for all loans to protect and maintain the credit standing of the country.- Although the subject presidential decrees do not state specific amounts to be paid, necessitated by the very nature of the problem being addressed, the amounts nevertheless are made certain by the legislative parameters provided in the decrees. The Executive is not of unlimited discretion as to the amounts to be disbursed for debt servicing. The mandate is to pay only the principal, interest, taxes and other normal banking charges on the loans, credits or indebtedness, or on the bonds, debentures or security or other evidences of indebtedness sold in international markets incurred by virtue of the law, as and when they shall become due. No uncertainty arises in executive implementation as the limit will be the exact amounts as shown by the books of the Treasury.

SEPARATE OPINION

CRUZ [dissent]

He sees that an essential requirement for valid appropriation is that the sum authorized for release should be determinate or determinable. The Presidential Decrees do not satisfy this requirement. As to the ponencia’s reference to

“legislative parameters provided by law”, Cruz says no such regulatory boundaries exist.

PADILLA [dissent]

- He agrees with Cruz but furthers the argument by saying that Sec. 29(1)Article VI implies that a law enacted by Congress (and approved by the President) appropriating a particular sum or sums must be made before payment from the Treasury can be made. Laws should be construed in light of current laws and not those made by a one-man legislative branch. - Besides, these decrees issued by President Marcos relative to debt service were tailored for the periods covered by said decrees. Today it is Congress that should determine and approve the proper appropriations for debt servicing, as this is a matter of policy that, in his opinion, pertains to the legislative department, as the policy-determining body of the Government.

PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION V ENRIQUEZQUIASON; August 19, 1994

FACTS- House Bill No. 10900, the General Appropriation Bill of 1994 (GAB of 1994), was passed and approved by both houses of Congress on December 17, 1993.- On December 30, 1993, the President signed the bill into law, and declared the same to have become Republic Act No. 766316, the General Appropriation Act (GAA) of 1994. On the same day, the President delivered his Presidential Veto Message, specifying the provisions of the bill he vetoed and on which he imposed certain conditions. No step was taken in either House of Congress to override the vetoes.- In G.R. No. 113105, Philippine Constitution Association (PHILCONSA) et al. prayed for a writ of prohibition to declare as unconstitutional and void: (a) Article 41 on the Countrywide Development Fund or “pork barrels,” the special provision in Article I entitled Realignment of Allocation for Operational Expenses, (b) Article 48 on the Appropriation for Debt Service or the amount appropriated under said Article 48 in excess of the P37.9 B allocated for the DECS; and (c) the veto of the President of the Special Provision of Article 48 of the GAA of 1994- In G.R. No. 113174, 16 Senators question: (1) the constitutionality of the conditions imposed by the President in the items of the GAA of 1994: (a) for the Supreme Court, (b) Commission on Audit (COA), (c) Ombudsman, (d) Commission on Human Rights, (CHR), (e) Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGU's) and (f) State Universities and Colleges (SUC's); and (2) the constitutionality of the veto of the special provision in the appropriation for debt service. - In G.R. No. 113766, Senators Romulo and Tañada together with the Freedom from Debt Coalition, a non-stock domestic corporation, sued as taxpayers, challenging the constitutionality of the Presidential veto of the special provision in the appropriations for debt service and the automatic appropriation of funds therefor. - In G.R. No. 113888, Senators Romulo and Tañada contest the constitutionality of: (1) the veto on four special provisions added to items in the GAA of 1994 for the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH); and (2) the conditions imposed by the President in the implementation of certain appropriations for the CAFGU's, the DPWH, and the National Housing Authority (NHA). - In view of the importance and novelty of most of the issues raised in the four petitions, the Court invited former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando and former Associate Justice Irene Cortes as Amicus Curiae.

16 Entitled "AN ACT APPROPRIATING FUNDS FOR THE OPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF

THE PHILIPPINES FROM JANUARY ONE TO DECEMBER THIRTY ONE, NINETEEN HUNDRED AND NINETY-FOUR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES"

G.R. No. 113105

ISSUESProcedural1. WON the petitioners have legal standing17

Substantive2. WON the Countrywide Development Fund (CDF) or “pork barrels” is an encroachment by the legislature on executive power, since said power in an appropriation act is in implementation of a law3. WON the act of Congress giving debt service and not education 18 as the highest priority in the allocation of budget unconstitutional4. WON the special provision allowing a member of Congress to realign his allocation for operational expenses to any other expense category is unconstitutional, as it is contrary to Article VI Section 25(5) of the 1987 Constitution19

HELDProcedural1. A member of Congress has the legal standing to question the validity of a presidential veto or any other act of the Executive which injures the institution of Congress.Reasoning: Ponencia relied on precedent (Gonzales v. Macaraig) and a US case (United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co) as secondary source to recognize legal standing. Then in forming the ratio decidendi, it again relied on US cases as secondary sources (Coleman v. Miller, Holtzman v. Schlesinger) as well as the opinion of Justice Fernando as Amicus Curiae.Substantive2. The power of appropriation lodged in Congress carries with it the power to specify the project or activity to be funded under the appropriation law. It can be as detailed and as broad as Congress wants it to be.Reasoning: The CDF is explicit that it shall be used "for infrastructure, purchase of ambulances and computers and other priority projects and activities and credit facilities to qualified beneficiaries…" It was Congress itself that determined the purposes for the appropriation. Executive function under the CDF involves implementation of the priority projects specified in the law. The authority given to the members of Congress is only to propose and identify projects to be implemented by the President. Hence, under Article 48 of the GAA of 1994, if the proposed projects qualify for funding under the CDF, it is the President who shall implement them. In short, the proposals and identifications made by the members of Congress are merely recommendatory.3. The constitutional provision which directs the State shall assign the highest budgetary priority to education is merely directory.Reasoning: It relied on precedence, Guingona, Jr. v. Carague. While it is true that under Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution, Congress is mandated to “assign the highest budgetary priority to education” it does not thereby follow that Congress is deprived of its power to respond to the imperatives of the national interest and for the attainment of other state policies or objectives.4. The members only determine the necessity of the realignment of the savings in the allotments for their operating expenses but it is the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of Representatives who shall approve the realignment.

17 While the Solicitor General did not question the locus standi of petitioners in G.R. No. 113105, he

claimed that the remedy of the Senators in the other petitions is political (i.e., to override the vetoes) in effect saying that they do not have the requisite legal standing to bring the suits.18

Article XIV Section 5(5) of the 1987 Constitution states that: "The State shall assign the highest budgetary priority to education and ensure that teaching will attract and retain its rightful share of the best available talents through adequate remuneration and other means of job satisfaction and fulfillment."19

"No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations."

DecisionProcedural 1. Petitioners, as members of Congress have locus standiSubstantive2. No. The CDF is not an encroachment by the legislature on executive power, hence constitutional3. No. Congress’ act is not unconstitutional. It simply exercises its power to respond to the imperatives of the national interest and for the attainment of other state policies or objectives.4. No. It is not unconstitutional.

G.R. No. 113105 G.R. No. 113174

ISSUEWON veto of the special provision of Article 48 of the GAA of 1994 in the appropriation for debt service without vetoing the entire P86.3 B for said purpose is unconstitutionalOr, simply put: WON the President exceeded the item-veto power accorded by the Constitution20

HELDAny provision which does not relate to any particular item, or which extends in its operation beyond an item of appropriation, is considered “an inappropriate provision”21 which can be vetoed separately from an item. Reasoning: The issue, according to the ponencia is a mere rehash of the one put to rest in Gonzales v. Macaraig, Jr. Hence, it used this case as precedent. It also cited another case, Henry v. Edwards to support its ratio. Citing Gonzales: As the Constitution is explicit that the provision which Congress can include in an appropriations bill must "relate specifically to some particular appropriation therein" and "be limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates," it follows that any provision which does not relate to any particular item, or which extends in its operation beyond an item of appropriation, is considered "an inappropriate provision" which can be vetoed separately from an item. Citing Henry v. Edwards: When the legislature inserts inappropriate provisions in a general appropriation bill, such provisions must be treated as 'items' for purposes of the Governor's (President’s) item veto power over general appropriation bills.

DecisionYes. The President vetoed the entire paragraph 1 of the Special Provision of the item on debt service, including the provisos that the appropriation authorized in said item "shall be used for payment of the principal and interest of foreign and domestic indebtedness" and that "in no case shall this fund be used to pay for the liabilities of the Central Bank Board of Liquidators." The said provisos, being appropriate provisions since they germane to and have a direct connection with the item on debt service, cannot be vetoed separately. Hence the item veto of said provisions is void.

G.R. No. 113174G.R. No. 113766G.R. No. 113888

ISSUES1. WON the veto for revolving funds of State Universities and Colleges (SUC’s) is unconstitutional

20 Article VI Section 27(2) of the 1987 Constitution states that: “The President shall have the power to

veto any particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but veto shall mot affect the item or items to which he does not object.”21

Also included in the category of “inappropriate provisions” which are intended to amend our laws, because clearly these laws have no place in an appropriations bill, and therefore unconstitutional.

2. WON the veto of the provision in the appropriation for the Department of Public Works and Highways on 70% (administrative) / 30% (contract) ratio for road maintenance is unconstitutional3. WON the veto of the provision on purchase of medicines by AFP is unconstitutional4. WON the veto of special provisions on prior approval of Congress for purchase of military equipment is unconstitutional5. WON the veto of provision on use of savings to augment AFP pension funds is unconstitutional6. WON the President’s directive that the implementation of the Special Provision to the item on the CAFGU's shall be subject to prior Presidential approval is tantamount to an administrative embargo of the congressional will to implement the Constitution's command to dissolve the CAFGU's, therefore unconstitutional (Issue on Impoundment22) 7. WON veto of the President setting conditions or guidelines in the appropriations for the Supreme Court, Ombudsman, COA, DPWH and CHR is unconstitutional

HELD[1] to [5] Any provision which does not relate to any particular item, or which extends in its operation beyond an item of appropriation, is considered “an inappropriate provision” which can be vetoed separately from an item23

Reasoning: Same ratio decidendi from the issue in the previous section is applied in the 5 issues in this section. Hence the reasoning for the ratio is the same as well. (Notice how the ratio is applied in the ruling or dispositive)6. Any provision blocking an administrative action in implementing a law requiring legislative approval of executive acts must be incorporated in a separate substantive bill.Reasoning: The ponencia simply cited notes from journals24 in discussing the issue of Impoundment to support his reasoning in the present case. 7. The issuance of administrative guidelines on the use of public funds authorized by Congress is simply an exercise by the President of his constitutional duty to see that laws are faithfully executed.

Decision1. No. There was no undue discrimination when the President vetoed said special provisions.2. Yes. The Special Provision in question is not an inappropriate provision which can be the subject of a veto. It is not alien to the appropriation for road maintenance, and on the other hand, it specifies how the said item shall be expended - 70% by administrative and 30% by contract.3. Yes. Being directly related to and inseparable from the appropriation item on purchases of medicines by the AFP, the special provision cannot be vetoed by the President without also vetoing the said item. 4. No. Any provision blocking an administrative action in implementing a law or requiring legislative approval of executive acts must be incorporated in a separate and substantive bill. Therefore, being "inappropriate" provisions, Special Provisions Nos. 2 and 3 were properly vetoed.5. No. The Special Provision, which allows the Chief of Staff to use savings to augment the pension fund for the AFP being managed by the AFP Retirement and Separation Benefits System is violative of Sections 25(5)25 and 29(1)26 of the Article VI of the Constitution. Thus veto is not unconstitutional.

22 This is the first case before this Court where the power of the President to impound is put in issue .

Impoundment refers to a refusal by the President, for whatever reason, to spend funds made available by Congress. It is the failure to spend or obligate budget authority of any type (Notes: Impoundment of Funds, Harvard Law Review)23

Note that this ratio is also applied in issue [6] aside from the ratio which I formulated there. This can be implied from, “Again we state: a provision in an appropriations act cannot be used to repeal or amend other laws.” Hence, this is an “inappropriate provision” which can be vetoed separately.24

Notes: Impoundment of Funds, Harvard Law Review; Notes: Presidential Impoundment Constitutional Theories and Political Realities, Georgetown Law Journal; Notes Protecting the Fisc: Executive Impoundment and Congressional Power, Yale Law Journal

6. No. The provision in an appropriations act cannot be used to repeal or amend other laws. Impliedly, this is an “inappropriate provision” which can be vetoed separately.7. No. By setting guidelines or conditions in his veto, the President is simply exercising his constitutional duty to implement the laws faithfully.

DispositivePetitions DISMISSED, except with respect with respect to [1] G.R. Nos. 113105 and 113766 only insofar as they pray for the annulment of the veto of the special provision on debt service specifying that the fund therein appropriated "shall be used for payment of the principal and interest of foreign and domestic indebtedness" prohibiting the use of the said funds "to pay for the liabilities of the Central Bank Board of Liquidators", and [2] G.R. No. 113888 only insofar as it prays for the annulment of the veto of: (a) the 2nd paragraph of Special Provision No. 2 of the item of appropriation for the DPWH; and (b) Special Provision No. 12 on the purchase of medicines by the AFP which is GRANTED.Voting: 14 Concur, 1 Dissent

SEPARATE OPINION

PADILLA [concur and dissent]

- I concur with the ponencia of Mr. Justice Camilo D. Quiason except in so far as it re-affirms the Court's decision in Gonzalez v. Macaraig- An inappropriate provision is still as provision, not an item and therefore outside the veto power of the Executive.

VITUG [concur]

- I cannot debate the fact that the members of Congress, more than the President and his colleagues, would have the best feel on the needs of their own respective constituents. It is not objectionable for Congress, by law, to appropriate funds for such specific projects as it may be minded; to give that authority, however, to the individual members of Congress in whatever guise, I am afraid, would be constitutionally impermissible.

GONZALES V MACARAIGMELENCIO-HERRERA; November 19, 1990

FACTS- The Senate questioned the constitutionality of the Presidential veto of special and general provisions, particularly Sec. 55 of the General Appropriations Bill for 1989- The petitioners claim they have locus standi on the ground of:

- being member and ex-officio members of the Finance Committee- substantial taxpaers whose vital interests might be affected

- The respondents in this case are member of the Cabinet who are sued in their official capacity for the implementation of the General Appropriations Act of 1989- December 16, 1988 - The House of Representatives passed HB 19186 (GA Bill for 1989)

- eliminated/decreased items included in the proposed Budget of the President

25 "No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the President, the

President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations."26

"No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law"

- presented to President for approval- December 29, 1988 - The bill was signed into law (became RA 6688)

- The President vetoed 7 special provisions and Sec. 55- February 2, 1989- Senate expressed through Senate Resolution No. 381 that the veto of Sec. 55 was unconstitutional- April 11, 1989 - Petition for prohibition/mandamus was filed

- assailed the legality of veto of Sec. 55- enjoined the implementation of RA 6688- No restraining order was implemented by the Supreme Court

- September 7, 1989 - Court resolved to give due course to the petition- Jan. 17, 1990 - Motion for Leave to File and to Admit Supplementary Petition which raised the same issue as the original petition (questioning the presidential veto)- The vetoed provisions include:

- Sec. 55 of the Appropriations Act of 1989 - an item submitted by the President which has been reduced by Congress cannot be restored/increased. An item is deemed disapproved if there is no corresponding appropriation in the Act.- Sec. 16 of the Appropriations Act of 1990 - similar to Sec. 55 of the 1989 Appropriations Act except that this was lumped together with the use of savings- The basic difference between both provisions is that in the 1989 Appropriations Act, the "use of savings" is in Section 12, apart from Section 55 whereas in the 1990 \Appropriations Act, "use of savings" and the vetoed provision are both in Sec. 16

- The reason for the veto:- Violates Art. 6, Sec 25(5)- Nullifies the constitutional and statutory authroity of the President, the Senate President, Speaker of the House of Representatives, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and the Heads of Con-Coms to augment any item in the General Appropriations law- If allowed, the President and the other abovementioned officials cannot augment any item and appropriation from their savings even if special circumstances like calamity

- Petitioners' arguments:1) The president's line veto power regarding the appropriations bill is limited to item/s and does not cover provisions and therefore exceeded her authority (Sections 55 and 16 are provisions)2) When the president objects to provisions of an appropriation bill, it is not possible to exercise the item veto power but should veto the whole bill as well3) The item veto power does not carry with it the power to strike out conditions or restrictions for that would be legislation already (violative of separation of powers)4) Power of augmentation in Article 6, Sec. 25(5) is provided by law so Congress has prerogative to impose restrictions in the exercise of that power

- SolGen's arguments:1) The issue is a political question and the petitioners have a political remedy which is to override the veto.2) Sec. 53 is a rider which is extraneous to the Appropriations Act and should merit a veto.3) The power of the president to augment items in appropriations for the executive branches already provided for in Budget Law (specifically Sec. 44 and 45 of PD 1177 as amended by RA 6670)4) The President is empowered to veto provisions of other distinct and severable parts.

ISSUES 1. WON the issue is justiciable2. WON the veto by the President of Sec. 55 of the 1989 Appropriations Bill and its counterpart Sec. 16 of the 1990 Appropriations Bill is unconstitutional and without effect

HELD1. The issue is justiciable, not political.

a) There is an actual case or justiciable controversy between the Senate and the Executive that the Supreme Court may take cognizance of. The Demetria v. Alba case declared that the Supreme Court has the duty to declare acts of a government branch void if beyond that branch's powersb) Judicial arbitration needed because the petitioners stress the imperative need for definitive ruling by the Courtc) The petitioners have locus standi because the suit is a taxpayer's suit. The Sanidad ruling (the Court may or may not entertain a taxpayer's suit) and the Tolentino v. COMELEC ruling (members of the Senate have personality when a Constitutional issue is raised) were used. This is also not the first time that the veto power was discussed.

i) Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice - Court upheld the veto but reversed by the US Supreme Court because of the Appropriations Bill was not involved.ii) Bolinao Electronics v. Valencia - rejected the veto in an Appropriations Bill

2. NO the veto by the President of Sec. 55 of the 1989 Appropriations Bill and its counterpart Sec. 16 of the 1990 Appropriations Bill is constitutional*The extent of item veto power still includes the vetoing of provisions.- Art. 6 Sec. 27 - Veto power of the President

Paragraph 1 - general veto power of the President and if exercised would veto the entire billParagraph 2 - the item-veto of line-vbeto allows a veto over a particular item in an appropriations, revenue or tariff bill. The president may not veto less than all of an item (no authority to veto part of an item and approve the remaining portion of that item).

- Originally referred to veto of items of appropriations bills in the Organic Act of Aug. 29, 1916- 1935 Constitution, Art. 6, Sec 11(2) - The veto was more expansive since it included provisions and items in revenue and tariff bills- 1973 Constitution - more compact version and refers to the Prime Minister as the only official who has the power- 1987 Constitution - verbatim reproduction of 1973 provision except that a different public official (the President) was now involved and eliminated the reference to a veto of a provision- The Court held that even if there was an elimination of any reference to the veto provision, the extent of the President's veto power as previously defined by the 1935 Constitution has not changed.- An item in a bill relates to the particulars, details, distinct and severable parts of the bill whereas a provision is of a more general nature.- A restrictive interpretation as espoused by the petitioners disregards the basic principle that a distinct and severable part of the bill may be the subject of a separate veto but also overlooks the Constitutional mandate that any provision in the general appropriations bill shall relate specifically to some particular appropriation and that any such provision shall be limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates.- A provision does not relate to the entire bill.- The exercise of veto power does not partake of a legislative power as stated in the Bengzon case:

- The legislature has the power to enact laws while the Chief Executive has the negative power by the constitutional exercise of which he may defeat the will of the legislature.- The President finds its authority in the Constitution.- The Courts indulge every intendment in favor of the constitutionality of a veto in the same way that they presume constitutionality of an act passed by the Legislature.

* Secs. 55 and 16 are inappropriately called provisions.- Even if assuming that provisions are beyond the executive power to veto, Sec. 55 and Sec. 16 are not provisions in the budgetary sense.- Based on Art. 6, Sec. 25(2), a provision should relate specifically to some

particular appropriation therein. Secs. 55 and 16 do not fit this requirement.a) no relation to a particular or distinctive requirement. They apply generally to all items disapproved or reduced by Congress in the Appropriations Bill.b) disapproved or reduced items are nowhere to be found in the Bill.c) vetoed sections are more of an expression of Congressional policy in respect of augmentation from savings rather than a budgetary appropriation. Secs. 55 and 16 are inappropriate provisions that should be treated as items for the purpose of the veto power.

*Sections 55 and 16 are inappropriate conditions and are therefore susceptible to a veto.- Petitioners argue that Congress is free to impose conditions in an Appropriations Bill and where conditions are attached, veto powers do not have the power to strike them out.- These rules are settled in the sense that Congress can impose conditions on expenditure of funds and that the Executive cannot veto a condition of an appropriation while allowing the appropriation itself to stand.- But for the rule to apply, restrictions should be in the real sense of the term. Restrictions should exhibit a connection with money items in a budgetary sense in the schedule of expenditures. The test is appropriateness.- Secs. 55 and 16 are held to be inappropriate conditions.- Actually general law measures more appropriate for substantive and therefore separate legislation.- Neither shows the necessary connection with a schedule of expenditures. Items reduced or disapproved by Congress are not on the enrolled bill and can only be detected when compared with the original budgetary submittals of the President.* The power of augmentation and the validity of the veto- The President vetoed Sections 55 and 16 because they nullified the authority of the Chief Executive and heads of different branches of government to augment any item in the General Appropriations Law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations (with reference to Art. 6, Sec. 25(5)).- The power to augment lies dormant until authorized by law.- The constitution allowed the transfer of funds for the purpose of augmenting an item from savings in another item in the appropriation of a government branch so as to afford considerable flexibility in the use of public funds.- Separation of powers is endangered in no way.- Secs. 55 and 16 prohibit this augmentation and impair the constitutional and statutory authority of the President in the interest of expediency and efficiency.- The special power of augmentation from savings is merely incorporated in the GA Bill. The GA Bill is one of primary and specific aim to make appropriation of money from the public treasury. The power of augmentation from savings is not considered a specific appropriation of money. It is a non-appropriation item inserted in an appropriation measure.- To sanction this practice would withhold the power from the Executive and other officials and put in jeopardy the exercise of that power.- If the legislature does believe that the exercise of the veto powers by the executive were unconstitutional, a veto may be overriden by the votes of 2/3 of the members of Congress. But Congress made no attempt to do so.

ATITIW V ZAMORATINGA; September 30, 2005

FACTS- This is a petition for prohibition, mandamus, and declaratory relief as taxpayers, seeking the declaration of nullity of paragraph 1 of the Special Provisions of RA 8760 (General Appropriations Act (GAA) of 2000. Also seeking the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or TRO to enjoin implementation of the questioned provision. However, the 2000 GAA has long been implemented, the issuance is already moot and academic. But the Court shall pass upon the constitutional issues.- Brief historical account of the Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR):

- President Aquino initiated a series of peace talks to deal with insurgency in the Cordilleras. These dialogues focused on the establishment of an autonomous government in the Cordilleras.

- Section 15, Article X of the 1987 Constitution ordains the creation of autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras, and Section 18, Article X mandates the congressional enactment of the organic acts for each of the autonomous regions.- President Aquino promulgated E.O. No. 220 on July 15, 1987, creating the CAR, which is the interim and preparatory body tasked to administer the affairs of government in the Cordilleras.

-Pursuant to the 1987 Constitution, on October 23, 1989, Congress enacted RA 6766 (An Act Providing for an Organic Act for for the Cordillera Autonomous Region). A plebiscite was held where the people of the Cordilleras could ratify the Organic Act. However, the creation of an autonomous region was overwhelmingly rejected in all of the Cordilleras except for the Ifugao province. The Court ruled that Ifugao alone cannot validly constitute the CAR and upheld the disapproval of the Organic Act. The Court also declared E.O. No. 220 to be still in force and effect.-February 15, 2000: President Estrada signed into law the 2000 GAA which includes the assailed Special Provisions:

“1. Use of Fund. The amounts herein appropriated shall be used to wind up the activities and operations of the CAR, including the payment of separation and retirement benefits of all affected officials and employees…”

-July 20, 2000: President Estrada issued E.O. No. 270 extending the implementation of the winding up of operations of the CAR.

ISSUES1. WON the assailed Special Provisions in RA 8760 is a rider and as such is unconstitutional2. WON the Philippine Government, through Congress, can unilaterally amend/repeal E.O. No. 2203. WON the Republic should be ordered to honor its commitments as spelled out in EO 220.

HELD1. NO the assailed Special Provisions in RA 8760 is not a rider TF it is constitutionala. A rider is a provisions which is alien to or not germane to the subject of the bill in which it is incorporated. 2 provisions of the Constitution prohibit them: Art VI: Sec 25(2) “No provisions or enactment shall be embraced in the general appropriations bill unless it relates specifically to some particular appropriation therein…” and Sec 26(1) “Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be embraced in the title thereof”- The rule should not be construed so strictly as to tie the hands of Congress: it simply requires that all the provisions are either appropriation items, or non-appropriaton items which relate specifically to appropriation items.- Test: It must be 1) Particular – if it relates specifically to a distinct item of appropriation; 2) Unambiguous – when its application is apparent on the face of the bill and needs no reference to details/souces outside the bill; 3) Appropriate – when its subject does not necessarily have to be treated in a separate legislation.- The assailed provision does not constitute a rider: it passes the above test.Ratio when a provision is particular, unambiguous, and appropriate to the appropriations bill to which it belongs, it shall not be considered to be a riderb. Petitioners allege:

- that instead of providing a budget for the CAR, it had the effect of abolishing the CAR

- since a special law created the CAR, the 2000 GAA is not the place for amending or repealing a standing law.

- However, the CAR was not abolished. It has only been deactivated. - Abolish – to do away with, annul, abrogate, destroy completely, office ceases to exist;

- Deactivate – render inactive, break up by discharging or reassigning personnel, office continues to exist, albeit dormant.- But even if the limitation of the CAR’s budget had the effect of abolishing certain offices, the Congress has he power to do so.

- creation of public offices is primarily a legislative function- office created by the legislature is wholly within the power of that body, and it may abolish the office if it sees fit.

c. The CAR created through EO 220 is not the autonomous region contemplated in the Constitution. EO 220 has not established an autonomous regional government; rather, it has only created an administrative region. It can be considered a regional coordinating agency of the National Government.

2, 3: Except for the contention that the assailed paragraph is a rider, the rest of the arguments look into the wisdom and efficacy of said provisions. Political questions

Still 1. Contention that Congress can’t unilaterally amend or repeal EO 220: Rejected. There is no such thing as an irrepealable law. 2. Implementation of EO 220 is an executive prerogative while the sourcing of funds to support CAR’s activities is legislative. Absent grave abuse of discretion, the Court cannot correct the acts of the Executive or Congress.

ARROYO V HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL

FRANCISCO; July 14, 1995

FACTS- Petition for review of the decision of the HRET- 11 May 1992: Augusto L. Syjuco, Jr. (AS) & Joker P. Arroyo (JA) ran for congressman for the lone district of Makati. Board of canvassers proclaims A as winner. AS files an election protest before HRET, seeking revision and recounting of ballots in 75% of the precincts. His grounds: alleged irregularities/anomalies in the tabulation and entries of votes & massive fraud. JA files counter-protest questioning residence qualification of AS; dismissed by HRET. - HRET undertakes revision of ballots. Serious irregularities found. Justice Gancayco’s Report and Recommendation confirm irregularities and anomalies engineered by some HRET officials and personnel: Arroyo votes were consistently reduced … while Syjuco was always constant…”- Revision completed. Reception of evidence followed. JA submits certified true copies of the Revision Reports and election returns. AS submits over 200,000 pages of documentary evidence, “mere photocopies and not certified or authenticated by comparison with the original documents or identification by any witness…."- In his memorandum cum addendum, AS changes his original posture (revision and recount of ballots) to what he calls a “truly innovative and NON-TRADITIONAL process" — the PRECINCT-LEVEL DOCUMENT-BASED EVIDENCES.- By reason of the new allegations and substantial amendments (which broaden the scope of his protest, change his theory of the case or introduce additional causes of action in violation of Rule 28 Revised Rules of the Tribunal), HRET ordered him to show cause why his protest should not be dismissed. - 15 February 1994: by a 6-3 vote (the six Congressmen-members as against the three Justices-members), HRET resolved not to dismiss the protest, to continue with the examination and evaluation of the evidence on record, and thereafter to decide the case on the merits. - JA moved to dismiss the protest but to no avail. No hearings were conducted thereafter. - 25 January 1995: HRET, by the same 6-3 vote rendered its now assailed Decision annulling JA's proclamation, & declaring AS as the duly elected

congressman. Said decision also refers the case to COMELEC & the Office of the special Prosecutor for appropriate actions. - Without filing MFR, JA files the present case before SC.

ISSUES1. WON HRET committed grave abuse of discretion in

a. proceeding to decide the protest based on AS’ “precinct level document based anomalies/evidence" theory; b. rendering judgment on the kind of evidence before it and the manner in which the evidence was procured; &c. annulling election results in some contested precincts.

2. WON Syjuco should be cited for indirect contempt

HELD1. YES HRET committed grave abuse of discretiona. The "precinct level document based anomalies/evidence" theory- This innovative theory broadened the scope of the election protest beyond what AS originally sought. This is clearly substantial amendment of the election protest expressly proscribed by Rule 28 of the HRET internal rules. Impropriety of private respondent's belated shift of theory was sensed by majority members of HRET but they still resolved not to dismiss the protest…this a clear indication of grave abuse of discretion. No further hearings were conducted…JA's right to due process was clearly violated. - Substantial amendments to the protest maybe allowed only within the same period for the filing of the election protest 15 which, under Rule 16 of the HRET Rules, is ten (10) days after the proclamation of the winner. The rule in an election protest is that the protestant or counterprotestant must stand or fall upon the issues he had raised in his original or amended pleading filed prior to the lapse of the statutory period for the filing of protest or counterprotest. A party is bound by the theory he adopts and by the cause of action he stands on and cannot be permitted after having lost thereon to repudiate his theory and cause of action and adopt another and seek to re-litigate the matter anew either in the same forum or on appeal. <principle of estoppel>b. The kind of evidence used and how they were procured- Photocopies violate the best evidence rule: no evidence shall be received which is merely substitutionary in its nature so long as the original evidence can be had. Certain vital election documents (such as certified xerox copy of the number of registered voters per precinct and photocopies of statements of votes) were procured at the sole instance of the ponente of the majority decision, never offered in evidence by either of the parties.- Majority congressmen-members of the Tribunal by themselves without the participation of any of the three (3) remaining Justices-members, declared that 10,484 of the contested signature are fake. This grossly violates Rules 68 &5 of HRET Rules (all questions shall be submitted to the Tribunal as a body; and presence of at least one (1) Justice-member is required to constitute a valid quorum).c. Nullification of election results- HRET proceeded to annul votes without a dint of compliance with the 2 mandatory requisites for the annulment of election returns based on fraud, irregularities or terrorism:

i. that more than fifty percent (50%) of the total number of votes in the precinct or precincts were involved, &ii. that the votes must be shown to have been affected or vitiated by such fraud, irregularities or terrorism.

- Elections should never be held void unless they are clearly illegal; it is the duty of the court to sustain an election authorized by law if it has been so conducted as to give a free and fair expression of the popular will, and the actual result thereof is clearly ascertained. Absent fraud, mere irregularities or omissions committed by election officials which do not subvert the expression of popular will cannot countenance the nullification of election results. Corollarily, the misconduct of election officers or irregularities on their part will not justify rejecting the whole vote of a precinct (as was done in this case) where it does not appear that the result was affected thereby, even though the

circumstances may be such as to subject the officers to punishment. 32 These omissions are not decisive since actual voting and election by registered voters had taken place in the questioned precincts.

- General rule: a tribunal rendering a decision must be given an opportunity to rectify its error through a motion for reconsideration. BUT partiality of the majority of the members of the Electoral Tribunal having been shown, recourse for a reconsideration of its decision becomes nugatory and an immediate recourse to this Court can be had based on the fundamental principle of due process. A prior motion for reconsideration can be dispensed with if petitioner's fundamental right to due process was violated. - Persistent and deliberate violation of the Tribunal's own governing rules and of even the most basic rules of evidence cannot be justified by simply invoking that procedural rules should be liberally construed. Rule 80 of the very same internal rules expressly makes the Rules of Court, Supreme Court decisions, and Electoral Tribunal decisions of suppletory application. - Unwavering reverence to the rules of evidence as provided by the Rules of Court and jurisprudence is because they have been tested through years of experience as the most effective means of ferreting out the truth in any judicial controversy. Rules and uniformity of procedure are as essential to procure truth and exactness in elections as in anything else.

- Thus, with the patent nullity of the entire proceedings before HRET and its majority decision in the election protest filed by AS, Joker Arroyo’s proclamation as the winning congressman of the then lone district of Makati is deemed not to have been challenged at all.

2. YES Syjuco should be cited for indirect contempt- Since his statements in his Addendum which he prepared without aid of counsel appear to seriously undermine the integrity of some members of the Court- Want of intention to undermine the integrity of the Court is no excuse for the language employed by private respondent for it is a well-known and established rule that derogatory words are to be taken in the ordinary meaning attached to them by impartial observers

Decision WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby GRANTED, and public respondent HRET's majority decision dated January 25, 1995 is SET ASIDE. Private respondent Augusto L. Syjuco, Jr., having been found guilty of indirect contempt, is hereby fined the amount of one thousand pesos (P1,000.00) to be paid within five (5) days from receipt of this decision.

BONDOC V PINEDAGRINO-AQUINO; September 26, 1991

FACTS- In the local and congressional elections held on May 11, 1987, Marciano M. Pineda of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) and Dr. Emigdio A. Bondoc of the Nacionalista Party (NP) were rival candidates for the position of Representative for the Fourth District of the province of Pampanga. - On May 19, 1987, Pineda was proclaimed winner in the election with a lead of 3,300 votes. In due time, Bondoc filed a protest (HRET Case No. 25) in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) which is composed of (9) members: 3 Justices of the Supreme Court and 6 members of the House of Representatives chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein (Sec. 17, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution) as follows:

AMEURFINA M. HERRERA ChairmanAssociate Justice, SCISAGANI A. CRUZ MemberAssociate Justice, SCFLORENTINO P. FELICIANO MemberAssociate Justice, SC

HONORATO Y. AQUINO MemberCong, 1st Dist., Benguet, LDPDAVID A. PONCE DE LEON MemberCong, 1st Dist., Palawan, LDPSIMEON E. GARCIA, JR. MemberCong 2nd Dist., Nueva Ecija, LDPJUANITO G. CAMASURA, JR. MemberCong, 1st Dist., Davao del Sur, LDPJOSE E. CALINGASAN MemberCong, 4th Dist., Batangas, LDPANTONIO H. CERILLES MemberCong, 2nd Dist., Zamb del Sur, (GAD, now NP).

- July 1989 – Bondoc filed petition- Oct 1990 - Bondoc won over Pineda by a margin of twenty-three (23) votes. LDP members in the Tribunal insisted on a reappreciation and recount of the ballots cast in some precincts, delaying the finalization of the decision by at least (4) months. The reexamination and re-appreciation of the ballots resulted in increasing Bondoc's lead over Pineda to 107 votes. Cong Camasura voted with the SC Justices and Cong Cerilles to proclaim Bondoc the winner of the contest.- March 4, 1991 – Cong Camasura revealed to Cong. Jose S. Cojuangco, Jr., LDP Sec Gen that he voted for Bondoc in the final tally in the case. This revelation stirred a hornets' nest in the LDP which went into a flurry of plotting appropriate moves to neutralize the pro-Bondoc majority in the Tribunal. - March 5, 1991 - HRET issued a Notice of Promulgation of Decision on March 4, 1991 in HRET Case No. 25. - March 13, 1991 – Cong. Cojuangco informed Cong. Camasura by letter that on Feb 28, 1991 LDP had already expelled him and Cong Benjamin Bautista for having allegedly helped to organize the Partido Pilipino of "Danding" Cojuangco, and for having invited LDP members in Davao del Sur to join said political party. Cong Cojuangco notified Speaker Ramon V. Mitra about the ouster of the two congressmen from the LDP, and asked the HoR, through the Speaker, to take note of it especially in matters where party membership is a prerequisite. - March 14, 1991 - the Chairman of the Tribunal, Mme. Jus Herrera, received a letter dated March 13, 1991, from the Office of the Sec Gen of the HoR, informing the Tribunal that on the basis of the letter from the LDP, the HoR decided to withdraw the nomination and rescind the election of Cong Camasura, Jr. to the House of Electoral Tribunal. - Justices Herrera, Cruz, and Feliciano promptly apprised the CJ and Assoc Jus of the SC of this "distressing development' and asked to be relieved from their assignments in the HRET because promulgation of the decision previously scheduled for 14 March 1991, is sought to be aborted. The decision reached (5 to 4 vote) may now be expected to be overturned on a motion for reconsideration by the party-litigant which would have been defeated. It was also said that:

> Proportional representation in the Tribunal (Art VI, Sec 17 Const) should be amended to provide instead for a return to the composition mandated in the 1935 Const: (3) members chosen by the House or Senate upon nomination of the party having the largest number of votes and (3) of the party having the second largest number of votes: and a judicial component consisting of three (3) justices from the SC> Suggestions:

+ The Senate Electoral Tribunal could sit as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the HoR and vice versa. So that there would be lesser chances of non-judicial elements playing a decisive role in the resolution of election contests. + There should also be a provision in the Constitution that upon designation to membership in the Electoral Tribunal, those so designated should divest themselves of affiliation with their respective political parties, to insure their independence and objectivity. (like that’s possible)

- During HRET open session, Tribunal issued a resolution canceling the promulgation of the decision in HRET Case No. 25 because the decision lacks the concurrence of the 5 members without Cong Camasura's vote as required by Sec 24 of the Rules of the Tribunal and, therefore, cannot be validly promulgated. - March 19, 1991 - SC declined the request of the justices to be relieved of their membership in the tribunal and directed them to do their duties. The court even said that all members of these bodies are appropriately guided only by purely legal considerations in the decision of the cases before them and that in the contemplation of the Constitution the members-legislators, sit in the Tribunal no longer as reps of their political parties but as impartial judges. The term of office of every member thereof should be considered co-extensive with the corresponding legislative term and may not be legally terminated except only by death, resignation, permanent disability, or removal for valid cause, not including political disloyalty. - March 21, 1991 - petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus was filed by Dr. Bondoc against Reps Pineda, Palacol, Camasura, Jr., or any other rep who may be appointed Vice Rep and HRET praying this Court to:

1. Annul the decision of the HoR of March 13, 1991, 'to withdraw the nomination and to rescind the nomination of Rep. Camasura, Jr. to HRET2. Issue a writ of prohibition restraining whomsoever may be designated in place of Camasura from assuming and discharging functions as a member of the HRET3. Issue a writ of mandamus ordering Camasura to immediately reassume and discharge his functions as a member of the HRET; and 4. Grant such other relief as may be just and equitable.

- The Court required the respondents to comment on the petition > Cong Juanito G. Camasura, Jr. did not oppose the petition. > Cong Marciano M. Pineda's plea for the dismissal of the petition as the Congress' is the sole authority that nominates and elects from its members. HRET allegedly has the sole power to remove any member whenever the ratio in the representation of the political parties in the House or Senate is materially changed on account of death, incapacity, removal or expulsion from the political party; that a Tribunal member's term of office is not co-extensive with his legislative term, for if a member of the Tribunal who changes his party affiliation is not removed from the Tribunal, the constitutional provision mandating representation based on political affiliation would be completely nullified; and that the expulsion of Congressman Camasura from the LDP, is "purely a party affair" of the LDP and the decision to rescind his membership in the House Electoral Tribunal is the sole prerogative of the House-of-Representative Representatives, hence, it is a purely political question beyond the reach of judicial review.> Cong Magdaleno M. Palacol alleged that the petitioner has no cause of action against him because he has not yet been nominated by the LDP for membership in the HRET. Moreover, the petition failed to implead the House of Representatives as an indispensable party for it was the House, not the HRET that withdrew and rescinded Congressman Camasura's membership in the HRET.> Sol Gen also argued that the inclusion of the HRET as a party respondent is erroneous because the petition states no cause of action against the Tribunal. The petitioner does not question any act or order of the HRET in violation of his rights. What he assails is the act of the HoR of withdrawing the nomination, and rescinding the election, of Camasura as a member of the HRET.

- Bondoc replied that HRET acknowledged that decision by canceling the promulgation of its decision in HRET Case No. 25 to his prejudice. Bondoc also explained that Cong Palacol was impleaded as one of the respondents because after the HoR had announced the termination of Cong Camasura's membership in the HRET several newspapers reported that the HoR would nominate and elect Palacol to take Camasura’s seat in the Tribunal.

ISSUE

WON the HoR can interfere with the disposition of an election contest in the HRET through "reorganizing" the representation in the tribunal of the majority party

HELD- Sec 17 reechoes Sec 11, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution, except the provision on the representation of the main political parties in the tribunal which is now based on proportional representation from all the political parties, instead of equal representation of three members from each of the first and second largest political aggrupations in the Legislature. - The use of the word "sole" in both Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution and Section 11 of the 1935 Constitution underscores the exclusive jurisdiction of the House Electoral Tribunal as judge of contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives (Robles vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 86647, February 5, 1990). The tribunal was created to function as a nonpartisan court. It is a non-political body in a sea of politicians. - To be able to exercise exclusive jurisdiction, the HRET must be independent. The Electoral Commission, a constitutional organ created for the specific purpose of determining contests relating to election returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly may not be interfered with by the judiciary when and while acting within the limits of its authority, but the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission for the purpose of determining the character, scope and extent of the constitutional grant to the commission as sole judge of all contests relating to the election and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly. (Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139.) + Resolution of the House of Representatives violates the independence of the HRET. — The resolution of the HoR is a clear impairment of the constitutional prerogative of the House Electoral Tribunal to be the sole judge of the election contest between Pineda and Bondoc. + Disloyalty to party is not a valid cause for termination of membership in the HRET. — As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. They must discharge their functions with complete detachment, impartiality, and independence even independence from the political party to which they belong. Hence, "disloyalty to party" and "breach of party discipline," are not valid grounds for the expulsion of a member of the tribunal. + Expulsion of Congressman Camasura violates his right to security of tenure. Members of the HRET as "sole judge" of congressional election contests are entitled to security of tenure just as members of the judiciary enjoy security of tenure under our Constitution (Sec. 2, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution). Therefore, membership in the House Electoral Tribunal may not be terminated except for a just cause, such as, the expiration of the term of office, his death, permanent disability, resignation from the political party he represents in the tribunal, formal affiliation with another political party, or removal for other valid cause. A member may not be expelled by the House of Representatives for "party disloyalty" short of proof that he has formally affiliated with another political group. As the records of this case fail to show that Congressman Camasura has become a registered member of another political party, his expulsion from the LDP and from the HRET was not for a valid cause; hence, it violated his right to security of tenure.- Since the expulsion of Cong Camasura from the House Electoral Tribunal by the House of Representatives was not for a lawful and valid cause, but to unjustly interfere with the tribunal's disposition of the Bondoc case and to deprive Bondoc of the fruits of the Tribunal's decision in his favor, the action of the House of Representatives is clearly violative of the constitutional mandate (Sec. 17, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution) - Ratio The House Electoral Tribunal, being an agency independent of the legislature, may not be interfered with by the HouseDecision WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is granted. The decision of the HoR withdrawing the nomination and rescinding

the election of Cong Juanito G. Camasura, Jr. as a member of the House Electoral Tribunal is hereby declared null and void ab initio for being violative of the Constitution, and Cong Juanita G. Camasura, Jr. is ordered reinstated to his position as a member of the HRET. The HRET Resolution No. 91-0018 dated March 14, 1991, canceling the promulgation of the decision in HRET Case No. 25 ("Dr. Emigdio Bondoc vs. Marciano A. Pineda") is also set aside. Considering the unconscionable delay incurred in the promulgation of that decision to the prejudice of the speedy resolution of electoral cases, the Court, in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, and in the interest of justice, hereby declares the said decision DULY PROMULGATED, effective upon service of copies thereof on the parties, to be done immediately by the Tribunal. Costs against respondent Marciano A. Pineda. Narvasa, Paras, Bidin, Medialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.Gutierrez, Jr., J., concurs as certified to by the Chief Justice.Fernan, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Cruz and Feliciano, JJ., took no part.

SEPARATE OPINION

PADILLA [dissent]-A fundamental principle in our constitutional system is that the powers of government are distributed among three (3) great departments. Each separate from, yet coordinate and co-equal with the others each one deriving its authority directly from the fundamental law.- This does not extend to the point that those in authority in one department can ignore and treat the acts of those in authority in the others, done pursuant to the authority vested in them, as nugatory and not binding in every other department. - The HoR has the power to nominate the members of the House Electoral Tribunal provided that the proportional representation of parties is maintained. - The power to appoint or designate a member of the House of Representatives to be a member of the House Electoral Tribunal must necessarily include the power to remove said member. - The question that must be asked in testing the validity of such legislative act is, does the House of Representatives have the power to do what it has done and not whether the House of Representatives should have done what it has done. - The judiciary cannot question a legislative act done within the constitutional authority of the legislature The judicial department has no power to review even the most arbitrary and unfair action of the legislative department, taken in the exercise of power committed exclusively to it by the Constitution . To hold otherwise would be to invalidate the principle of separation of powers. SARMIENTO [dissent]

- I believe that the questions as Jus Padilla raised it — can the Court annul an act of Congress, revamping its House Electoral Tribunal? — is a political question and a question in which the Court cannot intervene. - The jurisdiction of this Court includes the power to strike down excesses of any agency of Government, but the Charter did not alter or discard the principle of separation of powers. - Evidently, Congressman Camasura's ouster from the Tribunal was a result of political maneuvers within the lower house. This Court, however, is above politics and Justices should be the last persons to get involved in the "dirty" world of politics. If they do, they risk their independence.

LOZADA V COMELECDE CASTRO; January 27, 1983

FACTS

- Jose Mari Eulalio Lozada and Romeo Igot filed a petition for mandamus as a representative suit27 to compel the respondent COMELEC to call a special election to fill up existing vacancies numbering twelve (12) in the Interim Batasan Pambansa. The petition is based on Section 5(2), Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution28. - Lozada claims that he is a taxpayer and a bona fide elector of Cebu City and a transient voter of Quezon City, who desires to run for the position in the Batasan Pambansa; while Igot alleges that, as a taxpayer, he has standing to petition by mandamus the calling of a special election as mandated by the 1973 Constitution. As reason for their petition, petitioners allege that they are deeply concerned with their duties as citizens, and that they filed this petition in behalf of all other Filipinos since subjects are of profound and general interest.

ISSUES1. WON petitioners had standing to file for petition for mandamus2. WON SC has jurisdiction to entertain this petition3. WON Art. VIII, Sec. 5(2) in the 1973 Constitution applies to the Interim

Batasang Pambansa

HELD1. petitioners had no standing to file for petition for mandamus- As taxpayers, petitioners may not file the instant petition, for nowhere therein is it alleged that tax money is being illegally spent. Action complained of is the inaction of the COMELEC to call a special election, and therefore involves no expenditure of public funds. It is only when an act complained of, which may include a legislative enactment or statute, involves the illegal expenditure of public money that the so-called taxpayer suit may be allowed. - As voters, neither have petitioners the requisite interest or personality to qualify them to maintain and prosecute the present petition, for to have legal standing is to have personal and substantial interest in the case, or sustain direct injury as a result of its enforcement. Interest held in common by all members of the public is of abstract nature (as is the injury that will be sustained) and may not be used as standing to sue. Concrete injury, whether actual or threatened, is that indispensable element for one to have personality in a dispute. 2. SC has no jurisdiction to entertain this petition- The Supreme Court's jurisdiction over the COMELEC is only to review by certiorari the latter's decision, orders or rulings. This is as clearly provided in Article XII-C, Section II of the 1973 Constitution29. In this case, there is no such decision, order or ruling. Even from the standpoint of an action for mandamus, with the total absence of a showing that COMELEC has unlawfully neglected or refused the performance of a ministerial duty, it is not shown that petitioners have a clear right to the holding of a special election which is equally the clear and ministerial duty of COMELEC. - Only the Batasan Pambansa can make the necessary appropriation for special elections, and this power of the may neither be subject to mandamus by the courts much less may COMELEC compel the Batasan to exercise its power of appropriation. From the role Batasan Pambansa has to play in the holding of special elections, which is to appropriate the funds for the expenses thereof, it would seem that the initiative on the matter must come from said body, not the COMELEC. The power to appropriate is the sole and exclusive prerogative of the legislative body, the exercise of which may not be compelled through a petition for mandamus.

27 for and in behalf of those who wish to participate in the election irrespective of party affiliation

28 Article VIII, Sec.5 (2): In case a vacancy arises in the Batasang Pambansa eighteen months or more

before a regular election, the Commission on Election shall call a special election to be held within sixty (60) days after the vacancy occurs to elect the Member to serve the unexpired term.29

Any decision, order or ruling of the Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by

the aggrieved party within thirty days from his receipt of a copy thereof.

4. Art. VIII, Sec. 5(2) in the 1973 Constitution does not apply to the Interim Batasang Pambansa

- The cited provision of the 1973 Constitution is not intended to apply to the Interim Batasang Pambansa. - The strongest reason for this is the fact that the Interim Batasang Pambansa was to be composed by the delegates to the Constitutional Convention, as well as the then incumbent President and Vice-President, and the members or the Senate and House of Representatives of Congress under the 1935 Constitution. With such number of representatives representing each congressional district, or a province, not to mention the Senators, there was felt absolutely no need for filling vacancies occurring in the Interim National Assembly, considering the uncertainty of the duration of its existence. - The provision is intended to apply to the regular Batasang Pambansa, because a province or representative district would have only one representative in said body. The need to fill up the Interim Batasang Pambansa is neither imperative nor urgent, as there would always be adequate representation for every province which forms only part of a certain region, specially considering that the Body is only transitory in character.- That the provision is found in the main body of the Constitution and not in included in Transitory Provisions adds to the intention that the provision applies only to the regular, and not interim, Batasang Pambansa.

Decision Petition dismissed.

PACETE V SECRETARY OF COMMISSIONFERNANDO; July 23, 1971

FACTSFelizardo S. Pacete alleged that he was appointed by the then President of the Philippines on August 31, 1964 as Municipal Judge of Pigcawayan, Cotabato. He assumed office on September 11, 1964 and discharged his duties as such. As his appointment was made during recess of Congress, it was submitted to the Commission on Appointments at its next session in 1965. Appointment was unanimously confirmed on May 20, 1965 (with Senate President and Chairman of Commission on Appointments Ferdinand Marcos even sending him a congratulatory telegram). Nine months after his confirmation, on February 7, 1966, the then Secretary of Justice advised petitioner to vacate his position as municipal judge. Petitioner was informed that on May 21, 1965, Senator Rodolfo Ganzon (a member of the Commission on Appointments) wrote to its Chairman stating that he was filing a motion for reconsideration of the appointment in view of derogatory information which he had received.

ISSUES1. WON the filing of a motion for reconsideration with the Commission on

Appointments (CA), without being acted on, suffices to set at naught a confirmation duly made of an ad interim appointment.

2. WON the issue is a justiciable question, with the CA being an independent organ of the Constitution.

HELD1. As per Altarejos v. Molo, the confirmation stands; it must be given force

and effect.Ratio Petitioner buttresses his plea for prohibition on the ground that the letter of then Senator Ganzon, even on the assumption that it was a motion to reconsider an appointment duly confirmed, was without force and effect as it was not approved by the body as a whole.Reasoninga. The controlling principle is supplied by Altarejos v. Molo, which interpreted Rule 21 of the Revised Rules of the Commission on Appointments, which reads: “Resolution of the Commission on any appointment may be reconsidered on motion by a member presented not more than one (1) day after their approval. If a majority of the members present concur to grant a

reconsideration, the appointment may be laid on the table, this shall be a final disposition of such a motion.” Holding of the Court was that the mere filing of a reconsideration did not have the effect of setting aside a confirmation. In the case, Aldeguer’s (respondent in Altarejos case) theory would give to the mere filing of a motion for reconsideration the effect which it would have if the motion approved, and hence, would dispense with the necessity of such approval, for which the concurrence of a majority of the members present is necessary. This is inconsistent with Rule 21 of the Revised Rules of the Commission.

In case of an adjournment sine die the period for filing the motion for reconsideration having expired, under Section 22, then the motion for reconsideration not having been acted upon is not approved and therefore, has no effect whatsoever.

What is decisive is that a confirmation duly made is not nullified simply by a motion of reconsideration being filed, without its being voted upon and approved.b. “The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the CA or until the next adjournment of Congress.”- A distinction is made between the exercise of such presidential prerogative requiring confirmation by the CA when Congress is in session and when it is in recess. In the former, the President nominates, and only upon the consent of the CA may the person assume office. As with ad interim appointments, the appointment takes effect at once. The appointment is effective until disapproval by the CA or until the next adjournment in Congress. There must either be a rejection by the CA or nonaction on its part.

2. The insistence of respondent that the question involved is beyond the jurisdiction of this Court is untenable. It would extend the boundaries of the political question doctrine beyond its legitimate limits. The courts are called upon to see to it that private rights are not invaded.- Although the CA is not a power in our tripartite system of government, it is to all intents and purposes, like the Electoral Tribunals, when acting within the limits of its authority, an independent organ. Its actuation in the exercise of its power to approve appointment submitted to it by the President of the Philippines is exempt from judicial supervision and interference, except on a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of the powers as will constitute a denial of due process.

AVELINO V CUENCOPER CURIAM; March 4, 1949

RESOLUTION on Original action in the SC

FACTS- Summary: The Avelino I case illustrates judicial review of internal affairs of the legislature. The Court refused to look into the legality of the election of a Senate President, in view of the separation of powers, the political nature of the controversy and the Senate’s constitutional power to elect its own presidentBefore the opening of a morning session of the Senate, Senators Lorenzo Tañada and Prospero Sanidad prepared a resolution enumerating charges30

against the then Senate President Jose Avelino. AVELINO presided the session and called the meeting in order, and except for a senator who was confined in a hospital and another who is in the United States, all the Senators were present.31

30 BRYAN SJ: Among which were advocacy of the graft and corruption in the government

(particularly those committed by the Liberal Party, to which AVELINO was a member); questionable possession of checks totaling more than P500,000 after AVELINO’s assumption of office; and justification of electoral fraud.

31 Similar to the 1987 Const, the Senate is composed of 24 senators under the 1935 Const.

- TAÑADA sought to be recognized, but AVELINO and his followers prevented TAÑADA from delivering his privilege speech. A commotion later ensued, upon which AVELINO and 9 other senators left the session hall. Subsequently, the Senate President Pro-tempore took the Chair and proceeded with the session. The remaining senators unanimously approved, among others, a resolution “declaring vacant the position of the President of the Senate and designating… Mariano Jesus Cuenco Acting President of the Senate." The next day the President of the Philippines recognized CUENCO as acting Senate President.- Hence, the present petition, AVELINO asking the Court to declare him the rightful Senate President and oust CUENCO.

ISSUEWON SC has jurisdiction over the subject matter

HELDNO (6-4 vote)Ratio The issue of the validity of the election of the new Senate President is a political question.Reasoning- The answer is in the negative, in view of the separation of powers, the political nature of the controversy and the constitutional grant to the Senate of the power to elect its own president, which power should not be interfered with, nor taken over, by the judiciary. We should abstain in this case because the selection of the presiding officer affects only the Senators themselves who are at liberty at any time to choose their officers, change or reinstate them. If the majority of the Senators want AVELINO to preside, his remedy lies in the Senate Session Hall, not in the Supreme Court.- The Court will not sally into the legitimate domain of the Senate on the plea that our refusal to intercede might lead into a crisis, even a revolution. No state of things has been proved that might change the temper of the Filipino people as peaceful and law-abiding citizens. It is furthermore believed that the recognition accorded by the Chief Executive to CUENCO makes it advisable, to adopt the hands-off policy enunciated by this Court in matters of similar nature.Decision Petition dismissed.

SEPARATE OPINION

PERFECTO [dissent]

- There was illegal adjournment of the morning session. The power to adjourn is one of the exclusive prerogatives of a legislative chamber. It cannot be exercised by any single individual, without usurpation of the collective prerogatives. The functions of the Senate and its opportunity to transact official business cannot be left to the discretion of a single individual without jeopardizing the high purposes for which a legislative deliberative body is established in a democratic social order.- There is no provision in the present rules of the Senate which expressly or impliedly authorizes an adjournment without the consent of the body or one which authorizes the presiding officer to decree motu propio said adjournment, and the sound parliamentary practice and experience in this country and in the United States of America, upon which ours is patterned, would not authorize the existence of such a provision.- AVELINO alleges that he ordered the adjournment because the motion of a senator to said effect was properly made and met with no objection. The evidence, however, fails to support AVELINO’s claim. The circumstances lead us to the conclusion that illegal adjournment and the walk out of AVELINO and his supporters from the session hall had the purpose of defeating or, at least, delaying, action on the proposed investigation of the charges against AVELINO and of his impeding ouster, by the decisive votes of CUENCO's group.- The rump session (i.e. the session after the AVELINO group walkout) had no valid quorum to transact business. – The Constitution provides: “A majority of

each House shall constitute a quorum to do business…” [cf Art. VI, Sec. 16 (2), 1987 Const]. The majority mentioned in the provision cannot be other than the majority of the actual members of the Senate. The words "each House" in the above provision refer to the full membership of each chamber of Congress. The Senate is composed of 24 Senators, and a majority of them cannot be less than 13. 12 is only half of 24. Nowhere and at no time has one-half ever been the majority. Majority necessarily has to be more than one-half.

FERIA [concur]

- If the rump session was not a continuation of the morning session, was it validly constituted? Yes. At the beginning of the rump session there were at least 14 senators. Also, in view of the absence from the country of one senator, 12 senators constitute a majority of the Senate of 23 senators. When the Constitution declares that a majority of "each House" shall constitute a quorum, "the House" does not mean "all" the members. There is a difference between a majority of "all the members of the House" and a majority of "the House", the latter requiring less number than the first. Therefore an absolute majority (12) of all the members of the Senate less one (23), constitutes constitutional majority of the Senate for the purpose of a quorum.

RESOLUTION on Motion for Reconsideration

FACTS- In Avelino II, the Court, in light of events subsequent to Avelino I (i.e., refusal of the Avelino group to return to the session hall despite the compulsory process served upon them), reversed its original decision and now assumed jurisdiction over the case

ISSUES1. WON SC will assume jurisdiction over this case2. WON election of Cuenco as Senate President is valid

HELD1. The Court has resolved (7-4 vote) to assume jurisdiction over the case in the light of subsequent events which justify its intervention.2. Partly for the reasons stated in the first resolution of this Court and partly upon the grounds stated by Feria [and] Perfecto, JJ. in their separate opinions, to declare that there was a quorum at the session where CUENCO was elected acting Senate President. Chief Justice [Moran] agrees with the result of the majority's pronouncement on the quorum, it appearing from the evidence that any new session with a quorum would result in CUENCO's election as Senate President, and that the CUENCO group has been trying to satisfy [the constitutional] formalism by issuing compulsory processes against senators of the AVELINO group, but to no avail, because of the latter's persistent efforts to block all avenues to constitutional processes. For this reason, [the Chief Justice] believes that the CUENCO group has done enough to satisfy the requirements of the Constitution and that the majority's ruling is in conformity with substantial justice and with the requirements of public interest.Decision The judgment of the Court is, therefore, that CUENCO has been legally elected as Senate President and the petition is dismissed.

SEPARATE OPINION

FERIA [concur]

I maintain my opinion that there was a quorum in the (rump) session. Among others, the amendment of the quorum provision from "the majority of all the members of the National Assembly constitute a quorum to do business," into "a majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business," shows the intention of the framers of the Constitution to base the majority, not on the

number fixed or provided for in the Constitution, but on actual members or incumbents, and this must be limited to actual members who are not incapacitated to discharge their duties by reason of death, incapacity, or absence from the jurisdiction of the House or for other causes which make attendance of the member concerned impossible, even through coercive process which each House is empowered to issue to compel its members to attend the session in order to constitute a quorum.

PERFECTO [concur]

- The words "all the members" used in the original, for the determination of the quorum of the National Assembly, have been eliminated in the amendment, as regards the Houses of Congress, because they were a mere surplusage. I, as Member of the Second National Assembly and in my capacity as Chairman of the Committee on Third Reading, was the one who proposed the elimination of said surplusage, because "majority of each House" can mean only the majority of the members thereof, without excluding anyone, that is, of all the members.The word majority is a mathematical word. It has, as such, a precise and exact mathematical meaning. A majority means more than one-half (1/2). It can never be identified with one-half (1/2) or less than one-half. The Senate is composed of 24 senators. The majority of said senators cannot be less than thirteen 13. 12 do not constitute the majority in a group composed of 24 units. No amount of mental gymnastics or juristic logodaedaly will convince anyone that one of two equal numbers constitute a majority part of the two numbers combined. The 5 fingers of one hand cannot be the majority of the combined 10 fingers of the two hands. Majority is incompatible with equality. It implies the idea of superiority. Majority presupposes the existence of a total and, in the present case, the total number of 24 senators composing the Senate.- The above pronouncements notwithstanding, we are now inclined to conclude that for the purpose of choosing CUENCO merely as Acting Senate President, the presence of the 12 senators was enough quorum. The Constitution provides: “A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum…, but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day and may compel the attendance of absent Members in such manner and under such penalties as such House may provide" [again, cf Art. VI, Sec. 16 (2), 1987 Const]. The "smaller number" referred to has to act collectively and cannot act as collective body to perform the functions specifically vested in it by the Constitution unless presided by one among their number. The collective body constituted by said "smaller number" has to take measure to "compel the attendance of absent members," so as to avoid disruption in the functions of the respective legislative chamber. Said "smaller number" may be 12 or even less than 12 senators to constitute a quorum for the election of a temporary or acting president, who will have to act until normalcy is restored. - At the hearing of this case, CUENCO manifested that he was looking for an opportunity to renounce the position of Acting Senate President, and that if AVELINO should attend the sessions of the Senate and insist on claiming the presidency thereof, CUENCO would allow AVELINO to preside over the sessions. AVELINO’s refusal to attend the sessions, notwithstanding CUENCO’s commitment to allow him to preside over them, can and should logically be interpreted as an abandonment which entails forfeiture of office.

OSMENA V PENDATUNBENGZON; October 28, 1960

FACTS- On June 23, 1960, Congressman Sergio Osmeña, Jr., in a privilege speech delivered before the House, made the serious imputations of bribery against the President. The House of Representatives, through Resolution No. 59, created a special committee of 15 members to investigate the truth of the charges against the President. It summoned Osmeña to appear before it to substantiate his charges.

- On July 14, 1960, Osmeña filed with the Supreme Court a petition for "declaratory relief, certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction" against Congressman Salipada Pendatun and the fourteen other members of the Special Committee. He asked that said resolution be annulled and that said members of the special committee be enjoined from proceeding in accordance with it, particularly the portion authorizing them to require him to substantiate his charges against the President, with the admonition that if he failed to do so, he must show cause why the House should not punish him. Osmeña alleged: (1) the Constitution gave him complete parliamentary immunity, and so, for words spoken in the House, he ought not to be questioned; (2) that his speech constituted no disorderly behaviour for which he could be punished; and (3) supposing he could be questioned and disciplined therefor, the House took up other business, and Rule XVII, sec. 7 of the Rules of the House provides that if other business has intervened after the Member had uttered obnoxious words in debate, he shall not be held to answer therefor nor be subject to censure by the House- Aware of the petition, the special committee continued to perform its task, and after giving Osmena a chance to defend himself, submitted its report on July 18, 1960, finding said congressman guilty of serious disorderly behavior. Acting on such report, the House approved on the same day-before closing its session-House Resolution No. 175, declaring him guilty as recommended, and suspending him from office for fifteen months.- Thereafter, Osmeña took the additional position that the House has no power, under the Constitution, to suspend one of its members.- On July 19, 1960, the respondents filed their answer, challenged the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain the petition, defended the power of Congress to discipline its members with suspension, upheld House Resolution No. .175 and then invited attention to the fact that Congress having ended its session on July 18, 1960, the Committee-whose members are the sole respondents-had thereby ceased to exist.

ISSUES1. WON the Constitution gives members of Congress complete parliamentary

immunity for words spoken in the House 2. WON the Speech of Osmeña constituted unruly behavior for which he could

be punished 3. WON Osmeña can be held to answer for or be censured by the House,

given that other business had intervened after gave the speech in question 4. WON the House has the power to suspend its members

HELD1. NO. Section 15, Article VI of our Constitution which provides that "for any speech or debate" in Congress, the Senators or Members of the House of Representatives "shall not be questioned in any other place." This section was taken or is a copy of sec. 6, clause I of Art. 1 of the Constitution of the United States, wherein the provision has always been understood to mean that although exempt from prosecution or civil actions for their words uttered in Congress, the members of Congress may, nevertheless, be questioned in Congress itself. - Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental privilege cherished in every legislative assembly of the democratic world. It guarantees the legislator complete freedom of expression without fear of being made responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts or any other forum outside of the Congressional Hall. But it does not protect him from responsibility before the legislative body itself whenever his words and conduct are considered by the latter disorderly or unbecoming a member thereof. 2. YES. The House is the judge of what constitutes disorderly behavior, not only because the Constitution has conferred jurisdiction upon it, but also because the matter depends mainly on factual circumstances of which the House knows best but which can not be depicted in black and white for presentation to, and adjudication by the Courts. For one thing, if this Court assumed the power to determine whether Osmeña's conduct constituted disorderly behavior, it would thereby have assumed appellate jurisdiction,

which the Constitution never intended to confer upon a coordinate branch of the Government. The theory of separation of powers fastidiously observed by this Court, demands in such situation a prudent refusal to interfere. Each department, it has been said, has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction and is supreme within its own sphere.- "The Legislative power of the Philippine Congress is plenary, subject only to such limitations as are found in the Republic's Constitution. So that any power deemed to be legislative by usage or tradition, is necessarily possessed by the Philippine Congress, unless the Constitution provides otherwise." (Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil., 192, 212.)3. YES. Resolution No. 59 was unanimously approved by the House, such approval amounted to a suspension of the House Rules, which according to standard parliamentary practice may be done by unanimous consent. Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with their observance, the courts have no concern. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action when the requisite number of members has agreed to a particular measure." 4. YES. For unparliamentary conduct, members of Parliament or of Congress have been, or could be censured, committed to prison, suspended, even expelled by the votes of their colleagues. The practice and the traditional power of legislative assemblies to take, disciplinary action against its members, including imprisonment, suspension or expulsion have been recognized in the United States. The Rules of Philippine House of Representatives provide that the parliamentary practices of the Congress of the United States shall apply in a supplementary manner to its proceedings.Decision Petition DISMISSED.

ASTORGA V VILLEGASMAKALINTAL; April 30, 1974

FACTS- Original Action in the SC. Mandamus, injunction and/or prohibition with preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction- HB No. 9266 was filed and was passed on the third reading without amendments in the House of Representatives (HoR). It was referred to the Senate Committee on Provinces and Municipal Governments and Cities headed by Sen. Roxas. Sen. Roxas suggested a minor amendment on HB 9266. However, this recommendation was not acted upon by the Senate during its second hearing, and instead, approved in toto Sen. Tolentino’s substantial amendment on the section definig the powers and duties of the VM. - After that the Secretary of the Senate sent a letter to the HoR that HB. No. 9266 had been passed by the Senate with amendments. However, the attached amendments were not Sen. Tolentino’s but Sen. Roxas’amendments. The HoR signified its approval of HB No. 9266 (with Roxas amendment) and printed copies of it which were certified and attested by the Secretary of the HoR, the Speaker of the HoR, the Secretary of the Senate, and the Senate President. The Secretary of the House transmitted 4 copies of the bill to the President of the Philippines, who affixed his signatures by way of approval – enacted the bill into R.A. No. 406532 - The respondent mayor (Villegas) publicly denounced the RA, then Sen. Tolentino made a press statement that the enrolled copy of HB 9266 signed by the President is not the version passed by the Senate since it did not contain the amendments he made. The Senate President then informed the President that the enrolled copy of the signed HB 9266 was not the bill duly approved by Congress and that his signature is invalid and had no effect, and could not validate the bill which was not the version approved by the Congress. The President then withdrew his signature on the HB 9266.

32 An Act Defining the Powers, Rights and Duties of the Vice-Mayor of the City of Manila, Further

Amending for the Purpose Section 10 and 11 of RA No. 409, Otherwise known as the Revised Charter of the City of Manila

- With the withdrawal of signatures of the Senate President and the President of the Philippines, Villegas issued circulars ordering city government officials and operators of business establishments to disregard the provisions of RA 4065. He likewise ordered the Chief of Police to recall the police officers assigned to the vice-mayor presumably under the said RA.- As a reaction, the petitioner vice mayor (Astorga) filed a petition for “Mandamus, Injunction and/or Prohibition with Preliminary Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction” to compel respondents to comply with the provisions of RA 4065. - Respondents argued that RA 4056 never became law since (1) it was not the bill approved by Congress and (2) entries in the journal of that body and not the enrolled bill should be decisive in the resolution of the issue. Since Mayor Villegas was going abroad on an official trip, Court issued restraining order for Astorga to not exercise the powers vested to him as Acting Mayor under the RA 4065.

ISSUES1. WON the Court could resolve the issue regarding the “enrolled bill doctrine” 2. WON the attestation of the presiding officers of the Congress approves the

bill and validates it into a law3. WON in the absence of the attestation of the presiding officers, the “journal

entry” in the Journals of Congress could constitute proof of due enactment 4. WON RA 4065 was duly enacted and therefore did not become a law

HELD1. Ratio YES. The enrolled copy of the resolution and the legislative

journals are conclusive upon the Courts under Section 313 of Act 190, as amended by Act. No. 2210 as evidence for the due enactment of a bill.

Obiter- compared this case to the Mabanag v. Lopez Vito where the Court denied to resolve the issue of WON a resolution of both Houses of Congress proposing an amendment to the 1935 Constitution to be appended as an ordinance thereto had been passed by a “vote for three-fourths of all the members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives” pursuant to Article XV of the Constitution, saying that it involved a political question (enrolled bill doctrine) which is not in the province of the judiciary.- using J. Bengzon’s separate opinion in the same case, J. Makalintal said that the case at bar is justiciable since enrolled copy of the resolution and the legislative journals are conclusive upon the courts based on Section 313 of Act 190, as amended by Act. No. 2210 as proof of due enactment of provisions of acts.- basis of the enrolled bill theory: respect due to coequal and independent departments which requires the judicial department to “accept, as having passed the Congress, all bills authenticated by it. 2. Ratio NO. The final passage of the bill ends the lawmaking

process and the certification/attestation of the bill is only a mode of authentication devised by the Congress which does not add the validity of the bill nor cure any defect already present upon it.

Obiter effects of Attestation of the bill: just a mode of authentication; signify the Chief Executive that the bill being presented to him has been duly approved by Congress and is ready for his approval or disapproval3. Ratio YES. If attestation is absent and is not mandated in the

Constitution for the validity of a statute, the courts may resort to the journals and other records of Congress for proof of its due enactment.

Obiter Attestation by the presiding officers is not mandated in the Constitution as a proof of due enactment of a bill, but requires a Journal of the Congress’ proceedings [comparison of Constitutions: 1935 consti vs 1987 Consti: Sec 10(4) = Art VI, sec 26 (2); Sec. 21(2) = Art VI, sec 27(1)] 4. Ratio NO. Given that (1) the Court could resolve the issue

regarding the enrolled bill doctrine, (2) that the Court could use the attestation of the presiding officers of Congress and, in the absence of the latter, the records of the proceedings of the Congress entered into the Journals of Congress as proof of the due enactment of RA 4065 since the

law is deemed enacted after the passage of the bill in the 3 rd reading and the attestation of the presiding officers just serve as a mode of authenticating the bill, (3) that, upon referring to the journal entries of the proceedings of congress, the Court discovered that substantial and lengthy amendments were introduced to the HB but were not incorporated in the printed text which was signed by the President of the Philippines, and (4) that the President of the Philippines and of the Senate already withdrew their signatures, then RA 4065 was not duly enacted and therefore did not become a law.

Decision RA 4065 was declared not to have been duly enacted and therefore did not become law. TRO made permanent. [8 concur, 2 no part, 1 did not take part (I don’t know the difference), 1 on leave = 12 only]

MARTINEZ V MORFEFERNANDO; March 24, 1972

FACTS- Petitioners Manuel Martinez and Fernando Bautista, Sr. were delegates of the 1971 Constitutional Convention facing criminal prosecutiono Martinez was charged with falsification of a public document for stating under oath in his certificate of candidacy for delegate to the Constitutional Convention that he was born on June 20, 1945, when in truth he was born on June 20, 1946o Bautista was accused of violating Section 51 of the Revised Election Code in that he gave and distributed free of charge, food, drinks, and cigarettes at two public meetings

- Both wanted the respective warrants of arrest issued against them to be quashed, by virtue of the parliamentary immunity they enjoy as delegates, traceable to Section 15 Article VI of the Constitution as construed together with Article 145 of the Revised Penal Code

ISSUES1. WON the petitioners are immune from arrest2. WON Section 15 Article VI of the Constitution should be construed together with Article 145 of the Revised Penal Code, thereby expanding congressional immunity

HELD1. No. Parliamentary immunity does not cover criminal arrests.

Under Section 15 of Republic Act No. 6132, otherwise known as the 1971 Constitutional Convention Act, delegates are entitled to the parliamentary immunities of a senator or a representative.

Article VI Section 15 of the Constitution provides: “The Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall in all cases except treason, felony, and breach of peace, be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of the Congress, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any speech o debate therein, they shall not be questioned in any other place.”

Immunity from arrest does not cover any prosecution for treason, felony and breach of peaceo Treason-levying war against the Republic and adhering to enemies

and giving them aid and comforto Felony-an act or omission punishable by lawo Breach of peace-covers any offense whether defined by RPC or any

special statute History of parliamentary immunity shows that it was never intended to

exempt members of the National Assembly from criminal arrest The power or right of the State to claim privileges is due to the fact that it

has the right to carry out its function without obstacle In England, operation of parliamentary privilege excludes all crimes,

applies only to prosecutions of civil nature

There is a full recognition of the necessity to have members of the Congress, and likewise, delegates of the Constitutional Convention, entitled to the utmost freedom to enable them to discharge responsibilities

However, when it comes to freedom from arrest, it would amount to the creation of a privileged class if notwithstanding their liability for a criminal offense, they would be immune during their attendance in Congress and in going to and returning from the same.

A legislator or a delegate can perform his functions efficiently and well without the need for any transgression of criminal law.

If a legislator or delegate is facing criminal prosecution, he should be treated like any other citizen considering that there is a strong public interest in seeing to it that a crime should not go unpunished.

2. No. Article 145 of the Revised Penal Code is inoperative. Article 145 penalizes a public officer or employee who shall, during the

session of Congress, arrest or search any member thereof, except in case such member has committed a crime punishable under the RPC by a penalty higher than prision mayor.

RPC took effect on January 1, 1932, before the enforcement of the 1935 Constitution

Art. XVI, Sec, 2 of the 1935 Constitution states: “All laws of the Philippine Islands shall continue in force until the inauguration the Commonwealth of the Philippines; thereafter, such laws shall remain operative, unless inconsistent with this Constitution, until amended, altered, modified or repealed by the Congress of the Philippines…”

Article 145 which accords legislators a generous treatment exempting them from arrest even if warranted under the penal law, is inconsistent with the Constitution, and is consequently inoperative.

JIMENEZ V CABANGBANGCONCEPCION; August 3, 1966

FACTS- Ordinary Civil Action for the recovery of several sums of money by way of damages for the publication of an allegedly libelous letter of defendant Bartolome Cabangbang- Defendant moved to dismiss upon ground that letter is a privileged communication and not libelous since he was a member of the House of Representatives and Chairman of House Committee on National Defense- The letter in question is an open letter to the President of the Philippines dated Nov 14, 1958 while congress was presumably not in session.- Defendant caused the publication of the letter in several newpapers.- The open letter was an exposé on allegedly three operational plans. The first plan is said to be an insidious plan or a massive political build up of then Sec. of Nat’l Defense, Jesus Vagas, by propagandizing and glamorizing him in such a way as to be prepared to become candidate for President in 1961. (Plan II – A coup d’etat;Plan III – A modification of Plan I)- The letter also implicated that the “planners” have under their control the following : (1) Col. Nicanor Jimenez , (2)Lt.Col. Jose Lukban,(3) Capt. Carlos Albert, (4)Col Fidel Llamas, (5) Lt. Col Jose regala, (6)Maj. Jose Reyna…….” It is of course possible that the officers mentioned above are unwitting tools of the plan of which they may have absolutely no knowledge.”- Lower Court dismissed- Petitioners appealed

ISSUES1. WON the publication is a privileged communication2. (if not) WON it is libelous

HELD1. NO. The publication in question is not absolutely privileged. It was an open letter to the President published by the defendant when the Congress was not

in session. And in thus causing it to be published he was not performing his official duty, either as a member of Congress or as officer of any House Committee.- The phrase “speech or debate therein” as used in Article VI, Sec 15 of the 1935 Constitution refers to utterances made by congressmen in the performance of their official functions, such as speeches delivered, statements made, or votes cast in the halls of Congress while it is in session, as well as bills introduced in Congress whether it is in session or not, and other acts performed by Congressmen, either in congress or outside the premises housing its offices, in the discharge of their duties as members of Congress and of Congressional Committees duly authorized to perform its function as such, at the time of the performance of the acts in question.2. NO. The letter in question is not sufficient to support plaintiffs’ action for damages. Although the letter says that plaintiffs are under the control of the planners, the defendant likewise added that it was possible that plaintiffs are unwitting tools of the plan which they may have absolutely no knowledge. The statement is not derogatory to the plaintiffs, to the point of entitling them to recover damages.

PELAEZ V AUDITOR GENERALCONCEPCION; September 24, 1965

FACTS- During the period from September 4 to October 29, 1964 the President of the Philippines, purporting to act pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, issued Executive Order Nos. 93 to 121, 124 and 126 to 129; creating 33 municipalities.- RAC Section 68

- provides, among others, that the President may by executive order define the boundary of municipality, increase or diminish its territory provided that the authorization of the Congress of the Phil shall first be obtained.

- The petitioner argued that these EOs are null and void because of RA 2370 Section 3 which provides that barrios may “not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed” except by Acts of Congress or of the corresponding provincial board “upon petition of a majority of the voters in areas affected” and the “recommendation of the council of the municipality in which the proposed barrio is situated.”- Procedure Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice President of the Philippines and as taxpayer, instituted the present civil action, for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction, against the Auditor General, to restrain him, as well as his representatives and agents, from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said executive orders and/or any disbursement by said municipalities.- The mayors who were adversely affected by the EOs intervened in the case.- Atty. Enrique Fernando and Emma Quisumbing-Fernando appeared as amici curiae.

ISSUES1. WON the executive orders are null and void upon the ground that Section 68 of RAC, which was the basis of the EOs has been impliedly repealed by RA 2730.2. WON the power of the President to create municipalities under RAC amount to an undue delegation of legislative power.

HELD1. Yes. RA 2370’s denial of the presidential authority to create a new barrio implies a negation of the bigger power to create municipalities, each of which consists of several barrios.2. Yes. The authority to create municipal corporations is essentially legislative in nature. There could only be a due delegation of legislative power if the law is (a) complete in itself – it must set forth the policy to be executed, carried out

or implemented by the “delegate” - and (b) fix a standard – the limits of which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions.- Sec 28 of RAC does not meet these well settled requirements for a valid delegation of the power to fix the details in the enforcement of a law. It does not enunciate any policy to be carried out or implemented by the President. Neither does it give a standard sufficiently precise to avoid the evil effects of the power the President.Reasoninga. adherence to precedent (Schechter Poultry Corp vs. US)- It was held here that in Recovery Act there was an undue delegation of legislative power because it supplies no standards for any trade, industry or activity.b. Constitutional provision (incompatible and inconsistent with RAC)- Sec 10 of Art VII of 1935 Constitution ordains:

“The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise general supervision over all local governments as may be provided by LAW. (take note: such control does not include the authority either to abolish or create)

Decision The Executive Orders are declared null and void ab initio and the respondent are permanently restrained from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said Eos or any disbursement by the municipalities concerned.

ARNAULT V NAZARENOOZAETA; July 18, 1950

FACTS- This refers to two land deals entered into by the Philippine government as follows: 1. BUENAVISTA ESTATE- The Philippine government leased from San Juan de Dios Hospital for twenty five years the Buenavista estate and had an option to purchase the same for P 3.0 million. This purchase option was exercised by the then occupation republic by tendering the owner the sum of P 3.0 million and, on its rejection, depositing the said funds in Court on June 21, 1944 together with the accrued rentals of P 324,000. - San Juan de Dios on June 29, 1946 sold this same property to Ernest H. Burt, an non-resident American for P 5,000,000 with the initial downpayment of P 10,000 with the balance payable under very favorable terms. Burt was unable to comply with the terms agreed.2. TAMBOBONG ESTATE - On May of 1946, the same Burt purchase from Philippine Trust Corporation, the Tambobong estate for P 1.2 million with a downpayment of P 10,000.00 and terms which are as generuous as those from San Juan de Dios. There was however no other payment received from Burt.- The Philippine government, through the Rural Progress Administration, acquired this same property from its original owner for the sum of P 750,000 and subsequently instituted a notarial demand upon Burt for the resolution and cancellation of his contract of purchase with Philippine Trust for non payment. The Court of First Instance in this case ordered the cancellation of Burt’s title and the issuance of a new one under the name of Rural Progress Administration.- For one reason or another, despite the fact the Philippine government already owned both the above estate, it again bought the same from Burt for a total consideration of P 5,000,000 (P 4.5 million for Buenavista and P 500,000 for Tambobong). The government paid initially P 1,000,000 for Buenavista and the full amount of P 500,000 for the Tambobong estate through two corporations acting as Burt’s attorneys-in-fact. These two were represented in the trasaction by one and the same person, Jean L. Arnault.- It was also brought out that the Rural Progress Administration was headed at that time by the Justice secretary who was at the same time Chairman of the Philippine National Bank, the institution that lent the funds to Rural Progress.

- The transactions resulted into a public outcry which led into the Philippine Senate adopting Resolution 8 which created a special committee to investigate the Buenavista and Tambobong Estates deal.- The committee was tasked, among others, with determining:

a. the validity, honesty, propriety of the purchaseb. the fairness of the purchase pricec. the parties involved/responsible for the deal

- During the public hearings of the Committee, various witnesses were called. Among them and apparently the most important was Jean Arnault, the person who represented Burt in the transactions. - During the said hearing, Arnault confirmed receiving the money from the government and withdrawing, in cash, P 440,000 which he gave to someone on instruction of Burt. When asked to identify the person he gave the money to, he replied that he did not know his name despite the fact that he met the person on many occasions. When pressed to answer, he also said that answering the question might incriminate him. Based on this refusal, the senate approved a resolution on May 15, 1950 arraigning him for contempt and subsequently found him guilty of the charge. He was committed to the custody of the Senate Sergeant at arms until he reveals the name of the person he gave the money to. The Senate adjourned three days later. The work of the Committee however was extended via Resolution 16.- Arnault filed an original action for the issuance of a writ of Habeas Corpus with the Supreme Court to obtain his release cited the following grounds:

a. the Senate has no power to punish him for contempt since the requested information is not material to the intended legislation and his refusal to answer has not impeded or obstructed the legislated process. The Senate has already approved bills related to the transactions. b. the Senate lacks the authority to commit him in contempt for a term beyond its legislative session.c. the information sought will be self-incriminating

- rior to discussing the issues, the Supreme Court went into the general principles of law with regard the power of either house of Congress to punish a person not a member for contempt as this case is the first of its kind to be tried under the Philippine constitution. In so doing, the Supreme Court had to draw from American precedents in recognition of the fact that the Constitution of the Philippines were patterned after largely American institutions and practices. The discussions were as follows:

a. There is no expressed provisions in the constitution which grant power to either House to investigate or exact testimonies to exercise legislative function. However, this power of inquiry, and the process to enforce it, is a necessary element to enable the body to wisely and effectively perform their respective legislative functions. In the absence of information that it requires, Congress has no other recourse but to get the same from others who have them. At times, the information required are not entirely accurate or complete. Given this, Congress has the implied coercive to obtain such information. b. The power to compel is limited to information required in a matter into which Congress has jurisdiction to inquire.

ISSUES WON the writ of Habeas Corpus should be granted

HELDa. The requested information is needed to comply with the direction of the senate as contained in Resolution Nos. 8 & 16 to secure the names of the persons responsible for the transaction. The materiality of the question asked in the public hearing should be determined by its direct relation to the matter being inquired into and not by its indirect relation to any proposed or possible legislation. The only time that the Supreme Court may interfere with the Senate is when a petitioner is being forced to answer questions which are not pertinent to the matter inquiry. In this case and citing McGrain vs Daugherty, Congress would be guilty of a clear abuse of authority in the exercise of its power. As to

whether the information sought to be elicited is material to an proposed legislation, the Court could not say as this is not within their scope. - Citing the case Re: Chapman, where the petitioner was jailed for contempt of the US Senate for refusing to answer questions with regard accounts of Senators in his company, the Supreme Court held that the Philippine Senate has the authority to compel Arnault and if he so refuses to give the information, also the power find him in contempt and to imprison him until he complies with said requirement. b. The power of the Senate to commit Arnault to prison does not end with the termination of the legislative session. The opinion of Justice Malcolm was cited with regard the Candido Lopez case where he opines that the imprisonment of Lopez terminates when the House of Representatives adjourns. Citing however the McGrain case again, the Court said that, unlike the House of Representatives which losses all its members every four years (hence its term is only four years), the Senate is deemed as a continuing body whose members are elected for a six year term and are so divided that only a third of the seats become vacant every two years. Hence, the power of the Senate to hold Arnault is a continuing power. The only caveat of the Supreme Court in this case is that if the Senate disregards the proper limitation to jail parties in contempt, the remedy is with the Court.c. Arnault’s claim to self incrimination cannot be sustained citing Mason vs US as a precedent. The Court must be given the chance to determine from all the facts and circumstances whether the witness is justified in refusing to answer any question which could incriminate him. Arnault’s testimony was obviously false. He obviously knew the name of the person he gave the money to. His refusal to testify truthfully is punishable with contempt.Decision Petition is denied

SEPARATE OPINION

TUASON [dissent]

- The power of the legislative body to punish for contempt is based on the necessity for its attainment of the ends. The power is however not absolute. And this is precisely where disagreement occur.- Justice Tuason is of the opinion that the question being asked has no relation whatsoever to the contemplated legislation. A stated reason for the insistence on getting an answer to the question as to who received the money is supposedly to vindicate or clear the names of the persons suspected of getting the money (Antonio Quirino, one of the suspects, is the brother of President Quirino). The Senate is not the proper forum for such vindication. The Senate investigation seems to have only one objective and this is to prepare the way for court action since they could not expect the Justice department to take the initiative to investigate and prosecute the responsible parties as it seems that the Secretary of the Justice department had a hand in the transaction. This is not the a duty of the Legislative department.- The Committee’s report has been submitted to the entire Senate. And as a matter of fact three bills were passed by the Senate in connection with the investigation. This being the case there is no need to extract names. The importance of names is when it comes to a criminal prosecution. - In ending, Justice Tuason stated that the investigation of the Senate is commendable and legal. His main objection lies in the fact that the Senate has overstepped its authority and trespassed on the territory of other braches of government “when it imprisoned a witness for contumacy on a point that is unimportant, useless, impertinent and irrelevant, let alone moot”.

LIDASAN V COMMISSION ON ELECTIONSSANCHEZ; October 25, 1967

FACTS

- On June 18, 1966, the Chief Executive signed into law House Bill 1247, known as Republic Act 4790, now in dispute. The body of the statute, reproduced in haec verba, reads:

SECTION 1. Barrios Togaig, Madalum, Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan, Kabamakawan, Kapatagan, Bongabong, Aipang, Dagowan, Bakikis, Bungabung, Losain, Matimos and Magolatung, in the Municipalities of Butig and Balabagan, Province of Lanao del Sur, are separated from said municipalities and constituted into a distinct and independent municipality of the same province to be known as the Municipality of Dianaton, Province of Lanao del Sur. The seat of government of the municipality shall be in Togaig.SEC. 2. The first mayor, vice-mayor and councilors of the new municipality shall be elected in the nineteen hundred sixty-seven general elections for local officials.SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

- It came to light later that barrios Togaig and Madalum just mentioned are within the municipality of Buldon, Province of Cotabato, and that Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan, and Kabamakawan are parts and parcel of another municipality, the municipality of Parang, also in the Province of Cotabato and not of Lanao del Sur. Bara Lidasan, a resident and taxpayer of Parang, Cotabato, prays that Republic Act 4790 be declared unconstitutional; and that Comelec's resolutions of August 15, 1967 and September 20, 1967 implementing the same for electoral purposes, be nullified.

ISSUES1. WON the title of RA 4790 conforms with the constitutional requirement that the subject of a bill shall be expressed in the title NO2. WON RA 4790 may still be salvaged with reference to the nine barrios in Lanao del Sur NO3. WON petitioner has legal standing to challenge the statute YES

HELD1. The title - "An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton, in the Province of Lanao del Sur" 8 - projects the impression that solely the province of Lanao del Sur is affected by the creation of Dianaton. Not the slightest intimation is there that communities in the adjacent province of Cotabato are incorporated in this new Lanao del Sur town. The phrase "in the Province of Lanao del Sur," read without subtlety or contortion, makes the title misleading, deceptive. Such title did not inform the members of Congress as to the full impact of the law; it did not apprise the people in the towns of Buldon and Parang in Cotabato and in the province of Cotabato itself that part of their territory is being taken away from their towns and province and added to the adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur; it kept the public in the dark as to what towns and provinces were actually affected by the bill.2. Where a portion of a statute is rendered unconstitutional and the remainder valid, the parts will be separated, and the constitutional portion upheld. But when the parts of the statute are so mutually dependent and connected, as conditions, considerations, inducements, or compensations for each other, as to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a whole, and that if all could not be carried into effect, the legislature would not pass the residue independently, then, if some parts are unconstitutional, all the provisions which are thus dependent, conditional, or connected, must fall with them. When the foregoing bill was presented in Congress, unquestionably, the totality of the twenty-one barrios - not nine barrios - was in the mind of the proponent thereof. That this is so, is plainly evident by the fact that the bill itself, thereafter enacted into law, states that the seat of the government is in Togaig, which is a barrio in the municipality of Buldon in Cotabato. And then the reduced area poses a number of questions, thus: Could the observations as to progressive community, large aggregate population, collective income sufficient to maintain an independent municipality, still apply to a motely group of only nine barrios out of the twenty-one?

3. Petitioner is a qualified voter. He expects to vote in the 1967 elections His right to vote in his own barrio before it was annexed to a new town is affected. He may not want, as is the case here, to vote in a town different from his actual residence. He may not desire to be considered a part of hitherto different communities which are formed into the new town; he may prefer to remain in the place where he is and as it was constituted, and continue to enjoy the rights and benefits he acquired therein. He may not even know the candidates of the new town; he may express a lack of desire to vote for anyone of them; he may feel that his vote should be cast for the officials in the town before dismemberment. Since by constitutional direction the purpose of a bill must be shown in its title for the benefit, amongst others, of the community affected thereby, 16 it stands to reason to say that when the constitutional right to vote on the part of any citizen of that community is affected, he may become a suitor to challenge the constitutionality of the Act as passed by Congress.

MILLER V MARDOBARRERA; July 31, 1961

FACTS- These are different cases taken together as they present only one identical question- 1st case: Manuel Gonzales filed complaint against Bill Miller at the DoL, claiming that he is a driver of Miller and was arbitrarily dismissed without separation pay- Miller filed petition for prohibition against Hearing Officer Mardo of the DoL on ground that HO has no jurisdiction to hear and decide on the case- Court rendered decision though that Reorg. Plan 2-A did not repeal Judiciary Act that conferred to CFI original jurisdiction to take cognizance of money claims re violations of labor standards- 2nd case: Cresencio Estano filed complaint at the DoL against Chin Hua Trading Co., for not being paid overtime and vacation leave pay as a driver in the company- same circumstances as 1st case, and court issued permanent injunction against hearing the cases by the Hearing Officer, as Reorg. Plan 2-A is null and void.- 3RD case: Numeriana Raganas filed with CFI a complaint against Sen Bee Trading Company for being underpaid, not being paid overtime, without sick leave and vacation leave pay, as a seamstress- Sun Bee filed motion to dismiss, and insisted that CFI does not have jurisdiction as money claims must be filed with Regional Office of DoL under Reorg. Plan 2-A- 4th case: Vicente Romero filed case against Sia Seng at the DoL Sia Leng did noy\t file an answer and a decision was rendered in favor of Romero. But Labor Administrator Hernando refused to issue the writ of execution of the ecision as he believed that Sia Seng deserved to be heard

they insist as well that Reorg. Plan is not validly passed as a statute and unconstitutional

- 5th case: Mariano Pabillare filed at the DoL a complaint against Fred Wilson and Co., as he was summarily dismissed wihout cause, without separation pay, and without sufficient notice.

- They moved to dismiss as it is only an administrative body, with no power to adjudicate money claims- Certiorari, prohibition and injuction was filed as well – that Reorg Plan is null and void insofar as it vest original exclusive jurisdiction over money claims

ISSUES1. WON Reorganization Plan 20-A, prepared and submitted under the authority of RA 997 as amended by RA 1241, is valid, insofar as it confers jurisdiction to the Regional Offices of the Department of Labor to decide on claims of laborers for wages, overtime and separation pay, etc.2. WON Reorganization Plan 20-A was validly passed by Congress

HELD1. No it is not valid.- While the Reorganization Commission could create functions, it referred merely to administrative and not judicial functions such as deciding on money claims. Judicial power rests exclusively on the judiciary- While legislature may confer administrative boards quasi-judicial powers, it must be incident to the exercise of administrative dunctions- Conferment of quasi-judicial functions cannot be implied from a mere grant of power to create functions in connection with reorganization of the Executive2. No it was not validly passed by Congress- A law is not passed by mere silence or non-action of Congress even if it be stated in Sec 6(a) of RA 997- It is contrary to well-settled and well-understood parliamentary law- that two houses are to hold separate sessions for their deliberations and the determination of the one upon a proposed law is to be submitted to the separate determination of the other.

TANADA V TUVERAESCOLIN; April 24, 1985

FACTS- Petition to review the decision of the Executive Assistant to the President.- Invoking the people’s right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 constitution, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette, of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders. The respondents would have this case dismissed on the ground that petitioners have no legal personality to bring this petition. Petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns a public right and its object is to compel public duty, they need not show any specific interest. Respondents further contend that publication in the OG is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates.

ISSUEWON publication in the Official Gazette is an indispensable requirement for the effectivity of the PDs, LOIs, general orders, EOs, etc. where laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates

HELDYes. It is the people’s right to be informed on matters of public concern & corollarily access to official records, & to documents & papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, shall be afforded the citizens subject to such limitation as may be provided by law (Sec. 6, Art. IV, 1973 Constitution). Laws, to be valid & enforceable, must be published in the OG or otherwise effectively promulgated. The fact that a PD or LOI states its date of effectivity does not preclude their publication in the OG as they constitute important legislative acts. The publication of presidential issuances “of public nature” or “of general applicability” is a requirement of due process. Before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially informed of its contents.Decision Respondents ordered to publish in Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances of general application, and unless so published shall have no binding force and effect.Important Point It illustrates how decrees & issuances issued by one man — Marcos — are in fact laws of general application and provide for penalties. The constitution afforded Marcos both executive & legislative powers.- The generality of law (CC Art. 14) will never work w/o constructive notice. The ruling of this case provides that publication constitutes the necessary constructive notice & is thus the cure for ignorance as an excuse.- Ignorance will not even mitigate the crime.

TANADA V TUVERACRUZ; December 29, 1986

FACTS- In the decision of this case on April 24, 1985, the Court affirmed the necessity for the publication of some of these decrees, declaring in the dispositive portion as follows:

"WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish to the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect."

- This is a motion for reconsideration/clarification of the first decision, specifically, on the following questions:

ISSUES1. What is meant by "law of public nature" or "general applicability"?2. Must a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are not?3. What is meant by "publication"?4. Where is the publication to be made?5. When is the publication to be made?

HELD1 & 2. The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature. Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.3. The publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the laws. The mere mention of the number of the presidential decree, the title of such decree, its whereabouts (e.g., "with Secretary Tuvera"), the supposed date of effectivity, and in a mere supplement of the Official Gazette cannot satisfy the publication requirement. This is not even substantial compliance.33

4. We have no choice but to pronounce that under Article 2 of the Civil Code, the publication of laws must be made in the Official Gazette, and not elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity after fifteen days from such publication or after a different period provided by the legislature.5. We also hold that the publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as possible, to give effect to the law pursuant to the said Article 2. There is that possibility, of course, although not suggested by the parties that a law could be rendered unenforceable by a mere refusal of the executive, for whatever reason, to cause its publication as required. This is a matter, however, that we do not need to examine at this time.

LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO V COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

TINGA; February 24, 2004

FACTS

33 This was the manner in which the General Appropriations Act for FY 1975, a presidential decree

undeniably of general applicability and interest, was "published" by the Marcos administration. The evident purpose was to withhold rather than disclose information on this vital law.

- LDP together with other political parties formed a coalition called Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP)- KNP has chose Fernando Poe as its Standard Bearer for the President of the Phils in the May 2004 elections- LDP filed with COMELEC a petition to certify nomination of candidates for the upcoming elections- on Dec. 8, 2003, LDP filed a Manifestation informing the COMELEC

a) that only the Party Chairman, Senator Edgardo Angara or his authorized representative may endorse the certificate of candidacy of the party’s official candidatesb) that LDP had placed its Secretary General, Representative Agapito Aquino, on “indefinite forced leave” and Ambassador Enrique Zaldivar was the Acting Sec-Gen

- Rep. Aquino contended that the Party Chairman does not have authority to impose disciplinary sanctions on the Sec-Gen and asked COMELEC to disregard the Manifestation - pending resolution, a Certificate of Nomination was filed with COMELEC, naming Sen. Panfilo Lacson as LDP’s Standard Bearer for president; the certificate was signed by Rep. Aquino- the COMELEC, noting that the conflict was an internal party matter and that the period for filing for the Certificate of Nomination was about to end, granted the petition for both Petitioner (Angara) and Oppositor (Aquino) in that it recognized all the candidates nominated by both parties as the official candidates of the LDP identifying each set of candidates as the “Angara Wing” and the “Aquino Wing”- Angara filed the present petition assailing the COMELEC Resolution for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion

ISSUEWON COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it applied equity and divided LDP into “wings”

HELDYES there was grave abuse of discretion. The only issue to be resolved by the Commission was who as between the Chairman and the Secretary General had the authority to sign the certificates of candidacy. To resolve the issue, the COMELEC need only to refer to the Party Constitution. Equity is applied only if there absence of law that can be applied to resolve the issue which is not the case here.

- as provided in the 1987 Constitution the COMELEC has the authority to ascertain the identity of the political parties and its legitimate officers; consequently it has the power to settle any controversy regarding leadership of the party as an incident to its power to register political parties. This matter is important in determining as to who between Aquino and Angara had the authority to certify LDP’s candidates- According to the Party Constitution, it is the Chairman who has the power to sign documents in behalf of the party; the Sec-Gen has power to sign documents only when authorized by the Chairman. That Aquino had been given authority in the past, as found by the COMELEC during the 2001 elections, it does not follow that said authority is still existing since it can be gathered in Angara’s Manifestation that Aquino’s authority had been revoked, which the Chairman may do so in his discretion as implied in his authority to grant such power- However, the lack of authority of Aquino to certify candidates does not cancel the certificates he signed. The candidates named will only be treated as independent candidates following COMELEC Resolution No. 6453, section 7- The COMELEC, by allowing two wings to nominate their own candidates, confused the electorate as to which set of candidates truly represent the ideologies that the LDP represents- The constitutional policy towards a free and open party system envisions a system that shall “evolve according to the free choice of the people” and not one molded by the COMELEC

BRILLANTES V COMELECCALLEJO; June 15, 2004

FACTS- On 12/22/97, Congress enacted RA 8436, authorizing COMELEC to use an automated election system (AES) for the process of voting, counting of votes and canvassing/consolidating results of the national and local elections for May 11 ’98. Also allowed the acquisition of automated counting machines (ACM) and other devices to adopt new electoral forms and printing materials. However, the failure of the machines to read ballots correctly deferred implementation of modernization plan.- 10/29/02, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 02-0170, a three-phase modernization program for the 2004 elections. o Phase 1 – computerized registration and validationEncountered problems in implementation because machine was reverting to

old listing of voterso Phase 2 – computerized voting and countingScrapped because COMELEC had to maintain manual voting and counting

system due to the problems encountered with validationo Phase 3 – Electronic transmission of unofficial results (which is

challenged in this case)- Despite failure of the first 2 phases, COMELEC through its commissioners still decided to implement Phase 3 - GMA issued EO 172 which allocated P250,000,000 to fund the AES for the May 10 ’04 elections. Also issued EO 175, giving an additional P500M budget for the AES project.- Senate President Drilon had misgivings about the proposed electronic transmission of results because according to the Constitution (Art VII, Sec 4), Congress has the sole authority to canvass votes for President and VP. Implementing Phase 3 would be pre-emptive of the authority of Congress and would also lack constitutional authority- Aside from Drilon’s apprehension, there were budget problems for implementation because the money allocated by GMA had already been used for phases 1 and 2. COMELEC, however, still conducted a field test of the electronic transmission of results (phase 3) on 04/27/04 (Separate opinions of COMELEC officials found on p. 277. Read just in case.)- COMELEC, 2 weeks before the national and local elections, approved RESOLUTION 6712 stating the implementation of phase 3 and declared that results of each city/municipality shall be electronically transmitted in advance to COMELEC, Manila. They established a National Consolidation Center (NCC), Electronic Transmission Centers (ETC) for each city/municipality and a special ETC at COMELEC for the absentee voters. (procedure p. 278). Note that the results garnered in the procedure are of unofficial character.- Hence, petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention brought their misgivings to SC.

ISSUES1. WON petitioners have locus standi 2. WON COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing RA 6712

HELD1. Petitioners claim their standing as taxpayers and since the Resolution obviously involves the expenditure of funds, they do have the requisite standing to question its validity. Most of the petitioners-in-intervention are also part of NAMFREL, the citizens’ authorized arm to conduct an unofficial quick count during elections. Lastly, Drilon and De Venecia are heads of Congress, the sole authority for canvassing votes for President and VP.2. The resolution usurps the tabulation of election results based on a copy of the election returns the sole and exclusive authority of Congress to canvass votes for President and VP. COMELEC’s claim that it is not prohibited because it is an unofficial vote is unacceptable.

- the resolution goes against the constitutional provision that no money shall be paid out of the treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law (Sec 29, Art VI). Because the tabulation in the resolution is unofficial in character, it is not an appropriation made by law. In fact, it may be considered a felony under Art 217 under the Penal Code (malversation of public funds/property). - it disregards existing laws that any unofficial counting of votes is done by NAMFREL by using a copy of the election returns. Not even COMELEC is authorized to use a copy of election returns for counting. - COMELEC failed to notify authorized representatives of accredited political parties and all candidates of the proposed use of technology for the elections under Sec 52 of the Omnibus Election Code. There are 2 conditions that COMELEC must comply with before undertaking technology for electoral purposes: take into account the situation prevailing and the funds available, and notify authorized representatives. These conditions give the affected people an opportunity to object if need be. Details on p 302-303.- resolution has no constitutional and statutory basis for COMELEC to undertake a separate and unofficial tabulation of results. It also doesn’t make sense that Phase 3 of the program should go on when the first two phases have been scrapped. They should be taken as a whole and not independent of each other. In the first place, there is a great possibility that the unofficial results will differ greatly from the official count so what is the use of spending all that money for something uncertain, something that the NAMFREL had always undertaken? It is an unnecessary waste of government funds and effort. - COMELEC uses the problem of dagdag-bawas as a reason for the resolution. Accdg to them, modernization of the election will decrease the possibility of dagdag bawas but it doesn’t make sense because dagdag-bawas is a result of human intervention. No matter how modern the technology for electoral purposes is, there will always be the need for human intervention so the problem will not be eradicated. Decision PETITION GRANTED. Resolution No. 6712 is NULL AND VOID.

PLDT V PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSIONMAKALINTAL; August 29, 1975

FACTS- September, 1964 – the Public Service Commission assessed several public utilities for supposed supervision and regulation fees for that year- PLDT (P214,353.60); Manila Electric Company - P727,526.00; Bolinao Electronics Corporation - P11,610.40; Philippine Stearn Navigation Company - P23.921.60; and General Shipping Company - P33,146.80- The assessed fees were based upon the value of the respective properties or equipment pursuant to Section 40(e) of the Public Service Act as amended by Republic Act 3792- After paying the demanded amounts, the said corporations sent Separate letters to the Commission, (except the Philippine Steam Navigation Company which filed a formal petition instead) requesting for reconsideration of the assessments their ground: under the said Section 40(e), such assessments should be based not on the value of the properties but upon the subscribed and paid up capital stocks of the corporations.- 28 September 1966—Public Service Commission denied request for reconsideration. Their reason: o the clause "or of the property and equipment, whichever is higher" in

section 40(e) of the Public Service Act as an alternative base for supervision fees collectible, applies to both stock and non-stock corporations.

o to use the value of property and equipment as an alternative base for fixing the rates only in case of public services not issuing shares would result in unreasonable discrimination against the latter

o a comma after the words "capital subscribed or paid" and another after the words "Capital invested," immediately preceding the clause "property and equipment, whichever is higher," indicates the intention of the legislature to constitute the latter as an alternative of both stock and non-stock corp.

ISSUES1. WON the law itself draws a distinction between public utilities issuing shares and those that do not as the capital invested is difficult to ascertain where no shares have been issued. Thus, the value of their property or equipment should provide as an alternative rate base for this class of operators2. WON reliance on the use of comma/punctuation should have bearing3. WON there is alleged disproportion of the total amount to be collected as supervisory fees

HELD1. NO. No showing of difficulty in ascertaining actual capital investment of public service operators that do not issue stocks. These companies are required to submit annual reports of finances and operations2. reliance on punctuation is too risky a method of statutory construction- the punctuation of the provision in question has undergone no alteration at all- the consideranda on punctuation was merely employed to reinforce its main argument that nothing in the law justifies a discriminatory application of the value of the property or equipment (as alternative rate base) solely to operators not issuing shares of capital stock.3. the very statute indicates that such fees as are therein fixed were designed to raise revenue for the general expenses of the Commission, and were not limited to reimbursement of actual expenditures in supervision.- we are in accord with petitioner operators that the Commission was in error in collecting the fees in question on die basis of the original cost of their property and equipment without due allowance for depreciation. Decision judgment MODIED in the sense that the supervision fees payable under Republic Act No. 3792 should be computed upon present values of properly and equipment in use; the appealed resolution of the Public Serviice Commission is AFFIRMED

ASSOCIATION OF PHILIPPINE COCONUT DESICCATORS V PHILIPPINE COCONUT AUTHORITY

MENDOZA; February 10, 1998

FACTS- Nov. 5, 1992 APCD brought suit to enjoin PCA from issuing permits to applicants for the establishment of new desiccated coconut processing plants— issuance would violate PCA’s Admin. Order No.02 series of 1991 as applicants were seeking to operate in congested areas- Nov.6 trial court issued TRO enjoining PCA from ussiung licenses- Pending the case, PCA issued on March 24, 1993 Resolution No.018-93 providing for the withdrawal of the PCA from all regulation of coconut product processing industry; registration would be limited to the monitoring of their volumes of production and admin of quality standards- PCA then issued certificates of registration to those wishing to operate desiccated coconut processing plants

ISSUE- Whether or not the PCA can renounce the power to regulate implicit in the law creating it for that is what the resolution in question actually is.

HELD- The power given to the PCA “to formulate and adopt a general program of dev’t for the coconut and other palms oil industry” is not a roving commission to adopt any program deemed necessary to promote the dev’t of the coconut and

other palm oils industry, but one to be exercised in the context of the regulatory structure.Reasoning- PCA was originally created by PD232 on June 30, 1973 to take over the powers and functions of the Coconut Coordinating Council, the Phil. Coco Admin, and the Phil. Coco Research Institute- By PD1468 on June 11, 1978, it was made an independent public corp...charged with carrying out State’s policy to promote the rapid integrated dev’t and growth of the coco and other palm oil industry and to ensure that the coco farmers become direct participants and beneficiaries through a regulatory scheme set up by law- Aug.28, 1982 by EO826 gov’t temporarily prohibited the opening of new coco processing plants and on Dec.6 phased out some of the existing ones--- because of overproduction in the industry resulting, ultimately, in the decline of the export performance of coco-based products- Oct.23, 1987 PCA adopted Resolution No.058-87 authorizing establishment and operation of additional DCN plants because of increased demand in world market- The above measures were adopted within the framework of regulation as established by law “to promote rapid integrated dev’t and growth of coco and other palm oil industry and to ensure that the coco farmers become direct participants and beneficiaries- the questioned resolution allows not only indiscriminate opening of new plants, but the virtual dismantling of the regulatory infrastructure- PD1468 Art.II Revised Coco Code—the role of the PCA is to “formulate and adopt a general program of dev’t for the coco and other palm oil industry in all its aspects”o By limiting the purpose of reg. to merely monitoring volumes of

production and admin. Of quality standards, PCA in effect abdicates its role and leaves it almost completely to market forces how the industry will develop

- Constitution Art.XIIo Sec.6 ...duty of the State to promote distributive justice and to intervene

when the common good so demandso Sec.19 State shall regulate or prohibit monopolies when public interest

so requireso Any change in policy must be made by the legislative dept of the gov’t.

The regulatory system has been set up by law. It is beyond the power of an administrative agency to dismantle it.

Decision Petition GRANTED; resolution NULL and VOID

SEPARATE OPINION

ROMERO [dissent]

- The resolution deregulating the coco industry is a valid exercise of delegated legislation. Such resolution is in harmony with the objectives sough to be achieved by the laws regarding the coco industry, particularly “to promote accelerated growth and dev’t of the coco industry” and “the rapid integrated dev’t and growth of the coconut industry”- The time has come for admin policies and regulations to adapt to ever-changing business needs rather than to accommodate traditional acts of the legislature- Trimming down an admin agency’s functions of registration is not an abdication of the power to regulate but is regulation itself

SANTIAGO V GUINGONA PANGANIBAN; November 18, 1998

FACTS

- On July 27, 1998, the Senate of the Philippines convened for the first regular session of the eleventh Congress. Elections for the officers of the Senate were held on the same day with Fernan and Tatad nominated to the position of Senate President. Fernan was declared the duly elected President of the Senate. The following were likewise elected: Senator Ople as president pro tempore, and Sen. Drilon as majority leader.- Senator Tatad manifested that he was assuming the position of minority leader, with the agreement of Senator Santiago. He explained that those who had voted for Senator Fernan comprised the "majority," while only those who had voted for him, the losing nominee, belonged to the "minority."- On July 30, 1998, the majority leader informed the body that he was in receipt of a letter signed by the seven Lakas-NUCD-UMDP senators, stating that they had elected Senator Guingona as the minority leader. By virtue thereof, the Senate President formally recognized Senator Guingona as the minority leader of the Senate.- On July 31, 1998, Senators Santiago and Tatad instituted an original petition for quo warranto to seek the ouster of Senator Guingona as minority leader of the Senate and the declaration of Senator Tatad as the rightful minority leader. They allege that Senator Guingona had been usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate minority leader, a position that, according to them, rightfully belonged to Senator Tatad.

ISSUES1. WON the Court have jurisdiction over the petition2. WON there is an actual violation of the Constitution3. WON Guingona is usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate minority leader4. WON Fernan acted with grave abuse of discretion in recognizing Guingona as the minority leader

HELD1. Yes, the court has jurisdiction. It is well within the power and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether indeed the Senate or its officials committed a violation of the Constitution or gravely abuse their discretion in exercise of their functions and prerogatives - The petitioners claim that Section 16 (1), Article VI of the Constitution, has not been observed in the selection of the Senate minority leader. They also invoke the Court's "expanded" judicial power "to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" on the part of respondents. - Avelino v. Cuenco tackled the scope of the Court's power of judicial review; that is, questions involving an interpretation or application of a provision of the Constitution or the law, including the rules of either house of Congress. Within this scope falls the jurisdiction of the Court over questions on the validity of legislative or executive acts that are political in nature, whenever the tribunal "finds constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies or previous constitutions, the 1987 Constitution is explicit in defining the scope of judicial power. The present Constitution now fortifies the authority of the courts to determine in an appropriate action the validity of the acts of the political departments. It speaks of judicial prerogative in terms of duty, viz.:- "Judicial power includes the duty of the court of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government." 2. No, there was no actual violation of the Constitution.- While the Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must be elected by a number constituting more than one half of all the members thereof, it does not provide that the members who will not vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the "minority", who could thereby elect the minority leader. Verily, no law or regulation states that the defeated candidate shall automatically become the minority leader.

- While the Constitution is explicit on the manner of electing a Senate President and a House Speaker, it is, however, dead silent on the manner of selecting the other officers in both chambers of Congress. All that the Charter says is that "each House shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary." The method of choosing who will be such other officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the constitutional provision. Therefore, such method must be prescribed by the Senate itself, not by this Court.- Congress verily has the power and prerogative to provide for such officers as it may deem. And it is certainly within its own jurisdiction and discretion to prescribe the parameters for the exercise of this prerogative. This Court has no authority to interfere and unilaterally intrude into that exclusive realm, without running afoul of constitutional principles that it is bound to protect and uphold - the very duty that justifies the Court's being. Constitutional respect and a becoming regard for the sovereign acts of a coequal branch prevents this Court from prying into the internal workings of the Senate. 3. No, Respondent Guingona was not usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate minority leader. - Usurpation generally refers to unauthorized arbitrary assumption and exercise of power by one without color of title or who is not entitled by law. In order for a quo warranto proceeding to be successful, the person suing must show that he or she has a clear right to the contested office or to use or exercise the functions of the office allegedly usurped or unlawfully held by the respondent. In this case, petitioners did not present sufficient proof of a clear and indubitable franchise to the office of the Senate minority leader.4. No, Respondent Fernan did not act with grave abuse of discretion in recognizing Respondent Guingona as the minority leader.- By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility.- Respondent Fernan did not gravely abuse his discretion as Senate President in recognizing Respondent Guingona as the minority leader.The latter belongs to one of the minority parties in the Senate, the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP. By unanimous resolution of the members of this party that he be the minority leader, he was recognized as such by the Senate President. Such formal recognition by Respondent Fernan came only after at least two Senate sessions and a caucus, wherein both sides were liberally allowed to articulate their standpoints.- Under these circumstances, we believe that the Senate President cannot be accused of "capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment" or of "an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility." Where no provision of the Constitution, the laws or even the rules of the Senate has been clearly shown to have been violated, disregarded or overlooked, grave abuse of discretion cannot be imputed to Senate officials for acts done within their competence and authority.

JOHN HAY PEOPLES ALTERNATIVE COALITION V LIMCARPIO-MORALES; October 24, 2003

FACTS- Petitioners: John Hay Peoples Alternative Coalition, Mateo Carino Foundation Inc., Center for Alternative Systems Foundation, Inc., Regina Victoria Benafin represented and joined by her mother Elisa Benafin, Izabel Luyk represented and joined by her mother Rebecca Luyk, Katherine Pe represented and joined by her mother Rosemarie Pe, Soledad Camilo, Alicia Pacalso alias “Kevab,” Betty Strasser, Ruby Giron, Ursula Perez alias “Ba-yay,” Edilberto Claravall, Carmen Caromina, Lilia Yaranon, Diane Mondoc

- Respondents: Victor Lim, President Bases Conversion and Development Authority; John Hay Poro Point Development Corporation, City of Baguio, TUNTEX, ASIAWORLD, DENR- Petition for prohibition, mandamus and declaratory relief with prayer for temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of injunction assailing the constitutionality of Presidential Proclamation No. 420, Series of 1994, “Creating and Designating a Portion of the Area Covered by the Former Camp John Hay as the John Hay Special Economic Zone Pursuant to Republic Act No. 7227”- RA 7227: An Act Accelerating the Conversion of Military Reservations into other Productive Uses, Creating the Bases Conversion and Development Authority for this Purpose, Providing Funds therefor and for Other Purposes OR “Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992”

> setting out policy to accelerate sound and balanced conversion into alternative productive uses of former military bases under the 1947 Philippine-United States of America Military Bases Agreement, namely Clark and Subic military reservations including extension Camp John Hay Station in Baguio> created Bases Conversion and Development Authority (BCDA), Subic Special Economic (and free port) Zone (Sebuc SEZ)> granted Subic SEZ incentives such tax and duty-free importations, exemption of businesses from local and national taxes> gave authority to the President to create through executive proclamation, subject to the concurrence of the local government units directly affected, other Special Economic Zones (SEZ) in Clark (Pampanga), Wallace Air Station (La Union), and Camp John Hay (Baguio)

- Aug 16, 1993 – BCDA entered MoA and Escrow Agreement with TUNTEX and ASIAWORLD, private corporations under laws of British Virgin Islands, in preparing for a joint venture for development of Poro Point in La Union and Camp John Hay as a premier tourist destinations and recreation centers - Dec 16, 1993 – BCDA, TUNTEX and ASIAWORLD executed a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) binding themselves to put up a joint venture company called Baguio International Development and Management Corporation leasing areas within Camp John Hay and Poro Point for tourism and recreationSangguaniang Panglungsod of Baguio City’s Resolutions to BCDA

> Sept 29, 1993 –to exclude all the barangays partly and totally located within Camp John Hay from the reach and coverage of any plan or program for development> Jan 19, 1994 – abdication, waiver or quitclaim of its ownership over homelots being occupied by residents of 9 barangays surrounding CJH> Feb 21, 1994 – 15-point concept of the development of CJH which includes protection of the environment, making of a family-oriented tourist destination, priority in employment of Baguio residents, free access to base area, guaranteed participation of the city government in the management and operation of the camp, exclusion of the previously mentioned 9 bgys, liability for local taxes of businesses

BCDA-TUNTEX-ASIAWORLD response> modified the proposal stressing the need to declare CJH a SEZ as a condition to its full development according to RA 7227

- May 11, 1994 – sanggunian passed resolution asking mayor to order determination of realty taxes which may be collected from real properties of CJH checking if CJH real properties exempt from taxes and economic activity from local and national taxes- June 1994 – sanggunian passed Resolution No. 255 (Series of 1994) seeking and supporting subject to its concurrence, the issuance of Pres. Ramos of presidential proclamation declaring area of 288.1 hectares of the camp as a SEZ in accordance to RA 7227- July 5, 1994 – Ramos issued Proc No. 420 establishing a SEZ on Camp John Hay which reads

Pursuant to powers vested in me by the law and the resolution of concurrence by the City Council of Baguio… create and designate… former Camp John Hay… as John Hay Special Economic Zone

Sec 1. Coverage of John Hay SEZ: 288.1 hectares out of 677 hectares surveyed and verified by DENRSec 2. Governing Body: pursuant to Sec 15 of RA 7227, the Bases Conversion and Development Authority (BCDA) is established to govern JHSEZ, authorized to determine utilization and disposition of lands subject to private rights and in consultation and coordination with the City Government of Baguio after consultation with its inhabitants, and to promulgate necessary policies, rules, and regulations to govern and regulate the zone thru the John Hay Poro Point Development Corporation (JHPPDC), the implementing arm for its economic development and optimum utilizationSec 3. Investment Climate in JHSEZ: pursuant to Sec 5(m) and Section 15 of RA 7227, the JH Poro Point Development Corporation shall implement necessary policies, rules and regulations governing the zone, including investment incentives, in consultation with pertinent government departments. The zone shall have all the applicable incentives of the SEZ under Sec 12 of RA 7227 and those applicable incentives granted in the Export Processing Zones, the Omnibus Investment Code of 1987, the Foreign Investment Act of 1991, and new investment laws that will be enacted.Sec 4. Role of Departments, Bureaus, Offices, Agencies and Instrumentalities: All heads of departments, etc of the government are directed to give full support to BCDA and/or implementing subsidiary or joint venture to facilitate necessary approvals to expedite programs.Sec 5. Local Authority: The affected local government units shall retain basic autonomy and identity.

- April 25, 1995 – petition for prohibition, mandamus and declaratory relief challenging Proc. No. 420’s constitutionality or validity as well as the legality of MoA and JVA between BCDA and TUNTEX and ASIAWORLD- Petitioner’s Allege:

1. Proc. No. 420 grants tax exemptions is invalid and illegal as it is an unconstitutional exercise by the President of a power granted only to the Legislature2. Proc. No. 420 limits the powers and interferes with the autonomy of the City of Baguio is invalid, illegal and unconstitutional3. Proc. No. 420 is unconstitutional that it violates the rule that all taxes should be uniform and equitable4. MoA having been entered into only by direct negotiation is illegal5. terms and conditions of the MoA is illegal6. the conceptual development plan of respondents not having undergone environmental impact assessment is being illegally considered without a valid environmental impact assessment- a TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction prayed to enjoin BCDA, JHPPDC and the city government from implementing Proc. No. 420 and TUNTEX and ASIAWORLD from proceeding with their plan respecting CJH’s development pursuant to the JVA

- Public respondents (BCDA, JHPPDC, City of Baguio) Allege1. issues are moot and academic because in November 21, 1995 BCDA formally notified TUNTEX and ASIAWORLD of the revocation of the MoA and JVA2. in maintaining the validity of Proc. No. 420, extending to the JHSEZ economic incentives to those enjoyed by Subic SEZ (established in RA 7227), the proclamation merely implements the legislative intent of said law to turn the US military bases into hubs of business activity or investment3. denying Proc. No. 420 derogates the local autonomy of Baguio City or violative of the equal protection clause4. petitioners have no standing to being suit even as taxpayers in the absence of an actual controversy5. disregarded hierarchy of courts and the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies

- Petitioners Reply1. doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply since they are invoking the exclusive authority of SC under Section 21 of RA 7227

to enjoin or restrain implementation of projects for conversion of the base areas2. they possess standing to bring petition as taxpayers

ISSUESProcedural1. WON petitioners violated doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies2. WON issues regarding TUNTEX and ASIAWORLD is moot and academic3. WON present petition complies with the requirements of SC’s exercise of jurisdiction over constitutional issuesSubstantive4. WON Proc. No. 420 is constitutional by providing for national and local tax exemption within and granting other economic incentives to the John Hay SEZ5. WON Proc. No. 420 is constitutional for limiting or interfering with local autonomy of Baguio City

HELD1. Although judicial policy of SC entails not entertaining declaratory relief or direct resort to it except when the redress sought cannot be obtained in the proper courts, or when exceptional and compelling circumstances warrant availment of a remedy within and calling for the exercise of SC’s primary jurisdiction, under Sec 21 of RA 7227, only SC has the power to enjoin implementation of projects for the development of the former US military reservations therefore SC will take cognizance of this petition. Reasoning - Also SC retains full discretionary power to take cognizance of such petition. Besides, remanding this case to the lower courts may unduly prolong adjudication of the issues- transformation of an area in CJH into a SEZ is not a simple re-classification of an area TF a crucial issue. Conversion involves

> focal point for investments by local and foreign entities> site for vigorous business activity spurring country’s economic growth > like Sub SEZ, turning into self-sustaining, industrial, commercial, financial and investment center> critical links to a host of environmental and social concerns affecting communities are located and nation in general> challenges in providing an ecologically sustainable, environmentally sound, equitable transition for city in CJH reversion to government property e.g. problem of scarcity of water supply in Baguio City

2. Revocation of the agreements with private respondents made issues regarding them as moot and academic.3. Yes, present petition complies with requirements for judicial review.Reasoning- Requisites of exercise of power of judicial review

1. existence of an actual or an appropriate case> not conjectural or anticipatory; definite and concrete; parties pitted against each other due to their adverse legal interests> in present case, there is a real clash of interests and rights between petitioners and respondents arising from issuance of Proc. No. 420 converting a portion of CJH into a SEZ where petitioners insist Proc. No. 420 has unconstitutional provisions and the respondents claiming otherwise> Pimentel, Jr. v Aguirre: By the mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval of the challenged act, the dispute is deemed to have ripened into a judicial controversy even without an overt act. Indeed, even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or law is enough to awaken judicial duty

2. personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question

> RA 7227 requires concurrence of the affected local government units to the creation of SEZs and this grant by law on LGUs of the right to concurrence is equivalent to vesting a legal standing on LGUs

(recognition of real interests of communities in the utilization of such base areas)> as INHABITANTS OF BAGUIO, assailing Proc No. 420, is personal and substantial that they have sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the government act being challenged; material interest for what is at stake in the enforcement of Proc. No. 420 is the very economic and social existence of the people of Baguio City> Garcia v Board of Investments: residents of Limay, Bataan where SC characterized their interest in the establishment of a petrochemical plant in their place as actual, real, vital and legal for it would affect not only their economic life but even the air they breathe> Petitioners Edilberto Claravall and Lilia Yaranon were duly elected councilors of Baguio at the time; duties included deciding for and on behalf of their constituents on the question of concurrence to Proc. No. 420; they opposed Res. No. 255 which supported Proc. No. 420

3. pleaded in the earliest opportunity4. constitutional question is the lis mota of the case- 3 and 4 no question since action filed purposely to bring forth constitutionality issues

4. Unless limited by a provision in the Constitution, if there is no express extension of tax exemption and other economic incentives granted by law, any presidential proclamation granting such extension through implication is unconstitutional because it violates Art VI Sec 28(4) which gives the legislature, not the executive, the full power to exempt any person or corporation or class of property from taxation and its power to exempt being as broad as its power to tax. Reasoning- Art VI Sec 28(4): No law granting any tax exemption shall be passed without the concurrence of a majority of all the members of Congress.- Sec 3 Proc. No. 420: Investment Climate in JH SEZ: … the zone shall have all the applicable incentives of the SEZ under Sec 12 of RA 7227 and those applicable incentives granted in the Export Processing Zones, the Omnibus Investment Code of 1987, the Foreign Investment Act of 1991 and new investment laws that may be hereinafter enacted

> Sec 12 RA 7227: Subic SEZ(b & c) exemption from tariff or custom duties, national and local taxes of business entities(d) free market and trade of specified goods or properties(f) liberalized banking and finance(g) relaxed immigration rules for foreign investors- deliberations of Senate confirm exclusivity to Subic SEZ of the tax and investment privileges

(discussing Sec 12 RA 7227)Angara: … we must confine these policies to Subic and provide that “THE SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONE OF SUBIC SHALL BE ESTABLISHED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FOLLOWING POLICIES”… it is very clear that these principles and policies are applicable only to Subic as a free port… so we agreed that we will simply limit the definition of pweors and description of the zone to Subic but that does not exclude the possibility of creating other economic zones within the baselands… the provision now will be confined only to Subic

> RA 7916: The Special Economic Zone Act of 1995- privilege of export processing zone-based businesses of importing capital equipment and raw materials free from taxes, duties and other restrictions

> Omnibus Investment Code of 1987- tax and duty exemptions, tax holiday, tax credit, and other incentives

> RA 7042: Foreign Investments Act of 1991- applicability to the subject zone of rules governing foreign investments in the Philippines

- It is clear that under Sec 12 RA 7227 ONLY the SUBIC SEZ which was granted by Congress with tax exemption, investment incentives and the like

and no express extension of the aforesaid benefits to other SEZs still to be created at the time via presidential proclamation ; also grant of privileges to JH SEZ finds no support in the other laws specified under Sec 3 Proc. No. 420 which are already extant before the issuance of the proclamation or the enactment of RA 7227- SC can void an act or policy of the political departments of the govt on two grounds – infringement of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion – and clearly, Proc. No. 420 infringes upon the Constitution5. NO because when the law merely emphasizes or reiterates the statutory role or functions is has been granted.Reasoning- under RA 7227, BCDA is entrusted with the following(a) to own, hold and/or administer the military reservations of John Hay Air Station, Wallace Air Station, O’Donnell Transmitter Station… which may be transferred to it by the President - such broad rights of ownership and administration vested in BCDA over CJH, BCDA virtually has control over it subject to certain limitations of lawDecision Sec 3 of Proc. NO.420 is null and void and declared no legal force and effect. Proc. No. 420, without the invalidated portion, remains valid and effective

SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC V NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

YNARES-SANTIAGO; August 12, 2003

FACTS- June 16, 2000 – NTC, pursuant to its rule-making and regulatory powers, issued Memorandum Circular (MC) No. 13-6-2000. It promulgated rules and regulations on the billing of telecommunications services:

1. Billing statements shall be received by the service subscriber (SS) not later than 30 days from the end of each billing cycle. In case it is received beyond 30 days, SS shall have a grace period within which to pay the bill. During such period, SS shall not be disconnected from service by the public telecommunications entity (PTE).

2. There shall be no charge for calls that are diverted to a voice mailbox, voice prompt, recorded message or similar facility excluding the customer’s own equipment.

3. PTEs shall verify identification and address of each purchaser of prepaid SIM cards. Prepaid call cards and SIM cards shall be valid for at least 2 years from the date of first use. Holders of prepaid SIM cards shall be given 45 days from the date it is fully consumed but not beyond 2yrs 45 days from date of first use to replenish SIM card. The validity of an invalid SIM card shall be installed upon request of the SS at no addtl charge except the presentation of a valid prepaid call card.

4. SS shall be updated of the remaining value of their cards before the start of every call using the cards.

5. The unit of billing for (Cellular Mobile Telephone) CMT service whether postpaid or prepaid shall be reduced from 1min/pulse to 6sec/pulse. The authorized rates per minute shall be divided by 10.

- The MC provided that it shall take effect 15 days after its publication in a newspaper of general circulation and three certified copies furnished at the UP Law Center. - June 22, 2000 – MC was published in the Philippine Star; MC provisions regarding sale and use of prepaid cards & unit of billing took effect 90 days from effectivity of MC- August 30, 2000 – NTC issued a Memorandum to all CMT service operators (SO) which contained measures to minimize incidence of stealing of cell phone units. It directed CMT SO to:

1. Strictly comply with MC requiring the presentation and verification of the identity and addresses of prepaid SIM card customers

2. Require all respective prepaid SIM card dealers to comply with MC

3. Deny acceptance to the networks those customers using stolen cell phone units or cell phone units registered to somebody else when properly informed of all information relative to the stolen cell phone units

4. Share all necessary info of stolen cell phone units to all other CMT SO in order to prevent their use

5. Require all existing prepaid SIM card customers to register and present valid identification cards.

- October 6, 2000 – NTC issued another Memorandum addressed to all PTEs, which was “for strict compliance.”

1. All prepaid cards and all SIM packs used by subscribers of prepaid cards sold on Oct. 7, 2000 and beyond shall be valid for at least 2 years from date of first use.

2. The billing unit shall be on a 6sec pulse effective October 7, 2000.- Procedure October 20, 2000 – ISLACOM and PILTEL filed against the NTC an

action for Declaration of Nullity of MC (the Billing Circular) and of the Oct. 6 Memorandum, with prayer for injunction and TRO in the RTC-QC on the grounds that-

a. NTC has no jurisdiction to regulate the sale of consumer goods since such jurisdiction belongs to the DTI under the Consumer Act of the Phils

b. MC is oppressive and violative of the Due Process Clause (deprivation of property)

c. MC will result in the impairment of the viability of prepaid service by unduly prolonging the expiration of prepaid SIM and call cards

d. Requirements of identification of prepaid card buyers and call balance announcement are unreasonable

GLOBE and SMART filed a joint Motion to Admit Complaint-in-Intervention October 27, 2000 – RTC issued TRO enjoining NTC from implementing

MC November 20, 2000 – RTC denied NTC’s motion to dismiss for lack of merit.

Injunction is granted, pending finality of the decision of the case. October 9, 2001 – CA granted NTC’s petition for certiorari and

prohibition. January 10, 2002 – Motions for Reconsideration were denied by CA

ISSUES1. WON the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction to hear this case 2. WON the Doctrine on Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies is applicable

HELDObiter Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative or rule-making powers and quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory powers.

Quasi-legislative power is the power to make rules and regulations, which should be within the scope of the statutory authority granted by the legislature to such administrative agency. The regulations must be germane to the purposes of the law, and not in contradiction to the standards prescribed by law.

Quasi-judicial power is exercised by an administrative agency when it performs in a judicial manner an act which is essentially of an executive nature, where the power to act in such a manner is incidental to or reasonably necessary for the performance of the administrative duty entrusted to it.

1. Yes.Ratio In cases assailing the validity of a rule or regulation issued by an administrative agency in the performance of its QUASI-LEGISLATIVE function, the regular courts have jurisdiction. The power of JUDICIAL REVIEW is vested in the courts by the Constitution. The Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction is only applicable when the administrative agency is exercising its QUASI-JUDICIAL function.- Art.VIII Sec.1 1987 Consti: Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion

on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the gov’t. - Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction: The courts will not determine a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior to the resolution of that question by the administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of the admin. tribunal to determine technical matters of fact. 2. No.Ratio In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule issued by an administrative agency, in exercise of its QUASI-LEGISLATIVE powers, a party need not exhaust administrative remedies before going to court. Only judicial review of decisions of administrative agencies made in the exercise of their quasi-judicial function is subject to the exhaustion doctrine (Assoc. of Phil. Coconut Desiccators v. PHILCOA).- Even if the Doctrine on Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies is applicable, records show that petitioners have complied with such requirement:- During deliberation stages of MC, petitioners registered their protests and submitted proposed schemes for the Billing Circular. - After issuance of MC, petitioners wrote successive letters asking for the suspension and reconsideration of the MC.- Such letters were not acted upon and instead, NTC issued 10/06/00 Memorandum. This was taken by petitioners as a clear denial of their requests.Decision Consolidated petitions are GRANTED. The decision of CA and its Resolution are reversed. The case is REMANDED to the RTC-QC for continuation of the proceedings.

ART VII: EXECUTIVE

GONZALES V MARCOSFERNANDO; July 31, 1975

(SEE DIGEST UNDER DOMINIUM AND IMPERIUM)

MARCOS V MANGLAPUSCORTES; September 15, 1989

FACTSMr. Marcos and the immediate members of his family filed a petition for mandamus and prohibition asking the court to order the respondents to issue travel documents to them and to enjoin the implementation of the President’s decision to bar their return to the Philippines. Petitioners state that the right of the Marcoses to return to the Philippines is guaranteed under Sections 1 and 6 of the Bill of Rights, arguing that before the right to travel may be impaired by any authority/agency of the government, there must be legislation to that effect. They also invoke generally accepted principles of international law: (1) Art. 13, par. 2 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which provides that everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his own country, and (2) Art. 12, par. 2 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which states that “no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country.” Respondents contend that the issue of whether the two rights claimed by the Marcoses collide with the more primordial and transcendental right of the state to security and safety of its nationals involves a political question and is non-justiciable. In support thereof, they cite Sections 4 and 5 of the Constitution. They also point out that the decision to bar Marcos and family from returning to the Philippines for reasons of national security and public safety has international precedents.

ISSUES

1. WON the President has the power under the Constitution to bar the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.2. WON the President acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when she determined that the return of the Marcoses to the Philippines poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare and decided to bar their return.

HELD1. Yes. Although the 1987 Constitution imposes limitations on the exercise of specific powers of the President, it maintains intact what is traditionally considered as within the scope of “executive power.” Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. In other words, executive power is more than the sum of the specific powers so enumerated.- The request/demand of the Marcoses to be allowed to return to the Philippines cannot be considered in light solely of the constitutional provision guaranteeing liberty of abode and the right to travel, subject to certain exceptions, or of case law which clearly never contemplated situations even remotely similar to the present one. It must be treated as a matter that is appropriately addressed to those residual unstated powers of the President which are implicit and correlative to the paramount duty residing in that office to safeguard and protect general welfare.

2. No. The President did not act arbitrarily and capriciously and whimsically in determining that the return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat to the national interest and welfare and in prohibiting their return. The documented history of the efforts of the Marcoses and their followers to destabilize the country and the precarious state of the economy were the factual bases for the President to conclude that the return of the Marcoses during that time would only exacerbate and intensify the violence directed against the State and instigate more chaos. The State, acting through the Government, is not precluded from taking preemptive action against threats to its existence if, though still nascent, they are perceived as apt to become serious and direct. The preservation of the State – the fruition of the people’s sovereignty – is an obligation in the highest order. The President, sworn to preserve and defend the Constitution and to see the faithful execution of the laws, cannot shirk from that responsibility.

SEPARATE OPINION

FERNAN [concur]

History and time-honored principles of constitutional law have conceded to the Executive Branch certain powers in times of crisis or grave and imperative national emergency. Many terms are applied to these powers: “residual,” “inherent,” “moral,” “implied,” “aggregate,” “emergency.” Whatever they may be called, the fact is that these powers exist, as they must if the governance function of the Executive Branch is to be carried out effectively and efficiently.

GUTIERREZ [dissent]

The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law may be impaired only upon lawful order of the court, not of an executive officer, not even the President. I do not think that we should differentiate the right to return home from the right to go abroad or to move around in the Philippines. If at all, the right to come home must be more preferred than any other aspect of the right to travel.

CRUZ [dissent]

Marcos is entitled to the same right to travel and liberty of abode that Aquino then invoked.

PARAS [dissent]

The former President, as a Filipino citizen, has the right to return to his own country, except only if prevented by the demands of national safety and national security.

PADILLA [dissent]

With or without restricting legislation, the right to travel may be impaired or restricted in the interest of national security, public safety, and public health. Power of the state to restrict the right to travel finds abundant support in police power. The government failed to present convincing evidence to defeat Marcos’ right to return to this country.

SARMIENTO [dissent]

The right to return to one’s own country cannot be distinguished from the right to travel and freedom of abode. While the President may exercise powers not expressly granted by the Constitution but may necessarily implied therefrom, the latter must yield to the paramountcy of the Bill of Rights. Under the new Constitution, the right to travel may be impaired only within the limits provided by law. The President has been divested of the implied power to impair the right to travel. The determination of whether the Marcos’ return poses a threat to national security should not be left solely to the Chief Executive; the Court itself must be satisfied that the threat is not only clear but also present.

ESTRADA V DESIERTOPUNO;

(SEE DIGEST UNDER REMAKING THE CONSTITUTION)

VILLENA V SECRETARY OF INTERIORLAUREL; April 21, 1939

FACTS- Jose D. Villena, then Mayor of Makati, sought to restrain the Secretary of the Interior (SI) and his agents from proceeding with the investigation against him until this case was settled by the SC.- Upon the request of the SI, the Division of Investigation of the Department of Justice conducted an inquiry into the conduct of Villena. He was found to have committed bribery, extortion, malicious abuse of authority and unauthorized practice of the law profession.- Feb. 8, 1939 ~ SI recommended to the President that Villena be suspended so as to prevent the coercion of witnesses. The President verbally granted the recommendation on the same day.- Feb. 9,1939~ SI suspended Villena from office and instructed the Provincial Governor of Rizal to advise Villena of his suspension.- Feb. 13,1939~SI wrote Villena specifying the charges against him and notifying him that Emiliano Anonas was the special investigator of the case.- Feb. 17, 1939~ the date set by Anonas when the formal investigation would begin. But eventually postponed to March 28,1939 due to several incidents and postponements. - Hence, this petition for Prelim Injunction. Villena contends that:

> SI has no jurisdiction or authority to suspend him, to file administrative charges against him, and to decide the merits of the charges because the power to suspend, to try and punish municipal elective officials is lodged in some other agencies of the government.> SI’s acts are null and void because:

+ SI usurped the power given by the Constitution to the President when SI suspended him (Villena).

+ SI must exercise the power to supervise in accordance with the provisions of law and the provisions of law governing the trials and charges of against elective municipal officials are those contained in sec. 2188 of the Administrative Code as amended. + SI is exercising an arbitrary power by converting himself into a complainant and at the same time the judge of the charges he filed against him.+ SI’s action didn’t follow the procedure under Sec. 2188 of the AC, which requires that a complaint be based on a private person’s or citizen’s sworn statement.

- Villena prays that a writ of Preliminary Injunction be issued to stop the SI and his agents from proceeding further with the investigation until this case is heard; that SI be declared as without authority to suspend him and order his reinstatement in office; that SI be declared as without authority to file charges against him and to investigate such charges.- His petition for the writ of preliminary injunction was denied.- The Solicitor General contends that:

> Sec. 79 (C) in relation with sec. 86 of the Revised AC expressly empowers the SI to “order the investigation of any act or conduct of any person in the service of any bureau or office under his department” and in connection therewith to “designate an official or person who shall conduct such investigation.”> Sec. 2188 of the Revised AC, invoked by Villena, doesn’t preclude SI from exercising the powers stated in Sec. 79 in connection to Sec. 86. Also, that invoked section, must be read in relation to sec. 37 of the Reorganization Law of 1932.> Villena didn’t question the jurisdiction of the SI at the start of the investigation but merely contended that such charges were not in accordance with law for the reason that they didn’t bear the oaths of the complaints.> The authority of a department head to order the investigation of a subordinate necessarily carries with it by implication the authority to take such measures as he may deem necessary to accomplish the purpose of the investigation, including suspending the officer; plus, the President authorized the suspension.> Courts of Equity have no power to restrain public officials by injunction from performing any official act, which they are required by law to perform, or acts, which are not in excess of the authority, and discretion reposed in them.

ISSUES1. WON the SI has the legal authority to order an investigation, by a special investigator appointed by him, of the charges of corruption and irregularity against Villena.2. WON the SI has the legal authority to suspend Villena pending the investigation of the charges.

HELD1. The SI is invested with authority to order the investigation of the charges against the petitioner, Villena, and to appoint a special investigator for that purpose.- Sec. 79 of the Revised AC speaks of direct control, direction and supervision over bureaus and offices under the jurisdiction of the SI but it should be interpreted in relation to sec. 86 of the same Code which grants to the Dept of Interior “executive supervision over the administration of provinces, municipalities, chartered cities and other local political subdivisions.”- Citing Planas v. Gil: “ Supervision is not a meaningless thing. It is an active power. It is certainly not without limitation, but it at least implies authority to inquire into facts and conditions in order to render the power real and effective. If supervision is to be conscientious and rational, and not automatic and brutal, it must be founded upon knowledge of actual facts and conditions disclosed after careful study and investigation.”

2. There is no clear and express grant of power to the secretary to suspend a mayor of a municipality who is under investigation.- NOTE: There was an argument regarding the verbal approval or acquiescence of the President to the suspension. It was said that if the justices were to accept that the President had the authority to suspend the petitioner, then the suspension made by the SI, since the President approved it, should be sustained. Then this was followed by the discussion regarding certain acts of the President that could not be validated by subsequent approval or ratification. There are certain constitutional powers and prerogatives of the Chief Executive that should be exercised in person (i.e. suspension of the writ of habeas corpus and proclamation of martial law and the exercise of pardon.) But there were doubts regarding the verbal approval by the President of the suspension if such could be considered as ratification in law (with law giving the power to suspend being the Chief Exec.) Hence, the ratio.Ratio “xxx…under the presidential type of government which we have adopted and considering the departmental organization established and continued in force by par. 1, sec. 12, Art.VII of our (1935) Constitution, all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or the law to act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.” Obiter With reference to the Executive Dept of the Gov’t, there is one purpose which is crystal-clear and is readily visible without the projection of judicial searchlight, and that it is, the establishment of a single, not plural, Executive. - The First Section of Article VII of the Constitution, dealing with the Executive Department, begins with the enunciation of the principle that “The executive power shall be vested in a President of the Philippines.”- Without minimizing the importance of the heads of the various departments, their personality is reality but the projection of that of the President. - Citing Chief Justice Taft in Myers v. US~ “each head of a department is, and must be, the President’s alter ego in the matters of that department where the President is required by law to exercise authority.”- As a matter of executive policy, they may be granted departmental autonomy as to certain matters but this is by mere concession of the executive, in the absence of valid legislation in the particular field.- The President should be answerable for the acts of administration of the entire Executive Department before his own conscienceNote Read this case in relation to Sec. 1 and 17 of Art. 7 of the 1987 Constitution.

SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS V MABALOT

BUENA; February 27, 2002

FACTS- On February 19, 1996, then DOTC Secretary Jesus B. Garcia, Jr. issued Memorandum Order No. 96-735 addressed to Land Transportation Franchising Regulatory Board (LTFRB) Chairman Dante Lantin directing him to “effect the transfer of regional functions of that office to the DOTC-CAR Regional Office…”- On March 13, 1996, Roberto Mabalot filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction and/or restraining order against DOTC Secretary and LTFRB chair, praying among others that Memorandum Order No. 96-735 be declared “illegal and without effect.”

- On March 20, the lower court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining DOTC Secretary from implementing Memorandum Order No. 96-735. The lower court issued a writ of preliminary injunction on April 8, 1996.- On January 29, 1997, then DOTC Secretary Amado Lagdameo issued Department Order No. 97-1025 establishing the DOTC-CAR Regional Office “as the Regional Office of the LTFRB-CAR and shall exercise the regional functions of the LTFRB in the CAR…”- On March 31, 1999, the lower court rendered a decision declaring Memorandum Order Nos. 96-735 and 97-1025 “null and void and without any legal effect as being violative of the provision of the Constitution against encroachment on the powers of the legislative department and also of the provision enjoining appointive officials from holding any other office or employment in the Government.”

ISSUEWON the assailed memorandum orders establishing the DOTC Regional Office as an LTFRB Regional Office is unconstitutional for being an undue exercise of legislative power.

HELD- The President may, through his/her duly constituted political agent and alter ego, legally and validly decree the reorganization of the National Government in exercise of authority granted by law. - A public office may be created through any of the following modes: (1) by the Constitution (fundamental law), (2) by law (statute duly enacted by Congress), or (3) by authority of law. The creation and establishment of LTFRB-CAR Regional Office was made pursuant to the third mode.- The President, through Administrative Order No. 36 directed the various departments and agencies of government to immediately undertake the creation and establishment of their regional offices in CAR.- It is as if the President himself carried out the creation and establishment of the LTFRB-CAR Regional Office, when in fact, the DOTC Secretary directly and merely sought to implement the Chief Executive’s Administrative Order.- The President’s control over all executive departments come from Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, while the continuing authority to reorganize the national government is vested by Presidential Decree No. 1772 which amended Presidential Decree No. 1416 (as ruled in Larin Vs. Executive Secretary). - Villena vs Secretary of the Interior: “without minimizing the importance of the heads of various departments, their personality is in reality but the projection of that of the President.” Thus, their acts, “performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.”- The designation and subsequent establishment of DOTC-CAR as the Regional Office of the LTFRB in CAR and the concomitant exercise and performance of functions by the former as the LTFRB-CAR Regional Office fall within the scope of the continuing authority of the President to effectively reorganize the DOTC (and other departments).- In this jurisdiction, reorganization is regarded as valid provided it is pursued in good faith. A reorganization is carried out in good faith if it is for the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. The reorganization in this case was decreed “in the interest of service” and “for purposes of economy and more effective coordination of the DOTC functions in CAR.”- The assailed orders are also not in violation of Sections 7 and 8 of Article IX-B of the Constitution since the organic personnel of the DOTC-CAR are, in effect, merely designated to perform the additional duties and functions of an LTFRB Regional Office subject to the direct supervision and control of the LTFRB Central Office, pending the creation of a regular LTFRB Regional Office.

BENGUET EXPLORATION V DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL RESOURCES

FERNANDO; February 28, 1977

FACTS- Sofia Reyes filed with the Bureau of Mines an adverse claim against a domestic Mining corporation’s (Benguet Exploration, Inc.) Lode Lease Agreement covering three mining claims in Benguet, Mountain Province.- Bureau of Mines dismissed the adverse claim- Reyes appealed to the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resource maintaining the sufficiency of her adverse claim- At first the Department dismissed the appeal but on a second motion for reconsideration and ordered a formal hearing of the case- Benguet Exploration, Inc. filed petition for review

ISSUES1. WON the decision rendered by the Director of Lands approved by the Secretary, upon a question of fact, is justiciable2. WON the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources can be precluded from conducting his own inquiry 3. WON Secretary Pascual, in calling for a hearing, failed to abide by the requirements of the law

HELD1. A decision rendered by the Director of Lands and approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and commerce, upon a question of fact is conclusive and not subject to be reviewed by the courts unless there is a showing that such decision was rendered in consequence of fraud, imposition or mistake, other than error of judgment in estimating the value or effect of evidence, regardless of whether or not it is consistent with the preponderance of evidence, so long as there is some evidence upon which the finding in question could be madeReasoningActs of a department head, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumably the acts of the Chief Executive2. The State acting through the legislature through its power of imperium acting as a sovereign regulating property to come up with rules with which to exercise its power of dominium as owner of the property cannot act arbitrarily but in accordance with lawReasoningIndefeasibility of a title over land previously public is not a bar to an investigation by the Director of Lands as to how such title has been acquired3. The Mining Act speaks of findings of facts of the Director of Mines “when affirmed by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources being final and conclusive,” in which case the aggrieved party may file a petition for review with this Court where only questions of law may be raisedReasoning No such affirmance by the secretary that’s why he ordered a hearing. It is but a right and proper in the interest of justice that a formal hearing on the merits of this case be conductedDecision: petition for review is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Unanimous

LANSANG V GARCIACONCEPCION; December 11, 1971

FACTS:- 8 consolidated petitions of writ of habeas corpus.Other petitions:L-33965 Arienda vs Sec of National DefenseL-33973 David vs GarciaL-33982 Prudente v Yan, GarciaL-34004 Tomas vs GarciaL-34013 Rimando vs GarciaL-34039 De Castro vs Rabago

L-34265 Oreta vs GarciaL-34339 Olivar vs Garcia- August 21, 1971 – Plaza Miranda bombing. 8 persons died, several injured- August 23, 1971- President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 889 suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, by virtue of the powers vested upon the President by ART VII Section 10 of the 1935 Constitution. His reason was that “lawless elements have created a state of lawlessness and disorder affecting public safety and the security of the State…” and that “public safety requires immediate and effective action”- Several people were apprehended and detained including the petitioners on “reasonable belief” that they had “participated in the crime of insurrection or rebellion.”- August 30, 1971 – Proclamation 889-A amended Proclamation 889. - September 18 and 25, October 4, 1971 -- Proclamations 889-B, 889-C and 889-D lifted the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in some provinces, sub-provinces, cities, EXCEPT in Bataan, Benguet, Bulacan, Camarines Sur, Ifugao, Isabela, Laguna, Lanao, North and South Cotabato, Nueva Ecija, Nueva Viscaya, Pampanga, Quezon, Rizal, Tarlac, Zambales, Aurora, Quirino, and 18 cities including Manila.

ISSUES1. WON the Court had authority to and should inquire into the existence of the factual bases required by the Constitution for the suspension of the privilege of the writ2. WON the Proclamation was valid/ constitutional. WON it complied with ART III Section 1 par 1434 and ART VII Section 10 par 235 of the Constitution? 3. WON the President act arbitrarily in issuing PN 8894. WON the Petitioners are covered by PN 889. WON petitioners detained should be released

HELD1. YES. Upon deliberation, the Court abandoned the doctrine in Barcelon v Baker and Montenegro v Castañeda (determination by the President of existence of any of the grounds prescribed by the Constitution for the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus should be conclusive upon the courts. The President, with all the intelligence sources was in a better position than the SC to ascertain the real state of peace and order). The grant of power to suspend the privilege is neither absolute no unqualified. The authority to suspend the privilege of the writ is circumcised, confined, restricted (more so because it is stated in the negative – “shall not be… except”), and like the limitations and restrictions imposed upon the legislative department, adherence thereto and compliance therewith may, within proper bounds, be inquired into by courts of justice.- The Executive is vested with the power to suspend the privilege of the writ, and the Executive is supreme within its own sphere, however, the separation of powers goes hand in hand with the system of checks and balances. The authority to determine whether or not the Executive acted within the sphere allotted to him is vested in the Judiciary.2. YES. a. Proclamation 889, as amended by Proclamation 889-A, declared the existence of an uprising -- “lawless elements xxx joined and banded their forces together for the avowed purpose of staging, undertaking, waging and are actually engaged in an armed insurrection and rebellion xxx”

34 “The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended except in cases of invasion,

insurrection, or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, in any way of which events the same may be suspended wherever during such period the necessity for such suspension shall exist.”35

“The President shall be commander-in-chief of all armed forces of the Philippines, and, whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, insurrection, or rebellion. In case of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion, or imminent danger thereof when the public safety requires it, he may suspend the privileges of the writ of habeas corpus, or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law.”

b. The 2 conditions for a valid suspension a) there must be ‘invasion, insurrection, or rebellion’ or ‘imminent danger thereof’ and b) ‘public safety must require the aforementioned suspension’ are PRESENT.c. The 1st condition can be attested through jurisprudence (there were a lot of cases already – HUKBALAHAP, etc). The emergence and establishment of CPP NPA is proof of the existence of a rebellion.d. The 2nd condition is justified through the reports of the acts of the NPA (its infiltration of several mass-based organizations, various killings and bombings, encounters with the military, etc) and the threat it poses to the public safety. According to intelligence reports, the CPP and its front organizations are capable of preparing powerful explosive, and that there was a plan of a series of assassinations, kidnappings, mass destruction of property, etc.3. NO. The President did not act arbitrarily. He had possession of intelligence reports, he consulted his advisers, and had reason to feel that the situation was critical. The suspension of the privilege of the writ in the entire Philippines was justified as he could not have ascertained the places to be excluded at the time of the proclamation, and he gradually lifted the suspension.4. Some petitioners were already released and with respect to them, the issue is moot and academic. As to petitioners David, Felipe, Olivar, de los Reyes, del Rosario and Sison, still under detention, they have been charged with violation of the Anti-Subversion Act/ accused of overt acts covered by the PN 889. The PN 889 being valid, their release may not be ordered by the SC, but the CFI is directed to act with utmost dispatch in conducting the preliminary investigation of the charges and to issue corresponding warrants of arrest if probable cause is found or otherwise , to order their release.Decision President did not act arbitrarily. PN 889 not unconstitutional. Petitions L33964, L33965, L33982, L34004, L34013, L34039, L34265 dismissed. CFI to conduct investigation and issue warrants of arrest or order of release as to petitioners still under detention.All concur. Fernando dissents only as to the fourth issue.

SEPARATE OPINION

FERNANDO [dissent]

- I find it difficult to accept the conclusion that the six petitioners still under detention should be set free.- The petitioners ought not to be further deprived of their liberty in the absence of a warrant of arrest for whatever offense they may be held to answer, to be issued by a judge after a finding of probable cause. That is to comply with the constitutional requirement against unreasonable search and seizure. - To keep them in confinement after ordinary processes of the law are to be availed of is to ignore the safeguard of the Bill of Rights that no person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.

AQUINO V PONCE ENRILEMAKALINTAL; September 17, 1974

FACTS- September 21, 1972, President Ferdinand E. Marcos signed Proclamation No. 1081, proclaiming a state of Martial Law in the Philippines- September 22, 1972, General Order No. 2 was signed by the President which provided an order to the Secretary of National Defense to arrest and take into custody the individuals named in the list for being participants in the conspiracy to seize political and state power in the country and to take over the government by force- Secretary of National Defense, Juan Ponce Enrile, immediately effected the arrest of the herein petitioners- Petitioners sought relief from Court, filing petitions for habeas corpus- Respondents filed their “Return to Writ and Answer to the Petition” and prayed that the petition be dismissed

- Pending resolution of these Petitions, petitioners, except for two (Sen. Benigno Aquino, Jr. and Sen. Jose Diokno), were released from custody on different dates under a “Conditional Release”- December 28, 1973, Diokno filed a Motion to Withdraw Petition, imputing delay in the disposition of his case, and asseverating that because of the decision of the Court in the Ratification Cases and the action of the Members of the Court in taking an oath to support the New Constitution, he cannot “reasonably expect to get justice in this case”- The respondents opposed the motion on the grounds that there is a public interest in the decision of these cases and that the reasons given for the motion to withdraw are untrue, unfair and contemptuous.- The Court denied Diokno’s motion with a vote of 5 to 7- Makalintal, Zaldivar, Fernando, Teehankee, Muňoz-Palma, Aquino and Barredo voted to grant Diokno’s motion to withdraw petition

ISSUES1. WON the Court has jurisdiction to inquire into the constitutional sufficiency of the proclamation of martial law2. WON Proclamation No. 1081 is valid given then the circumstances required by the Constitution for the proclamation of a state of martial law3. WON petitioners were illegally detained entitling them the relief of habeas corpus

HELDAll petitions dismissed except those which have been previously withdrawn by the respective petitioners with the approval of this Court.

Makasiar, Esguerra, Fernandez, Muñoz Palma and Aquino, JJ., concur.Castro, J., in a separate opinion, explains his reasons for his concurrence in the dismissal of all the petitions.Fernando, J., concurs and dissents in a separate opinion.Teehankee, J., files a separate opinion.Barredo, J., concurs in the dismissals in a separate opinion. Antonio, J., concurs in a separate opinion.

SEPARATE OPINIONWON the Court has jurisdiction to inquire into the constitutional sufficiency of the proclamation of martial law (justiciability of the martial law proclamation)

CASTRO [justiciable]

- cited Lansang vs. Garcia where the Court asserted the power to inquire into the “existence of the factual bases for the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in order to determine the sufficiency thereof.”- The judicial department can determine the existence of conditions for the exercise of the President’s powers and is not bound by the recitals of his proclamation. But whether in the circumstances obtaining public safety requires the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the proclamation of martial law is initially for the President to decide. The President’s findings as to necessity is persuasive upon the courts.

FERNANDO [justiciable]

- The action taken by any or both the political branches whether in the form of a legislative act or an executive order could be tested in court. Where private rights are affected, the judiciary has the duty to look into its validity. A showing that plenary power is granted either department of government may not be and obstacle to judicial inquiry. Its improvident exercise or the abuse thereof may give rise to a justiciable controversy. Necessarily then, it becomes the responsibility of the courts to ascertain whether the two coordinate branches

have adhered to the mandate of the fundamental law. The question thus posed is judicial rather than political.- The range of permissible inquiry to be conducted by the Court is necessarily limited to the ascertainment of whether or not such a suspension, in the light of the credible information furnished by the President, was arbitrary. The question before the judiciary is not the correctness but the reasonableness of the action taken.- Referred to Lansang vs. Garcia where the Court sustained the presidential proclamation suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus as there was no showing of arbitrariness in the exercise of a prerogative belonging to the executive, the judiciary merely acting as a check on the exercise of such authority. Chief Justice Concepcion in his opinion: In the exercise of such authority, the function of the Court is merely to check, not to supplant the Executive, or to ascertain merely whether he has gone beyond the constitutional limits of his jurisdiction, not to exercise the power vested in him or the determine the wisdom of his act.

TEEHANKEE [justiciable]

"it has the authority to inquire into the existence of said factual bases [stated in the proclamation suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or placing the country under martial law as the case may be, since the requirements for the exercise of these powers are the same and are provided in the very same clause] in order to determine the constitutional sufficiency thereof."32 The Court stressed therein that "indeed, the grant of power to suspend the privilege is neither absolute nor unqualified. The authority conferred upon by the Constitution, both under the Bill of Rights and under the Executive Department, is limited and conditional. The precept in the Bill of Rights establishes a general rule, as well as an exception thereto. What is more, it postulates the former in the negative, evidently to stress its importance, by providing that '(t)he privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended x x x.' It is only by way of exception that it permits the suspension of the privilege 'in cases of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion'-or under Art. VII of the Constitution, 'imminent danger thereof-'when the public safety requires it, in any of which events the same may be suspended wherever during such period the necessity for such suspension shall exist.' Far from being full and plenary, the authority to suspend the privilege of the writ is thus circumscribed, confined and restricted, not only by the prescribed setting or the conditions essential to its existence, but also, as regards the time when and the place where it may be exercised. These factors and the aforementioned setting or conditions mark, establish and define the extent, the confines and the limits of said power, beyond which it does not exist. And, like the limitations and restrictions imposed by the Fundamental Law upon the legislative department, adherence thereto and compliance therewith may, within proper bounds, be inquired into by the courts of justice. Otherwise, the explicit constitutional provisions thereon would be meaningless. Surely, the frames of our Constitution could not have intended to engage in such a wasteful exercise in futility."

BARREDO [qualified vote: justiciable]

- The inquiry which the Constitution contemplates for the determination of the constitutional sufficiency of a proclamation of martial law by the President should not go beyond facts of judicial notice and those that may be stated in the proclamation,, if these are by their very nature capable of unquestionable demonstration.- While a declaration of martial law is not absolutely conclusive, the Court’s inquiry into its constitutional sufficiency may not, contrary to what is implied in Lansang, involve the reception of evidence to be weighed against those on which the President has acted, nor may it extend to the investigation of what evidence the President had before him. Such inquiry must be limited to what is

undisputed in the record and to what accords or does not accord with facts of judicial notice.- It is entirely up to the Court to determine and define its own constitutional prerogatives vis-à-vis the proclamation and the existing martial law situation, given the reasons for the declaration and its avowed objectives.

1. The Constitution is the supreme law of the land. This means among other things that all the powers of the government and of all its officials from the President down to the lowest emanate from it.

2. The Judiciary provisions of the Constitution point to the Supreme Court as the ultimate arbiter of all conflicts as to what the Constitution or any part thereof means.

3. In the same way the Supreme Court is the designated guardian of the Constitution, the President is the specifically assigned protector of the safety, tranquility and territorial integrity of the nation. This responsibility of the President is his alone and may not be shared by any other Department.

4. The Constitution expressly provides that “in case of invasion, insurrection or rebellion or imminent danger thereof, when the public safety requires it, the Executive may place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law”

5. In the same manner that the Executive power conferred upon the Executive by the Constitution is complete, total and unlimited, so also, the judicial power vested in the Supreme Court and the inferior courts, is the very whole of that power, without any limitation or qualification.

6. Even the basic guarantee of protection of life, liberty, or property without due process of law readily reveals that the Constitution’s concern for individual rights and liberties is not entirely above that for the national interests, since the deprivation it enjoins is only that which is without due process of law and laws are always enacted in the national interest or to promote and safeguard the general welfare.

7. Whereas the Bill of Rights of the 1935 Constitution explicitly enjoins that the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, there is no similar injunction whether expressed or implied against the declaration of martial law.

- Political questions are not per se beyond the Court’s jurisdiction…but that as a matter of policy, implicit in the Constitution itself, the Court should abstain from interfering with the Executive’s Proclamation.

ANTONIO [political question]

- The right of a government to maintain its existence is the most pervasive aspect of sovereignty. To protect the nation's continued existence, from external as well as internal threats, the government "is invested with all those inherent and implied powers which, at the time of adopting the Constitution, were generally considered to belong to every government as such, and as being essential to the exercise of its functions"- These powers which are to be exercised for the nation's protection and security have been lodged by the Constitution under Article VII, Section 10 (2) thereof, on the President of the Philippines, who is clothed with exclusive authority to determine the occasion on which the powers shall be called forth.- Cited Barcelon vs. Baker : The existing doctrine at the time of the framing and adoption of the 1935 Constitution was that of Barcelon v. Baker. It enunciated the principle that when the Governor-General with the approval of the Philippine Commission, under Section 5 of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, declares that a state of rebellion, insurrection or invasion exists, and by reason thereof the public safety requires the suspension of the privileges of habeas corpus, this declaration is held conclusive upon the judicial department of the government. And when the Chief Executive has decided that conditions exist justifying the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, courts will presume that such conditions continue to exist until the same authority has decided that such conditions no longer exist. These doctrines are rooted on pragmatic considerations and sound reasons of public policy. The "doctrine

that whenever the Constitution or a statute gives a discretionary power to any person, such person is to be considered the sole and exclusive judge of the existence of those facts" has been recognized by all courts and "has never been disputed by any respectable authority." The political department according to Chief Justice Taney in Martin v. Mott, is the sole judge of the existence of war or insurrection, and when it declares either of these emergencies to exist, its action is not subject to review or liable to be controlled by the judicial department of the State.

MAKASIAR [political question]AQUINO [political question]

FERNANDEZ [political question]

- The Constitution is sufficiently explicit in locating the power to proclaim martial law. It is similarly explicit in specifying the occasions for its exercise. "In case of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion, or imminent danger thereof, when the public Safety requires it, he (the President as Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines) may suspend the privileges of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law."- The power to proclaim martial law is exclusively vested in the President. The proclamation and its attendant circumstances therefore form a political question.- Unless this Court decides that every act of the executive and of the legislature is justiciable there can be no clearer example of a political question than Proclamation No. 1081. It is the exercise by the highest elective official of the land of a supreme political duty exclusively entrusted to him by the Constitution. Our people have entrusted to the President through a specific provision of the fundamental law the awesome responsibility to wield a powerful weapon. The people have entrusted to him the estimation that the perils are so ominous and threatening that this ultimate weapon of our duly constituted government must be used.- The Supreme Court was not given the jurisdiction to share the determination of the occasions for its exercise. It is not given the authority by the Constitution to expand or limit the scope of its use depending on the allegations of litigants. It is not authorized by the Constitution to say that martial law may be proclaimed in Isabela and Sulu but not in Greater Manila. Much less does it have the power nor should it even exercise the power, assuming its existence, to nullify a proclamation of the President on a matter exclusively vested in him by the Constitution and on issues so politically and emotionally charged. The Court's function in such cases is to assume jurisdiction for the purpose of finding out whether the issues constitute a political question or not. Its function is to determine whether or not a question is indeed justiciable.- Granted that Proclamation No. 1081 is not political but justiciable, it is still valid because the president has not acted arbitrarily in issuing it.

ESGUERRA [political question]

- I maintain that Proclamation No. 1081 is constitutional, valid and binding; that the veracity or sufficiency of its factual bases cannot be inquired into by the Courts and that the question presented by the petitions is political in nature and not justiciable. Whether or not there is constitutional basis for the President’s action is for him to decide alone.- Ruled Barcelon vs. Baker over Lansang vs. Garcia

MUNOZ-PALMA [justiciable]

With Lansang, the highest Court of the land takes upon itself the grave responsibility of checking executive action and saving the nation from an arbitrary and despotic exercise of the presidential power granted under the Constitution to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and/or proclaim martial law; that responsibility and duty of the Court must be

preserved and fulfilled at all costs if We want to maintain its role as the last bulwark of democracy in this country.

WON Proclamation No. 1081 is valid given then the circumstances required by the Constitution for the proclamation of a state of martial law

CASTRO [valid]

- Our Constitution authorizes the proclamation of martial law in cases not only of actual invasion, insurrection or rebellion but also of “imminent danger” thereof.- The so called “open court” theory does not apply to the Philippine situation because our 1935 and 1973 Constitutions expressly authorize the declaration of martial law even where the danger to public safety arises merely from the imminence of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion. Moreover, the theory is too simplistic for our day, what with the universally recognized insidious nature of Communist subversion and its overt operations

FERNANDO [valid]

While it is beyond question that the 1973 Constitution stipulates, in a transitory provision, that: All proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, and acts promulgated, issued, or done by the incumbent President shall be part of the law of the land, and shall remain valid, legal, binding, and effective even after lifting of martial law or the ratification of this Constitution, unless modified, revoked, or superseded by subsequent proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, or other acts of the incumbent President, or unless expressly and explicitly modified or repealed by the regular National Assembly.

TEEHANKEE [no pronouncement]

BARREDO [valid]

The proclamation had merely put the Constitution in a state of anesthesia, since a major surgery is needed to save the nation’s life.

MUNOZ-PALMA [valid]

The extreme measure taken by the President to place the entire country under martial law was necessary. The President's action was neither capricious nor arbitrary. An arbitrary act is one that arises from an unrestrained exercise of the will, caprice, or personal preference of the actor, one which is not founded on a fair or substantial reason, is without adequate determining principle, nonrational, and solely dependent on the actor's will. Such is not the case with the act of the President, because the proclamation of martial law was the result of conditions and events, not of his own making, which undoubtedly endangered the public safety and led him to conclude that the situation was critical enough to warrant the exercise of his power under the Constitution to proclaim martial law

WON petitioners were illegally detained entitling them the relief of habeas corpus

CASTRO [legal]

- Given the validity of the proclamation of martial law, the arrest and detention of those reasonably believed to be engaged in the disorder or in fomenting it is well nigh beyond questioning.- In the cases at bar, the respondents have justified the arrest and detention of the petitioners on the ground of reasonable belief in their complicity in the

rebellion and insurrection. Except Diokno and Aquino, all the petitioners have been released from custody, although subject to defined restrictions regarding personal movement and expression of views. As the danger to public safety has not abated, I cannot say that the continued detention of Diokno and Aquino and the restrictions on the personal freedoms of the other petitioners are arbitrary, just as I am not prepared to say that the continued imposition of martial rule is unjustified.

FERNANDO [proclamation of martial law does not automatically carry the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus]

It is not to be denied that where such a state of affairs could be traced to the wishes of the President himself, it carries with it a presumption of validity. The test is again arbitrariness as defined in Lansang. While the detention of petitioners could have been validly ordered, as dictated by the very proclamation itself, if it continued for an unreasonable length of time, then his release may be sought in a habeas corpus proceeding.

BARREDO [legal]

- The imposition of martial law automatically carries with it the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in any event, the Presidential order of arrest and detention cannot be assailed as deprivation of liberty without due process.- The primary and fundamental purpose of martial law is to maintain order and to insure the success of the battle against the enemy by the most expeditious and efficient means without loss of time and with the minimum effort. This is self-evident. The arrest and detention of those contributing to the disorder and especially of those helping or otherwise giving aid and comfort to the enemy are indispensable, if martial law is to mean anything at all.

ANTONIO [legal]

- The Court is precluded from inquiring into the legality of arrest and detention of petitioners. Having concluded that the Proclamation of Martial Law on September 21, 1972 by the President of the Philippines and its continuance are valid and constitutional, the arrest and detention of petitioners, pursuant to General Order No. 2 dated September 22, 1972 of the President, as amended by General Order No. 2-A, dated September 26, 1972, may not now be assailed as unconstitutional and arbitrary.- It should be important to note that as a consequence of the proclamation of martial law, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus has been impliedly suspended. Authoritative writers on the subject view the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus as an incident, but an important incident of a declaration of martial law.

FERNANDEZ [the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is ipso facto suspended upon a proclamation of martial law]

MUNOZ-PALMA [not legal, the proclamation of martial law did not carry with it the automatic suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus]

- First, from the very nature of the writ of habeas corpus which as stressed in the early portion of this Opinion is a "writ of liberty" and the "most important and most immediately available safeguard of that liberty", the privilege of the writ cannot be suspended by mere implication. The Bill of Rights (Art. III, Sec. 1(14), 1935 Constitution, Art. IV, Sec. 15, 1973 Constitution) categorically states that the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended

except for causes therein specified, and the proclamation of martial law is not one of those enumerated.- Second, the so-called Commander-in-Chief clause, either under Art. VII, Sec. 10(2), 1935 Constitution, or Art. IX, Sec. 12, 1973 Constitution, provides specifically for three different modes of executive action in times of emergency, and one mode does not necessarily encompass the other, viz, (a) calling out the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawlessness, etc., (b) suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and (c) placing the country or a part thereof under martial law. In the latter two instances even if the causes for the executive action are the same, still the exigencies of the situation may warrant the suspension of the privilege of the writ but not a proclamation of martial law and vice versa.- Third, there can be an automatic suspension of the privilege of the writ when, with the declaration of martial law, there is a total collapse of the civil authorities, the civil courts are closed, and a military government takes over, in which event the privilege of the writ is necessarily suspended for the simple reason that there is no court to issue the writ; that, however, is not the case with us at present because the martial law proclaimed by the President upholds the supremacy of the civil over the military authority,and the courts are open to issue the writ.

IBP V ZAMORAKAPUNAN; August 15, 2000

FACTS- In view of the alarming increase in violent crimes in Metro Manila, President Estrada, in a verbal directive, ordered the PNP and the Marines to conduct joint visibility patrols for the purpose of crime prevention and suppression.- The Secretary of National Defense, the Chief of Staff of the AFP, the Chief of Staff of the PNP and the Secretary of the Interior and Local Government were tasked to execute and implement the said order.- The PNP Chief, through Police Superintendent Edgar Aglipay, formulated Letter of Instruction 02/2000, which contains the ff:

> Purpose: for the suppression of crime prevention and other serious threats to national security> Situation: Criminal incidents in Metro Manila have been perpetrated not only by ordinary criminals but also by organized syndicates whose members include active and former police/military personnel. The police visibility patrol in urban areas will reduce the incidence of crimes specially those perpetrated by active or former police/military personnel.> Mission: sustained street patrolling to minimize or eradicate all forms of high-profile crimes especially those perpetrated by organized crime syndicates whose members include those that are well-trained, disciplined and well-armed active or former PNP/military personnel> Concept in Joint Visibility Patrol Operations:

a. Conducted jointly by the National Capital Region Police Office and the Philippine Marines to curb criminality in Metro Manila and to preserve the internal security of the state against insurgents and other serious threat to national security, although the primary responsibility over Internal Security Operations still rest upon the AFP.

b. Principle of integration of efforts: work cohesively and unify efforts to ensure a focused, effective and holistic approach in addressing crime prevention.

c. A provisional Task Force Tulungan shall be organized to provide the mechanism, structure and procedures for the integrated planning, coordinating, monitoring and assessing the security situation.

d. Areas for deployment: Monumento Circle, SM City North Edsa, Araneta Shopping Center, Greenhills, SM Megamall, Makati Commercial Center, LRT/MRT Stations and the NAIA and Domestic Airport.

- On January 17, 2000, the IBP filed petition to annul LOI 02/2000 and to declare the deployment of the Marines, null and void and unconstitutional because no emergency situation obtains in Metro Manila as would justify the deployment of soldiers for law enforcement work (violates Art 2, Sec. 3), deployment constitutes an insidious incursion by the military in a civilian function of government (violates Art. 16, Sec. 5), and deployment creates a dangerous tendency to rely on the military to perform civilian functions of the government. It also makes the military more powerful than what it should really be under the Constitution. - The President confirmed his previous directive on the deployment of the Marines in a Memorandum, dated 24 January 2000, addressed to the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief. The President expressed his desire to improve the peace and order situation in Metro Manila through more effective crime prevention program including increased police patrols. He further stated that to heighten police visibility in the Metropolis, augmentation from the AFP is necessary. Invoking his powers as Commander-in Chief under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, the President directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless violence. Finally, the President declared that the services of the Marines in the anti-crime campaign are merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable period only.

ISSUES1. WON the President’s factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces is subject to judicial review

a. WON petitioner has legal standing2. WON the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violates the constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy, over the military and the civilian character of the PNP

HELD1. On Judicial ReviewRatio 1: When questions of constitutional significance are raised, the Court can exercise its power of judicial review only if the following requisites are complied with, namely: (1) the existence of an actual and appropriate case; (2) a personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is the lis mota of the case.Ratio 2: When the issues raised are of paramount importance to the public, the Court may brush aside technicalities of procedure.a. The IBP has not sufficiently complied with the requisites of standing in this case.

> Definition of locus standi+ a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged+ “interest” means a material interest, an interest in issue affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest+ gist: whether a party alleges such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions

> The mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it with standing in this case> IBP has failed to present a specific and substantial interest in the resolution of the case. It has not shown any specific injury, which it has suffered or may suffer by virtue of the questioned government act.

2. The President did not commit grave abuse of discretion in calling out the MarinesDefinition of political question

- concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not the legality, of a particular act or measure being assailed- (Tanada v. Cuenco) questions which are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive department; if an issue is clearly identified by the text of the Constitution as matters for discretionary action by a particular branch of government or to the people themselves then it is held to be a political question- (Baker v. Carr) prominent on the surface of any case held to be a political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for questioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on the one question

Ratio 3: When the grant of power is qualified, conditional or subject to limitations, the issue of whether the prescribed qualifications or conditions have been met or the limitations respected, is justiciable—the problem being one of legality or validity.Ratio 4: When political questions are involved, the Constitution limits the determination as to whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the official whose action is being questioned.

- grave abuse of discretion: capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment that is patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility- There is no evidence to support the assertion that there exist no justification for calling out the armed forces. Likewise, there is no evidence to support the proposition that grave abuse was committed because the power to call was exercised in such a manner as to violate the constitutional provision on civilian supremacy over the military.

There is a clear textual commitment under Art. VII, Sec. 18, par. 1 of the Constitution to bestow on the President full discretionary power to call out the armed forces and to determine the necessity for the exercise of such power The full discretionary power of the President to determine the factual basis for the exercise of the calling out power is also implied and further reinforced in the rest of the said provision.

- Congress may revoke proclamation of martial law or suspension of the writ of habeas corpus and the Court may review the sufficiency of the factual basis thereof. There is no such equivalent provision dealing with the revocation or review of the President’s action to call out the armed forces- Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Where the terms are expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to other matters.- Fr. Bernas: graduated power of the President as Commander-in-Chief; when he exercises this lesser power of calling on the armed forces, when he says it is necessary, his judgment cannot be reviewed by anybody- Besides the absence of textual standards that the Court may use to judge necessity, information necessary to arrive at such judgment might also prove unmanageable for the courts. On the other hand, the President has a vast intelligence network to gather information.

The deployment of the Marines does not violate the civilian supremacy clause nor does it infringe the civilian character of the police force

Constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement- limited participation by the Marines- real authority belongs to the PNP

Deployment of the Marines does not unmake the civilian character of the police force

- the real authority in these operations is lodged with the head of a civilian institution, the PNP, and not with the military- since none of the Marines was incorporated or enlisted as members of the PNP, there can be no appointment to a civilian position to speak of- the Marines render nothing more than assistance required in conducting the patrols; there can be no “insidious incursion” of the military in civilian affairs nor can there be a violation of the civilian supremacy clause in the Constitution

Military assistance to civilian authorities in various forms persists in Philippine jurisdiction

- Military assistance in: elections, administration of the Phil. Red Cross, relief and rescue operations, conduct of licensure exams, sanitary inspections, conduct of census work, etc. - Systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of Congress and, yet, never before questioned- Mutual support and cooperation between the military and civilian authorities, not derogation of civilian supremacy

Decision Petition dismissed - 10 concur (Kapunan, Davide, Melo, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, De Leon)- 5 concur in the result (Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing)- 1 on official leave (Bellosillo)

SEPARATE OPINION

PUNO

- Political questions are defined as those questions which under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of government They have two aspects: (1) those matters that are to be exercised by the people in their primary political capacity and (2) matters which have been specifically delegated to some other department or particular office of the government, with discretionary power to act.- (Barcelon v. Baker) Under our form of government, one department has no authority to inquire into the acts of another, which acts are performed within the discretion of the other department. Whenever a statute gives discretionary power to any person, to be exercised by him upon his own opinion of certain facts, the statute constitutes him the sole judge of the existence of those facts. The exercise of this discretion is conclusive upon the courts. Once a determination is made by the executive and legislative departments that the conditions justifying the assailed acts exist, it will presume that the conditions continue until the same authority decide that they no longer exist. The executive branch, thru its civil and military branches, are better situated to obtain information about peace and order from every corner of the nation, in contrast with the judicial department, with its very limited machinery- (Alejandrino v. Quezon) Under the Jones Law, the power of the Senate to punish its members for disorderly behavior does not authorize it to suspend an appointive member from the exercise of his office. The Supreme Court does not possess the power of coercion to make the Philippine Senate take any particular action. The Philippine Legislature or any branch thereof cannot be directly controlled in the exercise of their legislative powers by any judicial process- (Vera v. Avelino) Legislature has the inherent right to determine who shall be admitted to its membership- (Mabanag v. Lopez Vito) A proposal to amend the Constitution is a highly political function performed by Congress in its sovereign legislative capacity- (Arnault v. Balagtas) The process by which a contumacious witness is dealt with by the legislature is a necessary concomitant of the legislative process and the legislature’s exercise of its discretionary authority is not subject to judicial interference

- (Osmena v. Pendatun) The Court did not interfere with Congress’power to discipline its members- (Avelino v. Cuenco) The Court could assume jurisdiction over the controversy in light of the subsequent events justifying intervention among which was the existence of a quorum- (Tanada v. Cuenco) The Senate is not clothed with “full discretionary authority” in the choice of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal and the exercise of its power thereon is subject to constitutional limitations, which are mandatory in nature. - (Cunanan v Tan, Jr.) The Commission on Appointments is a creature of the Constitution and its power does not come from Congress but from the Constitution- (Gonzales v. Comelec) The question of whether or not Congress, acting as a constituent assembly in proposing amendments to the Constitution violates the Constitution was held to be justiciable and not a political issue. The power to amend the Constitution or to propose amendments thereto is not included in the general grant of legislative powers to Congress. As a constituent assembly, the members of Congress derive their authority from the fundamental law and they do not have the final say on whether their acts are within or beyond constitutional limits- (Tolentino v. Comelec) Acts of a constitutional convention called for the purpose of proposing amendments to the Constitution are at par with acts of Congress acting as a constituent assembly- In sum, this Court brushed aside the political question doctrine and assumed jurisdiction whenever it found constitutionally-imposed limits on the exercise of powers conferred upon the Legislature- The Court hewed to the same line as regards the exercise of Executive Power

- (Severino v. Governor-General) When the Legislature conferred upon the Governor-General powers and duties, it did so for the reason that he was in a better position to know the needs of the country than any other member of the executive department, and with full confidence that he will perform such duties as his judgment dictates- (Abueva v. Wood) Under the principle of separation of powers, it ruled that it was not intended by the Constitution that one branch of government could encroach upon the field of duty of the other. Each department has an exclusive field within which it can perform its part within certain discretionary limits. - (Forbes v. Tiaco) The President’s inherent power to deport undesirable aliens is universally denominated as political, and this power continues to exist for the preservation of peace and domestic tranquility of the nation- (Manalang v. Quitoriano) The appointing power is the exclusive prerogative of the President upon which no limitations may be imposed by Congress except those resulting from the need of securing concurrence of the Commission on Appointments and from the exercise of the limited legislative power to prescribe qualifications to the given appointive office- (Untal v. Chief of Staff, AFP) As Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, the President has the power to determine whether war, in the legal sense, still continues or has terminated. It is within the province of the political department and not the judicial department of government to determine when war is at the end- (Montenegro v. Castaneda) The authority to decide whether the exigency has arisen requiring the suspension of the privilege belongs to the President and his decision is final and conclusive on the courts.- (Lansang v. Garcia) The suspension of the writ of habeas corpus was not a political question. The power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is neither absolute nor unqualified because the Constitution sets limits on the exercise of executive discretion on the matter. These limits are: (1) that the privilege must not be suspended except only in cases of invasion, insurrection or rebellion or imminent danger thereof; and (2) when the public safety requires it, in any of which events the same may be suspended wherever during such period the necessity for the suspension shall exist. The extent of the power, which may be inquired into by courts is

defined by these limitations. The function of the Court is not to supplant but merely to check the Executive; to ascertain whether the President has gone beyond the constitutional limits of his jurisdiction, not to exercise the power vested in him or to determine the wisdom of his act. - (Javellana v. Executive Secretary) While a majority of the Court held that the issue of whether or not the 1973 Constitution was justiciable, a majority also ruled that the decisive issue of whether the 1973 Constitution had come into force and effect, with or without constitutional ratification, was a political question- (Aquino, Jr. v. Enrile) The Court upheld the President’s declaration of martial law. On whether the validity of the imposition of martial law was a political or justiciable question, the Court was almost evenly divided.- (Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile) The issuance of the Presidential Commitment Order by the President was not subject to judicial inquiry. In times of war or national emergency, the President must be given absolute control for the very life of the nation and government is in peril- (Morales, Jr. v. Enrile) By the power of judicial review, the Court must inquire into every phase and aspect of a person’s detention from the moment he was taken into custody up to the moment the court passes upon the merits of the petition

- The language of Art. VIII, Sec. 1 clearly gives the Court the power to strike down acts amounting to grave abuse of discretion of both the legislative and executive branches of government- It is clear that the President, as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces of the Philippines, may call out the armed forces subject to two conditions: (1) whenever it becomes necessary; and (2) to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. Undeniably, these conditions lay down the sine qua requirement for the exercise of the power and the objective sought to be attained by the exercise of the power. They define the constitutional parameters of the calling out power. Whether or not there is compliance with these parameters is a justiciable issue and is not a political question.- On the use of Bernas’ opinion: The Constitution does not derive its force from the convention which framed it, but from the people who ratified it, the intent to be arrived at is that of the people.- When private justiciable rights are involved in a suit, the Court must not refuse to assume jurisdiction even though questions of extreme political importance are necessarily involved.

VITUG

The act of the President in simply calling on the armed forces of the Philippines, an executive prerogative, to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols in the metropolis, does not constitute grave abuse of discretion that would now warrant an exercise by the Supreme Court of its extraordinary power as so envisioned by the fundamental law.

MENDOZA [concur and dissent]

- The judgment on the substantive constitutional issues raised by petitioner must await an actual case involving real parties with injuries to show as a result of the operation of the challenged executive action- A citizen’s suit challenging the constituti0onality of governmental action requires that (1) the petitioner must have suffered an “injury in fact” of an actual or imminent nature; (2) there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action by this Court- Only a party injured by the operation of the governmental action challenged is in the best position to aid the Court in determining the precise nature of the problem presented.- Because of the absence of parties with real and substantial interest to protect, we do not have evidence on the effect of military presence in malls and commercial centers

- Dismiss suit on the ground of lack of standing of petitioner and the consequent lack of an actual case or controversy

SANLAKAS V EXECUTIVE SECRETARYTINGA; February 3, 2004

FACTS- July 27, 2003 – Some 300 junior officers and enlisted men of AFP, armed with ammunitions and explosives, stormed into Oakwood apartments in Makati. They demanded the resignation of GMA, Defense Secretary and the PNP Chief.- Later that day, the President issued Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 both declaring “a state of rebellion” and calling out the AFP to suppress the rebellion.- Oakwood occupation ended in the evening after negotiations.- August 1, 2003 – President lifted the declaration.- PARTIES> Sanlakas and Partido ng Manggagawa (PD)

o Sec 18, Art 7 does not require declaration of a state of rebellion to call out the armed forces

o There is no sufficient factual basis for an indefinite period since Oakwood occupation had ceased.

> Social Justice Society (SJS) as Filipino citizens, taxpayers, law professors and bar reviewers

o Declaration is constitutional anomaly that confuses because overzealous public officers acting pursuant to the proclamation are liable to violate the constitutional rights of citizens

o Circumvention of the report requirement in Sec 18, Art 7, commanding the President to submit a report to Congress within 48 hours from proclamation of martial law

o Presidential issuances cannot be construed as an exercise of emergency powers as Congress has not delegated any such power to the President

> Rep. Suplico et al as citizens and members of House of Representativeso Their rights, powers, and functions were allegedly affectedo Declaration is a superfluity and is actually an exercise of emergency

powers and therefore is a usurpation of the power of the Congress in Art 6, Sec 23 par 2

> Sen. Pimentelo Issuances are unwarranted, illegal, and abusive exercise of a martial

law power that has no constitutional basis> Solicitor-General

o Case has become moot because of the lifting of the declaration

ISSUES1. WON issue is justiciable given mootness of the issue and legal standing of the partiesb. WON petitioners have legal standing

2. WON issuances of the President are valid

HELD1. The President, in declaring state of rebellion and in calling out the armed forces, was merely exercising a wedding of her Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief powers. These are purely executive powers, vested on the President by Sections 1 and 18, Article 7 as opposed to the delegated legislative powers contemplated by Section 23 (2), Article 6.- Justiciable even if moot - Courts will decide a question, otherwise moot, if it is capable of repetition yet evading review- Lacson v. Perez – mootness preclude the Court from addressing its Constitutionality

- Only Rep Suplico et al and Sen Pimentel have legal standing because when an act of the Executive injures the institution of the Congress and causes a derivative but substantial injury, then any member can file suit (Phil. Constitution Association v. Enriquez)- Sanlakas, PM, and SJS have no legal standing because they did not obtain any direct injury from the governmental act that is being challenged. People’s organization status would not vest them with the requisite personality to question the validity of the presidential issuances (Kilosbayan v. Morato)- SJS as taxpayers and citizens have no legal standing because there was no illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation2. Presidential issuances are valid- Art 7, Sec 18 – Sequence of graduated powers: 1.calling out power, 2.power to suspend writ of habeas corpus, 3.power to declare martial law.- 2 and 3 require concurrence of actual invasion or rebellion AND that public safety requires the exercise of such power. These are not required in calling-out power (IBP v. Zamora)- It does not expressly prohibit the President from declaring a state of rebellion. The Constitution vests the President not only with Commander-in-Chief powers but with first and foremost, Executive powers- US Constitutional history: commander-in-chief powers are broad enough as it is and become more so when taken together with the provision on executive power and presidential oath of office- President’s authority to declare state of rebellion springs in the main from her powers as chief executive and at the same time draws strength from her commander-in-chief powers- The declaration of state of rebellion only gives notice to the nation that such a state exists and the armed forces may be called to prevent or suppress it.- Declaration cannot diminish or violate constitutionality protected rights (Lacson)- President has full discretionary power to call out the armed forces and to determine the necessity of the exercise of such power. There is no proof that the President acted without factual basis.- Declaration of state of rebellion does not amount to declaration of martial law.

DAVID V MACAPAGAL-ARROYOSANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ; May 3, 2006

FACTS- On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20 th Anniversary of the Edsa People Power I, President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national emergency, thus:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Republic of the Philippines and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested upon me by Section 18, Article 7 of the Philippine Constitution which states that: “The President. . . whenever it becomes necessary, . . . may call out (the) armed forces to prevent or suppress. . .rebellion. . .,” and in my capacity as their Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction; and as provided in Section 17, Article 12 of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of National Emergency.

- The declaration is premised military and police intelligence containing concerted efforts of Left and Right wing factions to bring down the Arroyo Government.- On the same day, the President issued G. O. No. 5 implementing PP 1017 (hence, the same premise as PP1017), thus:

NOW, THEREFORE, I GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, by virtue of the powers vested in me under the Constitution as President of the

Republic of the Philippines, and Commander-in-Chief of the Republic of the Philippines, and pursuant to Proclamation No. 1017 dated February 24, 2006, do hereby call upon the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP), to prevent and suppress acts of terrorism and lawless violence in the country;I hereby direct the Chief of Staff of the AFP and the Chief of the PNP, as well as the officers and men of the AFP and PNP, to immediately carry out the necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of terrorism and lawless violence.

- On March 3, 2006, exactly one week after the declaration of a state of national emergency and after all these petitions had been filed, the President lifted PP 1017. ARGUMENTS OF THE GOVERNMENT

In their presentation of the factual bases of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, respondents stated that the proximate cause behind the executive issuances was the conspiracy among some military officers, leftist insurgents of the New People’s Army (NPA), and some members of the political opposition in a plot to unseat or assassinate President Arroyo.[4] They considered the aim to oust or assassinate the President and take-over the reigns of government as a clear and present danger.

During the oral arguments held on March 7, 2006, the Solicitor General specified the facts leading to the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5. SIGNIFICANTLY, THERE WAS NO REFUTATION FROM PETITIONERS’ COUNSELS.

On January 17, 2006, Captain Nathaniel Rabonza and First Lieutenants Sonny Sarmiento, Lawrence San Juan and Patricio Bumidang, members of the Magdalo Group indicted in the Oakwood mutiny, escaped their detention cell in Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City. In a public statement, they vowed to remain defiant and to elude arrest at all costs. They called upon the people to “show and proclaim our displeasure at the sham regime. Let us demonstrate our disgust, not only by going to the streets in protest, but also by wearing red bands on our left arms.” [5]

On February 17, 2006, the authorities got hold of a document entitled “Oplan Hackle I ” which detailed plans for bombings and attacks during the Philippine Military Academy Alumni Homecoming in Baguio City. The plot was to assassinate selected targets including some cabinet members and President Arroyo herself.[6] Upon the advice of her security, President Arroyo decided not to attend the Alumni Homecoming. The next day, at the height of the celebration, a bomb was found and detonated at the PMA parade ground.

On February 21, 2006, Lt. San Juan was recaptured in a communist safehouse in Batangas province. Found in his possession were two (2) flash disks containing minutes of the meetings between members of the Magdalo Group and the National People’s Army (NPA), a tape recorder, audio cassette cartridges, diskettes, and copies of subversive documents.[7] Prior to his arrest, Lt. San Juan announced through DZRH that the “Magdalo’s D-Day would be on February 24, 2006, the 20th Anniversary of Edsa I.”

On February 23, 2006, PNP Chief Arturo Lomibao intercepted information that members of the PNP- Special Action Force were planning to defect. Thus, he immediately ordered SAF Commanding General Marcelino Franco, Jr. to “disavow” any defection. The latter promptly obeyed and issued a public statement: “All SAF units are under the effective control of responsible and trustworthy officers with proven integrity and unquestionable loyalty.”

On the same day, at the house of former Congressman Peping Cojuangco, President Cory Aquino’s brother, businessmen and mid-level government officials plotted moves to bring down the Arroyo administration. Nelly Sindayen of TIME Magazine reported that Pastor Saycon, longtime Arroyo critic, called a U.S. government official about his group’s plans if President Arroyo is ousted. Saycon also phoned a man code-named Delta. Saycon identified him as B/Gen. Danilo Lim, Commander of the Army’s elite Scout Ranger. Lim said “it was all systems go for the planned movement against Arroyo.”[8]

B/Gen. Danilo Lim and Brigade Commander Col. Ariel Querubin confided to Gen. Generoso Senga, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the

Philippines (AFP), that a huge number of soldiers would join the rallies to provide a critical mass and armed component to the Anti-Arroyo protests to be held on February 24, 2005. According to these two (2) officers, there was no way they could possibly stop the soldiers because they too, were breaking the chain of command to join the forces foist to unseat the President. However, Gen. Senga has remained faithful to his Commander-in-Chief and to the chain of command. He immediately took custody of B/Gen. Lim and directed Col. Querubin to return to the Philippine Marines Headquarters in Fort Bonifacio.

Earlier, the CPP-NPA called for intensification of political and revolutionary work within the military and the police establishments in order to forge alliances with its members and key officials. NPA spokesman Gregorio “Ka Roger” Rosal declared: “The Communist Party and revolutionary movement and the entire people look forward to the possibility in the coming year of accomplishing its immediate task of bringing down the Arroyo regime; of rendering it to weaken and unable to rule that it will not take much longer to end it.”[9]

On the other hand, Cesar Renerio, spokesman for the National Democratic Front (NDF) at North Central Mindanao, publicly announced: “Anti-Arroyo groups within the military and police are growing rapidly, hastened by the economic difficulties suffered by the families of AFP officers and enlisted personnel who undertake counter-insurgency operations in the field.” He claimed that with the forces of the national democratic movement, the anti-Arroyo conservative political parties, coalitions, plus the groups that have been reinforcing since June 2005, it is probable that the President’s ouster is nearing its concluding stage in the first half of 2006.

Respondents further claimed that the bombing of telecommunication towers and cell sites in Bulacan and Bataan was also considered as additional factual basis for the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5. So is the raid of an army outpost in Benguet resulting in the death of three (3) soldiers. And also the directive of the Communist Party of the Philippines ordering its front organizations to join 5,000 Metro Manila radicals and 25,000 more from the provinces in mass protests.[10]

By midnight of February 23, 2006, the President convened her security advisers and several cabinet members to assess the gravity of the fermenting peace and order situation. She directed both the AFP and the PNP to account for all their men and ensure that the chain of command remains solid and undivided. To protect the young students from any possible trouble that might break loose on the streets, the President suspended classes in all levels in the entire National Capital Region. PETITIONER’S ARGUMENTS

In G.R. No. 171396, petitioners Randolf S. David, et al. assailed PP 1017 on the grounds that (1) it encroaches on the emergency powers of Congress; (2) it is a subterfuge to avoid the constitutional requirements for the imposition of martial law; and (3) it violates the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press, of speech and of assembly.

In G.R. No. 171409, petitioners Ninez Cacho-Olivares and Tribune Publishing Co., Inc. challenged the CIDG’s act of raiding the Daily Tribune offices as a clear case of “censorship” or “prior restraint.” They also claimed that the term “emergency” refers only to tsunami, typhoon, hurricane and similar occurrences, hence, there is “absolutely no emergency” that warrants the issuance of PP 1017.

In G.R. No. 171485, petitioners herein are Representative Francis Joseph G. Escudero, and twenty one (21) other members of the House of Representatives, including Representatives Satur Ocampo, Rafael Mariano, Teodoro Casiño, Liza Maza, and Josel Virador. They asserted that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 constitute “usurpation of legislative powers”; “violation of freedom of expression” and “a declaration of martial law.” They alleged that President Arroyo “gravely abused her discretion in calling out the armed forces without clear and verifiable factual basis of the possibility of lawless violence and a showing that there is necessity to do so.”

In G.R. No. 171483, petitioners KMU, NAFLU-KMU, and their members averred that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are unconstitutional because (1) they arrogate unto President Arroyo the power to enact laws and decrees;

(2) their issuance was without factual basis; and (3) they violate freedom of expression and the right of the people to peaceably assemble to redress their grievances.

In G.R. No. 171400, petitioner Alternative Law Groups, Inc. (ALGI) alleged that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are unconstitutional because they violate (a) Section 4[15] of Article II, (b) Sections 1,[16] 2,[17] and 4[18] of Article III, (c) Section 23[19] of Article VI, and (d) Section 17[20] of Article XII of the Constitution.

In G.R. No. 171489, petitioners Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz et al., alleged that PP 1017 is an “arbitrary and unlawful exercise by the President of her Martial Law powers.” And assuming that PP 1017 is not really a declaration of Martial Law, petitioners argued that “it amounts to an exercise by the President of emergency powers without congressional approval.” In addition, petitioners asserted that PP 1017 “goes beyond the nature and function of a proclamation as defined under the Revised Administrative Code.”

And lastly, in G.R. No. 171424, petitioner Loren B. Legarda maintained that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are “unconstitutional for being violative of the freedom of expression, including its cognate rights such as freedom of the press and the right to access to information on matters of public concern, all guaranteed under Article III, Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution. ” In this regard, she stated that these issuances prevented her from fully prosecuting her election protest pending before the Presidential Electoral Tribunal. - In respondents’ Consolidated Comment, the Solicitor General countered that: first, the petitions should be dismissed for being moot; second, petitioners in G.R. Nos. 171400 (ALGI), 171424 (Legarda), 171483 (KMU et al.), 171485 (Escudero et al.) and 171489 (Cadiz et al.) have no legal standing; third, it is not necessary for petitioners to implead President Arroyo as respondent; fourth, PP 1017 has constitutional and legal basis; and fifth, PP 1017 does not violate the people’s right to free expression and redress of grievances.

ISSUESProcedural1. WON the moot and academic principle precludes the Court from taking cognizance of the cases 2. WON petitioners in 171485 (Escudero et al.), G.R. Nos. 171400 (ALGI), 171483 (KMU et al.), 171489 (Cadiz et al.), and 171424 (Legarda) have legal standingSubstantive3. WON Supreme Court can review the factual basis of PP 10174. WON PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are unconstitutional

a. Facial Challengeb. Constitutional Basisc. As Applied Challenge

HELDProcedural1. NO. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution; [31] second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved; [32] third, when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public;[33] and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.[34] Reasoning- Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution;[31] second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved; [32] third, when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public;[33] and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.[34] - All the foregoing exceptions are present here and justify this Court’s assumption of jurisdiction over the instant petitions. Petitioners alleged that the

issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 violates the Constitution. There is no question that the issues being raised affect the public’s interest, involving as they do the people’s basic rights to freedom of expression, of assembly and of the press. Moreover, the Court has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional precepts, doctrines or rules. It has the symbolic function of educating the bench and the bar, and in the present petitions, the military and the police, on the extent of the protection given by constitutional guarantees.[35] And lastly, respondents’ contested actions are capable of repetition. Certainly, the petitions are subject to judicial review. In their attempt to prove the alleged mootness of this case, respondents cited Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban’s Separate Opinion in Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary.[36] However, they failed to take into account the Chief Justice’s very statement that an otherwise “moot” case may still be decided “provided the party raising it in a proper case has been and/or continues to be prejudiced or damaged as a direct result of its issuance.” The present case falls right within this exception to the mootness rule pointed out by the Chief Justice. 2. YES. The requirement of Locus standi which is the right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question shall be set aside by the Court whenever it is shown that the case is of transcendental importance.Reasoning- Locus standi is defined as “a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question.”[37] In private suits, standing is governed by the “real-parties-in interest” rule as contained in Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. It provides that “every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest .” Accordingly, the “real-party-in interest” is “the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. ”[38]

Succinctly put, the plaintiff’s standing is based on his own right to the relief sought.- By way of summary, the following rules may be culled from the cases decided by this Court. Taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, and legislators may be accorded standing to sue, provided that the following requirements are met:

1. the cases involve constitutional issues; 2. for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public

funds or that the tax measure is unconstitutional;3. for voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of

the election law in question;4. or concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised

are of transcendental importance which must be settled early; and5. or legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of

infringes upon their prerogatives as legislators.- Now, the application of the above principles to the present petitions. - The locus standi of petitioners in G.R. No. 171396, particularly David and Llamas, is beyond doubt. The same holds true with petitioners in G.R. No. 171409, Cacho-Olivares and Tribune Publishing Co. Inc. They alleged “direct injury” resulting from “illegal arrest” and “unlawful search” committed by police operatives pursuant to PP 1017. Rightly so, the Solicitor General does not question their legal standing.- In G.R. No. 171485, the opposition Congressmen alleged there was usurpation of legislative powers. They also raised the issue of whether or not the concurrence of Congress is necessary whenever the alarming powers incident to Martial Law are used. Moreover, it is in the interest of justice that those affected by PP 1017 can be represented by their Congressmen in bringing to the attention of the Court the alleged violations of their basic rights.- In G.R. No. 171400, (ALGI), this Court applied the liberality rule in Philconsa v. Enriquez,[60] Kapatiran Ng Mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas, Inc. v. Tan,[61] Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform,[62] Basco v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation,[63] and Tañada v. Tuvera,[64] that when the issue concerns a public right, it is sufficient that the petitioner is a citizen and has an interest in the execution of the laws.- In G.R. No. 171483, KMU’s assertion that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 violated

its right to peaceful assembly may be deemed sufficient to give it legal standing. Organizations may be granted standing to assert the rights of their members.[65] We take judicial notice of the announcement by the Office of the President banning all rallies and canceling all permits for public assemblies following the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5.- In G.R. No. 171489, petitioners, Cadiz et al., who are national officers of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) have no legal standing, having failed to allege any direct or potential injury which the IBP as an institution or its members may suffer as a consequence of the issuance of PP No. 1017 and G.O. No. 5. In Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora,[66] the Court held that the mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it with standing in this case. This is too general an interest which is shared by other groups and the whole citizenry. However, in view of the transcendental importance of the issue, this Court declares that petitioner have locus standi.- In G.R. No. 171424, Loren Legarda has no personality as a taxpayer to file the instant petition as there are no allegations of illegal disbursement of public funds. The fact that she is a former Senator is of no consequence. She can no longer sue as a legislator on the allegation that her prerogatives as a lawmaker have been impaired by PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5. Her claim that she is a media personality will not likewise aid her because there was no showing that the enforcement of these issuances prevented her from pursuing her occupation. Her submission that she has pending electoral protest before the Presidential Electoral Tribunal is likewise of no relevance. She has not sufficiently shown that PP 1017 will affect the proceedings or result of her case. But considering once more the transcendental importance of the issue involved, this Court may relax the standing rules.- It must always be borne in mind that the question of locus standi is but corollary to the bigger question of proper exercise of judicial power. This is the underlying legal tenet of the “liberality doctrine” on legal standing. It cannot be doubted that the validity of PP No. 1017 and G.O. No. 5 is a judicial question which is of paramount importance to the Filipino people. To paraphrase Justice Laurel, the whole of Philippine society now waits with bated breath the ruling of this Court on this very critical matter. The petitions thus call for the application of the “transcendental importance” doctrine, a relaxation of the standing requirements for the petitioners in the “PP 1017 cases.” - This Court holds that all the petitioners herein have locus standi. - Incidentally, IT IS NOT PROPER TO IMPLEAD PRESIDENT ARROYO AS RESPONDENT. SETTLED IS THE DOCTRINE THAT THE PRESIDENT, DURING HIS TENURE OF OFFICE OR ACTUAL INCUMBENCY, [67] MAY NOT BE SUED IN ANY CIVIL OR CRIMINAL CASE, AND THERE IS NO NEED TO PROVIDE FOR IT IN THE CONSTITUTION OR LAW. It will degrade the dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into court litigations while serving as such. Furthermore, it is important that he be freed from any form of harassment, hindrance or distraction to enable him to fully attend to the performance of his official duties and functions. Unlike the legislative and judicial branch, only one constitutes the executive branch and anything which impairs his usefulness in the discharge of the many great and important duties imposed upon him by the Constitution necessarily impairs the operation of the Government. However, this does not mean that the President is not accountable to anyone. Like any other official, he remains accountable to the people[68] but he may be removed from office only in the mode provided by law and that is by impeachment.[69] Substantive3. The President’s “calling-out” power is a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. However, “this does not prevent an examination of whether such power was exercised within permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion.” This ruling is based on Section 1, Article VIII of 1987 Constitution which fortifies the authority of the courts to determine in an appropriate action the validity of the acts of the political departments. Under the new definition of judicial power, the courts are authorized not only “to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and

enforceable,” but also “to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.” The latter part of the authority represents a broadening of judicial power to enable the courts of justice to review what was before a forbidden territory, to wit, the discretion of the political departments of the government.[81] It speaks of judicial prerogative not only in terms of power but also of duty.[82] - However, “judicial inquiry can go no further than to satisfy the Court not that the President’s decision is correct,” but that “the President did not act arbitrarily.” Thus, the standard laid down is not correctness, but arbitrariness. [83]

It is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the President’s decision is totally bereft of factual basis” and that if he fails, by way of proof, to support his assertion, then “this Court cannot undertake an independent investigation beyond the pleadings. - Petitioners failed to show that President Arroyo’s exercise of the calling-out power, by issuing PP 1017, is totally bereft of factual basis. A reading of the Solicitor General’s Consolidated Comment and Memorandum shows a detailed narration of the events leading to the issuance of PP 1017, with supporting reports forming part of the records. Petitioners presented nothing to refute such events. Thus, absent any contrary allegations, the Court is convinced that the President was justified in issuing PP 1017 calling for military aid.4. YES. Notwithstanding the discretionary nature of the constitutional exercise of the President of his/her calling out of power, the Courts shall have authority to inquire into the factual basis of such exercise to determine whether it was within the constitutionally permissible limits or whether grave abuse of discretion attended its exercise. (This interpretation was based on Article VIII, section 1a. Facial Challenge. Facial invalidation of laws (overbreadth doctrine) shall not be resorted to in the absence of clear showing that (1) the law involves the exercise of free speech; (2) that there can be no instance that the assailed law may be valid; and that (3) the Court has no other alternative remedies available.- Under the void-for-vagueness doctrine, a law shall be facially invalid only if men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.ReasoningPetitioners contend that PP 1017 is void on its face because of its “overbreadth.” They claim that its enforcement encroached on both unprotected and protected rights under Section 4, Article III of the Constitution and sent a “chilling effect” to the citizens. - A facial review of PP 1017, using the overbreadth doctrine, is uncalled for. First and foremost, the overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool developed for testing “on their faces” statutes in free speech cases. A plain reading of PP 1017 shows that it is not primarily directed to speech or even speech-related conduct. It is actually a call upon the AFP to prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence. In United States v. Salerno,[104] the US Supreme Court held that “we have not recognized an ‘overbreadth’ doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment” (freedom of speech). Moreover, the overbreadth doctrine is not intended for testing the validity of a law that “reflects legitimate state interest in maintaining comprehensive control over harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct.” Undoubtedly, lawless violence, insurrection and rebellion are considered “harmful” and “constitutionally unprotected conduct.” - Second, facial invalidation of laws is considered as “manifestly strong medicine,” to be used “sparingly and only as a last resort,” and is “generally disfavored;”[107] The reason for this is obvious. Embedded in the traditional rules governing constitutional adjudication is the principle that a person to whom a law may be applied will not be heard to challenge a law on the ground that it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others, i.e., in other situations not before the Court.[108] - And third, a facial challenge on the ground of overbreadth is the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that there can be no instance when the assailed law may be valid. Here, petitioners

did not even attempt to show whether this situation exists. - Related to the “overbreadth” doctrine is the “void for vagueness doctrine” which holds that “a law is facially invalid if men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. ”[110]

It is subject to the same principles governing overbreadth doctrine. For one, it is also an analytical tool for testing “on their faces” statutes in free speech cases. And like overbreadth, it is said that a litigant may challenge a statute on its face only if it is vague in all its possible applications. Again, petitioners did not even attempt to show that PP 1017 is vague in all its application. They also failed to establish that men of common intelligence cannot understand the meaning and application of PP 1017. b. Constitutional Basis. The authority of the President to exercise his calling out power to suppress lawless violence shall not be deemed to include the power to authorize: (a) arrests and seizures without judicial warrants; (b) ban on public assemblies; (c) take-over of news media and agencies and press censorship; and (d) issuance of Presidential Decrees, as these powers can be exercised by the President as Commander-in-Chief only where there is a valid declaration of Martial Law or suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. - The take care power of the President, which includes the power to enforce obedience of laws shall not be deemed to include calling the military to enforce or implement certain laws, such as customs laws, laws governing family and property relations, laws on obligations and contracts and the like.- The ordinance power of the President shall not include the power to make “decrees” with the same force and effect as those issued by President Marcos.- In the absence of delegated authority from Congress, the authority of the President to declare a state of emergency shall not be deemed to include the power to temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest. - Acts of terrorism no matter how repulsive shall not be deemed to be punishable in the absence of legislation clearly defining said acts and providing specific punishments therefor.Reasoning Calling-out Power - The Constitution grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a “sequence” of graduated powers. These are: the calling-out power, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to declare Martial Law. The only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power is that “whenever it becomes necessary,” the President may call the armed forces “to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.” Considering the circumstances then prevailing, President Arroyo found it necessary to issue PP 1017. Owing to her Office’s vast intelligence network, she is in the best position to determine the actual condition of the country.- Under the calling-out power, the President may summon the armed forces to aid him in suppressing lawless violence, invasion and rebellion. This involves ordinary police action. But every act that goes beyond the President’s calling-out power is considered illegal or ultra vires. For this reason, a President must be careful in the exercise of his powers. He cannot invoke a greater power when he wishes to act under a lesser power. There lies the wisdom of our Constitution, the greater the power, the greater are the limitations.- It is pertinent to state, however, that there is a distinction between the President’s authority to declare a “state of rebellion” (in Sanlakas) and the authority to proclaim a state of national emergency. While President Arroyo’s authority to declare a “state of rebellion” emanates from her powers as Chief Executive, the statutory authority cited in Sanlakas was Section 4, Chapter 2, Book II of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, which provides:

SEC. 4. – Proclamations. – Acts of the President fixing a date or declaring a status or condition of public moment or interest, upon the existence of which the operation of a specific law or regulation is made to depend, shall be promulgated in proclamations which shall have the force of an executive order.

- President Arroyo’s declaration of a “state of rebellion” was merely an act declaring a status or condition of public moment or interest, a declaration

allowed under Section 4 cited above. Such declaration, in the words of Sanlakas, is harmless, without legal significance, and deemed not written. In these cases, PP 1017 is more than that. In declaring a state of national emergency, President Arroyo did not only rely on Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, a provision calling on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. She also relied on Section 17, Article XII, a provision on the State’s extraordinary power to take over privately-owned public utility and business affected with public interest. Indeed, PP 1017 calls for the exercise of an awesome power. Obviously, such Proclamation cannot be deemed harmless, without legal significance, or not written, as in the case of Sanlakas.- Some of the petitioners vehemently maintain that PP 1017 is actually a declaration of Martial Law. It is no so. What defines the character of PP 1017 are its wordings. It is plain therein that what the President invoked was her calling-out power.- In his “Statement before the Senate Committee on Justice” on March 13, 2006, Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza said that of the three powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief, the power to declare Martial Law poses the most severe threat to civil liberties. It is a strong medicine which should not be resorted to lightly. It cannot be used to stifle or persecute critics of the government. It is placed in the keeping of the President for the purpose of enabling him to secure the people from harm and to restore order so that they can enjoy their individual freedoms. - Justice Mendoza also stated that PP 1017 is not a declaration of Martial Law. It is no more than a call by the President to the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence. As such, it cannot be used to justify acts that only under a valid declaration of Martial Law can be done. Its use for any other purpose is a perversion of its nature and scope, and any act done contrary to its command is ultra vires. Specifically, (a) arrests and seizures without judicial warrants; (b) ban on public assemblies; (c) take-over of news media and agencies and press censorship; and (d) issuance of Presidential Decrees, are powers which can be exercised by the President as Commander-in-Chief only where there is a valid declaration of Martial Law or suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. - Based on the above disquisition, it is clear that PP 1017 is not a declaration of Martial Law. It is merely an exercise of President Arroyo’s calling-out power for the armed forces to assist her in preventing or suppressing lawless violence. “Take Care” Power- The second provision of PP 1017 pertains to the power of the President to ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. This is based on Section 17, Article VII which reads:

SEC. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.

- As the Executive in whom the executive power is vested, [115] the primary function of the President is to enforce the laws as well as to formulate policies to be embodied in existing laws. He sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of his department. Before assuming office, he is required to take an oath or affirmation to the effect that as President of the Philippines, he will, among others, “execute its laws.” [116] In the exercise of such function, the President, if needed, may employ the powers attached to his office as the Commander-in-Chief of all the armed forces of the country, [117]

including the Philippine National Police[118] under the Department of Interior and Local Government.[119]

Is it within the domain of President Arroyo to promulgate “decrees”? - PP 1017 states in part: “to enforce obedience to all the laws and decrees x x x promulgated by me personally or upon my direction.” - The President is granted an Ordinance Power under Chapter 2, Book III of Executive Order No. 292 (Administrative Code of 1987), which allows her to issue executive orders, administrative orders, proclamations, memorandum

orders/circulars, general or special orders. President Arroyo’s ordinance power is limited to the foregoing issuances. She cannot issue decrees similar to those issued by Former President Marcos under PP 1081. Presidential Decrees are laws which are of the same category and binding force as statutes because they were issued by the President in the exercise of his legislative power during the period of Martial Law under the 1973 Constitution.[121] - The assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants President Arroyo the authority to promulgate “decrees.” Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Section 1, Article VI categorically states that “[t]he legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.” To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify President Arroyo’s exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees. Can President Arroyo enforce obedience to all decrees and laws through the military? - As this Court stated earlier, President Arroyo has no authority to enact decrees. It follows that these decrees are void and, therefore, cannot be enforced. With respect to “laws,” she cannot call the military to enforce or implement certain laws, such as customs laws, laws governing family and property relations, laws on obligations and contracts and the like. She can only order the military, under PP 1017, to enforce laws pertinent to its duty to suppress lawless violence.

Power to Take Over The pertinent provision of PP 1017 states:x x x and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders, and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction; and as provided in Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution do hereby declare a state of national emergency.

- The import of this provision is that President Arroyo, during the state of national emergency under PP 1017, can call the military not only to enforce obedience “to all the laws and to all decrees x x x” but also to act pursuant to the provision of Section 17, Article XII which reads:

Sec. 17. In times of national emergency, when the public interest so requires, the State may, during the emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest.

What could be the reason of President Arroyo in invoking the above provision when she issued PP 1017? - During the existence of the state of national emergency, PP 1017 purports to grant the President, without any authority or delegation from Congress, to take over or direct the operation of any privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest.- This provision was first introduced in the 1973 Constitution. In effect at the time of its approval was President Marcos’ Letter of Instruction No. 2 dated September 22, 1972 instructing the Secretary of National Defense to take over “the management, control and operation of the Manila Electric Company, the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority, the Philippine National Railways, the Philippine Air Lines, Air Manila (and) Filipinas Orient Airways . . . for the successful prosecution by the Government of its effort to contain, solve and end the present national emergency.” - Petitioners, particularly the members of the House of Representatives, claim that President Arroyo’s inclusion of Section 17, Article XII in PP 1017 is an encroachment on the legislature’s emergency powers. - A distinction must be drawn between the President’s authority to declare “a state of national emergency” and to exercise emergency powers. To the first,

Section 18, Article VII grants the President such power, hence, no legitimate constitutional objection can be raised. But to the second, manifold constitutional issues arise. - Section 23, Article VI of the Constitution reads:

SEC. 23. (1) The Congress, by a vote of two-thirds of both Houses in joint session assembled, voting separately, shall have the sole power to declare the existence of a state of war.(2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof.

- It may be pointed out that the second paragraph of the above provision refers not only to war but also to “other national emergency.” If the intention of the Framers of our Constitution was to withhold from the President the authority to declare a “state of national emergency” pursuant to Section 18, Article VII (calling-out power) and grant it to Congress (like the declaration of the existence of a state of war), then the Framers could have provided so. Clearly, they did not intend that Congress should first authorize the President before he can declare a “state of national emergency.” Therefore, President Arroyo could validly declare the existence of a state of national emergency even in the absence of a Congressional enactment. - But the exercise of emergency powers, such as the taking over of privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest, is a different matter. This requires a delegation from Congress. - Constitutional provisions in pari materia are to be construed together. Otherwise stated, different clauses, sections, and provisions of a constitution which relate to the same subject matter will be construed together and considered in the light of each other. [123] Considering that Section 17 of Article XII and Section 23 of Article VI relate to national emergencies, they must be read together to determine the limitation of the exercise of emergency powers. - Generally, Congress is the repository of emergency powers. This is evident in the tenor of Section 23 (2), Article VI authorizing it to delegate such powers to the President. Certainly, a body cannot delegate a power not reposed upon it. However, knowing that during grave emergencies, it may not be possible or practicable for Congress to meet and exercise its powers, the Framers of our Constitution deemed it wise to allow Congress to grant emergency powers to the President, subject to certain conditions, thus:

(1) There must be a war or other emergency. (2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by Congress.[124]

- Section 17, Article XII must be understood as an aspect of the emergency powers clause. The taking over of private business affected with public interest is just another facet of the emergency powers generally reposed upon Congress. Thus, when Section 17 states that the “the State may, during the emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest,” it refers to Congress, not the President. Now, whether or not the President may exercise such power is dependent on whether Congress may delegate it to him pursuant to a law prescribing the reasonable terms thereof. - Emergency, as a generic term, connotes the existence of conditions suddenly intensifying the degree of existing danger to life or well-being beyond that which is accepted as normal. Implicit in this definitions are the elements of intensity, variety, and perception. Emergencies, as perceived by legislature or executive in the United Sates since 1933, have been occasioned by a wide range of situations, classifiable under three (3) principal heads: a) economic, b) natural disaster,[129] and c) national security.- “Emergency,” as contemplated in our Constitution, is of the same breadth. It

may include rebellion, economic crisis, pestilence or epidemic, typhoon, flood, or other similar catastrophe of nationwide proportions or effect. [131] This is evident in the Records of the Constitutional Commission. - Following our interpretation of Section 17, Article XII, invoked by President Arroyo in issuing PP 1017, this Court rules that such Proclamation does not authorize her during the emergency to temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest without authority from Congress. - Let it be emphasized that while the President alone can declare a state of national emergency, however, without legislation, he has no power to take over privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest. The President cannot decide whether exceptional circumstances exist warranting the take over of privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest. Nor can he determine when such exceptional circumstances have ceased. Likewise, without legislation, the President has no power to point out the types of businesses affected with public interest that should be taken over. In short, the President has no absolute authority to exercise all the powers of the State under Section 17, Article VII in the absence of an emergency powers act passed by Congress. c. Applied Challenge. The Court shall not declare laws as invalid solely on the basis of their misapplication or abuse or susceptibility to abuse by the people tasked to implement them. - The arrest of Randy David and other acts done by the authorities pursuant to the parts of the laws herein considered unconstitutional are also deemed unconstitutional without prejudice to the filing of necessary administrative, criminal or civil actions against specific abuses committed by authorities.ReasoningCan this Court adjudge as unconstitutional PP 1017 and G.O. No 5 on the basis of these illegal acts? In general, does the illegal implementation of a law render it unconstitutional?- Settled is the rule that courts are not at liberty to declare statutes invalid although they may be abused and misabused[135] and may afford an opportunity for abuse in the manner of application.[136] The validity of a statute or ordinance is to be determined from its general purpose and its efficiency to accomplish the end desired, not from its effects in a particular case.[137] PP 1017 is merely an invocation of the President’s calling-out power. Its general purpose is to command the AFP to suppress all forms of lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. It had accomplished the end desired which prompted President Arroyo to issue PP 1021. But there is nothing in PP 1017 allowing the police, expressly or impliedly, to conduct illegal arrest, search or violate the citizens’ constitutional rights.- Now, may this Court adjudge a law or ordinance unconstitutional on the ground that its implementor committed illegal acts? The answer is no. The criterion by which the validity of the statute or ordinance is to be measured is the essential basis for the exercise of power, and not a mere incidental result arising from its exertion.[138] This is logical. - President Arroyo issued G.O. No. 5 to carry into effect the provisions of PP 1017. General orders are “acts and commands of the President in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.” They are internal rules issued by the executive officer to his subordinates precisely for the proper and efficient administration of law. Such rules and regulations create no relation except between the official who issues them and the official who receives them.[139] They are based on and are the product of, a relationship in which power is their source, and obedience, their object. [140] For these reasons, one requirement for these rules to be valid is that they must be reasonable, not arbitrary or capricious. - G.O. No. 5 mandates the AFP and the PNP to immediately carry out the “necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of terrorism and lawless violence.” - Unlike the term “lawless violence,” the phrase “acts of terrorism” is still an amorphous and vague concept. Congress has yet to enact a law defining and punishing acts of terrorism.- The absence of a law defining “acts of terrorism” may result in abuse and

oppression on the part of the police or military. - So far, the word “terrorism” appears only once in our criminal laws, i.e., in P.D. No. 1835 dated January 16, 1981 enacted by President Marcos during the Martial Law regime. - P.D. No. 1835 was repealed by E.O. No. 167 (which outlaws the Communist Party of the Philippines) enacted by President Corazon Aquino on May 5, 1985. These two (2) laws, however, do not define “acts of terrorism.” Since there is no law defining “acts of terrorism,” it is President Arroyo alone, under G.O. No. 5, who has the discretion to determine what acts constitute terrorism. Her judgment on this aspect is absolute, without restrictions. Consequently, there can be indiscriminate arrest without warrants, breaking into offices and residences, taking over the media enterprises, prohibition and dispersal of all assemblies and gatherings unfriendly to the administration. All these can be effected in the name of G.O. No. 5. These acts go far beyond the calling-out power of the President. Certainly, they violate the due process clause of the Constitution. Thus, this Court declares that the “acts of terrorism” portion of G.O. No. 5 is unconstitutional.

VALIDITY OF SPECIFIC ACTS CONDUCTED BY AUTHORITIES PURSUANT TO PP 1017 AND G.O. NO. 5 - In the Brief Account[144] submitted by petitioner David, certain facts are established: first, he was arrested without warrant; second, the PNP operatives arrested him on the basis of PP 1017; third, he was brought at Camp Karingal, Quezon City where he was fingerprinted, photographed and booked like a criminal suspect; fourth, he was treated brusquely by policemen who “held his head and tried to push him” inside an unmarked car; fifth, he was charged with Violation of Batas Pambansa No. 880[145] and Inciting to Sedition; sixth, he was detained for seven (7) hours; and seventh, he was eventually released for insufficiency of evidence. - The Constitution enunciates the general rule that no person shall be arrested without warrant. The recognized exceptions are in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

- Neither of the two (2) exceptions mentioned above justifies petitioner David’s warrantless arrest. During the inquest for the charges of inciting to sedition and violation of BP 880, all that the arresting officers could invoke was their observation that some rallyists were wearing t-shirts with the invective “Oust Gloria Now” and their erroneous assumption that petitioner David was the leader of the rally.[146] Consequently, the Inquest Prosecutor ordered his immediate release on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. He noted that petitioner David was not wearing the subject t-shirt and even if he was wearing it, such fact is insufficient to charge him with inciting to sedition. Further, he also stated that there is insufficient evidence for the charge of violation of BP 880 as it was not even known whether petitioner David was the leader of the rally.[147] - But what made it doubly worse for petitioners David et al. is that not only was their right against warrantless arrest violated, but also their right to peaceably assemble.- “Assembly” under Art. III, Sec. 2 of the Constitution means a right on the part of the citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs. It is a necessary consequence of our republican institution and complements the right of speech. This right is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that Congress has a right to prevent. In other words, the right to assemble is not subject to previous restraint or censorship. It may not be conditioned upon the prior issuance of a permit or authorization from the government authorities except,

of course, if the assembly is intended to be held in a public place, a permit for the use of such place, and not for the assembly itself, may be validly required. - The ringing truth here is that petitioner David, et al. were arrested while they were exercising their right to peaceful assembly. They were not committing any crime, neither was there a showing of a clear and present danger that warranted the limitation of that right. As can be gleaned from circumstances, the charges of inciting to sedition and violation of BP 880 were mere afterthought. Even the Solicitor General, during the oral argument, failed to justify the arresting officers’ conduct. - On the basis of the above principles, the Court likewise considers the dispersal and arrest of the members of KMU et al. (G.R. No. 171483) unwarranted. Their dispersal was done merely on the basis of Malacañang’s directive canceling all permits previously issued by local government units. This is arbitrary. The wholesale cancellation of all permits to rally is a blatant disregard of the principle that “freedom of assembly is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the State has a right to prevent.”[149] Tolerance is the rule and limitation is the exception. Only upon a showing that an assembly presents a clear and present danger that the State may deny the citizens’ right to exercise it.With the blanket revocation of permits, the distinction between protected and unprotected assemblies was eliminated. - Moreover, under BP 880, the authority to regulate assemblies and rallies is lodged with the local government units. They have the power to issue permits and to revoke such permits after due notice and hearing on the determination of the presence of clear and present danger. Here, petitioners were not even notified and heard on the revocation of their permits. The first time they learned of it was at the time of the dispersal. Such absence of notice is a fatal defect. When a person’s right is restricted by government action, it behooves a democratic government to see to it that the restriction is fair, reasonable, and according to procedure.- G.R. No. 171409, (Cacho-Olivares, et al.) presents another facet of freedom of speech i.e., the freedom of the press. Petitioners’ narration of facts, which the Solicitor General failed to refute, established the following: first, the Daily Tribune’s offices were searched without warrant; second, the police operatives seized several materials for publication; third, the search was conducted at about 1:00 o’ clock in the morning of February 25, 2006; fourth, the search was conducted in the absence of any official of the Daily Tribune except the security guard of the building; and fifth, policemen stationed themselves at the vicinity of the Daily Tribune offices. - Thereafter, a wave of warning came from government officials. Presidential Chief of Staff Michael Defensor was quoted as saying that such raid was “meant to show a ‘strong presence,’ to tell media outlets not to connive or do anything that would help the rebels in bringing down this government.” Director General Lomibao further stated that “if they do not follow the standards –and the standards are if they would contribute to instability in the government, or if they do not subscribe to what is in General Order No. 5 and Proc. No. 1017 – we will recommend a ‘takeover.’” National Telecommunications Commissioner Ronald Solis urged television and radio networks to “cooperate” with the government for the duration of the state of national emergency. He warned that his agency will not hesitate to recommend the closure of any broadcast outfit that violates rules set out for media coverage during times when the national security is threatened.- The search is illegal. Rule 126, Section 4 of The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure requires that a search warrant be issued upon probable cause in connection with one specific offence to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. Section 8 mandates that the search of a house, room, or any other premise be made in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of his family or in the absence of the latter, in the presence of two (2) witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality. And Section 9 states that the warrant must direct that it be served in the daytime, unless the property is on the person or in the place

ordered to be searched, in which case a direction may be inserted that it be served at any time of the day or night. All these rules were violated by the CIDG operatives. - Not only that, the search violated petitioners’ freedom of the press. The best gauge of a free and democratic society rests in the degree of freedom enjoyed by its media. In the Burgos v. Chief of Staff[152] this Court held that --

As heretofore stated, the premises searched were the business and printing offices of the "Metropolitan Mail" and the "We Forum” newspapers. As a consequence of the search and seizure, these premises were padlocked and sealed, with the further result that the printing and publication of said newspapers were discontinued.Such closure is in the nature of previous restraint or censorship abhorrent to the freedom of the press guaranteed under the fundamental law, and constitutes a virtual denial of petitioners' freedom to express themselves in print. This state of being is patently anathematic to a democratic framework where a free, alert and even militant press is essential for the political enlightenment and growth of the citizenry.

- While admittedly, the Daily Tribune was not padlocked and sealed like the “Metropolitan Mail” and “We Forum” newspapers in the above case, yet it cannot be denied that the CIDG operatives exceeded their enforcement duties. The search and seizure of materials for publication, the stationing of policemen in the vicinity of the The Daily Tribune offices, and the arrogant warning of government officials to media, are plain censorship. It is that officious functionary of the repressive government who tells the citizen that he may speak only if allowed to do so, and no more and no less than what he is permitted to say on pain of punishment should he be so rash as to disobey.[153] Undoubtedly, the The Daily Tribune was subjected to these arbitrary intrusions because of its anti-government sentiments. This Court cannot tolerate the blatant disregard of a constitutional right even if it involves the most defiant of our citizens. Freedom to comment on public affairs is essential to the vitality of a representative democracy. It is the duty of the courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments thereon. The motto should always be obsta principiis.[154] - Incidentally, during the oral arguments, the Solicitor General admitted that the search of the Tribune’s offices and the seizure of its materials for publication and other papers are illegal; and that the same are inadmissible “for any purpose,” - The Court has passed upon the constitutionality of these issuances. Suffice it to reiterate that PP 1017 is limited to the calling out by the President of the military to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. When in implementing its provisions, pursuant to G.O. No. 5, the military and the police committed acts which violate the citizens’ rights under the Constitution, this Court has to declare such acts unconstitutional and illegal. - In this connection, Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban’s concurring opinion, attached hereto, is considered an integral part of this ponencia.

Decision- WHEREFORE, the Petitions are partly granted. The Court rules that PP 1017 is CONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it constitutes a call by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence. However, the provisions of PP 1017 commanding the AFP to enforce laws not related to lawless violence, as well as decrees promulgated by the President, are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. In addition, the provision in PP 1017 declaring national emergency under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution is CONSTITUTIONAL, but such declaration does not authorize the President to take over privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest without prior legislation. - G.O. No. 5 is CONSTITUTIONAL since it provides a standard by which the AFP and the PNP should implement PP 1017, i.e. whatever is “necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of

lawless violence.” Considering that “acts of terrorism” have not yet been defined and made punishable by the Legislature, such portion of G.O. No. 5 is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. - The warrantless arrest of Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas; the dispersal and warrantless arrest of the KMU and NAFLU-KMU members during their rallies, in the absence of proof that these petitioners were committing acts constituting lawless violence, invasion or rebellion and violating BP 880; the imposition of standards on media or any form of prior restraint on the press, as well as the warrantless search of the Tribune offices and whimsical seizure of its articles for publication and other materials, are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

BAUTISTA V SALONGAPADILLA; April 13, 1989

FACTS- Petition for certiorari to review decision of Commission on Appointments- Pres designated petitioner Mary Concepcion Bautista as Acting Chair of CHR, who took oath of office before CJ Fernan. She discharged functions/duties of Chair of CHR.- Bautista rcvd letter fr Sec of Commission on Appointments requesting her to submit info and docs in connection w/ her confirmation as Chair of CHR.- Secretary again wrote to Bautista to request her presence at a meeting to deliberate on her appointment.- Bautista wrote to Chair of Commission on Appointments, saying why she considered Comm on Appointments as having no jurisdiction to review her appointment.- As conveyed in a letter to the Exec Secretary, Commission on Appointments disapproved Bautista’s “ad interim” appointment as Chair.- Bautista’s motion for reconsideration was denied.- A Manila Standard news item reported that Pres designated Mallillin as Acting Chair of CHR pending resolution of Bautista’s case.- Bautista filed this petition w/ prayer for issuance of restraining order to enjoin Commission of Appointments not to proceed w/ deliberation on her appointment.- Bautista filed amended petition for restraining order impleading Mallillin as respondent. She also filed ex-parte motion to stop Mallillin fr exercising fcns of Chair and fr demanding courtesy resignations fr officers.- Court issued TRO regarding Mallillin but not regarding Commission on Appointments, being instrumentality of coequal branch.- Bautista was extended by Pres to permanent appointment as Chair on Dec 17, 1988. This appointment was for Pres solely to make.

ISSUES1. WON appointment by Pres of Chair of Commission on Human Rights is to be w/ or w/o confirmation of Commission on Appointments2. WON Pres could extend another appointment to petitioner on Jan 14, 1989 an ad interin appointment or any other kind of appointment to same office of Chair of CHR that called for confirmation by Commission on Appointments.3. WON in appointments solely for Pres to make, the Pres can voluntarily submit such appointment to Commission on Appointment for confirmation.4. WON the petition has become moot and academic.HELD1. NO- CHR Chair position is not among positions mentioned in Sec 16 Art 12 of Consti. Therefore, appointment must be w/o review of Commission on Appointments.- Unlike Chair/Members of CSC, COMELEC and CoA, the position of CHR Chair does not have express provision that appointment should be with consent of Commission on Appointments.- Sec 2(c) of EO 163 says CHR Chair is among those w/c Pres is authorized by law to appoint.

2. NO- Bautista’s appointment on Dec 17, 1988 as Chair was a completed act on the part of the Pres.- No new appointment could be made to position already filled by a previously completed appointment, accepted by appointee through qualification and assumption of duties.- Even if Pres could submit to Commission on Appointments an appointment that belongs solely to her, still, there was no vacancy on Jan 14 1989.- Nor can respondents contend that the new appointment on Jan 14 was an ad interim appointment bec it does not apply to appointments solely for Pres to make. It extends only to those where review of Comm on Appointments is needed. That is why those types of appointments remain valid until disapproval by Commission on Appointments or until next adjournment of Congress.3. NO- To say otherwise is to say that Pres w/ Congress can from time to time move power boundaries in Consti.- Neither Exec nor Legislative can create power where Consti confers none. If Consti made appointment exclusive for Pres, Pres can’t grant power of participation in Commission on Appointments. Nor can Commission on Appointments create power to confirm appointments that Consti has reserved to Pres alone.4. NO- Respondent contends that w/ or w/o confirmation, Bautista can be removed fr office anytime at pleasure of Pres. And w/ disapproval of appointment/nomination by Commission on Appointments, there was greater reason for her removal. Thus, issue is moot and academic. SC disagrees and says petitioner came in timely manner and didn’t show intention of abandoning her petition.- EO 163 speaks of term of office (7 yrs without reappointment) while EO 163-A speaks of tenure in office (at pleasure of Pres). The diff bet term and tenure is impt. Consistent w/ CHR’s needed independence, tenure in office can’t be later made dependent on pleasure of Pres.Obiter- Sarmiento III V. Mison

- Issue: Which appointments under 1987 Consti are to be w/ and w/o review of Commission on Appointments?- Ratio: Only appointments mentioned in 1st sentence of Sec 16 Art VII are to be reviewed by Commission. Other appointments by President are to be made w/o participation of Commission.- Held: Appointment of Mison as Bureau of Customs head is valid.

- Marbury V. Madison- Ratio: Once appointment is made, Pres’ power over the office is terminated in all cases, where by law the officer is not removable by him.

Decision Petition is granted; TRO is made permanent against Mallillin; Petitioner Bautista is lawful Chair of CHR, she may be removed only for cause.Gutierrez Jr., Dissenting OpinionCruz, DissentingGriño-Aquino, Dissenting

SARMIENTO V MISONPADILLA; December 17, 1987

FACTS- Petitioners Sarmiento and Arcilla who are taxpayers, lawyers, members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and Constitutional Law professors seeks to enjoin Salvador Mison from performing the functions as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs. In addition, they would want to enjoin Budget Secretary Guillermo Carague from disbursing Mison’s salary and emoluments. The grounds for the petition was that Mison’s stay in Office is unconstitutional as there was no confirmation coming from the Commission on Appointments that

is “required” by the Constitution. The Commission on Appointments was allowed to intervene in the court proceeding.- The case was considered justiciable given that there is great public interest such as the need for stability in public service. This disposed the question of whether this is the proper remedy to question respondents right to the Office of the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and also that of the legal standing of the petitioners. - The Constitutional Provision under careful examination is Article VII Section 16, which states that: “The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of the departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.”

ISSUEWON Mison’s stay in Office was Constitutional

HELD- Yes it is constitutional.- Reading Article VII Section 16 there are 4 groups of officers who the President is able to appoint. The first group would be the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. The second group is composed of those officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law. The third group are those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint. Lastly, the fourth group, are those officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone.- To interpret the law the Justices went back in history to look at the previous constitutions, the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions. In the 1935 Constitution all appointments is subject to the approval of the Commission on Appointments while this was removed in the 1973 Constitution wherein the President is able to appoint without the need for the approval of the Commission on Appointments. Both were problematic as the 1935 provision became a venue of “horse-trading” (used for political leverage) while the 1973 provision gave too much power to the President. The court held that the 1987 provision on appointment was the middle ground that was sought by the 1986 Constitutional Commission. - Looking through the records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission they said that the clear and positive intent of the framers were to make those officers in the first sentence the individuals that are subject to the approval and confirmation of the Commission on Appointments while those on the second and third sentence need not seek such confirmation. Given that the position as the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is not under those specified in the first sentence but the second, therefore petitioner Mison is not in need of the approval of the Commission on Appointments and thus should be able to exercise full authority and functions and be entitled to his salary and emoluments. Decision Petition DISMISSED.Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Bidin, Cortes, Teehankee, Melencio-Herrera, Sarmiento- concurring (11)Gutierrez, Cruz- dissenting (2)

SEPARATE OPINION

CRUZ [dissent]

There is a need to look at the provision in its entirety. The focus of the records was merely on the first sentence of the provision and the not on the following sentences. Those are crucial given that the position in question falls under the latter. Also, the records of the Constitutional Commission are merely extrinsic aids and are at best persuasive only and not necessarily conclusive. In addition, strictly interpreting the third sentence may create an absurdity for it gives Congress the discretion of not creating a law that would give the President the power to appoint those who are lower in rank. An irony arises when those in a lower position require the approval of the Commission on Appointments while those who are higher in position would not.

PIMENTEL V ERMITACARPIO; October 13, 2005

FACTS- 7/26/2004: Congress commenced their regular session - 8/25/2004: The Commission on Appointments (composed of members of Congress) was constituted

+ meanwhile, GMA issued appointments to respondents as acting secretaries of their respective departments:Arthur Yap (DOA), Alberto Romulo (DFA), Raul Gonzales (DOJ), Florencio Abad (DOE) Avelino Cruz (DND),Rene Villa (DAR), Joseph Durano (DOT), Mike Defensor (DENR)+ the aforementioned respondents took their oaths of office and assumed their duties as acting secretaries

- 9/8/2004: a group of senators, headed by Sen. Pimentel, filed this present petition for certiorari and prohibition, praying for a writ of preliminary injunction to declare these appointments by GMA unconstitutional- 9/23/2004: GMA issued ad interim (temporary) appointments, replacing respondents’ acting capacity- Sol Gen argues

+ petition is moot because GMA had issued the ad interim appointments after the recess of Congress; prohibition may not enjoin acts already done.+ the power to appoint is executive in nature—the Commission of Appointments, though it be composed of members of Congress, is a body independent of Congress, and its executive power emanates from the Consti.+ only Senators Enrile, Lacson, Angara, Ejercito-Estrada and Osmena, as members of the Commission, possess standing in the present petition.

- Petitioners’ Argument+ petitioners assert that GMA cannot issue such appointments because no law grants such a powerS10 Ch2 B4, EO 292: “…in case of a vacancy in the Office of a Secretary, it is only an Undersecretary who can be designated as Acting Secretary…”+ while Congress is in session, no appointments can be made w/o the consent of the Commission

Respondents’ Argument:-respondents assert that GMA can issue such appointments for the reason that no law prohibits itS16 Ch5 T1 B3, EO 292: “The Pres. shall exercise the power to appoint such officials as provided by…the law”S17 Ch5 T1 B3, EO 292: the Pres. may appoint an officer already in service or any other competent person

ISSUEWON GMA’s appointment of respondents as acting secretaries w/o the consent of the Commission of Appointments while Congress is in session is unconstitutional

HELD- the court held that the President may make such appointments, as the law expressly provides it

S17 Ch5 Title 1 Book 3, EO 292: “… the President may temporarily designate an officer already in the government service or any other competent person to perform the function of an office in the executive branch…”

- EO 292 applies to appointments vested in the President by law—Congress is not the only source of law

S17(3) of the previous provision states: “In no case shall a temporary designation exceed one (1) year.” Petitioners fail to consider that this provision acts as a safeguard against the abuse of such appointments

- a department secretary is considered an alter ego of the President, that is, it holds a position of great trust and confidence. Hence, Congress cannot impose that the undersecretary automatically be appointed—the Pres. must appoint an alter ego of her choice.

J. Bernas, SJ.: “acting appointments may be extended any time there is a vacancy; ad interim appointments are extended only during a recess of Congress and require submission to the Commission of Appointments for approval or rejection.”

- notwithstanding Bernas’ textbook definition, the court finds no abuse of appointments in the present case as such were issued immediately upon the recess of Congress, way before the lapse of one year.Decision Petition DISMISSED

MATIBAG V BENIPAYOCARPIO; April 2, 2002

FACTS- The Case: Petition for Prohibition w/ prayer for a writ of prelim injunction and TRO. Petitioner questions the appointment and the right of respondents to remain in office as Chairman and Commissioners of the COMELEC- On Feb.2, 1999, Petitioner Ma. Angelina Matibag was appointed by the COMELEC en banc as “Acting Director IV” of the Education and Information Dept. (EID), her appointment was renewed on Feb 15, 2000 in a “Temporary” capacity and renewed yet again on Feb 15, 2001 in the same “Temporary” capacity. - On March 22, 2001 PGMA appointed ad interim, respondents Alfredo Benipayo as COMELEC Chairman and Resurreccion Borra, and Florentino Tuason as COMELEC commissioners respectively, for a term of 7 years, expiring on Feb. 2, 2008. They took their oaths and assumed their positions with the President submitting their ad interim appointments to the Commission on Appointments on May 22, 2001 for confirmation. The Commission on Appointments, however, did not act on their appointments. - On June 1, 2001, PGMA renewed their ad interim appointments with the term and the expiration remaining the same (for 7 years and expiring on Feb 2, 2008). The new appointees took oath a 2nd time and the same was transmitted to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation on June 5, 2001. The Congress adjourned before the Commission could act on the appointments resulting in the renewal of their ad interim appointments by the President for the 3rd time on June 8, 2001. - Benipayo, acting as COMELEC chairman, assigned a Velma Cinco as officer-in-charge of EID and reassigned petitioner to the Law Dept, a move which she requested reconsideration for, citing Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular no. 7 (transfer of employees prohibited during election period: Jan.2-June 13, 2001). Benipayo denied the request and citing COMELEC Resolution no. 3300. Petitioner appealed to the COMELEC, filed an administrative and criminal complaint with the Law Dept against Benipayo and while the complaint was pending, she also filed this action. She claims that ad interim

appointments violate the constitutional provisions on the independence of the COMELEC, and on temporary appointments and reappointments of its Chairman and members. Petitioner also assails her reassignment to the Law Dept, the appointment of Cinco as well as the disbursements made by the COMELEC Finance Services Dept officer by way of salaries and emoluments in favor of respondents. - PGMA, on Sept. 6, 2001 renewed once again the ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason for a term of 7 years expiring on Feb. 2, 2008. ISSUE1. WON Benipayo’s ad interim appointment and assumption of office as COMELEC chairman is constitutional 2. WON issue is justiciable3. If Benipayo, Borra and Tuason were indeed appointed lawfully, WON the renewal of their appointments and subsequent assumption of office was constitutional4. WON petitioner’s removal and reassignment is illegal (done w/o approval of the COMELEC as a collegial body)5. WON the Officer-in-charge of COMELEC Finance Services Dept, in making disbursements in favor of the new appointees, acted in excess of jurisdiction.

HELD1. An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment made by the Pres. in the meantime that Congress is in recess. It is not an appointment in a temporary or acting capacity. It takes effect immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the Pres. once the appointee has qualified into office. The fact that it is subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does not alter its permanent character. Reasoning- Although the last sentence of Art IX-C Sec 1(2) of the Constitution says, “In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity,” an ad interim appointment is not a temporary appointment. A distinction was made between the two in Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila v IAC, where it was held that an ad interim appointment as defined in Black’s Law Dictionary is one that is appointed to fill a vacancy, or to discharge the duties of the office during the absence or temporary incapacity of its regular incumbent. But such is not the meaning nor the use intended in the context of Phil. law. Ad interim is used to denote the manner in which said appointments were made, that is, done by the President, in the meantime, while the body, which is originally vested with the power or appointment, is unable to act. - Although the 1935 Consti did not have the provision prohibiting temporary or acting appointments, this Court then decided such an appointment in Nacionalista Party v Bautista as unconstitutional declaring that, “It would be more in keeping with the intent, purpose and aim of the framers of the Constitution to appoint a permanent Commissioner than to designate one to act temporarily. Likewise, In Brillantes v Yorac, decided under the present Constitution, this Court struck down as unconstitutional the designation by then Pres. Aquino of Haydee Yorac as Acting Chairperson of the COMELEC. - Art. IX-A §1 should be harmonized with Art. VII §16. for to hold that the independence of the COMELEC requires the Commission on Appointments to first confirm ad interim appointments before the appointees can assume office will negate the President’s power to make ad interim appointments. - The original draft of Art. VII §16 did not provide for ad interim appointments, however, it was reinstated to avoid interruptions in vital govt services that would result from prolonged vacancies in govt offices. The ad interim appointment has since been practiced by Presidents Aquino, Ramos and Estrada. 2. Justiciability of the case: The Court determined the justiciability of the case by tackling the requisites of judicial review raised by the respondents which they claimed to be lacking (actual case/controversy was not raised)

> personal and substantial interest of the party

Petitioner has a personal and material stake in the resolution of the case. If Benipayo’s appointment is unlawful, petitioner’s reassignment is without legal basis; if it is lawful, then she has no cause to complain provided that it was done in accordance with the Civil Service Law. Because of her personal and material stake in the resolution of the constitutionality of respondent’s assumption of office, she has locus standi to raise it as a constitutional issue

> exercise of judicial review must be pleaded at the earliest opportunityIt is not the date of filing of the petition that determines whether the constitutional issue was raised at the earliest opportunity. The earliest opportunity to raise a constitutional issue is to raise it in the pleadings before a competent court that can resolve the same, such that, “if it is not raised in the pleadings, it cannot be considered at the trial, and if not considered at the trial, it cannot be considered on appeal.”Petitioner questioned the constitutionality of the ad interim appointments when she filed her petition before this Court, which is the earliest opportunity for pleading the constitutional issue before a competent body.

> the constitutional issue must be the lis mota of the caseThe Respondents claim that the legality of petitioner’s reassignment from the EID to the Law Dept. is the issue. The Court, however, held that unless the constitutionality of Benipayo’s appointment is determined, the legality of petitioner’s assignment cannot be determined, therefore the lis mota of this case is clearly the constitutional issue raised by petitioner.

3. The phrase “without reappointment” in Art. IX-C §1(2) applies only to appointments by the President and confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, regardless of WoN such person appointed completes the term of office. Reasoning The phrase “without reappointment” does not apply to the renewal of appointments to Benipayo, Tuason and Borra because there were no previous appointments that were confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. - The renewal of their appointments was by-passed by the Commission on Appointments. It was not acted upon on the merits at the close of the session of Congress. There was no final decision by the Commission on Appointments to give or withhold its consent to the appointment as required by the Constitution. It is therefore neither fixed nor an unexpired term. Absent such decision, the President is free to renew the ad interim appointment of a by-passed appointee as recognized in Sec.17 of the Rules of the Commission on Appointments. Moreover, their appointments were all for a fixed term expiring on Feb. 2, 2008, clearly not in breach of the 7 year term limit. 4. The COMELEC Chairman is the official expressly authorized by law to transfer or reassign COMELEC personnel and the person holding that office, in a de jure capacity, is Benipayo. He has full authority to exercise all the powers of that office for so long as his ad interim appointment remains effective. Moreover, in COMELEC Resolution no. 3300, the COMELEC en banc, approved the transfer or reassignment of COMELEC personnel during the election period. 5. Because Benipayo is held to be the lawful COMELEC chairman, the Officer-in-Charge did not act in excess of his jurisdiction, in the disbursement of their salaries.Decision Petition is dismissed for lack of merit. Concurred with by JJs: Davide, Bellosillo, Melo, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, De Leon, and Sandoval-Gutierrez.Puno and Vitug, JJs, were on official leave.

Consti Provisions cited:Art. IX-A §1 The Consti Commissions… COMELEC… shall be independentArt. IX-C §1(2) Nature and term of appointment of Comelec chairman and commissioner: (7 years w/o reappointment). In no case shall there be appointment in a temporary or acting capacity.

Art. VII §16 power of Pres. to make appointments during recess of Congress… effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress.

CONSTANTINO V CUISATINGA; October 13, 2005

FACTS- This Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus assails said contracts which were entered into pursuant to the Philippine Comprehensive Financing Program for 1992. It seeks to enjoin respondents from executing additional debt-relief contracts pursuant thereto.- The Financing Program was devised under President Corazon Aquino to manage the country’s external debt problem through a negotiation-oriented debt strategy by means of two debt-relief options: 1) cash buyback of portions of the Philippine foreign debt at a discount, or 2) allowed creditors to convert existing Philippine debt instruments into bonds/securities.- Petitioners challenge the Program as follows:

1. That it is beyond the powers granted to the President under Section 20, Article VII of the Constitution:

The President may contract or guarantee foreign loans in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines…That buyback and securitization/bond conversion schemes are neither “loans” nor “guarantees,” and hence, beyond the power of the President.

2. That assuming the above as constitutionally permissible, it is only the President who may exercise the power to enter into these contract and such power may not be delegated.3. That the Program was made available for debts fraudulently contracted or void. Petitioners rely on 1992 Commission on Audit report identifying several “behest” loans contracted or guaranteed fraudulently during the Marcos regime. That since these were eligible for buyback or conversion, they would be void for being waivers of the Republic’s right to repudiate the void or fraudulently contracted loans.

- For their part, respondents dispute the points raised by petitioners. They also question the standing of petitioners and the justiciability of the issues presented.

ISSUESProcedural1. WON the petitioners have locus standi.2. WON the case is ripe for adjudicationSubstantive3. WON the scope of section 20, Article VII includes bond-conversion and buyback4. WON the power to incur foreign debts is expressly reserved by the Constitution in the person of the President and may not be delegated5. WON there has been grave abuse of discretion and violation of constitutional policies

HELD1. The Court’s cognizance of this petition will not only determine the validity or invalidity of the subject pre-termination (buyback) and bond-conversion of foreign debts but also create a precedent for other debts or debt-related contract executed or to be executed in behalf of the President by the Secretary of Finance. Seen in this light, the transcendental importance of the issues herein cannot be doubted.- Where constitutional issues are properly raised in the context of alleged facts, procedural questions acquire a relatively minor significance. By the very nature of the power wielded by the President, the effect of using this power on the economy, and the well-being in general of the Filipino nation, the Court

must set aside the procedural barrier of standing and rule on the justiciable issues presented by the parties.

2. The Court holds that some issues are not ripe for adjudication.One such issue raised by petitioners is the allegation that respondents waived the Philippines’ right to repudiate void and fraudulently contracted loans is not justiciable.- Records do not show whether the so-called behest loans were subject of the debt-relief contracts.- Moreover, asserting a right to repudiate void or fraudulently contracted loans begs the question of whether indeed particular loans are void or fraudulently contracted. Petitioners’ theory depends on a prior annulment or declaration of nullity of the pre-existing loans, which thus far have not been submitted to this Court. - As a final point, petitioners have no real basis to fret over a possible waiver of the right to repudiate void contracts. Respondents unequivocally assert that the Republic did not waive any such right, it having incorporated a “no-waiver” clause in the agreements.- Obiter Many advocates that the Republic should renege on obligations that are considered as “illegitimate.” However, such course of action would have adverse repercussions. Among the consequences is that the standard cross-default provisions in Philippine foreign loans may come into effect, in which case, default even in one loan would be ground for other creditors to declare default on other loans.- In any event, the discretion on the matter lies not with the Courts but with the executive.

3. On Bond-Conversion- An investor who purchases a bond is lending money to the issuer, and the bond represents the issuer’s contractual promise to pay interest and repay principal according to specific terms. The language of the Constitution is simple and clear as it is broad. It allows the President to contract and guarantee foreign loans. It makes no prohibition on the issuance of certain kinds of loans or distinctions as to which kinds of debt instruments are more onerous than others.- The only restriction that the Constitution provides aside from the prior concurrence of the Monetary Board, is that the loans must be subject to limitations provided by law. In this regard, it is noted RA 245 as amended by PD 142 entitled An Act Authorizing the Secretary of Finance to Borrow to Meet Public Expenditures Authorized by Law, and for Other Purposes, allows foreign loans to be contracted in the form of bonds thus:

… the Secretary of Finance, with the approval of the President… after consultation with the Monetary board, is authorized to borrow… and to issue therefore evidences of indebtedness… may be of the following types: Treasury bonds…

- Also under the foregoing provision, sovereign bonds may also be provided for the purchase, redemption, or refunding of nay obligation, either direct or guaranteed, of the Philippine Government.On the Buyback Scheme- It is true that in the separation of powers, it is Congress that manages the country’s coffers by virtue of its taxing and spending powers. However, the law-making authority has promulgated a law ordaining an automatic appropriations provision for debt servicing. The Court in Guingona v. Carague, held:

Debt service is not included in the General Appropriation Act, since authorization therefore already exists under RA 4860 and 245, as amended, and PD 1967. In the light of this subsisting authorization, Congress does not concern itself with details for implementation by the Executive. Upon such approval, Congress has spoken and cannot be said to have delegated its wisdom to the Executive.

- Specific legal authority for the buyback even without further action from Congress is established under Section 2 of RA 240 thus:

… the Secretary of Finance shall cause to be paid out of any moneys in the National Treasury not otherwise appropriated… any interest falling due, or accruing on any portion of the public debt authorized by law. He shall also cause to be paid out… the principal amount of any obligations which have matured… or, if redeemed prior to maturity, such portion of the face value as is prescribed by the terms and conditions under which such obligations were originally issued.

- Buyback is a necessary power which springs from the grant of the foreign borrowing power. Every statute is understood, by implication, to contain all such provisions as may be necessary to effectuate its object and purpose.- Also, the Constitution, as a rule, does not enumerate – let alone enumerate all – the acts which the President (or any other public officer) may not do, and the fact that the Constitution does not explicitly bar the President from exercising a power does not mean that he or she does not have that power.

4. The evident exigency of having the Secretary of Finance implement the decision of the President to execute the debt-relief contracts is made manifest by the fact that the process of establishing and executing strategy for managing the government’s debt is deep within the realm of the expertise of the Department of Finance. If the President were to personally exercise every aspect of the foreign borrowing power, this would negate the very existence of cabinet positions and the respective expertise which the holders thereof are accorded, and would unduly hamper the President’s effectivity in running the government.- Necessity thus gave birth to the doctrine of qualified political agency. Though the President is the Executive of the Government and no other, the heads of the executive department occupy political positions and hold office in an advisory capacity and should be of the President’s bosom confidence and alter ego in the matters of that department where the President is required by law to exercise authority subject to the direction of the President. And it is upon the Secretary of Finance as the alter ego of the President to deal with matters regarding the sound and efficient management of the financial resources of Government.- And although there are powers vested in the President that may not be delegated are only those that call for the supersedence of executive prerogatives over those exercised by co-equal branches of government, e.g. power to suspend the write of habeas corpus and proclaim martial law (Par. 3 Sec 11, Art VII) and the benign prerogative of mercy (Par. 6 Sec 11, Art VII), the power to contract or guarantee foreign debts does not fall within the same exceptional class.- Another important qualification is that the Secretary of Finance or any designated alter ego of the President is bound to secure the latter’s prior consent to or subsequent ratification of his acts. A lack of showing that President Aquino countermanded the acts of respondents leads us to conclude that the said acts carried presidential approval.

5. Petitioners cite an article by Jude Esguerra that under the Program a best case scenario would give a yield significantly lower than estimated by the Program and a worst case scenario where what can be gained in the best case is lesser than what can be lost in this worst case. In addition, petitioners postulate a more simple rescheduling agreement in place of the debt-relief package. Petitioners allege therefore that the Program violates constitutional state policies to promote a social order that will “ensure the prosperity and independence of the nation” and free “the people from poverty, foster social justice in all phases of national development,” and develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos.”- The Court held that the policies set by the Constitution as litanized are not a panacea that can annul every governmental act sought to be struck down. Insofar as the case at bar, the court can make no conclusion other than that respondents’ efforts were geared towards debt-relief with marked positive results and towards achieving the aforementioned constitutional policies.

SEPARATE OPINION

PANGANIBAN

- Indubitably, former President Aquino’s decision to honor outstanding debts of the Republic was purely an executive call; hence, beyond judicial scrutiny. For this reason, neither can respondents be faulted for implementing the Program executed pursuant to that constitutional executive policy.- Also, that petitioners question the legality of several foreign loans necessitates a review of the assailed contracts. Because the petitioners failed to substantiate the charges, the argument cannot be addressed. A determination of the validity of such allegations requires a review of factual matters. The Supreme Court is not a trier or facts. The proper action for petitioners is to file their petition in the lower courts, which had concurrent jurisdiction over the subject matter and which are better equipped to conduct a firsthand examination of factual evidence in support of their allegations. This notwithstanding, there is nothing in this decision to preclude the Department of Justice or the Office of the Ombudsman from initiating an investigation of the alleged fraudulent loans. Suppletorily, probable cause must be shown in order that prosecution may be brought to bear.

FREE TELEPHONE WORKERS V MINISTERFERNANDO; October 30, 1981

- Free Telephone Workers Union, herein petitioner, attacks the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa Blg. 13036 (BP 130) in so far as it amends Art. 264 of the Labor Code delegating to the Minister of Labor and Employment the power and discretion to assume jurisdiction and/or certify strikes for compulsory arbitration to the National Labor Relations Commission, and in effect make or unmake the law on free collective bargaining. Petitioner contends that [a] BP 30 is an undue delegation of legislative powers [b] such conferment of authority may also run contrary to the assurance of the State to the workers' right to self-organization and collective bargaining.- Procedure+ Sept. 14, 1981 notice of strike with the Ministry of Labor for unfair labor practices stating the following grounds: 1) Unilateral and arbitrary implementation of a Code of Conduct; 2) Illegal terminations and suspensions of officers and members as a result of the implementation of said Code of Conduct; and 3) Automatic treatment as of sick leaves as AWOL with suspensions, in violation of Collective Bargaining Agreement + Sept. 15, 1981, notification to the Ministry of compliance with the 2/3 strike vote and other formal requirements of the law and Implementing Rules. Conciliation meetings called by the Minister followed. + Sept. 25, 1981, respondent certified the labor dispute to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) for compulsory arbitration and enjoined any strike at the private respondent's establishment. + Hearing at NLRC was set on Sept. 28. Petitioner filed petition to SC the next day. Court issued resolution for respondents to file answer. After parties were duly heard y SC on Oct. 8, case was ripe for decision.

36 "In labor disputes causing or likely to cause strikes or lockouts adversely affecting the national interest,

such as may occur in but not limited to public utilities, companies engaged in the generation or distribution of energy, banks, hospitals, and those within export processing zones, the Minister of Labor and Employment may assume jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or certify the same to the Commission for compulsory arbitration. Such assumption or certification shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or impending strike or lockout. If one has already taken place at the time of assumption or certification, all striking or locked out employees shall immediately return to work and the employers shall immediately resume operations and readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. The Minister may seek the assistance of law enforcement agencies to ensure compliance with this provision as well as with such orders as he may issue to enforce the same."

ISSUES1. WON BP 130 insofar as it empowers the Minister of Labor to assume jurisdiction over labor disputes causing or likely to cause strikes or lockouts adversely affecting the national interest and thereafter decide it or certify the same to the NLRC is unconstitutional for being violative of the doctrine of non-delegation of legislative power2. WON there is unconstitutional application of BP 130

HELD1. The delegation to the Minister of Labor of the power to assume jurisdiction in a labor dispute likely to affect the national interest or to certify the same to the NLRC for arbitration does not constitute undue delegation of legislative powers.Reasoning: First. It lays down the premise. The power which would be denied the Minister of Labor by virtue of such principle is within the competence of the President, who in its opinion can best determine national interests, but only when a strike is in progress. Such admission is qualified by the assumption that the President "can make law." But what possesses significance for the purpose of this litigation is that it is the President who "shall have control of the ministries." It points that the adoption of certain aspects of a parliamentary system in the amended Constitution does not alter its essentially presidential character.37

Then it cites the expanse of the powers of the President by the provisions in the Constitutions both of 1935 and 1973. (Note: My reading here is that the power by the Minister of Labor to assume jurisdiction in a labor dispute is an executive function)Second. The ponencia cited precedence to develop its argument. Villena v. Secretary of Interior says that "all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive.” In other words, without minimizing the importance of the heads of the various departments, their personality is in reality but the projection of that of the President. (Note: It used this doctrine in a later case Phil. American Management Co. v. Phil. American Management Employees Association)Third. Even on the assumption that the authority conferred to the Minister of Labor partakes of a legislative character, still no case of an unlawful delegation of such power may be discerned. It cites Edu v. Ericta: To determine whether or not there is an undue delegation of legislative power, the inquiry must be directed to the scope and definiteness of the measure enacted. The legislature does not abdicate its functions when it describes what job must be done, who is to do it, and what is the scope of his authority. [a] Distinction between delegation of power to make the laws which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, which constitutionally may not be done, and delegation of authority or discretion as to its execution to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law, to which no valid objection can be made; [b] To avoid unlawful delegation, there must be a standard, which implies at the very least that the legislature itself determines matters of' principle and lays down fundamental policy; [c] Thereafter, the executive or administrative office designated may in pursuance of the above guidelines promulgate supplemental rules and regulations. In People v Exconde: regulation should be germane to the objects and purposes of the law; that the regulation be not in contradiction with it; but conform to the standards that the law prescribes. BP 130 did not violate these guidelines.Fourth. The ponencia stressed the ruling in People v. Vera, saying that though scholarly and erudite, it aroused apprehension for being to rigid. The liberal approach in the ruling in Edu v. Ericta as reinforced in Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing Administration v. Confederation of Unions in

37 Article VII on the presidency starts with this provision: "The President shall be the head of state and

chief executive of the Republic of the Philippines." Its last section is an even more emphatic affirmation that it is a presidential system that obtains in our government. Thus: "All powers vested in the President of the Philippines under the 1935 Constitution and the laws of the land which are not herein provided for or conferred upon any official shall be deemed and are hereby vested in the President unless the Batasang Pambansa provides otherwise."

Government Corporations and Offices recognized that: “It would be self-defeating in the extreme if the legislation intended to cope with the grave social and economic problems of the present and foreseeable future would founder on the rock of an unduly restrictive and decidedly unrealistic meaning to be affixed to the doctrine of non-delegation.”- Also quoting Professor Jaffe: “The occasions for delegating power to administrative offices [could be] compassed by a single generalization. Thus: Power should be delegated where there is agreement that a task must be performed and it cannot be effectively performed by the legislature without the assistance of a delegate or without an expenditure of time so great as to lead to the neglect of equally important business. Delegation is most commonly indicated where the relations to be regulated are highly technical or where their regulation requires a course of continuous decision.”

2. In the absence of factual determinations (by the Ministry of Labor and the NLRC), this Court is not in a position to rule on whether or not there is unconstitutional application.

Decision[1] No. BP 130 insofar as it empowers the Minister of Labor to assume jurisdiction over labor disputes causing or likely to cause strikes or lockouts adversely affecting the national interest and thereafter decide it or certify the same to the NLRC is NOT on its face unconstitutional since there was no undue delegation of legislative power.[2] There is no ruling on the question of whether or not BP 130 has been unconstitutionally applied in this case, for being repugnant to the regime of self-organization and free collective bargaining, as on the facts alleged, disputed by private respondent, the matter is not ripe for judicial determinationDispositive Petition Dismissed.Voting 11 concur, no dissent.

AYTONA V CASTILLOBENGZON; January 19, 1962

FACTS- December 29, 1961 – Pres. Carlos P. Garcia appointed Aytona as ad interim Governor of the Central Bank. Aytona took his oath of office on that day.- December 30, 1961 – President-elect Diosdado Macapagal took his oath of office- December 31, 1961 – Macapagal issued Administrative Order # 2 recalling, withdrawing and cancelling all ad interim appointments made by Garcia after December 13, 1961 (the date Macapagal was proclaimed as the elected president by Congress)- January 1, 1962 – Macapagal appointed Andres Castillo as ad interim governor of the Central Bank- January 2, 1962 – Both Aytona and Castillo exercised the powers of their office but Castillo informed Aytona of his appointment. The next day, Aytona was prevented from holding office- Aytona instituted a quo warranto which challenged Castillo's right to exercise the powers of Governor of Central bank. Aytona claims he was:

1. validly appointed2. qualified for the post3. and that the subsequent appointment and qualification of Castillo was

void because the occupation was occupied by him- Castillo argued that the appointment of Aytona had been revoked by AO 2.

ISSUEWON the new President (Macapagal) had the power to issue the order of the cancellation of the ad interim appointments made by the past President (Garcia) even after the appointees had already qualified.

HELD

Castillo is the rightful governor of the Central Bank.- December 29, 1961 – Garcia sent to the Commission on Appointments (not yet in session) a communication submitting for confirmation ad interim appointments of several officials including the Central Bank Governor in the person of Aytona. There were three other communications regarding the same matter submitted on the same day.- All in all there were 350 midnight appointments by Garcia.- In revoking the appointments, Macapagal acted based on the following reasons:

1) outgoing President should have refrained from filling vacancies to give the new President the opportunity to consider names in the light of new plicies

2) Scandalously hurried appointments in mass do not fall within the intent and spirit of the constitutional provision authorizing the issuance of ad interim appointments

3) Appointments were irregular, immoral and unjust because they were issued only upon the condition that the appointee would immediately qualify obviously to prevent a recall by the incoming President which would result to those deserving the appointment of the new President to be declined and by-passed

4) Abnormal conditions surrounding the appointment and qualifications evinced a desire on the part of the outgoing President to merely subvert the policies of the incoming administration

- Many of the persons mentioned in the December 29 communication did not qualify.- It is Malacanang's practice to submit ad interim appointments only when the Committee on Appointments is in session so that only those who have accepted the appointment and qualified are submitted for confirmation.- It is common sense to believe that after the proclamation of the election of Macapagal, Garcia's administration was no more than a caretaker administration. He was supposed to prepare for the orderly transfer of authority to the incoming President and he should not do acts which he ought to know, would embarrass or obstruct the policies of his successor.- The appointment of 350 people in one night could be regarded as abuse of Presidential prerogatives.- When the President makes appointments with the consent of the Commission of Appointments, he has the benefit of their advice. When he makes ad interim appointments, he exercises a special prerogative and is bound to be prudent to insure approval of his selection either by previous consultation with the members of the Commission or by thereafter explaining to them the reason for such selection.- But in this case Garcia should have been doubly careful because:– the Commission that would consider the appointments is different

from the one existing during the time the appointments were made– the names are to be submitted by his successor who may not fully

approve of the appointments- The Court chose not to disregard Administrative Order 2 and cancelled the midnight appointments. There are precedents that once an appointment has been issued, it cannot be reconsidered. But none of the precedents have involved mass ad interim appointments.

QUIMSING V TAJANGLANGITBARRERA; February 29, 1964

FACTS- May 20, 1960- Quimsing designated Acting Chief of Police of Iloilo City- Dec. 20, 1961- Pres. Garcia extended an ad-interim appointment to Quimsing to the same position- Dec. 28, 1961- Quimsing took his oath of office, continued discharging functions of Chief of Police- May 16, 1962- Quimsing’s, as well as other people’s appointments were confirmed

- May 17, 1962- at the session of the Commission on Appointments, a motion for reconsideration of all the confirmed appointments was approved, and the Commission was adjourned with no future date fixed for its next meeting- June 11, 1962- President Macapagal designated Eduardo Tajanglangit as Acting Chief of Police of Iloilo.- Hence this -Petition for prohibition to restrain Eduardo Tajanglangit from occupying the position of Chief of Police to which petitioner Quimsing had previously been appointed and duly qualified and the functions of which he was actually discharging.

ISSUEWON Quimsing’s appointment was not lawfully confirmed, because of the motion for reconsideration of his confirmation, which has, to the present, remained unacted upon

HELDThe appointment of Tajanglangit to the position of Chief of Police of Iloilo City was null and void, because said position was not vacant.- The revised rules of the Commission on Appointments provide:“SEC. 21: …Any motion to reconsider the vote on any appointment may be laid on the table, and this shall be a final disposit on such a motion“SEC. 22: Notice of confirmation or disapproval of an appointment shall not be sent to the President of the Philippines before the expiration of the period for its reconsideration, or while a motion for reconsideration is pending.”- The Commission had not disapproved of Quimsing’s appointment, it was merely under reconsideration. It has been established that on July 19, 1962, Quimsing’s appointment was delivered to Malacanang. This, as well as the provisions above, supports the conclusion that the laying of a motion for reconsideration on the table does not have the effect of withholding the effectivity of the confirmation, nor is it synonymous with disapproval of the appointment. In fact, it is recognition that the appointment was confirmed.

PEOPLE V VERALAUREL; November 16, 1937

FACTS- 15 October 1931: information for criminal case “People v. Mariano Cu Unjieng, et al.” filed in CFI Manila. In the said case, HSBC, being the offended party, intervened as private prosecutor.- 8 January 1934: after a protracted trial, CFI rendered a judgment of conviction sentencing MCU to imprisonment.- 26 March 1935: SC upholds sentence of conviction w/ a slight modification of the duration of imprisonment.- 17 December 1935: MFR and 4 motions for new trial by MCU denied by Phil SC.- 18 December 1935: final judgment was entered by Phil SC. MCU seeks to elevate the case to US SC. - November 1936: US SC denies petition for certiorari. - 24 November 1936: Phil Sc denies MCU’s petition for leave to file a 2nd

alternative MFR or new trial; & remands the case to CFI Manila for execution of the judgment.- 27 November 1936: MCU files application for probation under the provisions of Act No. 4221 of the Phil Legislature. CFI Manila, Judge Pedro Tuason presiding, refers the application to the Insular Probation Office (IPO)- 18 June 1937: IPO recommends denial of MCU’s application for probation- 5 April 1937: hearing of the petition before CFI Manila, 7th branch with Judge Jose O. Vera presiding. HSBC & the Fiscal of the City of Manila file separate oppositions to the granting of probation. HSBC attacks constitutionality of Act No. 4221 on the following grounds: equal protection of the laws (its applicability is not uniform throughout the Islands); undue delegation of legislative power (section 11 of the said Act endows prov’l boards w/ power to make said law effective or otherwise in their respective provinces).

- 28 June 1937: Judge Jose O. Vera of CFI Mnla promulgates resolution with a finding that MCU is innocent of the crime of which he stands convicted but denying the latter's petition for probation.- 3 July 1937: counsel for MCU files exception to the resolution denying probation & notice of intention to file MFR. This was followed by a series of alternative motions for new reconsideration or new trial. A motion for leave to intervene in the case as amici curiae signed by 33 (34) attorneys was also filed. (Attorney Eulalio Chaves, 1 of the 34, subsequently filed a petition for leave to withdraw his appearance as amicus curiae on the ground that the motion was circulated at a banquet given by counsel for MCU & that he signed the same "without mature deliberation & purely as a matter of courtesy.”) HSBC files opposition to motion for intervention.- 6 August 1937: the Fiscal of the City of Mnla files motion w/ TC for issuance of an order to execute judgment of Phil SC in said case & to commit MCU to jail in obedience to said judgment.- 19 August 1937 is the date set for hearing on the various motions for CFI’s consideration. On this same date, this instant case was field before Phil SC to put an end to what they alleged was an interminable proceeding in CFI Mnla. - Note Probation implies guilt by final judgment. While a probation case may look into the circumstances attending the commission of the offense, this does not authorize it to reverse the findings and conclusive of this court, either directly or indirectly, especially wherefrom its own admission reliance was merely had on the printed briefs, averments, and pleadings of the parties. If each and every Court of First Instance could enjoy the privilege of overruling decisions of the Supreme Court, there would be no end to litigation, and judicial chaos would result. <emphasis on the hierarchy in the Philippine judicial system>

ISSUES 1. WON the constitutionality of Act No. 4221 has been properly raised in these proceedings2. if YES, WON said Act is constitutional

a. WON Act No. 4221 encroaches upon the pardoning power of the Executiveb. WON section 11 of Act No. 4221 constitute an undue delegation of legislative powerc. WON the Probation Act violates Bill of Rights provisions on equal protection of the laws

3. WON the entire Act should be avoided

HELD1. The constitutionality of an act of the legislature will not be determined by the courts unless that question is properly raised and presented in appropriate cases and is necessary to a determination of the case. <lis mota> The question of the constitutionality of an act of the legislature is frequently raised in ordinary actions BUT resort may be made to extraordinary legal remedies, particularly where the remedies in the ordinary course of law even if available, are not plain, speedy and adequate. <e.g. in mandamus proceedings, in an action of quo warranto, in habeas corpus proceedings, on an application for injunction to restrain action under the challenged statute, & even on an application for preliminary injunction where the determination of the constitutional question is necessary to a decision of the case, or through petitions for prohibition and certiorari. - Code of Civil Procedure of the Philippine Islands, section 516: Philippine SC is granted concurrent jurisdiction in prohibition with courts of first instance over inferior tribunals or persons, and original jurisdiction over courts of first instance, when such courts are exercising functions without or in excess of their jurisdiction. - General rule: the question of the validity of the criminal statute must be raised by a defendant in the trial court and be carried regularly in review to the Supreme Court. BUT in cases where a new act seriously affected numerous persons and extensive property rights, and was likely to cause a multiplicity of actions, the Supreme Court exercised its discretion to bring the issue of the

act's validity promptly before it and decide in the interest of the orderly administration of justice. - The writ of prohibition is an extraordinary judicial writ issuing out of a court of superior jurisdiction and directed to an inferior court, for the purpose of preventing the inferior tribunal from usurping a jurisdiction with which it is not legally vested. General rule: the merit of prohibition will not lie where the inferior court has jurisdiction independent of the statute the constitutionality of which is questioned. BUT where the inferior court or tribunal derives its jurisdiction exclusively from an unconstitutional statute, it may be prevented by the writ of prohibition from enforcing that statute. A CFI sitting in probation proceedings is a court of limited jurisdiction. Its jurisdiction in such proceedings is conferred exclusively by Act No. 4221 of the Philippine Legislature. It is unquestionable that the constitutional issue has been squarely presented not only before this court by the petitioners but also before the trial court by the private prosecution.- The power to enforce begets inherently a discretion to permanently refuse to do so. The authority to define and fix the punishment for crime is legislative and includes the right in advance to bring within judicial discretion, for the purpose of executing the statute, elements of consideration which would be otherwise beyond the scope of judicial authority, and that the right to relieve from the punishment, fixed by law and ascertained according to the methods by it provided belongs to the executive department.- Cooley on Constitutional Limitations: A court will not consider any attack made on the constitutionality of a statute by one who has no interest in defeating it because his rights are not affected by its operation. The power to declare a legislative enactment void is one which the judge, conscious of the fallibility of the human judgment, will shrink from exercising in any case where he can conscientiously and with due regard to duty and official oath decline the responsibility. - General rule: only those who are parties to a suit may question the constitutionality of a statute involved in a judicial decision, it has been held that since the decree pronounced by a court without jurisdiction is void, where the jurisdiction of the court depends on the validity of the statute in question, the issue of the constitutionality will be considered on its being brought to the attention of the court by persons interested in the effect to be given the statute.- General rule: the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity, so that if not raised by the pleadings, ordinarily it may not be raised at the trial, and if not raised in the trial court, it will not considered on appeal. BUT courts, in the exercise of sounds discretion, may determine the time when a question affecting the constitutionality of a statute should be presented. In criminal cases, the question may be raised for the first time at any stage of the proceedings, either in the trial court or on appeal. Same is true in civil cases if it appears that a determination of the question is necessary to a decision of the case. Also, a constitutional question will be considered by an appellate court at any time, where it involves the jurisdiction of the court below - General rule: the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustained, direct injury as a result of its enforcement. The People of the Philippines, in whose name the present action is brought, has a substantial interest in having Act No. 4221 set aside. Of greater import than the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the enforcement of an invalid statute. Hence, the well-settled rule that the state can challenge the validity of its own laws. The constitution is the supreme law, and to its behests the courts, the legislature, and the people must bow. The state is always interested where the integrity of its Constitution or statutes is involved.- A judge should not judicially declare a statute unconstitutional until the question of constitutionality is tendered for decision, and unless it must be decided in order to determine the right of a party litigant. An officer on whom a statute imposes the duty of enforcing its provisions cannot avoid the duty upon the ground that he considers the statute unconstitutional, and hence in enforcing the statute he is immune from responsibility if the statute be unconstitutional. Executive officers (e.g., the state auditor and state treasurer)

should not decline to perform ministerial duties imposed upon them by a statute, on the ground that they believe the statute is unconstitutional.- The mere fact that the Probation Act has been repeatedly relied upon the past and all that time has not been attacked as unconstitutional by the Fiscal of Manila but, on the contrary, has been impliedly regarded by him as constitutional, is no reason for considering the People of the Philippines estopped from nor assailing its validity. For courts will pass upon a constitutional questions only when presented before it in bona fide cases for determination, and the fact that the question has not been raised before is not a valid reason for refusing to allow it to be raised later. The fiscal and all others are justified in relying upon the statute and treating it as valid until it is held void by the courts in proper cases.- Is the determination of the constitutionality of Act No. 4221 is necessary to resolve the instant case? While the court will meet the question with firmness, where its decision is indispensable, it is the part of wisdom, and just respect for the legislature, renders it proper, to waive it, if the case in which it arises, can be decided on other points. - General rule: the determination of a constitutional question is necessary whenever it is essential to the decision of the case, as where the right of a party is founded solely on a statute the validity of which is attacked. There is no doubt that Cu Unjieng draws his privilege to probation solely from Act No. 4221 now being assailed.- Moreover, the Probation Act is a new addition to our statute books and its validity has never before been passed upon by the courts; many persons accused and convicted of crime in the City of Manila have applied for probation; some of them are already on probation; more people will likely take advantage of the Probation Act in the future; and the respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng has been at large for a period of about four years since his first conviction. All wait the decision of this court on the constitutional question. Considering, therefore, the importance which the instant case has assumed and to prevent multiplicity of suits, strong reasons of public policy demand that the constitutionality of Act No. 4221 be now resolved. - Also, in Phil SC’s ruling in an analogous situation in Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, the Court said: "Inasmuch as the property and personal rights of nearly twelve thousand merchants are affected by these proceedings, and inasmuch as Act No. 2972 is a new law not yet interpreted by the courts, in the interest of the public welfare and for the advancement of public policy, we have determined to overrule the defense of want of jurisdiction in order that we may decide the main issue. We have here an extraordinary situation which calls for a relaxation of the general rule." Phil SC’s ruling on this point was sustained by the US SC. “A more binding authority in support of the view we have taken can not be found.”

2. <the essence of judicial duty> It is the office and duty of the judiciary to enforce the Constitution. This court, by clear implication from the provisions of section 2, subsection 1, and section 10, of Article VIII of the Constitution, may declare an act of the national legislature invalid because in conflict with the fundamental lay. It will not shirk from its sworn duty to enforce the Constitution. And, in clear cases, it will not hesitate to give effect to the supreme law by setting aside a statute in conflict therewith.- Fundamental criteria: all reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a statute. An act of the legislature approved by the executive, is presumed to be within constitutional limitations. The members of the Legislature and the Chief Executive have taken an oath to support the Constitution and it must be presumed that they have been true to this oath and that in enacting and sanctioning a particular law they did not intend to violate the Constitution. The courts cannot but cautiously exercise its power to overturn the solemn declarations of two of the three grand departments of the governments. The judiciary ought to reflect the wisdom of the people as expressed through an elective Legislature and an elective Chief Executive. - The President of the Philippines had already expressed his opinion against the constitutionality of the Probation Act. In a message dated September 1, 1937, he recommended to the NA its immediate repeal, resulting in the

approval of Bill No. 2417 of the NA repealing the probation Act, subject to certain conditions therein mentioned; but that said bill was vetoed by the President on September 13, 1937, much against his wish. In vetoing the bill referred to, the President exercised his constitutional prerogative. He may express the reasons which he may deem proper for taking such a step, but his reasons are not binding upon us in the determination of actual controversies submitted for our determination. Whatever opinion is expressed by him under these circumstances, however, cannot sway our judgment on way or another and prevent us from taking what in our opinion is the proper course of action to take in a given case. We are independent of the Executive no less than of the Legislative department of our government — independent in the performance of our functions, undeterred by any consideration, free from politics, indifferent to popularity, and unafraid of criticism in the accomplishment of our sworn duty as we see it and as we understand it.- The constitutionality of Act No. 4221 is challenged on three principal grounds: (1) That said Act encroaches upon the pardoning power of the Executive; (2) that its constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power and (3) that it denies the equal protection of the laws.

a. Jones Law, in force at the time of the approval of Act No. 4221 vests in the Governor-General of the Philippines "the exclusive power to grant pardons and reprieves and remit fines and forfeitures". This power is now vested in the President of the Philippines (A7, s11(6)). Our Constitution also makes specific mention of "commutation" and of the power of the executive to impose, in the pardons he may grant, such conditions, restrictions and limitations as he may deem proper; and to grant amnesty with the concurrence of the NA. But the pardoning power has remained essentially the same.- Jones Law vests the pardoning power exclusively in the Chief Executive. The exercise of the power may not, therefore, be vested in anyone else. Where the pardoning power is conferred on the executive without express or implied limitations, the grant is exclusive, and the legislature can neither exercise such power itself nor delegate it elsewhere, nor interfere with or control the proper exercise thereof. - Killitts decision involving an embezzlement case: US SC ruled in 1916 that an order indefinitely suspending sentenced was void. Under the common law the power of the court was limited to temporary suspension and the right to suspend sentence absolutely and permanently was vested in the executive branch of the government and not in the judiciary. But, the right of Congress to establish probation by statute was conceded.- US v Murray: when a person sentenced to imprisonment by a district court has begun to serve his sentence, that court has no power under the Probation Act of March 4, 1925 to grant him probation even though the term at which sentence was imposed had not yet expired. In this case of Murray, the constitutionality of the probation Act was not considered but was assumed. US SC denied the right of the district courts to suspend sentence. The court pointed out the necessity for action by Congress if the courts were to exercise probation powers in the future.- Riggs v US: the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Fourth Circuit held that the constitutionality of Probation Act of March 4, 1925 have been sustained by the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Ninth Circuit (7 F. [2d], 590), and the same was held in no manner to encroach upon the pardoning power of the President. - 1916: US SC, in plain and unequivocal language, pointed to Congress as possessing the requisite power to enact probation laws. A federal probation law was actually enacted in 1925. The constitutionality of the Act has been assumed by the US SC in 1928 and consistently sustained by the inferior federal courts in a number of earlier cases. The Philippine Legislature, like the US Congress, may legally enact a probation law under its broad power to fix the punishment of any and all penal offenses. Indeed, the Philippine Legislature has defined all crimes and fixed the penalties for their violation. Invariably, the legislature has demonstrated the desire to vest in the courts -- particularly the trial courts -- large discretion in imposing the penalties which the law prescribes in particular cases. It is believed that justice can best be served by vesting this power in the courts, they being in a position to best

determine the penalties which an individual convict, peculiarly circumstanced, should suffer. <Revised Penal Code, Indeterminate Sentence Law, Parole Act, Juvenile Delinquency Law, (Adult) Probation Law, etc show the intention of the legislature to “humanize” the penal laws.>- Some US cases hold it unlawful for the legislature to vest in the courts the power to suspend the operation of a sentenced, by probation or otherwise, as to do so would encroach upon the pardoning power of the executive. Other cases, however, hold contra. Phil SC elects to follow the long catena of authorities holding that the courts may be legally authorized by the legislature to suspend sentence by the establishment of a system of probation however characterized. - Probation and pardon are not coterminous; nor are they the same. They are actually district and different from each other, both in origin and in nature. Probation, the power to suspend sentence, was always a part of the judicial power. It simply postpones the judgment of the court temporarily or indefinitely, but the conviction and liability following it, and the civil disabilities, remain and become operative when judgment is rendered. The power to grant reprieves and pardons, on the other hand, was always a part of the executive power. A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense and the guilt of the offender. It releases the punishment, and blots out of existence the guilt, so that in the eye of the law, the offender is as innocent as if he had never committed the offense. It removes the penalties and disabilities, and restores him to all his civil rights. It makes him, as it were, a new man, and gives him a new credit and capacity. - Probation should also be distinguished from reprieve and from commutation of the sentence. Snodgrass vs. State: the power to suspend the sentence does not conflict with the power of the Governor to grant reprieves. A reprieve postpones the execution of the sentence to a day certain, whereas a suspension is for an indefinite time. A commutation is but to change the punishment assessed to a less punishment. - State ex rel. Bottomnly vs. District Court: A "pardon" is an act of grace, proceeding from the power intrusted with the execution of the laws which exempts the individual on whom it is bestowed from the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has committed. It is a remission of guilt, a forgiveness of the offense. "Commutation" is a remission of a part of the punishment; a substitution of a less penalty for the one originally imposed. "Reprieve" or "respite" is the withholding of the sentence for an interval of time, a postponement of execution, a temporary suspension of execution.- The Probation Act does not conflict with the pardoning power of the Executive. The pardoning power, in respect to those serving their probationary sentences, remains as full and complete as if the Probation Law had never been enacted. The President may yet pardon the probationer and thus place it beyond the power of the court to order his rearrest and imprisonment.

b. Under the Consti, gov’t powers are distributed among 3 coordinate and substantially independent organs: legislative, executive and judicial. Each department derives its authority from the Constitution, the highest expression of popular will. Each has exclusive cognizance of the matters within its jurisdiction, supreme within its own sphere.- The power to make laws (the legislative power) is vested in a bicameral Legislature by the Jones Law (sec. 12) and in a unicameral National Assembly by the Constitution (A6,s1). The Philippine Legislature or the National Assembly may not escape its duties and responsibilities by delegating that power to any other body or authority. Any attempt to abdicate the power is unconstitutional and void, on the principle that potestas delegata non delegare potest, an accepted corollary of the principle of separation of powers. - The rule, however, which forbids the delegation of legislative power is not absolute and inflexible. It admits of exceptions like: (1) delegation of legislative powers to local authorities; (2) to such agencies in US territories as Congress may select; (3) to the people at large; and (4) to those whom the Constitution itself delegates such legislative powers (e.g., the President). The case before us does not fall under any of these exceptions. - Test of Undue Delegation: to inquire whether the statute was complete in all

its terms and provisions when it left the hands of the legislature so that nothing was left to the judgment of any other appointee or delegate of the legislature. BUT to a certain extent matters of detail may be left to be filled in by rules and regulations to be adopted or promulgated by executive officers and administrative boards. As a rule, an act of the legislature is incomplete and hence invalid if it does not lay down any rule or definite standard by which the administrative officer or board may be guided in the exercise of the discretionary powers delegated to it. - In the case at bar, the provincial boards of the various provinces are to determine for themselves, whether the Probation Law shall apply to their provinces or not at all. The applicability and application of the Probation Act are entirely placed in the hands of the provincial boards. If the provincial board does not wish to have the Act applied in its province, all that it has to do is to decline to appropriate the needed amount for the salary of a probation officer. The plain language of the Act is not susceptible of any other interpretation.- The true distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made. - It is true that laws may be made effective on certain contingencies, as by proclamation of the executive or the adoption by the people of a particular community. The legislature may delegate a power not legislative which it may itself rightfully exercise. The power to ascertain facts is such a power which may be delegated. There is nothing essentially legislative in ascertaining the existence of facts or conditions as the basis of the taking into effect of a law. That is a mental process common to all branches of the government. - The efficiency of an Act as a declaration of legislative will must, of course, come from Congress, but the ascertainment of the contingency upon which the Act shall take effect may be left to such agencies as it may designate. The legislature, then may provide that a contingencies leaving to some other person or body the power to determine when the specified contingencies has arisen. In the case at bar, the various provincial boards are, in practical effect, endowed with the power of suspending the operation of the Probation Law in their respective provinces.- While the legislature may suspend a law, or the execution or operation of a law, a law may not be suspended as to certain individuals only, leaving the law to be enjoyed by others. The suspension must be general, and cannot be made for individual cases or for particular localities. Here the sovereign and absolute power resides in the people; and the legislature can only exercise what is delegated to them according to the constitution. It is manifestly contrary to the first principles of civil liberty and natural justice, and to the spirit of our constitution and laws, that any one citizen should enjoy privileges and advantages which are denied to all others under like circumstances; or that ant one should be subject to losses, damages, suits, or actions from which all others under like circumstances are exempted.- True, the legislature may enact laws for a particular locality different from those applicable to other localities. But option laws thus sustained treat of subjects purely local in character which should receive different treatment in different localities placed under different circumstances. While we do not deny the right of local self-government and the propriety of leaving matters of purely local concern in the hands of local authorities or for the people of small communities to pass upon, we believe that in matters of general of general legislation like that which treats of criminals in general, and as regards the general subject of probation, discretion may not be vested in a manner so unqualified and absolute as provided in Act No. 4221. The validity of a law is not tested by what has been done but by what may be done under its provisions. - A great deal of latitude should be granted to the legislature not only in the expression of what may be termed legislative policy but in the elaboration and execution thereof. "Without this power, legislation would become oppressive and yet imbecile." The mass of powers of government is vested in the representatives of the people and that these representatives are no further

restrained under our system than by the express language of the instrument imposing the restraint, or by particular provisions which by clear intendment, have that effect. (Angara case)- We conclude that section 11 of Act No. 4221 constitutes an improper and unlawful delegation of legislative authority to the provincial boards and is, for this reason, unconstitutional and void.

c. This basic individual right sheltered by the Constitution is a restraint on all the tree grand departments of our government and on the subordinate instrumentalities and subdivision thereof, and on many constitutional power, like the police power, taxation and eminent domain. BUT what may be regarded as a denial of the equal protection of the laws in a question not always easily determined. No rule that will cover every case can be formulated. - Class legislation discriminating against some and favoring others in prohibited. But classification on a reasonable basis, and nor made arbitrarily or capriciously, is permitted. The classification, however, to be reasonable must be based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; it must be germane to the purposes of the law; it must not be limited to existing conditions only, and must apply equally to each member of the class.- In the case at bar, however, the resultant inequality may be said to flow from the unwarranted delegation of legislative power, although perhaps this is not necessarily the result in every case. While inequality may result in the application of the law and in the conferment of the benefits therein provided, inequality is not in all cases the necessary result. But whatever may be the case, it is clear that in section 11 of the Probation Act creates a situation in which discrimination and inequality are permitted or allowed. - There is no difference between a law which denies equal protection and a law which permits of such denial. A law may appear to be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it permits of unjust and illegal discrimination, it is within the constitutional prohibitions. Statutes may be adjudged unconstitutional because of their effect in operation. If the law has the effect of denying the equal protection of the law it is unconstitutional.

3. In seeking the legislative intent, the presumption is against any mutilation of a statute, and the courts will resort to elimination only where an unconstitutional provision is interjected into a statute otherwise valid, and is so independent and separable that its removal will leave the constitutional features and purposes of the act substantially unaffected by the process. - Where part of the a statute is void, as repugnant to the Organic Law, while another part is valid, the valid portion, if separable from the valid, may stand and be enforced. The void provisions must be eliminated without causing results affecting the main purpose of the Act, in a manner contrary to the intention of the Legislature. What remains must express the legislative will, independently of the void part, since the court has no power to legislate. - In the case at bar, section 11 (which makes the Probation Act applicable only in those provinces in which the respective provincial boards provided for the salaries of probation officers) is so inseparably linked with the other portions of the Act that with the elimination of the section what would be left is the bare idealism of the system, devoid of any practical benefit to a large number of people who may be deserving of the intended beneficial result of that system. - Between is and ought there is a far cry. The wisdom and propriety of legislation is not for us to pass upon. We may think a law better otherwise than it is. But much as has been said regarding progressive interpretation and judicial legislation we decline to amend the law. We are not permitted to read into the law matters and provisions which are not there. Not for any purpose — not even to save a statute from the doom of invalidity. The clear intention and policy of the law is not to make the Insular Government defray the salaries of probation officers in the provinces but to make the provinces defray them should they desire to have the Probation Act apply thereto. - Probation as a development of a modern penology is a commendable system. Probation laws have been enacted, here and in other countries, to permit what modern criminologist call the "individualization of the punishment", the adjustment of the penalty to the character of the criminal and the

circumstances of his particular case. It provides a period of grace in order to aid in the rehabilitation of a penitent offender. It takes advantage of an opportunity for reformation and avoids imprisonment so long as the convicts gives promise of reform.

Decision WHEREFORE, Act No. 4221 is hereby declared unconstitutional and void and the writ of prohibition is, accordingly, granted. Without any pronouncement regarding costs. So ordered.

TORRES V GONZALESFELICIANO; July 23, 1987

FACTS- an original petition for habeas corpus filed on behalf of petitioner Wilfredo S. Torres, presently confined at the National Penitentiary in Muntinlupa. - Sometime before 1979, Torres was convicted by the CFI of Manila of the crime of estafa (two counts) and was sentenced to an aggregate prison term of from (11) yrs, (10) mos and (22) days to (38) yrs, (9) mos. and (1) day, and to pay an indemnity of P127,728.75. These convictions were affirmed by the CA. The maximum sentence would expire on 2 Nov 2000.- On 18 April 1979, a conditional pardon was granted by the President on condition that petitioner would "not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines. Should this condition be violated, he will be proceeded against in the manner prescribed by law." Petitioner accepted the conditional pardon and was consequently released from confinement.- On 21 May 1986, the Board of Pardons and Parole resolved to recommend to the President the cancellation of the conditional pardon granted to the petitioner. In making its recommendation, the Board relied upon the decisions of this Court in Tesoro vs. Director of Prisons and Espuelas us. Provincial Warden of Bohol. The petitioner had been charged with 20 counts of estafa, which were then pending trial before the RTC, and convicted by the RTC of the crime of sedition, which was then pending appeal before the IAC. Many other charges have been brought against the petitioner, although some have been identified as dismissed.- On 4 June 1986, the respondent Minister of Justice wrote to the President informing her of the Resolution of the Board recommending cancellation of the conditional pardon previously granted to petitioner.- On 8 September 1986, the President cancelled the conditional pardon of the petitioner.- On 10 October 1986, the respondent Minister of Justice issued "by authority of the President" an Order of Arrest and Recommitment against petitioner. The petitioner was accordingly arrested and confined in Muntinlupa to serve the unexpired portion of his sentence.- Petitioner now impugns the validity of the Order of Arrest and Recommitment. He claims that he did not violate his conditional pardon since he has not been convicted by final judgment. Petitioner also contends that he was not given an opportunity to be heard before he was arrested and recommitted to prison, and accordingly claims he has been deprived of his rights under the due process clause of the Constitution.

ISSUEWON conviction of a crime by final judgment of a court is necessary before the petitioner can be validly rearrested and recommitted for violation of the terms of his conditional pardon and accordingly to serve the balance of his original sentence.

HELD- Tesoro vs. Director of Prisons. - It was held that the determination if the parole had been breached rested exclusively in the sound judgment of the GovGen and that such determination would not be reviewed by the courts. As Tesoro had consented to place his liberty on parole upon the judgment of the power that had granted it, the Court held that "he [could not] invoke the aid of

the courts, however erroneous the findings may be upon which his recommitment was ordered." Tesoro had in effect agreed that the GovGen's determination (rather than that of the regular courts of law) that he had breached one of the conditions of his parole by committing adultery while he was conditionally at liberty, was binding and conclusive upon him.- Sales vs. Director of Prisons - The executive clemency is extended upon the conditions named in it, and it is accepted upon those conditions. The governor may withdraw his grace in a certain contingency, and the governor shall himself determine when that contingency has arisen. It is as if the convict, with full competency to bind himself in the premises, had expressly contracted and agreed that, whenever the governor should conclude that he had violated the conditions of his parole, an executive order for his arrest and remandment to prison should at once issue, and be conclusive upon him.- Espuelas vs. Provincial Warden of Bohol - The Court reaffirmed the Tesoro and Sales rulings. "Due process is not necessarily judicial The appellee had had his day in court and been afforded the opportunity to defend himself during his trial for the crime of inciting to sedition with which he was charged, that brought about or resulted in his conviction, sentence and confinement in the penitentiary. When he was conditionally pardoned it was a generous exercise by the Chief Executive of his constitutional prerogative. The acceptance thereof by the convict or prisoner carrie[d] with it the authority or power of the Executive to determine whether a condition or conditions of the pardon has or have been violated To no other department of the Government [has] such power been entrusted."

The status of our case law on the matter under consideration may be summed up in the following propositions:

1. The grant of pardon and the determination of the terms and conditions of a conditional pardon are purely executive acts which are not subject to judicial scrutiny.2. The determination of the occurrence of a breach of a condition of a pardon, and the proper consequences of such breach, may be either a purely executive act, not subject to judicial scrutiny under Sec 64 of the Revised Administrative Code; or it may be a judicial act consisting of trial for and conviction of violation of a conditional pardon under Art 159 RPC. Where the President opts to proceed under Section 64 (i) RAC, no judicial pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime is necessary, much less conviction therefore by final judgment of a court, in order that a convict may be recommended for the violation of his conditional pardon.3. Because due process is not semper et ubique judicial process, and because the conditionally pardoned convict had already been accorded judicial due process in his trial and conviction for the offense for which he was conditionally pardoned, Sec 64 (i) RAC is not afflicted with a constitutional vice.

- A convict granted conditional pardon, like the petitioner herein, who is recommitted must of course be convicted by final judgment of a court of the subsequent crime or crimes with which he was charged before the criminal penalty for such subsequent offense(s) ran be imposed upon him. Since Art 159 RPC defines a distinct, substantive, felony, the parolee or convict who is regarded as having violated the provisions thereof must be charged, prosecuted and convicted by final judgment before he can be made to suffer the penalty prescribed in Art 159.- In proceeding against a convict who has been conditionally pardoned and who is alleged to have breached the conditions of his pardon, the Executive Department has two options: (i) to proceed against him under Sec 64 (i) RAC; or (ii) to proceed against him under Art 159 RPC, upon a convict who "having been granted conditional pardon by the Chief Executive, shall violate any of the conditions of such pardon." Here, the President has chosen to proceed against the petitioner under Sec 64 (i) RAC. Decision Petition dismissed

SEPARATE OPINION

CRUZ [dissent]

- As many as such charges may be, none of them so far has resulted in a final conviction, without which he cannot be recommitted under the condition of his pardon. - Mere accusation is not synonymous with guilt. (People v. Dramayo, 42 SCRA 59). A prima facie case only justifies the filing of the corresponding information, but proof beyond reasonable doubt is still necessary for conviction. - The executive can only allege the commission of crime and thereafter try to prove it through indubitable evidence. If the prosecution succeeds, the court will then affirm the allegation of commission in a judgment of conviction.The current doctrine holds that, by virtue of Sec 64(i) RAC, the President may in his judgment determine whether the condition of the pardon has been violated.- I agree that the authority is validly conferred as long as the condition does not involve the commission of a crime but, say, merely requires good behavior from the pardonee.

BARRIOQUINTO V FERNANDEZFERIA; January 21, 1949

FACTSJimenez and Barrioquinto were charged with murder. Jimenez was sentenced to life imprisonment, while Barrioquinto’s trial was delayed because he was arrested later than Jimenez. Both submitted their cases to the Guerilla Amnesty Commission pursuant to Proclamation No. 838 which the said commission remanded to the CFI of Zamboanga without deciding if they were entitled to amnesty or not on the ground that neither of them has admitted to the commission of the offense.

ISSUEWON confession to the crime is necessary to be entitled to the benefits of Proclamation No. 8 (grant of amnesty)

HELD- In order to entitle a person to the benefits of the Amnesty Proclamation of September 7, 1946, it is not necessary that he should admit having committed the criminal act or offense with which he is charged, and allege the amnesty as a defense. For whether or not he admits or confesses having committed the offense with which he is charged, the Commissions should conduct summary hearing of the witnesses both for the complainants and the accused, on whether he has committed the offense in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy, or against persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy, and decide whether he is entitled to the benefits of amnesty and to be "regarded as a patriot or hero who have rendered invaluable services to the nation”.- Since the Amnesty Proclamation is a public act, the courts and Amnesty Commissions should apply the benefits granted to cases coming within their province or jurisdiction, whether pleaded or claimed by the person charged with such offenses or not, if the evidence presented shows that the accused is entitled to said benefits.- If the courts have to proceed to the trial or hearing of a case and decide whether the offense committed by the defendant comes within the terms of the

38 Proclamation No. 8 (dispositive): I, Manuel Roxas, President of the Philippines, in accordance with the

provisions of Article VII, section 10, paragraph 6 of the Constitution, do hereby declare and proclaim an amnesty in favor of all persons who committed any act penalized under the Revised Penal Code in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy or against persons aiding in the war effort of the enemy, and committed during the period from December 8, 1941 to the date when each particular area of the Philippines was actually liberated from the enemy control and occupation. This amnesty shall not apply to crimes against chastity or to acts committed from purely personal motives.

Amnesty Proclamation although the defendant has pleaded not guilty, there is no reason why the Amnesty Commissions can not do so. - (This case is under “Executive” of our outline, and the following, although really obiter, is most relevant to this section)

Difference of Amnesty from PardonPardon Amnesty

-granted by the Chief Executive, thus a private act which must be pleaded and proved by the person pardoned and which the courts may not take notice of.

-by proclamation of the president with the concurrence of the Congress, and is a public act of which the courts may take judicial notice.

Granted to one after conviction Granted to classes of persons or communities who may be guilty, generally before or after institution of prosecution and sometimes after conviction

-looks forward and relieves offender of consequences of crime; abolishes and forgives punishment, but doesn’t abolish civil liability

-looks backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense itself, as though he had committed no offense

Doesn’t restore rights to hold public office, suffrage, unless expressly restored by pardon

Rights not affected as the offender is treated as if he committed no crime at all

Decision respondents ordered to hear and decide the applications for amnesty of petitioners unless courts have already decided WoN they are entitled to benefits of amnesty.

SEPARATE OPINION

PERFECTO [concur]

To entitle a person to have his case heard and decided by a Guerrilla Amnesty Commission only the following elements are essential: 1. that he is charged or may be charged with an offense penalized under

the RPC, except those against chastity or for purely personal motives;2. that he committed the offense in furtherance of the resistance to the

enemy; 3. that it was committed during the period from December 8, 1941, to the

date when the area where the offense was committed was actually liberated from enemy control and occupation.

If these three elements are present in a case brought before a Guerrilla Amnesty Commission, the latter cannot refuse to hear and decide it under the proclamation. There is nothing in the proclamation to even hint that the applicant for amnesty must first admit having executed the acts constituting the offense with which he is charged or may be charged.

TUASON [dissent]

- As to the determination of the pretended right of the defendants, to the benefits of amnesty, the two orders of the Commission are decisions on the merits, definite and final as far as the Commission is concerned. The fact that the defendants denied having committed the crime imputed to them was cited by the Commission as ground for its decision to turn down their application. That circumstance was not given as ground for refusal to act. The Commission has thus amply performed the duties required of it by the Amnesty Proclamation in both the matters of investigating and deciding. - The Amnesty Commissions are executive instrumentalities acting for and in behalf of the President. They are not courts; they are not performing judicial

functions, and this Court has no appellate jurisdiction over their actuations, orders or decisions.- Mandamus is ordinarily a remedy for official inaction. (Guanio vs. Fernandez) - The Court can order the Commission to act but it can not tell the Commission how to act. How or for whom a case should be decided is a matter of judgment which courts have no jurisdiction to control or review. The writ of mandamus will not issue to control or review the exercise of discretion of a public officer where the law imposes upon a public officer the right and the duty to exercise judgment. In reference to any matter in which he is required to act, it is his judgment that is to be exercised and not that of the court. (Blanco vs. Board of Medical Examiners)- Amnesty presupposes the commission of a crime. When an accused says that he has not committed a crime he cannot have any use for amnesty. It is also self-evident that where the Amnesty Proclamation imposes certain conditions, it is incumbent upon the accused to prove the existence of those conditions. A petition for amnesty is in the nature of a plea of confession and avoidance. The pleader has to confess the allegations against him before he is allowed to set out such facts as, if true, would defeat the action. It is a rank inconsistency for one to justify an act, or seek forgiveness for an act of which, according to him, he is not responsible.

MONSANTO V FACTORANFERNAN; February 9, 1989

FACTSIn a decision rendered on March 25, 1983, the Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner Salvacion A. Monsanto (then assistant treasurer of Calbayog City) and three other accused, of the complex crime of estafa thru falsification of public documents and sentenced them to imprisonment and payment of fine. Petitioner appealed her conviction to the SC which affirmed the same. She filed a motion for reconsideration, but while the motion was pending, she was extended absolute pardon on December 17, 1984 by then President Marcos, which she accepted on December 21, 1984. By reason of said pardon, petitioner wrote Calbayog City Treasurer requesting that she be reinstated to her former post. The Finance Ministry ruled that petitioner may be reinstated to her position without the necessity of a new appointment not earlier than the date she was extended the absolute pardon, but she still has to pay. Seeking reconsideration, petitioner wrote the Ministry stressing that the full pardon bestowed on her has wiped out the crime which implies that her service in the government has never been interrupted, and therefore the date of her reinstatement should correspond to the date of her preventive suspension which is August 1, 1982. Petitioner contended that:

she is entitled to backpay for the entire period of her suspension. she should not be required to pay the proportionate share of the

amount of P4,892.50.

ISSUES1. WON a public officer, who has been granted an absolute pardon by the Chief Executive, is entitled to reinstatement to her former position without need of a new appointment.2. WON petitioner is still liable to pay civil indemnities notwithstanding pardon.

HELD1. Ratio Pardon is defined as “an act of grace, proceeding from the power entrusted with the execution of the laws, which exempts the individual, on whom it is bestowed, from the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has committed. It is the private, though official act of the executive magistrate xxx and not communicated officially to the Court. “This was governed by the 1973 Constitution.Reasoning- People v. Lising

“xxx acquittal, not absolute pardon, of a former public officer is the only ground for reinstatement to his former position and entitlement to payment of his salaries, benefits and emoluments due to him during the period of his suspension pendent elite.

“In fact, in such a situation, the former public official must secure a reappointment before he can reassume his former position. xxx “

- The penalty of prision mayor carries the accessory penalties of temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage, enforceable during the term of the principal penalty. Temporary absolute disqualification bars the convict from public office or employment, such disqualification to last during the term of the sentence.- In the present case, it is not material when the pardon was bestowed, whether before or after the conviction, for the result would still be the same. Having accepted the pardon, petitioner is deemed to have abandoned her appeal and her unreversed conviction by the Sandiganbayan assumed the character of finality. Pardon implies guilt. It does not erase the fact of the commission of the crime and the conviction thereof, as opposed to the Ex Parte Garland, Pelobello, and Cristobal cases. It involves forgiveness, and not forgetfulness.- While the Court is prepared to concede that pardon may remit all the penal consequences of a criminal indictment if only to give a meaning to the fiat that a pardon, being a presidential prerogative, should not be circumscribed by legislative action, we do not subscribe to the fictitious belief that pardon blots out the guilt of an individual and that once he is absolved, he should be treated as if he were innocent. Pardon cannot mask the acts constituting the crime.- Public offices are intended primarily for the collective protection, safety and benefit of the common good. They cannot be compromised to favor private interests. A pardon, albeit full and plenary, cannot preclude the appointing power from refusing appointment to anyone deemed to be of bad character.2. As for the exemption from the payment of the civil indemnity, the Court cannot oblige her. Civil liability is governed by RPC, and subsists notwithstanding service of sentence, or for any reason the sentence is not served by pardon, amnesty or commutation of sentence.Decision The assailed resolution of former Deputy Executive Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr. is affirmed. 1. Petitioner is not automatically reinstated, and must apply for appointment to her former position.2. Petitioner is not entitled to any backpay, and must pay the proportionate share of the amount of P4,892.50.

MACAGA-AN V PEOPLEFELICIANO; July 39, 1987

FACTS- The 22 petitioners include municipal treasurers of various municipalities of Lanao del Norte and Lanao del Sur, and the Officer-in-Charge of the Provincial Treasurer's Office of Lanao del Sur, as well as the Provincial Auditor and the Assistant Provincial Auditor of Lanao del Sur. Petitioners were charged and convicted in 33 cases for estafa through falsification of public and commercial documents (Article 315, in relation to Article 17 1, Revised Penal Code) in a decision of the Sandiganbayan promulgated on 15 July 1981. The total amount of Government funds (treasury warrants) involved was somewhat over P2.7 million.- The petitioners state that they applied for amnesty through the 3rd and 11th Amnesty Commission (sic) of Lanao del Sur and Marawi City and that on 2 February 1985, they were granted conditional amnesty by the said Commission, subject to the approval or final action of the President of the Philippines pursuant to P.D. No. 1082, dated 2 February 1977. The Amnesty Commission, the petitioners continue, endorsed the amnesty applications of the petitioners to the President, recommending approval thereof or grant of

executive clemency to the petitioners. The petitioners' amnesty applications are said to have been submitted to the Office of the President by the then Presidential Assistant Victor Nituda. Former Governor Mohammed Ali Dimaporo, the petitioners further state, made written representations dated 27 January 1986 with former President Marcos concerning the petitioners' applications during a political rally of the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan on 22 January 1986. Mr. Marcos apparently wrote on the upper righthand corner of former Governor Dimaporo's letter the following: "Approved" and signed the same with a partly illegible date. The petitioners state, finally, that the original copies of the amnesty papers were in the possession of then Presidential Adviser Joaquin Venus and were lost or destroyed at Malacañang "during the February 1986 bloodless military revolution" and could not now be located.- The respondent court held that the benefits of amnesty were never available to the petitioners under P.D. No. 1182 as amended by PD 1429. They further contend that the applicable law to them is PD 1082, which granted amnesty to those resisting the duly constituted authorities in several parts of Mindanao.

ISSUEWON President Marcos’ grant of amnesty to the petitioners is in accordance with law.

HELDNO. Acts of the President in contravention with the laws, which he himself promulgated in the exercise of his concurrent legislative powers, are void and of no effect.ReasoningThe benefits of amnesty were never available to the petitioners under PD 1182.

- Under said law, the crimes to be amnestied must have been for violations of subversion laws or for crimes against public order under the RPC. Among those disqualified from amnesty under PD 1182 are those “who, while holding public office or employment… diverted public funds from the lawful purpose for which they had been appropriated.” In the instant case, petitioners were charged with and convicted of Art. 315 viz Art 171, RPC. Art. 315 is under Crimes Against Property, while Art. 171 is under Crimes Against Public Interest. Clearly, petitioners are among those expressly disqualified under PD 1182.

Neither were petitioners able to avail of amnesty under PD 1082.- The offenses for which amnesty may be granted under PD 1082 are acts “penalized by existing laws in the furtherance of… resistance to the duly constituted authorities of the Republic…” by members and supporters of MNLF, Bangsa Moro Army and other “anti-government groups with similar motivations and aims.” The “resistance” referred to is typified by the offenses of rebellion, insurrection, sedition, or conspiracy to commit rebellion or sedition, all offenses with a political character and all of which are embraced in the RPC under Crimes Against Public Order. On the other hand, the acts of which petitioners were convicted were ordinary crimes without any political complexion and consisting simply of diversion of public funds to private profit.- We do not discount the possibility that the former President did in fact act in contravention of PDs 1082 and 1182 by granting the amnesty claimed by petitioners, and that by such act, he may indeed have aroused expectations (however unjustified under the terms of existing law) in the minds of the petitioners. If such be the case, then the appropriate recourse of petitioners is not to this Court, nor to any other court, but rather to the Executive Department.

Decision Petition denied.

ARANETA V DINGLASANTUASON; August 26, 1949

FACTS

- The petitions challenge the validity of executive orders of the President avowedly issued in virtue of Commonwealth Act No. 671. Involved in cases Nos. L-2044 and L-2756 is Executive Order No. 62, which regulates rentals for houses and lots for residential buildings. The petitioner, J. Antonio Araneta, is under prosecution in the Court of First Instance of Manila for violation of the provisions of this Executive Order, and prays for the issuance of the writ of prohibition to the judge and the city fiscal. Involved in case L-3055 is Executive Order No. 192, which aims to control exports from the Philippines. In this case, Leon Ma. Guerrero seeks a writ of mandamus to compel the Administrator of the Sugar Quota Office and the Commissioner of Customs to permit the exportation of shoes by the petitioner. Both officials refuse to issue the required export license on the ground that the exportation of shoes from the Philippines is forbidden by this Executive Order. Case No. L-3054 relates to Executive Order No. 225, which appropriates funds for the operation of the Government of the Republic uf the Philippines during the period from July 1, 1949 to June 30, 1950, and for other purposes. The petitioner, Eulogio Rodriguez, Sr., as a tax-payer, an elector, and president of the Nacionalista Party, applies for a writ of prohibition to restrain the Treasurer of the Philippines from disbursing money under this Executive Order. Affected in case No. L-3056 is Executive Order No. 226, which appropriates P6,000,000 to defray the expenses in connection with, and incidental to, the holding of the national elections to be held in November, 1949. The petitioner, Antonio Barredo, as a citizen, tax-payer and voter, asks this Court to prevent the respondents from disbursing, spending or otherwise disposing of that amount or any part of it.- Petitioners rest their case chiefly on the proposition that the C.A. No. 671 ( An Act Declaring a State of Total Emergency as a Result of War involving the Philippines and Authorizing the President to Promulgate Rules and Regulations to Meet such Emergency) has ceased to have any force and effect, thereby rendering the assailed Executive Orders null and void.

ISSUEWON the emergency powers delegated to the President had ceased when Congress held its regular session

HELDYES. Commonwealth Act No. 671 became inoperative when Congress met in regular session on May 25, 1946, and that Executive Orders Nos. 62, 192, 225 and 226 were issued without authority of law. - Commonwealth Act No. 671 does not in term fix the duration of its effectiveness. The intention of the Act has to be sought for in its nature, the object to be published, the purpose to be subserved, and its relation to the Constitution. - Section 26 of Article VI of the Constitution provides:

"In time of war or other national emergency, the Congress may by law authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to promulgate rules and regulations to carry out a declared national policy."

- The words "limited period" as used in the Constitution are beyond question intended to mean restrictive in duration. Emergency, in order to justify the delegation of emergency powers, "must be temporary or it can not be said to be an emergency." It is to be presumed that Commonwealth Act No. 671 was approved with this limitation in view. The opposite theory would make the law repugnant to the Constitution, and is contrary to the principle that the legislature is deemed to have full knowledge of the constitutional scope of its powers. - The assertion that new legislation is needed to repeal the act would not be in harmony with the Constitution either. If a new and different law were necessary to terminate the delegation, the period for the delegation would be unlimited, indefinite, negative and uncertain; that which was intended to meet a temporary emergency may become permanent law; for Congress might not enact the repeal, and even if it would, the repeal might not meet with the approval of the President, and the Congress might not be able to override the veto. Furthermore, this would create the anomaly that, while Congress might

delegate its powers by simple majority, it might not be able to recall them except by a two-third vote. In other words, it would be easier for Congress to delegate its powers than to take them back. This is not right and is not, and ought not to be, the law. - Section 4 of Act No. 671 stipulates that "the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder shall be in full force and effect until the Congress of the Philippines shall otherwise provide." The silence of the law regarding the repeal of the authority itself, in the face of the express provision for the repeal of the rules and regulations issued in pursuance of it, a clear manifestation of the belief held by the National Assembly that there was no necessity to provide for the former. It would be strange if having no idea about the time the Emergency Powers Act was to be effective the National Assembly failed to make a provision for its termination in the same way that it did for the termination of the effects, and incidents of the delegation. There would be no point in repealing or annulling the rules and regulations promulgated under a law if the law itself was to remain in force, since, in that case, the President could not only make new rules and regulations but he could restore the ones already annulled by the legislature.- More anomalous than the exercise of legislative functions by the Executive when Congress is in the unobstructed exercise of its authority is the fact that there would be two legislative bodies operating over the same field, legislating concurrently and simultaneously, mutually nullifying each other's actions. Even if the emergency powers of the President, as suggested, be suspended while Congress was in session and be revived after each adjournment, the anomaly would not be eliminated. Congress by a 2/3 vote could repeal executive orders promulgated by the President during congressional recess, and the President in turn could treat in the same manner, between sessions of Congress, laws enacted by the latter. In entire good faith, and inspired only by the best interests of the country as they saw them, a former President promulgated an executive order regulating house rentals after he had vetoed a bill on the subject enacted by Congress, and the present Chief Executive issued an executive order on export control after Congress had refused to approve the measure.- Quite apart from these anomalies, there is good basis in the language of Act No. 671 for the inference that the National Assembly restricted the life of the emergency powers of the President to the time the Legislature was prevented from holding sessions due to enemy action or other causes brought on by the war. Section 3 provides:

"The President of the Philippines shall as soon as practicable upon the convening of the Congress of the Philippines report thereto all the rules and regulations promulgated by him under the powers herein granted."

- The clear tenor of this provision is that there was to be only one meeting of Congress at which the President was to give an account of his trusteeship. The section did not say each meeting, which it could very well have said if that had been the intention. If the National Assembly did not think that the report mentioned in section 3 was to be the first and last and did not think that upon the convening of the first Congress Act No. 671 would lapse, what reason could there be for its failure to provide in appropriate and clear terms for the filing of subsequent reports? Such reports, if the President was expected to continue making laws in the form of rules, regulations and executive orders, were as important, or as unimportant, as the initial one.- As a contemporary construction, President Quezon's statement regarding the duration of Act No. 671 is enlightening and should carry much weight, considering his part in the passage and in the carrying out of the law. Pres. Quezon, who called the National Assembly to a special session, who recommended the enactment of the Emergency Powers Act, if indeed he was not its author, and who was the very President to be entrusted with its execution, stated in his autobiography, "The Good Fight," that Act No. 671 was only "for a certain period" and "would become invalid unless reenacted." These phrases connote automatic extinction of the law upon the conclusion of a certain period. Together they denote that a new legislation was necessary to keep alive (not to repeal) the law after the expiration of that period. They signify

that the same law, not a different one, had to be repassed if the grant should be prolonged.- Pres. Quezon in the same paragraph of his autobiography furnished part of the answer. He said he issued the call for a special session of the National Assembly "when it became evident that we were completely helpless against air attack, and that it was most unlikely the Philippine Legislature would hold its next regular session which was to open on January 1, 1942." It can easily be discerned in this statement that the conferring of enormous powers upon the President was decided upon with specific view to the inability of the National Assembly to meet. Indeed no other factor than this inability could have motivated the delegation of powers so vast as to amount to an abdication by the National Assembly of its authority. The enactment and continuation of a law so destructive of the foundations of democratic institutions could not have been conceived under any circumstance short of a complete disruption and dislocation of the normal processes of government. The period that best comports with the constitutional requirements and limitations, with the general context of the law and with what we believe to be the main if not the sole raison d'etre for its enactment, was a period coextensive with the inability of Congress to function, a period ending with the convening of that body.- In setting the first regular session of Congress instead of the first special session which preceded it as the point of expiration of the Act, the purpose and intention of the National Assembly is given effect. In a special session, the Congress may "consider general legislation or only such subjects as the President may designate." (Section 9, Article VI of the Constitution.) In a regular session, the power of Congress to legislate is not circumscribed except by the limitations imposed by the organic law.- After all the criticisms that have been made against the efficiency of the system of the separation of powers, the fact remains that the Constitution has set up this form of government, with all its defects and shortcomings, in preference to the commingling of powers in one man or group of men. The Filipino people by adopting parliamentary government have given notice that they share the faith of other democracy-loving peoples in this system, with all its faults, as the ideal. The point is, under this framework of government, legislation is preserved for Congress all the time, not excepting periods of crisis no matter how serious. Never in the history of the United States, the basic features of whose Constitution have been copied in ours, have the specific functions of the legislative branch of enacting laws been surrendered to another department, not even when that Republic was fighting a total war, or when it was engaged in a life-and-death struggle to preserve the Union. The truth is that under our concept of constitutional government, in times of extreme perils more than in normal circumstances the various branches, executive, legislative, and judicial, given the ability to act, are called upon to perform the duties and discharge the responsibilities committed to them respectively.Decision Petitions GRANTED.

QUA CHEE GAN V DEPORTATION BOARDBARRERA; September 30, 1963

FACTS- Appeal from a decision of the CFI of Manila denying the petition for writ of habeas corpus and/or prohibition, certiorari, and mandamus filed by the petitioner-appellants- The petitioners were charged before the Deportation Board (DB) with having purchased $130,000.00 US dollars without the necessary license from the Central Bank of the Philippines and having remitted the same to HK; and three of the petitioner-appellants with having attempted to bribe officers of the Philippine and US Governments in order to evade prosecution for said unauthorized purchase of US dollars. - After filing of deportation charges, presiding member of the DB issued a warrant of arrest for the said aliens but upon filing of a surety bond and cash bond, the petitioner-appelants were provisionally set free.

- The petitioner-appellants then filed a joint motion to dismiss the charges on the grounds that (1) deportation charges do not constitute legal ground for deportation of aliens and (2) the DB has no jurisdiction to entertain such charges, but was denied by the DB. The petitioner-appellants then filed a petition for habeas corpus and/or prohibition which was remanded to the CFI of Manila. The CFI issued a writ of preliminary injunction, restraining DB from hearing the deportation charges against the petitioners, pending final termination of the habeas corpus and/or prohibition proceedings. DB filed its answer to the original petition, maintaining that the DB, as an agent of the Prexi, has jurisdiction over the charges and the authority to order their arrest. CFI dismissed the petition, hence this appeal.

ISSUES1. WON the deportation charges constitute legal ground form deportation of the petitioner-appellants2. WON, conceding without deciding that the President can personally order the arrest of the alien complained of, such power can be delegated by him to the DB

HELD1. Yes. The act of profiteering, hoarding, or blackmarketing of US dollars violate Central Bank regulations and could be treated as ECONOMIC SABOTAGE, which is a ground for deportation under RA 503 amending Sec 37 of CA 613.2. No. Official functions requiring the exercise of discretion such as the power to arrest cannot be delegated to an agent of the President.

Obiter2 ways to deport an undesirable alien:

Section 37, CA No. 613 (Immigration Act of 1940) : Commissioner of Immigration empowered to effect the arrest and expulsion of an alien, after previous determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of ground or grounds therefore BUT did not concentrate exercise power to deport to the Commissioner, as seen in Sec 52 [which is the repealing clause of the Immigration Act, which expressly exempted Sec 69 of Act 2711

Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code (Act No. 2711): only indicates that the Executive or his authorized agent could only deport/expel/exclude from RP aliens upon conducting a prior investigation of the ground of such action and the rest of it indicates the procedure concerning the protection of the said alien during the deportation proceedings. [indication of the recognition of the existence of power of the executive to deport aliens]

President’s power under Sec. 69, Act 2711 may be delegated: proofs through history

EO No. 494 (first EO of Gov-Gen Murphy, 1934): constitute a board to take actions on complaints against foreigners, conduct investigations and make recommendations

EO No. 33 (Quezon, 1936): creation of DB to receive complaints against aliens, to conduct investigations (under Sec 69, Act 2711) and make recommendations – authorized by President

***TAKE NOTE: Power to INVESTIGATE, not POWER TO ORDER ARREST OF THE ALIEN

EO 69 (Roxas, 1947): orders respondents in deportation proceedings to file a bond with the Commissioner of Immigration to ensure their appearance and facilitate execution of deportation order whenever the President decides the case against the respondent

***TAKE NOTE: Filing of BOND, NOT AUTHORIZE ARREST OF THE RESPONDENT

EO 398 (Quirino, 1951): reorganized the DB and authorized the DB, upn filing of formal charges by the Special Prosecutor of the Board, to issue warrant for the arrest of the alien complained of and to hold him under detention during the investigation unless he files a bond (so here,

PRESIDENT ALREADY AUTHORIZED ARREST OF RESPONDENT ALIENS)

On rights of the accused: Sec 1, ART III of 1935 CONSTI = Sec 2, ART III, 1987 CONSTI

This provision specifies that the probable cause must be determined by the judge after examination under oath of the complainant and the witness produced unlike that of the 4th Amendment, Philippine Bill, or Jones Act which does not determine who exactly would determine the probable cause for the order of arrest. The Consti is silent on whether a warrant of arrest may be issued upon determination of the probable cause by other authority besides the Judge.

*DURING INVESTIGATION, IT IS NOT NECESSARY THAT THE ALIEN BE ARRESTED. IT IS ENOUGH THAT A BOND BE REQUIRED TO INSURE THE APPEARANCE OF THE ALIEN DuriNG THE INVESTIGATION.Decision EO 398, series of 1951, insofar as it empowers the DB to issue warrant of arrest upon the filing of formal charges against an alien or aliens and to fix bond and prescribe the conditions for the temporary release of said aliens, is declared illegal. Order of arrest null and void, bonds filed decreed cancelled. Decision appealed from affirmed with modification.

ART VIII: JUDICIARY

DEMETRIA V ALBAFERNAN; February 27, 1987

FACTS- Petitioners, in this petition for prohibition with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction assailed the constitutionality of the first paragraph of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177, otherwise known as the “Budget Reform Decree of 1977” on the ff. grounds:

o it infringes upon the fundamental law by authorizing the illegal transfer of public moneys

o it is repugnant to the constitution as it fails to specify the objectives and purposes for which the proposed transfer of funds are to be made

o it allows the President to override the safeguards, form and procedure prescribed by the Constitution in approving appropriations

o it amounts to undue delegation of legislative powerso the transfer of funds by the President and the implementation thereof

by the Budget Minister and the Treasurer are without or in excess of their authority and jurisdiction

- Solicitor General, for the public respondents, questioned the legal standing of petitioners. He further contended that:

o The provision under consideration was enacted pursuant to Section 16(5), Art.VIII of the 1973 Constitution

o Prohibition will not lie form one branch of the government to a coordinate branch to enjoin the performance of duties within the latter’s sphere of responsibility

- On February 27, the Court required petitioners to file a Reply to the Comment- Petitioners stated that as a result of the change in the administration, there is a need to hold the resolution of the present case in abeyance- The Solicitor General filed a rejoinder with a motion to dismiss setting forth as ground therefore, abrogation of Section 16(5), Art.VIII of the 1973 Constitution by the Freedom Constitution, rendering the petition moot and academic

ISSUES1. WON the case is justiciable2. WON the Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177 is unconstitutionalHELD

1. YES- The court cited Ecelio Javier v. COMELEC where it said that: “This Court will not disregard and in effect condone wrong on the simplistic and tolerant pretext that the case has become moot and academic.”- As regards taxpayers’ suit, this Court enjoys that open discretion to entertain the same or not- Where the legislature or the executive branch acts beyond the scope of its constitutional powers, it becomes the duty of the judiciary to declare what the other branches of the government had assumed to do, as void. This is the essence of judicial power conferred by the Constitution “in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.” 2. YES. Paragraph 1of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177, being repugnant to Section 16(5) Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution, is null and void.- Paragraph 1 of Section 44 provides: “The President shall have the authority to transfer any fund, appropriated for the different departments, bureaus, offices and agencies of the Executive Department, which are included in the General Appropriations Act, to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau, or office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment.” - Section 16(5) Article VIII reads as follows: “No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations, however, the President, the Prime Minister, the Speaker, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of constitutional commissions may by law be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.”- Prohibition to transfer was explicit and categorical- For flexibility, the Constitution provided a leeway- The purpose and condition for which funds may be transferred were specified- Paragraph 1 of Section 44 unduly over-extends the privilege granted under Section 16(5), and empowers the President to indiscriminately transfer funds from one department, bureau, office or agency of the Executive Department, which are included in the General Appropriations Act, to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau, or office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment, without regard to WON the funds to be transferred are savings, or WON the transfer is for the purpose of augmenting the item to which the transfer is to be made- It completely disregards the standards set in the fundamental law, amounting to an undue delegation of legislative power

DE AGBAYANI V PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANKFERNANDO; April 29, 1971

FACTS- Francisca De Agbayani obtained a P450.00loan from PNB dated July 19, 1939 maturing on July 19, 1944, secured by real estate mortgage- As of November 27, 1959 the loan balance was P1,294.00- July 13 1959, PNB instituted extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings in the office of Pangasinan Provincial Sherriff for the recovery of the unpaid loan balance- August 10, 1959 Plaintiff filed suit against PNB and Sheriff alleging that 15 years having elapsed from the date of maturity the mortgage have prescribed.- PNB prayed for the dismissal since the defense of prescription would not be available in the period of March 10, 1945 , when EO 32 providing for a moratorium on debts was issued, to July 26, 1948 when RA 342 which extended the period of moratorium was declared invalid, were to be deducted from the time during which PNB took no legal steps for the recovery of the loan- Lower court ruled in favor of De Agbayani

ISSUES1. WON a statute subsequently adjudged as invalid should be deemed to have force and effect before the declaration of its nullity.

2. (if yes) WON prescription ran during the eight year period that EO 32 and RA 342 was in force.

HELD1. YES Prior to the declaration of nullity a challenged legislative or executive act must have been in force and effect.- The actual existence of a statute, prior to the determination of unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot be justly ignored.2. NOBecause of the judicial recognition that moratorium was a valid governmental response to the plight of the debtors who were war sufferer the SC has made clear its view in a series of cases that during the eight year period that EO 32 and RA 342 was in force, prescription did not run. (cases decided: Day v. CFI, Republic vs. Hernaez.- Orthodox view on an unconstitutional act: An unconstitutional act, for that matter an executive order or a municipal ordinance likewise suffering from that infirmity, cannot be the source of any legal rights or duties. Nor can it justify any official act taken under it.- SC said, in Agbayani vs. PNB that orthodox view is unrealistic and that until after the judiciary declares its invalidity it is entitled to obedience and respect.

DE LA LLANA V ALBAFERNANDO; March 12, 1982

FACTS- The National Assembly enacted the Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, entitled "An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds Therefor and for other Purposes". BP 129 mandates that Justices and Judges of inferior courts from the Court of Appeals to municipal courts, except the occupants of the Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals, unless appointed to the inferior courts established by such Act, would be considered separated from the Judiciary. The intent of this Act is to attain (1) more efficiency in the disposal of cases, (2) improvement in the quality of justice dispensedby the court, (3) democratization of social and economic opportunities and the substantiation of the true meaning of social justice.- Procedure De La Llana,a judge, together with other petitioners filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief and/or Prohibition, seeking to enjoin respondent Minister of the Budget, respondent Chairman of the Commission on Audit, and respondent Minister of Justice from taking any action implementing BP 129.

ISSUES1.WON the petitioners have legal standing.2.On Constitutionality of BP 129

a. WON there was lack of good faith on the part of Legislature in its enactment.b. WON the abolition of an office by the Legislature is valid.c. WON the provision of BP 129 (regarding fixing of compensation and allowances of members of Judiciary by the Executive) constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power.d. WON BP 129 is violative of the security of tenure (Art. X Sec 7 of 1973 Constitution) enjoyed by incumbent justices and judges and the Supreme Court's power to discipline and remove judges.

HELD1.YES. The petitioners, being members of the bar and officers of the court and taxpayers, have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement. 2.a. NO. The Legislature, after careful study and evaluation of the judicial system in the country, found out that institutional reforms is both pressing and urgent. b. YES. The abolition of an office,if within the competence of a legitimate body and if done in good faith suffers from no infirmity.

Reasoning0 adherence to precedent (in Bendanillo Sr. v. Provincial Gov and in Zandueta v. De La Costa, the Court also held that the abolition of anoffice is valid)- Interpretation of the Consti provision - Article VII Sec 2 of 1973 Consti "vests in the NA the power to define, prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts, subject to certain limitation in the case of SC." In short, the NA has the power to abolish an office that it created.c. NO. There is no undue delegation of legislative power if the law is complete and provides for a standard.Reasoning- In this case, the Act provides a clear standard. The President may be authorized to fix the allowances and compensation but guided by theLetter of Implementation No. 93 and pursuant to PD 985.d. NO. Removal from office is different from termination by virtue of the abolition of the office. In case of removal, there is an office with an occupant who would thereby lose his position. In the case of abolition, there is in law no occupant. There can be no tenure to a non-existent office.Reasoning- Conflicting constitutional provisions, the power of the NA to abolish an office on one hand and the security of tenure, on the other, must be reconciled and harmonized. Reconciliation and balancing is well high unavoidable under the fundamental principle of separation of powers.- Political theory (Holmes and Tuazon): There is more truism and actuality of interdependence among different branches of governmentthan in independence and separation of powers. Decision: Dismissed. The unconstitutionality of BP 129 has not been shown.

SEPARATE OPINION

TEEHANKEE [dissent]

The express constitutional guaranty of security of tenure of judges must prevail over the implied constitutional authority to abolish courts and to oust judges. Such subjection of a judge to public "harassment and humiliation ....can diminish public confidence in the courts." The ills the judiciary suffers from were caused by impairing its independence: they will not be cured by totally destroying their independence. It would be ironical if Judges who are called upon to give due process cannot count it on themselves.

BARREDO [concur]

Inferior courts are mere creatures of law (of the Legislature) . It follows that it is within the legislature' s power to abolish or reorganize them no matter what the cost is. He personally believes that the present situation in the judiciary calls for its reorganization. He believes that the Constitution is a living instrument which translates and adapts itself to the demands of obtaining circumstances (realist approach in interpreting the Consti)

AQUINO [concur in the result]

For him the suit is premature, but affirming expressly that the abolition was in good faith. CONCEPCION (concurs in the result)

GUERRERO [concur]

Social justification and the functional utility of the law to uphold its constitutionality is the ratio decidendi of this case. For him, inquiring into the wisdom of the law is a political question. Public office is a privilege in the gift of the State and not a right. Dura lex sed lex, even though it is harsh.

ABAD SANTOS [concur and dissent]

Concurs but dissented on the ground that the statute being free from any constitutional infirmity, the "Executive is entitled to exercise its constitutional power to fill the newly created judicial positions without any obligation to consult with the Supreme Court and to accord its views the fullest consideration.

DE CASTRO [concur except as qualified]

The power of the Legislature to create courts also includes the power to abolish them. When there is a conflict between public welfare(the duty of the legislature to provide a society with a fair and effective judicial system) and personal benefit (security of tenure), the latter must of necessity to yield to the former. The abolition of the courts is a matter of legislative intent into which no judicial inquiry is proper. Petition is premature. No actual controversy yet. Not until the abolition of courts is not done, can there be possibly a violation of the security of tenure. "Salus populi est suprema lex" - The welfare of the people is the supreme law.

MELENCIO-HERRERA [concur]

Tenure of Judges is different from tenure of Courts. A legislature is not bound to give security of tenure to courts. The constitutional guarantee of tenure of Judges applies only as their Courts exist.

ERICTA [concur]

No law is irrepealable. The power to create an office includes the power to abolish them. "Salus populi est suprema lex" - The welfare of the people is the supreme law.

PLANA [concurs and dissent]

Actual and not merely presumptive good faith attended its enactment. His qualification being that the "President is under no obligation to consult with the SC and the SC as such is not called upon to give legal advice to the President."

PEOPLE V CUARESMANARVASA; April 18, 1989

FACTS- On the basis of affidavits of Luz Lumacao and her witness, Soledad Tanilon, both dated August 21,1978 which were sworn to before the First Assistant City Fiscal of Dumaguete City, said Assistant Fiscal filed on the same day an information with the City Court Judge of Dumaguete City charging Rosie Cuaresma with oral defamation. The complaint was docketed as Criminal Case Number 7238.- Rosie Cuaresma moved to quash the case contending that the case had been commenced by an information by the fiscal instead of a complaint of the offended party as required by Article 360 of the revised Penal Code. The said article provides that criminal action for defamation cannot be prosecuted de oficio except at the instance of and upon the complaint expressly filed by the offended party.- The Judge, on August 4, 1980, denied the motion on the basis of the Supreme Court ruling in Fernandez v. Lantin, 74 SCRA 338 (1976), which stated that the error can be corrected by the filing of the sworn statement of the complainant, assuming it contains all the information required under the Rules, with the Court to comply with Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code.

Alternatively, the fiscal can file with the court a verified complaint of the offended party. In the order denying the quashal, the judge, however, required the fiscal to file the verified complaint within ten days. The fiscal complied with the order by filing the needed document on the same day.- Cuaresma filed another motion to quash three months later alleging that the offense had prescribed since the filing of the original information o August 2, 1978 did not interrupt the running of the period of prescription of the crime ( two months from discovery) and that said prescriptive period had long lapsed prior to the submission of the corrective complaint on august 4, 1980. Judge granted her the motion stating that “it was the filing of the verified that conferred jurisdiction upon the Court and this was on August 4, 1980”.- The fiscal belatedly filed a motion for consideration on Jube 26, 1981 which was denied for lack of merit and for having been filed out of time.- Hence this action for certiorari with the Supreme Court as filed by the Second Assistant City Fiscal on May 31, 1984 or three years after the dismissal of the motion to reconsider. ISSUEWON the Supreme Court should give due course to the application for certiorari

HELD1. The order of dismissal dated April 4, 1980 is a final order having been disposed of by the Court. The appeal, if taken in a timely fashion, could have succeeded as the order of the Court was tainted by an error of law. The filing of the complaint in the form of an affidavit, the investigation by the fiscal, and the subsequent filing of the information with the Court did indeed toll the period of prescription. 2. The filing of the writ for certiorari was also improper in several counts:

a. The filing should have been done by the Solicitor General instead of the Second Assistant City Fiscal and was dismissible on this account [Republic v Partisala , 118 SCRA 870 (1982)]. b. Remedy of certiorari is limited to acts of any agency or officer exercising judicial functions or of any judge which are claimed to be without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion. In the case at bar, the correct procedure is the filing of an appeal as the judgment rendered is an error in law and not grave abuse of discretion.c. The Supreme Court’s jurisdiction to issue extraordinary writs (e.g. certiorari, mandamus, etc.) is not exclusive and granted to lower courts. There is also a hierarchy that should be followed in matters of this nature. Direct action to the Supreme Court will be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefore. And these reasons should be clearly set out in the petition.

Decision Petition dismissed.

YNOT V INTERMEDIATE APPELATE COURTCRUZ; March 20, 1987

FACTSThe petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo on January 13, 1984, when they were confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo, for violation of EO No. 626-A. The petitioner sued for recovery, and the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City issued a writ of replevin upon his filing of a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. After considering the merits of the case, the court sustained the confiscation of the carabaos and, since they could no longer be produced, ordered the confiscation of the bond. The court also declined to rule on the constitutionality of the executive order, as raised by the petitioner, for lack of authority and also for its presumed validity. The thrust of his petition is that the executive order is unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes outright confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being transported across provincial boundaries. His claim is that the

penalty is invalid because it is imposed without according the owner a right to be heard before a competent and impartial court as guaranteed by due process. He complains that the measure should not have been presumed, and so sustained, as constitutional. There is also a challenge to the improper exercise of the legislative power by the former President under Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution.

ISSUES1. WON the SC impliedly affirmed the constitutionality of EO No. 626-A2. WON lower courts have authority to rule on constitutionality of statute 3. WON EO No. 626-A violates due process 4. WON EO No. 626-A is an invalid exercise of police power 5. WON EO No. 626-A is an invalid delegation of legislative power

HELD1. NO. While also involving the same executive order, the case of Pesigan v. Angeles is not applicable here. The question raised there was the necessity of the previous publication of the measure in the Official Gazette before it could be considered enforceable. We imposed the requirement then on the basis of due process of law. In doing so, however, this Court did not, as contended by the Solicitor General, impliedly affirm the constitutionality of EO No. 626-A.2. YES. While lower courts should observe a becoming modesty in examining constitutional questions, they are nonetheless not prevented from resolving the same whenever warranted, subject only to review by the highest tribunal. We have jurisdiction under the Constitution to "review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or rules of court may provide," final judgments and orders of lower courts in, among others, all cases involving the constitutionality of certain measures. This simply means that the resolution of such cases may be made in the first instance by these lower courts.3. YES. The minimum requirements of due process are notice and hearing which, generally speaking, may not be dispensed with because they are intended as a safeguard against official arbitrariness. In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the police station commander, were returned to the petitioner only after he had filed a complaint for recovery and given a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00, which was ordered confiscated upon his failure to produce the carabaos when ordered by the trial court. The executive order defined the prohibition, convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed punishment, which was carried out forthright. The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of powers.4. YES. The police power is simply defined as the power inherent in the State to regulate liberty and property for the promotion of the general welfare. To justify the State in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear, first, that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such interference; and second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. The carabao, as the poor man's tractor, so to speak, has a direct relevance to the public welfare and so is a lawful subject of EO No. 626-A. But while the amendatory measure has the same lawful subject as the original executive order, we cannot say with equal certainty that it complies with the second requirement, that there be a lawful method. To strengthen the original measure, EO No. 626-A imposes an absolute ban not on the slaughter of the carabaos but on their movement, providing that "no carabao, regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose (sic) and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to another." The object of the prohibition escapes us. The reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned measure is missing.5. YES. Section 1 of EO No. 626-A reads: “The carabao or carabeef transported in violation of this Executive Order as amended shall be subject to confiscation and forfeiture by the government, to be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat

Inspection Commission may see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos.” There is an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken. The phrase "may see fit" is an extremely generous and dangerous condition. Definitely, there is here a "roving commission," a wide and sweeping authority that is not "canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing," in short, a clearly profligate and therefore invalid delegation of legislative powers.

BENGZON V DRILONGUTIERREZ; April 15, 1992

FACTS- Petition to review the constitutionality of the veto by the President of certain provisions of the General Appropriations Act (GAA) for the Fiscal Year 1992- Petitioners are retired justices of the SC and the CA who were receiving monthly pensions under RA No.910 as amended by RA No. 1797- Respondents Drilon et al are sued in their official capacities of the Executive, involved in the implementation of the release of funds under the GAA- RA910 was enacted in 1953 to provide retirement pensions to Justices of the SC and the CA who have rendered service at least 2o years either in the judiciary or in any branch of govt, or in, both, or having attained the age of 70, or who resign by reason of incapacity to discharge the duties of the office; he shall receive until his death the salary which he has received at the time of his retirement- RA910 was amended by RA1797. Identical retirement benefits were given to Consti Commissions and the AFP, under RA1568, as amended by RA3595, and PD578, respectively- Marcos issued successive decrees which automatically readjusted the retirement pensions of military officers and enlisted men. But those in the judiciary and the Consti Commissions were not included in this automatic readjustment, as Marcos repealed the automatic readjustment provisions (Section 3-a of RA1797 and RA3595) for the judiciary and the Consti Commissions- Realizing this unfairness, Congress in 1990 sought to reenact the repealed provisions by approving a bill on the matter (HB16297 and SB740)- Pres. Aquino vetoed the HB on the ground that it would erode the foundation of the policy on standardization of compensation under the Salary Standardization Law, RA6758- On the other hand, retired CA justices Barcelona and Enriquez filed a petition for readjustment of their pensions in accordance with RA1797 by reasoning out that PD644 repealing RA1797 did not take effect as there was no valid publication pursuant to Tanada v Tuvera, supposedly promulgated in 1975 but published only in the OG in 1983; Court authorized it as a result- As a result of the resolution by the Court, Congress included in the GAA appropriations for the Judiciary intended for the payment of adjusted pensions rates for the retired justices- In Jan 1992, President vetoed portions of Section 1, and the entire Section 4 of the Special Provision for the SC and the Lower Courts on the ground that the President vetoed the HB on the matter already, and such appropriation would erode the policy of salary standardization

ISSUEWON the veto by the president of certain provisions in the General Appropriations Act for the Fiscal Year 1992 relating to the payment of the adjusted pension of the retired Justices of the SC and the CA

HELD- The President did not veto items but provisions of the law in the GAA.

- While veto power is generally all or nothing, vetoing the entire bill or none at all, it does not hold when it comes to appropriation, revenue or tariff bills.

o The Constitution has a item veto power to avoid inexpedient riders being attached to an indispensable appropriation or revenue measure; only a particular item or items may be vetoed

o Item in a bill refers to the particulars, the details, the distinct and severable parts; it is a specific appropriation of money, not some general provision of law, which happens to be put into an appropriation bill

o The President did not veto the general fund adjustment of 500M, to meet certain obligations WHICH is an ITEM.

o What she vetoed were provisions – methods and systems placed by Congress to insure that obligations would be paid when they fell due

o Thus, augmentation of specific appropriations found inadequate to pay retirement benefits is a provision and not an item

o Actually, what she really vetoed were RA1797 and the Resolution of the SC dated Nov 1991. WHICH SHE CANNOT VETO.

- The repealing decrees (PD644) of Marcos re taking away the automatic readjustment for the judiciary never became valid law because it was never published, pursuant to the Tanada v Tuvera doctrine; RA 1797 was never repealed and there was no need for an HB in 1990 to restore it so even the president’s veto of the HB does not even have any effect in the continuing implementation of the law- The Veto by the president trenches upon the constitutional grant of fiscal autonomy to the Judiciary

o Guaranty of full flexibility to allocate and utilize their resources with the wisdom and dispatch that their needs require

o Power to levy, assess and collect fees, fix rates of compensation not exceeding highest rates authorized by law

o Veto is tantamount to dictating to the judiciary how its funds should be utilized

- The Justices have a right to their pensions pursuant to RA1797o The purpose retirement laws like such is to entice competent men

and women to enter the government service and retire with relative security

GARCIA V MACARAEGBARREDO; May 31, 1971

FACTS- Administrative complaint filed by Paz M. Garcia against Hon. Catalino Macaraig, Jr., Judge of the CFI of Laguna Branch VI, now Undersecretary of Justice, in his former capacity as judge, for alleged "dishonesty, violation of his oath of office as judge ... gross incompetence, violation of Republic Act 296 or the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, (particularly) Sections 5, 55 and 58 thereof.- Judge Macaraig took his oath as Judge of the CFI of Laguna and San Pablo City with station at Calamba on June 29, 1970. The court, being one of the 112 newly created CFI branches, had to be organized from scratch. After consultations with the officials of the province of Laguna, the municipality of Calamba and the Department of Justice, he decided to accept the offer of the Calamba Municipal Government to supply the space for the courtroom and offices of the court, to utilize the financial assistance promised by the Laguna provincial government for the purchase of the necessary supplies and materials and to rely on the national government for the equipment needed by the court (Under Section 190 of the Revised Administrative Code, all these items must be furnished by the provincial government The provincial officials of Laguna, however, informed him that the province was not in a position to do so).

- As to the space requirements of the court, the Municipal Mayor of Calamba assured him that the court could be accommodated in the west wing of the Calamba municipal building as soon as the office of the municipal treasurer and his personnel are transferred to another location. When the projected transfer of the municipal treasurer's office was about to be effected, the treasurer and several municipal councilors objected. The municipal mayor then requested Macaraig to look over some of the office spaces for rent in Calamba, with the commitment that the municipal government will shoulder the payment of the rentals. Respondent's first choice was the second floor of the Republic Bank branch in Calamba, but the negotiations failed when the owner of the building refused to reduce the rent to P300 a month. The next suitable space selected by Macaraig was the second floor of the Laguna Development Bank. After a month's negotiations, the municipality finally signed a lease agreement with the owner on October 26, 1970. Another month passed before the municipal government could release the amount necessary for the improvements to convert the space that was rented, which was a big hall without partitions, into a courtroom and offices for the personnel of the court and for the assistant provincial fiscal. Thereafter, upon Macaraig's representations, the provincial government appropriated the amount of P5,000 for the purchase of the supplies and materials needed by the court. Early in December, 1970 respondent also placed his order for the necessary equipment with the Property Officer of the DOJ but, unfortunately, the appropriation for the equipment of the CFI was released only on December 23, 1970 and the procurement of the equipment chargeable against this allotment is still under way.- When Macaraig realized that it would be sometime before he could actually preside over his court, he applied for an extended leave (during the 16 years he had worked in the DOJ, Macaraig had, due to pressure of duties, never gone on extended leave, resulting in his forfeiting all the leave benefits he had earned beyond the maximum ten months allowed by the law). The Secretary of Justice, however, prevailed upon him to forego his leave and instead to assist him, without being extended a formal detail, whenever he was not busy attending to the needs of his court.- Complainant Garcia alleged:

> That from July 1, 1970 up to February 28, 1971 inclusive, respondent has not submitted his monthly reports containing the number of cases filed, disposed of, decided and/or resolved, the number of cases pending decisions for one month, two months to over three months, together with the title, number, number of hours of court session held a day.> That he has not submitted his certificate of service (New Judicial Form No. 86, Revised 1966) from July to December, 1970 and from January to February, 1971 inclusive.> That as incumbent Judge of Branch VI, CFI of Laguna and San Pablo and knowing fully well that he has never performed his official duties or discharged the duties appertaining to his office, he has collected and was paid his salaries from July 1970 to February 1971 in flagrant violation of Section 5 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.> That his deliberate failure to submit the monthly reports on the accomplishments of the Court constitutes a clear violation of Sections 55 and 58 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended.

ISSUEWON respondent is guilty of dishonesty, violation of his oath of office as judge, gross incompetence and violation of Circular No. 10 dated February 6, 1952 of the Department of Justice and RA 296 or the Judiciary Act of 1948 particularly Sections 5, 55 and 58

HELD- Sections 5, 55 and 58 of the Judiciary Act and Circular No. 10 of the Department of Justice are not applicable to a Judge not actually discharging his judicial duties. Respondent's inability to perform his judicial duties under the circumstances does not constitute incompetence. Respondent was, like every lawyer who gets his first appointment to the bench, eager to assume his judicial

duties and rid himself of the stigma of being 'a judge without a sala,' but forces and circumstances beyond his control prevented him from discharging his judicial duties. Respondent's collection of salaries as judge does not constitute dishonesty because aside from the time, effort and money he spent in Organizing the CFI at Calamba, he worked in the Department of Justice.- None of these is to be taken as meaning that this Court looks with favor at the practice of long standing of judges being detailed in the DOJ to assist the Secretary even if it were only in connection with his work of exercising administrative authority over the courts. The line between what a judge may do and what he may not do in collaborating or working with other offices or officers under the other great departments of the government must always be kept clear and jealously observed, lest the principle of separation of powers on which our government tests by mandate of the people thru the Constitution be gradually eroded by practices purportedly motivated by good intentions in the interest of the public service. The fundamental advantages and the necessity of the independence of said three departments from each other, limited only by the specific constitutional precepts on check and balance between and among them, have long been acknowledged as more paramount than the serving of any temporary or passing governmental conveniences or exigencies. It is thus of grave importance to the Judiciary under our present constitutional scheme of government that no Judge of even the lowest court in this Republic should place himself in a position where his actuations on matters submitted to him for action or resolution would be subject to review and prior approval and, worst still, reversal, before they can have legal effect, by any authority other than the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, as the case may be. Needless to say, the Court feels very strongly that it is best that this practice is discontinued.Decision Complaint dismissed. (8 votes to dismiss, Castro & Teehankee took no part.)

SEPARATE OPINION

FERNANDO [concur]

- Respondent Judge Macaraig should not be held in any wise accountable. No taint of bad faith can be attached to his conduct. What he was required to do was in accordance with the practice heretofore followed by the Department of Justice. He is, under the statute in force, under the administrative supervision of its head. Nor can the good faith of Secretary of Justice Abad Santos be impugned. What was done by him was likewise in accordance with what previous secretaries of justice were accustomed to do. The root of the evil then is the statutory authority of the Department of Justice over courts of first instance and other inferior courts. While a distinction could be made between the performance of judicial functions which in no way could be interfered with by the Department and the task of administration which is executive in character, still the conferment of such competence to a department head, an alter ego of the President, is to my mind, not only unwise but of doubtful constitutionality. For in issuing administrative rules and regulations over matters deemed non-judicial, they may trench upon the discretion of judges which should be exercised according to their conscience alone. What is more, the influence that the Secretary has over them is magnified. It is already unavoidable under our scheme of government that they court his goodwill; their promotion may at times depend on it. With this grant of authority, the assertion of independence becomes even more difficult. it is thus objectionable in principle and pernicious in operation. That certainly is not the way to reduce to the minimum any participation of the executive in judicial affairs arising from the power to appoint. As it is, even when the government as the adverse party in criminal cases, tax suits, and other litigations is in the right, a favorable decision from the lower courts could be looked upon with suspicion. The judiciary must not only be independent; it must appear to be so.- The presence in the statute books of such power of administrative oversight then, is, to my mind, anomalous. More specifically, were it not for such power

granted the department head, respondent Judge in this case could not have been called upon to assist the Secretary of Justice. Considering that the Constitutional Convention is about to meet, it is to be hoped that it be made clear that the judiciary is to be totally freed from any supervisory authority of an executive department. (Take note guys that this case was decided just a day before the Manila Hotel inaugural session of the con-con that created the 1973 Consti. And remember that the supervision of the CFI and other inferior courts (under the DOJ in the 1935 Consti) was transferred to the SC under the new Consti which provision was copied in the 1987 Consti. I guess this case was influential in making that change possible. By the way, Macaraig was a former UP law prof.)

BADUA V CORDILLERA BODONG ADMINISTRATIONGRINO-AQUINO; February 14, 1991

FACTSRespondent David Quema alleges that he is the owner of a parcel of land which he mortgaged to Dra. Valera. He was able to redeem the property but only after 22 years. On the other hand, petitioner spouses claim the property was sold to them by Dra. Valera. Quema filed a case before the Barangay Council but when it failed to settle, he filed a complaint in the tribal court of the Maeng Tribe. (The disputed land is located in Villaviciosa, Abra) The tribal court decided in favor of Quema. But as the spouses did not immediately vacate the land, they received a warning order from the Cordillera People’s Liberation Army (CPLA). Petitioners filed this action alleging that respondent Cordillera Bodong Administration’s decision is void for lack of judicial power or jurisdiction. Respondent contends the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction over tribal courts because they are not part of the judicial system.

ISSUEWON a tribal court of the Cordillera Bodong Administration can render a valid and executory decision

HELDNO. Decision of tribal court is annulled for lack of jurisdiction. The creation of the Cordillera Autonomous Region was rejected in a plebiscite by the provinces and cities of the Cordillera Region hence the Cordillera Bodong Administration, the indigenous and special courts for the indigenous cultural communities and the CPLA as a regional command of the Armed Forces of the Philippines do not legally exist. The Maeng Tribal Court not being constituted into an indigenous court, it is but an ordinary tribal court existing under the customs and traditions of an indigenous cultural community. Such tribal courts are not part of the Philippine Judicial System which consists of the Supreme Court and the lower courts which have been established by law. They do not possess judicial power.

PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY V COURT OF APPEALSROMERO; February 5, 1996

FACTS- Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) entered into three contracts regarding various services at the South Harbor:

> With Ocean Terminals Services, Inc. (OTSI). OTSI was granted exclusive right to manage and operate stevedoring services at the South Harbor> With Marina Port Services Inc. (MPSI). MPSI was granted exclusive management and operation of arrastre and container handling services at the South Harbor> With 7-R Ports Services. 7-R was granted warehousing services

- On November 28, 1991, the contract with MPSI was renewed. Part of the contract required the MPSI to cause integration of storage, arrastre and stevedoring services at the South Harbor. Consequently, OTSI and 7-R assigned their respective stevedoring and warehousing services to MPSI. In effect MPSI had the duty and responsibility to manage, operate and render the following services:

- Arrastre- receiving, handling, checking as well as custody and delivery of cargo services. These are services done on land.- Stevedoring- all work performed on board vessel, that is, the process of loading and unloading cargo, stowing inside hatches, compartments and on deck or open cargo spaces on board vessels.- Container Terminal Handling- the services of handling container discharged or loaded unto vessels.- Storage- storing of containers, bulk and break bulk cargoes in all storage areas at the South Harbor.- April 2, 1992, PPA entered into a contract with petitioner Manila Floating Silo Corporation (MAFSICOR) whereby the latter was granted right, privilege, responsibility and authority to provide, operate a floating bulk terminal facilities for bulk cargoes bound for the South Harbor with a proviso that use of such facility shall not be compulsory to bulk shippers or importers. Contract would be enforced for 5 years and shall be on an interim basis until an actual land based bulk terminal plant for the Port of Manila.- Sept. 8, 1192, PPA and MAFSICOR entered a supplemental agreement stating that manpower needed for stevedoring services shall be hired from OTSI.- MPSI filed a petition against PPA and MAFSICOR for “declaratory relief, final injunction with prayer for temporary restraining order and preliminary prohibitory injunction claiming that said contract was in complete derogation of their rights under their contract with PPA.- RTC of Manila through judge Veridiano II, issued TRO directing PPA to maintain status quo and enjoining MAFSICOR from bringing in the floating terminal and set a hearing on the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.- PPA filed an opposition to the issuance of said writ stating PPA-MAFSICOR contract actually supports PPA-MPSI contract as stevedoring manpower would be hired from MPSI. And that on a 2-day public hearing, most of the registrants agreed to the operation of the floating terminal.- MAFSICOR also filed an urgent motion for the lifting of the TRO and a denial of the the preliminary injunction on the ground that an injunctive relief is not available in an action for declaratory relief. They filed another motion to dismiss complaint stating that declaratory relief was not available to MPSI because MAFSICOR was not a party in the PPA-MPSI contract therefore they were not a party-in-interest.- AUGUST 25, 1993, trial court denied writ of preliminary injunction and lifted TRO stating that first, the right to operate a floating terminal was not on the PPA-MPSI contract and there would be no conflict between contracts with MPSI and MAFSICOR since MPSI is not the sole entity authorized to render stevedoring services in the South Harbor and besides, stevedoring services for MAFSICOR shall be provided by OTSI. Second, contract with MAFSICOR was noon-exclusive meaning MPSI could also operate a floating terminal. Third, injunctive relief may not be granted for an action for declaratory relief. Further, MPSI could not question PPA-MAFSICOR contract they being not a party thereto.- MPSI filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the court on Sept. 15, 1993.- Meanwhile on Sept. 3 1993, Katipunan ng mga Manggagawa sa Daungan (KAMADA) the bargaining agent or the 4000 stevedores employed by MPSI, filed a complaint against MPSI, PPA and MAFSICOR for the annulment of PPA-MAFSICOR contract alleging that the operation of the floating bulk would duplicate their function of stevedoring in the South Harbor. They also alleged that MAFSICOR had not contacted them on the matter regarding the hiring of their services in the supplemental contract. Also, KAMADA said that the requirement of MAFSICOR of trained and qualified stevedores (since services in the floating terminal would be done by machine), certainly some of their member employees would be deprived.- Case was raffled and was presided by Judge Mabunay. Court granted TRO stating great and irreparable injuries upon the applicant would result before the matter can be heard on notice.- MAFSICOR filed a motion to dismiss civil case and for the lifting of the TRO (complete reasons in p.224-25). Reasons included Court Circular No. 13-93

which prohibits the issuance of injunction against certain government agencies including public utilities. Motion was denied.- Sept. 10, 1993, MAFSICOR filed a supplement to its motion to dismiss and to lift TRO, raising as an additional reason, Section 1 of P.D. no. 1818 which states that:

“no court in the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order, preliminary injunction, or preliminary mandatory injunction in any case, dispute or controversy involving an infrastructure project… including among others public utilities for the transport of goods or commodities, stevedoring and arrastre contracts, to prohibit any person or persons, entity or government office from proceeding with… the operation of such public utility…”

- MPSI opposed stating MAFSICOR is not a public utility nor is performing a public function and thus non public interest may be affected.- Judge Mabunay denied MAFSICOR’s motion.- Sept. 28,1993, KAMADA case was resolved by Judge Mabunay in which writ was denied due to failure of KAMADA to present clear and convincing evidence of any damages it will suffer.”- Another case was filed by yet another party. This was a case for injunction with provisional remedy of preliminary injunction involving the same PPA-MAFSICOR contract. This was filed by the Chamber of Customs Brokers Inc., the only accredited association for customs brokers in the country, stating that they were never informed of the proposal to put up a floating grains terminal and that operation of such would adversely affect and prejudice its members (reason in p.226-227).- Case was raffled and was presided by Judge Bayhon. Court issued a restraining order. In due course, on October 1, 1993, lower court issued a preliminary injunction upon the filing of MPSI of an injunction bond.- PPA and MAFSICOR filed before the SC a petition for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for an issuance of a TRO and/or preliminary injunction. Petition impleaded Judge Verdiano as a public respondent. Petition also prayed Judges Mabunay and Bayhon be administratively dealt with for disregarding Circular No. 13-93.- Pursuant to Sec. 9(1) of B.P. 29, SC referred case to Court of Appeals.- October 13, 1993, CA issued a writ of preliminary injunction finding that MPSI has exclusive stevedoring rights at the South Harbor and that the operation of a floating grains terminal by MAFSICOR would overlap on the rights of MPSI. On the applicability of PD 1818 and Circular No. 13-93, court stated that what is being stopped temporarily is private respondent’s operation of the floating bulk terminal facility that would lessen MPSI’s stevedoring services as it infringes on the latter’s contractual right.- MAFSICOR filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied.- On June 8, 1994, CA decided that writ of preliminary injunction is made permanent and that Judge Bayhon be permanently enjoined from issuing injunctive orders during the trial of the case in the court.- Thus, CA affirmed the exclusivity of the stevedoring contract in favor of MPSI. That being so, it precluded infringement of the PPA-MPSI contract by the PPA-MAFSICOR contract. CA explained that the floating grains terminal is simply a mechanized unloading of grains cargo from the vessel to the barge or other transport facilities. And also that what is solely done by stevedores is substituted by machines complemented by needed stevedores. With respect to the supplemental agreement which states that stevedores would be hired by MAFSICOR from OTSI, court stated that it was just an adjustment in order not to violate PPA-MPSI contract. And that MAFSICOR can legally excuse themselves from the contract because OTSI already assigned its stevedoring services to MPSI. As regards to forum shopping allegation of MAFSICOR (filing of separate petitions by MPSI, KAMADA and Chamber), court said that there was no forum shopping because petitioners had separate and distinct legal personalities. There also was no proof that they confabulated to forum-shop. On the applicability of PD 1818, CA affirmed its Oct.13 ruling.- PPA and MAFSICOR filed a motion for review on certiorari alleging that Court of Appeals decision: a) violates PD 1818 and Circular No. 13-93, the constitutional principle of separation of judicial and executive powers and

prescription against forum shopping, b) supplants the discretion of the trial court to pass upon the propriety of a preliminary injunction and c) is contrary to the evidence on record.

ISSUEWON PD 1818 applicable to the case

HELDYESRatio “no court in the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order, preliminary injunction, or preliminary mandatory injunction in any case, dispute or controversy involving an infrastructure project… including among others public utilities for the transport of goods or commodities, stevedoring and arrastre contracts, to prohibit any person or persons, entity or government office from proceeding with… the operation of such public utility…”- Clearly, the prohibition in PD 1818 does not cover infrastructure alone. It includes among others stevedoring services. The law being clear, there is no room for interpretation or construction. A verbis legis non est recendum (from the words of a statute there should be no departure).- PD 1818 applies “in controversies involving facts or the exercise of discretion in technical cases.” It is founded on the principle that to allow courts to determine such matters would disturb the smooth functioning of the administrative machinery.- In Republic v. Capulong discretion was defined as “a power or right conferred upon them by law of acting officially under certain circumstances, uncontrolled by the judgment or conscience of others.- Entering into a contract for the operation af a floating grains terminal notwithstanding the existence of other stevedoring contracts pertaining to the South Harbor is undoubtedly an exercise of the discretion on the part of the PPA. No other persons or agencies are in a better position to gauge the need for the floating terminal than the PPA; certainly not the courts. Courts have no brooding of such administrative agencies (Hon. Reinerio Reyes et al v. Hon Doroteo Caneba et al). courts will intervene only to ascertain whether a branch or instrumentality of the Government has transgressed its constitutional boundaries (Bureau Veritas v. Office of the President). Under the separation of powers, the courts may not tread into matters requiring the exercise of discretion of a functionary or office in the executive and legislative branches, unless it is clearly shown that the government official or office abused his or its discretion. In this case there is no showing that the PPA abused its discretion in entering into the contract with MAFSICOR. Judge Veridiano correctly concluded that there is no provision for the putting up of a floating grains terminal in the PPA-MPSA contract. All it covers are the general services of stevedoring. While the operation of a floating grains terminal may be considered as part and parcel of stevedoring as such operation merely entails the mechanization of stevedoring, it was considered by the PPA, in the exercise of its discretion, as necessary to improve the services rendered in the South Harbor in the meantime that no land-based bulk terminal is yet operational.- There are actually instances when PD 1818 should not find application. These are a) where there is clear and grave abuse of discretion b) where the effect of the non-issuance of an injunction or a restraining order would be to “stave off implementation of a government project.” In this case the operation of a floating bulk terminal would augment and improve the over-all operations at the port of Manila and/or stevedoring services awarded to MPSI.- Another contention against the applicability of PD 1818 is that MAFSICOR is a private entity. Such contention betrays a failure to comprehend the functions of the PPA. One of the duties of the PPA is to provide services (whether on its own, by contract or otherwise) within the Port Districts … to make or enter contracts of any kind or nature to enable it to discharge its functions under its decree.- Section 1 of PD 1818 clearly states that an injunction may not be issued to prevent any person or persons, entity or government official from undertaking

the protected activities enumerated. The prohibition therefore applies regardless of whether or not the entity or person being enjoined is a public or private person or entity, provided that the purpose of the law to protect essential government projects in pursuit of economic development is attained.- court did not resolve main issues offered (such as the exclusivity of the PPA-MPSI contract) for resolution therein which necessitates trial on merits. However court took note of the allegations against two judgesDecision Petition on certiorari granted decision of the CA is reversed and set aside.

IN RE: VALENZUELA AND VALLARTANARVASA; November 9, 1998

FACTS- The Resolution of the Court En Banc, handed down on May 14, 1998, sets out the relevant facts.- Referred to the Court En Banc by the Chief Justice are the appointments signed by the President under date of March 30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B. Vallarta as Judges of the Regional Trial Court of Branch 62, Bago City and of Branch 24, Cabanatuan City, respectively.- received at the Chief Justice's chambers on May 12, 1998- view by Senior Associate Justice Florenz D. Regalado, Consultant of the Council, who had been a member of the Committee of the Executive Department and of the Committee on the Judicial Department of the 1986 Constitutional Commission: that on the basis of the Commission's records, the election ban had no application to appointments to the Court of Appeals. Without any extended discussion or any prior research and study on the part of the other Members of the JBC, this hypothesis was accepted, and was then submitted to the President for consideration, together with the Council's nominations for eight (8) vacancies in the Court of Appeals- April 6, 1998: Chief Justice received an official communication from the Executive Secretary transmitting the appointments of eight (8) Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals all of which had been duly signed on March 11, 1998 by the President- In view of the fact that all the appointments had been signed on March 11, 1998 - the day immediately before the commencement of the ban on appointments imposed by Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution - which impliedly indicated that the President's Office did not agree with the hypothesis that appointments to the Judiciary were not covered by said ban, the Chief Justice resolved to defer consideration of nominations for the vacancy in the Supreme Court created by the retirement of Associate Justice Ricardo J. Francisco- May 4, 1998: Chief Justice received a letter from the President, addressed to the JBC, requesting transmission of the "list of final nominees" for the vacancy" no later than Wednesday, May 6, 1998," in view of the duty imposed on him by the Constitution "to fill up the vacancy . . . within ninety (90) days from February 13, 1998, the date the present vacancy occurred."- May 5, 1998: Secretary of Justice Silvestre Bello III requested the Chief Justice for "guidance" respecting the expressed desire of the "regular members" of the JBC to hold a meeting immediately to fill up the vacancy in the Court in line with the President's letter . The Chief Justice advised Secretary Bello to await the reply that he was drafting - May 6, 1998: the Chief Justice sent his reply to the President-- stating that no sessions had been scheduled for the Council until after the May elections because of the "need to undertake further study of the matter," prescinding from "the desire to avoid any constitutional issue regarding the appointment to the mentioned vacancy"; delivered to Malacañang May 6, 1998, and a copy given to the Office of Justice Secretary Bello- Justice Secretary and the regular members of the Council had already taken action –on May 6, 1998 they came to an agreement on a resolution: they drew attention to Section 4 (1), Article VIII of the Constitution (omitting any mention of Section 15, Article VII) as well as to the President's letter of May 4, with an

appeal that the Chief Justice convene the Council for the purpose "on May 7, 1998- CJ convoked the Council to a meeting at 3 o'clock in the afternoon of May 7, 1998- May 7, 1998: Chief Justice received a letter from President: "the election-ban provision applies only to executive appointments or appointments in the executive branch of government," the whole article being "entitled 'EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT.'", "firmly and respectfully reiterate(d) . . . (his) request for the Judicial and Bar Council to transmit . . . the final list of nominees for the lone Supreme Court vacancy."- May 8, 1998: Chief Justice replied: --Section 15 of Article VII imposes a direct prohibition on the President which is the general rule, the only exception being only as regards "executive positions"(judicial positions are covered by the general rule)- Section 4 (1) of Article VIII, unlike Section 15, Article VII, the duty of filling the vacancy is not specifically imposed on the President - normally, when there are no presidential elections Section 4 (1), Article VIII shall apply but when (as now) there are presidential elections, the prohibition in Section 15, Article VII comes into play: the President shall not make any appointments- requesting the regular Members of the Judicial and Bar Council to defer action on the matter until further advice by the Court- May 8, 1998: another meeting was held; closed with a resolution that "the constitutional provisions be referred to the Supreme Court En Banc for appropriate action- May 12, 1998: Chief Justice received from Malacañang the appointments of two (2) Judges of the Regional Trial Court mentioned above; places on the Chief Justice the obligation of transmitting the appointments to the appointees so that they might take their oaths and assume the duties of their office (trouble is that in doing so, the Chief Justice runs the risk of acting in a manner inconsistent with the Constitution)- the Court Resolved that pending the foregoing proceedings and the deliberation by the court on the matter, and until further orders, no action be taken on the appointments of Hon. Valenzuela and Hon. Vallarta which in the meantime shall be held in abeyance and not given any effect and said appointees shall refrain from taking their oath of office and the Judicial and Bar Council is INSTRUCTED to defer all action on the matter of nominations - Valenzuela took his oath on May 14, 1998 -- In his "Explanation" he stated that he did so because on May 7, 1998 he "received from Malacañang copy of his appointment . . ." which contained the following direction: "By virtue hereof, you may qualify and enter upon the performance of the duties of the office"- The Relevant Constitutional ProvisionsSection 15, Article VII:"Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein prejudice public service or endanger public safety."Section 4 (1), Article VIII:"The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or, in its discretion, in divisions of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof ."Section 9, Article VIII:"The Members of the Supreme Court and judges in lower courts shall be appointed by the President from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation.For the lower courts, the President shall issue the appointments within ninety days from the submission of the list."

ISSUE

WON during the period of the ban on appointments imposed by Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution, the President is nonetheless required to fill vacancies in the judiciary, in view of Sections 4(1) and 9 of Article VIII

HELDThe appointments of Messrs. Valenzuela and Vallarta on March 30, 1998 were unquestionably made during the period of the ban. Such appointments come within the operation of the first prohibition relating to appointments which are considered to be for the purpose of buying votes or influencing the election. Reasoning- While the filling of vacancies in the judiciary is undoubtedly in the public interest there is no showing in this case of any compelling reason to justify the making of the appointments during the period of the ban. On the other hand, there is a strong public policy for the prohibition against appointments made within the period of the ban.- Sections 4(1) and 9 of Article VIII simply mean that the President is required to fill vacancies in the courts within the time frames provided therein unless prohibited by Section 15 of Article VII.- journal of the commission which drew up the present Constitution discloses: desire to make certain that the size of the Court would not be decreased for any substantial period as a result of vacancies, the insertion in the provision of the same mandate that "IN CASE OF ANY VACANCY, THE SAME SHALL BE FILLED WITHIN TWO MONTHS FROM OCCURRENCE THEREOF." was proposed- Section 15, Article VII is directed against two types of appointments: (1) those made for buying votes and (2) those made for partisan considerations. The first refers to those appointments made within the two months preceding a Presidential election

The second type of appointments prohibited by Section 15, Article VII consists of the so-called "midnight" appointments- the Court recognized that there may well be appointments to important positions which have to be made even after the proclamation of the new President. Such appointments, so long as they are "few and so spaced as to afford some assurance of deliberate action and careful consideration of the need for the appointment and the appointee's qualifications," can be made by the outgoing President- The exception allows only the making of temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies will prejudice public service or endanger public safety. Obviously, the article greatly restricts the appointing power of the President during the period of the ban.- Considering the respective reasons for the time frames for filling vacancies in the courts and the restriction on the President's power of appointment, it is this Court's view that, as a general proposition, in case of conflict, the former should yield to the latter- the Constitution must be construed in its entirety as one, single instrument; instances may be conceived of the imperative need for an appointment, during the period of the ban, not only in the executive but also in the Supreme Court. - concerning Valenzuela's oath-taking and "reporting for duty"--Standing practice is for the originals of all appointments to the Judiciary to be sent by the Office of the President to the Office of the Chief Justice, the appointments being addressed to the appointees "Thru: the Chief Justice, Supreme Court, Manila." It is the Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court, in the Chief Justice's behalf, who thereafter advises the individual appointees of their appointments and also of the date of commencement of the pre-requisite orientation seminar to be conducted by the Philippine Judicial Academy for new Judges.

OIL AND NATURAL GAS COMMISSION V OCURT OF APPEALS

MARTINEZ; July 23, 1998

FACTS- Oil & Natural Gas Commission (petitioner)- a foreign corporation owned and controlled by the Government of India - Pacific Cement Company (respondent) -a private corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines.- The two parties entered into a contract on Feb 26, 1983, where respondent undertook to supply the petitioner (4,300) metric tons of oil well cement; petitioner to pay ($477,300.00) - The oil well cement was loaded on the ship MV SURUTANA NAVA in Surigao City, for delivery at Bombay and Calcutta, India. - respondent had already received payment but failed to deliver the oil well cement due to a dispute between the ship owner and respondent, the cargo was held up in Bangkok and did not reach its point of destination- so they just agreed that the private respondent will replace the entire 4,300 metric tons of oil well cement with Class "G" cement cost free. However, upon inspection, the Class "G" cement did not conform to the petitioner's specifications.- The petitioner then informed the private respondent that it was referring its claim to an arbitrator pursuant to Clause 16 of their contract- July 23, 1988, the chosen arbitrator (Shri N.N. Malhotra) resolved the dispute in petitioner's favor - Respondent- to pay $ 899,603.77 + 6% interest- To enable the petitioner to execute the award, it filed a Petition before the Court in India praying that the decision of the arbitrator be made "the Rule of Court" in India which the said court granted - The plaintiff shall also be entitled to get from defendant US$899,603.77 with 9% interest per annum till the last date of realization - However, respondent refused to pay- Petitioner filed a complaint to RTC of Surigao- RTC and CA dismissed the complaint

ISSUES1. WON the arbitrator had jurisdiction over the dispute between the petitioner and the private respondent under Clause 16 of the contract; phrased differently, WON the non-delivery of the said cargo is a proper subject for arbitration under the above-quoted Clause 162. WON the judgment of the foreign court is enforceable in this jurisdiction

HELD1. YES. the correct interpretation to give effect to both stipulations in the contract is for Clause 16 to be confined to all claims or disputes arising from or relating to the design, drawing, instructions, specifications or quality of the materials of the supply order/contract, and for Clause 15 to cover all other claims or disputes.- For the sake of argument, granted that the non-delivery of the oil well cement is not a proper subject for arbitration, the failure of the replacement cement to conform to the specifications of the contract is a matter clearly falling within the ambit of Clause 16.2. YES.- This Court has held that matters of remedy and procedure are governed by the lex fori or the internal law of the forum. 32 Thus, if under the procedural rules of the Civil Court of Dehra Dun, India, a valid judgment may be rendered by adopting the arbitrators findings, then the same must be accorded respect- if the procedure in the foreign court mandates that an Order of the Court becomes final and executory upon failure to pay the necessary docket fees, then the courts in this jurisdiction cannot invalidate the order of the foreign court simply because our rules provide otherwise- the private respondent herein, as the party attacking a foreign judgment, has the burden of overcoming the presumption of its validity which it failed to do in the instant case.Decision Petition GRANTED

ART X: LOCAL GOVERNMENT

ABBAS V COMMISSION ON ELECTIONSCORTES; November 10, 1989

FACTS- Petitioner Abbas, a representative of other taxpayers in Mindanao, filed this petition to(1) enjoin the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from conducting the plebiscite and the Secretary of Budget and Management from releasing funds to the COMELEC for that purpose; and (2) declare R.A. No. 6734, or parts thereof, unconstitutional- The 1987 Constitution provides for regional autonomy through Article X, section 15 which provides that "there shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines."- To effectuate this mandate, the Constitution further provides:

Sec. 16. The President shall exercise general supervision over autonomous regions to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. Sec. 17. All powers, functions, and responsibilities not granted by this Constitution or by law to the autonomous regions shall be vested in the National Government.Sec. 18. The Congress shall enact an organic act for each autonomous region with the assistance and participation of the regional consultative commission composed of representatives appointed by the President from a list of nominees from multisectoral bodies. The organic act shall define the basic structure of government for the region consisting of the executive and representative of the constituent political units. The organic acts shall likewise provide for special courts with personal, family, and property law jurisdiction consistent with the provisions of this Constitution and national laws.The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only the provinces, cities, and geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region.Sec. 19 The first Congress elected under this Constitution shall, within eighteen months from the time of organization of both Houses, pass the organic acts for the autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras.Sec. 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national laws, the organic act of autonomous regions shall provide for legislative powers over:

(1) Administrative organization;(2) Creation of sources of revenues;(3) Ancestral domain and natural resources;(4) Personal, family, and property relations;(5) Regional urban and rural planning development;(6) Economic, social and tourism development;(7) Educational policies;

(8) Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and(9) Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the general welfare of the people of the region.

Sec. 21. The preservation of peace and order within the regions shall be the responsibility of the local police agencies which shall be organized, maintained, supervised, and utilized in accordance with applicable laws. The defense and security of the region shall be the responsibility of the National Government.

Pursuant to the constitutional mandate, R.A. No. 6734 was enacted and signed into law on August 1, 1989.The present controversy relates to the plebiscite in thirteen (13) provinces and nine (9) cities in Mindanao and Palawan, scheduled for November 19, 1989, in implementation of Republic Act No. 6734, entitled "An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao."

ISSUES1. WON certain provisions of R.A. No. 6734 conflict with the Tripoli Agreement.2 .WON R.A. 6734, or parts thereof, violates the Constitution.

HELD1. No, RA 6743 does not conflict with the Tripoli Agreement.SC finds it neither necessary nor determinative of the case to rule on the nature of the Tripoli Agreement and its binding effect on the Philippine Government whether under public international or internal Philippine law. The Constitution itself provides for the creation of an autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao. The standard for any inquiry into the validity of R.A. No. 6734 would therefore be what is so provided in the Constitution. Thus, any conflict between the provisions of R.A. No. 6734 and the provisions of the Tripoli Agreement will not have the effect of enjoining the implementation of the Organic Act. Assuming for the sake of argument that the Tripoli Agreement is a binding treaty or international agreement, it would then constitute part of the law of the land. But as internal law it would not be superior to R.A. No. 6734, an enactment of the Congress of the Philippines, rather it would be in the same class as the latter. 2. No, R.A. No. 6734 does not violate 1987 Constitution.a. Petitioner Abbas argues that R.A. No. 6734 unconditionally creates an autonomous region in Mindanao, contrary to the aforequoted provisions of the Constitution on the autonomous region which make the creation of such region dependent upon the outcome of the plebiscite. The reference to the constitutional provision cannot be glossed over for it clearly indicates that the creation of the autonomous region shall take place only in accord with the constitutional requirements. Second, there is a specific provision in the Transitory Provisions (Article XIX) of the Organic Act, which incorporates substantially the same requirements embodied in the Constitution and fills in the details, thus:SEC. 13. The creation of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao shall take effect when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent units provided in paragraph (2) of Sec. 1 of Article II of this Act in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than ninety (90) days or later than one hundred twenty (120) days after the approval of this Act: Provided, That only the provinces and cities voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the Autonomous Region in Muslim

Mindanao. The provinces and cities which in the plebiscite do not vote for inclusion in the Autonomous Region shall remain the existing administrative determination, merge the existing regions.Thus, under the Constitution and R.A. No 6734, the creation of the autonomous region shall take effect only when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite, and only those provinces and cities where a majority vote in favor of the Organic Act shall be included in the autonomous region. The provinces and cities wherein such a majority is not attained shall not be included in the autonomous region. It may be that even if an autonomous region is created, not all of the thirteen (13) provinces and nine (9) cities mentioned in Article II, section 1 (2) of R.A. No. 6734 shall be included therein. The single plebiscite contemplated by the Constitution and R.A. No. 6734 will therefore be determinative of (1) whether there shall be an autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao and (2) which provinces and cities, among those enumerated in R.A. No. 6734, shall compromise it.

b. Equal protection of the law – Petitioner insists that R.A. No. 6734 is unconstitutional because only the provinces of Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Lanao del Sur, Lanao del Norte and Maguindanao and the cities of Marawi and Cotabato, and not all of the thirteen (13) provinces and nine (9) cities included in the Organic Act, possess such concurrence in historical and cultural heritage and other relevant characteristics. By including areas which do not strictly share the same characteristic as the others, petitioner claims that Congress has expanded the scope of the autonomous region which the constitution itself has prescribed to be limited.Petitioner's argument is not tenable. The Constitution lays down the standards by which Congress shall determine which areas should constitute the autonomous region. Guided by these constitutional criteria, the ascertainment by Congress of the areas that share common attributes is within the exclusive realm of the legislature's discretion. Any review of this ascertainment would have to go into the wisdom of the law. SC cannot do this without doing violence to the separation of governmental powers Moreover, equal protection permits of reasonable classification. The guarantee of equal protection is thus not infringed in this case, the classification having been made by Congress on the basis of substantial distinctions as set forth by the Constitution itself.

c. Free exercise of religion – Petitioner questions the validity of R.A. No. 6734 on the ground that it violates the constitutional guarantee on free exercise of religion [Art. III, sec. 5]. The objection centers on a provision in the Organic Act which mandates that should there be any conflict between the Muslim Code [P.D. No. 1083] and the Tribal Code (still be enacted) on the one had, and the national law on the other hand, the Shari'ah courts created under the same Act should apply national law. Petitioners maintain that the islamic law (Shari'ah) is derived from the Koran, which makes it part of divine law. Thus it may not be subjected to any "man-made" national law. Petitioner Abbas supports this objection by enumerating possible instances of conflict between provisions of the Muslim Code and national law, wherein an application of national law might be offensive to a Muslim's religious convictions.

Judicial power includes the duty to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable. [Art. VIII, Sec. 11. As a condition precedent for the power to be exercised, an actual controversy between litigants must first exist. In the present case, no actual controversy between real litigants exists. There are no conflicting claims involving the application of national law resulting in an alleged violation of religious freedom. The Court in this case may not be called upon to resolve what is merely a perceived potential conflict between the provisions the Muslim Code and national law.

TANO V SOCRATESDAVIDE; August 21, 1997

FACTS- special civil action for certiorari and prohibition praying to:

1. declare as unconstitutional: (a) Ordinance No. 15-92, dated 15 December 1992, of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Puerto Princesa(b) Office Order No. 23, Series of 1993, dated 22 January 1993, issued by Acting City Mayor Amado L. Lucero of Puerto Princesa City; and (c) Resolution No. 33, Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1993, dated 19 February 1993, of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan;

2. enjoin the enforcement thereof; and 3. restrain respondents Provincial and City Prosecutors of Palawan and Puerto Princesa City and Judges of the Regional Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Palawan from assuming jurisdiction over and hearing cases concerning the violation of the Ordinances and of the Office Order.

- Ordinance No. 15-92 - took effect on January 1, 1993- entitled: "AN ORDINANCE BANNING THE SHIPMENT OF ALL LIVE FISH AND LOBSTER OUTSIDE PUERTO PRINCESA CITY FROM JANUARY 1, 1993 TO JANUARY 1, 1998 AND PROVIDING EXEMPTIONS, PENALTIES AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES THEREOF," - Purpose: to effectively free our water from Cyanide and other Obnoxious substance- unlawful for any person, business enterprise, company to ship out from Puerto Princesa City to any point of destination either via aircraft or seacraft of any live fish (all alive, breathing not necessarily moving, used for foor and for aquarium purposes) and lobster except SEA BASS (apahap), CATFISH (hito-hito), MUDFISH (dalag), AND MILKFISH FRIES.- Penalty: fine of not more than P5,000.00, imprisonment of not more than 12 mos and/or cancellation of their permit to do business in the City of Puerto Princesa

- Office Order No. 23, Series of 1993 - pursuant to City Ordinance No. PD426-14-74 (requirement of mayor’s permit) and Ordinance No. 15-92 (banning of shipment of live fish and lobster), authorized and directed to check or conduct necessary inspections on cargoes containing live fish and lobster to ascertain whether the shipper possessed the required Mayor's Permit issued by this Office and the shipment is covered by invoice or clearance issued by the local office of the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources

- Resolution No. 33 - prohibits catching, gathering, possessing, buying, selling, and shipment of live marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms coming from Palawan waters (mameng, suno, panther/senorita, taklobo, mother of pearl, giant clams, tiger prawn, loba/green grouper, tropical aquarium fishes) for a period of five years - WHEREAS

- studies disclose only 5% of the corals of Palawan remain to be in excellent condition

- cannot be gainsaid that destruction and devastation of the corals of our province were principally due to illegal fishing activities like dynamite fishing, sodium cyanide fishing, use of other obnoxious substances- need to protect and preserve the existence of the remaining excellent corals and allow the devastated ones to regenerate within 5 years- RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991) empowers the Sangguniang Panlalawigan to protect the environment and impose appropriate penalties e.g. to dynamite fishing and other forms of destructive fishing

- Ordinance No. 2- prohibits catching, gathering, possessing, buying, selling, and shipment of live marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms coming from Palawan waters (mameng, suno, panther/senorita, taklobo, mother of pearl, giant clams, tiger prawn, loba/green grouper, tropical aquarium fishes) for a period of five years - Policy Considerations:

- Sec. 2-A (RA 7160: policy of the state that subdivisions of the State shall enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy to be self-reliant communities, more responsive and accountable local government structure through a system of decentralization whereby local government units shall be given more powers, authority, responsibilities and resources.- Sec. 5-A (RA 7160): Any fair and reasonable doubts as to the existence of the power shall be interpreted in favor of the Local Government Unit concerned- Sec. 5-C (RA 7160). The general welfare provisions in this Code shall be liberally interpreted to give more powers to LGU in accelerating economic development and upgrading the quality of life for the people in the community.- Sec. 16 (RA 7160). Every LGU shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance; and those which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare.

- Policy of the Province of Palawan: to protect and conserve the marine resources of Palawan - Penalty: fine of not more P5,000.00, and/or imprisonment of 6 mos to 12 mos and confiscation and forfeiture of paraphernalia

- Petitioners Allege:- Ordinances deprived them of due process of law (no consultation), their livelihood (all the fishermen of Palawan), and unduly restricted them from the practice of their trade (Airline Shippers Association of Palawan), in violation of Art XII Sec 2 (2) (3)39 and Art XIII Sec 240, 741 (1987).- Office Order No. 23 contained no regulation or condition under which the Mayor's permit could be granted or denied (Mayor - absolute authority WON to issue permit)- Ordinance No. 2 altogether prohibited the catching, gathering, possession, buying, selling and shipping of live marine coral dwelling organisms, without

39 Art XII Sec 2 (2): The State shall protect the nation’s marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial

sea, and exclusive economic zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens.(3) The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens, as well as cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and fisherworks in rivers, lakes, bays and lagoons. 40

Art XIII Sec 2: The promotion of social justice shall include the commitment to create economic opportunities based on freedom of initiative and self-reliance. 41

Art XIII Sec 7: The State shall protect the rights of subsistence fishermen, especially of local communities, to the preferential use of the communal marine and fishing resources, both inland and offshore. It shall provide support to such fishermen through appropriate technology and research, adequate financial, production, and marketing assistance, and other services. The State shall also protect, develop, and conserve such resources. The protection shall extend to offshore fishing grounds of subsistence fishermen against foreign intrusion. Fisherworks shall receive a just share form their labor in the utilization of marine and fishing resources.

any distinction whether it was caught or gathered through lawful fishing method

- fishermen to earn their livelihood in lawful ways- members of Airline Shippers Association were unduly prevented from pursuing their vocation and entering contracts essential to carry out their business endeavors to a successful conclusion

- if Ordinance No. 2 is null and void, TF criminal cases against Tano et al have to be dismissed

- Interests of petitioners- Tano et al: to prevent prosecution, trial and determination of the criminal cases until constitutionality or legality of the said Ordinances they allegedly violated shall have been resolved - Airline Shippers Association of Palawan and 77 fishermen: declaratory relief because Ordinances adversely affects them

ISSUES1. WON SC has jurisdiction2. WON Ordinances 15-92, Office Order 23, Ordinance 2 of Resolution 33 are constitutional

HELD1.NO because there is clear disregard for hierarchy of courts and petitioners have no cause of action BUT SC opt to resolve this case because of the lifetime of the challenged Ordinances is about to end (1993-1998).ReasoningPetitioners Tano, et al WRT cause of action- no cause of action because there is no showing that the petitioners filed a Motion to Quash the information in their respective criminal cases that would have this remedy proper therefore the petitioners cannot allege the lower courts of having acted in excess of their jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion- If petitioners filed motion to quash information, it should have contained that the facts charged do not constitute an offense because the ordinances in question are unconstitutional. BUT if their Motion to Quash was denied, the remedy is not certiorari but to go to trial without prejudice to reiterating special defenses and if an adverse decision is rendered, an appeal should have been the proper remedy. And if there is an exceptional circumstance where special civil action for certiorari may be filed, the lower court must be accorded a Motion for Reconsideration to allow itself to correct any errorsPetitioners Airline Shippers et al WRT Declaratory Relief - SC is not possessed of original jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory relief even if only questions of law are involved being settled that the SC merely exercises appellate jurisdiction over such petitionsPeople v Cuaresma- There is after all hierarchy of courts. A direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is established policy… strict adherence thereto in the light of what it perceives to be a growing tendency on the part of litigants and lawyers to have their applications for the so-called extraordinary writs… directly and immediately by the highest tribunal of the land...Santiago v Vasques- judicial policy that SC will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts or where exceptional and compelling circumstances justify availment of a remedy within and calling for the exercise of its primary jurisdictionBUT, these Ordinances were undoubtedly enacted in the exercise of powers under the new LGC relative to the protection and preservation of the environment and are thus novel and or paramount importance. No further delay then may be allowed.2. YES, since it is settled that laws, including ordinances of LGUs enjoy the presumption of constitutionality and the petitioners did not present clear, convincing and unequivocal evidence to overthrow this assumption.

ReasoningPeralta v COMELEC

- presumption of constitutionality of laws including ordinances of LGUs and to overthrow this presumption, it must be shown beyond reasonable doubt.

Subsistence or Marginal Fishermen- There is no showing that any of the petitioners qualify as subsistence or marginal fishermen

> Airline Shipping Association of Palawan: a private association composed of marine merchants> Virginia and Robert Lim: merchants> the rest of petitioners: fishermen without any qualification to their status

- Since consti does not provide for the definition of subsistence or marginal Marginal Fisherman- Generally, an individual engaged in fishing whose margin of return or reward in his harvest of fish is barely sufficient to yield a profit or cover the cost of gathering fish- Sec 13 RA7160 an individual engaged in subsistence fishing which shall be limited to the sale, barter or exchange of agricultural or marine products produced by himself and his immediate family Subsistence Fishermen- Generally, one whose catch yields but the irreducible minimum for his livelihoodArt XII Sec 2- aim primarily not to bestow any right of subsistence fishermen but to lay stress on the duty of the State to protect the nation’s marine wealth- provision merely recognizes priority to subsistence fishermenSec 149 of LGC- only provision of law which speaks of preferential right of marginal fishermenJoint Administrative Order No. 3 (1996)- prescribed guidelines concerning preferential treatment of small fisherfolk relative to fishery right in Sec 149 but this case does not involve such fishery right

Protection of the Environment v Right of Marginal FishermenArt XIII Sec 7- speaks not only of communal marine and fishing resources but of their protection, development, and conservationArt XII Sec 2 (Regalian Doctrine) - marine resources belong to the State and EDU shall be under full control and supervision of the StateConstitutional Commission - between Rodrigo and Bengzon- marginal fishermen subject to rules and regulations and local lawsOposa v Factoran - even though balanced and healthful ecology is under Declaration of Principles and State Policies it does not follow that is less important the civil and political rights enshrined in the Bill of Rights… for it concerns self-preservation and self-perpetuation… this basic right need not be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of humankindSec 16 LGC - right of people to a balanced and healthful ecology in General Welfare Clause

Realization of the General Welfare Clause, Decentralization and Exercise of Police Power

Sec 5(c) LGC- general welfare provisions of the LGC shall be liberally interpreted to give more powers to the LGU in accelerating economic development and upgrading the quality of lifeFishery Laws- that LGU may enforce under Sec 17 in municipal water include

- PD 704 - PD 1015 – closed season

- PD 1219 – exploration, exploitation, utilization, conservation of coral resources- PD 5474 – unlawful to catch, sell, etc. ipon during closed season- PD 6451 – prohibits and punishes electrofishing

Memorandum of Agreement (1994)- between Dept of Agriculture and DILG- issuance of permits to construct fish cages, gather aquarium fishes, gather kapis shells, gather/culture shelled mollusks, establish seaweed farms, establish culture pearls, transports fish and fishery products and establishment of closed season RA 7611 Strategic Environment Plan for Palawan Act- comprehensive framework for sustainable development of Palawan compatible with protecting and enhancing the natural resources and endangered environment of the province which shall serve to guide the local government of Palawan nd the government agencies concerned in the formulation and implementation of plans, programs and projects affecting Palawan

Principal Objectives of Ordinances1) establish closed season for the species covered in the said ordinances for a period of five years2) to protect the corals in the marine waters of Puerto Princesa and Palawan from further destruction due to illegal fishing activities

Jurisdiction of BFAR or LGU- Bellosillo: Lack of authority of Sangguniang Panlungsod of Puerto Princesa to enact Ordinance 15 Series of 1992 because supposed to be within the jurisdiction and respoinsibility of BFAR (Fisheries and Aquatic Resources) under PD 704 otherwise known as Fisheries Act of 1975 TF unenforceable for lack of approval by the Secretary of DNR (Natl Res)- Majority: BFAR jurisdiction over management, conservation, development, etc not all-encompassing; excludes municipal waters; BFAR no longer under DNR, now under DoA TF incorrect to challenge that ordinances unenforceable because no approval of Sec of DENR but of Sec of DoA instead; BUT this can be dispensed with because of Repealing Claus of LGC insofar as those provisions are inconsistent and power to enact ordinances to enhance right of people to a balanced ecology contained in the General Welfare Clause in the LGCDecision Petition dismissed for lack of merit and TRO liftedVoting 10 concur, 4 dissent, 1 on leave

SEPARATE OPINION

MENDOZA [concur]

- fully concurs with the decision- two important points: uphold presumption of validity of the ordinances in view of total absence of evidence that undermine their factual basis AND need not allow shortcircuiting of the normal process of adjudication on the mere plea that unless we take cognizance of petitions like this, by-passing the trial courts, alleged violations of constitutional rights will be left unprotected, when the matter can be very well be looked into by trial courts and in fact it should be brought there

BELLOSILLO [dissent]

- Lack of authority of Sangguniang Panlungsod of Puerto Princesa to enact Ordinance 15 Series of 1992 because supposed to be within the jurisdiction and respoinsibility of BFAR (Fisheries and Aquatic Resources) under PD 704 otherwise known as Fisheries Act of 1975 TF unenforceable for lack of approval by the Secretary of DNR (Natl Res)

PROVINCE OF BATANGAS V ROMULO

CALLEJO; May 30, 2004

FACTS- EO 48 – issued by Pres. Estrada on 12/07/98 entitled “Establishing a Program for Devolution Adjustment and Equalization”:

Devolution Adjustment and Equalization Fund was created DBM was directed to set aside an amount to be determined by the

Oversight Committee based on appraisal surveys by DILG Oversight Committee (which was constituted under Local Gov’t Code of

1991) has been tasked to issue implementing rules and regulations governing equitable allocation and distribution of the said fund to the LGUs

- GAA of 1999 – In this General Appropriations Act, the program was renamed as Local Gov’t Service Equalization Fund (LGSEF)

Php96.78B was the allotted share of the LGUs in the IR taxes “Special Provisions” included that the amount of Php5B shall be

earmarked for LGSEF, and it shall be released to the LGUs subject to the IRR (Implementing Rules and Regulations) prescribed by the Oversight Committee

Internal Revenue Allotment shall be released directly by the DBM to the LGUs concerned

- OCD Resolutions – Oversight Committee allocated Php5B as follows: Php2B in accordance with formula sharing scheme prescribed under

LGC of 1991 Php2B allocated with a modified CODEF sharing scheme Php1B to be earmarked to support local affirmative action projects and

other priority initiatives; proposals were to be submitted by the LGUs to the Oversight Committee subject to its approval (OC prescribed a Criteria for Eligibility)

- GAA of 2000 – Also contained a proviso earmarking Php5B of the IRA for the LGSEF (similar to GAA of 1999)

Php3.5B shared by the LGUs using a percentage-sharing formula agreed upon by the various Leagues of LGUs

Php1.5B to be earmarked for projects, which are to be endorsed to and approved by the Oversight Committee

- GAA of 2001 – GAA of 2000 was deemed re-enacted and OC allocated Php5B LGSEF as follows:

Php3B according to the modified codal formula Php1.9B is earmarked for priority projects Php100M for capability building fund subject to OC’s approval

- ProcedureProvince of Batangas, represented by Gov. MANDANAS filed a petition for CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION, and MANDAMUS to declare as unconstitutional the assailed provisos in GAA of 99, ’00, ’01 and OCD Resolutions and was issued against Exec. Sec. ROMULO (Chairman of Oversight Committee on Devolution), Sec. BONCODIN (Dept. of Budget and Mngmt.), and Sec. LINA (DILG) - Petitioner’s grounds –

Violative of Sec.6 Art.10 of 1987 Consti (just share must be automatically released to the LGUs)

Vesting the Oversight Committee with authority in determining distribution and release of LGSEF is contrary to the principle of local autonomy

Improper sharing scheme (provisos modified sec.285 of LGC) resulting to an illegal amendment by the Executive branch of substantive law

ISSUESProcedural1. WON petitioner has legal standing2. WON petition involves factual questions properly cognizable by lower courts3. WON petition has been rendered moot and academicSubstantive

4. WON assailed provisos violate constitutional provision on local autonomy5. WON the assailed provisos result to a proper amendment of sharing scheme provided in LGC

HELD1. Yes.- The petitioner seeks relief in order to protect or vindicate its own interests, which pertains to the LGUs’ share in the national taxes (IRA). The potential injury it stands to suffer is the diminution of its share in the IRA, which is clearly “a plain, direct and adequate interest.”2. No.- It involves a legal question (on what is the proper legal interpretation) which is to be settled by the SC. Also, the facts necessary to resolve the issue need not be determined by a trial court since they are not disputed.3. No.- Even if the LGSEF for ’99, ’00, and ’01 have already been released, there is still compelling reason for the SC to resolve substantive issues.- “Even in cases where supervening events, whether intended or accidental, had made the cases moot, the Court did not hesitate to resolve the legal or constitutional issues raised to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, bar and public.”Obiter- Sec.25 Art.2: The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments.- Sec.2 Art.10: The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy.- President’s power over LGUs is one of general supervision, and this excludes power of control. (Drilon v. Lim: “The supervisor merely sees to it that the rules are followed, but he himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he have the discretion to modify or replace them.”)- Autonomy is either DECENTRALIZATION of ADMINISTRATION or decentralization of POWER. - LOCAL AUTONOMY means a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization. LGUs are subject to regulation, however limited, for no other purpose than to enhance self-government.- Local autonomy includes both ADMINISTRATIVE (autonomy in the exercise of its functions) and FISCAL AUTONOMY (power to create own sources of revenue, in addition to equitable share in national taxes.)4. Yes.- Sec.6 Art.10 mandates that -

o LGUs shall have a JUST SHARE in the NATIONAL TAXESo “Just share” shall be DETERMINED BY LAWo “Just share” shall be AUTOMATICALLY RELEASED to the LGUs

- As such, the LGUs are NOT required to perform any act to receive the “just share” accruing to them from national taxes (Sec.286 LGC: It shall be released to them without need of further action.”) The provision is IMPERATIVE. Any retention is prohibited.- Ratio To subject the distribution and release of the LGSEF to implementing rules and regulations, including mechanisms prescribed by the OC, as sanctioned by the provisos in the GAAs of ’99, ’00, ’01 and the OCD Resolutions makes the release NOT automatic, which violates the Constitution.- OC exercising jurisdiction and control contradicts principle of local autonomy. There is also NO STATUTORY BASIS for this power since the OC was created merely to formulate rules and regulations for efficient implementation of the LGC (only ad hoc character)- As evident from the Con-Com deliberations, the Automatic release provision was intended to GUARANTEE principle of local autonomy. 5. No. - The sharing scheme provided for in the LGC is fixed and may not be reduced except “in the event that the national government incurs an unmanageable public sector deficit.” (Sec.285 LGC: Provinces – 23%, Cities – 23%, Municipalities – 34%, Barangays – 20%)

- Congress may amend LGC but should do so through a separate law, and not just through an appropriations law. Decision Petition granted.

Provisions relating to LGSEF declared unconstitutional. Respondents are directed to rectify unlawful distribution of LGSEF. Entire IRA to be released automatically without further action by LGUs.

MIRANDA V AGUIRREPUNO; September 16, 1999

FACTS- Special Civil Action in Supreme Court. of prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction.- Petitioners are Miranda, mayor of Santiago City at time of filing of petition, and residents of Santiago City (located in Province of Isabela)- Respondents are executive, local government and budget secretaries, and public officials of the province of Isabela- Intervenor is winner of additional seat in provincial board brought about by the “reallocation.”

- Assailed is the constitutionality of RA 8528 –AN ACT AMENDING CERTAIN SECTIONS OF RA 7720(AN ACT CONVERTING THE MUNICIPALITY OF SANTIAGO INTO AN INDEPENDENT COMPONENT CITY TO BE KNOWN AS THE CITY OF SANTIAGO.)

- The RA deletes the word “independent” and treats Santiago City just as a component city. Its territory and territorial jurisdiction remains unchanged.

- Petitioners believe that this amounts to a conversion of Santiago City and must therefore be decided by the city’s citizens in a plebiscite, of which the RA has no provisions provided for. Respondents, on the other hand, deem that this is a mere reclassification.

ISSUES1. WON issue is justiciable2. WON a plebiscite must be provided

HELD1. Ratio The enumeration in Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution shall include any material change in the political and economic rights of the local government unit(s) directly affected.- Petitioners have standing. The change will affect the powers of the mayor and the voting exercise of residents.- Not a political question. Petitioners claim that under Sec. 10, Art. X of the 1987 Constitution they have a right to approve or disapprove RA 8528 in a plebiscite before it can be enforced. The Court has the duty to ensure that Congress complies with the Constitution in law-making.2. Ratio The change from independent component city to component city shall amount to a conversion which therefore requires a plebiscite as contemplated in Rule II, Article 6, paragraph (f) (1) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Local Government Code. - Sec. 10, Art. X of the 1987 Constitution provides:“No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, or divided, merged, or abolished, or its boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.”- Respondents emphasize that the change provided in the RA is not among those enumerated in the foregoing provision. Moreover, the territory and boundaries of Santiago City remained unchanged.- But the ponente points out that there is a common denominator among those enumerated in the provision –all of them result to a material change in the political and economic rights of the local government units directly affected and the people therein. The same applies to the present case.

- As the petitioners mentioned, the change of Santiago City from independent component city to component city will have the following effects:

From being directly under the Office of the President, the city will be reverted to the Provincial Government of Isabela, thereby increasing its land area and subsequently increasing its share in the internal revenue allotment.

Taxes which the city collects for its benefit will be redefined and may be shared with the province.

Allocation of operating funds will now come from the Province which amounts to a decrease in the city’s funds.

Registered voters of Santiago City will vote for and can be voted as provincial officials

City officials, especially the mayor, will now be under the control of the Provincial Governor

Resolutions and ordinances by the Sangguniang Panlungsod will now be subject to review of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan

- Clearly this amounts to a conversion if not a downgrade of Santiago City.- Rule II, Article 6, paragraph (f) (1) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Local Government Code is in accord with the Constitution when it provides that:- “(f) Plebiscite –(1) no creation, conversion, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries of LGUs shall take effect unless approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose in the LGU or LGUs affected. The plebiscite shall be conducted by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) within one hundred twenty (120) days from the effectivity of the law or ordinance prescribing such action, unless said law or ordinance fixes another date.”Decision Petition is granted. Republic Act No. 8528 is declared unconstitutional and the writ of prohibition is hereby issued commanding the respondents to desist from implementing said law.Voting 10 concur; 4 dissent

TORRALBA V MUNICIPALITYMELENCIO-HERRERA; January 29, 1987

FACTS- Residents and taxpayers of Butuan City with Torralba, a member of the Sangguniang Panglungsod of the same city contend that Batas Pambansa (BP) 56, creating the Municipality of Sibagat, Province of Agusan del Sur, violated Sec. 3, Art. 11 of the 1973 Constitution: No province, city, municipality, or barrio may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code, and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected. Petitioners argue that under the said provision, the Local Government Code must first be enacted to determine the criteria of the creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of the boundary of any province, municipality, or barrio; and that since no Local Government Code had as yet been enacted as of the date BP 56 was passed, the statute could not have possibly complied with any criteria when respondent Municipality was created. Hence, it is null and void. - The Local Government Code was enacted only on 10 February 1983 so that when BP 56 was enacted, the Code was not yet in existence. A plebiscite had also been conducted among the people of the unit/units affected by the creation of the new Municipality, who expressed approval thereof; and that officials of the newly created Municipality had been appointed and had assumed there respective positions as such.

ISSUE WON BP Blg 56 is unconstitutional.

HELD

- No. The absence of the Local Government Code at the time of its enactment did not curtail nor was it intended to cripple legislative competence to create municipal corporations. Sec. 3, Art. 11 of the 1973 does not prohibit the modification of territorial and political subdivisions before the enactment of the Local Government Code. It contains no requirement that the Local Government Code is a condition sine qua non for creating a new municipality, in much the same way that creating a new municipality does not preclude the enactment of a Local Government Code. What the constitutional provision means is that the once said Code is enacted, the creation, modification or dissolution of local government units should conform to the criteria thus laid down. In the interregnum, before the enactment of such code, the legislative power remains plenary except that the creation of the new local government unit should be approved by the people concerned in a plebiscite called for the purpose.- The creation of the new Municipality of Sibagat conformed to said requisite. A plebiscite was conducted and the people of the unit/units affected endorsed and approved the creation of the new local government unit. Further, it is a long-recognized principle that the power to create a municipal corporation is essentially legislative in nature. Absent any constitutional limitations, a legislative body may create any corporation it deems essential for the more efficient administration of government. The creation of the new municipality of Sibagat was a valid exercise of the legislative power then vested by the 1973 Constitution in the Interim Batasang Pambansa.

TAN V COMMISSION ON ELECTIONSALAMPAY; July 11, 1986

FACTS- A plebiscite was held on January 3, 1986 which divided the province of Negros Occidental into two – Negros del Norte and Negros Occidental.- The petitioners, residents of the province of Negros Occidental, challenge the constitutionality of the Batas Pambansa Blg. 885, the act which created Negros del Norte. The said law provides that some cities from the island of Negros would be separated in order to create the new province, subject to a concurrence of the majority in a plebiscite. - The petitioners contend that the act is not in accord with the Local Government Code as in Article 11, Section 3 of the Constitution. The Constitution provides that a plebiscite be held “in the unit or units affected”. The petitioners said that Negros Occidental is a unit affected by the creation of the new province, thus, they should be allowed to vote. Also, they contend that the minimum requirement of 3500 square kilometers for the creation of a new province (as provided by the Local Government Code) has not been complied since the Negros del Norte is only comprised of 2856.56 square kilometers. They pray that the plebiscite be declared null and void, and that the Court order the COMELEC to conduct another plebiscite which includes Negros Occidental.- The respondents, meanwhile, argue that the term “unit or units affected” does not include Negros Occidental. As such, they cited a Paredes vs. Executive Secretary, where the court ruled that only the members of the newly created barangay are allowed to vote in the plebiscite. Also, they contend that Negros del Norte actually is comprised of 4,019.95 square kilometers, thus, it has met the requirement of the LGC. Lastly, they argue that since the plebiscite has already happened, the case is moot and academic.

ISSUES1. WON the case is moot and academic2. WON the act complied with the constitutional requirements

HELD1. No. The case cannot be truly viewed as moot and academic. The legality of the plebiscite itself is being challenged by the petitioners. The Court has the duty to repudiate acts which run counter to the Constitution, done by whatever branch of government.

2. No.Plebiscite - The province of the Negros Occidental should be allowed to vote in the plebiscite. It is clear that they are part of the “units affected” by the creation of the new province, it being the “parent province”. - The case cited by the petitioners, Paredes vs. Executive Secretary, is different with the case at bar. It merely includes the division of a barangay, the smallest political unit. This case refers to a division of the largest political unit, a barangay, thus there will be more problems involved. The Court also looked at the dissent of Justice Vicente Abad Santos in that case, which mimics they decision of the Court in this case. - Looking at Parliamentary Bill No. 3644, the bill wherein BP Blg. 885 originated, it clearly said that a plebiscite “shall be conducted in the areas affected”. BP Blg. 885, on the other hand, says that a plebiscite “shall be conducted in the proposed new province which are the areas affected”. The Court found no legal basis for the change.- The Court also declared the pronouncement in Paredes vs Executive Secretary is abandoned.- However, the act being unconstitutional, the Court cannot direct the conduct of a new plebiscite, there being no legal basis to do so.Minimum area requirement - Upon examining the certification issued by the Provincial Treasurer, the new province, at most, has a land area of only 2765.4 square kilometers. Respondent’s contention that the term “land area” is meant to include not only land, but water also cannot be appreciated. The Court looked at the last sentence of the first paragraph of Sec 197 of the LGC which states that “the territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two or more islands”. It is clear that the use of the word territory has reference only to land mass since it speaks of territory not needing to be contiguous or adjacent to each other.Decision Petition granted. BP Blg. 885 declared unconstitutional. The plebiscite is void as well as the proclamation of Negros del Norte as a new province and the appointment of its new officials.

SEPARATE OPINION

TEEHANKEE

- congratulated the Court in its unanimity in the decision.- Additional facts: Act was approved in “deep secrecy and inordinate haste” in the last day of session, Dec 3, 1985. Though the act provided that a plebiscite be conducted 120 days its approval, but the plebiscite was held in Jan 3, 1986. The petitioners filed the case in Dec 23, 1985, even as no printed copies of the Act were available, since its has not been published. Since it was Christmas break at that time, the petition was only acted upon by the Court only on January 7, 1986, after the plebiscite has been held.

CORDILLERA BROAD COALITION V COMMISSION ON AUDIT

CORTES; January 29, 1990

FACTS- Note Read first sec. 15-21, Art. X of the 1987 Constitution for this case.- The constitutionality of Executive Order No. 220, dated July 15,1987, which created the Cordillera Administrative Region, is assailed on the primary ground that it pre-empts the enactment of an organic act by the Congress (see sec. 18, Art. X) and the creation of the autonomous region in the Cordilleras conditional on the approval of the act through a plebiscite.- Executive Order No. 220, issued by the President in the exercise of her legislative powers under Art. XVIII, sec. 6 of the 1987 Constitution, created the Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR), which covers the provinces of Abra,

Benguet, Ifugao, Kalinga-Apayao and Mountain Province and the City of Baguio [secs. 1 and 2].- It was created to accelerate economic and social growth in the region and to prepare for the establishment of the autonomous region in the Cordilleras [sec. 3]. - Its main function is to coordinate the planning and implementation of programs and services in the region, particularly, to coordinate with the local government units as well as with the executive departments of the National Government in the supervision of field offices and in identifying, planning, monitoring, and accepting projects and activities in the region [sec. 5)].- It shall also monitor the implementation of all ongoing national and local government projects in the region.- The CAR shall have a Cordillera Regional Assembly as a policy formulating body and a Cordillera Executive Board as an implementing arm (secs. 7, 8 and 10].- The CAR and the Assembly and Executive Board shall exist until such time as the autonomous regional government is established and organized [sec. 17].- Explaining the rationale for the issuance of E.O. No. 220, its last "Whereas" clause provides:

WHEREAS, pending the convening of the first Congress and the enactment of the organic act for a Cordillera autonomous region, there is an urgent need, in the interest of national security and public order, for the President to reorganize immediately the existing administrative structure in the Cordilleras to suit it to the existing political realities therein and the Government's legitimate concerns in the areas, without attempting to pre-empt the constitutional duty of the first Congress to undertake the creation of an autonomous region on a permanent basis.

- During the pendency of this case, Republic Act No. 6766 entitled "An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region," was enacted and signed into law. The Act recognizes the CAR and the offices and agencies created under E.O. No. 220 and its transitory nature.

ISSUE1. WON EO No. 220 is unconstitutional because it pre-empts the enactment of an organic act by the Congress and the creation of the autonomous region in the Cordilleras conditional on the approval of the said organic act through a plebiscite2. WON EO No. 220 created a new territorial and political subdivision with CAR3. WON the creation of the CAR contravened the constitutional guarantee of the local autonomy for the provinces

HELD1. EO. No. 220 is constitutional. - Petitioners’ assertions that the President has pre-empted Congress from its mandated task of enacting said organic act.

- EO No. 220 does not create the autonomous region contemplated in the Constitution. It merely provides for transitory measures in anticipation of the enactment of an organic act and the creation of an autonomous region. In short, it prepares the ground for autonomy.- The President is acting on a contingency. The complex procedure in Art. X of the Constitution will take time.o The President, in 1987 still exercising legislative powers, as the first

Congress had not yet convened, saw it fit to provide for some measures to address the urgent needs of the Cordilleras in the meantime that the organic act had not yet been passed and the autonomous region created.

- The transitory nature of the CAR does not necessarily mean that it is, as petitioner Cordillera Broad Coalition asserts, "the interim autonomous region in the Cordilleras."

o EO No. 220 created a region, covering a specified area, for administrative purposes with the main objective of coordinating the

planning and implementation of programs and services [secs. 2 and 5].

o The bodies created by E.O. No. 220 do not supplant the existing local governmental structure, nor are they autonomous government agencies. They merely constitute the mechanism for an "umbrella" that brings together the existing local governments, the agencies of the National Government, the ethno-linguistic groups or tribes, and non-governmental organizations in a concerted effort to spur development in the Cordilleras.

- The Congress was convened. It enacted Republic Act No. 6658, which created the Cordillera Regional Consultative Commission. (per Sec. 18, Art. X). The President then appointed its members. o The commission prepared a draft organic act, which became the

basis for the deliberations of the Senate and the House of Representatives. The result was Republic Act No. 6766, the organic act for the Cordillera autonomous region, which was signed into law on October 23, 1989.

o A plebiscite for the approval of the organic act, to be conducted shortly, shall complete the process outlined in the Constitution, in the meantime, E.O. No. 220 had been in force and effect for more than two years and despite E.O. No. 220, the autonomous region in the Cordilleras is still to be created. Events have shown that petitioners' fear that E.O. No. 220 was a "shortcut" for the creation of the autonomous region in the Cordilleras was totally unfounded.

2. It did not create a new territorial and political subdivision or merge existing ones into a larger subdivision.- The CAR is not a public corporation or a territorial and political subdivision. It does not have a separate juridical personality, unlike provinces, cities and municipalities.

o Neither is it vested with the powers that are normally granted to public corporations, e.g. the power to sue and be sued, the power to own and dispose of property, the power to create its own sources of revenue, etc.

o As stated earlier, the CAR was created primarily to coordinate the planning and implementation of programs and services in the covered areas.

- Considering the control and supervision exercised by the President over the CAR and the offices created under E.O. No. 220, and considering further the indispensable participation of the line departments of the National Government, the CAR may be considered more than anything else as a regional coordinating agency of the National Government, similar to the regional development councils which the President may create under the Constitution (Art. X, see. 14).

o These councils are "composed of local government officials, regional heads of departments and other government offices, and representatives from non-governmental organizations within the region for purposes of administrative decentralization to strengthen the autonomy of the units therein and to accelerate the economic and social growth and development of the units in the region."

3. The creation of autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras, which is peculiar to the 1987 Constitution, contemplates the grant of political autonomy and not just administrative autonomy to these regions. Thus, the provision in the Constitution for an autonomous regional government with a basic structure consisting of an executive department and a legislative assembly and special courts with personal, family and property law jurisdiction in each of the autonomous regions [Art. X, sec. 18].- The concept of local autonomy:

It must be clarified that the constitutional guarantee of local autonomy in the Constitution [Art. X, sec. 2] refers to the administrative autonomy of local government units or, cast in more technical language, the decentralization of government authority [Villegas v. Subido, G.R. No. L31004, January 8, 1971, 37 SCRA 11.]

The CAR is a mere transitory coordinating agency that would prepare the stage for political autonomy for the Cordilleras. It fills in the resulting gap in the process of transforming a group of adjacent territorial and political subdivisions already enjoying local or administrative autonomy into an autonomous region vested with political autonomy.

Decision Petition to declare EO No. 220 as unconstitutional is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Voting All 15 justices concurred with J. Gutierrez, Jr. concurring in the result since for him the issue has become moot and academic because Republic Acts No. 6658 and No. 6766 superseded the assailed EO already.

ORDILLO V COMMISSION ON ELECTIONSGUTIERREZ; December 4, 1990

FACTS- January 30, 1990, pursuant to Republic Act No. 6766 entitled “An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region”, the people of the provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, Abra and Kalinga-Apayao and the city of Baguio cast their votes in a plebiscite. - Results of plebiscite: approved by majority of 5,889 votes in Ifugao, rejected by 148,676 in the rest provinces and city. The province of Ifugao makes up only 11% of total population, and as such has the second smallest number of inhabitants, of the abovementioned areas.- February 14, 1990, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 2259 stating that the Organic Act for the Region has been approved and/or ratified by majority of votes cast only in the province of Ifugao. Secretary of Justice also issued a memorandum for the President reiterating COMELEC resolution, stating that “…Ifugao being the only province which voted favorably – then. Alone, legally and validly constitutes CAR.”- March 8, 1990, Congress ebacted Republic Act No. 6861 setting elections in CAR of Ifugao on first Monday of March 1991.- Even before COMELEC resolution, Executive Secretary issued February 5, 1990 a memorandum granting authority to wind up the affairs of the Cordillera Executive Board and Cordillera Regional Assembly created under Executive Order No. 220.- March 30, 1990, President issued Administrative Order No. 160 declaring among others that the Cordillera Executive Board and Cordillera Regional Assembly and all offices under Executive Order No. 220 were abolished in view of the ratification of Organic Act.- Petitioners: there can be no valid Cordillera Autonomous Region in only one province as the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6766 require that the said Region be composed of more than one constituent unit.- Petitioners therefore pray that the court:

a. declare null and void COMELEC resolution No. 2259, the memorandum of the Secretary of Justice, Administrative Order No. 160, and Republic Act No. 6861 and prohibit and restrain the respondents from implementing the same and spending public funds for the purpose

b. declare Executive Order No. 220 constituting the Cordillera Executive Board and the Cordillera Regional Assembly and other offices to be still in force and effect until another organic law for the Autonomous Region shall have been enacted by Congress and the same is duly ratified by the voters in the constituent units.

ISSUEWON the province of Ifugao, being the only province which voted favorably for the creation of the Cordillera Autonomous Region can, alone, legally and validly constitute such region.

HELD- The sole province of Ifugao cannot validly constitute the Cordillera Autonomous Region.

a. The keyword ins Article X, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution – provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical areas connote that “region” is to be made up of more than one constituent unit. The term “region” used in its ordinary sense means two or more provinces.

- rule in statutory construction must be applied here: the language of the Constitution, as much as possible should be understood in the sense it has in common use and that the words used in constitutional provisions are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed.

b. The entirety of Republic Act No. 6766 creating the Cordillera Autonomous Region is infused with provisions which rule against the sole province of Ifugao constituting the Region.

- It can be gleaned that Congress never intended that a single province may constitute the autonomous region.- If this were so, we would be faced with the absurd situation of having two sets of officials: a set of provincial officials and another set of regional officials exercising their executive and legislative powers over exactly the same small area. (Ifugao is one of the smallest provinces in the Philippines, population-wise) (Art III sec 1 and 2; Art V, sec 1 and 4; Art XII sec 10 of RA 6766)- Allotment of Ten Million Pesos to Regional Government for its initial organizational requirements can not be construed as funding only a lone and small province [Art XXI sec 13(B)(c)]- Certain provisions of the Act call for officials “coming from different provinces and cities” in the Region, as well as tribal courts and the development of a common regional language. (Art V sec 16; Art VI sec 3; Art VII; Art XV RA 6766)

- Thus, to contemplate the situation envisioned by the COMELEC would not only violate the letter and intent of the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6766 but would be impractical and illogical.Decision Petition (both a and b) granted.

BASCO V PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT GAMING CORPORATION

PARAS; May 14, 1991

FACTS- Petitioners are taxpayers and practicing lawyers. Petitioner Basco is the Chairperson of the Committee on Laws of the City Council of Manila. On July 1981 PAGCOR was created under P.D. 1869 to enable the Government to regulate and centralize all games of chance authorized by existing franchise or permitted by law- Petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of PD 1869 and they pray for its annulment based on the ff. grounds:

"A. It constitutes a waiver of a right prejudicial to a third person willing right recognized bylaw. It waived the Manila City government's right to impose taxes and license fees, which is recognized by law."B. The law has intruded into the local government's right to impose local taxes and license fees. This, in contravention of the constitutionally enshrined principle of local autonomy."C. It violates the equal protection clause of the constitution in that it legalizes PAGCOR - conducted gambling. while most other forms of' gambling are outlawed. together with prostitution, drug trafficking and other vices;"C. It violates the avowed trend of the government away from monopolistic and crony economy and toward free enterprise and privatization.

ISSUES1. WON petitioners have standing to question and seek the annulment of PD 18692. WON PD 1869 violates the principle of local autonomy of Manila

3. WON PD 1869 violates the equal protection clause

HELD1. Yes, petitioners have standing to question and seek the annulment of PD 1869.- Considering the importance to the public of the case at bar, and in keeping with the Court's duty, under the 1987 Constitution, to determine whether or riot the other branches of government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws and that they have not abused the discretion given to them, the Court has brushed aside technicalities of procedure and has taken cognizance of this petition. With particular regard to the requirement of proper party as applied in the cases before the Supreme Court, it holds that the same is satisfied by the petitioners and intervenors because each of them has sustained or is in danger of' sustaining an immediate injury as a result of the acts or measures complained of." And even if, strictly speaking they are not covered by the definition, it is still within the wide discretion of the Court to waive the requirement and so remove the impediment to its addressing and resolving the serious constitutional questions raised.2. No, PD 1869 does not violate the local autonomy of Manila with regard to its exemption clause.

a. The City of Manila, being a mere Municipal corporation hits no inherent right to impose taxes. Its "power to tax" must always yield to a legislative act which is superior having been passed upon by the state itself which has the "inherent power to tax" b. The Charter of the City of Manila is subject to control by Congress. The City of Manila's power to impose license fees on gambling, has long been revoked. As early as 197.5, the power of local governments to regulate gambling thru the grant of "franchise. licenses or permits" was withdrawn by P.D. No. 771 and was vested exclusively on the National Government.Therefore, only the National Government has the power to issue "licenses or permits" for the operation of gambling. Necessarily, the power to demand or collect license fees which is a consequence of the issuance of "licenses or permits" is no longer vested in the City of Manila.

3. No, PD 1869 does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution - The "equal protection clause" does not prohibit the Legislature from establishing classes of individuals or objects upon which different rules shall. The mere fact that some gambling activities like cockfighting (P.D. 449) horse racing (R -A. 306 as amended by RA 983), sweepstakes, lotteries and races (RA 1169 as amended by B.P. 42) are legalized under certain conditions. while others are prohibited, does not render the applicable laws, P.D. 1869 for one. unconstitutional.

JUDGE LEYNES V COMMISSION ON AUDITCORONA; December 11, 2003

FACTS- Petitioner is the presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court of Calapan City, Oriental Mindoro, was formerly assigned in the Municipality of Naujan, Oriental Mindoro as the sole presiding judge of the Municipal Trial Court.- His salary and representation and transportation allowance (RATA) were drawn from the budget of the Supreme Court. In addition, he received a monthly allowance from the local funds of the Municipality of Naujan starting 1984.- March 15, 1993- the Sangguniang Bayan of Naujan, through Resolution No. 057, sought the opinion of the Provincial Auditor and the Provincial Budget Officer regarding any budgetary limitation on the grant of a monthly allowance by the municipality to petitioner judge.- May 7, 1993- the Sangguniang Bayan unanimously approved Resolution 101, increasing petitioner judge’s monthly allowance starting May 1993.- February, 17, 1994- Provincial Auditor Salvacion M. Dalisay sent a letter to the Municipal Mayor and the Sangguniang Bayan of Naujan directing them to

stop the payment of the monthly allowance and to require the immediate refund of the amounts previously paid. Her directive was based on the following:

1. Section 36, RA No.7645, General Appropriations Act of 19932. National Compensation Circular No. 67 of the Department of Budget

and Management- Petitioner Judge appealed to Commission on Audit, Regional Director upheld opinion of Provincial Auditor Dalisay and added that Resolution No. 101 Series of 1993 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Naujan failed to comply with Section 3 of the Local Budge Circular No. 53 outlining the conditions for the grant of the allowances to judges and other national officials or employees by the local government units.- Petitioner judge appealed the unfavorable resolution of the Regional Director to the Commission on Audit.- September 14, 1999- Commission on Audit issued its decision affirming Resolution of the Regional Director.

1. the main issue is whether or not the municipality can validly provide RATA to its municipal judge

2. Section 36 of RA 7645 states:- Payable from the programmed/appropriated amount and others from

personal services savings of the respective offices where the officials or employees draw their salaries;

- Not exceeding the rates prescribed by the Annual General Appropriations Act;

- Officials/amployees on detail with other offices or assigned to serve other offices or agencies shall be paid from their parent agencies

- No one shall be allowed to collect RATA from more than one source.2. The municipal government may provide additional allowances and

other benefits to judges and other national government officials or employees assigned or stationed in the municipality, provided, that the finances of the municipality allow the grant thereof pursuant to Section 447, Par. 1 RA 7160, and provided further that similar allowances/additional compensation are not granted by the national government to the official/employee assigned to the local government unit as provided under Section 3(e) of local Budget Circular No. 53.

3. Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 101 is null and void. The Honorable Judge Tomas C. Leynes, being a national government official is prohibited to receive additional RATA from the local government fund pursuant to Section 36 of the General Appropriations Act and National Compensation Circular No. 67.

- Position of Commission on Audit> The municipality could not grant RATA to judges in addition to the RATA already received from the Supreme Court

1. National Compensation Circular No. 67- the RATA of national officials and employees shall be payable from

the programmed appropriations or personal services savings of the agency where such officials or employees draw their salary and

- no one shall be allowed to collect RATA from more than one source2. General Appropriations Act of 1993 (RA 7645)- the RATA of national officials shall be payable from the programmed

appropriations of their respective offices3. Local Budget Circular No. 53- prohibits local government units from granting allowances to national

government officials or employees stationed in their localities when such allowances are also granted by the national government or are similar to the allowances granted by the national government to such officials or employees

- Position of Petitioner> Municipality is expressly and unequivocally empowered by RA 7160 (the Local Government Code of 1991) to enact appropriation ordinances granting allowances and other benefits to judges stationed in its territory.> DBM cannot amend or modify a substantive law like the Local Government Code 1991 through mere budget circulars.

ISSUEWON Judge Leynes can validly receive allowance from municipality

HELD- Ratio When a national official is on detail with another national agency, he should get his RATA only from his parent national agency and not from the other national agency he is detailed to.-Respondent COA erred in opposing the grant of the monthly allowance by the Municipality of Naujan to petitioner Judge Leynes- Reasoning

RA 7645 is amended by NCC No. 67. No, administrative circular cannot supersede, abrogate, modify, or nullify a statute.

The Constitution guarantees the principle of local autonomy- Article 10, Section 2 An ordinance must be presumed valid in the absence of evidence

showing that it is not in accordance with the law.

ART XI: ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS

FRANCISCO V HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVESPER CURIAM; September 27, 2005

FACTSErnesto B. Francisco, Jr. vs. The House Committee on Justice, represented by Its Chairman, Rep. Simeon Datumanong, The House of Representatives, represented by Its Speaker, Rep. Jose de Venecia and President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo

MINUTE RESOLUTION- Urgent Motion for Reconsideration dated 13 September 2005: DENIED WITH FINALITY as no substantial arguments were presented to warrant the reversal of the questioned resolution- Urgent Motion for Consolidation dated 24 September 2005 DENIED for lack of merit- Letter dated 26 September 2005 NOTED WITHOUT ACTION

FRANCISCO V NAGMAMALASAKIT NA MGA MANANANGGOL NG MGA MANGAGAWANG PILIPINO,

INC.CARPIO-MORALES; November 10, 2003

FACTS- Art 11, Sec 8 Constitution – Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this Section.- November 2001 - 12th Congress of the House of Representatives adopted and approved the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings (House Impeachment Rules) superseding the Rules approved by 11th Congress

> Section 16. – Impeachment Proceedings Deemed Initiated. – In cases where a Member of the House files a verified complaint of impeachment or a citizen files a verified complaint that is endorsed by a Member of the House through a resolution of endorsement against an impeachable officer, impeachment proceedings against such official are deemed initiated on the day the Committee on Justice finds that the verified complaint and/or resolution against such official, as the case may be, is sufficient in substance, or on the date the House votes to overturn or affirm the finding of the said Committee that the verified complaint and/or resolution, as the case may be, is not sufficient in substance. In cases

where a verified complaint or a resolution of impeachment is filed or endorsed, as the case may be, by at least one-third (1/3) of the Members of the House, impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated at the time of the filing of such verified complaint or resolution of impeachment with the Secretary General.> Section 17. Bar Against Initiation Of Impeachment Proceedings. – Within a period of one (1) year from the date impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated as provided in Section 16 hereof, no impeachment proceedings, as such, can be initiated against the same official.

- July 2002 – House of representatives adopted a Resolution directing Committee on Justice to conduct an investigation in aid of legislation on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Judiciary Development Fund- June 2003 – Pres. Estrada filed the first impeachment complaint against Davide and 7 associate justices for culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of public trust, and other high crimes; endorsed by Rep. Suplico, Zamora, and Dilangalen House Committee on Justice dismissed the complain because insufficient in substance- October 2003 – Rep. Teodoro and Fuentebella filed second impeachment complaint founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry; resolution of endorsement/impeachment was signed by at least 1/3 of all the members of the House of Representatives

ISSUES1. WON issue is justiciable2. WON Rules of Procedure for Impeachment Proceedings adopted by 12 th

Congress is constitutional and second impeachment complaint is valid

HELD1. Justiciable. The Constitution did not intend to leave the matter of impeachment to the sole discretion of Congress. Instead, it provided for judicially discoverable standards for determining the validity of the exercise of such discretion through power of judicial review.

o Locus standi - Case is of transcendental pubic importance. o Ripe for adjudication - the second complaint had been filed and the

2001 rules had been promulgated and enforced. o Lis mota - (1) whether Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the House

Impeachment Rules adopted by the 12th Congress are unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution; and (2) whether, as a result thereof, the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution.

o Judicial Restraint – not an option because the Court is not legally disqualified; no other tribunal to which the controversy may be referred.

2. Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which were approved by the House of Representatives on November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional. Consequently, the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. which was filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella with the Office of the Secretary General of the House of Representatives on October 23, 2003 is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.

o Interpretation of the term “initiate” – takes place by the act of filing and referral or endorsement of the impeachment complaint to the House Committee on Justice or, by filing by at least 1/3 of the members of the HR with the Secretary General of the House, the meaning of Sec 3 (5) of Art XI becomes clear.

o Sec 3 (5) of Article XI – once an impeachment complains has been initiated, another complaint may not be filed against the same official within a period of one year.

o Under Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules, impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated (1) if there is a finding by the House Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is sufficient in substance, or (2) once the House itself affirms or overturns the finding of the Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is not sufficient in substance or (3) by the filing or endorsement before the Secretary-General of the House of Representatives of a verified complaint or a resolution of impeachment by at least 1/3 of the members of the House. These rules clearly contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI since the rules give the term “initiate” a meaning different meaning from filing and referral.

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION V DACOYCOYPARDO; April 29, 1999

FACTS- Respondent Pedro O. Dacoycoy was charged with habitual drunkenness, misconduct and nepotism before the Civil Service Commission. Accordingly, the Commission conducted a formal investigation, and thereafter, promulgated its resolution finding no substantial evidence to support the charge of habitual drunkenness and misconduct. However, the Commission found respondent guilty of nepotism on two counts as a result of the appointment of his two sons, Rito and Ped Dacoycoy, as driver and utility worker, respectively, and their assignment under his immediate supervision and control as the Vocational School Administrator Balicuatro College of Arts and Trades, and imposed on him the penalty of dismissal from the service.- The Commission denied respondent's motion for reconsideration. - Respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a special civil action for certiorari with preliminary injunction to set aside the Civil Service Commission’s resolutions. The Court of Appeals then reversed and set aside the decision of the Civil Service Commission, ruling that respondent did not appoint or recommend his two sons Rito and Ped, and, hence, was not guilty of nepotism. The Court of Appeals further held that it is "the person who recommends or appoints who should be sanctioned, as it is he who performs the prohibited act." It likewise declared null and void the Civil Service Commission’s resolution dismissing him from the service.- The Commission then filed an appeal via ceriorari before the Supreme Court.

ISSUES1. WON respondent is guilty of nepotism2. WON the Commission is the "party adversely affected by the decision" of the Court of Appeals who may file an appeal therefrom

HELD1. YES- Under the definition of nepotism (Section 59 of Executive Order 292), one is guilty of nepotism if an appointment is issued in favor of a relative within the third civil degree of consanguinity or affinity of any of the following:

a) appointing authority;b) recommending authority;c) chief of the bureau or office, andd) person exercising immediate supervision over the appointee.

- the last two mentioned situations, it is immaterial who the appointing or recommending authority is. To constitute a violation of the law, it suffices that an appointment is extended or issued in favor of a relative within the third civil degree of consanguinity or affinity of the chief of the bureau or office, or the person exercising immediate supervision over the appointee.- Respondent is the Vocational School Administrator, Balicuatro College of Arts and Trades, Allen, Northern Samar. He did not appoint or recommend his two sons to the positions of driver and utility worker in the Balicuatro College of Arts and Trades. It was Mr. Jaime Daclag, Head of the Vocational Department of the BCAT, who recommended the appointment of Rito. Mr. Daclag's authority

to recommend the appointment of first level positions such as watchmen, security guards, drivers, utility workers, and casuals and emergency laborers for short durations of three to six months was recommended by respondent Dacoycoy and approved by DECS Regional Director Eladio C. Dioko, with the provision that such positions shall be under Mr. Daclag’s immediate supervision. Atty. Victorino B. Tirol II, Director III, DECS Regional Office VIII, Palo, Leyte, appointed Rito Dacoycoy driver of the school. Mr. Daclag also appointed Ped Dacoycoy as casual utility worker. However, it was respondent Dacoycoy who certified that “funds are available for the proposed appointment of Rito Dacoycoy” and even rated his performance as “very satisfactory”. On the other hand, his son Ped stated in his position description form that his father was “his next higher supervisor”. The circumvention of the ban on nepotism is quite obvious. Unquestionably, Mr. Daclag was a subordinate of respondent Pedro O. Dacoycoy, who was the school administrator. He authorized Mr. Daclag to recommend the appointment of first level employees under his immediate supervision. Then Mr. Daclag recommended the appointment of respondent’s two sons and placed them under respondent’s immediate supervision serving as driver and utility worker of the school. Both positions are career positions.- To our mind, the unseen but obvious hand of respondent Dacoycoy was behind the appointing or recommending authority in the appointment of his two sons. Clearly, he is guilty of nepotism.- Nepotism is one pernicious evil impeding the civil service and the efficiency of its personnel. The basic purpose or objective of the prohibition against nepotism also strongly indicates that the prohibition was intended to be a comprehensive one. The Court was unwilling to restrict and limit the scope of the prohibition which is textually very broad and comprehensive. If not within the exceptions, it is a form of corruption that must be nipped in the bud or bated whenever or wherever it raises its ugly head. As we said in an earlier case "what we need now is not only to punish the wrongdoers or reward the ‘outstanding’ civil servants, but also to plug the hidden gaps and potholes of corruption as well as to insist on strict compliance with existing legal procedures in order to abate any occasion for graft or circumvention of the law."2. YES- There is no question that respondent Dacoycoy may appeal to the Court of Appeals from the decision of the Civil Service Commission adverse to him. He was the respondent official meted out the penalty of dismissal from the service. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the court required the petitioner therein, here respondent Dacoycoy, to implead the Civil Service Commission as public respondent as the government agency tasked with the duty to enforce the constitutional and statutory provisions on the civil service.- Subsequently, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Civil Service Commission and held respondent not guilty of nepotism. Who now may appeal the decision of the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court? Certainly not the respondent, who was declared not guilty of the charge. Nor the complainant George P. Suan, who was merely a witness for the government. Consequently, the Civil Service Commission has become the party adversely affected by such ruling, which seriously prejudices the civil service system. Hence, as an aggrieved party, it may appeal the decision of the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court. By this ruling, we now expressly abandon and overrule extant jurisprudence that "the phrase ‘party adversely affected by the decision’ refers to the government employee against whom the administrative case is filed for the purpose of disciplinary action which may take the form of suspension, demotion in rank or salary, transfer, removal or dismissal from office" and not included are "cases where the penalty imposed is suspension for not more then thirty (30) days or fine in an amount not exceeding thirty days salary" or "when the respondent is exonerated of the charges, there is no occasion for appeal." In other words, we overrule prior decisions holding that the Civil Service Law "does not contemplate a review of decisions exonerating officers or employees from administrative charges." - The Court of Appeals’ reliance on Debulgado vs. Civil Service Commission, to support its ruling is misplaced. The issues in Debulgado are whether a

promotional appointment is covered by the prohibition against nepotism or the prohibition applies only to original appointments to the civil service, and whether the Commission had gravely abused its discretion in recalling and disapproving the promotional appointment given to petitioner after the Commission had earlier approved that appointment. Debulgado never even impliedly limited the coverage of the ban on nepotism to only the appointing or recommending authority for appointing a relative. Precisely, in Debulgado, the Court emphasized that Section 59 "means exactly what it says in plain and ordinary language: x x x The public policy embodied in Section 59 is clearly fundamental in importance, and the Court had neither authority nor inclination to dilute that important public policy by introducing a qualification here or a distinction there."Decision Petition granted. The Court of Appeals' decision is reversed and the resolutions of the Civil Service Commission are revived and affirmed.

SEPARATE OPINION

MELO [dissent and concur]

- Although I completely agree with the result and likewise with the wisdom in which the issues relating to nepotism are threshed out in the majority opinion, I do not agree with the majority opinion stating that the Civil Service Commission may appeal a judgment of exoneration in an administrative case involving nepotism. And Mr. Justice Puno would go further by allowing even a private complainant – and by implication, a complainant office, to appeal a decision exonerating or absolving a civil service employee of charges against, or even imposing a penalty upon him. This totally contravenes our well-settled ruling in several cases.- The Court of Appeals exonerated respondent Dacoycoy of the charge of nepotism. From such “adverse decision”, the Civil Service Commission, through its Office for Legal Affairs, interposed the present appeal by way of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Under existing laws and jurisprudence this is not allowed, so this Court ruled in the above-cited cases. If this point is not stressed by the Court, the present decision might be misconstrued as a watering down of the settled doctrine.- It is axiomatic that the right to appeal is merely a statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provision of law.- A cursory reading of P.D. 807, otherwise known as “The Philippine Civil Service Law” shows that said law does not contemplate a review of decisions exonerating officers or employees from administrative charges.- Section 37 paragraph (a) thereof, provides:- "The Commission shall decide upon appeal all administrative disciplinary cases involving the imposition of a penalty of suspension for more that thirty days, or fine in an amount exceeding thirty days’ salary, demotion in rank or salary or transfer, removal or dismissal from office."- Said provision must be read together with Section 39 paragraph (a) of P.D. 805 (should be 807) which contemplates:

"Appeals, where allowable, shall be made by the party adversely affected by the decision."

- The phrase "party adversely affected by the decision" refers to the government employee against whom the administrative case is filed for the purpose of disciplinary action which may take the form of suspension, demotion in rank or salary, transfer, removal or dismissal from office. The remedy of appeal may be availed of only in a case where the respondent is found guilty of the charges against him. But when the respondent is exonerated of said charges, as in the case, there is no occasion for appeal.- Based on the above provision of law, appeal to the Civil Service Commission in an administrative case is extended to the party adversely affected by the decision, that is, the person or the respondent employee who has been meted out the penalty of suspension for more than thirty days; or fine in an amount exceeding thirty days salary, demotion in rank or salary or transfer, removal or dismissal from office. The decision of the disciplining authority is even final and

not appealable to the Civil Service Commission in cases where the penalty imposed is suspension for not more than thirty days or fine in an amount not exceeding thirty days’ salary. Appeal in cases allowed by law must be filed within fifteen days from receipt of the decision.- It is my submission that the prerogative to now determine whether this practice of disallowing appeals in cases of exoneration should still continue or not, exclusively belongs to Legislature. The Court cannot and should not arrogate this policy-making power of Congress unto itself, not even in the guise of the exercise of its expanded power of judicial review under the 1987 Constitution. Only Congress has authority to remedy inadequacies in the wisdom of a law, should it find any, especially when the definite intention of the existing law was to disallow the State to appeal from judgments of exoneration. Any attempt by the Court to transgress this most basic principle in the separation of powers between these two branches of government would to my mind, result in the abhorrent act of judicial legislation.- Effective June 1, 1995, Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95 ordained that, appeals from awards, judgments or final orders or resolutions of or authorized by any quasi-judicial agency (which includes the Civil Service Commission) in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions shall be taken by filing a verified petition for review with the Court of Appeals. Although in general, appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals may be filed via a verified petition for review on certiorari with this Court (where pure questions of law, distinctly set forth therein, may be duly raised), an appeal involving a judgment or final order of the Court of Appeals exonerating a government employee in an administrative case, in particular, falls within the ambit of the provisions of Section 39, paragraph (a) of Presidential Decree No. 807. It is elementary that a special law such as Presidential Decree No. 807 takes precedence over general rules of procedure such as Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. No appeal may, therefore, be taken under Rule 45.- Moreover, it is recognized in our jurisdiction that an administrative case which could result in the revocation of license, or similar sanctions like dismissal from office, constitutes a proceeding which partakes of a criminal nature. Being such, provisions of law pertaining thereto must perforce be construed strictly against the State, just as penal laws are strictly construed strictly against the State. Any ambiguity, should there be any, must be resolved in favor of the respondent in the administrative case. The term "party adversely affected" should not be construed as to include the State in administrative charges involving nepotism.- To allow appeals from decisions, be they exonerative or otherwise, against civil service employees would, to my mind, be stocking the stakes too much against our civil servants. It should be noted in this regard that the greater bulk of our government workers are ordinary people, working under supervision and, more often than not, exposed to political pressure and the influence of peddlers of power. Their simple status notwithstanding, they are not easily cowed and intimidated. Many, though, are threatened with complaints, transfer of station, or demotion, if they refuse to do the bidding of some unscrupulous superiors or politicians. I can, therefore, understand why the law and our jurisprudence disallow appeal by the complainant from decisions in administrative cases, be they exonerative or otherwise. Verily, an employee may be hounded into spending up to his last resources and losing his self-respect and honor by successive appeals.- What will happen, if for instance, the respondent government employee is initially exonerated or given a light penalty, and the complainant may appeal, insisting that the employee is guilty or that he deserves a heavier penalty? And, if the Civil Service Commission thereafter metes out a penalty not to the liking of the complainant, the matter may still be elevated to the Court of Appeals or even this Court? Where else will all this end, if not in the physical and financial exhaustion of the respondent civil servant? Again, I wish to stress that I speak here of the ordinary employees. The big shots in government who commit wrongs may somehow hereby benefit, but then we shall be content in concluding that we decided in favor of the many, that the good of the majority prevailed.

- A judgment of exoneration by the Court of Appeals, as in the case of a judgment of exoneration by the Civil Service Commission or the now defunct Merit System Protection Board, may indeed prove to be truly adverse to the government agency concerned and eventually to the State as a whole. This is especially so when there had been lapses in the interpretation and/or application of the law as in the present case. This notwithstanding, the right to appeal, which is merely statutory may not be invoked, much less exercised, when the law does not provide any. Again, until and unless Congress exercises its prerogative to amend such law, this Court is bound by it and has no other recourse except to apply the same. Fortunately for petitioner but not so for respondent, the latter failed to invoke the foregoing general rule. In a similar case, we held that the party favored by such law who fails to interpose any objection to an appeal may be deemed to have waived this right. - Premises considered and with the above observations, I vote to grant the petition as stated in the dispositive thereof.

PUNO [concur]

- Appeal to the Civil Service Commission in an administrative case is extended to the party adversely affected by the decision, that is, the person of the respondent employee who has been meted out the penalty of suspension for more than thirty days, or fine in an amount exceeding thirty days salary, demotion in rank or salary or transfer, removal or dismissal from office. The decision of the disciplining authority is even final and not appealable to the Civil Service Commission in cases where the penalty imposed is suspension for not more than thirty days or fine in an amount not exceeding thirty days salary. Appeal in cases allowed by law must be filed within fifteen days from receipt of the decision.- It is axiomatic that the right to appeal is merely a statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provision of law.- By inference or implication, the remedy of appeal may be availed of only in a case where the respondent is found guilty of the charges filed against him. But when the respondent is exonerated of said charges, as in this case, there is no occasion for appeal.- The phrase ‘party adversely affected by the decision’ refers to the government employee against whom the administrative case is filed for the purpose of disciplinary action which may take the form of suspension, demotion in rank or salary, transfer, removal or dismissal from office.- With humility, I make the submission that is time to strike down the doctrine disallowing appeals to the Civil Service Commission when the decision exonerates a government official or employee from an administrative charge. The doctrine is principally based on a constricted interpretation of Section 39 of P.D. No. 807 (Civil Service Law) which states:

“Sec. 39. (a) Appeals, where allowable, shall be made by the party adversely affected by the decision within fifteen days from receipt of the decision unless a petition for reconsideration is seasonably filed, which petition shall be decided within fifteen days. x x x”

- According to Paredes, Mendez and Magpale, the phrase “party adversely affected by the decision” refers alone to the respondent government official or employee against whom the administrative case is filed. They excluded from its compass the party complainant whose charge is dismissed. Hence, when the respondent government official or employee is exonerated, the decision is deemed final as the party complainant is precluded from appealing.- I find it difficult to agree with the above interpretation which is not only too narrow but is subversive of the essence of our civil service law. In the case at bar, private respondent is the Vocational Administrator of the Balicuatro College of Arts and Trades. His charged with the offense of nepotism for the appointment of two sons as driver and utility worker under his immediate control and supervision. It is beyond argument that nepotism is prohibited by our civil service law for it breeds inefficiency, if not corruption, in government service. The critical question, therefore, is: who has the standing to prevent the violation of this law and protect public interest? I submit that a taxpayer has the

standing to bring suit to void nepotic acts for he has an interest that “appointments in the civil service shall be made only according to merit and fitness x x x.” A taxpayer has a right to good government and good government cannot result from appointments determined by bloodlines. The Civil Service Law itself recognizes that there are offenses which can be the subject of a complaint by any private citizen. Thus, Section 37 of the law allows any private citizen to file a complaint against a government official or employee directly with the Commission. Section 38 also recognizes that “administrative proceedings may be commenced against a subordinate officer or employee by the head of the department or office of equivalent rank, or head of local government or chiefs of agencies, or regional directors or upon sworn written complaint of any other persons.” The general rule is that one who has a right to be heard has standing to seek review of any ruling adverse to him. Hence, if a private citizen has the right to file an administrative complaint, he must also have the right to appeal a dismissal of his complaint, unless the law clearly precludes his right of appeal for indubitable policy reasons. A contrary rule will diminish the value of the right to complain. The cases of Paredes, Mendez and Magpale do not give any policy reasons why the dismissal of a charge of nepotism cannot be appealed. They merely resort to doubtful inferences in justifying the bar to appeals. Such an approach goes against the rule that “preclusions of judicial review of administrative action . . . is not lightly to be inferred.- In truth, the doctrine barring appeal is not categorically sanctioned by the Civil Service Law. For what the law declares as "final" are decisions of heads of agencies involving suspension for not more than 30 days or fine in an amount not exceeding 30 days salary. But there is a clear policy reasons for declaring these decisions final. These decisions involve minor offenses. They are numerous for they are the usual offenses committed by government officials and employees. To allow their multiple level appeal will doubtless overburden the quasi-judicial machinery of our administrative system and defeat the expectation of fast and efficient action from these administrative agencies. Nepotism, however, is not a petty offense. Its deleterious effect on government cannot be over-emphasized. And it is a stubborn evil. The objective should be to eliminate nepotic acts, hence, erroneous decisions allowing nepotism cannot be given immunity from review, especially judicial review. It is thus non sequitur to contend that since some decisions exonerating public officials from minor offenses can not be appealed, ergo, even a decision acquitting a government official from a major offense like nepotism cannot also be appealed.- Similarly, the doctrine barring appeal cannot be justified by the provision limiting the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission to review decisions involving: (1) suspension for more than thirty (30) days; (2) fine in an amount exceeding thirty (30) days salary; (3) demotion in rank or salary; and (4) transfer, removal or dismissal from office. Again, there is nothing in this provision indicating legislative intent to bar appeal from decisions exonerating a government official or employee from nepotism. Statutory preclusion of appeals is the exception rather than the rule, for as stressed by Mr. Justice Douglas, "tolerance of judicial review has been more and more the rule against the claim of administrative finality." Yet the cases of Paredes, Mendez and Magpale precisely barred all appeals despite lack of an explicit, positive provision in the Civil Service Law.- Moreover, the case at bar involves the right of a party adversely affected to resort to judicial review. This case does not involve the appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission, i.e., whether or not it has the power to review a decision exonerating a government official from a charge of nepotism. The facts show that it was the Civil Service Commission that at the first instance found Dacoycoy guilty of nepotism. It was Dacoycoy who appealed the decision of the Civil Service Commission to our regular court, more exactly, the Court of Appeals pursuant to the Rules of Court. As Dacoycoy only impleaded Suan as respondent, the Court of Appeals ordered that the Civil Service Commission should also be impleaded as party respondent. The Court of Appeals then reversed the Commission as it cleared Dacoycoy from the charge of nepotism. The question therefore is whether or not this Court is precluded

from reviewing the decision of the Court of Appeals on a petition for certiorari under Rule 45. Again, I submit that this Court has jurisdiction to entertain this review. Indeed, under the Constitution, the jurisdiction of this Court has even been expanded "to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government." The question is not our lack of jurisdiction but the prudential exercise of power. In certiorari cases alleging grave abuse of discretion, our given task is to determine how much is too much of an abuse.- To my mind, it is also of de minimis importance that the petition of thus Court was filed by the Civil Service Commission. The records will reveal that Suan, the original complainant, wrote to the Civil Service Commission urging it to make the appeal ostensibly for lack of means. But even without Suan, I submit that the nature of the issue in the case at bar and its impact on the effectiveness of government give the Civil Service Commission the standing to pursue this appeal. The issue in the case at bar is basically a legal one, i.e., the proper interpretation of who can be convicted of nepotism, and undoubtedly, this Court has the authoritative say on how to interpret laws. Administrative agencies have always conceded that the final interpretation of laws belongs to regular courts. And the issue has broad implications on the merit and fitness philosophy of our civil service system. Under Sec. 3, Article IX (B) of our Constitution, it is the Civil Service Commission that has oversight of our civil service system. It is thus the party better equipped to argue the diverse dimensions of the issue. It is also the most affected, for it has the duty not to stand still when nepotic practices threaten the principle of meritrocacy in our government. It seems to me self evident that this type of injury to public interest can best be vindicated by the Commission and not by a private person.- There are other disturbing implication if we do not junk the doctrine of non-reviewability of decisions exonerating government officials from charges of nepotism. For one, the doctrine unduly favors officials charged with nepotism, for while we allow further review of their conviction, we disallow review of their exoneration, regardless of the errors. This distorted rule contravenes our distaste against nepotism, a practice whose continuance can fatally erode faith in government. For another, perpetuating a nepotic act, an evil that should be extirpated wherever found, can never be the intent of our legislators who crafted our Civil Service Law. For still another, completely cutting off access to judicial review goes against the spirit of the 1987 Constitution expanding the jurisdiction of this Court. Putting up borders of non-reviewability weakens the judiciary’s checking power. Indeed, shielding abusive administrative actions and decisions from judicial oversight will ultimately erode the rule of law. As Justice Brandeis opined, "supremacy of law demands that there shall be an opportunity to have some court decide whether an erroneous rule of law was applied and whether the proceeding in which facts were adjudicated was conducted regularly."- I join the majority opinion.

ROMERO [dissent]

- Does the Civil Service Commission have the legal personality to appeal a decision of the Court of Appeals exonerating an employee charged in an administrative case, which decision, in effect, reversed and nullified the Commission’s finding that the respondent employee is guilty as charged?- After an exhaustive and careful scrutiny of P.D. No. 807 (otherwise known as the Civil Service Law), Executive Order No. 292 (otherwise known as the Revised Administrative Code of 1987) as well as the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292, I find no legal basis to support the contention of the majority that the Commission has that legal personality.- The Civil Service Commission is the central personnel agency of the government. Corollarily, it is equipped with the power and function to hear and decide administrative cases instituted by or brought before it directly or on appeal, including contested appointments and to review decisions and actions of its offices and the agencies attached to it. This is in consonance with its

authority to pass upon the removal, separation and suspension of all officers and employees in the civil service and upon all matters relating to the conduct, discipline and efficiency of such officers and employees except as otherwise provided by the Constitution or by law. It is thus clear that the Civil Service Commission has been constituted as a disciplining authority. - Section 34, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 provides the answer as to who may appear before the Commission, thus:

"Administrative proceedings may be commenced against a subordinate officer or employee by the following officials and employees:

(a) Secretary of department;(b) Head of Office of Equivalent rank;(c) Head of Local Government Unit;(d) Chief of Agency;(e) Regional Director; or(f) Upon Sworn, Written complaint of Any other Person."

- Consequently, the complaint can either be the Secretary of department, head of office of equivalent rank, head of a local government unit, chief of agency, regional director or any other person or party. The phrase ‘any other party’ has been understood to be a complainant other than the head of department or office of equivalent rank or head of local government or chiefs of agencies or regional directors.- The respondent, on the other hand, is any subordinate officer or employee. Nowhere can be found, expressly or impliedly, in Section 34 of Rule XIV of Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of E.O. No. 292, the Commission as one of the parties, either as complainant or respondent in an administrative case. Logically and by necessary implication, it cannot considered either a complaint or a respondent. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. The express mention of one person, thing or consequence implies the exclusion of all others. Based on the foregoing, there is no other conclusion but that the Civil Service Commission is not a party to an administrative proceeding brought before it. As provided by Supreme Court Administrative Circular 1-95, decisions, orders or rulings of the Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court, now to the Court of Appeals, on certiorari by the aggrieved party. By inference, an aggrieved party is either the one who initiated the complaint before the Commission or the respondent, the person subject of the complaint. In fact, the question as to who is an “aggrieved party” has long been settled in a litany of cases. An aggrieved party in an administrative case is the government employee against whom an administrative complaint is filed. The Civil Service Commission is definitely not a government employee. Neither is it an agency against whom an administrative charge is filed. While it may be argued that, in a sense, the government is an "aggrieved party" in administrative proceedings before the Commission, it nevertheless is not the "aggrieved party" contemplated under P.D. No. 807 or the Civil Service Law.- Having established that the Civil Service Commission is not a party, much less an aggrieved party, then indubitably, it has no legal personality to elevate the case to the appellate authority. The Commission, therefore, has no legal standing to file the instant petition.- While admittedly, the Civil Service Commission is considered a nominal party when its decision is brought before the Court of Appeals, such is only a procedural formality. As with appellate processes, a nominal party is not the aggrieved party. Its inclusion as a party is based primarily on the fact that the decision, order or ruling it issued is being contested or assailed and secondarily, for purposes of enforcement. By analogy, the Commission in the performance of its quasi-judicial functions is just like a judge who should "detach himself from cases where his decision is appealed to a higher court for review. The raison d’etre for such doctrine is that a judge is not an active combatant in such proceeding and must leave the opposing parties to contend their individual positions and for the appellate court to decide the issues without his active participation. By filing this case, petitioner in a way ceased to be judicial and has become adversarial instead."- I dissent from the ponencia’s conclusion that the Commission may appeal a judgement of exoneration in an administrative case involving nepotism in light

of the foregoing disquisition.

ART IX: CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONSCIVIL SERVICE

UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES V CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

PANGANIBAN; April 3, 2001

FACTS- Dr. Alfredo De Torres is UPLB Assoc Prof., who went on vacation LOA w/o pay, during which he served as official rep to the Centre on Integrated Rural Devt for Asia and the Pacific (CIRDAP). CIRDAP requested UPLB for extension of LOA but was denied by Director of ACCI of UPLB. The Director advised De Torres to report for duty. Also. UPLB Chancellor de Guzman apprised him on rules of Civil Service and possibility of being considered AWOL. When De Torres wrote that he will continue with CIRDAP, Chancellor warned that UPLB would be forced to drop him fr rolls of personnel.- After almost 5 yrs of absence w/o leave, De Torres wrote that he was reporting back to duty at UPLB. Chancellor Villareal said he should have come fr an approved leave. ACCI Director said De Torres was considered AWOL and advised him to reapply. But Chancellor Villareal reversed his stand and said De Torres may report bec records do not show that he had been officially dropped. ACCI requested ruling from Civil Service Commission.- CSC ruled that De Torres have been dropped fr service. Petitioners sought recourse before the CA but the petition was dismissed.

ISSUEWON De Torres’ automatic separation from civil service was valid

HELDNO. Automatic dismissal was invalid.- Section 33, Rule XVI of Revised Civil Service Rules speaks of automatic separation even w/o prior notice and hearing.- Quezon v. Borromeo: chief nurse of Iligan City Hospital requested for two extensions of leave. Both granted. She sought third extension. It was not acted upon. It was ruled that she violated Sec 33. She was dropped.- Isberto v. Raquiza: Employee, absent w/o official leave ought to have known that he was deemed automatically separated.- Ramo v. Elefaño: Petitioner was dropped fr service for her failure to return to duty after expiration of leave of absence.- There is sufficient notice when Chancellor advised petitioner and warned of possibility of being considered AWOL. But in those three cases, the petitioners were actually dropped. Here, De Torres was never actually dropped. He remained in the rolls. His salary was even increased several times during his absence. His appointment was also reclassified. These are acts inconsistent w/ separation. UP has chosen not to exercise its prerogative to dismiss petitioner.- Here, UP exercised academic freedom. It has power to determine who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, who may be admitted to study. CSC has no authority to dictate UP the outright dismissal of its personnel.

CUEVAS V BACALMENDOZA; December 6, 2000

FACTS- Justice Cuevas, Executive Secretary Zamora, and Atty. Demaisip v Atty. Bacal

- This case is a petition for certiorari of a previous ruling of the Court of Appeals regarding the legality of the appointment and transfer of Josefina Bacal to the Office of the Regional Director of the Public Attorney’s Office. Josefina Bacal is a Career Executive Officer III which she alleges entitled her to the position of Chief Public Attorney in the Public Attorney’s Office. - Bacal passed the Career Executive Services Examinations in 1989 and on 1994 was conferred CES eligibility and was appointed as Regional Director of the PAO. On January 5, 1995 she was appointed to the rank of CESO III and on November 5, 1997 the Secretary of Justice appointed her as Chief Public Attorney that was confirmed by President Ramos on February 5, 1998, wherein she took her oath and assumed office.- On July 1, 1998 Carina Demaisip was appointed Chief Public Defender by Pres. Estrada while Bacal was appointed Regional Director without her consent. Demaisip took her oath of office on the 7 th of July. Bacal filed a petition quo warranto that questioned her replacement to the Supreme Court that was dismissed without prejudice for it to refiled in the Court of Appeals. Court of Appeals ruled in Bacal’s favor.

ISSUES1. WON the case should be dismissed for its failure to exhaust administrative remedies through an appeal to the Office of the President2. WON Bacal’s removal amounted to a removal without cause (which is illegal)3. WON by the mere fact of being appointed would enable the individual to acquire security of tenure4. WON a Career Executive Service personnel can be shifted from one office to another without violation of their right to security of tenure as their status and salaries is based on their ranks and not on their jobs5. WON Demaisip has a security of tenure

HELD1. No, because the administrative decision sought to be reviewed is that of the President himself. No appeal need be taken to the Office of the President from the decision of a department head because the latter is in theory the alter ego of the former. In addition, exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply when the question raised is purely legal.2. No, her appointment to the position of Chief Public Attorney requires her to be appointed to a CES Rank Level I which never materialized. If the rank of an individual is not appropriate to the position her appointment is deemed to be temporary and she cannot claim security of tenure. The right to tenure is conferred upon the individual filling the position based on the possession of required qualifications. The general rule would be that those who were qualified would be appointed, but as an exception, those with insufficient qualifications may be appointed but merely in an acting capacity.3. No, security of tenure is acquired with respect to the rank and not to the position. In addition, the guaranty of security of tenure is applicable only to those in the first and second level in the civil service.4. No, reading through PD No. 1 that created the Integrated Reorganization Plan, the Career Executive Service provides that reassignments or transfers are allowed provided that it is made in the interest of public service and involves no reduction in the rank or salary of the individual and that this should not be done more oftener than two years. If the individual deems it as unjustified s/he may appeal to the President. The rule that an employee can claim security of tenure is applicable only to Election Registrars, Election Officers, also in the Commission on Elections, and Revenue District Officers in thew Bureau of Internal Revenues. Bacal was just CESO III therefore, she is meant to qualify in the position where she was subsequently appointed to which is Regional Director.5. No, she does not. The security of tenure is also not permanent following the same logic that was used for Bacal, Demaisip having not acquired the qualification of CES Rank Level I implies that her stay in the position is temporary.

CANONIZADO V AGUIRREGONZAGA-REYES; January 25, 2000

FACTS- PETITITON to declare RA 8851 (RA 8551) unconstitutional- the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) was originally created under RA 6975 entitled “An Act Establishing The Philippine National Police Under A Reorganized Department Of The Interior And Local Government, And For other Purposes”.- under RA 6975, petitioners Alexis Canonizado, Edgar Torres, Rogelio Pureza, and respondents Jose Adiong and Dula Torres were appointed as NAPOLCOM commissioners on Jan. 1991 for six year terms- 3/6/1998: RA 8551, aka the “Philippine National Police Reform and Reorganization Act of 1998” took effect, declaring the terms of the current commissioners expired- the petitioners question the constitutionality of S4 of RA 8551 which amends S13 of RA 6975, altering the composition of NAPOLCOM as well as S8, which removes them from office and allegedly violates their security of tenure.- as members of the civil service, the petitioners cannot be removed from office except for causes “provided by law”, that is, with legal cause and not merely for reasons deemed fit by the appointing power- the creation or abolition of public offices is primarily a legislative function; Congress may abolish any office w/o impairing the officer’s right to continue in his position. This power may be exercised for reasons such as a lack of funds or the interests of the economy; abolition must be made in good faith, not personal or political reasons

ISSUES1. WON there was a bona fide reorganization of NAPOLCOM 2. WON there was a valid abolition of the petitioners’ offices

HELD1. NO. Under RA 6975, the NAPOLCOM was described as “a collegial body w/in the DILG”, and under RA 8551 it was defined as “an agency attached to the Department for policy and program coordination.” This increase in the agency’s autonomy does not result in the creation of an entirely new office. S4 of RA 8551amends the NAPOLCOM’s composition by adding the PNP Chief as an ex-officio member, requiring the membership of 3 civilian commissioners, a fourth commissioner from the law enforcement sector and at least one female commissioner. Such changes are trivial and do not affect the nature of the NAPOLCOM; in fact, the powers and duties of NAPOLCOM remain unchanged. Reorganization only takes place when there is an alteration of the existing structure of the office including lines of control and authority and may involve a reduction of personnel or abolition of offices if done in good faith (economic purposes, bureaucratic efficiency, etc.) Despite the new law, NAPOLCOM continues to exercise substantially the same administrative, supervisory, rule-making, advisory and adjudicatory functions. 2. NO. Respondents stress that S8 of RA 8551 discloses legislative intent to abolish NAPOLCOM pursuant to a bona fide reorganization. As held in UP Board of Regents v. Rasul, the removal of an incumbent is not justified if the functions of the old and new positions are the same, that is, if there is no true reorganization. The court finds that RA 8551 does not expressly abolish the petitioners’ positions upon examination of the changes introduced by the new law. In the event of a reorganization done in good faith, no dismissal actually occurs because the office itself ceases to exist. If the abolition merely seeks to enact a change of nomenclature or attempt to circumvent the constitutional security of tenure of civil service personnel, then the abolition is void ab initio. In the case at bar, no bona fide reorganization had been mandated by congress; hence, petitioners were removed from office with no legal cause, making S8 of RA 8551 unconstitutional, and entitling them to immediate reinstatement.

Decision -Petition GRANTED, but only to the extent of declaring S8 of RA 8551 unconstitutional for violating the petitioners’ rights to security of tenure. Petitioners are entitled to reinstatement.

GAMINDE V COMMISSION ON AUDITPARDO; December 13, 2000

FACTS - The Case: Special civil action of certiorari seeking to annul and set aside two “decisions” of the Commission on Audit (COA) - On June 11, 1993, Petitioner Thelma P. Gaminde was appointed as ad interim Commissioner of the Civil Service Commission (CSC) by then Pres. Ramos for a term expiring Feb. 2, 1999. She assumed office after taking her oath and her appointment was confirmed by Congress. - Before the end of her term, or on Feb. 24, 1998, petitioner sought clarification from the Office of the Pres. as to the expiry date of her term of office. In reply, the Chief Presidential Legal Counsel (now Associate Justice) Corona, in a letter, opined that petitioner’s term would expire on Feb. 2, 2000 not on Feb. 2, 1999. She thus remained in office after Feb. 02, 1999, relying on the said advisory opinion. - On Feb. 04, 1999, CSC Chairman Alma De Leon, requested opinion from the COA on whether petitioner and her co-terminous staff should continue to be paid their salaries notwithstanding the fact that their appointment had already expired. COA General Counsel issued an opinion that the petitioner’s appointment had indeed expired. - CSC Resident Auditor issued a notice disallowing in audit the salaries and emoluments pertaining to petitioner and her staff, a decision which petitioner appealed to the COA en banc. The appeal was dismissed, COA affirmed the disallowance, and held that the issue of petitioner’s term of office may be addressed by mere reference to her appointment paper which had Feb. 02, 1999 as expiration date. COA also stated that the Commission is bereft of power to recognize an extension of her term, not even with the implied acquiescence of the Office of the President. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, she was again denied; hence this petition. ISSUEWON petitioner Atty. Gaminde’s term of office, as CSCommissioner, expired on Feb. 2, 1999 or on Feb. 2, 2000

HELDIt expired on Feb. 2, 1999. For Commissioners (5 year term) the count is:Feb.02, 1987---Feb.02, 1992---Feb.02, 1999---Feb.02, 2006…Ratio The appropriate starting point of the terms of office of the first appointees to the Constitutional Commissions under the 1987 Constitution must be on Feb. 02, 1987, the date of the adoption of the 1987 Constitution in order to maintain the regular interval of vacancy every 2 years consistent in the previous appointment intervals. Reasoning - The term of office of the Chairman and members of the Civil Service Commission is prescribed in the 1987 Constitution under Art IX-B Sec. 1(2). The 1973 Constitution introduced the first system of a regular rotation or cycle in the membership of the CSC (Art. XII Sec. 1(1), 1973 Consti). It was a copy of the Constitutional prescription in the amended 1935 Constitution of a rotational system for the appointment of the Chairman and members of the Commission on Elections (Art. X Sec. 1, 1935 Consti, as amended). - In Republic v Imperial, it was said that “the operation of the rotational plan requires two conditions: (1) that the terms of the first (3) Commissioners should start on a common date, and, (2) that any vacancy due to death, resignation or disability before the expiration of the term should only be filled only for the unexpired balance of the term.”- Consequently, the terms of the first Chairman and Commissioners of the Constitutional Commissions under the 1987 Constitution must start on a

common date, irrespective of the variations in the dates of appointments and qualifications of the appointees, in order that the expirations of the firs terms of 7, 5 and 3 years should lead to the regular recurrence of the 2-year interval between the expiration of the terms. - In the law of public officers, “term” of office is distinguished from “tenure” of the incumbent. The term means the time during which the officer may claim to hold office as of right, and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another. The tenure represents the term during which the incumbent actually holds the office. The term of office is not affected by the hold-over. The tenure may be shorter than the term for reasons within or beyond the power of the incumbent. - Although Art. XVIII Sec. 15 provides that incumbent members of the Constitutional Commissions shall continue in office for one year after the ratification of this Constitution, unless they are sooner removed for cause or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office or appointed to a new term, what it contemplates is “tenure” not “term.” The term “unless” imports an exception to the general rule. Clearly, the transitory provisions mean that the incumbent members of the Consti Commissions shall continue… for 1 year after ratification of the Consti under their existing appointments at the discretion of the appointing power who may cut short their tenure by reasons the reasons stated therein. However, they do not affect the “term” of office fixed in Art. IX, providing for a 7-5-3 yr rotational interval for the 1st appointees.Decision Term of office expired on Feb. 2, 1999. However, petitioner served as de facto officer in good faith until Feb. 2, 2000 and thus entitled to receive her salary and other emoluments for actual service rendered. COA decision disallowing salaries/emoluments is reversed.Voting 10 Concur, Bellosillo No part., Related to one of the parties, Puno, concur (In the result), De Leon, Jr., Concurring and Dissenting opinionMendoza, Joins De Leon’s dissent

SEPARATE OPINION

DE LEON [concur and dissent]

Dissents: -the term of petitioner expired on Feb. 2, 2000 not on Feb. 2, 1999 as explained in ponencia.-the term of the first set of CSCommissioners appointed under the 1987 Constitution commenced on the Feb. 2, 1988 not on the date of its ratification on Feb. 2, 1987. Concurs:-that the salaries and emoluments which petitioner as CSCommissioner received after Feb. 2, 1999 should not be disallowed by COA.

BLAQUERA V ALCALAPURISIMA; September 11, 1998

FACTS- G.R. Nos. 109406, 110642, 111494, and 112056 are cases for certiorari and prohibition, challenging the constitutionality and validity of AO 29 and 268- Petitioners are officials and employees of several government departments and agencies who were paid incentive benefits for the year 1992, pursuant to EO 292 otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, and the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of EO 292.- In 1993, then President Ramos issued AO 29 authorized the grant of productivity incentive benefits for the year 1992 in the maximum amount of P1,000.00 and reiterating the prohibition under Section 7 of AO 268 (issued by President Aquino), enjoining said grants without prior approval of the President. Section 4 of AO 29 directed “all departments, offices and agencies which authorized payment of CY 1992 Productivity Incentive Bonus in excess of the amount authorized under Section 1 hereof to immediately cause the

return/refund of the excess.” In compliance therewith, the heads of the departments or agencies of the government concerned, who are the herein Respondents, caused the deduction from petitioners’ salaries or allowances of the amounts needed to cover the alleged overpayments.- To prevent the Respondents from making further deductions from their salaries or allowances, the Petitioners have come before this Court to seek relief. - In G.R. No. 119597, the facts are different but the petition poses a common issue with the other consolidated cases. The Petitioner, Association of Dedicated Employees of the Philippine Tourism Authority (“ADEPT”), is an association of employees of the Philippine Tourism Authority (“PTA”) who were granted productivity incentive bonus for calendar year 1992 pursuant to RA 6971, otherwise known as the Productivity Incentives Act of 1990. Subject bonus was, however, disallowed by the Corporate Auditor on the ground that it was prohibited under AO 29. The disallowance of the bonus in question was finally brought on appeal to the Commission on Audit (COA) which denied the appeal.

ISSUES1. WON with regard to G.R. No. 119597, Incentives under RA 6971 are applicable to ADEPT employees2. WON AO 29 and 268 (being Presidential pronouncements) are violative of the provisions of EO 292 (being a law passed by the legislature), and hence null and void, and WON AO 29 and 268 unlawfully usurp the Constitutional authority granted solely to the Civil Service Commission3. WON the forced refund of incentive pay is an unconstitutional impairment of a contractual obligation4. WON assuming arguendo that the grant of incentives was invalid, the same should be the personal liability of officials directly responsible therefore in accordance with section 9 of AO 268

HELD1. There are generally two types of GOCCs:

1. Those incorporated under the general corporation law. Employees of this type have the right to bargain (collectively), strike, and other such remedies available to workers of private corporations. Functions are mainly proprietary.

2. Those with special charter (a.k.a. original charter), which are subject to Civil Service Laws, have no right to bargain (collectively). Incorporated in pursuance of a State Policy.

- Only GOCCs incorporated under the general corporation law, and thus performing proprietary functions, are included under the coverage of RA 6791. GOCCs created in pursuance of a policy of the state and those whose officers and employees are covered by the Civil Service are expressly excluded.- The legislative intent to place only GOCCs performing proprietary functions under the coverage of RA 6971 is also gleanable from the other provisions of the law making reference to remedies available only to laborers akin to the private sector.- Also, pursuant to EO 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987, which provides for the establishment of Department or Agency Employee Suggestions and Incentives Award Systems for GOCCs with original charters, it is thus evident that the PTA is already within the scope of an incentives award system.2. In accordance with EO 292, the functions of the Civil Service Commission have been “decentralized to the offices and agencies where such functions can be effectively performed;” specifically, the implementation of the Employee Suggestions and Incentive Award System ahs been decentralized to the President or to the head of each department or agency (as his/her alter ego).- The President is the head of government. His/her power includes control over executive departments. Control means “the power to alter what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.” In issuing AO 29 limiting the amount of benefits, enjoining heads of departments from granting benefits without prior approval from him/her, and directing the refund of any excess

over the prescribed amount, the President was just exercising his power of control over executive departments. Specifically, seeing that the incentives program was producing demoralization instead of the original goal of encouragement, owing to the fact that employees not receiving the incentives felt slighted and underappreciated, the President merely exercised his power of control by modifying the acts of the respondents who granted incentive benefits without appropriate clearance from the Office of the President.- Neither can it be said that the President encroached upon the authority of the Civil Service Commission to grant benefits to government employees. AO 29 and 268 did not revoke, but rather only regulated, the grant and amount of incentives.3. Not all contracts entered into by the government will operate as a waiver of its non-suability; distinction must be made between its sovereign and proprietary acts. The acts involved in this case are governmental. Besides, incentive pay is in the nature of a bonus, which is not a demandable or enforceable obligation.4. Absent a showing of bad faith, public officers are not personally liable for damages resulting form the performance of official duties.Decision In upholding the Constitutionality of AO 268 and 29, the Court reiterates the doctrine that in interpreting statutes, that which will avoid a finding of unconstitutionality is to be preferred.Considering, however, that all the parties here acted in good faith, the Court cannot countenance the refund of the incentives which amount the petitioners have already received, as a corollary, further deductions from salaries are thus enjoined.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

LIGA NG MGA BARANGAY V COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

PADILLA; May 5, 1994

FACTS- Nature Petitions for prohibition to stop the threatened illegal transfer, disbursement, and use of public funds in a manner contrary to the Constitution and the law- 18 April 1994: Petitioner Liga Ng Mga Barangay, an organization of barangays, represented by petitioner Alex David (as taxpayer and as president and secretary-general of the organization) filed this petition for prohibition, with prayer for a temporary restraining order. - 22 April 1994: Another petition raising the same issues were filed. - Petitioners question what they perceive as “the threatened illegal transfer, disbursement, and use of public funds in a manner contrary to the Constitution and the law” relative to the conduct of the forthcoming barangay elections. They claim that in the General Appropriations Act (GAA) of 1994, only P137,878,000.00 were appropriated by the Congress for the holding of the said elections. The petitioners claim that by early 1994, Congress itself has made the assessment that the money is insufficient to defray cost of holding the elections. Petitioners allege that in order to augment said amount, respondents have threatened and are about to transfer/re-allocate certain moneys to be sourced from the executive and legislative branches of government to COMELEC, which in turn will use it to fund the elections: [a] P180M from the appropriation of the DILG, [b] P160M from the Countryside Development Fund; P70M from the Senate; P30M from the HReps; and [c] P43M from the Internal Revenue Allotments (IRA) of Provinces, Cities and Municipalities (Note: This is the scheme that is being assailed in the issue of this case)- 21 April 1994: Court resolved to require respondents to submit comment on the petition within the non-existentiable period of 5 days- 26 April 1994: Respondents through the Solicitor General filed their comment. They claim that petitioners acted solely on the basis of reports made in the newspaper (“Barangay Poll Funds Found” article from the Manila Bulletin) and

did not bother to confirm the veracity of article. They also claim that said reports were mere unofficial proposals/suggestions made in the process of searching for funds. COMELEC further alleges that that it intends to fund the barangay elections from the money allotted by Congress for the purpose and from its own savings resulting from unused funds. The Solicitor General supports the stand of the respondents, as it is according to Sec. 25 (5), Article VI of the Constitution and Sectoons 17 (Use of Savings) and 19 (Meaning of Savings and Appropriations) of the GAA for Fiscal Year 1994.- Respondents also maintain that funds from LGUs may also be used to help defray the cost of the forthcoming barangay elections. They cite Opinion No. 51 of the Secretary of Justice, dated 19 April 1994, which says that under Sec. 50 of the Omnibus Election Code, LGUs are required to appropriate funds for barangay elections

ISSUEWON the existence or lack of factual basis on WON the impleaded public respondents are attempting, or intending to effect the transfer of funds which would be in direct contravention of Art. VI Sec. 25 (5) of the Constitution42

HELDAny threat or attempt to pursue a transfer of funds scheme that exists only in newspaper reports is not sufficient factual basis to render such scheme by the COMELEC unconstitutional.Reasoning1. [a] The threat to pursue the scheme, if ever there was one, existed only in newspaper reports which could have misled the general public, including the petitioners, into believing that the same emanated from impeccable sources. [b] Court acknowledges petitioners have displayed vigilance and acted with the best of intentions, but they should have first obtained an official statement or at least confirmation from respondents as to the veracity of the report instead of relying on the newspaper article.2. The court went further in saying – actually, in affirming the arguments of the respondents – that consistent with Art. VI Sec. 25 (5) of the Constitution, the following may be availed by the COMELEC to defray the cost of the forthcoming barangay elections: [a] Article IV of the Omnibus Election Code provides that LGUs should appropriate funds for the barangay elections. COMELEC may make arranges with local governments to comply with this article pursuant to its constitutional authority to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of elections. COMELEC may also issue an appropriate directive for the province city, or municipality to advance election expenses that are chargeable to it. Since the President exercises general supervision of all local governments, the COMELEC may course its directives to local governments through the Office of the President and to be implemented by DILG. (Note: This is based on the Opinion No. 51, s. 1994 of Sec. of Justice which was cited as authority)[b] Sections 17 and 19 of GAA for FY 1994 where it was stated that the Heads of Constitutional Commissions under Article IX of the Constitution…are hereby authorized to augment any item in this Act for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.Decision Petitions DISMISSED for lack of merit.Voting 14 concur, no dissent.

LOONG V COMMISSION ON ELECTIONSPUNO; April 14, 1999

42No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the President, the

President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.

FACTS- RA 8436 prescribed the adoption of an automated election system

> Was used in the May 11, 1998 regular elections in the ARMM which includes Sulu> Atty. Jose Tolentino was the head of the COMELEC Task Force in Sulu

- Sulu voting readily peaceful except that there was a problem with the automated counting of votes

> Discrepancies were reported (May 12, 1998) between the election returns and the votes cast for mayor in the muncipality of Pata (later on confirmed when checked by Atty. Tolentino)> The automated counting of ballots in Pata were suspended and the problem was immediately communicated to the COMELEC technical experts> The problem was caused by the misalignment of the ovals opposite the names of candidates in the local ballots but nothing was wrong with the machines.

- Emergency meeting called by Atty. Tolentino participated in by military police officials and local candidates. Petitioner Loong was among those who attended along with private respondent Tan.

> Discussed how ballots should be counted.> Shift to manual count recommended by Brig. Gen. Espinosa and Subala, PNP Director Alejandrino, gubernatorial canddidates Tan and Tulawie and congressinal candidate Tulawie> Automated count insisted by gubernatorial candidates Loong and Jikiri. Written position papers were required to be submitted.> Local ballots in five municipalities were rejected by automated machines (Talipao, Siasi, Tudanan, Tapul and Jolo). Ballots rejected because of the wrong sequence code.> COMELEC issued Minute Resolution 98-1747 ordering manual recount in Pata. By 12 midnight of May 12, Atty. Tolentino had sent an en banc report to the COMELEC reommending manual recount in the whole province of Sulu because it is possible that the same problem would extend to other provinces in Sulu.> The COMELEC approved of Atty. Tolentino's recommendation with the following implementation procedures:

+ Counting machines from Jolo be transported to Manila in the PICC to keep COMELEC away from bloodshed between AFP and MNLF+ Authorize the official travel of the board of canvassers concerned for the conduct of the automated and manual operations of the counting of votes at PICC+ To authorize the presence of only the duly authorized representative of the political parties concerned and the candidate watchers both outside and inside the perimeters of the PICC

> May 15, 1998 – COMELEC laid down rules for manual count through Minute Resoln 98-1796> May 18, 1998 – Loong filed objection to Minute Resolution 98-1796

+ Violates provisions of RA 8436 providing for automated counting of ballots in ARMM. Automated count is mandatory and could not be substituted by manual counting.+ Ballots were rejected because ballots were tampered with and/or the texture was different from the official ballot+ Counting machines designed in such a way as only genuine official ballots could be read by the machine+ Other counting machines in other municipalities were in order.

> COMELEC still began with the manual count on May 18.> Loong filed petition for certiorari with Supreme Court:

+ COMELEC issued Minute Resolutions without prior notice and hearing to him+ Order for manual counting violated RA 8346+ Manual counting gave opportunity to election cheating:

< Counting by human hands of fake, tampered and counterfeit ballots which machines were programmed to reject< Opportunity to substite ballots in PICC

< 22 Board of Election Inspectors for 1,194 precincts gives sufficient time to change and tamper ballots< Opportunity to delay the proclamation of winning candidates through dilatory moves in pre-proclamation controversy because the returns and certificates are already made by man

> Tan proclaimed winner in Sulu. Loong garnered 3rd highest votes.

ISSUES1. WON petition for certiorari was appropriate remedy to invalidate COMELEC resolutions2. WON COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdisction in order manual count

a. Is there legal basis for manual count?b. Are its factual bases reasonable?c. Was there denial of due process when COMELEC ordered manual count?

3. Won it is proper to call for special election for the position of Sulu governor assuming the manual count is illegal and result is unreliable.

HELD1. Certiorari is the proper remedy according to Art. 9, Sec. 7 of the Constitution- Interpretation of RA 8436 must be made in relation the COMELEC's broad power in Art. 9, Section 2(1) “to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election.”- Adjudicatory for the petitioner, private respondent and intervenor so there are enough considerations for the certiorari jurisdiction.2. No grave abuse of discrection amounting to lack of jurisdiction because the post election realities show that the order for the manual count was not arbitrary, capricious or whimsical.

a. There was legal basis for the manual count.- RA 8436 cannot be insisted upon after the machines rejected the local ballots in five municipalities of Sulu. The errors were not machine related by were because of the ballots.- Congress failed to provide for remedy when the error in counting is not machine-related. The vacuum in the law cannot prevent the COMELEC from levitating the problem. Article 9, Section 2(1) of the Constitution gives the COMELEC the broad power “to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall.”

b. There was reasonable factual basis.- Automated machines failed to read the ballots correctly in Pata. Local ballots in Jolo, Siasi, Tapal, Indanan and Talipao were rejected.

> Flaws were carefully analyzed by COMELEC experts and found nothing wrong with the machines but with the ballots.> To continue with the automated count would result in a grossly erroneous result.

- COMELEC had to act derisively in order to restore peace and order, especially since past election tensions have been created by failures in automated counting. Military and authorities recommended manual counting to preserve peace and order.

c. There was no denial of due process when COMELEC ordered the manual count.

- They were given every opportunity to oppose the manual count of local ballots in Sulu.

> Orally heard> Written position papers> Representatives escorted transfer of ballots and automated machines to Manila> Watchers observed manual count

- The integrity of the local ballots was safeguarded when they were transferred from Sulu to Manila and when they were manually counted.- Manual count is reliable because when the COMELEC ordered manual

count, it issued corresponding rules and regulations to govern the counting and the ballots were not difficult to understand.

3. A special election for Sulu governor is improper.- A special election only governs exceptional circumstances. The plea can only be grounded on a failure of election.

> A failure of election applies when “on account of force majeure, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes, the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed, or had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the dosing of the voting, or after the voting and during the preparation and the transmission of the election returns or in the custody of canvass thereof.” > A plea for special election must also be addressed to the COMELEC not to the SC (Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code should be read in relation to RA 7166).> Grounds for failure of election involve questins after the fact. They can only be determined by the COMELEC en banc after due notice and hearing to the parties. Loong did not do this in the present case. His plea for special election was an afterthought.- To hold a specal election would be discriminatory.> All elected officials in Sulu now discharging functions.;> Tan's election cannot be singled out as invalid for alikes cannot be treated unalikes.

In addition- COMELEC was organied under Comm. Act 607 in August 1940. The power to enforce election laws was originally vested in the President and exercised through the Dept. of Interior.- 1940 amendments to 1935 Constitution transformed the COMELEC to a constitutional body. COMELEC was granted power to have “exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections.”- 1973 Constitution broadened powers of the COMELEC by making it the sole judge of all election contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of members of the national legislature and elective provincial and city officials. It was given judicial power asde from the traditional administrative and executive functions.- 1987 Constitution added powers to the COMELEC by allowing it to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of elections, plebiscites, initiative, referenda and recalls. It also includes contets involving elective municipal and barangay officals.

SANCHEZ V COMMISSION ON ELECTIONSMELENCIO-HERRERA; June 19, 1982

FACTS- Jan. 30, 1980 local elections- Sanchez and Biliwang ran for Mayor of San Fernando, Pampanga- Biliwang was proclaimed winner- Sanchez filed with COMELEC a Petition to declare null and void the local elections due to alleged large scale terrorism- Ultimately, the COMELEC found that after the voting was over in the local elections, terrorism and irregularities were committed- counters were threatened by armed goons and policemen into making spurious election returns in favor of Biliwang.- Thus, COMELEC issued a resolution ordering:

1. The annulment the Jan. 30, 1980 election and the setting aside of the proclamation of Biliwang2. To certify to the President/Prime Minister and the Batasang Pambansa the failure of election, so that remedial legislation may be enacted, and pending such enactment, the President/PM may appoint municipal officials in San Fernando

- Sanchez sought reconsideration of the COMELEC Resolution certifying the failure of election, and praying instead that COMELEC call a special election in San Fernando- COMELEC denied reconsideration- Both Biliwang and Sanchez filed petitions with the SC, which were consolidated into the following issues:

ISSUES1. WON the COMELEC has the power to annul an entire municipal election on the ground of post-election terrorism2. WON the COMELEC has the authority to call for a special election

HELD1. Biliwang asserts that COMELEC lacks the power to annul elections of municipal officials because, under Section 190 of the 1978 Election Code, the power to try election contests relative to elective municipal officials is vested in the CFI- SC: It may be true there is no specific provision vesting COMELEC with authority to annul an election. Under the 1935 Constitution, the SC said that COMELEC did not have this power, and that instead the power lay with the Senate Electoral Tribunal and the House Electoral Tribunal. Now, however, it is “the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all members of the Batasang Pambansa and elective provincial and city officials.” The COMELEC must be deemed possessed of the authority, in line with its plenitude of powers and its function to protect the integrity of elections.2. COMELEC opined that it had no powers to order the holding of a new or special election, because the actual election itself took place, and in a proper, orderly fashion. According to COMELEC, the Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 grants COMELEC authority to call for a new or special election only in a failure of election, but in this case, there was a failure to gauge the true and genuine will of the electorate, as opposed to a failure of election (tainted casting of ballots (failure of election) vs. tainted counting of ballots (failure to gauge the will)) - SC: to state that this is not the failure of election contemplated by Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 because elections did take place is too tenuous a distinction. In practical effect, no election has been held; there has been in truth and in fact, a failure to elect. This interpretation only hampers the effectiveness of the COMELEC and delays the opportunity to the voters to cast their votes. Decision The SC upholds the power and prerogative of the COMELEC to annul an election and to call for a special election.

UNIDO V COMMISSION ON ELECTIONSBARREDO; April 3, 1981

FACTS - Appeal by the UNIDO (a political org campaigning for "NO" votes to amendments to the 1973 Consti proposed by the Batasang Pambansa), from the resolutions of COMELEC dated March 18 and March 22, 1981. - 5 March 1981: COMELEC issued 3 Resolutions providing for Rules and Regulations concerning the plebiscite campaign:

(1) Resolution No. 1467 providing for equal opportunity on free public discussions and debates;(2) Resolution No.1468 providing for equal time on the use of the broadcast media (radio & TV) <equal as to duration and quality…at the same rates or given free of charge>; & (3) Resolution No.1469 providing for equal space on the use of the print media; but COMELEC recognizes the principle of self-regulation & shall practice only minimal supervision.

- 10 March 1981: UNIDO writes to COMELEC re: news that Pres. Marcos will lead the campaign for "Yes" votes in his 2-hr nationwide "Pulong-Pulong sa Pangulo" radio-TV program on March 12, which will be carried live by 26 television and 248 radio stations throughout the country. Citing the said COMELEC resolutions, they demand exactly the same number of TV and radio stations all over the country to campaign for 'No' votes.- 17 March 1981: UNIDO writes a follow-up letter to COMELEC, stating that on March 21, they will hold a public meeting at the Plaza Miranda, Quiapo, Manila, & requesting that it covered by radio and television from 9:30 to 11:30 P.M. They expect COMELEC to direct the radio & TV facilities to comply with their request.- 18 March 1981: COMELEC issued Resolution saying UNIDO’s request "cannot be granted and is hereby denied" & that

(1) 'Pulong-Pulong sa Pangulo' is not a political or partisan vehicle but an innovative system of participatory democracy where the President as leader of the nation enunciates certain programs or policies…. Its format is intended to result in effective multi-way consultation between the leader of the nation and the people; and that(2) UNIDO, not having the same constitutional prerogatives vested in the President/Prime Minister, has no right to 'demand' equal coverage by media accorded President Marcos but is free to enter into appropriate contracts with the TV or radio stations concerned. COMEMEC cannot direct these media to grant free use of their facilities.

- 20 March 1981: UNIDO writes another letter as MFR. Denied by COMELEC for lack of merit. Hence, this appeal before SC. Petitioner raises the following grounds:

(1) COMELEC resolutions in question are contrary to the Constitution and the law, for being unjust, unfair & inequitable. They violate the basic principles of equality, good faith and fair play, & are not conducive to insure free, orderly and honest elections; (2) UNIDO’s request/demand for equal broadcast media of its public meeting/rally at Plaza Miranda was arbitrarily denied. The campaign for NO votes should be granted the same right & equal use of facilities granted Marcos’ campaign for YES.

ISSUEWON COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion

HELD “…for being beyond what the charter, the laws and pertinent Comelec regulations contemplate, for being more than what the opposition is duly entitled vis-a-vis the duty, obligation and/or privilege inherent in the head of state to directly dialogue with the sovereign people when the occasion demands, for being impractical under prevailing circumstances, and for its failure to join in the instant petition indispensable parties, thereby depriving the Court of jurisdiction to act, and for these alone among other reasons which there is hardly time to state herein, the prayer in the instant petition cannot be granted. “- The proposed changes of the Charter are of deep and transcendental importance and the more the people are adequately

informed about the proposed amendments, their exact meaning, implications and nuances, the better. - Denial of due process is considered generally as the first and the most valued right of everyone under the Bill of Rights. UNIDO should have made the television and radio stations (who will be directly affected by any injunction of the Comelec upon SC’s orders) parties to this case. Said parties are indispensable without which the Court cannot proceed properly. - In fact, petitioner has not shown, for apparently they have not done so, that they have requested any TV or radio station to give them the same time and style of "pulong-pulong" as that which they afforded the President. Also, there are other groups and aggrupations not to speak of individuals who are similarly situated as petitioner who would also want to be heard. - The "free orderly and honest elections" clause of the Constitution is applicable also to plebiscites, particularly one relative to constitutional amendments. It is indispensable that they be properly characterized to be fair submission: the voters must of necessity have had adequate opportunity, in the light of conventional wisdom, to cast their votes with sufficient understanding of what they are voting on. - Nothing can be of more transcendental importance than to vote in a constitutional plebiscite. It is the duty of the Comelec to see to it that the sale of air time by TV and radio stations insures that time equal as to duration and quality is available to all contending views.- Curtailment of the freedom of speech and the press of television and radio stations is permissible for election purposes.- The head of state of every country in the world must from the very nature of his position, be accorded certain privileges not equally available to those who are opposed to him. When the head of state wants to communicate on matters of public concern, no government office or entity is obliged to give the opposition the same facilities. They have to avail themselves of their own resources. - In instances where the head of state is at the same time the president of the political party that is in power, it does not necessarily follow that he speaks with two voices when he dialogues with the governed. When the President spoke in "Pulong-Pulong sa Pangulo" he spoke as President-Prime Minister and not as head of the KBL, the political party now in power. - The petitioner had not adequately shown that COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion. The Comelec has indeed the power to supervise and regulate the mass media with respect to the equal opportunity provisions, but such authority arises only when there is a showing that any sector or member of the media has denied to any party or person the right to which it or he is entitled. Comelec is not supposed to dictate to the media. - There are other political parties similarly situated as petitioner. To grant to petitioner what it wants, it must necessarily follow that such other parties should also be granted. That would be too much to expect from the media that has also its own right to which it or he is entitled. Comelec is not supposed to dictate to the media.Decision Appeal dismissed.

CHAVEZ V COMMISSION ON ELECTIONSBIDIN; July 3, 1992

FACTS

- Petition for the issuance of a TRO enjoining COMELEC from proclaiming the 24th highest senatorial candidate.- May 5, 1992 - Court issued a Resolution of the case "Francisco Chavez v. Comelec, et al.," disqualifying Melchor Chavez from running for Senator in the May 11, 1992 elections. The petitioner then filed an urgent motion with the Comelec praying that it (1) disseminate to all its agents and the general public the resolution; and (2) order said election officials to delete the name of Melchor Chavez as printed in the certified list of candidates, tally sheets, election returns and "to count all votes cast for the disqualified Melchor, Chavez in favor of Francisco I. Chavez . . . ."- May 8, 1992 - Comelec issued a resolution which resolved to delete the name of Melchor Chavez from the list of qualified candidates. However, it failed to order the crediting of all "Chavez" votes in favor of petitioner as well as the cancellation of Melchor Chavez name in the list of qualified candidates. On Election Day, Melchor Chavez remained undeleted in the list of qualified candidates. Commissioner Rama issued a directive over the radio and TV ordering that all “Chavez” votes be credited to the petitioner however it did not reach all the precincts - Petitioner claims that the Comelec failed to perform its mandatory function under Sec. 7, RA 7166 which states that if a candidate has been disqualified, it shall be the duty of the Commission to instruct without delay the deletion of the name of said candidate.- Confusion arose as the "Chavez" votes were either declared stray or invalidated by the Boards of Election Inspectors (BEIs).As a result, "Chavez" votes were not credited in favor of petitioner.- May 12, 1992 - Comelec issued another Resolution directing all municipal and city election registrars throughout the country to examine the minutes of voting submitted by the BEIs and to credit all the "Chavez" votes, which have been declared stray or invalidated by the BEIs, in favor of petitioner.- Petitioner maintains that the said resolution proved futile because it did not reach all the various BEIs throughout the country on time for implementation and that the minutes of voting did not indicate the number of "Chavez" votes which were declared stray or invalidated.- May 23, 1992, petitioner filed an urgent petition before the respondent Comelec praying the latter to (1) implement its May 12, 1992 resolution with costs de officio; (2) to re-open the ballot boxes to scan for the "Chavez" votes for purposes of crediting the same in his favor; (3) make the appropriate entries in the election returns/certificates of canvass; and (4) to suspend the proclamation of the 24 winning candidates.- Dissatisfied with the failure of respondent Comelec to act on his petition, petitioner filed this urgent petition for prohibition and mandamus, with prayer for the issuance of a TRO, enjoining the Comelec from proclaiming the 24th highest senatorial candidate, without first implementing Comelec's resolution of May 12, 1992 and acting upon petitioner's letter/complaint dated May 14, 1992 and urgent petition dated May 22, 1992. Petitioner alleges that respondent Comelec acted capriciously and whimsically and with grave abuse of discretion.- June 8, 1992, Sen Agapito Aquino prayed for the dismissal of the instant petition on the ground that the law does not allow pre-proclamation controversy involving the election of members of the Senate.

ISSUE1. WON SC has jurisdiction over the case

HELD1. Jurisdiction- The alleged inaction of Comelec in ordering the deletion of Melchor Chavez's name in the list of qualified candidates does not call for the exercise of the Court's function of judicial review. The Court can review the decisions or orders of the Comelec only in cases of grave abuse of discretion committed by it in the discharge of its quasi-judicial powers and not those arising from the exercise of its administrative functions.

- Comelec can administratively undo what it has administratively left undone. Comelec has ordered the deletion of Melchor Chavez's name not only on the official list of candidates, but also on the election returns, tally sheet and certificate of canvass. Hence, petitioner's allegation that respondent Comelec failed to implement the resolutions does not hold water.- Petitioner has no cause of action, the controversy being in the nature of a pre-proclamation. While the Commission has exclusive jurisdiction over pre-proclamation controversies involving local elective officials, such are not allowed in elections for President, Vice-President, Senator and Member of the House of Representatives.- Sec. 15 of Republic Act 7166 provides:"Sec. 15. Pre-proclamation Cases Not Allowed in Elections for President, Vice-President, Senator, and Member of the House of Representatives. - For purposes of the elections for President, Vice-President, Senator and Member of the House of Representatives, no pre-proclamation cases shall be allowed on matters relating to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of the election returns or the certificate of canvass, as the case may be. However, this does not preclude the authority of the appropriate canvassing body motu propio or upon written complaint of an interested person to correct manifest errors in the certificate of canvass or election returns before it. xxx xxx xxx"Any objection on the election returns before the city or municipal board of canvassers, or on the municipal certificates of canvass before the provincial boards of canvassers or district board of canvassers in Metro Manila Area, shall be specifically noted in the minutes of their respective proceedings."What is allowed is the correction of "manifest errors in the certificate of canvass or election returns." To be manifest, the errors must appear on the face of the certificates of canvass or election returns sought to be corrected and/or objections thereto must have been made before the board of canvassers and specifically noted in the minutes of their respective proceedings.- The petitioner's prayer does not call for the correction of "manifest error's in the certificates of canvass or election returns" before the Comelec but for the re-opening of the ballot boxes and appreciation of the ballots contained therein. He has not even pointed to any "manifest error" in the certificates of canvass or election returns he desires to be rectified. There being none, the proper recourse is to file a regular election protest which exclusively pertains to the Senate Electoral Tribunal.- The word "sole" underscores the exclusivity of the Tribunals' jurisdiction over election contests relating to their respective Members is therefore the Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the instant petition. It is the Senate Electoral Tribunal which has exclusive jurisdiction to act on the complaint of petitioner involving, as it does, contest relating to the election of a member of the Senate. Petitioner's proper recourse is to file a regular election protest before the Senate Electoral Tribunal after the winning senatorial candidates have been proclaimed.- Petitioner argues that a recount before the Senate Electoral Tribunal would force him to shell out the expenses imposes not only a property requirement for the enjoyment of the right to be voted upon but also a price on the right of suffrage which would ultimately stifle the sovereign will.- The law is very clear on the matter and it is not right for petitioner to ask this Court to abandon settled jurisprudence, engage in judicial legislation, amend the Constitution and alter the Omnibus Election Code. The mandatory procedures laid down by the existing law in cases like the one at bar must be faithfully followed. The proper recourse is for petitioner to ask not this Court but the Legislature to enact remedial measures.- Sanchez v. Commission on Elections: "… (1) Errors in the appreciation of ballots by the board of inspectors are proper subject for election protest and not for recount or reappreciation of ballots. (2) The appreciation of ballots is not part of the proceedings of the board of canvassers. The function of ballots appreciation is performed by the board election inspectors at the precinct level. (3) The scope of pre-proclamation controversy is limited to the issues enumerated under Sec. 243 OEC. The complete election returns whose

authenticity is not in question, must be prima facie considered valid for the purpose of canvassing the same and proclamation of the winning candidates. "The ground for recount relied upon by Sanchez is clearly not among the issues that may be raised in pre-proclamation controversy. His allegation of invalidation of "Sanchez" votes intended for him bear no relation to the correctness and authenticity of the election returns canvassed. Neither the Constitution nor statute has granted the Comelec or the board of canvassers the power in the canvass of election returns to look beyond the face thereof, once satisfied of their authenticity (Abes v. Comelec, 21 SCRA 1252, 1256)."- Petitioner has not demonstrated any manifest error in the certificates of canvass or election returns before the Comelec which would warrant their correction. Decision Premises considered, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the instant petition for lack of merit.Narvasa, (C.J.), Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.Notes Pre-proclamation controversy is defined as "any question pertaining to or affecting the proceedings of the board of canvassers which may be raised by any candidate or by any registered political party or coalition of political parties before the board or directly with the Commission, or any matter raised under Sections 233, 234, 235 and 236 in relation to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of the election returns." [Sec. 241, Omnibus Election Code).

BUAC AND BAUTISTA V COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND CAYETANO

PUNO; January 26, 2004

FACTS- Buac and Bautista filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus to compel the COMELEC to take cognizance of contests involving the conduct of a plebiscite and the annulment of its result.- In April 1988, a plebiscite was held to ratify the cityhood of Taguig (converting Tagiug into a highly urbanized city). The Plebiscite Board of Canvassers (PBOC), without completing the canvass of sixty-four (64) other election returns, declared that the “No” votes won, indicating that the people rejected the conversion of Taguig into a city. However, upon order of the COMELEC, the PBOC reconvened and completed the canvass of the plebiscite returns, eventually proclaiming that the negative votes still prevailed.- Alleging that fraud and irregularities attended the casting and counting of votes, Buac and Bautista filed with the COMELEC a petition seeking the annulment of the announced results of the plebiscite with a prayer for revision and recount of the ballots. The COMELEC treated the petition as an election protest.- Cayetano intervened in the case. He filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction over an action involving the conduct of a plebiscite. He alleged that a plebiscite cannot be the subject of an election protest, and such must be within the jurisdiction of the RTC.- COMELEC initially gave due course to the petition and ruled that it had jurisdiction over the case, but this was overturned completely upon the MFR of Cayetano.

ISSUEWON COMELEC has jurisdiction to decide cases regarding plebiscite contests.

HELDYES

Ratio COMELEC has jurisdiction over plebiscite contest contests as power to decide such cases is part of the power vested by the 1987 Constitution to the COMELEC under Art. IX(C) Sec. 2(1)43.Reasoning: there are 7 reasons given.1. Part of judicial power is the settlement of conflicting rights as conferred by

law. Under the present case, there is no involvement of the violation of any legally demandable right, for it merely involves the ascertainment of the vote of the electorate of Taguig.

2. Jurisdiction of RTC is only on civil actions. A Plebiscite is NOT a civil action but a determination of public will.

3. To grant jurisdiction to RTC would result to jumbled justice. There would be confusion if plebiscite contest cases were given to the RTC for what if the plebiscite was a national one. Every RTC in the Philippines would have jurisdiction over nationwide plebiscite, which runs contrary to the principle that jurisdiction of an RTC is limited to their region.

4. The Consti gives jurisdiction of contests involving only election of officers to the courts (part of judicial function) or to administrative tribunals (exercising quasi-judicial power). As such, jurisdiction over plebiscite contests is not vested on the courts.

5. The Constitutional mandate to COMELEC to enforce and administer laws and regulations relative to conduct of plebiscites (among others) includes the power to ascertain the true results of such plebiscite. It includes the power to do all that is necessary to achieve honest and credible plebiscites.*The provision granting COMELEC jurisdiction over contests re: elected officials is not limiting in the sense that it only limits quasi-judicial power of COMELEC to such cases. The power to ascertain true results is implicit in its power to enforce all laws relative to the conduct of plebiscite.

6. COMELEC is best suited to have jurisdiction over such cases because of their indisputable expertise in election and related laws.

7. MFR of Cayetano filed out of time (filed 10 days, not the prescribed 5 days, after receipt of the Order or Resolution of COMELEC).

Decision COMELEC directed to reinstate the petition to annul the results and decide it without delay.

SEPARATE OPINION

CARPIO-MORALES [dissent]

- Quasi-judicial function of COMELEC is limited to contests involving election of regional, provincial, and city officials (limited to what the provision in the Consti said). As such, jurisdiction must be granted to the RTC, since no other court or agency has jurisdiction over it.- Present contest is based on allegations of fraud and irregularities, which involves a legal question that is determinable by a judicial or quasi-judicial body. - There is also the involvement of a demandable right (right to a canvass free from fraud, anomalies, and irregularities) which arose from their right to to vote in a plebiscite. - Jurisdiction is settled upon determining WoN there is involvement of a judicial controversy or a purely administrative function. In this case, it is clearly judicial.

COMMISSION ON AUDIT

ALLIANCE OF GOVERNMENT WORKERS V MINISTER OF LABOR

GUTIERREZ; August 3, 1983

43 Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:

(1) Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall.

FACTS- Petitioner Alliance of Government Workers (AGW) is a registered labor federation while the other petitioners are its affiliate unions with members from among the employees of the following offices, schools, or government-owned or controlled corporations: PNB, MWSS, GSIS, SSS, PVTA, PNC, PUP. The workers in the respondent institutions have not directly petitioned the heads of their respective offices or their representatives in the Batasang Pambansa. They have acted through a labor federation and its affiliated unions. The workers and employees are taking collective action through a labor federation which uses the bargaining power of organized labor to secure increased compensation for its members.- The petitioners contend that they should be included as recipients of the P.D. 851 Christmas bonus which states:SECTION 1. All employers are hereby required to pay all their

employees receiving a basic salary of not more than P 1000 a month, regardless of the nature of their employment, a 13th-month pay not later than December 24 of every year.

SECTION 2. Employers already paying their employees a 13th-month pay or its equivalent are not covered by this Decree.

- Section 3 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing PD 851 provides:“Section 3. Employees covered. – The Decree shall apply to all employers except to:

b) The Government and any of its political subdivisions, including government-owned and controlled corporations, except those corporations operating essentially as private subsidiaries of the Government;”

- The petitioners argue that regulations adopted under legislative authority must be in harmony with the provisions of the law and for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. A legislative act cannot be amended by a rule and an administrative officer (Minister of Labor) cannot change the law.

ISSUE1. WON the Court has jurisdiction over the case;2. WON branches, agencies, subdivisions, and instrumentalities of the Government included among the “employers” under PD 851 are required to pay all their employees receiving a basic salary of less than P1000 13 th-month pay;3. Whether or not branches, agencies, subdivisions, and instrumentalities of the Government are allowed to collectively bargain for wages and benefits.

HELD1. The Court does not have jurisdiction over the petition.Reasoning The petitioners are faced with a procedural barrier. The petition is one for declaratory relief, an action not embraced within the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. There is no statutory or jurisprudential basis for petitioners’ statement that the SC has original and exclusive jurisdiction over declaratory relief suits where only questions of law are concerned.HOWEVER, the petition has far reaching implications and raises questions that should be resolved. 2. Government employees are not entitled to 13th-month pay as provided in PD 851.Ratio Unless so specified, the government does not fall within the terms of any legislation or decree (STATCON).Reasoning The Republic of the Philippines, as sovereign, cannot be covered by a general term like “employer” unless the language used in the law is clear and specific to that effect. In fact, it has been expressly stated in Section 3 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing PD 851 that Government subdivisions, etc. are not covered by the Decree. The benefit is extended only to employees of private companies/

corporations. In addition, Sec. 2 of PD 851 bars the petitioners from receiving the bonus, since government offices have instituted an across the board wage increase.3. Public officers and employees may not join associations which impose the obligation to engage in concerted activities in order to get salaries, fringe benefits, and other emoluments higher than or different from that provided by law and regulation.Reasoning Since the terms and conditions of government employment are fixed by law¸ government workers cannot use the same weapons employed by workers in the private sector to secure concessions from their employers. The principle behind labor unionism in private industry is that industrial peace cannot be secured through compulsion by law. Relations between private employers and their employees rest on an essentially voluntary basis. In government employment, it is the legislature and the administrative heads (when properly delegated the power) of government which fix the terms and conditions of employment.- Under the present Constitution, government-owned or controlled corporations are specifically mentioned as embraced by the civil service (Section 1, Article XII-B). This was to correct the situation where more favored employees of the government could enjoy the benefits of two worlds. Salaries and fringe benefits of those embraced by the civil service are fixed by law. As such petitioners have no standing to bargain collectively (or to bargain at all) for wages.

SEPARATE OPINION

FERNANDO [concur pro hac vice]

- This is in conformity to the prevailing doctrine of statutory construction that unless so specified, the government does not fall within the terms of any legislation or decree.- ART. XIII Sec. 1: “Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees shall serve with the highest degree of responsibility xxx”

> Under the Constitution there can be no right to strike by them nor to take a mass leave which is a way of doing indirectly what is not legally allowable.

- Government workers cannot use the same weapons employed by workers in the private sector to secure concessions from employers (terms are fixed by law).

MAKASIAR [dissent]

- All the “whereases” are the premises of the decree requiring all employers to pay all their employees receiving a basic salary of not more than P1000 a month. All working masses, without exception whether private sector or public, are also suffering from ravages of inflation, and are entitled to properly celebrate Christmas every year.- Both the employees of the respondents and the employees of the private sector are similarly situated and have collective bargaining agreements with their respective employers.

NATIONAL SERVICE CO. V NLRCPADILLA; November 29, 1988

FACTS- Nature: Special civil actions for certiorari to review the decision of the NLRC. - Summary: In NASECO, the Court explained that the civil service under the 1987 Const does not cover employees from GOCCs organized as subsidiaries under the general corporation law. Accordingly, employees in such GOCCs are under NLRC’s jurisdiction. By further implication, the auditing power of COA does not apply over said GOCCs.

- Eugenia Credo was an employee of NASECO, a corporation that provides manpower services to PNB and its agencies. Because of certain administrative charges against her such as discourtesy and insubordination, she was dismissed from NASECO in 1983. In the same year Credo filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, which was eventually decided by the NLRC in 1984 in her favor.- NASECO contends, among others, that the NLRC44 has no jurisdiction to order Credo's reinstatement. NASECO claims that, as a GOCC [by virtue of its being a subsidiary of the National Investment and Development Corporation (NIDC), a subsidiary of the PNB, which in turn is a GOCC], the terms and conditions of employment of its employees are governed by the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations. In support of this argument, NASECO cites National Housing Corporation vs. Juco [134 SCRA 172 (1985)], where SC held that "employees of GOCCs are governed by the civil service law.”

ISSUEFor the purpose of determining whether the case falls under the NLRC or CSC, WON NASECO (without original charter) covered by the civil service as defined in the 1987 Constitution

HELD- GOCCs without legislative charter shall not be deemed to be embraced by the term civil service under the Constitution. By implication, labor disputes in said GOCCs shall fall within the jurisdiction of the NLRC. By further implication, the auditing power of COA shall not apply to them.Reasoning In the matter of coverage by the civil service of GOCCs, the 1987 Constitution starkly varies from the 1973 Constitution, upon which NHC is based. Under the 1973 Const, it was provided that

"[t]he civil service embraces every… instrumentality of the Government, including every government-owned or controlled corporation."

- On the other hand, the 1987 Const provides that [Art. IX-B, Sec. 2(1)]“[t]he civil service embraces all… instrumentalities… of the Government, including government owned or controlled corporations with original charters."

- Thus, the situation sought to be avoided by the 1973 Constitution and the NHC case regarding subsidiary corporations created under the Corporation Code, whose "officials and employees would be… free from the strict accountability required by the Civil Service Decree and the regulations of the Commission on Audit,” appear relegated to relative insignificance by the above 1987 Constitutional provision. By clear implication [of Art. IX-B, Sec. 2(1)], the Civil Service does not include GOCCs which are organized as subsidiaries of GOCCs under the general corporation law.45

- On the premise that it is the 1987 Constitution that governs the instant case because it is the Constitution in place at the time of [SC’s] decision thereof, the NLRC has jurisdiction to accord relief to the parties. As an admitted subsidiary of the NIDC, in turn a subsidiary of the PNB, the NASECO is a GOCC without original charter.46 NLRC decision affirmed.

CRISTOBAL V MELCHORMUNOZ-PALMA; July 29, 1977

44 BRYAN_SJ: NLRC does not have jurisdiction over those covered by the CSC. It had jurisdiction

on labor issues of private corporations or broadly speaking, private businesses.45

BRYAN_SJ: A corporation can be created generally in two ways: by incorporation under the Corporation Code, or by special law. Corporations created by special law are also called corporations with special/original charters.

46 BRYAN_SJ: What the Court seems to mean is that although PNB has an original charter, and

hence covered by civil service law, NASECO (as PNB’s sub-subsidiary) was organized under the Corporation Code. Hence, NASECO is under NLRC’s jurisdiction.

FACTS- Jose Cristobal was formerly employed as a private secretary in the President's Private Office in Malacañan, having been appointed to that position on July 1, 1961 with a salary of P4,188.00 per annum. On the second week of January, 1962, the then Executive Secretary Amelito Mutuc, thru a letter, informed the plaintiff that his services as private secretary in the President's Private Office were terminated effective January 1, 1962. A similar letter was addressed by Sec. Mutuc to some other employees in the Office of the President (OP). The dismissed employees appealed to the President by means of letters dated January 3, 1962 and January 26, 1962 for a reconsideration of their separation from the service. In a letter dated February 21, 1962, their request for reconsideration was denied by Secretary Mutuc, acting 'by authority of the President'.- On March 24, 1962, five of the employees who were separated (excluding Cristobal) filed a civil action before the CFI of Manila against Secretary Mutuc and the Cash Disbursing Officer of the OP praying for reinstatement and the payment of their salaries effective as of January 1, 1962. From a judgment dismissing their complaint, the said employees appealed to the Supreme Court which rendered a decision promulgated on November 29, 1968 reversing the dismissal of their complaint and declaring their removal from office as illegal and contrary to law, and ordering their reinstatement and the payment of their salaries from January 1, 1962 up to the date of their actual reinstatement.- Sometime in May, 1962, when the civil action filed by Raul Ingles, et al was still pending in the CFI of Manila, the dismissed employees who filed said action were recalled to their positions in the OP, without prejudice to the continuation of their civil action. With respect to the other employees who were not reinstated – Cristobal included, efforts were exerted by Sec. Mutuc to look for placements outside of Malacañan so that they may be reemployed. Cristobal waited for Sec. Mutuc to make good his assurance that he would be recalled to the service, until the latter was replaced by other executive secretaries who likewise assured the plaintiff of assistance to be reemployed at the opportune time.- After the decision of the SC promulgated on November 29, 1968, the plaintiff addressed a letter to the OP dated January 19, 1969, requesting reinstatement to his former position and the payment of salary from January 1, 1962 up to the time of actual reinstatement, supposedly in accordance with said decision. This request was denied repeatedly by the OP in successive letters addressed to the plaintiff dated September 1, 1969, January 19, 1970, April 23, 1970, May 23, 1970, and May 19, 1971, the last of which declared the matter 'definitely closed',- Consequently, Cristobal filed on August 10, 1971, with the CFI of Manila a complaint against then Exec. Sec. Alejandro Melchor and Federico Arcala, Cash Disbursing Officer of the OP, and praying for the following: 1. Declaring his dismissal as illegal and contrary to law; 2. Ordering Sec. Melchor to certify his name in the payroll of the OP, to be retroactive as of January 1, 1962, the effective date that he was illegally dismissed from the service; 3. Ordering Arcala to pay all the emoluments and/or salary to which the plaintiff is entitled effective as of January 1, 1962; and 4. Ordering them to allow him to continue with the performance of his duties in the Secretary Office Staff, Office of the President of the Philippines.- The defendants, represented by the Solicitor General alleged that Cristobal had no cause of action as he is deemed to have abandoned his office for failure to institute the proper proceedings to assert his right within one year from the date of separation pursuant to Sec. 16, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court, he having come to court only after the lapse of more than nine years, thereby in effect acquiescing to his separation, and therefore he is not entitled to any salary from termination of his employment. - On May 18, 1972, the trial court rendered its decision dismissing the complaint reasoning that: Section 16 of Rule 66 of the Rules of Court expressly provides that an action against a public office or employee may not be filed for the plaintiff’s ouster from office unless the same is commenced within one year after the cause of the ouster, or the right of the plaintiff to hold

much office or position arose. This period of one year is a condition precedent for the existence of the cause of action for quo warranto. The rationale of this doctrine is that the Government must be immediately informed or advised if any person claims to be entitled to an office or position in the civil service, as against another actually holding- it, so that the Government may not be faced with the predicament of having to pay two salaries, one for the person actually holding the office although illegally, and another for one not actually rendering service although entitled to do so. The fact that the petitioner sought to pursue administrative remedies to secure his reinstatement does not excuse the failure to file the action within the one year period.

ISSUEWON Cristobal has abandoned his right to seek judicial relief for not having filed his complaint within the one-year period provided for in Section 16, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court

HELDNO. The Court agrees that in actions of quo warranto involving right to an office, the action must be instituted within the period of one year from the time the cause of action arose; Persons claiming a right to an office of which they are illegally dispossessed should immediately take steps to recover said office and that if they do not do so within a period of one year, they shall be considered as having lost their right thereto by abandonment. However, this doctrine of laches (laches is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it) which is invoked to defeat Cristobal's suit, is not applicable in this case. There are certain exceptional circumstances attending which take this case out of the rule.Reasoning1. There was no acquiescence to or inaction on the part of Jose Cristobal amounting to abandonment of his right to reinstatement in office.> Upon receipt of the letter or January 1, 1962 advising him of his separation from the service, Cristobal, with the other dismissed employees, sought reconsideration in a letter dated January 3, 1962, calling inter alia the attention of then Sec. Mutuc that he was a civil eligible employee with eight years of service in the government and consequently entitled to security of tenure under the Constitution. This was followed by another letter of January 26, 1962. Reconsideration having been denied, a complaint was filed on March 24, 1962, with the CFI of Manila entitled Ingles vs. Mutuc, which prayed for reinstatement and payment of salaries as of January 1, 1962, wherein the SC held that the removal of the plaintiff-employees was illegal and contrary to law and that they were entitled to be reinstated with payment of their salaries from January 1, 1962 up to the date of their actual reinstatement.> Cristobal was not one of the plaintiffs in the civil case, it is true, but his non-participation is not fatal to his cause of action. During the pendency of the civil case, Cristobal continued to press his request for reinstatement together with the other employees who had filed the complaint and was in fact promised reinstatement as will be shown more in detail later. More importantly, Cristobal could be expected - without necessarily spending time and money by going to court - to relic upon the outcome of the case filed by his co-employees to protect his interests considering the similarity of his situation to that of the plaintiffs therein and the identifical relief being sought. 2. It was an act of the government through its responsible officials more particularly then Sec. Mutuc and his successors which contributed to the alleged delay in the filing of Cristobal's present complaint for reinstatement.> After the Ingles suit was filed in court, the dismissed employees, Cristobal included, continued to seek reconsideration of their dismissal. It was then that Sec. Mutuc assured the employees that without prejudice to the continuation of the civil action, he would work for their reinstatement. Accordingly, some of the dismissed employees were recalled to their respective positions in the OP among whom were the plaintiffs in the civil case and several others who were

not parties therein. Sec. Mutuc even tried to place the others outside of the Malacañan Office. In the meantime, however, Sec. Mutuc was replaced by other Exec. Secretaries to whom Cristobal over and over again presented his request for reinstatement and who gave the same assurance that Cristobal would be recalled and re-employed at "the opportune time". > It was this continued promise of the government officials concerned which led Cristobal to bide his time and wait for the Office of the President to comply with its commitment. Furthermore, he had behind him the decision of the Supreme Court in Ingles vs. Mutuc which he believed should be applied in his favor. But when Cristobal, in answer to his various letters, received the letter of May 19, 1971 from the Office of the President denying his reinstatement and declaring the matter "definitely closed" because of his failure to file an action in court within one year from his separation, it was only then that he saw the necessity of seeking redress from the courts.> Surely, it would now be the height of inequity and injustice, if after Cristobal relied and reposed his faith and trust on the word and promises of the former Executive Secretaries who dealt with him and who preceded the herein respondent Sec. Melchor, that the court hold that he lost his right to seek relief because of lapse of time.3. The dismissal of appellant Cristobal was contrary to law on the strength of the Supreme Court's decision in Ingles vs. Mutuc.> In Ingles, the defendants maintained that the principal issue in the case was whether or not the employees were occupying positions primarily confidential in nature and therefore subject to removal at the pleasure of the appointing power, and that this issue was to be resolved in the affirmative. The Court held: that one holding in the government a primarily confidential position is "in the Civil Service" and that "officers or employees in the unclassified" as well as "those in the classified service" are protected by the provision in the organic law that "no officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law" (Section 4, Article XII, 1935 Constitution); that while the incumbent of a primarily confidential position holds office at the pleasure only of the appointing power and such pleasure turns into displeasure, the incumbent is not "removed" or "dismissed" but that his term merely "expires"; that there was no evidence to indicate that the respective positions of the dismissed employees were "primarily confidential" in nature and on the contrary the compensation attached and the designation given thereto suggest the purely or at least mainly clerical nature of their work; and consequently, considering that the dismissed employees were admittedly civil service eligibles with several years of service in the Government, their removal from office was "illegal and contrary to law".> No evidence was adduced by the government to show that Cristobal's position was "primarily confidential". On the contrary as stated by this Court in Ingles vs. Mutuc, the compensation attached to his item and the designation of the position indicate the purely clerical nature of his functions. In fact, none of the letters sent to him from the OP ever indicated that he was holding his position at the pleasure of the appointing power or that his services were terminated because his term of office had "expired". The only reason given - and this appears in the letter of September 1, 1969 from the OP - was that he failed to institute the proper proceeding to assert his right, if any, to the position within the period of one year from the date of termination and under settled jurisprudence he is deemed to have abandoned his right to said office or acquiesced in his removal.> In granting relief to the Cristobal on the matter of back salaries, however, there is no proof to show that from January 1, 1962 up to the promulgation of this decision, Cristobal at no time worked or was employed at some other office. The court cannot ignore the probability of Cristobal's having sought employment elsewhere during that period to support himself and his family. Considering the lapse of almost nine years before he filed this suit, the resolved to grant back salaries at the rate last received by him only for a period of five (5) years without qualification and deduction.> The Public Officials concerned are directed to reinstate Jose Cristobal, either in the OP or in some other government office, to any position for which he is

qualified by reason of his civil service eligibility, subject to present requirements of age and physical fitness; and to pay him back salaries for a period of 5 years at the rate of P4,188.00 per annum without qualification and deduction.Decision Decision set aside.

ACOLOLA V TANTUICOSANTOS; June 27, 1978

FACTS - Nature ORIGINAL PETITION for certiorari, mandamus with preliminary injunction.- Petitioner Arturo A. Acolola was assigned as Provincial Auditor of Capiz on April 16, 1972. Sometime before December 12, 1972, an administrative complaint was filed against him charging him with various irregularities in connection with the discharge of his duties. The complaint was subsequently dismissed. - On December 27, 1974 he was again administratively charged with offenses ranging from "misconduct, neglect of duty to incompetence in the performance of official duties," which charges were likewise dismissed. - On December 3, 1976, while petitioner was assigned as Acting Highway Engineering District Auditor of Romblon, private respondent Horacio A. Martinez, a contractor of Public Works Project in the province of Romblon, filed another complaint against petitioner charging him, this time, with

(1) Delaying action on payment of vouchers.(2) Delaying action on request for inspection of accomplished work:(3) Refusal to assign an auditor's representative to check deliveries of materials at job sites at the time of deliveries;(4) Piecemeal suspension of vouchers:(5) Demanding free transportation and meals when on inspection of materials delivered or work accomplished, and (6) Demanding P24,000 cost of plane fare for his twin daughter's trip to the United States.

- Upon the recommendation of the Civil Security Office of the Commission on Audit, an entrapment scheme was devised and executed on December 15, 1976. Petitioner was apprehended by the PC Provincial Command in the act of receiving from complainant Horacio A. Martinez, the amount of P2,000.00 in marked P20 bills as bribe money, while he was about to enter his room at the Seaside Hotel. - On January 12, 1977, a formal administrative charge was preferred against him. At the same time the preventive suspension of petitioner was ordered by the respondent pursuant to Section 41, Presidential Decree No. 807. Respondent, now petitioner, answered the charge. - On May 12, 1977, petitioner was summarily dismissed from the service, pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 807, dated October 6, 1975. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration praying for a formal investigation denied, appeals to Court, seeking: (1) the review and reversal of the order of May 27, 1977 of the Acting Chairman Cormnission on Audit, (Hon. Francisco S. Tantuico Jr.) summarily dismissing him from the service, on the grounds that respondent acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion and the said order is violative of his constitutional rights; and (2) his reinstatement to his former position. Petition was given due course, respondents required to file their comments, TRO issued.- On March 18, 1978, the Solicitor General for and in behalf of respondent Tantuico, Chairman of COA, filed the required comment and prayed that the petition be dismissed for lack of merit. Petitioner filed his rejoinder (should be reply) to the said comment on April 20, 1978.

ISSUEWON the respondent Chairman of the Commission on Audit, could summarily dismiss petitioner pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 807.

HELD

Ratio Yes, the respondent Chairman of COA could summarily dismiss petitioner Pursuant to PD 807. Section 40 of Presidential Decree No. 807 specifically provides:"SEC. 40. Summary Proceedings.-No formal investigation is necessary and the respondent may be immediately removed or dismissed if any of the following circumstances is present:

(a) When the charge is serious and the evidence of guilt is strong.(b) When the respondent is a recidivist or has been repeatedly charged and there is reasonable ground to believe that he is guilty of the present charge.(c) When the respondent is notoriously undesirable.

- Resort to summary proceedings by disciplining authority shall be done with utmost objectivity and impartiality to the end that no injustice is committed: Provided, That removal or dismissal except those by the President, himself, or upon his order, may be appealed to the Commission."- Petitioner was caught red-handed by agents of the Philippine Constabulary in the entrapment operations, and the evidence against him was over whelming which warranted his summary dismissal from the service under PD 807. The seriousness of the offense charged, the circumstances surrounding its commission and the evidence of guilt, being overwhelming and indubitably strong, the interest of the public service demanded the drastic remedy of summary dismissal, which respondent Chairman of the Commission -on Audit judiciously took against petitioner. Decision Petition DISMISSEd for lack of merit. TRO LIFTED and SET ASIDE.Voting 4 concur: Fernando (Chairman), Barredo, Antonio, and Aquino1 on official leave: Concepcion Jr.

SANDIGANBAYAN

NUNEZ V SANDIGANBAYANFERNANDO; January 30, 1982

FACTS- Petitioner Rufino Nuñez was accused before the Sandiganbayan of estafa through falsification of public and commercial documents committed in connivance with his other co-accused, all public officials- Informations were filed on February 21 and March 26, 1979- On May 15, petitioner filed a motion to quash on constitutional and jurisdictional grounds - Respondent court denied the motion, as well as the MFR- Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the SC, assailing the validity of PD 1486, as amended by PD 1606, creating the Sandiganbayan

ISSUEWON Presidential Decree No. 1486, as amended, is violative of the due process, equal protection, and ex post facto clauses of the Constitution

HELDPetition dismissed. Petitioner has been unable to make a case calling for the declaration of unconstitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 1486, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1606.RatioOn the equal protection clause of the Constitution…- Petitioner’s premise is that the Sandiganbayan proceedings violates petitioner’s right to equal protection because:

> Appeal, as a matter of right, became minimized into a matter of discretion> Appeal was limited to questions of law, excluding a review of facts and trial evidence> There is only one chance to appeal conviction, by certiorari to the SC, instead of the traditional two chances

while all other estafa indictees are entitled to appeal as a matter of right covering questions of law and of facts, and to two appellate courts (CA and SC)

- Classification satisfies the test announced by this court in People v. Vera> Must be based on substantial distinction> Must be germane to the purposes of the law> Must not be limited to existing conditions only and must apply equally to each member of the class

- The Constitution specifically makes mention of the creation of a special court, in response to problem, namely, the dishonesty in the public service.- Petitioners, should therefore have anticipated that a different procedure that would be prescribed for that tribunal would not be violative of the equal protection clause- The general guarantees of the Bill of Rights must give way to specific provisions of the Constitution, for the promotion of the general welfare, which is the end of the law On the ex post facto provision of the Constitution…- Petitioner’s contention that the challenged Presidential Decree is contrary to the ex post facto law is premised on the allegation that “petitioner’s right of appeal is being diluted or eroded efficacy wise.- Justice Makasiar, in the Kay Villegas Kami decision, defined an ex post facto law as one which:

> makes criminal an act done before the passage of the law and which was innocent when done, and punishes such an act> aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was when committed> changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when committed> alters the legal rules on evidence, and authorizes conviction upon less or different testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense> assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only, in effect imposes penalty or deprivation of a right for something which when done was lawful> deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has become entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty

- the “lawful protection” to which an accused “has become entitled” is qualified, not given a broad scope- the mode of procedure provided for in the statutory right to appeal can hardly be argued to be embraced therein- the test to whether the ex post facto law is disregarded, in the language of Justice Harlan in Thompson v. Utah, is “taking from an accused any right that was regarded, at the time of the adoption of the constitution as vital for the protection of life and liberty, and which he enjoyed at the time of the commission of the offense charged against him” - the omission of the CA as an intermediate tribunal does not deprive the petitioner of a right vital to the protection of his liberty- his innocence or guilt is passed upon by a three-judge court, where a unanimous vote is required- if convicted, the SC has the duty to see whether any error of law was committed- the SC in determining whether to give due course to the petition for review must be convinced that the constitutional presumption of innocence has been overcome- SC carefully scrutinizes whether the quantum of evidence required for a finding of guilt has been satisfied- It is farfetched and highly unrealistic to conclude that the omission of the CA as a reviewing authority results in the loss of “vital protection of liberty.”

On the due process clause of the Constitution…- Petitioner alleges lack of fairness- In Arnault v. Pecson, the court declared that what is required for compliance with the due process mandate in criminal proceedings is “a fair and impartial trial and reasonable opportunity for the preparation of defense

- In criminal proceedings then, due process is satisfied if the accused is “informed as to why he is proceeded against and what charge he has to meet, with his conviction being made to rest on evidence that is not tainted with falsity after full opportunity for him to rebut it and the sentence being imposed in accordance with a valid law.”- If an accused has been heard in a court of competent jurisdiction, and proceeded against under the orderly process of law, and only punished after inquiry and investigation, upon notice to him, with an opportunity to be heard, and a judgment awarded within the authority of a constitutional law, then he has had due process of law.

ZALDIVAR V SANDIGANBAYANPER CURIAM; May 19, 1988

FACTSGR Nos. 79690-707- Petitioner Enrique A. Zaldivar (Antique Governor) sought to restrain the Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan Raul Gonzales from proceeding with the prosecution and hearing of Criminal cases Nos. 12159 – 12161 and 12163-12177- Petitioner alleged that said cases were filed by Tanodbayan without legal and constitutional authority since the 1987 Constitution conferred upon the Ombudsman (not the present Tanodbayan) the authority to file cases with the SandiganbayanGR No. 80578- Petitioner Enrique Zaldivar, on substantially the same grounds as first petition, sought to restrain Tanodbayan Gonzales from conducting preliminary investigations and filing similar cases with the Sandiganbayan

ISSUES1, WON the Tanodbayan, under the 1987 Constitution, have the authority to conduct preliminary investigations and direct the filing of cases with the Sandiganbayan

HELDNO. The incumbent Tanodbayan, under the 1987 Constitution is without authority to conduct preliminary investigations and to direct the filing of criminal cases with the Sandiganbayan- The Tanodbayan, under the 1987 Constitution, has been transformed into the Office of the Special Prosecutor which shall continue to function and exercise its powers provided by law, EXCEPT those conferred on the Office of the Ombudsman created under the sam Constitution (1987).- The 1987 Constitution provides that the Ombudsman as distinguished from the incumbent Tanodbayan has the duty to investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient.- The Special Prosecutor (Raul Gonzales) is thus a subordinate of the Tanodbayan(Ombudsman) and can investigate and prosecute cases only upon the latter’s authority or orders.Obiter Raul Gonzales does not remain as Ombudsman in as much as he has not been replaced because he has never been the Ombudsman. The Office of the Ombudsman is a new creation under Article XI of the 1987 constitution different from the Office of the Tanodbayan created under PD 1607.

COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS

EXPORT PROCESING ZONE AUTHORITY V COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS

GRINO-AQUINO; April 14, 1992

FACTS - Nature Special Civil Action for certiorari and prohibition to review the orders of the Commission on Human Rights- P.D. 1980 was issued reserving and designating certain parcels of land in Rosario and General Trias, Cavite, as the “Cavite Export Processing Zone” (CEPZ). The area was divided into four four Phases and Phase IV was bought by Filoil and was later sold to EPZA.- Before EPZA could take possession of the area, several individuals, had entered the premises and planted agricultural products therein without permission from EPZA or Filoil. To convince the intruders to depart peacefully, EPZA paid a P10K-financial assistance to those who accepted the same and signed quitclaims. Among them were Teresita Valles and Alfredo Aledia, the father of the respondent Loreto Aledia. - Ten years later, the private respondents filed in CHR a joint complaint praying for “justice and other reliefs and remedies”. The CHR conducted an investigation.- According to CHR, EPZA, together with help of PNP, bulldozed and level the area, despite the fact that the occupants presented a letter from the Office of the President of the Phil ordering postponement of bulldozing. - Because of this, the CHR issued an Order of injunction to desist from committing further acts of demolition, terrorism and harassment until further orders from the CHR and to appear before the Commission for a dialogue. - However, the same group again bulldozed the area and allegedly handcuffed private respondent Valles, pointed their firearms at others and fired a shot in the air.- The CHR issued another injunction Order reiterating the same order. - Procedure

1. EPZA filed in CHR a motion to lift the Order of injunction for lack of authority to issue injunctive writs and temporary restraining orders but this was denied.2. EPZA filed a special civil action of certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for issuance of restraining order and/or preliminary injunction. It was granted by the Court.3. CHR filed a Motion to lift the restraining order contending that CHR has the power not only to investigate but also to provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the under privileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection (Art. 13 Sec. 18, 1987 Consti)

ISSUEWON the CHR have jurisdiction to issue a writ of injunction or restraining order against supposed violators of human rights, to compel them to cease and desist from continuing the acts complained of

HELDNO. Not being a court of justice nor even a quasi-judicial body, the CHR itself has no jurisdiction to issue a writ of preliminary injunction, for it may only be issued by the judge of any court in which the action is pending (within his district), or by a Justice of the Court of Appeals, or of the Supreme Court or by the judge of the Regional Trial Court.Reasoning1. adherence to precedent- In Hon. Isidro Carino vs. CHR the Court held that the CHR is not a court of justice nor even a quasi-judicial body. Fact-finding function is different from adjudication and cannot be likened to a judicial function.2, textual interpretation of the text - plain meaning- The Constitutional provision directing the CHR to “provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the under privileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection” may not be construed to confer jurisdiction on the Commission to issue a restraining order or writ of injunction for, if that were the intention, the Constitution would have expressly said so.

“Jurisdiction is conferred only by the Constitution or by la.” It is never derived by implication.- “preventive measures and legal aid services” refer ti extrajudicial and judicial remedies which the CHR may seek from the proper courts on behalf of the victims.Decision The petition for certiorari and prohibition is GRANTED. Orders of injunction of CHR are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. TRO which the Court issued is made PERMANENT.

ART XII: NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY

KRIVENKO V DIRECTOR OF LANDSMORAN; November 15, 1947

(SEE DIGEST UNDER DOMINIUM AND IMPERIUM)

MANILA PRINCE HOTEL V GSISBELLOSILLO; February 3, 1997

FACTS- Respondent GSIS, pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine Government under Proclamation No. 50 dated 8 December 1986, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of respondent MHC which owns the historic Manila Hotel. In a closed bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two (2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51 % of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.- Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder and the execution of the necessary contracts, petitioner in a letter to respondent GSIS dated 28 September 1995 matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by Renong Berhad. In a subsequent letter dated 10 October 1995 petitioner sent a manager's check issued by Philtrust Bank for Thirty-three Million Pesos (P33-000,000.00) as Bid Security to match the bid of the Malaysian Group, Messrs. Renong Berhad which respondent GSIS refused to accept.- On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that respondent GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the sale of 51% of the MHC may be hastened by respondent GSIS and consummated with Renong Berhad, petitioner came to this Court on prohibition and mandamus. On 18 October 1995 the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining respondents from perfecting and consummating the sale to the Malaysian firm. On 10 September 1996 the instant case was accepted by the Court En Banc after it was referred to it by the First Division.- The petitioner argues the following:

1. Petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second Par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution and submits that the Manila Hotel has been identified with the Filipino nation and has practically become a historical monument which reflects the vibrancy of Philippines heritage and culture. To all intents and purpose, it has become a part of the national patrimony.2. Petitioner also argues that since 51% of the shares of the MHC carries with it the ownership of the business of the hotel which is owned by respondent GSIS, the hotel business of respondent GSIS being a part of the tourism industry is unquestionably a part of the national economy. Thus, any transaction involving 51% of the shares of stock of the MHC is clearly covered by the term national economy, to which Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, 1987 Constitution, applies.3. It is also the thesis of petitioner that since Manila Hotel is part of the national patrimony and its business also unquestionably part of the national economy petitioner should be preferred after it has matched the bid offer of

the Malaysian firm. For the bidding rules mandate that if for any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to the other Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided that these Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in terms of price per share.

- Respondents maintain that:1. Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is merely a statement of principle and policy since it is not a self-executing provision and requires implementing legislation(s). Thus, for the said provision to operate, there must be existing laws "to lay down conditions under which business may be done."2. Granting that this provision is self-executing, Manila Hotel does not fall under the term national patrimony which only refers to lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna and all marine wealth in its territorial sea, and exclusive marine zone as cited in the first and second paragraphs of Sec. 2, Art. XII, 1987 Constitution. While petitioner speaks of the guests who have slept in the hotel and the events that have transpired therein which make the hotel historic, these alone do not make the hotel fall under the patrimony of the nation. What is more, the mandate of the Constitution is addressed to the State, not to respondent GSIS which possesses a personality of its own separate and distinct from the Philippines as a State.3. Granting that the Manila Hotel forms part of the national patrimony, the constitutional provision invoked is still inapplicable since what is being sold is only 51% of the outstanding shares of the corporation, not the hotel building nor the land upon which the building stands. Certainly, 51% of the equity of the MHC cannot be considered part of the national patrimony. Moreover, if the disposition of the shares of the MHC is really contrary to the Constitution, petitioner should have questioned it right from the beginning and not after it had lost in the bidding.4. The reliance by petitioner on par. V., subpar. J. I., of the bidding rules which provides that if for any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to the other Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided that these Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in terms of price per share, is misplaced. Respondents postulate that the privilege of submitting a matching bid has not yet arisen since it only takes place if for any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares.5. The prayer for prohibition grounded on grave abuse of discretion should fail since respondent GSIS did not exercise its discretion in a capricious, whimsical manner, and if ever it did abuse its discretion it was not so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. Similarly, the petition for mandamus should fail as petitioner has no clear legal right to what it demands and respondents do not have an imperative duty to perform the act required of them by petitioner.

ISSUES1. WON Sec. 10, 2nd par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is non-self-executing2. WON the Manila Hotel falls under the term national patrimony3. WON 51% of the equity of MHC can be considered part of national patrimony4. WON petitioner should be allowed to match the highest bid5. WON GSIS committed grave abuse of discretion

HELD1. NO. A provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-executing, as a

contrary rule would give the legislature discretion to determine when, or whether, they shall be effective. Sec. 10, second par., of Art. XII is couched in such a way as not to make it appear that it is non-self-executing but simply for purposes of style. The argument of respondents that the non-self-executing nature of Sec. 10, second par. of Art. XII is implied from the tenor of the first and third paragraphs of the same section which undoubtedly are not self-executing is flawed. If the first and third paragraphs are not self-executing because Congress is still to enact measures to encourage the formation and operation of enterprises fully owned by Filipinos, as in the first paragraph, and the State still needs legislation to regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within its national jurisdiction, as in the third paragraph, then a fortiori, by the same logic, the second paragraph can only be self-executing as it does not by its language require any legislation in order to give preference to qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony. A constitutional provision may be self-executing in one part and non-self-executing in another. Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially enforceable.2. YES. In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage. When the Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used the term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos. Manila Hotel has become a landmark - a living testimonial of Philippine heritage. Its existence is impressed with public interest; its own historicity associated with our struggle for sovereignty, independence and nationhood. Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our national economy and patrimony.3. YES. 51% of the equity of the MHC comes within the purview of the constitutional shelter for it comprises the majority and controlling stock, so that anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will have actual control and management of the hotel. In this instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be disassociated from the hotel and the land on which the hotel edifice stands. Respondents further argue that the constitutional provision is addressed to the State, not to respondent GSIS which by itself possesses a separate and distinct personality. In constitutional jurisprudence, the acts of persons distinct from the government are considered "state action" covered by the Constitution (1) when the activity it engages in is a "public function"; (2) when the government is so significantly involved with the private actor as to make the government responsible for his action; and, (3) when the government has approved or authorized the action. It is evident that the act of respondent GSIS in selling 51% of its share in respondent MHC comes under the second and third categories of "state action." Therefore the transaction, although entered into by respondent GSIS, is in fact a transaction of the State and therefore subject to the constitutional command.4. YES. It should be stressed that while the Malaysian firm offered the higher bid it is not yet the winning bidder. The bidding rules expressly provide that the highest bidder shall only be declared the winning bidder after it has negotiated and executed the necessary contracts, and secured the requisite approvals. Since the Filipino First Policy provision of the Constitution bestows preference on qualified Filipinos the mere tending of the highest bid is not an assurance that the highest bidder will be declared the winning bidder. Resultantly, respondents are not bound to make the award yet, nor are they under obligation to enter into one with the highest bidder. For in choosing the awardee respondents are mandated to abide by the dictates of the 1987 Constitution the provisions of which are presumed to be known to all the bidders and other interested parties. Paragraph V. J. I of the bidding rules provides that [i]f for any reason the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to other Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided that these Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in terms of price per share. The constitutional mandate itself is reason enough not to award the block of shares immediately to the foreign

bidder notwithstanding its submission of a higher, or even the highest, bid. Where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a public bidding concerning the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, thereby exceeding the bid of a Filipino, there is no question that the Filipino will have to be allowed to match the bid of the foreign entity. And if the Filipino matches the bid of a foreign firm the award should go to the Filipino. It must be so if we are to give life and meaning to the Filipino First Policy provision of the 1987 Constitution. The argument of respondents that petitioner is now estopped from questioning the sale to Renong Berhad since petitioner was well aware from the beginning that a foreigner could participate in the bidding is meritless. Undoubtedly, Filipinos and foreigners alike were invited to the bidding. But foreigners may be awarded the sale only if no Filipino qualifies, or if the qualified Filipino fails to match the highest bid tendered by the foreign entity. In the case before us, while petitioner was already preferred at the inception of the bidding because of the constitutional mandate, petitioner had not yet matched the bid offered by Renong Berhad. Only after it had matched the bid of the foreign firm and the apparent disregard by respondent GSIS of petitioner's matching bid did the latter have a cause of action.5. YES. Since petitioner has already matched the bid price tendered by Renong Berhad pursuant to the bidding rules, respondent GSIS is left with no alternative but to award to petitioner the block of shares of MHC and to execute the necessary agreements and documents to effect the sale in accordance not only with the bidding guidelines and procedures but with the Constitution as well. The refusal of respondent GSIS to execute the corresponding documents with petitioner as provided in the bidding rules after the latter has matched the bid of the Malaysian firm clearly constitutes grave abuse of discretion.Voting Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Kapunan, Francisco, and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur with the main opinion.Narvasa, C.J, joins Justice Puno in his dissent.

SEPARATE OPINION

PADILLA [concur]

- Under the 1987 Constitution, "national patrimony" consists of the natural resources provided by Almighty God (Preamble) in our territory (Article 1) consisting of land, sea, and air. The concept of national patrimony has been viewed as referring not only to our rich natural resources but also to the cultural heritage of our race. The Manila Hotel is very much a part of our national patrimony and, as such, deserves constitutional protection as to who shall own it and benefit from its operation. This institution has played an important role in our nation's history, having been the venue of many a historical event, and serving as it did, and as it does, as the Philippine Guest House for visiting foreign heads of state, dignitaries, celebrities, and others.- "Preference to qualified Filipinos," to be meaningful, must refer not only to things that are peripheral, collateral, or tangential. It must touch and affect the very "heart of the existing order." In the field of public bidding in the acquisition of things that pertain to the national patrimony, preference to qualified Filipinos must allow a qualified Filipino to match or equal the higher bid of a non-Filipino; the preference shall not operate only when the bids of the qualified Filipino and the non-Filipino are equal in which case, the award should undisputedly be made to the qualified Filipino. The Constitutional preference should give the qualified Filipino an opportunity to match or equal the higher bid of the non-Filipino bidder if the preference of the qualified Filipino bidder is to be significant at all.

VITUG [separate]

- The provision in our fundamental law which provides that "(i)n the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos" is self-

executory. The provision does not need, although it can obviously be amplified or regulated by, an enabling law or a set of rules.- The term "patrimony" does not merely refer to the country's natural resources but also to its cultural heritage. A "historical landmark”, Manila Hotel has now indeed become part of Philippine heritage.- The act of the GSIS, a government entity which derives its authority from the State, in selling 51% of its share in MHC should be considered an act of the State subject to the Constitutional mandate.- On the pivotal issue of the degree of "preference to qualified Filipinos," the only meaningful preference would really be to allow the qualified Filipino to match the foreign bid. The magnitude of the bids is such that it becomes hardly possible for the competing bids to stand exactly "equal" which alone, under the dissenting view, could trigger the right of preference.

MENDOZA [separate opinion in the judgment]

- The only way to enforce the constitutional mandate that "[i]n the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national patrimony the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos" is to allow petitioner Philippine corporation to equal the bid of the Malaysian firm Renong Berhad for the purchase of the controlling shares of stocks in the Manila Hotel Corporation.- We are dealing here not with common trades or common means of livelihood which are open to aliens in our midst, but with the sale of government property, which is like the grant of government largess or benefits. Therefore no one should begrudge us if we give preferential treatment to our citizens.- Nor is there any basis for the suggestion that to allow a Filipino bidder to match the highest bid of an alien could encourage speculation, since all the Filipino entity would then do would be not to make a bid or make only a token one and, after it is known that a foreign bidder has submitted the highest bid, make an offer matching that of the foreign firm. This is not possible under the rules on public bidding of the GSIS. Under these rules there is a minimum bid required. If the Filipino entity, after passing the prequalification process, does not submit a bid, he will not be allowed to match the highest bid of the foreign firm because this is a privilege allowed only to those who have "validly submitted bids."

TORRES [separate]

- History, culture, heritage, and tradition are not legislated and is the product of events, customs, usages and practices. It is actually a product of growth and acceptance by the collective mores of a race. It is the spirit and soul of a people. The Manila Hotel is part of our history, culture and heritage. The Manila Hotel is witness to historic events which shaped our history for almost 84 years. The history of the Manila Hotel should not be placed in the auction block of a purely business transaction, where profit subverts the cherished historical values of our people.

PUNO [dissent]

- The vital issues can be summed up as follows:1. Whether Sec. 10, Par. 2 of Art. XII of the Constitution is a self-

executing provision and does not need implementing legislation to carry it into effect;

2. Assuming Sec. 10, Par. 2 of Art. XII is self executing, whether the controlling shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation form part of our patrimony as a nation;

3. Whether GSIS is included in the term "State," hence, mandated to implement Sec. 10, Par. 2 of Art. XII of the Constitution;

4. Assuming GSIS is part of the State, whether it failed to give preference to petitioner, a qualified Filipino corporation, over and above Renong Berhad, a foreign corporation, in the sale of the controlling shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation;

5. Whether petitioner is estopped from questioning the sale of the shares to Renong Berhad, a foreign corporation.

- 1st issue: courts as a rule consider the provisions of the Constitution as self executing, rather than as requiring future legislation for their enforcement. If they are not treated as self-executing, the mandate of the fundamental law ratified by the sovereign people can be easily ignored and nullified by Congress. Case law also lays down the rule that a constitutional provision is not self-executing where it merely announces a policy and its language empowers the Legislature to prescribe the means by which the policy shall be carried into effect. The first paragraph of Section 10 is not self-executing. By its express text, there is a categorical command for Congress to enact laws restricting foreign ownership in certain areas of investments in the country and to encourage the formation and operation of wholly-owned Filipino enterprises. The second and third paragraphs of Section 10 are different. They are directed to the State and not to Congress alone which is but one of the three great branches of our government. Their coverage is also broader for they cover "the national economy and patrimony" and "foreign investments within [the] national jurisdiction" and not merely "certain areas of investments." Their language does not suggest that any of the State agency or instrumentality has the privilege to hedge or to refuse its implementation for any reason whatsoever. Their duty to implement is unconditional and it is now.- The second issue is whether the sale of a majority of the stocks of the Manila Hotel Corporation involves the disposition of part of our national patrimony. The records of the Constitutional Commission show that the Commissioners entertained the same view as to its meaning. According to Commissioner Nolledo, "patrimony" refers not only to our rich natural resources but also to the cultural heritage of our race. The unique value of the Manila Hotel to our history and culture cannot be viewed with a myopic eye. The value of the hotel goes beyond pesos and centavos. The Hotel may not, as yet, have been declared a national cultural treasure pursuant to Republic Act No. 4846 but that does not exclude it from our national patrimony.- The third issue is whether the constitutional command to the State includes the respondent GSIS. The GSIS is not a pure private corporation. It is essentially a public corporation created by Congress and granted an original charter to serve a public purpose. As a state-owned and controlled corporation, it is skin-bound to adhere to the policies spelled out in the Constitution especially those designed to promote the general welfare of the people. One of these policies is the Filipino First policy which the people elevated as a constitutional command.- To date, Congress has not enacted a law defining the degree of the preferential right. Consequently, we must turn to the rules and regulations of respondents Committee on Privatization and GSIS to determine the degree of preference that petitioner is entitled to as a qualified Filipino in the subject sale. A look at the rules and regulations will show that they are silent on the degree of preferential right to be accorded a qualified Filipino bidder. However, they cannot be read to mean that they do not grant any degree of preference to petitioner for Par. 2, Sec. 10, Art. XII of the Constitution is deemed part of said rules and regulations. I submit that the right of preference of petitioner arises only if it tied the bid of Renong Berhad. In that instance, all things stand equal, and petitioner, as a qualified Filipino bidder should be preferred. Under the rules, the right to match the highest bid arises only "if for any reason, the highest bidder cannot be awarded the block of shares" No reason has arisen that will prevent the award to Renong Berhad. It qualified as a bidder. It complied with the procedure of bidding. It was declared as the highest bidder by the GSIS and the rules say this decision is final. It deserves the award as a matter of right for the rules clearly did not give to the petitioner as a qualified Filipino the privilege to match the higher bid of a foreigner. What the rules did not grant, petitioner cannot demand.- Petitioner is estopped from assailing the winning bid of Renong Berhad. It knew that the rules and regulations do not provide that qualified Filipino bidder can match the winning bid after submitting an inferior bid. It knew that the bid was open to foreigners and that foreigners qualified even during the first

bidding. Petitioner cannot be allowed to obey the rules when it wins and disregard them when it loses.

PANGANIBAN [dissent]

- The majority contends the Constitution should be interpreted to mean that, after a bidding process is concluded, the losing Filipino bidder should be given the right to equal the highest foreign bid, and thus to win. No statute empowers a losing Filipino bidder to increase his bid and equal that of the winning foreigner. In the absence of such empowering law, the majority's strained interpretation, I respectfully submit, constitutes unadulterated judicial legislation, which makes bidding a ridiculous sham where no Filipino can lose and where no foreigner can win.- Aside from being prohibited by the Constitution, such judicial legislation is short-sighted and, viewed properly, gravely prejudicial to long-term Filipino interests. It encourages other countries - in the guise of reverse comity or worse, unabashed retaliation - to discriminate against us in their own jurisdictions by authorizing their own nationals to similarly equal and defeat the higher bids of Filipino enterprises solely, while on the other hand, allowing similar bids of other foreigners to remain unchallenged by their nationals.- In the absence of a law specifying the degree or extent of the "Filipino First" policy of the Constitution, the constitutional preference for the "qualified Filipinos" may be allowed only where all the bids are equal. The Constitution mandates a victory for the qualified Filipino only when the scores are tied. But not when the ballgame is over and the foreigner clearly posted the highest score.

MINERAL ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES V SECRETARY

ROMERO; January 16, 1995

FACTS- Controversy is due to the change introduced by Art XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution on the system of exploration, development and utilization of the country’s natural resources. Utilization of inalienable lands of public domain through license, concession or lease is no longer allowed in the present Consti.- With the state in full control and supervision, the only options for mineral exploration development and utilization is only through direct undertaking or by entering into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements, or by entering into agreement with foreign-owned corporations for large-scale exploration, development and utilization.- The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development and utilization of minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils…- In view of these provisions, the President issued Executive Order No. 211 and No. 279. The former prescribes interim procedures in the processing and approval of applications for the exploration, development and utilization of minerals pursuant to the 1987 Consti. The latter authorizes the DENR secretary to negotiate and conclude joint venture, co-production or production-sharing agreements, and prescribed guidelines for these agreements and those with foreign-owned corporations- To implement the legislative acts, the DENR Secretary promulgated AO Nos 57 and 82. The former converts all existing mining leases or agreements prior to the 1987 Consti into production-sharing agreements except small-scale mining leases and those pertaining to sand, gravel and quarry resources cover an area of 20 hectares or less. The latter laid down the Procedural Guidelines on the Award of Mineral Production Sharing Agreement Through Negotiation (MPSA).- It is for these AOs that the MAP, Inc. filed the petition- They contend that:

o The issuance of the AOs was in excess of his rule-making power under EO279

o The AOs violate the non-impairment of contract provision under Art 3, Sec 10 of the 1987 Consti as AO57 unduly pre-terminates existing mining leases and other

mining agreements and converts it into production-sharing agreements within a year of its effectivity and

AO82 declares that failure to submit Letter of Intent and MPSA within 2 years of effecitivity of guidelines shall cause the abandonment of their mining, quarry and gravel permits

o AOs have the effect of repealing or abrogating existing mining laws which are not inconsistent with the provisions of EO279 as the Eos merely reiterated the acceptance and registration of declarations of location and all other kinds of mining applications by the Bureau of Mines and Geo-Sciences under PD 463, as amended, until Congress opts to modify the same

- A TRO was given enjoining the implementation of the AOs. The Continental Marble Corp. also intervened as its DENR refused to renew its mining permit

ISSUES1. WON DENR Sec committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating AOs 57 and 822. WON PD 463 continues to subsist insofar as it allows licenses, concessions and leases for the exploration, utilization and development of mineral resources3. WON AO 57 and 82 impairs vested frights as to violate the non-impairment of contract doctrine as guaranteed by Art 3, Section 10 of the Consti4. WON AO 57 and 82 authorizes automatic conversion of mining leases and agreements granted after the effectivity of the 1987 Consti into production sharing agreements

HELD- There is no clear showing that the DENR Sec has transcended the bounds demarcated by EO279 for the exercise of his rule-making power tantamount to grave abuse of discretion

o The power of administrative officials to promulgate rules and regulations in the implementation of a statute is necessarily limited only to carrying into effect what is provided in the legislative enactment

o By such regulations, the law cannot be extended. So long as the relate solely to carrying into effect the provision of law, they are valid

o The rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or proceeding to carry into effect the law as it has been enacted

o In case of discrepancy between the basic law and a rule issued to implement said law, the basic law prevails as rule or regulation cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the basic law

o Sec 6 of EO269 specifically authorized the said official to promulgate such supplementary rules and regulations as may be necessary to effectively implement the provisions of the law. More so, the subject sought to be governed and regulated is germane to the objects and purposes of EO279, specifically issued to carry out the mandate of the 1987 Consti

- PD 463 is not the governing law anymore as it pertained to the old system of exploration, development and utilization of natural resources through license, concession or lease which has been disallowed by Article XII, Section 2 the 1987 Consti., except those provision in PD463 that are not inconsistent with the provisions of EO279

o To continue the licenses, concessions or lease would be inconsistent witht raison d’etre of EO279 and contravening the express mandate of the Article XII, Section 2 the 1987 Consti.

o The Consti only orders that the State have full control and supervision of the mineral resources and the only mode for its exploration, utilization and development is through a direct act, or may enter into co-production, joint venture, production sharing agreements or into agreement with foreign-owned corporations involving technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the general terms and conditions provided by law, based on real contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the country.

- The AOs do not unduly preterminate existing mining leases in general as it does not apply retroactively to license, concession of lease granted by government under the 1973 Consti or before the effectivity of the 1987 Consti but to those granted after the effectivity of the 1987 Consti and shall be subject to modifications and alterations which Congress may adopt

o As such, by issuing EO279, the President validly modified or altered the privileges granted as well as the terms and conditions of mining leases under EO211

o Moreover, even if there were contracts, leases or agreements granted by the State such as those granted by EO211, these are still subject to alterations through a reasonable exercise of the police power of the State and even the court recognizes the superiority of police power over the sanctity of the contract especially when such power is exercised to preserve the security of the state and the means adopted are reasonably adapted to the accomplishment of that end and are, therefore, not arbitrary or oppressive.

o The State may not be precluded by the constitutional restriction on non-impairment of contract from altering, modifying and amending the mining leases or agreements granted under PD 463 or EO211

o The object of this police power is clear – the exploration, development and utilization of mineral resources are matters vital to the public interest and the general welfare of the people

- There is not provision in AO57 that leads to the conclusion of an authorization of automatic conversion of mining leases and agreements granted after the effectivity of the 1987 Consti pursuant to EO211, into production-sharing agreements

o The use of the term production-sharing agreement implies negotiation and cannot be presumed as a unilateral declaration on the part of government

o The MPSA requires a meeting of the minds of the parties after negotiations are arrived at in good faith and in accordance with procedure as laid out in AO 82

Decision AO 57 and 82 are valid and constitutional

REPUBLIC V COURT OF APPEALS AND DELA ROSACRUZ; April 15, 1988

FACTS- Jose dela Rosa filed an application for registration of a parcel of land divided into 9 lots in Tuding, Itogon, Benguet Province on February 11, 1965 on his own behalf and on behalf of his children. According to the application, Lots 1-5 were sold to Jose dela Rosa and Lots 6-9 to his children by Mamaya Balbalio and Jaime Alberto, respectively in 1964. Balbalio and Alberto testified that they had acquired the subject land by virtue of prescription.- It was opposed by Benguet Consolidated, Inc. as to Lots 1-5, Atok Big Wedge Corporation as to portions of Lots 1-5 and all of Lots 6-9, and by the Republic through the Bureau of Forestry Development as to Lots 1-9. Benguet opposed on the ground that June Bug mineral claim covering Lots 1-5 was sold to it on September 22, 1934 by the successors-in-interest of James Kelly who located the claim in September 1909 and recorded it on October 14, 1909. Atok alleged that a portion of Lots 1-5 and all of Lots 6-9 were covered by the Emma

and Fredia mineral claims located by Harrison and Reynolds on December 25, 1930 and recorded on January 2, 1931 in the Office of the mining recorder of Baguio. The locations of the mineral claims were made in accordance with Section 21 of the Philippine Bill of 1902.- The Bureau of Forestry Development argued that the land sought to be registered was covered by the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve under Proclamation No. 217 dated February 16, 1929. By reason of its nature, it was not subject to alienation under the Constitutions of 1935 and 1973.

ISSUEWON the Benguet and Atok Mining Companies have exclusive rights to the property in question.

HELDYES. Though the property was considered forest land and included in the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve, this did not impair the rights already vested in Benguet and Atok at that time. The perfection of the mining claim converted the property into mineral land and under the laws then in force removed it from the public domain. By such act, the locators acquired exclusive rights over the land, against even the government, without need of any further act such as the purchase of the land or the obtention of a patent over it. As the land became the private property of the locators, they had the right to transfer the same, as they did, to Benguet and Atok.- There was insufficient evidence of open, continuous, adverse and exclusive possession submitted by the applicants to support their claim of ownership. They acquired the land only in 1964 and applied for its registration in 1965.- This is an application of the Regalian doctrine which is intended for the benefit of the State, not of private persons. The rule reserves to the State all minerals that may be found in public and even private land. Thus, if a person is the owner of agricultural land in which mineral is discovered, his ownership of such land does not give him the right to extract or utilize the said minerals without the permission of the State to which such minerals belong.- Benguet and Atok have exclusive rights to the property in question by virtue of their respective mining claims which they validly acquired before the Constitution of 1935 prohibited the alienation of all lands of the public domain except agricultural lands, subject to vested rights existing at the time of its adoption. The land was not and could not have been transferred to the private respondents by virtue of acquisitive prescription, nor could its use could be shared simultaneously by them and the mining companies for agricultural and mineral purposes.Voting Teehankee (C.J.), Narvasa, Gancayco and Griño-Aquino, concur.

ATOK BIG WEDGE MINING V COURT OF APPEALSPARAS; January 18, 1991

FACTS- Fredia Mineral claim was located in Itogon, Benguet by A. I. Reynolds in 1930. The mineral claim was duly recorded in the Office of the Mining Recorder. In 1931, the mineral claim was sold by A.I. Reynolds to petitioner. Since then petitioner has been in continuous and exclusive ownership and possession of said claim. - In 1964, respondent Liwan Consi constructed a house in the land where the claim was located. It was only in 1984 when he was told that said lot belonged to Atok. Respondent contends that he had been paying taxes on said land which his father had occupied before him. Atok filed a complaint for forcible entry. The MTC dismissed the case. The RTC decided in favor of Atok. Upon appeal by Consi, the CA dismissed the forcible entry action ruling that both Consi and Atok are holders of possessory titles, the former through long term occupancy, and the latter by virtue of its being the claim locator.

ISSUE

WON an individual’s long term occupation of land of the public domain vests him with such rights over the same as to defeat the rights of the owner of that claim

HELD NO. The perfection of the mining claim converted the property to mineral land and under the laws then in force removed it from the public domain. As the land had become private property of the locators (A.I.) they had the right to sell it to Atok. Where there is a valid location of mining claim, the area becomes segregated from the public and the property of the locator. (Note however that the sale in the case took place in 1931) Atok then have exclusive rights to the property in question by virtue of their respective mining claims which they validly acquired before the 1935 Constitution prohibited alienation of all lands of the public domain except agricultural lands, subject to vested rights existing at the time of its adoption.- Neither could Consi argue long term possession. His possession was not in the concept of owner of the mining claim but of the property as agricultural land. Since the subject lot is a mineral land, private respondent’s possession did not confer upon him possessory rights,

DIRECTOR OF LANDS V KALAHI INVESTMENTSMADIALDEA; January 31, 1989

FACTS- On December 12, 1963, Kalahi Investment Inc., moved for an advanced hearing of Lot No. 1851-B, Floridablanca Cadastre. Evidence was presented and Kalahi’s title was to be registered under the provisions of Act 496.- It was later on found out that this lot was a vast land of mountain ranges covering an area no less than 886,021,588 square meters. This lot contains the alleged 123 mineral claims of Kalahi. It was also found out that the said lot was labeled as timber land under RA 3092. in the land classification of the province of Pampanga and Zambales, these lands were also considered part of the Project No. 11, Timber Land.- The Bureau of Forestry’s opposition on the registration of the lot is based on the ground that these lands are part of the vast public forest known as TIMBER LAND. These lots are not yet released as alienable agricultural lands and were even declared by the President of the Philippines under Proclamation No. 82 as part of the Mt. Dorst Forest Reserve.- Kalahi thus abandoned its former claim over Lot No. 1851-B. it limited its claim to two land which when combined, cover an area of 1,730 hectares. This land contained the 123 mining claims of Kalahi and where the alleged 500,000 coffee plants were planted. Kalahi claimed and presented evidence that it had located in 1934 and prior thereto 123 mineral claims in Floridablanca Mountains; made annual assessments work thereto; made declaration of location and paid annual assessment work from 1965-1966; constructed roads traversing the mountains and hills and planted 500,00 coffee trees. These however were not considered by the court as basis sufficient in law and in fact for the registration of title under act 496.- Kalahi thus contended that these mineral lands were now segregated from government lands and its mining claims thereon deemed property rights. These were based on an opinion of the Secretary of Justice dated August 31, 1956 which stated that “the legal effect of a valid location of a mining claim is not only to segregate the area from the public domain, but to grant the locator the beneficial ownership of the claim and the right to a patent therefore upon compliance with the terms and conditions prescribed by law… the area is segregated and becomes the property of the locator.”- Citing the San Mauricio doctrine“Under the Act of Congress of 1902 (Philippine Bill), a right or rights acquired by a holder of unpatented but valid and existing claim located and registered under its provisions becomes the property of the locator… the right of the locator to enjoy the surface ground and the minerals within the limits of his claim becomes exclusive as against the whole world, limited only by

extralateral rights of adjoining locators. He is not required to purchase the claim or secure a patent and as long as he could comply with the mining laws, his possessory rights of ownership are as good as though secured by patent.”- It also claims registration of title based on its actual, open, public, peaceful, continuous, adverse possession in the concept of an owner for more than 30 years or confirmation of imperfect title under Sec. 48 (b) CA141 as amended by RA No. 1942.- In its decision, the court a quo denied the claim for registration ruling that a) the 123 mining claims are governed by mining law; hence under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Mines which is the proper agency to enforce the claims and to adjudicate the rights of the claimants, which in fact Kalahi recognized when it filed an application for lease with said Bureau, and b) that the claim for confirmation of imperfect title based on the evidence of Public Land Law provisions:- The lands in the public domain are classified under three main categories: Mineral, Forest and Agricultural lands in the public domain that title could be issued… the Public Law never governs private lands.- The Public Land Law is not applicable to forest lands nor to mineral lands. The confirmation of imperfect land title can not be basis for registration of titles over forest and/or mineral lands.- On appeal Kalahi assigned as errors the following:

1)the lower court erred in not considering the basis for the registration of land in question sufficient in law and in fact.2)the lower court erred in declaring that the doctrine of the Supreme Court and the opinion of the Secretary of Justice never contemplate of a procedure that will entitle the claimants to the registration of the lands in question.3)the lower court erred in denying the claim for registration of the claimant’s title over the land in question at last a portion thereof covered by the mining claims and their gaps.

- On the other hand the Director of Lands contended:“Kalahi admitted that the land in question is a mining property consisting of mining claims located and registered under the provisions of the Act of the US Congress of July 1, 1902. and as such, said Act requires Kalahi as holder of mining claims to do no other act except to proceed with the acquisition of mining patent in the Bureau of Mines. The Act prescribes an explicit and definite procedure by which mining patents are to be secured administratively…”- CA thus certified the following questions (issues) for SC resolution:

ISSUES1. WON mining claims acquired, registered perfected and patentable under the Old Mining Law matured to private ownership would entitle claimant-appellant to the ownership thereof2. who has the authority to examine process and find out WON the requirements of the Act of Congress of 1902 have been complied by applicant- the Court or the Bureau of Mines

HELD1. NO. In the recent case of Santa Rosa Mining Co. v Hon Minister of Natural Resources Jose Leido jr. and Director of Mines Juanito Fernandez the SC ruled that while it recognized that the right of a locator of a mining claim is a property right, this right is not absolute. It is merely a possessory right more so when petitioner’s claims are still unpatented. “Mere location does not mean absolute ownership over the located claim. It merely segregates the located land or area from the public domain by barring other would-be locators from locating the same and appropriating for themselves the minerals found therein… the intention of the lawmaker is that the locator should faithfully and consistently comply with the requirements for annual work and improvements in the located mining claims.” This case modifies the San Mauricio doctrine in that while a perfected location of a mining claim has the effect of segregating said land from the body of public domain, the area covered does not thereby become the private property of the locator.

- Concurring opinion of Justice Laurel in Gold Creek Mining Corp. v Rodriguez and Abadilla: “… my opinion is that while the locator, under the circumstances, secures the beneficial ownership or the dominum utile, the government retains the bare ownership or the dominium directum, until the locator’s claim ripens into full ownership upon full compliance with all requirements of the law for the issuance of a patent.”- Dissenting opinion of Justice Concepcion in the Gold Creek Mining Corp. case: ”To give a broader meaning and give a greater effect to the location of a mining claim is to contend that location is all that is necessary to acquire absolute ownership over a located mining claim. This is not the law. Location without more,confers only the right of possession… I maintain that in prohibiting the alienation of natural resources, save any existing right, the Constitution does not refer to the right of location or the inherent right of possession, or any inchoate or contingent right which are only means to bring about another right; it refers only to the right to obtain a patent.”- It is not clear if Kalahi has fully complied with the requirements of Act of Congress of 1902. this is a factual issue which is beyond the issue of the Court. Nonetheless, even assuming claimant to be a holder of a subsisting and valid patentable mining clai8m, we hold that it can no longer proceed with the acquisition of a mining patent in view of PD No. 1214 issued in October 14, 1977, directing “holders of subsisting an valid patentable mining claims located under the provisions of the Act of Congress of 1902 to file a mining lease application within one year of the approval of the Decree… non-filing of the application within the period prescribed shall cause the forfeiture of all his rights to the claim.- Records show that claimant has already filed a mining lease application.2. Having filed a mining lease application, its mining claims therefore, are deemed covered by PD 1214 and the Bureau of Mines may accordingly process the same as a lease application, in accordance with PD 463, pursuant to PD 1214. As to whether or not the Bureau of Mines is qualified to rule on whether there has been full and faithful compliance with the requirements of Philippine Bill of 1902, SC ruled that the Bureau is empowered as a corollary function in the processing of mining lease applications.Decision The decision of the CFI of Pampanga is affirmed, with the modification that Kalahi’s mining claims may be processed as a mining lease application by the Bureau of Mines.

TAN V DIRECTOR OF FORESTRYMAKASIAR; October 27,1983

FACTS- Petitioner-appellant: Wenceslao Vinzons Tan- Respondents-appellees: Sec. of Agri. And Nat. Resources (DANR) Jose Feliciano, Director of Bureau of Forestry (BOF) Apolonio Rivera- Intervenors: Ravago Commercial Co., Jorge Lao Happick, Atanacio Mallari- April 1961 – the Bureau of Forestry issued a notice advertising for public bidding a tract of public forest land (6,420 hectares) in Olongapo, Zambales. It was located within the former US Naval Reservation.- May 5, 1962 – petitioner Wenceslao Tan submitted his application plus nine other applicants- Thereafter, questions arose as to the wisdom of having the are declared as a forest reserve or allow the same to be awarded to the most qualified bidder- June 7, 1961 – then Pres. Carlos Garcia issued a directive to the Dir. Of Bureau of Forestry to prepare a draft proclaiming the said land as a watershed forest reserve for Olongapo and to reject the bids they have received- Sec. Fortich (DANR) however sustained the recommendations of the director of BOF who concluded that it would be beneficial to the public interest of the are is made available for exploitation. The Director said that to the declare the forest are as a forest reserve rather than to open it for timber exploitation under license and regulation would do more harm than good to the public interest since it might just become a “Free Zone and Logging Paradise” to the problem loggers of Dinalupihan, Bataan – an open target for timber smugglers and

kaingineros; also, rejecting the received bids would cause the department huge embarrassment- The area was then awarded to Wenceslao Tan by the BOF against the other bidders, Rovago Commercial Company and Jorge :Lao Happick- May 30, 1963 – DANR Sec. Gozon (who succeeded then Sec. Fortich) issued a memorandum authorizing the grant of new ordinary timber license for areas not more than 3,000 hectares each and the extension of ordinary timber licenses for areas not exceeding 5000 hectares- Dec. 19, 1963- Gozon was then replaced by acting Sec. Jose Feliciano, who upon assumption of office he revoked the memorandum.- But that same day, the license of Wenceslao Tan was signed by acting Director of (BOF), Estanislao Bernal, without the approval of the Secretary of DANR- Ravago Commercial Company and Jorge Lao Happick then wrote a letter to the Sec. of DANR praying that the license issued to Tan be cancelled on the ground that it was irregular, anomalous and contrary to existing forestry laws, rules and regulations- The license was declared void ab initio- Petitioner Tan claims that respondents unlawfully, illegally, whimsically, capriciously and arbitrarily acted w/o or in excess of its jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion by revoking a valid and existing timber license without just cause, by denying petitioner Tan of the equal protection of the laws and by depriving him of his constitutional right to property w/o due process of law by impairing the obligation of contracts- His petition was dismissed because it did not state a sufficient cause of action

ISSUEWON the facts in the petition constitute a sufficient cause of action

HELDcause of action – 3 essential elements

1. legal right of the plaintiff2. correlative obligation of the defendants3. the act or omission of the defendant in violation of that right

NO. - the petition was dismissed by the trial court for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted; the timber license relied upon by the petitioner was void ab initio- also, court takes judicial notive that the are has been declared a forest reserve on April 39, 1964- what is important for the validity of a timber license is the date of release of the license and n the sate of signing. Before the release, not tight is acquired by the licensee. Tan’s license was signed Dec. 9, 1963 and was released Jan. 6, 1964 – by January 6, the Director of Forestry no longer had any authority to release the license- the petitioner had not acquired any legal right under such void license- the petitioner also failed to exhaust all administrative remedies. He should have appealed the order of the DANR Secretary to the President, who has the power to review on appeal the orders/acts of the said secretary – where administrative appeal is available, special civil action of certiorari cannot be availed- moreover, not only did the petitioner fail to exhaust his administrative remedies, he also failed to note that his action is a suit against the state which under the doctrine of immunity from suit, cannot prosper unless the state gives it consent to be dued- Next, granting that the license granted to him was valid, still the respondents can validly revoke this license

REPUBLIC V QUASHAREYES; August 17, 1972

FACTS- The case involves a judicial determination of the scope and duration of the rights acquired by American citizens and corporations controlled by them under the Parity Amendment appended to the Constitution as of Sept. 18, 1946- William Quasha is an American citizen who purchased a land in Forbes Park on Nov.26,1954. He filed a petition on March 1968 where he averred the acquisition of the said land; that the RP claimed that upon expiration of the Parity Amendment (PA) on July 3, 1974, rights acquired by US citizens shall cease; that this claim affects his right and interest and that the uncertainty as to the status of his property after the PA ends reduces the property’s value and precludes him from having improvements made on it; and so he contends that the ownership of properties during the effectivity of the PA continues despite its termination- Sol.Gen. Antonio Barredo: land acquired by Quasha is private agri. land and that the acquisition violated Sec.5 Art.XIII of the Constitution which prohibits the transfer of private agricultural land to non-Filipinos except by hereditary succession; and assuming validity of acquisition, his rights acquired through the PA will expire on July 3, 1974- CFI: rendered decision in favor of plaintiff, holding that acquisition was valid and he has a right to continue in ownership of property even beyond July 1974.Thus, this appeal.

ISSUES1. WON by virtue of the so-called PA to the Philippine Constitution Quasha could validly acquire ownership of the private residential land which is concededly classified private agricultural land2. On the assumption that Quasha’s purchase of the private agricultural land is valid and constitutional, WON his rights will expire on July 3, 1974

HELD1. NO. The Parity Amendment gives Americans no right to validly acquire ownership of private agricultural land in the Philippines.

-examination of the PA reveals that it only establishes an express exception to 2 provisions—Section 1 Article XIII (disposition, exploitation, etc. of public lands) and Section 8 Article XIV (operation of public utilities)> no other provision was referred to, not Sections 2 & 5 of Art.XIII-Quasha argues that since PA permitted US citizens/entities to acquire agricultural lands of the public domain, then such citizens/entities became entitled to acquire private agricultural land in the Phils., even without hereditary succession > this argument does not rest upon the text of the PA but upon a mere inference; if it was ever intended to create an exception to Sec.5, it would have bee mentioned just as Sec.1 and 8 were mentioned-whether from the Phil. Or the American side, the intention was to secure parity for US citizens only in: 1)exploitation, development and utilization of public lands and other natural resources, and 2) the operation of public utilities-Quasha further contends that when the Constitution was adopted in 1935, US citizens were already qualified to acquire public agri land, so even without hereditary succession transfer of private agri lands to Americans is permitted> such capacity could exist only during the American sovereignty over the Islands (before the RP is established)

2. His rights will expire. All the exceptional rights conferred upon US citizens and business entities owned or controlled by them, under the Parity Amendment, are to last during the effectivity of the agreement entered into on July 4, 1946, but in no case to extend beyond July 3, 1974.

-text of PA: “in no case to extend beyond July 3, 1974”—in conformity with Article X, Section 2 “this agreement shall have no effect after July 3, 1974. It may be terminated be either the US or the Phils at any time...”

-Quasha argues that the limitative period should not be applicable because under Art.428 of the Civil Code, “the owner has the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other limitations than those established by law”> this limitation already existed when he purchased the land> The can’t complain of deprivation of due process because PA is part of Consti, the highest law of the land> if the Philippine Government can not dispose of its alienable public agricultural lands beyond that date under PA, then, logically, the Constitution, as modified by PA, only authorizes either of two things: a) alienation or transfer of rights less than ownership or b) a resoluble ownership that will be extinguished not later than the specified period.

DiscussionHistorical Background• Article XIII Conservation and Utilization of Natural Resources Sec.1 All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain...belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corps. At least 60% of the capital of which is owned by such citizens... Sec.2 No private corporation...may acquire, lease, or hold public agricultural lands in excess of 1,024 hectares... Sec.5 Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines. • Article XIV General Provisions Sec.8 No franchise...for the operation of a public utility shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations organized under the laws of the Philippines, 60% of the capital of which is owned by citizens of the Philippines...• nationalistic spirit are self-evident in these provisions• 1945 Report of the Committee on Territories and Insular Affairs: when the Philippines do become independent next July, they will start on the road to independence with a country whose commerce, trade and political institutions have been very damaged; internal revenue have been greatly diminished by war.• in 1946, US enacted Philippine Trade Act authorizing the President of the US to enter into an Exec. Agreement with the President of the Philippines, which should contain a provision that—“the disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization...be open to citizens of the US and to all forms of business enterprise owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by US citizens.”; and that “the gov’t of the Phil. Will take such steps as are necessary to secure the amendment of the Constitution so as to permit the taking effect as laws of the Phils. Of such part of the provisions• Commonwealth Act No.733- authorized the President of the Phils. To enter into the Executive Agreement•proposed amendment was submitted to a plebiscite and was ratified in Nov. 1946• Parity Amendment: “Notwithstanding the provision of section 1, Article 13, and section 8, Article 14, of the foregoing Constitution, during the effectivity of the Executive Agreement entered into...on July 4, 1946...but in no case to extend beyond July 3, 1974, the disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization...be open to citizens of the US and to all forms of business enterprise owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by US citizens in the same manner as to, and under the same conditions imposed upon, citizens of the Philippines or corporations or associations owned or controlled by citizens of the Philippines.”• Laurel-Langley Agreement (revision of PA enacted in June 1955): establishes some sort of reciprocity rights between US and Phils.--no direct application to the case at bar, since the purchase by Quasha of the property in question was made in 1954, prior to the effectivity of this agreement

LAUREL V GARCIA

GUTIERREZ; July 25, 1990

FACTS- The subject property in this case (Roppongi) is one of the four (4) properties in Japan acquired by the Philippine government under the Reparations Agreement entered into with Japan in 1956, the other lots being: Nampeidai Property , Kobe Commercial Property, and Kobe Residential Property. The properties are part of the indemnification to the Filipino people for their losses in life and property and their suffering during World War II.- The Reparations Agreement provides that reparations valued at $550 million would be payable in twenty (20) years in accordance with annual schedules of procurements to be fixed by the Philippine and Japanese governments. Rep. Act No. 1789, the Reparations Law, prescribes the national policy on procurement and utilization of reparations and development loans. The Roppongi property was acquired from the Japanese government under the Second Year Schedule. - On August 1986, President Aquino created a committee to study the disposition/utilization of Philippine government properties in Tokyo and Kobe, Japan. - On July 1987, the President issued Executive Order No. 296 entitling non-Filipino citizens or entities to avail of reparations' capital goods and services in the event of sale, lease or disposition. Amidst opposition by various sectors, the Executive has been pushing its decision to sell the reparations properties starting with the Roppongi lot. Petitioners have filed two petitions to stop the sale of the Roppongi property.

ISSUES1. WON the Roppongi property and others of its kind can be alienated by the Philippine Government2. WON Executive Order No. 296, which entitles non-Filipino citizens or entities to avail of reparations' capital goods and services, is constitutional. WON EO 296 violate the following constitutional provisions:

a. constitutional mandate to conserve and develop the national patrimony stated in the Preamble of the 1987 Constitutionb. reservation of the ownership and acquisition of alienable lands of the public domain to Filipino citizensc. there is preference for Filipino citizens in the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimonyd. WON there is protection given to Filipino enterprises against unfair competition and trade practicese. WON there is guarantee of the right of the people to information on all matters of public concernf. WON there is declaration of the state policy of full public disclosure of all transactions involving public interest

HELD 1. NO, the Roponggi property is public domain. As property of public dominion, the Roppongi lot is outside the commerce of man. It cannot be alienated. Its ownership is a special collective ownership for general use and enjoyment, an application to the satisfaction of collective needs, and resides in the social group. 2. The Court does not ordinarily pass upon constitutional questions unless these questions are properly raised in appropriate cases and their resolution is necessary for the determination of the case. The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record if the case can be disposed of on some other ground such as the application of a statute or general law. Decision Petitions are GRANTED. A writ of prohibition is issued enjoining the respondents from proceeding with the sale of the Roppongi property in Tokyo, Japan.

RAMIREZ V VDA. DE RAMIREZ

ABAD-SANTOS; February 15, 1982

FACTS- APPEAL for the partitioning of testate estate of Jose Eugenio Ramirez (a Filipino national, died in Spain on December 11, 1964) among principal beneficiaries:

Marcelle Demoron de Ramirez- widow- French who lives in Paris- received ½ (as spouse) and usufructuary rights over 1/3 of the free portion Roberto and Jorge Ramirez- two grandnephews- lives in Malate- received the ½ (free portion) Wanda de Wrobleski- companion- Austrian who lives in Spain- received usufructuary rights of 2/3 of the free portion- vulgar substitution in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horacio Ramirez

- Maria Luisa Palacios - administratix- Jorge and Roberto Ramirez opposed becausea. vulgar substitution in favor of Wanda wrt widow’s usufruct and in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horacio Ramirez, wrt to Wanda’s usufruct is INVALID because first heirs (Marcelle and Wanda) survived the testatorb. fideicommissary substitutions are INVALID because first heirs not related to the second heirs or substitutes within the first degree as provided in Art 863 CCc. grant of usufruct of real property in favor of an alien, Wanda, violated Art XIII Sec 5d. proposed partition of the testator’’s interest in the Santa Cruz Building between widow and appellants violates testators express will to give this property to them- LC: approved partition

ISSUEWON the partition is valid insofar asa. widow’s legitimeb. substitutionsc. usufruct of Wanda

HELD

a. YES, appellants do not question ½ because Marcelle is the widow47 and over which he could impose no burden, encumbrance, condition or substitution of any kind whatsoever48

- the proposed creation by the admininstratix in favor of the testator’s widow of a usufruct over 1/3 of the free portion of the testator’s estate cannot be made where it will run counter to the testator’s express will. The Court erred for Marcelle who is entitled to ½ of the estate “en pleno dominio” as her legitime and which is more than what she is given under the will is not entitled to have any additional share in the estate. To give Marcelle more than her legitime will run counter to the testator’s intention for as stated above his disposition even impaired her legitime and tended to favor Wanda.b. Vulgar substitutions are valid because dying before the testator is not the only case where a vulgar substitution can be made. Also, according to Art 859 CC, cases also include refusal or incapacity to accept inheritance therefore it is VALID.BUT fideicommissary substitutions are VOID because Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace Ramirez are not related to Wande and according to Art 863 CC, it

47 Art 900 CC: If the only survivor is the widow or widower, she or he shall be entitled to ½ of the

hereditary estate48

Art 904 (2) CC

validates a fideicommissary substitution provided that such substitution does not go beyond one degree from the heir originally instituted. Another is that there is no absolute duty imposed on Wanda to transmit the usufructuary to the substitutes and in fact the apellee agrees that the testator contradicts the establishment of the fideicommissary substitution when he permits the properties be subject to usufruct to be sold upon mutual agreement of the usufructuaries and naked owners.c. YES, usufruct of Wanda is VALID- Art XIII49 Sec 5 (1935): Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold land of the public domain in the Philippines.50

The lower court upheld the usufruct thinking that the Constitution covers not only succession by operation of law but also testamentary succession BUT SC is of the opinion that this provision does not apply to testamentary succession for otherwise the prohibition will be for naught and meaningless. Any alien would circumvent the prohibition by paying money to a Philippine landowner in exchange for a devise of a piece of land BUT an alien may be bestowed USUFRUCTUARY RIGHTS over a parcel of land in the Philippines. Therefore, the usufruct in favor of Wanda, although a real right, is upheld because it does not vest title to the land in the usufructuary (Wanda) and it is the vesting of title to land in favor of aliens which is proscribed by the Constitution. Decision: ½ Marcelle (as legitime), ½ Jorge and Roberto Ramirez (free portion) in naked ownership and the usufruct to Wanda de Wrobleski with simple substitution in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace Ramirez

CRUZ V NCIPPER CURIAM; December 20, 2000

(SEE DIGEST UNDER DOMINIUM AND IMPERIUM)

LA BUGAL TRIBAL ASSOCIATION V WESTERN MINING CORPORATION PHILIPPINES

CARPIO-MORALES; January 29, 2004

FACTS- Marivic M.V.F. Leonen, et. al for petitioners - SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in Supreme Court. Mandamus and Prohibition.- Assailed is the constitutionality of RA 7942, otherwise known as the PHILIPPINE MINING ACT OF 1995, along with the Implementing Rules and Regulations issued pursuant thereto, Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Administrative Order 96-40, and of the Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) entered into on March 30, 1995 by the Republic of the Philippines and Western Mining Corporation (Philippines), Inc. (WMCP), a corporation organized under Philippine laws.- July 25, 1987 –President Aquino issued EO 279 authorizing the DENR Secretary to accept, consider and evaluate proposals from foreign-owned corporations or foreign investors for contracts of agreements involving either technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, which, upon appropriate recommendation of the Secretary, the President may execute with the foreign proponent. In entering into such proposals, the President shall consider the real contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the country that will be realized, as well as the development and use of local scientific and technical resources that will be promoted by the proposed contract or agreement. Until Congress shall determine otherwise, large-scale mining, for purpose of this Section, shall

49 Art XIII (1935): Conservation and Utilization of Natural Resources

50 Art XII Sec 7 (1987): Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private [removed agricultural] lands

shall be transferred or conveyed [1935: assigned] except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain [removed in the Philippines].

mean those proposals for contracts or agreements for mineral resources exploration, development, and utilization involving a committed capital in a single mining unit project of at least Fifty Million Dollars in United States currency (US $50,000,000.00).- March 3, 1995 –President Ramos approved 7942 to govern the exploration, development, utilization and processing of all mineral resources. RA 7942 defines modes of mineral agreements for mining operations, outlines the procedure for filing and approval, assignment/transfer, and withdrawal, and fixes their terms. These also apply to FTAAs. - The law also prescribes the contractor’s qualifications, grants certain rights such as timber, water, easement rights and right to possess explosives. Surface owners or occupants are forbidden from preventing holders of mining rights from entering private lands and concession areas. A procedure for settlement of conflicts is also provided for.- The Act restricts conditions for exploration, quarry and other permits. It regulates the transport, sale and processing of minerals, and promotes the development of mining communities, science and mining technology, and safety and environmental protection.- The government’s share in the agreements is spelled out and allocated, taxes and fees are imposed, incentives granted. Aside from penalizing certain acts, the law likewise specifies grounds for the cancellation, revocation and termination of agreements and permits. - April 9, 1995 –RA 7942 took effect.- March 30, 1995 –Shortly before RA 7942 took effect, the President entered into and FTAA with WMCP covering 99,387 hectares of land in South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Davao del Sur and North Cotabato.- August 15, 1995 –DENR Secretary Ramos issued DENR Administrative Order (DAO) 95-23, s. 1995, otherwise known as the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 7942. This was later repealed by DAO 96-40, s. 1996 which was adopted on December 20, 1996.- January 10, 1997 –Counsels for petitioners sent letter to DENR Secretary demanding that they stop the implementation of RA 7942 and DAO 96-40, giving them 15 days from receipt to act thereon. DENR has yet to respond or act on petitioners’ letter.- Hence, this petition for prohibition and mandamus, with a prayer for a temporary restraining order.- Petitioners claim that the DENR Secretary without or in excess of jurisdiction:

1) In signing and promulgating DAO 96-40 implementing RA 7942, the latter being unconstitutional in that:

It allows fully foreign owned corporations to explore, develop, utilize and exploit mineral resources in a manner contrary to Art. XII, sec. 2, par. 4, 1987 Constitution

It allows the taking of private property without the determination of public use and for just compensation

It violates Art. III, sec. 1 It allows enjoyment by foreign citizens as well as fully foreign

owned corporations of the nation’s marine wealth contrary to Art. XII, sec. 2, par. 2

It allows priority to foreign and fully foreign owned corporations in the exploration, development and utilization of mineral resources contrary to Art. XII

2) In recommending approval of and implementing the FTAA between the President and WMCP because the same is illegal and constitutional

- They pray that the Court issue an order permanently enjoining the respondents from acting on any application for an FTAA; declaring RA 7942, DAO 96-40 and all other similar administrative issuances as unconstitutional and null and void; and, canceling the FTAA issued to WMCP as unconstitutional, illegal and null and void. - Respondents, aside from meeting petitioners’ contentions, argue that the requisites for judicial inquiry have not been met, the petition does not comply with the criteria for prohibition and mandamus, and there has been a violation of the rule on hierarchy of courts.

- WMCP subsequently filed a Manifestation dated September 25, 2002 alleging that on January 23, 2001 WMC sold all its shares in WMCP to Sagittarius Mines, Inc. (Sagittarius), a corporation organized under Philippine laws, 60% of the equity of which is owned by Filipinos and/or Filipino-owned corporations while about 40% is owned by Indophil Resources NL, an Australian company.- Because of this, the DENR Secretary, by Order of December 18, 2001, approved the transfer and registration of the subject FTAA from WMCP to Sagittarius. Said Order, however, was appealed by Lepanto Consolidated Mining Co. (Lepanto). Because there is no final judgment yet, the case cannot be considered moot.

ISSUES1. WON case is justiciable2. WON EO 279 took effect 3. WON the WMCP FTAA is constitutional4. WON RA 7942 is constitutional

HELD1. Case is justiciable.Ratio In cases involving constitutional questions, the Court is not concerned with whether petitioners are real parties in interest, but with whether they have legal standing.- Petitioners traverse a wide range of sectors. Among them are La Bugal B’Laan Tribal Association, Inc., a farmers and indigenous people’s cooperative organized under Philippine laws representing a community actually affected by the mining activities of WMCP, members of said cooperative, as well as other residents of areas also affected by the mining activities of WMCP. Even if they are not the actual parties in the contract, they claim that they will suffer “irremediable displacement” as a result of the FTAA allowing WMCP to conduct mining activities in their area of residence. - And although RA 7942 and DAO 96-40 were not in force when the subject FTAA was entered into, the question as to their validity is ripe for adjudication. RA 7942 explicitly makes certain provisions apply to pre-existing arrangements. The WMCP FTAA also provides that any term and condition favorable to FTAA contractors resulting from a law or regulation shall be considered part of the agreement. - The petition for prohibition and mandamus is also the appropriate remedy. Public respondents, in behalf of the Government, have obligations to fulfill under said contract. Petitioners seek to prevent them from fulfilling such obligations on the theory that the contract is unconstitutional and, therefore, void.- The contention that the filing of the petition violates the rule on hierarchy of courts does not likewise lie. The repercussions of the issues in this case on the Philippine mining industry, if not the national economy, as well as the novelty thereof, constitute exceptional and compelling circumstances to justify resort to this Court in the first instance. Indeed, when the issues raised are of paramount importance to the public, this Court may brush aside technicalities of procedure.2. YES. Ratio When the issues raised are of paramount importance to the public, the Court may brush aside technicalities of procedure.- Petitioners contend that EO 279 did not take effect because its supposed date of effectivity came after President Aquino had already lost her legislative powers under the Provisional Constitution. But it was explained that the convening of the first Congress merely precluded the exercise of legislative powers by the President –it did not prevent the effectivity of laws she had previously enacted.3. NO. Ratio The convening of the first Congress merely precluded the exercise of legislative powers by the President and did not prevent the effectivity of laws she had previously enacted.In accordance with Art. XII, sec. 2 of the constitution, FTAAs should be limited to “technical or financial assistance” only. However, contrary to the language of

the Constitution, the WMCP FTAA allows WMCP, a fully foreign-owned mining corporation, to extend more than mere financial or technical assistance to the State, for it permits WMCP to manage and operate every aspect of the mining activity.- WMCP nevertheless submits that the word “technical” encompasses a broad number of possible services, perhaps, scientific and/or technological in basis. It thus posits that it may well include the area of management and operations. The Court is not persuaded. Casus omisus pro omisso habendus est –a person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally. Moreover, the management or operation of mining activities by foreign contractors, which is the primary feature of service contracts, was precisely the evil that the drafters of the 1987 Constitution sought to eradicate.- Respondents insist that “agreements involving technical or financial assistance” is just another term for service contracts. The proceedings of the CONCOM indicate that the members used the terms interchangeably. The Court is likewise not persuaded. While certain commissioners may have mentioned the term “service contracts”, they may have been using the term loosely and not in the context of the 1973 Constitution. Also, the phrase “service contracts” has been deleted in the 1987 Constitution’s Article on National Economy and Patrimony. If the CONCOM intended to retain the concept of service contracts under the 1973 Constitution, it could have simply adapted the old terminology instead of employing new and unfamiliar terms (“agreements… involving either technical or financial assistance”).- The UP Law Draft and Article XII, as adopted, uses the same terminologies. And the UP Law draft proponents viewed service contracts under the 1973 Constitution as grants of beneficial ownership of the country’s natural resources to foreign owned corporations. While, in theory, the State owns these natural resources –and Filipino citizens, their beneficiaries –service contracts actually vested foreigners with the right to dispose, explore for, develop, exploit, and utilize the same. This arrangement is clearly incompatible with the constitutional ideal of nationalization of natural resources. But the proponents nevertheless acknowledged the need for capital and technical know-how in the large-scale exploitation, development and utilization of natural resources. Hence, they proposed a compromise –technical or financial agreements.4. NO, insofar as said Act authorizes service contracts.Ratio Financial or technical agreements as contemplated in Art. XII, sec. 2 shall refer to financial agreements and/or technical agreements only and not to service contracts.- Although the statute employs the phrase “financial and technical agreements”, it actually treats these agreements as service contracts that grant beneficial ownership to foreign contractors contrary to fundamental law.Decision WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The Court hereby declares unconstitutional and void:

1) The following provision of RA 7942a) The proviso in Section 3 (aq)b) Section 23,c) Section 33 to 41,d) Section 56,e) The second and third paragraphs of Section 81, andf) Section 90.

2) All provisions of DAO 96-40, s. 1996 which are not in conformity with this Decision, and

3) The FTAA between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and WMC Philippines, Inc.

Voting 8 concur –including ponente, 5 dissent, 1 took no part

SEPARATE OPINION

VITUG

- It could not have been the object of the framers of the Charter to limit the contracts which the President may enter into, to mere “agreements for financial and technical assistance; The Constitution has not prohibited the State from itself exploring, developing, or utilizing the country’s natural resources, and, for this purpose, it may, enter into the necessary agreements with individuals or entities in the pursuit of a feasible operation.”

PANGANIBAN

- The petition should be dismissed on the ground of mootness. The dispute claiming the right to purchase the foreign shares in WMCP is between two Filipino companies (Sagittarius and Lepanto). So regardless of which side wins, the FTAA would still be in the hands of a qualified Filipino company.- The word “involving” signifies the possibility of inclusion of other activities. If the intention of the drafters were strictly to confine foreign corporations to financial or technical assistance and nothing more, their language would have been unmistakably restrictive and stringent.- The present Constitution still recognizes and allows service contracts (and has not rendered them taboo), albeit subject to several restrictions and modifications aimed at avoiding pitfalls of the past.- In the minds of the commissioners, the concept of technical and financial assistance agreements did not exist at all apart from the concept of service contracts duly modified to prevent abuses –“technical and financial agreements” were understood by the delegates to include service contracts duly modified to prevent abuses.- Current business practices often require borrowers seeking huge loans to allow creditors access to financial records and other data, and probably a seat or two on the former’s board of directors, or at least some participation in certain management decisions that may have an impact on the financial health or the long-term viability of the debtor, which of course will directly affect the latter’s capacity to repay it’s loans.- If the Supreme Court closes its doors to international realities and unilaterally sets up its own concepts of strict technical and financial assistance, then it may unwittingly make the country a virtual hermit –an economic isolationist –in the real world of finance.- The commissioners fully realized that their work would have to withstand the test of time, that the Charter, though crafted with the wisdom born of past experiences and lessons painfully learned, would have to be a living document that would answer the needs of the nation well into the future.

RESOLUTIONPANGANIBAN; December 1, 2004

FACTS- Marivic M.V.F. Leonen, et. al for petitioners - SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in Supreme Court. Mandamus and Prohibition- Ponente: Panganiban, J. (take note: major dissenter in part1)- All mineral resources are owned by the State. Their exploration, development and utilization (EDU) must always be subject to the full control and supervision of the State. More specifically, given the inadequacy of Filipino capital and technology in large-scale EDU activities, the State may secure the help of foreign companies in all relevant matters –especially financial and technical assistance –provided that, at all times, the State maintains its right of full control. The foreign assistor or contractor assumes all financial, technical and entrepreneurial risks in the EDU activities; hence it may be given reasonable management, operational, marketing, audit and other prerogatives to protect its investments and enable the business to succeed.- The Constitution should be read in broad, life-giving strokes. It should not be used to strangulate economic growth or to serve narrow, parochial interests. Rather, it should be construed to grant the President and Congress sufficient discretion and reasonable leeway to enable them to attract foreign investments

and expertise, as well as to secure for our people and our posterity the blessings of prosperity and peace.- On the basis of this control standard, this Court upholds the constitutionality of the Philippine Mining Law, its Implementing Rules and Regulations –insofar as they relate to financial and technical agreements –as well as the subject Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA).

ISSUES1. WON the case been rendered moot by the sale of the WMC shares in WMCP to Sagittarius and by the subsequent transfer and registration of the FTAA from WMCP to Sagittarius2. Assuming that the case has been rendered moot, WON it would still be proper to resolve the constitutionality of the assailed provisions of the Mining Law, DAO 96-40 and the WMCP FTAA3. What is the proper interpretation of the phrase Agreements Involving Either Technical or Financial Assistance contained in paragraph 4 of Section 2 of Article XII of the Constitution?

HELD1. YES.Ratio The courts will decide a question –otherwise moot and academic –if it is capable of repetition, yet evading review. - The dispute claiming the right to purchase the foreign shares in WMCP is between two Filipino companies (Sagittarius and Lepanto). So regardless of which side wins, the FTAA would still be in the hands of a qualified Filipino company. The plea to nullify the Mining Law has become a virtual petition for declaratory relief, over which this Court has no original jurisdiction.- Petitioners argue that the sale of shares and transfer of the FTAA is invalid. Government cannot enter into FTAA with Filipinos. - It does not take deep knowledge of law and logic to understand that what the Constitution grants to foreigners should be equally available to Filipinos.2. Ratio FTAAs are service contracts. But unlike those of the 1973 variety, the grant thereof is subject to several safeguards. - Petitioners stress the following points. First, while a case becomes moot and academic when there is no more actual controversy between the parties or no useful purpose can be served in passing upon the merits, what is at issue is not only the validity of the WMCP FTAA but also the constitutionality of RA 7942 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations. Second, the acts of private respondent cannot operate to cure the law of its alleged unconstitutionality or to divest this Court of its jurisdiction to decide. Third, the Constitution imposes upon the Supreme Court the duty to declare invalid any law that offends the Constitution.- But of equal if not greater significance is the cloud of uncertainty hanging over the mining industry, which is even now scaring away foreign investments. It is evident that strong reasons of public policy demand that the constitutionality issue be resolved now. And citing Acop v. Guingona, the courts will decide a question –otherwise moot and academic –if it is “capable of repetition, yet evading review.”3. Citing Francisco v. House of Representatives, the ponencia reiterated the well settled principles of constitutional construction:

Verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed.

Where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima. The words of the Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with the intent of its framers.

Ut magis valeat quam pereat. The Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole.

- Petitioners claim that the phrase “agreements… involving either technical or financial assistance” simply means technical assistance or financial assistance agreements, nothing more and nothing else.

- But if that was the intention, then what is the point of requiring that they be based on real contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the country?- It is also unclear how a verba legis approach leads to the conclusion that “the management or operation of mining activities by foreign contractors, which is the primary feature of service contracts, was precisely the evil that the drafters of the 1987 Constitution sought to eradicate. If the framers had intended to put an end to service contracts, they would have at least left some transitory guidelines.- The drafters will have to be credited with enough pragmatism and savvy to know that these foreign entities will not enter into such “agreements involving assistance” without requiring arrangements for the protection of their investments, gains and benefits.- Using ratio legis est anima, we may now examine the CONCOM deliberations. It may be observed that the members use the terms “financial and technical assistance agreements” and “service contracts” interchangeably. From their statements, it may be concluded that FTAAs are service contracts. But unlike those of the 1973 variety, the grant thereof is subject to several safeguards (in accordance with law, President as signatory, reporting to Congress…)- With ut magis valeat quam pereat, we may notice a contradiction between the State’s full control and supervision and the safeguarded service contracts with foreign contractors. It must be pointed out that the full control and supervision cannot be taken literally to mean that the State controls and supervises everything involved, down to the minutest details, and makes all decisions required in the mining operations. Control by State may be on the macro level –establishment of policies, guidelines, regulations, industry standards, etc.- To further disabuse the notion of these “new service contracts”, the government’s share in these operations will not be limited to taxes, duties and fees to be imposed. Those only consist of the basic government share. The law provides for an additional government share to be determined using formulas presented in DAO 96-40, either of which results to at least 50% of the net benefits from the mining.Decision WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES to GRANT the respondents’ and the intervenors’ Motions for Reconsideration; to REVERSE and SET ASIDE this Court’s January 27, 2004 Decision; to DISMISS the Petition; and to issue this new judgment declaring CONSTITUTIONAL 1) RA 7942 (Phil. Mining Law), 2) its Implementing Rules and Regulations contained in DAO 96-40 –insofar as they relate to financial and technical assistance agreements referred to in par. 4 of Section 2 of Art. XII of the Constitution; and 3) the FTAA dated March 30, 1995 executed by the government and WMCP, except Sections 7.8 and 7.9 of the subject FTAA which are hereby INVALIDATED for being contrary to public policy and for being grossly disadvantageous to the government.Voting 10 concur –including ponente, 4 dissent, 1 took no part

SEPARATE OPINION

CARPIO

- Provisions of RA 7942 abdicate the State’s constitutional duty to control and supervise fully the exploitation of mineral resources.- The change in language in the Constitution was a clear rejection of the old system of “license, concession or lease.”- The State as owner of the natural resources must receive income from its exploitation –taxes, fees and charges cannot substitute.- State must receive at least 60% of the net proceeds in FTAAs, which share is equivalent to the Filipino equity requirement.- The majority opinion refused to accept that the State is entitled to what the entire mining industry is willing to pay the State.

CARPIO-MORALES [part 1 ponente]

- The phrase “natural resources are owned by the State” simultaneously vests the legal title to the nation’s natural resources to the Government, and the beneficial ownership of these resources in the sovereign Filipino people.- In the EDU of natural resources, Government acts as trustee. So it cannot, without violating its sacred trust, enter into any agreement or arrangement which effectively deprives the Filipino people of their beneficial ownership of these resources.- Art. XII, sec. 2 in mentioning “based on real contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the country articulates the value which the Constitution places on natural resources, and recognizes their potential benefits.- Real benefits are intergenerational benefits because the motherland’s natural resources are the birthright not only of the present generation of Filipinos but of future generations as well.- “Involving” as the majority construes it runs counter to the restrictive spirit of the provision.- “Either” refers to one of two items and “any” is required when more than two items are involved.- “Either” is not merely descriptive but restrictive.- Casus omisus pro omisso habendus est –a person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally.- It is understandable, however regrettable, that a government, strapped for cash and in the midst of a self proclaimed fiscal crisis, would be inclined to turn a blind eye to the consequences of unconstitutional legislation in the hope, however false or empty, of obtaining fabulous amounts of hard currency; As always, the one overriding the consideration of this Court should be will of the sovereign Filipino people as embodied in their Constitution.- The task of reclaiming Filipino control over Philippine natural resources now belongs to another generation.

FREEDOM FROM DEBT COALITION V ERC AND MERALCO

TINGA; January 15, 2004

FACTS- Petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Injunction with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order or a Status Quo Order assailing the Order dated November 27, 2003 of respondent Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC), provisionally authorizing respondent Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) to increase its rates by an average amount of 12 centavos per kilowatt hour. Freedom from Debt Coalition (FDC) argues that the said Order of the ERC is void for having been issued without legal basis or statutory authority. It also contends that Rule 3, Sec. 4 of the Implementing Rules of the “Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001” (EPIRA) is unconstitutional for being an undue delegation of legislative power. FDC further asserts that the Order is void for having been issued by the ERC with grave abuse of discretion and manifest bias. In support of its prayer for the issuance of injunctive relief, FDC claims that the implementation by MERALCO of the provisional rate increase will result in irreparable prejudice to the FDC and others similarly situated unless the court restrains such implementation. - On Dec. 29, 2003, FDC filed with the Court an Urgent Motion to Grant Restraining or Status Quo Order. On Jan. 9, 2004, the ERC issued an Order clarifying that the provisional rate increase granted to MERALCO in its Nov. 27, 2003 Order should be applied beginning Jan. 1, 2004. The Court En Banc issued on Jan. 13, 2004, a Resolution ordering ERC and MERALCO to file their respective Comments on the Petition. The Court also enjoined ERC and MERALCO to observe the status quo prevailing before the filing of the Petition and set the case for oral arguments on Jan. 27, 2004. On Jan. 26, 2004, ERC,

MERALCO, and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed their respective Comments on the Petition.- In its Comment, the ERC concurred with the arguments of the OSG and insists that it is authorized to issue provisional orders under the law. ERC argues that it must not have been the intention of Congress to expand the functions of the ERC, as the successor of the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB), and clip its powers at the same time. The ERC also asserts that it is authorized to issue provisional rate increases ex parte, and that it may base its provisional order on the verified application and supporting documents submitted by the application, and it is not required to wait for the comments of consumers or local government units (LGUs) concerned before issuing a provisional order. The ERC also denies that the Nov. 27, 2003 Order was issued with grave abuse of discretion. On the contrary, it claims that the Order is supported by substantial evidence. Finally, ERC contends that the filing of the instant Petition is premature because it was denied the opportunity to have a full determination of the Application after trial on the merits, and is violative of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. - For its part, MERALCO asserts that the Order is valid, because it was issued by the ERC pursuant to Sec. 44 of the EPIRA which allows the transfer of powers (not inconsistent with the EPIRA) of the old ERB to ERC. It also denies that the assailed Order was issued by the ERC with grave abuse of discretion, asserting that on the contrary, the issuance thereof was based on the Application, affidavits and other supporting documents which it submitted earlier.

ISSUE 1. WON ERC has legal authority to grant provisional rate adjustments under RA No. 9136, otherwise known as the “Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001” (EPIRA)2. Assuming that the ERC has the authority to grant provisional orders, WON the grant by the ERC of the provisional rate adjustment in question constitutes grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction

HELD1. Yes. The ERC is endowed with statutory authority to approve provisional rate adjustments under the aegis of Sections 44 and 80 of the EPIRA. The sections read, thus:

Sec. 44. Transfer of Powers and Functions. — The powers and functions of the Energy Regulatory Board not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby transferred to the ERC. The foregoing transfer of powers and functions shall include all applicable funds and appropriations, records, equipment, property and personnel as may be necessary.Sec. 80. Applicability and Repealing Clause — The applicability provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended, otherwise known as the “Public Services Act,” Republic Act 6395, as amended, revising the charter of NPC; Presidential Decree 269, as amended, referred to as the National Electrification Decree; Republic Act 7638, otherwise known as the “Department of Energy Act;” Executive Order 172, as amended, creating the ERB; Republic Act 7832 otherwise known as the “Anti-Electricity and Electric Transmission Lines/Materials Pilferage Act of 1004;” shall continue to have full force and effect except insofar as they are inconsistent with this Act. The provisions with respect to electric power of Section 11(c) of Republic Act 7916, as amended, and Section 5(f) of Republic Act 7277 are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.

- Presidential Decree No. 40 and all laws, decrees, rules and regulations, or portions thereof, inconsistent with this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. (Emphasis supplied)

The principal powers of the ERB relative to electric public utilities transferred to the ERC are the following:1. To regulate and fix the power rates to be charged by electric companies;2. To issue certificates of public convenience for the operation of electric power utilities;3. To grant or approve provisional electric rates.

- It bears stressing that the conferment upon the ERC of the power to grant provisional rate adjustments is not inconsistent with any provision of the EPIRA. The powers of the ERB transferred to the ERC under Section 44 are in addition to the new powers conferred upon the ERC under Section 43.

Section 80 of the EPIRA complements Section 44, as it mandates the continued efficacy of the applicable provisions of the laws referred to therein. The material provisions of the Public Service Act which continue to be in full force and effect are contained in Section 16(c), which states thus:Section 16. Proceedings of the Commission, upon notice and hearing.The Commission shall have power, upon proper notice and hearing in accordance with the rules and provisions of this Act, subject to the limitations and exceptions mentioned and saving provisions to the contrary:xxx xxx xxxc) To fix and determine individual or joint rates, toll charges, classifications, or schedules thereof, as well as commutation, mileage, kilometrage, and other special rates which shall be imposed, observed, and followed thereafter by any public service: Provided, That the Commission may, in its discretion, approve rates proposed by public services provisionally and without necessity of any hearing; but it shall call a hearing thereon within thirty days thereafter, upon publication and notice to the concerned parties operating in the territory affected: Provided, further, That in case public service equipment of an operator is used principally or secondarily for the promotion of a private business, the net profits of said private business shall be considered in relation with the public service of such operator for the purposes of fixing the rates.

- Similarly, Sections 8 and 14 of EO No. 172 or the ERB Charter continue to be in full force by virtue of Sections 44 and 80 of the EPIRA. Said provisions of the ERB Charter read:

SEC. 8. Authority to Grant Provisional Relief. — The Board may, upon the filing of an application, petition or complaint or at any stage thereafter and without prior hearing, on the basis of the supporting papers duly verified or authenticated, grant provisional relief on motion of a party in the case or on its own initiative, without prejudice to a final decision after hearing, should the Board find that the pleadings, together with such affidavits, documents and other evidence which may be submitted in support of the motion, substantially support of the provisional order; Provided, That the Board shall immediately schedule and conduct a hearing thereon within thirty (30) days thereafter, upon publication and notice to all affected parties.SEC. 14. Applicability Clause — The applicability (applicable) provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended, otherwise known as the “Public Service Act;” Republic Act No. 6173, as amended, otherwise known as the “Oil Industry Commission Act;” Republic Act No. 6395, as amended, revising the charter of the National Power Corporation under CA 120; Presidential Decree No. 269, as amended, also referred to as the “National Electrification Administration Decree,” and Presidential Decree No. 1206, as amended, creating the Department of Energy, shall continue to have full force and effect, except insofar as inconsistent with this order. (Words in parenthesis supplied).

- Furthermore, under Sec. 80, only three specific laws were expressly repealed or modified. Sec. 8 of EO No. 172 and Section 16(c) of CA No. 146 which both grant the regulatory body concerned the authority to approve provisional rate increases are not among the provisions expressly repealed or modified. This clearly indicates the law’s intent to transfer the power to ERC. - Be it noted that implied repeals are not favored in our jurisdiction. Thus, a statute will not be deemed to have been impliedly repealed by another enacted subsequent thereto unless there is a showing that a plain, unavoidable, and irreconcilable repugnancy exists between the two.- Likewise, it may not be asserted with success that the power to grant provisional rate adjustments runs counter to the statutory construction guide provided in Sec. 75 of the law. This section ordains that the EPIRA shall be construed in favor of market competition and people power empowerment, thereby ensuring the widest participation of the people. To the Court, the goals of market competition and people empowerment are not negated by the ERC’s

exercise of authority to approve provisional rate adjustments. The concerns are taken care of by Sec. 43 of the EPIRA and its IRR. Again for one, even if there is a ground to grant the provisional rate increase, the ERC may do so only after the publication requirement is met and the consumers affected are given the opportunity to present their side. For another, the rate increase is provisional in character and therefore may be modified or even recalled anytime. Finally, the ERC is mandated to prescribe a rate-setting methodology “in the public interest” and “to promote efficiency.” For that matter, there is a plethora of provisions in Sec. 43 and related sections which seek to promote public interest, market competition, and consumer protection. - All the foregoing undeniably lead to the conclusion that the ERC, under Sections 43(u), 44, and 80 of the EPIRA, in relation to Sec. 16(c) of the Public Service Act and Sec. 8 of EO. No. 172, possesses the power to grant provisional rate adjustments subject to the procedure laid down in these laws as well as in the IRR. 2. Yes. It is settled that there is grave abuse of discretion when an act is done contrary to the Constitution, the law, or jurisprudence, or when executed whimsically, capriciously, or arbitrarily out of malice, ill will, or personal bias. What makes the challenged Order particularly repugnant is that it involves a blatant and inexcusable breach of the very rule which the ERC is mandated to observe and implement. The violated provision which is Sec. 4(e), Rule 3 of the IRR specifies how the ERC should exercise its power to issue provisional orders pursuant to Sec. 44 in relation to Sec. 80 of the EPIRA. First, the application for rate increase must be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the locality where the applicant operates; second, ERC must consider the comments or pleadings of the customers and LGU concerned in its action on the application or motion for provisional rate adjustment. Since the IRR was issued pursuant to the EPIRA, Sec. 4(e) of Rule 3 as part of the IRR has the force and effect of law and thus should have been complied with. - In view of the infirmities which attended the November 27, 2003 Order, particularly: 1) the failure of MERALCO to publish its Application or at least a summary thereof; 2) the failure of ERC to resolve the Motions for Production of Documents filed by the oppositors to MERALCO’s Application before acting on the motion for provisional rate adjustment; and 3) the failure of the ERC to consider the arguments raised by the oppositors in their respective pleadings prior to the issuance of the assailed Order, the Court declares void the November 27, 2003 Order of the ERC for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V ROSEMOOR MINING AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION

PANGANIBAN; March 30, 2004

FACTS- The petitioners, after having been granted permission to prospect for marble deposits in the mountains of Biak-na-Bato, succeeded in discovering marble deposits in Mount Mabio, which forms part of Biak-na-bato mountain range. The petitioners then applied with the Bureau of Mines for the issuance of the corresponding license to exploit said marble deposits. License No. 33 was granted to them. Shortly after respondent Ernesto Maceda was appointed Minister of the Department of Energy, he cancelled the petitioner’s license through his letter to Rosemoor Mining and Development Corporation dated Semptember 6, 1986. Because of the cancellation, the original petition was filed on August 21, 1991. - The trial court granted the petition and said that the privilege granted under the license had already ripened into a property right, thus the cancellation of the license without notice or hearing was against the Constitutional right of the petitioners against deprivation of their property rights. It was unjustified because that could be covered by four separate application is 400 hectares. Finally, they ruled that Proclamation No. 84, which confirmed the cancellation of the license, was an ex post facto law. Thus, they were allowed to continue their operations until the expiration of their license.

- On appeal, the CA held that the grant of quary license covering 330.3062 hectares to the respondents was valid because it was covered by four separate applications, each for an area of 81 hectares. Moreover, it held that the limitation under PD 463 - that any quarry license should not cover not more than 100 hectares in any given province – was supplanted by RA 7942, which increased the mining areas allowed under PD 463,

ISSUES1. WON the case is moot and academic2. WON the license is valid3. WON Proclamation No. 84 is valid

HELD1. No. With the shift of constitutional policy (Art 12 Sec 2) toward full control and supervision of the State over natural resources the Court in Miners Association of the Philippines vs Factoran declared the provisions of PD 463 as contrary to the Constitution. - RA 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 embodies the new constitutional mandate. It has repealed all laws that are inconsistent with any of its provisions. However, it does not apply retroactively to a license granted by the government under the 1973 Constitution. The Court therefore needs to determine WON the license of the respondents falls within the type of licenses wherein the new law cannot be applied.2. No. The license granted to the petitioners is subject to the terms and conditions of PD 463. Proclamation No. 2202, which awarded the license to Rosemoor, expressly states that the grant is subject to “existing policies, laws, rules and regulations”. The license is thus subject to Section 69 of PD 463, which states that a license cannot cover more than 100 hectares in any one province. The law does not provide any exception to the number of applications for a license. Moreover, the license was issued solely in the name of Rosemoore Mining and Development Corporation, rather than the four individual stockholders.3. Yes. Citing Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining Corporation vs. Balite Portal Mining Cooperative, Tan vs. Director of Forestry and Ysmael vs. Executive Secretary, the Court ruled that licenses may be revoked by executive action when national interest so requires, because it is not a contract, property or a property right protected by the due process clause. The license merely evidences the privilege granted by the state and does not vest any permanent or irrevocable right. The license likewise contains a provision which says that the license “may be revoked or cancelled at any time by the Director of Mines and Geo-Sciences when in his opinion, public interest so require”. As to the exercise of prerogative by Maceda, suffice to say that while the cancellation or revocation of the license is vested in the said director, the latter is subject to the department head.- Moreover, granting that the license is valid, it may also by revoked by the State in the exercise of police power. The exercise of power through Proclamation No. 84 is clearly in accord with jura regalia, which reserves to the State ownership of all natural resources.- Proc No. 84 is also not a bill of attainder since the declaration of the license as a nullity is not a declaration of guilt. Neither is the cancellation a punishment within the purview of the constitutional proscription against bills of attainder.- Proclamation No. 84 is also not an ex post facto law. It does not fall under the six recognized instances when a law is considered as such. Also, an ex post facto law is limited in its scope only to matters criminal in nature.Decision Petition granted

DIDIPIO EARTHSAVERS ASSOCIATION V SECRETARYCHICO-NAZARIO; March 30,2006

FACTS

- Nature Prohibition and mandamus- Assails the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7942 otherwise known as the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, together with the Implementing Rules and Regulations issued pursuant thereto, Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Administrative Order No. 96-40, s. 1996.- 25 July 1987 ~ President Aquino promulgated EO No. 279 which authorized the DENR Secretary to accept, consider and evaluate proposals from foreign-owned corporations or foreign investors for contracts of agreements involving either technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, which, upon appropriate recommendation of the Secretary, the President may execute with the foreign proponent.- 3 March 1995 ~ President Ramos signed into law Rep. Act No. 7942 entitled, “An Act Instituting A New System of Mineral Resources Exploration, Development, Utilization and Conservation,” otherwise known as the Philippine Mining Act of 1995.- 15 August 1995 ~ DENR Secretary Victor O. Ramos issued DENR Administrative Order (DAO) No. 23, Series of 1995, containing the implementing guidelines of Rep. Act No. 7942. - 23 January 1997 ~ DAO No. 96-40, s. 1996, which took effect on after due publication superseded DAO No. 23, s.1995.- Previously, however, or specifically on 20 June 1994, President Ramos executed an FTAA with AMC over a total land area of 37,000 hectares covering the provinces of Nueva Vizcaya and Quirino. Included in this area is Barangay Dipidio, Kasibu, Nueva Vizcaya.- Subsequently, AMC consolidated with Climax Mining Limited to form a single company that now goes under the new name of Climax-Arimco Mining Corporation (CAMC), the controlling 99% of stockholders of which are Australian nationals.- 7 September 2001 ~ counsels for petitioners filed a demand letter addressed to then DENR Secretary Heherson Alvarez, for the cancellation of the CAMC FTAA for the primary reason that Rep. Act No. 7942 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations DAO 96-40 are unconstitutional.- The Office of the Executive Secretary was also furnished a copy of the said letter. - There being no response to both letters, another letter of the same content dated 17 June 2002 was sent to President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo. - This letter was indorsed to the DENR Secretary and eventually referred to the Panel of Arbitrators of the Mines and Geosciences Bureau (MGB), Regional Office No. 02, Tuguegarao, Cagayan, for further action.- 12 November 2002 ~ counsels for petitioners received a letter from the Panel of Arbitrators of the MGB requiring the petitioners to comply with the Rules of the Panel of Arbitrators before the letter may be acted upon.- Yet again, counsels for petitioners sent President Arroyo another demand letter dated 8 November 2002. Said letter was again forwarded to the DENR Secretary who referred the same to the MGB, Quezon City.- In a letter dated 19 February 2003, the MGB rejected the demand of counsels for petitioners for the cancellation of the CAMC FTAA.- Petitioners thus filed the present petition for prohibition and mandamus, with a prayer for a temporary restraining order. They pray that the Court issue an order:

1. enjoining public respondents from acting on any application for FTAA;2. declaring unconstitutional the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 and its

Implementing Rules and Regulations;3. canceling the FTAA issued to CAMC.

ISSUESProcedural 1. WON the petitioners' eminent domain claim is a justiciable issue.Substantive 2. WON RA 7942 and the CAMC FTAA are void becausethey allow the unjust and unlawful taking of property without payment of just compensation, in violation of Art III Sec 9 of the Constitution

3. WON the mining act and its implementing rules and regulations are void and unconstitutional for sanctioning an unconstitutional administrative process of determining just compensation4. WON the state, through RA 7942 and the CAMC FTAA, abdicated its primary responsibility to the full control and supervision over natural resources5. WON the respondents interpretation of the role of the wholly foreign and foreign-owned corporations in their involvement in mining enterprises, violates Art XII Sec 2 (4) of the Constitution6. WON the 1987 Constitution prohibits service contracts

HELD1. YES. It is a justiciable issue. Based on the following considerations:

a. Locus Standi~ In the case, there is a clash of legal rights as Rep. Act No. 7942 has been enacted, DAO 96-40 has been approved and an FTAAs have been entered into. Petitioners embrace various segments of the society, like DESAMA representing a community actually affected by the mining activities of CAMC, as well as other residents of areas affected by the mining activities of CAMC. These petitioners have the standing to raise the constitutionality of the questioned FTAA as they allege a personal and substantial injury. They are under imminent threat of being displaced from their landholdings as a result of the implementation of the questioned FTAA.

b. Ripeness~ By the mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval of the challenged act, the dispute is said to have ripened into a judicial controversy even without any other overt act. Indeed, even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial duty.

c. The transcendental importance of the issues raised and the magnitude of the public interest involved will have a bearing on the country’s economy, which is to a greater extent dependent upon the mining industry. Also affected by the resolution of this case are the proprietary rights of numerous residents in the mining contract areas as well as the social existence of indigenous peoples, which are threatened.

2. On the Validity of Section 76 of Rep. Act No. 7942 and DAO 96-40- PETITIONERS contend that Sec. 76 of RA No. 7942 and Sec. 107 of DAO 96-40 allow the "unlawful and unjust "TAKING" of private property for private purpose in contradiction with Sec. 9, Art. III of the 1987 Constitution mandating that private property shall not be taken except for public use and the corresponding payment of just compensation." - They assert that public respondent DENR, through the Mining Act and its Implementing Rules and Regulations, cannot, on its own, permit entry into a private property and allow taking of land without payment of just compensation.- They cited the case of Republic v. Vda. de Castellvi to illustrate the concept of taking of property for purposes of eminent domain to wit:

> "“taking” under the concept of eminent domain as entering upon private property for more than a momentary period, and, under the warrant or color of legal authority, devoting it to a public use, or otherwise informally appropriating or injuriously affecting it in such a way as to substantially oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment thereof."

- Petitioners quickly add that even assuming arguendo that there is no absolute, physical taking, at the very least, Section 76 establishes a legal easement upon the surface owners, occupants and concessionaires of a mining contract area sufficient to deprive them of enjoyment and use of the property and that such burden imposed by the legal easement falls within the purview of eminent domain. (NOTE: An easement is defined to be a liberty privilege or advantage, which one man may have in the lands of another, without profit; it may arise by deed or prescription)- PUBLIC RESPONDENTS argue that Section 76 is NOT A TAKING provision but a VALID EXERCISE OF THE POLICE POWER and by virtue of which, the

state may prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order, safety and general welfare of the people. This government regulation involves the adjustment of rights for the public good and that this adjustment curtails some potential for the use or economic exploitation of private property. - Public respondents concluded that “to require compensation in all such circumstances would compel the government to regulate by purchase.” - Public respondents are inclined to believe that by entering private lands and concession areas, FTAA holders do not oust the owners thereof nor deprive them of all beneficial enjoyment of their properties as the said entry merely establishes a legal easement upon surface owners, occupants and concessionaires of a mining contract area.- Hence the distinctions below:1. Taking in Eminent Domain Distinguished from Regulation in Police Power

The power of eminent domain is the inherent right of the state (and of those entities to which the power has been lawfully delegated) to condemn private property to public use upon payment of just compensation.

On the other hand, police power is the power of the state to promote public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property.

Although both police power and the power of eminent domain have the general welfare for their object, and recent trends show a mingling of the two with the latter being used as an implement of the former, there are still traditional distinctions between the two.

Property condemned under police power is usually noxious or intended for a noxious purpose; hence, no compensation shall be paid. (NOTE: noxious= harmful)

Jurisprudence shows: WHERE A PROPERTY INTEREST IS MERELY RESTRICTED BECAUSE THE CONTINUED USE THEREOF WOULD BE INJURIOUS TO PUBLIC WELFARE, OR WHERE PROPERTY IS DESTROYED BECAUSE ITS CONTINUED EXISTENCE WOULD BE INJURIOUS TO PUBLIC INTEREST, THERE IS NO COMPENSABLE TAKING. However, WHEN A PROPERTY INTEREST IS APPROPRIATED AND APPLIED TO SOME PUBLIC PURPOSE, THERE IS COMPENSABLE TAKING.

In the exercise of its police power regulation, the state restricts the use of private property, but none of the property interests in the bundle of rights, which constitute ownership, is appropriated for use by or for the benefit of the public. (-Bernas)

TAKING MAY INCLUDE TRESPASS WITHOUT ACTUAL EVICTION OF THE OWNER, MATERIAL IMPAIRMENT OF THE VALUE OF THE PROPERTY OR PREVENTION OF THE ORDINARY USES FOR WHICH THE PROPERTY WAS INTENDED SUCH AS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN EASEMENT.

In Republic v. Castellvi, the Court had the occasion to spell out the requisites of taking in eminent domain, to wit:

1. the expropriator must enter a private property;2. the entry must be for more than a momentary period.3. the entry must be under warrant or color of legal authority;4. the property must be devoted to public use or otherwise informally

appropriated or injuriously affected;5. the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to

oust the owner and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the property. Normally, of course, the power of eminent domain results in the taking or

appropriation of title to, and possession of, the expropriated property; but no cogent reason appears why said power may not be availed of to impose only a burden upon the owner of the condemned property, without loss of title and possession. It is unquestionable that real property may, through expropriation, be subjected to an easement right of way.

THE ENTRY REFERRED TO IN SECTION 76 IS NOT JUST A SIMPLE RIGHT-OF-WAY WHICH IS ORDINARILY ALLOWED UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THE CIVIL CODE. Here, the holders of mining rights enter private lands for purposes of conducting mining activities such as exploration, extraction and processing of minerals. Mining right holders build mine infrastructure, dig mine shafts and connecting tunnels, prepare tailing ponds, storage areas and vehicle depots, install their machinery, equipment and sewer systems. On top of this, under Section 75, easement rights are accorded to them where they may build warehouses, port facilities, electric transmission, railroads and other infrastructures necessary for mining operations. All these will definitely oust the owners or occupants of the affected areas the beneficial ownership of their lands. WITHOUT A DOUBT, TAKING OCCURS ONCE MINING OPERATIONS COMMENCE.1. On Section 76 of RA No. 7942 as a Taking Provision Brief History of Mining Laws: First found in Section 27 of Commonwealth Act No. 137 A similar one was found in a provision of Presidential Decree No. 463,

otherwise known as “The Mineral Resources Development Decree of 1974”

Hampered by the difficulties and delays in securing surface rights for the entry into private lands for purposes of mining operations, Presidential Decree No. 512 dated 19 July 1974 was passed into law in order to achieve full and accelerated mineral resources development. Thus, Presidential Decree No. 512 provides for a new system of surface rights acquisition by mining prospectors and claimants.

Whereas in Commonwealth Act No. 137 and Presidential Decree No. 463 eminent domain may only be exercised in order that the mining claimants can build, construct or install roads, railroads, mills, warehouses and other facilities, this time, the power of eminent domain may now be invoked by mining operators for the entry, acquisition and use of private lands.

Considering that Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 512 granted the qualified mining operators the authority to exercise eminent domain and since this grant of authority is deemed incorporated in Section 76 of Rep. Act No. 7942, the inescapable conclusion is that the latter provision is a taking provision. o The taking to be valid must be for public use.o Public use as a requirement for the valid exercise of the power of

eminent domain is now synonymous with public interest, public benefit, public welfare and public convenience.

o It includes the broader notion of indirect public benefit or advantage. Public use as traditionally understood as “actual use by the public” has already been abandoned.

Decision THEREFORE, the Mining Law and the CAMC FTAA are not void because Sec. 76 of Rep. Act No. 7942 and Sec. 107 of DAO 96-40 provide for the payment of just compensation based on the agreement entered into by the holder of mining rights and the surface owner, occupant or concessionaire in accordance to PD 512.

Reasoning and Held/s on the Second Substantive Issue:3. On the Power of Courts to Determine Just CompensationThe question on the judicial determination of just compensation has been settled in the case of Export Processing Zone Authority v. Dulay wherein the Court declared that the determination of just compensation in eminent domain cases is a judicial function . Even as the executive department or the legislature may make the initial determinations, the same cannot prevail over the court’s findings. (NOTE: I think this is the ratio already.)

There is nothing in the provisions of the assailed law and its implementing rules and regulations that exclude

the courts from their jurisdiction to determine just compensation in expropriation proceedings involving mining operations. There is nothing wrong with the grant of primary jurisdiction by the Panel of Arbitrators or the Mines Adjudication Board to determine in a preliminary matter the reasonable compensation due the affected landowners or occupants. The jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts is not any less “original and exclusive” because the question is first passed upon by the DAR, as the judicial proceedings are not a continuation of the administrative determination.

4. On the Sufficient Control by the State Over Mining Operations Citing La Bugal-B’Laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos: The Court

held that RA 7942 provides for the state’s control and supervision over mining operations.

o The gamut of requirements, regulations, restrictions and limitations imposed upon the FTAA contractor by the statute and regulations easily overturns petitioners’ contention that the setup under RA 7942 and DAO 96-40 relegates the State to the role of a “passive regulator” dependent on submitted plans and reports.

On the contrary, the government agencies concerned are empowered to approve or disapprove -- hence, to influence, direct and change -- the various work programs and the corresponding minimum expenditure commitments for each of the exploration, development and utilization phases of the mining enterprise.

- Considering the provisions of the statute and the regulations just discussed, the Court believes that the State definitely possesses the means by which it can have the ultimate word in the operation of the enterprise, set directions and objectives, and detect deviations and noncompliance by the contractor; likewise, it has the capability to enforce compliance and to impose sanctions, should the occasion therefore arise.

In other words, the FTAA contractor is not free to do whatever it pleases and get away with it; on the contrary, it will have to follow the government line if it wants to stay in the enterprise. Ineluctably then, RA 7942 and DAO 96-40 vest in the government more than a sufficient degree of control and supervision over the conduct of mining operations.

5. On the Proper Interpretation of the Constitutional Phrase "Agreements Involving Either Technical or Financial Assistance"

Citing La Bugal-B’Laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos: Par. 4 of Sec. 2 Art XII allows for the possibility that matters, other

than those explicitly mentioned, could be made part of the agreement. o The use of the word “involving” implies that these agreements with

foreign corporations are not limited to mere financial or technical assistance. The difference in sense becomes very apparent when we juxtapose “agreements for technical or financial assistance” against “agreements including technical or financial assistance.” This much is unalterably clear in a verba legis approach.

o The word “involving” as used in this context has three connotations that can be differentiated thus: one, the sense of “concerning,” “having to do with,” or “affecting”; two, “entailing,” “requiring,” “implying” or “necessitating”; and three, “including,” “containing” or “comprising.”

If the real intention of the drafters was to confine foreign corporations to financial or technical assistance and nothing more, their language would have certainly been so unmistakably restrictive and stringent as to leave no doubt in anyone’s mind about their true intent.

o For example, they would have used the sentence foreign corporations are absolutely prohibited from involvement in the management or operation of mining or similar ventures or words of similar import. A search for such stringent wording yields negative results.

- The meaning of the phrase “agreements involving either technical or financial assistance” must not be construed in an exclusionary and limiting manner since there was a conscious and deliberate decision by the drafters to avoid the use of restrictive wording.

6. On Service Contracts Not Deconstitutionalized The 1987 Constitution allows the continued use of service contracts with foreign corporations as contractors who would invest in and operate and manage extractive enterprises, subject to the full control and supervision of the State; this time, however, safety measures were put in place to prevent abuses of the past regime. Citing Philippine Veterans Bank v. Court of Appeals:a. "The phrase agreements involving either technical or financial assistance, referred to in paragraph 4, are in fact service contracts. But unlike those of the 1973 variety, the new ones are between foreign corporations acting as contractors on the one hand; and on the other, the government as principal or “owner” of the works."b. "xxx..From the foregoing, we are impelled to conclude that the phrase agreements involving either technical or financial assistance, referred to in paragraph 4, are in fact service contracts. But unlike those of the 1973 variety, the new ones are between foreign corporations acting as contractors on the one hand; and on the other, the government as principal or “owner” of the works. "

- "As written by the framers and ratified and adopted by the people, the Constitution allows the continued use of service contracts with foreign corporations -- as contractors who would invest in and operate and manage extractive enterprises, subject to the full control and supervision of the State -- sans the abuses of the past regime. The purpose is clear: to develop and utilize our mineral, petroleum and other resources on a large scale for the immediate and tangible benefit of the Filipino people." (id.)

Decision The petition for prohibition and mandamus is hereby DISMISSED. Section 76 of Republic Act No. 7942 and Section 107 of DAO 96-40; Republic Act No. 7942 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations contained in DAO 96-40 – insofar as they relate to financial and technical assistance agreements referred to in paragraph 4 of Section 2 of Article XII of the Constitution are NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

SOUTHEAST MINDANAO GOLD MINING V BALITE PORTAL MINING

YNARES-SANTIAGO; April 3, 2002

FACTS- Diwalwal Gold Rush Area – rich tract of mineral land situated in the Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve. It is located at Mt. Diwata in the municipalities of Monkayo and Cateek in Davao Del Norte. The land has been embroiled in controversy since mid-80’s due to the scramble over gold deposits found within its bowels.- March 10, 1988, Marcopper Mining Corporation was granted Exploration Permit No. 133 (EP No. 133) over 4,491 hectares of land, which included the Diwalwal area. - June 27, 1991, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 7076 or the People’s Small-Scale Mining Act which established a People’s Small-Scale Mining Program to be implemented by the secretary of the DENR and created the Provincial Mining Regulatory Board (PMRB) under the DENR Secretary’s direct supervision and control. It also authorized the PMRB to declare and set aside small-scale mining areas subject to review by the DENR Secretary and award mining contracts to small-scale miners under certain conditions.- December 21, 1991, then DENR Secretary Fulgencio Factoran issued Department Administrative Order (DAO) No. 66 declaring 729 hectares of the

Diwalwal area as non-forest land open to small-scale mining. This was made pursuant to the powers vested in the DENR Secretary by Proclamation No. 369 which established the Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve.- Petition for the cancellation of EP No. 133 and the admission of a Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA) proposal over Diwalwal was filed before the DENR Regional Executive Director (RED Mines Case)- February 16, 1994, while RED mines case was pending, Marcopper assigned its EP No. 133 to Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining Corporation (SEM), which in turn applied for an integrated MPSA over the land covered by the permit. The Mines and Geosciences Bureau Regional Office No. XI in Davao City (MGB-XI) accepted and registered SEM’s integrated MPSA application. Several small-scale miners filed their opposition (MAC cases).- March 3, 1995, Republic Act No. 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act was enacted. Pursuant to this, the MAC cases were referred to a Regional Panel of Arbitrators (RPA) tasked to resolve disputes involving conflicting mining rights. RPA took cognizance of the RED Mines cases which was consolidated with the MAC cases.- April 1, 1997 Provincial Mining Regulatory Board of Davao passed Resolution No. 26, Series of 1997 authorizing the issuance of ore transport permits (OTPs) to small-scale miners operating in the Diwalwal mines.- May 30, 1997, petitioner SEM filed complaint for damages against DENR Secretary and PMRB-Davao, alleging that the illegal issuance of the OTPs allowed the extraction and hauling of P60,000 worth of gold ore per truckload from SEM’s mining claim.- Meanwhile, June 13, 1997, the RPA resolved the Consolidated Mines cases and decreed in an Omnibus Resolution that the validity of EP No. 133 is reiterated and all adverse claims against MPSAA No. 128 are dismissed.- June 24, 1997 the DENR Secretary issued Memorandum Order No. 97-03 which provided among others, that:

a. DENR shall study…the option of direct state utilization of the mineral resources in the Diwalwal Gold-Rush Area…

b. Study shall include… studying and weighing the feasibility of entering into management agreements or operating agreements…

c. Such agreements shall include provisions for profit-sharing… including profit-sharing arrangements with small-scale miners, as well as the payment of royalties to indigenous cultural communities…

- July 16, 1997 petitioner SEM filed a special civil action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus before the CA for the nullification of Memorandum Order No. 97-03 on the ground that the “direct state utilization” espoused therein would effectively impair its vested rights under EP No. 133, among others- January 6, 1998, the MAB rendered a decision in the Consolidated Mines cases, setting aside the judgment of the RPA. This decision was then elevated to he Supreme Court by way of consolidated petition.- March 19, 1998, the CA dismissed petition of SEM ruling that:

a. DENR Secretary did not abuse his discretion in issuing Memorandum Order No. 97-03 since it was merely a directive to conduct studies on the various options available to the government for solving the Diwalwal conflict.

b. The assailed memorandum did not conclusively adopt “direct state utilization” as official government policy on the matter, but was simply a manifestation of the DENR’s intent to consider it as one of its options, after determining its feasibility through studies.

c. Petitioner’s rights under EP No. 133 are not inviolable, sacrosanct or immutable and, being in the nature of a privilege granted by the State, the permit can be revoked, amended or modified by the Chief Executive when the national interest so requires.

- Motion for reconsideration was denied, thus this petition.

ISSUES1. WON CA erred in upholding the questioned acts of the DENR Secretary which petitioner allege as violative of mining laws and in derogation of vested rights of petitioner over the area as covered by EP No. 133.

2. WON CA erred in holding that an action on the validity of ore transport permit (OTP) is vested in the Regional Panel of Arbitrators (RPA).

HELD1. SC agreed with CA that the challenged MO 97-03 did not conclusively adopt “direct state utilization” as a policy in resolving the Diwalwal dispute. The terms of the memorandum clearly indicate that what was directed was merely a study of this option and nothing else. It did not grant any management/operating or profit-sharing agreement to small-scale miners or to any party, for that matter, but simply instructed the DENR officials concerned to undertake studies to determine its feasibility.- Petition was premature. The MO did not impose any obligation on the claimants or fix any legal relation whatsoever between and among the parties to the dispute. Petitioner can show no more than a mere apprehension that the State, through the DENR, would directly take over the mines, and until the DENR actually does so and petitioner’s fears turn into reality, no valid objection can be entertained against MO 97-03 on grounds which are purely speculative and anticipatory.2. Whether or not petitioner actually has a vested right over Diwalwal under EP No. 133 is still an indefinite and unsettled matter, as the EP’s validity is still being disputed in the Consolidated Mines cases.- Whether or not respondent Balite Communal Portal Mining Cooperative (BCPMC) and the other mining entities it represents are conducting illegal mining activities is a factual matter that has yet to be finally determined in the Consolidated Mines Cases.- SC also pointed out that under no circumstances may petitioner’s rights under EP No. 133 be regarded as total and absolute, as EP No. 133 merely evidences a privilege granted by the State, which may be amended, modified or rescinded when the national interest so requires. This is necessarily so since the exploration, development and utilization of the country’s natural mineral resources are matters impresses with great public interest.- Looking into Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution and Section 4, Chapter II of the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, the SC said that the State may pursue the constitutional policy of full control and supervision of the exploration, development and utilization of the country’s natural mineral resources, by either directly undertaking the same or by entering into agreements with qualified entities. The State need be guided only by the demands of public interest.- In the absence of any concrete evidence that the DENR Secretary violated the law or abused his discretion, he is presumed to have regularly issued the memorandum with a lawful intent and pursuant to his official functions.- With regard to the second issue, the Court did not rule on it as the grounds invoked by petitioner for invalidating the OTPs are inextricably linked to the issues raised in the Consolidated Mines cases.Decision Petition was denied; CA ruling affirmed.

CHAVEZ V PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY AND AMARI COASTAL BAY

CARPIO; July 9, 2002

FACTS- Nature original Petition for Mandamus with prayer for writ of preliminary injunction and a temporary restraining order. Petition also seeks to compel the Public Estates Authority (PEA) to disclose all facts on PEA’s then on-going renegotiations with Amari Coastal Bay and Development Corporation to reclaim portions of Manila Bay. The petition further seeks to enjoin PEA from signing a new agreement with AMARI involving such recalamtion.- 1973-The government through the Commission of Public Highways signed a contract with the Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP) to reclaim certain foreshore and offshore areas of Manila Bay

- 1977-President Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1084 creating the PEA. And was tasked to reclaim land, including foreshore and submerged areas and to develop, improve, acquire x x x lease and sell any and all kinds of lands. On the same date, President Marcos issued PD. 1085 transferring to PEA the lands reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore of the Manila Bay under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP)- 1981-Pres. Marcos issued a memorandum ordering PEA to amend its contract with CDCP which stated that CDCP shall transfer in favor of PEA the areas reclaimed by CDCP in the MCCRRP- 1988-President Aquino issued Special Patent granting and transferring to PEA parcels of land so reclaimed under the MCCRRP. Subsequently she transferred in the name of PEA the three reclaimed islands known as the “Freedom Islands”- 1995-PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) with AMARI, a private corporation, to develop the Freedom Islands and this was done without public bidding- President Ramos through Executive Secretary Ruben Torres approved the JVA- 1996-Senate President Maceda delivered a privileged speech in the Senate and denounced the JVA as the “grandmother of all scams”. As a result, investigations were conducted by the Senate. Among the conclusions were: (1) the reclaimed lands PEA seeks to transfer to AMARI under the JVA are lands of the public domain which the government has not classified as alienable lands and therefore PEA cannot alienate these lands; (2) the certificates of the title covering the Freedom Islands are thus void, and (3) the JVA itself is illegal- 1997-President Ramos created the Legal Task Force to conduct a study on the legality of the JVA in view of the Senate Committee report.1998-The Philippine Daily Inquirer published reports on on-going renegotiations between PEA and AMARI- PEA Director Nestor Kalaw and PEA Chairman Arsenio Yulo and former navy officer Sergio Cruz were members of the negotiating panel- Frank Chavez filed petition for Mandamus stating that the government stands to lose billions of pesos in the sale by PEA of the reclaimed lands to AMARI and prays that PEA publicly disclose the terms of the renegotiations of JVA. He cited that the sale to AMARI is in violation of Article 12, Sec. 3 prohibiting sale of alienable lands of the public domain to private corporations and Article 2 Section 28 and Article 3 Sec. 7 of the Constitution on the right to information on matters of public concern- 1999-PEA and AMARI signed Amended JVA which Pres. Estrada approved

ISSUES1. WON the principal reliefs prayed for in the petition are moot and academic because subsequent events2. WON the petition merits dismissal for failure to observe the principle governing the hierarchy of courts3. WON the petition merits dismissal for non-exhaustion of administrative-remedies4. WON petitioner has locus standi to bring this suit5. WON the constitutional right to information includes official information on on-going negotiations before a final agreement6. WON the stipulations in the amended joint venture agreement for the transfer to amari of certain lands, reclaimed and still to be reclaimed, violate the 1987 consitution; and7. WON the court is the proper forum for raising the issue of whether the amended joint venture agreement is grossly disadvantageuos to the government.

o threshold issue: whether amari, a private corporation, can acquire and own under the amended jva 367.5 hectares of reclaimed froeshore and submerged area in manila bay in view of sections 2 and 3, article 12 of the 1987 constitution

HELD

(1) The prayer to enjoin the signing of the Amended JVA on constitutional grounds necessarily includes preventing its implementation if in the meantime PEA and AMARI have signed one in violation of the Constitution and if already implemented, to annul the effects of an unconstitutional contract(2) The principle of hierarchy of courts applies generally to cases involving factual questionsReasoning the instant case raises constitutional issues of transcendental importance to the public(3) The principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply when the issue involved is a purely legal or constitutional question(4) Petitioner has standing if petition is of transcendental public importance and as such, there is the right of a citizen to bring a taxpayer’s suit on these matters of transcendental public importance(5) The constitutional right to information includes official information on on-going negotiations before a final contract and must therefore constitute definite propositions by the government and should not cover recognized exceptions like privileged information, military and diplomatic secrets and similar matters affecting national security and public orderReasoning The State policy of full transparency in all transactions involving public interest reinforces the people’s right to information on matters of public concern. PEA must prepare all the data and disclose them to the public at the start of the disposition process, long before the consummation of the contract. While the evaluation or review is on-going, there are no “official acts, transactions, or decisions” on the bids or proposals but once the committee makes its official recommendation, there arises a definite proposition on the part of the government

(6) In a form of a summary:o The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom

Islands, now covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may lease these lands to private corporations but may not sell or transfer ownership of these lands to private corporations. PEA may only sell these lands to Philippine citizens, subject to ownership limitations in the 1987 Constitution and existing laws.

o The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural resources of the public domain and outside the commerce of man until classified as alienable or disposable lands open to disposition and declared no longer needed for public service. The government can make such classification and declaration only after PEA has reclaimed these submerged areas. Only then can these lands qualify as agricultural lands of the public domain, which are the only natural resources the government can alienate.

o Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, ownership of 77.34 hectares of the Freedom Islands, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 3, Article 12 of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain

o Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156 hectares of still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 2, Article 12 of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the alienation of natural resources other than agricultural lands of the public domain. PEA may reclaim these submerged areas. Thereafter, the government can classify the reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable, and further declare them no longer needed for public services. Still, the transfer of such reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain to AMARI will be void in view of Section 3, Article 12 which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.

Reasoning Commonwealth Act 141 of the Philippine National Assembly empowers the president to classify lands of the public domain into alienable or disposable” sec. 6. The President, upon recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, shall from time to time classify the lands of the

public domain into—(a) Alienable of disposable, (b) timber, and (c) mineral lands.-The President must first officially classify these lands as alienable or disposable, and then declare them open to disposition or concession.-Sec. 59 states that the lands disposable under this title shall be classified as follows: (a) Lands reclaimed by the Government by dredging, filling, or other means; (b) Foreshore; (c) Marshy lands (d) Lands not included in any of the foregoing classes. -Sec. 61 states that the lands comprised in classes (a), (b) and (c) of section 59 shall be disposed f to private parties by lease only and not otherwise -After the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, government reclaimed and marshy disposable lands of the public domain continued to be only leased and not sold to private parties. These lands remained suis generic as the only alienable or disposable lands of the public domain the government could not sell to private parties. The only way that the government can sell to private parties government reclaimed and marshy disposable lands of the public domain is for the legislature to pass a law authorizing such sale.-in case of sale or lease of disposable lands of the public domain, a public bidding is required-1987 Constitution declares that all natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. Article 12, Sec. 3 states that alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands. Private corporations or associations may not hold such alienable lands of the public domain except by lease, for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and not to exceed one thousand hectares in area. -ration behind the ban on corporations from acquiring except through lease is not well understood. If the purpose is to equitably diffuse lands ownership then the Consti could have simply limited the size of alienable lands of the public domain that corporations could acquire. If the intent was to encourage “owner-cultivatorship and the economic family-size farm and to prevent a recurrence of cases like the instant case, then placing the land in the name of a corporation would be more effective in preventing the break-up of farmlands. If the farmland is registered in the name of a corporation, upon the death of the owner, his heirs would inherit shares in the corporation instead of subdivided parcels of the farmland. This would prevent the continuing break-up of farmlands into smaller and smaller plots from one generation to the next. In actual practice then, this ban strengthens the consti limitation on individuals from acquiring more than the allowed area of alienable lands of the public domain. Without the ban, individuals who already acquired the maximum area of alienable lands of the public domain could easily set up corporations to acquire more alienable public lands. An individual could own as many corporations as his means would allow him. He could even hide his ownership of a corporation by putting his nominees as stockholders of the corporation.

J.G. SUMMIT HOLDINGS V COURT OF APPEALSPUNO; September 24, 2003

FACTS- January 27, 1977 – The National Investment and Development Corporation (NIDC), a government corporation, entered into a Joint Venture Agreement with Kawasaki Heavy Industry, Ltd of Kobe, Japan for the construction, operation, management of the Subic National Shipyard, which became the Philippine Shipyard and Engineering Corporation (PHILSECO) with 60-40% capitalization.- One of the features of the agreement is the grant to the parties the right of first refusal should either of them decide to sell, assign or transfer its interest in the joint venture.- November 25, 1986-- the NIDC transferred all its rights, title and interest in PHILSECO to the Philippine National Bank (PNB). And subsequently transferred to the Nat’l Government pursuant to Administrative Order No. 14- December 8, 1986-- Pres Aquino issued Proclamation No. 50 establishing the Committee on Privatization (COP) and the Asset Privatization Trust (APT) to

take possession of, manage and dispose of non*performing assets of the National Government.- APT was named trustee in the National Gov’t share in PHILSECO.- COP and APT decided to sell the gov’t shares to private entities (87.67% equity share). - APT and KAWASAKI agreed to exhange KAWASAKI’s right of first refusal for the right to top by 5% the highest bid, and be entitled to name the company which could top. KAWASAKI named Philyard Holdings, Inc. (PHI)- JG Summit Holdings Inc submitted a bid of 2,030,000,000.00php with an acknowledgment of KAWASAKI/PHI’s right to top. JGSHI was declared the highest bidder.- KAWASAKI/PHI exercised the option to top and the COP approved. APT and PHI executed a Stock Purchase Agreement.- JGSHI filed a petition for mandamus to question the legality of the right to first refusal and right to top exercised by KAWASAKI/PHI.- CA held that petition for mandamus was not the proper remedy, and that JGSHI was estopped from questioning the validity because it participated in the public bidding with the full knowledge of KAWASAKI/PHI’s right to top.- SC held that a) the right to top granted to KAWASAKI/PHI was illegal. Because it allows foreign corporations to own more than 40% equity in PHILSECO, which is a public utility whose capitalization should be 60% Filipino-owned. It also violates the rules of competitive bidding; b) JGSHI cannot be estopped from questioning the unconstitutional, illegal and inequitable provision; c) APT should accept the 2,030,000,000.00 bid of JGSHI, execute Stock Purchase Agreement, return to PHI the amount of 2,131,500,000.00php, and cancel the stock certificates issued to PHI.- Respondents filed MFR with the ff. issues…

ISSUES1. WON PHILSECO is a public utility.2. WON under 1977 Joint Venture Agreement, KAWASAKI can exercise its right of first refusal only up to 40% of the total capitalization of PHILSECO3. WON the right to top granted to KAWASAKI violates the principles of competitive bidding.

HELD1. No. PHILSECO is not a public utility. A shipyard is not a public utility by nature, and there is no law declaring it to be.

a) Public utility = a business or service engaged in regularly supplying the public with some commodity or service of public consequence such as electricity, water, transportation. The facility must be necessary for the maintenance of life and occupation of residents.

b) Public utility implies public use and service to the public. Determinative characteristic: service or readiness to serve an indefinite public (not a privileged few), which has rights to demand and receive the services and commodities.

c) Public use is not synonymous with public interest. The fact that a business offers services and goods that promote public good and serve the interest of the public does not make it a public utility.

d) True criterion to judge the character of the use: whether the public may enjoy it by RIGHT or only by PERMISSION

e) Shipyard = a place or enclosure where ships are built or repaired. It has a limited clientele whom it may choose to serve as its discretion. It is not legally obliged to render its services to the public. Though the industry may be imbued with public interest, its public service is only incidental.

f) Shipyards in the past were declared as public utilities (by Act No 2307, Commonwealth Act No 146). Then Marcos’ PD No. 666 removed it from the list of public utilities to free the industry from the 60% citizenship requirement under the Constitution (he wanted to accelerate the growth of the industry). Then BP Blg 391 repealed PD No. 666 , reverting back the status of shipyards as public utilities.

g) Pres Aquino repealed BP Blg 391 with EO No. 226. But this did not revive PD No 666 or the other repealed laws. The status of shipyards reverts back to non-public utility prior to the Public Service Law.

2) No. There is nothing that prevents KAWASAKI to acquire more then 40% of PHILSECO’s total capitalization, under the Joint Venture Agreement. (or YES, it can own more than 40%). They agreed that in the event that one party sells its shares, the non-selling party have a preferential right to buy or to refuse the selling. The partnership is based on delectus personae. No one can become a member of the partnership association w/o the consent of all other associates.

3) No. The right to top did not violate the rules of competitive bidding.a) bidding = making an offer or an invitation to prospective

contractors whereby the gov’t manifests its intention to make proposals for the purpose of supplies, materials and equipment for official business or public use. Public bidding is the accepted method in arriving at a fair and reasonable price, and ensures that overpricing, favoritism, and other anomalous practices are eliminated or minimized.

b) Principles of bidding: 1) the offer to the public; 2) an opportunity for competition; 3) a basis for comparison of bids. As long as the three are complied with, the bidding is valid and legal.

c) The highest bid may not be automatically accepted. Bidding rules may specify other conditions or reservations.

d) In the case, 1) all interested bidders were welcomed; 2) basis for comparing bids were laid down; 3) all bids were accepted sealed and were opened and read in the presence of the COA’s official representative and before all other bidders.

e) The bidders were placed in equal footing. And they were made aware of the rules that the gov’t reserved the right to reject the highest bid should KAWASAKI/PHI decide to exercise its right to top.

f) If the parties did not swap right to first refusal with right to top, KAWASAKI would still have the right to buy the shares (for the original amount, which was lesser), so there is no basis in the submission that the right to top unfairly favored KAWASAKI.

Decision: MFR granted. Decision & resolution of CA affirmed.Voting Concur: Davide, Ynares-Santiago, Corona, Tinga (w/ sep op)

SEPARATE OPINION

TINGA

Shipyard is not a public utility. Since the enactment of CA No. 454 shipyards have never been considered public utilities. PD 666 merely removed any doubt as to their non-public utility status.

BAGATSING V COMMITTEE ON PRIVITIZATIONQUAISON; July 14, 1995

FACTS- this is a petition to nullify the bidding conducted for the sale of a block of shares of Petron Corporation and the award made to Aramco Overseas Company as the highest bidder and to stop the sale of said block of shares to Aramco- PETRON was originally registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission in 1966 under the corporate name “Esso Philippines, Inc.”- In 1973, the Philippine government acquired ESSO through the PNOC and became a wholly-owned company of the government under the corporate name PETRON and as a subsidiary of PNOC.- On December 8, 1986, President Aquino promulgated Proclamation No. 50 entitled “Proclaiming and Launching a Program for the Expeditious Disposition

and Privatization of Certain Government Corporations and/or the Assets thereof and creating the Committee on Privatization and the Asset Privatization Trust” in the exercise of her legislative power under the Freedom Constitution.- Implicit in the proclamation is the need to raise revenue for the government and the ideal of leaving business to the private sector.- December 2, 1991, President Ramos deemed the privatization program to be successful and beneficial.- September 9, 1992, the PNOC Board of Directors approved Specific Thrust No. 6 and moved to bring the attention of the administration to the need to privatize Petron.- October 21, 1992, Sec. Del Rosario, as Chairman of the Committee on Privatization, endorsed to President Ramos the proposal of PNOC.- January 4, 1993, a follow-up letter was sent by Secretary Del Rosario to President Ramos.- January 6, 1993, Secretary Lazaro of the Dept. of Energy endorsed for approval- January 12, 1993, the Cabinet approved the privatization of Petron as part of the Energy Sector Action Plan.- March 25, 1993, the Government Corporate Monitoring and Coordinating Committee recommended a 100% privatization of Petron.- March 31, 1883, the PNOC Board of Directors passed a resolution authorizing the company to negotiate and conclude a contract with the consortium of Salomon Brothers of Hongkong Limited and PCI Capital Corporation for financial advisory services to be rendered to Petron.- April 1, 1993, President Ramos approved the privatization of Petron up to a maximum of 65% of its capital stock.- August 10, 1993, President Ramos approved the 40%-40%-20% privatization strategy of Petron.- Invitation to bid was published.- The floor price bid for the 40% block was fixed at US$400 million.- The bids of Petroliam Nasional Berhad (PETRONAS), ARAMCO, and WESTMONT were submitted while the floor price was being dicussed.- ARAMCO was declared the winning bidder at US$502 million- December 16, 1993, Monino Jacob, President and Chief Executive Officer of PNOC, endorsed to COP the bid of ARAMCO for approval. And was approved on the same day. Also on the same day, WESTMONT filed a complaint questioning the award of shares to ARAMCO.- February 3, 1994, PNOC and ARAMCO signed the Stock Purchase Agreement- March 4, 1994, the two companies signed the Shareholders’ Agreement

ISSUES1. WON the petitioner have locus standi 2. WON the inclusion of Petron in the privatization program contravened the declared policy of the State 3. WON the bidding procedure was valid 4. WON Petron was a public utility

HELD1. YES. Taxpayers may question contracts entered into by the national government or government-owned or controlled corporations alleged to be in contravention of the law.2. YES. The decision of PNOC to privatize Petron and the approval of the COP of such privatization, being made in accordance with Proclamation No. 50, cannot be reviewed by the Court. Such acts are exercises of the executive function as to which the Court will not pass judgment upon or inquire into their wisdom.3. YES. The interpretation of an agency of its own rules should be given more weight than the interpretation by that agency of the law it is merely tasked to administer.4. NO. A public utility under the Constitution and the Public Service Law is one organized for hire or compensation to serve the public, which is given the right

to demand its service. Petron is not engaged in oil refining for hire and compensation to process the oil of other parties.Decision Petitions dismissed

ENERGY REGULATORY BOARD V COURT OF APPEALSYNARES-SANTIAGO; April 20, 2001

FACTS- Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals- Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (Shell) is engaged in the business of importing crude oil, refining the same and selling various petroleum products through a network of service stations throughout the country- Petroleum Distributors and Service Corporation (PDSC) owns and operates a Caltex service station at the corner of the MIA and Domestic Roads in Pasay City- June 30, 1983: Shell filed with the quondam Bureau of Energy Utilization (BEU) an application for authority to relocate its Shell Service Station at Tambo, Paranaque to Imelda Marcos Ave, Paranaque. The application was initially rejected because the old site had been closed for five years such that relocation of the same to a new site would amount to a new construction of a gasoline outlet, which construction was then the subject of a moratorium. Subsequently, BEU relaxed its position and gave due course to the application.- PDSC filed opposition on the grounds that: (1) there are adequate service stations attending to the motorists’ requirements in the trading area, (2) ruinous competition will result, and (3) there is a decline not an increase in the volume of sales in the area. Petrophil and Caltex also opposed on the ground that Shell failed to comply with the jurisdictional requirements.- March 6, 1984: BEU dismissed application on jurisdictional grounds and for lack of “full title” of the lessor over the proposed site- May 7, 1984: BEU reinstated application and conducted a hearing thereon- June 3, 1986: BEU rendered a decision denying application because there was no necessity for an additional petroleum products retail outlet on the site. Shell appealed to the Office of Energy Affairs (OEA)- May 8, 1987: EO 172 was issued creating the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) and transferring to it the regulatory and adjudicatory functions of the BEU- May 9, 1988: OEA denied Shell’s appeal. Shell moved for reconsideration and prayed for new hearing or remand of the case for further proceedings. Shell submitted a new feasibility study to justify application.- July 11, 1988: OEA remanded case to ERB noting the updated survey conducted by Shell- September 17, 1991: ERB allowed Shell to establish the service station- PDSC filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the ERB. It thus elevated the case to the CA.- November 8, 1993: CA reversed ERB judgment- CA denied motion for reconsideration. Shell and ERB thus elevated matters to the Supreme Court - While case was pending in the CA, Caltex filed a similar application in the same area. PDSC opposed on the same grounds but ERB also approved application. PDSC again filed a petition with the CA. Petition was dismissed in May 14, 1993.- ERB arguments: evidence used as basis for ERB’s decision is neither stale nor irrelevant and justifies establishment of retail outlet, evidence on vehicle volume and fuel demand supports construction of outlet, new outlet will not lead to ruinous competition- Shell arguments: ERB findings based on substantial evidence, feasibility study has not become irrelevant even if presented two years after preparation, CA erred in passing judgment and making pronouncement of purely economic and policy issues on petroleum business, proposed outlet will not result to ruinous competition, CA should have referred the new evidence to ERB under the doctrine of prior resort to primary jurisdiction

ISSUES1. WON the court should set aside the ERB decision2. WON there is substantial evidence to support ERB’s finding of public necessity to warrant approval of Shell’s application3. WON the Feasibility study has become stale because it was submitted in evidence two years after it was prepared in 19884. WON the establishment of the outlet would result to ruinous competition

HELDRatio The courts will not interfere with actions of an administrative agency, except if there is an error of law, abuse of power, lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion.General Rule: The courts will not interfere in matters, which are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under the special technical knowledge and training of such agencies- Executive officials are presumed to have familiarized themselves with all the considerations pertinent to the meaning and purpose of the law, and to have formed an independent, conscientious and competent expert opinion- Exception An action by an administrative agency may be set aside if there is an error of law, abuse of power, lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion clearly conflicting with the letter and spirit of the law.- When an administrative agency renders an opinion or issues a statement of policy, it merely interprets a pre-existing law and the administrative interpretation is at best advisory for it is the courts that finally determine what the law means.

1. No cogent reason to depart from general rule since ERB findings conform to the governing statutes and controlling case law on the matterRegulatory boards were empowered to entertain and act on applications for the establishment of gasoline stations in the Philippines. There is a worldwide trend towards economic deregulation. This

trend is reflected in our policy considerations, statutes and jurisprudence.- RA 8479 was enacted to implement Art XII, Sec. 19 of the

Constitution- Government believes deregulation will eventually prevent

monopoly- Art XII, Sec. 19 is anti-trust in history and spirit. It espouses

competition. The objective is based upon the belief that through competition producers will satisfy consumer wants at the lowest price with the sacrifice of the fewest resources. Competition among producers allows consumers to bid for goods and services and thus, matches their desires with society’s opportunity costs.

Recent developments in the oil industry as well as legislative enactments and jurisprudential pronouncements have overtaken and rendered stale the view espoused by the appellate court in denying Shell’s petition

2. ERB Decision was based on hard economic data Data includes: developmental projects, residential subdivision

listings, population count, public conveyances, commercial establishments, traffic count, fuel demand, growth of private cars, public utility vehicles and commercial vehicles increased market potential which will benefit community and transient motorists

ERB is in a better position to resolve Shell’s application being primarily the agency possessing the necessary expertise on the matter

Substantial evidence is all that is needed to support an administrative finding of fact. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion

3. The pronouncement of Court of Appeals’ Sixteenth Division affirming ERB Decision approving a similar application by Caltex is more in keeping with the policy of the State and the rationale of the statutes enacted to govern the industry CA: no gasoline station along the entire stretch; need not

necessarily result in ruinous competition, absent adequate proof to that effect; unless petitioner is able to prove by competent evidence that significant changes have occurred sufficiently to invalidate that afore-stated study, the presumption is that said study remains valid

4. The mere possibility of reduction of earnings of a business is not sufficient to prove ruinous competition In determining the allowance or disallowance of an application for

the construction of a service station, the CA confined the factors thereof within the rigid standards governing public utility regulation, where exclusivity, upon satisfaction of certain requirements, is allowed. However, exclusivity is more the exception rather than the rule in the gasoline service station business

PDSC failed to show that its business would not have sufficient profit to have a fair return on investment

Caltex, PDSC’s principal, never filed any opposition to Shell’s application

A climate of fear and pessimism generated by unsubstantiated claims of ruinous competition already rejected in the past should not be made to retard free competition, consistently with legislative policy of deregulating and liberalizing the oil industry to ensure a truly competitive market under a regime of fair prices, adequate and continuous supply, environmentally clean and high quality petroleum products

Decision(1) Challenged decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and set aside(2) ERB Order granting the amended application of Pilipinas Shell

Corporation to relocate its service station to Benigno Aquino Jr., Ave., Pque, Metro Manila reinstated

Voting 3 Justices concurred, 1 on sick leave

ART XIII: AGRARIAN REFORM

FORTRICH V CORONAMARTINEZ; November 17, 1998

FACTS- Two separate motions for reconsideration seeking reversal of the SC’s decision nullifying the win-win resolution dated November 7, 1997 issued by the Office of the President (OP)- Decision struck down as void the act of the OP in reopening the case in OP Case No. 96-C 6424 through the issuance of November 7, 1997 win-win Resolution which substantially modified its March 29, 1996 OP Decision that had long become final and executory- The March 29, 1996 OP Decision was declared by the same office as final and executory after the DAR’s motion for reconsideration of the said decision was denied for having been filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period- Movants:o The win-win resolution is valid as it seeks to correct an erroneous

rulingo Proper remedy for petitioner is a petition for review and not certiorario Filing of motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non before

petition for certiorari may be filedo Petitioners are guilty of forum shopping

- Intervenors:o They have right to intervene

o The win-win resolution is valid as it seeks to correct an erroneous ruling

o Win-win resolution properly addresses the substantial issues of the case

- Both movants ask that their motions be resolved en banc since the issues are “novel” and of “transcendental significance” Issue here according to them is WON the power of the local government units (LGU’s) to reclassify lands is subject to the approval of the Dept of Agrarian Reform (DAR)- Other issues raised by movants described as “substantial” (1) whether the subject land is considered a prime agricultural land with irrigation facility; (2) whether the land has long been covered by a Notice of Compulsory Acquisition (NCA); (3) whether the land is tenanted, and if not, whether the applicants for intervention are qualified to become beneficiaries thereof; and (4) whether the Sangguniang Bayan of Sumilao has the legal authority to reclassify the land into industrial/institutional use

ISSUEWON the SC’s decision nullifying the win-win resolution dated November 7, 1997 issued by the Office of the President (OP) must be reversed.

HELD- The issues presented are matters of no extraordinary import to merit the attention of the Court en banc

o The issue is no longer novel as having been decided in Province of Camarines Sur, et al. v. CA wherein it was held that LGU’s need not obtain the approval of the DAR to convert or reclassify lands from agricultural to non agricultural use.

o Decision sought to be reconsidered was arrived at by a unanimous vote of all five members of the 2nd Division.

- The order which denied the DAR’s motion for reconsideration of the March 29, 1996 OP Decision was not an erroneous ruling and it does not have to be corrected by the November 7, 1997 win-win resolution

o In accordance with Administrative order No. 18 which mandates that decisions, orders, resolutions of the OP shall become final after the lapse of 15 days from receipt of copy thereof… unless a motion for reconsideration is filed within such period.

o Late filing of DAR is not excusable because DAR must not disregard the reglementary period fixed by law in referring the decision to the departments concerned for the preparation of the motion of consideration

o Procedural rules should be treated with utmost respect and due regard as they are designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases to remedy the worsening problem of delay in the resolution of rival claims in the administration of justice

- There is a grave abuse of discretion in entertaining the second motion for reconsideration and on the basis thereof issued the win-win resolution was a flagrant infringement of the doctrine of res judicata. These grave breaches of the law, rules and settled jurisprudence are clearly substantial, not of technical nature.

o When the March 29, 1996 OP Decision was declared final and executory, vested rights were acquired by the petitioners

- When the DAR’s order denying the petitioners’ first application for conversion was first brought by petitioner to the OP, the appropriate administrative rules were not complied with. But movants cannot now question the supposed procedural lapse for the first time before the SC. It should have been raised and resolved at the administrative level.- Intervenors do not have certain right or legal interest in the subject matter.

o Being merely seasonal farmworkers without the right to own, application for intervention must fail as they have no legal or actual and substantial interest over the subject land

o even "win-win Resolution of November 7, 1997 did not recognize the latter as proper parties to intervene in the case simply because the

qualified farmer-beneficiaries have yet to be meticulously determined as ordered in the said resolution.

- The March 29, 1996 OP Decision has thoroughly and properly disposed of the aforementioned “substantial” issues

o Factual findings of administrative agencies which have acquired expertise in their field are binding and conclusive on the Court, presuming the OP is the most competent in matters falling within its domain

- Our affirmation of the finality of the March 29, 1996 OP Decision is precisely pro-poor considering that more of the impoverised members of society will be benefited by the agro-economic development of the disputed land which the province of Bukidnon and the municipality of Sumilao, Bukidnon intend to undertake.

o The OP Decision of March 29, 1996 was for the eventual benefit of the many, no just of the few. This is clearly shown from the development plan on the subject land as conceived by the petitioners

- WHEREFORE, the separate motions for reconsideration of the April 24, 1998 Decision of this Court, filed by the respondents and the applicants for intervention, are hereby DENIED with FINALITY.

SIGRE V COURT OF APPEALSAUSTRIA-MARTINEZ; August 8, 2002

FACTS- Private respondent Lilia Y. Gonzales, as co-administratrix of the Estate of Matias Yusay, filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for prohibition and mandamus seeking to prohibit the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) from accepting the leasehold rentals from Ernesto Sigre (predecessor of petitioner Rolando Sigre), and for LBP to turn over to private respondent the rentals previously remitted to it by Sigre. - Ernesto Sigre was private respondent’s tenant in an irrigated rice land located in Barangay Naga, Pototan, Iloilo. He was previously paying private respondent a lease rental of 16 cavans per crop or 32 cavans per agricultural year. In the agricultural year of 1991-1992, Sigre stopped paying his rentals to private respondent and instead, remitted it to the LBP pursuant to the Department of Agrarian Reform’s Memorandum Circular No. 6, Series of 1978, which set the guidelines in the payment of lease rental/partial payment by farmer-beneficiaries under the land transfer program of P.D. No. 27. - The pertinent provision of the DAR Memorandum Circular No. 6 reads:

"A. Where the value of the land has already been established.The value of the land is established on the date the Secretary or his authorized representative has finally approved the average gross production data established by the BCLP or upon the signing of the LTPA by landowners and tenant farmers concerned heretofore authorized.Payment of lease rentals to landowners covered by OLT shall terminate on the date the value of the land is established. Thereafter, the tenant-farmers shall pay their lease rentals/amortizations to the LBP or its authorized agents: provided that in case where the value of the land is established during the month the crop is to be harvested, the cut-off period shall take effect on the next harvest season. With respect to cases where lease rentals paid may exceed the value of the land, the tenant-farmers may no longer be bound to pay such rental, but it shall be his duty to notify the landowner and the DAR Team Leader concerned of such fact who shall ascertain immediately the veracity of the information and thereafter resolve the matter expeditiously as possible. If the landowner shall insist after positive ascertainment that the tenant-farmer is to pay rentals to him, the amount equivalent to the rental insisted to be paid shall de deposited by the tenant-farmer with the LBP or its authorized agent in his name and for his account

to be withdrawn only upon proper written authorization of the DAR District Officer based on the result of ascertainment or investigation."

- According to private respondent, she had no notice that the DAR had already fixed the 3-year production prior to October 1972 at an average of 119.32 cavans per hectare, and the value of the land was pegged at P13,405.67. Thus, the petition filed before the Court of Appeals, assailing, not only the validity of MC No. 6, but also the constitutionality of P.D. 27.- The Court of Appeals gave due course to the petition and declared MC No. 6 null and void. The LBP was directed to return to private respondent the lease rentals paid by Sigre, while Sigre was directed to pay the rentals directly to private respondent. In declaring MC No. 6 as null and void, the appellate court ruled that there is nothing in P.D. 27 which sanctions the contested provision of the circular; that said circular is in conflict with P.D. 816 which provides that payments of lease rentals shall be made to the landowner, and the latter, being a statute, must prevail over the circular; that P.D. 27 is unconstitutional in laying down the formula for determining the cost of the land as it sets limitations on the judicial prerogative of determining just compensation; and that it is no longer applicable, with the enactment of Republic Act No. 6657.Hence, these petitions.

ISSUES1. WON MC No. 6 is valid2. WON MC No. 6 can be reconciled with PD 8163. WON PD 27 is unconstitutional

HELD1. YES.- PD 27, issued on October 21, 1972 by then Pres. Ferdinand E. Marcos, proclaimed the entire country as a “land reform area” and decreed the emancipation of tenants from the bondage of the soil, transferring to them the ownership of the land they till. To achieve its purpose, the decree laid down a system for the purchase by tenant-farmers, long recognized as the backbone of the economy, of the lands they were tilling. Owners of rice and corn lands that exceeded the minimum retention area were bound to sell their lands to qualified farmers at liberal terms and subject to conditions. It was pursuant to said decree that the DAR issued MC No. 6, series of 1978.- The Court of Appeals held that P.D. No. 27 does not sanction said Circular, particularly, the provision stating that payment of lease rentals to landowners shall terminate on the date the value of the land is established, after which the tenant-farmer shall pay their lease rentals/amortizations to the LBP or its authorized agents.- We disagree. The power of subordinate legislation allows administrative bodies to implement the broad policies laid down in a statute by "filling in" the details. All that is required is that the regulation should be germane to the objects and purposes of the law; that the regulation be not in contradiction to but in conformity with the standards prescribed by the law. One such administrative regulation is DAR Memorandum Circular No. 6. As emphasized in De Chavez v. Zobel, emancipation is the goal of P.D. 27., i.e., freedom from the bondage of the soil by transferring to the tenant-farmers the ownership of the land they’re tilling. As noted, however, in the whereas clauses of the Circular, problems have been encountered in the expeditious implementation of the land reform program, thus necessitating its promulgation.- The rationale for the Circular was, in fact, explicitly recognized by the appellate court when it stated that “(T)he main purpose of the circular is to make certain that the lease rental payments of the tenant-farmer are applied to his amortizations on the purchase price of the land. x x x The circular was meant to remedy the situation where the tenant-farmer’s lease rentals to landowner were not credited in his favor against the determined purchase price of the land, thus making him a perpetual obligor for said purchase price.” Since the assailed Circular essentially sought to accomplish the noble purpose of P.D. 27, it is therefore valid. Such being the case, it has the force of law and is entitled to great respect.

2. YES.- The Court cannot see any “irreconcilable conflict” between P.D. No. 816 and DAR Memorandum Circular No. 6. Enacted in 1975, P.D. No. 816 provides that the tenant-farmer (agricultural lessee) shall pay lease rentals to the landowner until the value of the property has been determined or agreed upon by the landowner and the DAR. On the other hand, DAR Memorandum Circular No. 6, implemented in 1978, mandates that the tenant-farmer shall pay to LBP the lease rental after the value of the land has been determined.- In Curso v. Court of Appeals, involving the same Circular and P.D. 816, it was categorically ruled that there is no incompatibility between these two. - In other words, MC No. 6 merely provides guidelines in the payment of lease rentals/amortizations in implementation of P.D. 816. Under both P.D. 816 and MC No. 6, payment of lease rentals shall terminate on the date the value of the land is established. Thereafter, the tenant farmers shall pay amortizations to the Land Bank. The rentals previously paid are to be credited as partial payment of the land transferred to tenant-farmers. - Private respondent, however, “splits hairs,” so to speak, and contends that the Curso case is premised on the assumption that the Circular implements P.D. 816, whereas it is expressly stated in the Circular that it was issued in implementation of P.D. 27. Both MC No. 6 and P.D. 816 were issued pursuant to and in implementation of P.D. 27. These must not be read in isolation, but rather, in conjunction with each other. Under P.D. 816, rental payments shall be made to the landowner. After the value of the land has been determined/established, then the tenant-farmers shall pay their amortizations to the LBP, as provided in DAR Circular No. 6. Clearly, there is no inconsistency between them. Au contraire, P.D. 816 and DAR Circular No. 6 supplement each other insofar as it sets the guidelines for the payments of lease rentals on the agricultural property.3. NO.- P.D. 27 does not suffer any constitutional infirmity. It is a judicial fact that has been repeatedly emphasized by this Court in a number of cases. As early as 1974, in De Chavez v. Zobel, P.D. 27 was assumed to be constitutional, and upheld as part and parcel of the law of the land, viz.:

"There is no doubt then, as set forth expressly therein, that the goal is emancipation. What is more, the decree is now part and parcel of the law of the land according to the revised Constitution itself. Ejectment therefore of petitioners is simply out of the question. That would be to set at naught an express mandate of the Constitution. Once it has spoken, our duty is clear; obedience is unavoidable. This is not only so because of the cardinal postulate of constitutionalism, the supremacy of the fundamental law. It is also because any other approach would run the risk of setting at naught this basic aspiration to do away with all remnants of a feudalistic order at war with the promise and the hope associated with an open society. To deprive petitioners of the small landholdings in the face of a presidential decree considered ratified by the new Constitution and precisely in accordance with its avowed objective could indeed be contributory to perpetuating the misery that tenancy had spawned in the past as well as the grave social problems thereby created. There can be no justification for any other decision then whether predicated on a juridical norm or on the traditional role assigned to the judiciary of implementing and not thwarting fundamental policy goals."

- Thereafter, in Gonzales v. Estrella, which incidentally involves private respondent and counsel in the case at bench, the Court emphatically declared that "Presidential Decree No. 27 has survived the test of constitutionality."- Then, in 1982, P.D. 27, once again, was stamped with judicial imprimatur in Association of Rice & Corn Producers of the Philippines, Inc. v. The National Land Reform Council.- Further, in Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, involving the constitutionality of P.D. 27, E.O. Nos. 228 and 229, and R.A. 6657, any other assault on the validity of P.D. 27

was ultimately foreclosed when it was declared therein that “R.A. No. 6657, P.D. No. 27, Proc. No. 131, and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 are SUSTAINED against all the constitutional objections raised in the herein petition.”- The objection that P.D. 27 is unconstitutional as it sets limitations on the judicial prerogative of determining just compensation is bereft of merit. P.D. 27 provides:

"For the purpose of determining the cost of the land to be transferred to the tenant-farmer pursuant to this Decree, the value of the land shall be equivalent to two and one half (2 ½) times the average harvest of three normal crop years immediately preceding the promulgation of this Decree;"

- E.O. 228 supplemented such provision, viz.:"SEC. 2. Henceforth, the valuation of rice and corn lands covered by P.D. 27 shall be based on the average gross production determined by the Barangay Committee on Land Production in accordance with Department Memorandum Circular No. 26, series of 1973 and related issuances and regulation of the Department of Agrarian Reform. The average gross production per hectare shall be multiplied by two and a half (2.5), the product of which shall be multiplied by Thirty Five Pesos (P35.00), the government support price for one cavan of 50 kilos of palay on October 21, 1972, or Thirty One Pesos (P31.00), the government support price for one cavan of 50 kilos of corn on October 21, 1972, and the amount arrived at shall be the value of the rice and corn land, as the case may be, for the purpose of determining its cost to the farmer and compensation to the landowner."

- The determination of just compensation under P.D. No. 27, like in Section 16 (d) of R.A. 6657 or the CARP Law, is not final or conclusive. This is evident from the succeeding paragraph of Section 2 of E.O. 228:

"x x x In the event of dispute with the landowner regarding the amount of lease rental paid by the farmer beneficiary, the Department of Agrarian Reform and the Barangay Committee on Land Production concerned shall resolve the dispute within thirty (30) days from its submission pursuant to Department of Agrarian Reform Memorandum Circular No. 26, series of 1973, and other pertinent issuances. In the event a party questions in court the resolution of the dispute, the landowner’s compensation shall still be processed for payment and the proceeds shall be held in trust by the Trust Department of the Land Bank in accordance with the provisions of Section 5 hereof, pending the resolution of the dispute before the court."

- Clearly therefrom, unless both the landowner and the tenant-farmer accept the valuation of the property by the Barrio Committee on Land Production and the DAR, the parties may bring the dispute to court in order to determine the appropriate amount of compensation, a task unmistakably within the prerogative of the court.- Finally, the Court need not belabor the fact that R.A. 6657 or the CARP Law operates distinctly from P.D. 27. R.A. 6657 covers all public and private agricultural land including other lands of the public domain suitable for agriculture as provided for in Proclamation No. 131 and Executive Order No. 229; while, P.D. 27 covers rice and corn lands. On this score, E.O. 229, which provides for the mechanism of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, specifically states: “(P)residential Decree No. 27, as amended, shall continue to operate with respect to rice and corn lands, covered thereunder. x x x” It cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that R.A. 6657 did not repeal or supersede, in any way, P.D. 27. And whatever provisions of P.D. 27 that are not inconsistent with R.A. 6657 shall be suppletory to the latter, and all rights acquired by the tenant-farmer under P.D. 27 are retained even with the passage of R.A. 6657.Decision Petitions GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE.

ROXAS AND CO. V COURT OF APPEALSPUNO; December 17, 1999

FACTS- Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the CA- Three haciendas (Palico, Banilad, Caylaway) in Nasugbu, Bats is owned by Roxas and Co., a domestic corp.- President Aquino signed Proclamation No. 131 and EO 229 for a Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program.- Congress passed RA 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law or CARL). This was signed by Pres. Aquino.- Roxas and Co. filed w/ DAR a voluntary offer to sell Hacienda Caylaway. Haciendas Palico and Banilad were later placed under compulsory acquisition by DAR in accordance w/ CARL.PALICO AND BANILAD- For Haciendas Palico and Banilad, the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) sent notices Invitation to Parties to Roxas and Co. through Mr. Jaime Pimentel, Hacienda Administrator. This was to discuss the results of DAR investigation of Haciendas. The reports recommended that the haciendas be subject to compulsory acquisition. DAR, through its Secretary, sent Notices of Acquisition.- Whether they accept or reject this offer, they must inform Bureau of Land Acquisition and Distribution. In case of rejection or failure to reply, DAR conducts administrative proceedings to determine just compensation of the land. In case of acceptance or if compensation has already been deposited, DAR takes immediate possession of the land.- Bec petitioner rejected, DAR sent to Landbank a Request to Open Trust Account in favor of petitioner for its compensation.- Petitioner applied w/ DAR for conversion of Palico and Banilad fr agricultural to non-agri lands. Despite this application, DAR proceeded w/ acquisition of the haciendas.- The Landbank trust accounts for compensation were replaced by DAR with cash and Landbank bonds.- DAR registered Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) and distributed them to farmer beneficiaries.CAYLAWAY- This hacienda was voluntarily offered for sale to the gov’t. DAR accepted the petitioner’s voluntary offer and sent Notice of Acquisition.- However, Roxas and Co. President sent letter to DAR withdrawing voluntary offer for sale (VOS) bec Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu reclassified Caylaway fr agri to non-agri land.- DAR said reclassification would not exempt the land fr agrarian reform. It denied the withdrawal of the VOS.- Petitioner instituted case w/ DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB) for cancellation of the CLOAs bec Nasugbu is a tourist zone and not suitable for agri production. This petition for conversion was denied by the MARO.- Petitioner filed w/ CA, but CA dismissed the petition. Hence, the recourse to SC.

ISSUES1. WON SC can take cognizance despite failure of petitioner to exhaust administrative remedies2. WON acquisition proceedings were valid3. WON SC can rule on reclassification of the haciendas

HELD1. Yes.- Administrative remedies must be exhausted first. But judicial action can be resorted to immediately when

- question is purely legal- the administrative body is in estoppel- act is patently illegal

- there’s urgent need for judicial intervention- respondent disregarded due process- the respondent is a department secretary- irreparable damage will be suffered- there’s no other speedy remedy- strong public interest is involved- subject of controversy is private land- in quo warranto proceedings

- DAR issued CLOAs w/o just compensation. And the law provides that deposit must be made only in cash or Landbank bonds. DAR’s initial action to open trust account deposits does not constitute payment.2. No.- CARL provides for 2 modes of acquisition: compulsory and voluntary.- In compulsory acquisition, the farmer beneficiaries and the landowners must first be identified. However, the law is silent on how identification must be made. To address this, DAR issued Admin Order 12-1989. This was amended by DAR AO 9-1990 and DAR AO 1-1993. In these amendments, Notice of Coverage and letter of invitation to conference meeting were expanded.- The Notice of Coverage notifies landowner that his property is placed under CARP, informs him that a public hearing will be conducted and a field investigation of the land will be conducted.- Notices and pleadings against a corp are served on the President, Manager, Secretary, Cashier or agent or directors. This is to ensure prompt and proper notice. Jaime Pimentel is not one of these parties. - Petitioner’s principal place of business is in Makati. Pimentel is based in Nasugbu.- Assuming that Pimentel was an agent of the corp, there is no showing that he was duly authorized to attend the conference meeting.- Assuming petitioner was duly notified, the areas subject to CARP were not properly identified before they were taken over by DAR. The acquisition covers only portions, not the entire haciendas. The haciendas are not entirely agri lands. Petitioner had no idea which portion was subject to compulsory acquisition. This is important bec petitioner can exercise right to retention – choose to retain not more than 5 hectares out of the total area subject to CARP.- With respect to Caylaway, notices were not deemed received by the petitioner.3. No.- DAR’s failure to observe due process in acquisition does not ipso facto give SC power to adjudicate on application for conversion from agri to non-agri land. It’s DAR’s job.- Guiding principle in land use conversion is to preserve prime agri lands for food production while recognizing need of other sectors for land. CARL promotes social justice, industrialization, and optimum use of land.- Land use – manner of utilization of land incl. allocation, devt and mgmt.- Land use conversion requires field investigation.- Doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant SC to arrogate authority to resolve controversy jurisdiction over w/c is initially lodged w/ an administrative body. Here, DAR must be given chance to correct its procedural lapses.Decision Petition is remanded to DAR for proper acquisition proceedings and determination of petitioner’s application for conversion.

SEPARATE OPINION

MELO [concur and dissent]

- PP 1520 which declared Nasugbu, Bats as tourist zone, has force and effect of law unless repealed. It cannot be disregarded by DAR.

YNARES-SANTIAGO [concurr and dissent]

- If acts of DAR are patently illegal and rights of party are violated, the wrong decisions of DAR should be reversed and set aside.- CLOAs do not have nature of Torrens Title and administrative cancellation of title is sufficient to invalidate them.

ART XIV: EDUCATION

UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES BOARD OF REGENTS V COURT OF APPEALS AND ARIOKASWAMY WILLIAM

MARGARET CELINEMENDOZA; August 31, 1999

FACTS- Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine is an Indian citizen taking her doctoral program in Anthropology at the University of the Philippines. To complete the doctoral program she was required to pass a dissertation and she created one entitled, “Tamil influences in Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines.” She defended her dissertation although prior to it Dr. Medina noted some lifted material in the dissertation without proper acknowledgment. She got the nod of four of the five panelist and thus was allowed to graduate because the letter coming from Dean Paz that wanted her to be temporarily struck off the list of candidates for graduation to clear the problems regarding her dissertation did not reach the Board of Regents on time.- Prior to the graduation, Dean Paz told Celine through a letter that she would not be granted academic clearance without Celine substantiating her accusation of Drs. Diokno and Medina maliciously working for the disapproval of her dissertation. Celine answered by saying that the unfavorable attitude was due to some failure to include Dr. Medina in the list of panel members and that Dr. Diokno was guilty of harassment. Dr. Medina answered back and wrote that Celine’s dissertation contained plagiarized materials and that her doctorate be withdrawn.- An ad-hoc committee was formed to investigate the charges and that the request for the withdrawal of the doctorate degree was asked of the Board of Regents. In the investigation it was found out that in at least 90 instances the dissertation included lifted materials without proper or due acknowledgment. The College Assembly therefore unanimously approved and recommended the withdrawal of the doctorate degree and forwarded it to the University Council. The University Council approved, endorsed, and recommended the withdrawal to the Board of Regents. UP Diliman Chancellor Roman summoned Celine to a meeting and that she should submit her written explanation to the charges against her. The Chancellor informed Celine of the charges and showed a copy of the findings of the investigating committee. A second meeting was done as well as a third one, however Celine did not attend the third meeting alleging that the Board of Regents at that time already had decided her case before she was fully heard. Celine asked for a re-investigation and that the jurisdiction was placed on the student disciplinary tribunal in the case of dishonesty and that the withdrawal of the doctorate degree is not an authorized penalty. - A special committee was create by Chancellor Roman that investigated the case and they came out with the findings through all the documents and an interview of Celine. It was established that at least 22 counts of documented lifting were identified that forms the 90 instances found by the College ad-hoc committee. That Celine admits of being guilt of the allegation of plagiarism. The Board of Regents decided to withdraw the doctorate degree. Celine requested an audience with the Board of Regents and a reinvestigation which was denied.

- Thus this case, a petition for mandamus and a prayer for a writ of mandatory injunction and damages was filed. Trial court dismissed the petition for lack of merit while Court of Appeals reversed and ordered the restoration of the degree.

ISSUES1. WON the writ of Mandamus is applicable in this situation2. WON THE withdrawal of the doctoral degree can be done by the University3. WON there was a denial of due process

HELD1. No, a writ of Mandamus is not available to restrain an institution of higher learning from the exercise of its academic freedom that is a constitutional right2. Yes, because Mandamus is a writ commanding a tribunal, corporation, board or person to do the act required to be done when it or s/he unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, there being no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of a law. It could not be invoked against the academic freedom of the school as academic freedom as a Constitutional right (Article XIV Section 5 (2)) gives a wide sphere of authority over the choice of students. This entails as well that it can also determine who would have the distinction of being a graduate of the school. If the University discovers that the honor and distinction was obtained through fraud it has the right to revoke or withdraw such distinction. The actions of the University through the Board of Regents is to protect academic integrity by withdrawing her academic degree that she obtained through fraud.3. No, Due process was done as there were several investigations done by the school starting from the college to the Board of Regents. She was also invited in the investigation to clear up her name. However, the actual admission and the clear plagiarism of her sources proved that indeed she committed the offense. Her demand for the Student Tribunal to decide her case is untenable, as it is obvious that such case is useless for the penalty it gives is suspension. Celine in not in the ambit of disciplinary powers of the UP anymore.

MIRIAM COLLEGE FOUNDATION V COURT OF APPEALSKAPUNAN; December 15, 2000

FACTS-PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals-Vol. 41, No. 14, or the September-October 1994 issue of Miriam College’s school paper “Chi-Rho” entitled “Libog at Iba Pang Tula” was odiously received by the MCHS community, calling it “obscene”, “indecent” and “devoid of all moral values” among other things. -an excerpt written by Mr. Gomez, who wrote the foreword (‘Foreplay’) reads:

may mga palangganang nakatiwangwang—mga putang bikay na sa gitna‘di na puwedeng paglabhan‘di na maaring pagbabaran…”

-several other poems and stories are contained w/ the theme “sekswalidad at iba’t ibang karanasan nito”-ff the publication of the paper, Dr. Sevilla, Chair of the MC Discipline Committee wrote a letter to the editorial board, informing them of the complaints filed against their publication by the Miriam Community, along with the alleged school regulations violated, and requiring the board to submit a written statement in answer to the charges.-the students requested to transfer the case to DECS, w/c under Rule 7 of DECS order no. 94, has jurisdiction-the students’ atty., Ricardo Velmonte, contends that for actions committed w/in their capacity as campus journalists, what applies is RA 7079 (The Campus Journalism Act) and not committee regulations

-the committee proceeded w/ its investigation ex parte, suspending 5 students, expelling 3, dismissing 2 and withholding graduation privileges of 1 student-these students thus filed a petition for prohibition and certiorari with preliminary injunction and/or restraining order before the RTC of QC, questioning the Discipline Board’s jurisdiction-the RTC denied the prayer for a TRO and held that nothing in the DECS Order No. 94 excludes school Admin from exercising jurisdiction and that it cannot delimit the jurisdiction of schools over disciplinary cases-the students then filed a “Supplemental Petition and Motion for Reconsideration” after w/c the RTC granted the writ for preliminary injunction (against expulsion and dismissal) so as not to render the issues moot-both parties moved for reconsideration after w/c the RTC recalled the issues and dismissed the case-the RTC referred the case to the CA for disposition w/c issued a resolution requiring the respondents to show cause why no preliminary injunction should be issued, and issued a TRO (against the dismissals/suspensions)-the CA granted the students’ petition, declaring the RTC order and the dismissals/suspensions as void-hence this present petition by Miriam College

ISSUES1. WON the case has been rendered moot2. WON the TC has jurisdiction to entertain the petition for certiorari by the

students3. WON Miriam had jurisdiction over the complaints against the students

HELD1. NO. Petitioner asserts that the case is moot since more than 1 year had passed since the court issued the TRO. A preliminary injunction is granted at any stage of a proceeding prior to the judgment of a final order to preserve the status quo of things until the merits of the case can be heard and persists until issuance of a final injunction. A TRO on the other hand preserves the status quo until the hearing of the application of the preliminary injunction. In the instant case, no such preliminary injunction was issued, hence the TRO automatically expired (BP 224, TRO expires after 20 days if judge takes no action on application of preliminary injunction). The CA erred in assuming its order was complied w/ by Miriam; it can’t be said that the students had graduated w/in that short span of time. Miriam also allegedly refused the students readmission, and so actual controversy still existed. Since the RTC had set aside all previous orders, it allowed the dismissals and suspensions to remain in force. 2. YES. RA 7079 includes a certain S4 which states that the editorial board of a school publication is free to determine its editorial policies; S7 of the same act provides that a ..”a student shall not be expelled or suspended solely on the basis of articles he/she has written or…performance of his/her duties…”. S9 mandates DECS to “promulgate the rules and regulations for the act, as embodied by DECS Order No. 94, series of 1992 which under Rule 12 provides that …”DECS regional office shall have original jurisdiction over cases as a result of the decisions, actions and policies of the editorial board of a school w/in its area of administrative responsibility. When the Discipline Board imposed the sanctions on the students, they filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition raising the ff grounds: (1) the Discipline Board had no jurisdiction over the case (2) the Board did not have the qualities of an impartial and neutral arbiter, w/c would deny the students their right to due process.The issues thus raised were purely legal in nature and well within the jurisdiction of the TC to determine. The TC had the duty to render a decision for a case w/in its jurisdiction and should have settled the issues before dismissing the case.3. YES. A14 S5(2) of the Constitution guarantees all institution of higher learning academic freedom w/c includes the right of the school to decide for itself how best to attain it:

(1) who may teach (2) what may be taught (3) how it shall be taught (4) who may be admitted to study-“how it shall be taught” certainly encompasses the right of the school to discipline its students. “what may be taught” embodies the Constitutional obligation to instill discipline in students, stated in A14 S3(2)-“who may be admitted to study” clearly provides the school w/ the right to determine whom to expelA14 S4(1) merely recognizes the State’s power to regulate and supervise educational institutions, not deprive them of their rights-In several cases, the Court has upheld the rights of students to free speech in school premises.-As held in Tinker v. Des Moines School District: petitioners have the right to peacable assembly and free speech—they do not shed these constitutional rights at the schoolhouse gate. A student’s rights extend beyond class hours, and he/she may express even controversial subjects on school grounds -however, free speech is not absolute and students lose immunity when “conduct by the student…disrupts class work or involves…invasion of the rights of others.”-provisions of RA 7079 should be construed alongside the provisions of the Constitution. Consistent w/ jurisprudence, S7 of RA 7079 should be read to mean that the school can’t suspend/expel a student on the sole basis of articles he/she has written, except when such articles materially disrupt class work or…invades the rights of others.- From the foregoing, it is evident that Miriam College has jurisdiction over the complaints against the students, as the power to investigate is an adjunct of its power to suspend or expel students. It is a necessary corollary to its enforcement of rules and regulations, w/c is inherently granted by the Constitution. The court therefore rules that MC has the authority to hear and decide the cases filed against respondent students.

CAMACHO V CORESISQUISUMBING; August 22, 2002

FACTS- The Case: Special civil action for certiorari against the graft investigator in the Office of the Ombudsman, Atty. Jovito Coresis Jr., in dismissing the administrative and criminal complaints against private respondents. - In June 1995, Petitioner Manuel Camacho, the Dean of the College of Education of the University of Southeastern Philippines (USP) received complaints from several doctoral students regarding a class held by respondent Dr. Daleon during the 1st sem. of SY 1994-1995. The complaints were that there were “ghost students” in Dr. Daleon’s class, namely respondents Aida Agulo, Desiderio Alaba and Norma Tecson, who were given grades of 1.0, 1.5, and 1.25 respectively, despite their failure to attend regular classes. - June 13, 1995, petitioner requested respondent Daleon to furnish copies of exams, term papers, records of attendance, which respondent ignored. The matter was raised in a university council meeting and a committee was created to investigate the complaint. Dr. Daleon admitted that he made special arrangements with Agulo, Alaba and Tecson regarding their course without petitioner’s approval. - Petitioner recommended to Dr. Prantilla (the University Pres) that Agulo, Alaba, and Tecson be required to attend regular classes and comply with the course requirements. Dr. Prantilla approved the recommendation; however, he also entertained an appeal by Agulo to validate the grades given to them. The BoR upheld the grades and consequently, petitioner filed an administrative complaint against Dr. Daleon, as well as criminal complaints against Dr. Daleon, Agulo, Alaba, Tecson, and members of the USP BoR including Dr. Prantilla for violating R.A. 3019 and/or such other penal laws to the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao. Said office ordered respondents to desist from further proceedings to consolidate the administrative complaint with the criminal complaint.

- On June 3, 1997, a Resolution was issued by Atty. Jovito Coresis, Jr., the graft investigator of the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao, and approved by Ombudsman Aniano Desierto. It dismissed both complaints upon finding insufficient evidence to hold Dr. Daleon liable for the administrative charges as well as finding no prima facie violation for the criminal complaint. Petitioner moved for reconsideration and was denied for lack of merit. Hence, the case was brought before the Supreme Court.

ISSUEWON public respondents committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction (in exonerating Dr. Daleon from administrative as well as criminal liability arising from his giving passing grades to Agulo, Tecson, and Alaba without requiring them to attend classes).

HELD- Absent a showing of lack or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, the Court’s power of judicial review under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court may not be invoked.Reasoning1. From the records, there is no valid ground nor cogent reason to hold

respondent Office of grave abuse of discretion because the conclusions in its assailed Resolution are based on substantial evidence easily verifiable. Well established is the principle that factual findings of administrative agencies are generally accorded respect and even finality by this Court, provided such findings are supported by substantial evidence.

2. Public respondent anchored his decision on Art. 140 of the University Code which provides that the rules on attendance of students shall be enforced in all classes subject to the modification by the Dean in the case of graduate students and other courses. It is undisputed that Dr. Daleon had already been designated Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of the Graduate School by the President of USP and was even entitled to emoluments inherent to the Dean of the Grad. School. Accordingly, as OIC, performing the functions of the Dean of the Grad. School, Dr. Daleon had the authority to modify the rule on attendance without seeking permission of petitioner.

3. Dr. Daleon’s teaching style had support of the members of the Board of Regents (BoR), the body with the authority to formulate university policies, fully knowing the policy on attendance of students in the graduate school. In passing its resolution, they not only validated the grades given by Daleon, they also gave an imprimatur on the propriety, regularity and acceptability of Dr. Daleon’s instructional approach.

4. Dr. Daleon’s teaching style, validated by the USP BoR, is bolstered by the constitutional guarantee on academic freedom. Academic freedom is two-tiered - that of the academic institution and the teacher’s. As was held in Miriam College v. CA, “Institutional freedom includes the right of the school or college to decide for itself, its aims and objectives and the methods on how best to attain them, free from interference or outside coercion except when overriding public welfare calls for some restraint. It includes the freedom to determine for itself: who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study.

5. It was said in Montemayor v. Araneta University Foundation that, “Academic freedom also accords a faculty member the right to pursue his studies in his particular specialty.” Applied to the case at bar, academic freedom clothes Dr. Daleon with the widest latitude to innovate and experiment on the method of teaching which is most fitting to his students, subject only to the rules and policies of the university. Consider that the BoR, whose task is to lay down school rules and policies, has validated his teaching, there can be no reason for petitioner to complain before the Court simply because he holds a contrary opinion on the matter.

Decision Petition is dismissed for lack of merit. Resolution of Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao is affirmed.

Voting Concurred with by JJs: Bellosillo, Mendoza, and Corona

GARCIA V LOYOLA THEOLOGICAL SCHOOLFERNANDO; November 28, 1975

FACTS- This is a mandamus proceeding to compel the Admission Committee of the Loyola School of Theology to allow petitioner to continue studying there.- Petitioner alleged that she was admitted by respondent in the Summer of 1975 to pursue graduate studies leading to an MA in Theology, but was denied re-admission in the following semester. She contended that the reason given by respondent for such denial, namely: that "her frequent questions and difficulties were not always pertinent and had the effect of slowing down the progress of the class," is not valid ground for expulsion- Respondent, on the other hand, contended that petitioner was admitted, not to a degree program but merely to take some courses for credit, since admission to a degree requires acceptance by the Assistant Dean of the Graduate School of Ateneo de Manila University (as opposed to, the Loyola School of Theology), and no such acceptance was given.- Further, that respondent, being an "institute of higher learning" has the "academic freedom" to discretion whether to admit or continue admitting any particular student considering not only academic or intellectual standards but also other factors.- Finally that there is no "clear duty" to admit petitioner since the School of Theology is a seminary for the priesthood and petitioner is admittedly and obviously not studying for the priesthood, she being a lay person and a woman.

ISSUESProcedural1. WON a mandamus proceeding is proper in the case at barSubstantive2. WON respondent is deemed possessed of a right to continued admission to the Loyola School of Theology.3. WON her expulsion was based on reasonable grounds (therefore, not aribtrary).

HELD1. Mandamus shall not lie absent a showing that there is a clear legal right on her part and a clear duty on respondent's part to so admit her.- What a student possesses is a privilege rather than a right. She cannot therefore satisfy the prime an indispensable requisite of a mandamus proceeding.2. Autonomy recognized by the Constitution: "All institutions of higher learning shall enjoy academic freedom."- Although "academic freedom" is more often identified with the right of a faculty member to publish his findings and thoughts without fear of retribution, the reference given by the constitution of "institutions of higher learning," show that the school or college itself is possessed of such a right.- J. Frankfurter: "four essential freedoms" - determine for itself who may teach, what may taught, how, and who may be admitted to study- Universities, unlike public utitlities, have discretion as to whom to admit or reject.3. Denied not only on general principle, but also in view of the character of the particular educational institution involved. It is a seminary for the priesthood. Therefore, at most, she can lay claim to a privilege, no duty being cast on respondent school.- Decision for her expulsion was deemed best considering the interest of the school as well as of the other students and her own welfare. There was nothing arbitrary in such appraisal of the circumstances deemed relevant.

SEPARATE OPINION

TEEHANKEE [concur]

- Same points as Ponencia, plus:- A petition will be dismissed where petitioner has admittedly failed to exhaust her administrative remedies.- Questions of admission to the school are matters of technical and academic judgment that the courts will not ordinarily interfere with. Only after exhaustion of administrative remedies and when there is marked arbitrariness, will the courts interfere with the academic judgment of the school faculty. MAKASIAR [dissent]

- 1935 Constitution: "Universities established by the State shall enjoy academic freedom." VS. 1973 Constitution which broadened the scope into "All institutions of higher learning." Thus guaranteed, it is not limited to the members of the faculty nor to administrative authorities of the educational institution. It must also be deemed granted in favor of the student body because all three constitute the educational institution, without any one of which the educational institution can neither exist nor operate.- An individual has a natural and inherent right to learn and develop his faculties. The Constitution provides for this in various provisions. The happiness and full development of the curious intellect of the student are protected by the narrow guarantee of academic freedom and more so by the broader right of free expression, which includes free speech and press, and academic freedom.- No private person has the inherent right to establish and operate a school. Education is a sovereign state function; therefore, not different in this respect from commercial public utilities, whose right to exist and to operate depends upon state authority. Constitutional rights must be respected by the State and by enterprises authorized by the state to operate.

REYES V BOARD OF REGENTS OF UPMEDIALDEA; February 25, 1991

FACTS- Nature Petitions for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction and restraining order to review the decision of the CA- Respondent-students (students hereinafter) as then applicants to the University of the Philippines College, of Medicine (UPCM) obtained scores higher than 70 percent in the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) which was the cut-off score prescribed for academic year 1986-1987 by the UPCM Faculty in its meeting of January 17, 1986 as approved by the University Council (UC) on April 8,1986. - However, their scores were lower than the 90 percentile cut-off score prescribed by the UPCM Faculty in its meeting of October 8, 1986 effective for academic year 1987-88. - Upon appeal of some concerned PreMed students, the Board of Regents (BOR) in its 996th resolution dated February 24, 1987 reverted to the NWAT cut-off score of 70 percentile. The BOR reiterated its 996th resolution in its 997th resolution dated March 24, 1987. - subsequently, the University General Counsel, pursuant to the instruction of the Chancellor, conducted an investigation on the student's case and recommended inter alia the admission of all applicants obtaining a percentile I rating ranging from 70 to 90 "as a matter of right". - The Dean of the UPCM and the Faculty did not heed the BOR directive for them to admit the students. This prompted the students to file a petition for mandamus with the RTC. On June 11, 1987, the trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction for their admission.

- Students filed with the RTC a motion to dismiss and attached thereto their letter51 to the UPCM Faculty. In an Order dated June 15, 1990, the RTC dismissed their case with prejudice. In view of this development, the UPCM Faculty held an emergency meeting on June 22, 1990 where it denied the appeal of the students on the ground that they were not qualified for admission to the UPCM. As a result, the students filed with the RTC a motion to reconsider its order of dismissal. On June 27, 1990, the RTC issued an order for the admission of the students to the college. Whereupon, the petitioners moved to lift the ex-parte mandatory order.- Meanwhile, the BOR in its 1031st meeting dated June 28, 1990, invoking its plenary power under the Charter of the University over matters affecting university affairs, resolved to approve the admission of the students in the interest of justice and equity and to order the petitioners to admit them.- Consequently, the UP President issued a formal charge of Grave Misconduct against them and later, issued an Order for their Preventive Suspension. So, herein petitioners appealed to the CA but their appeal was dismissed. Motion for reconsideration was also denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUEWON the BOR violated the petitioners’ academic freedom, and thus could validly direct the petitioners to admit the students to the college of medicine.

HELDThere is no violation of academic freedom when an order of BOR in upholding the admission requirement approved by the University Council (in 1986) is supportive of right of the University Council to fix or approve admission requirements, against the UPCM Faculty and Dean who changed the admission requirements approved by the University Council without following the prescribed rules and procedures of the University.Reasoning The method deployed was simply referring to the UP Charter or to the University Code, and then applying the relevant provisions or rules to the case at bar. The ponencia cited the case of Garcia v. The Faculty Admission

Committee52, Loyola School of Theology, citing Justice Frankfurter's

concurring opinion in Sweezy v. New Hampshire53, though as obiter dicta only, to strengthen the arguments in support of the ratio decidendi. First. Under the UP Charter, the power to fix the requirements for admission to any college of the university is vested in the University Council (See. 9). The power to prescribe the courses of study is vested in the University Council subject to the approval of the Board of Regents (Sec. 9). The power to appoint the academic staff, fix their compensation, hours of service and other conditions is vested in the Board of Regents [Sec. 6(e)]. The power to allocate the income among the different categories of expenditures is vested in the Board of Regents

Second. Academic freedom54 may be asserted by the University Council or by the Board of Regents or both in so far (sic) as it relates to the functions vested in them by law which are essential to institutional academic freedom

51 Students manifested that they never intended to question the Faculty's right to academic freedom; that

they believed the issue was simply on the question of observance of the proper procedure in implementing admission requirements; that they felt they no longer have any moral right to pursue the court action; that they would leave to the Faculty the determination of humanitarian consideration of their case; that they apologized for offending the Faculty and that they would like to appeal for a chance to remain in the college52

The individual faculty member has the freedom to pursue his studies in his particular specialty and thereafter to make known or publish the result of his endeavors without fear that retribution would be visited on him in the event that His conclusions are found distasteful or objectionable to the powers that be, whether in the political, economic, or academic establishments53

In contrast, the University has the academic freedom to determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study54

Art. XIV Sec.5 (2) of the 1987 Constitution sates that Academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning.

The academic freedom claimed by the faculty to have been violated by the Board of Regents when it issued the questioned order is related to the right of the University to fix admission requirements. This right and power to fix admission requirements is clearly vested by law in the University Council. The College Faculty was merely empowered by the Board of Regents under Article 324 of the University Code to initially determine the admission requirements, subject to the approval of the University Council and the President of the University.Third. When the Board of Regents retained the cut off score in the NMAT at 70th percentile (p, 161, Rollo) which was the cut off score approved by the University Council on 8 April 1986, it did not exercise the power to prescribe the entrance requirements. It merely upheld the power of the University Council under the law to fix the requirements for admission to the UPCM and rendered ineffective the action of the UPCM Faculty, which attempted to exercise that power to increase the cut off score in NMAT to 90 percentile without the approval of the University Council and the President of the University in violation of Section 324 of the University Code (supra) which is very explicit on this matter.]Fourth. The BOR only exercised its power of governance and its duty in seeing to it that all the units abide with the law, university rules and regulations.Fifth. Under the Constitution, the students have the right to select a profession or course of study subject to a fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic requirements [Article XIV, Section 5(3)]. While it may be the UC could ratify the acts of the College regarding admission requirements, the same should be done within a reasonable time. It is to be recalled that the controversy regarding the students' admission started in 1987. It is surprising that despite petitioners' insistence on the UC's jurisdiction over admission requirements, they did not seek recourse to it immediately. From the records, there appears to be no physical or legal hindrance to the calling for a UC meeting on the students' case. To validate these resolutions at this point in time would not be fair and equitable to the students. In the span of three years, they have proved their mettle by passing the academic requirements of the collegeTherefore No. There was no violation of the petitioners’ academic freedom by the BOR since the BOR only exercised its power of governance and its duty in seeing to it that all the units abide with the law, university rules and regulations.Decision Petitions DISMISSED and the decisions of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED.Voting 3 concur, no dissent, 2 took no part.

MORALES V UPCHICO-NAZARIO; December 13, 2004

FACTS- According to Art. 410 of the UP Code, students who complete their courses with the following minimum weighted average grade shall be graduated with honors:

Summa cum laude – 1.20Magna cum laude – 1.45Cum laude – 1.75

- Provided that all the grades in all subjects prescribed in the curriculum, as well as subjects that qualify as electives, shall be included in the computation of the weighted average grade; provided further that in cases where the electives taken are more than those required in the program, the following procedure will be used in selecting the electives to be included in the computation of the weighted average grade:

1) For students who did not shift programs, consider the required number of electives in chronological order.

2) For students who shifted from one program to another, the electives to be considered shall be selected according to the following order of priority:a. Electives taken in the program where the student is graduating

will be selected in chronological order.

b. Electives taken in the previous program and acceptable as electives in the second program will be selected in chronological order.

c. Prescribed courses taken in the previous program, but qualify as electives in the second program will be selected in chronological order.

- Nadine Morales transferred from UP Manila (majored in Speech Pathology) to UP Diliman and enrolled in the European Languages undergraduate program in SY 1997-98. She was enrolled under the Plan A curriculum and chose French as her major and German as her minor.- Under Plan A, a student has to complete 141 units with 27 being electives.- 1st semester of AY 1997-98 – Morales enrolled in German 10 and German 11 where she obtained a grade of 1.0 in both subjects.- 2nd semester of AY 1997-98 – Morales changed minor to Spanish but maintained French as her major.- End of 1st semester of SY 1990-2000 – Morales included in list of candidates for graduation with probable honors based on the computation made by the College of Arts and Letters of Morales’ GWA inclusive of her grades of 1.0 in German 10 and 11. Her GWA then was 1.725.- 2nd semester of SY 1999-2000 – Morales’ GWA was 1.729 after obtaining an average of 1.708 in her final semester in UP, making her eligible for cum laude honors.- During the assessment for graduation, she was not granted cum laude honors because her grades in German 10 and 11 were excluded in the computation, bringing her GWA to 1.760.- According to Prof. Bautista of the Dept. of European Languages, a Plan A student is required to major in a European language other than Spanish and minor in any other discipline allowed in the curriculum. o In Morales’ case, her major is French and her minor is Spanish so

German does not fit into her curriculum.o Plan A curriculum also does not allow for free electives.

Electives must be major language electives taken from French courses in either literature or translation.

German 10 and 11 are basic language courses and do not fall under electives as contemplated in the Plan A curriculum.

- Morales requested that her German 10 and 11 grades be included in the computation of her GWA.o Her letter was taken up on a no-name basis during the University

Council meeting upon the endorsement of the Registrar. By a vote of 207-4, the Council affirmed the decision of the CAL in not awarding honors to Morales.

o Issue was then elevated by Morales to the UP Board of Regents and it was resolved that the appeal be returned to the University Council for further consideration with full disclosure of petitioner’s identity.

o By a vote of 99 in favor-12 against-6 abstaining, the Council denied the award of cum laude honors to Morales.

o A subsequent appeal was made to the Board of Regents. This appeal was denied 9-2.

- Morales filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus before the RTC and assailed the decision of the UP Board of Regents as erroneous. The RTC ruled in her favor by saying that the UP Board of Regents greatly abused its discretion in the improper application of its academic discretion in interpreting Art. 410 of the UP Code. The RTC ordered that UP recomputed Morales’ grades by including German 10 and 11 and confer upon her cum laude honors.- In the Court of Appeals:o In resolving the issue, the CA initially determined whether only

questions of law were involved and eventually decided that an analysis of the facts of the cases was indispensable.

o The CA ruled that the lower court violated UP’s constitutionally protected right to academic freedom when it substituted its own interpretation of the internal rules and regulations of the University for

that of the UP Board of Regents and applied the same to the case at bar.

ISSUES1. WON the CA had no jurisdiction over the appeal of the RTC Order because the essential facts were never in dispute, the case involving only questions of law2. WON the RTC’s interpretation of Art. 410 of the UP Code violated the academic freedom granted to UP as an institution of higher learning

HELD 1. Yes, the appeal raises questions of law. - A question of law arises when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative value of evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted and the doubt concerns the correct application of law and jurisprudence on the matter. There is a question of fact when the doubt or controversy arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. When there is no dispute as to fact, the question of whether or not the conclusion drawn therefrom is correct is a question of law.- Both parties admitted to the facts. Any conclusion based on these facts would not involve a calibration of the probative value of such pieces of evidence, but would be limited to an inquiry of whether the law was properly applied given the state of facts of the case. Since the appeal raises only questions of law, the proper mode of appeal is through a certiorari. The CA did not have the jurisdiction to take cognizance of the appeal.2. Yes, the RTC violated the academic freedom granted to UP.Ratio decidendi: Unless there is a clear showing of arbitrary and capricious exercise of judgment, courts may not interfere with the University’s exclusive right to decide for itself its aims and objectives and how best to attain them (in this case, to whom among its graduates it shall confer academic recognition based on its established standards).- In University of San Carlos v. Court of Appeals, it was said that the discretion of schools of learning to formulate the rules and guidelines in the granting of honors for purposes of graduation forms part of the academic freedom. Such discretion may not be disturbed much less controlled by the courts unless there is a grave abuse of discretion in its exercise.- Grave abuse of discretion involves capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The power should be exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.- UP proceeded fairly in evaluating the situation of Morales and gave her and her parents ample opportunity to present their side on different occasions. There is no showing of capriciousness or arbitrariness.o Deliberations were done in the University Council.

A member asked whether German 10 and 11 could be counted as electives for Morales and the Registrar responded the student was enrolled in Foreign Languages with a major in French and a minor in Spanish and German 10 and 11 are not required in the checklist. These can neither be considered as electives because electives should be non-language electives. German 10 and 11 are excess subjects.

Even if Morales completed all the required subjects under the curriculum so that German 10 and 11 should be included, the Dean of the CAL said that the same rule had applied in the past to previous students. Applying the rules to Morales would be unfair to the other students.

o Since the rule provides for an order of priority in the electives, there is an implication that not all electives may be included in the GWA.

o The Advising Committee allows students to change their majors and minors but these shifts are not counted as part of the course with credit in the curriculum.

- The word “program” in Art. 410 must be interpreted in the context of a particular curriculum. In computing the GWA, the grades of subjects prescribed in the curriculum and the grades of subjects that qualify as electives in the curriculum are included.- The interpretation of the required subjects or allowable electives in the curriculum should be taken in the context of the entire courses. Morales’ decision to shift caused the exclusion of her grades in German 10 and 11. Besides, German 10 and 11 were excess subjects, her total units taken up in the University being 147, instead of the required 141.- Well-settled is the principle that by reason of the special knowledge and expertise of administrative agencies over matters falling under their jurisdiction, they are in a better position to pass judgment thereon; thus their findings of fact in that regard are generally accorded respect, if not finality, by the Courts.Art. 14, Sec. 4 of the Constitution proves that academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all institution