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Chapter 5: Internal and External Reasons Julius & Aleks Ch. 4: Harman’s Relativism Ch. 5: Setting the Stage Ch. 5: “The Theory” Ch. 5: Millgram’s Challenge Ch. 5: Hampton’s Challenge Ch. 5: Korsgaard’s Challenge Chapter 5: Internal and External Reasons Julius & Aleks 03/27/2014 1 / 41
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Chapter 5: Internal and External Reasonsfaculty.philosophy.umd.edu/PGreenspan/Crs/chs. 4-5.pdf · Chapter5: Internal andExternalReasons Julius&Aleks Ch. 4: Harman’s Relativism Ch.

Jun 28, 2020

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Page 1: Chapter 5: Internal and External Reasonsfaculty.philosophy.umd.edu/PGreenspan/Crs/chs. 4-5.pdf · Chapter5: Internal andExternalReasons Julius&Aleks Ch. 4: Harman’s Relativism Ch.

Chapter 5: Internaland External Reasons

Julius & Aleks

Ch. 4: Harman’sRelativism

Ch. 5: Setting theStage

Ch. 5: “The Theory”

Ch. 5: Millgram’sChallenge

Ch. 5: Hampton’sChallenge

Ch. 5: Korsgaard’sChallenge

Chapter 5: Internal and External Reasons

Julius & Aleks

03/27/2014

1 / 41

Page 2: Chapter 5: Internal and External Reasonsfaculty.philosophy.umd.edu/PGreenspan/Crs/chs. 4-5.pdf · Chapter5: Internal andExternalReasons Julius&Aleks Ch. 4: Harman’s Relativism Ch.

Chapter 5: Internaland External Reasons

Julius & Aleks

Ch. 4: Harman’sRelativism

Ch. 5: Setting theStage

Ch. 5: “The Theory”

Ch. 5: Millgram’sChallenge

Ch. 5: Hampton’sChallenge

Ch. 5: Korsgaard’sChallenge

Ch. 4: Harman’s Relativism

Ch. 5: Setting the Stage

Ch. 5: “The Theory”

Ch. 5: Millgram’s Challenge

Ch. 5: Hampton’s Challenge

Ch. 5: Korsgaard’s Challenge

2 / 41

Page 3: Chapter 5: Internal and External Reasonsfaculty.philosophy.umd.edu/PGreenspan/Crs/chs. 4-5.pdf · Chapter5: Internal andExternalReasons Julius&Aleks Ch. 4: Harman’s Relativism Ch.

Chapter 5: Internaland External Reasons

Julius & Aleks

Ch. 4: Harman’sRelativism

Ch. 5: Setting theStage

Ch. 5: “The Theory”

Ch. 5: Millgram’sChallenge

Ch. 5: Hampton’sChallenge

Ch. 5: Korsgaard’sChallenge

The Overall Argument

For any x:

(1) If x morally ought to φ, then x ought to φ regardless ofwhether he cares to, regardless of whether φ-ing satisfies anyof his desires or furthers his interests.

(2) If x morally ought to φ, then x has a reason for φ-ing.

(3) Therefore, if x morally ought to φ, then x has a reason forφ-ing regardless of whether φ-ing serves his desires or furthershis interests.

(4) But there is no sense to be made of such reasons.

(5) Therefore, x is never under a moral obligation. [Joyce][p. 42]

3 / 41

Page 4: Chapter 5: Internal and External Reasonsfaculty.philosophy.umd.edu/PGreenspan/Crs/chs. 4-5.pdf · Chapter5: Internal andExternalReasons Julius&Aleks Ch. 4: Harman’s Relativism Ch.

Chapter 5: Internaland External Reasons

Julius & Aleks

Ch. 4: Harman’sRelativism

Ch. 5: Setting theStage

Ch. 5: “The Theory”

Ch. 5: Millgram’sChallenge

Ch. 5: Hampton’sChallenge

Ch. 5: Korsgaard’sChallenge

Harman’s Relativism

◮ Harman’s idea is to “save” ordinary moral discourse byinterpreting our moral judgments as elliptical for theagent-relative judgments (stemming from some instrumentalreasons).

◮ Motion discourse as a paradigm. What holds of motiondiscourse, should hold of morality as well.

4 / 41

Page 5: Chapter 5: Internal and External Reasonsfaculty.philosophy.umd.edu/PGreenspan/Crs/chs. 4-5.pdf · Chapter5: Internal andExternalReasons Julius&Aleks Ch. 4: Harman’s Relativism Ch.

Chapter 5: Internaland External Reasons

Julius & Aleks

Ch. 4: Harman’sRelativism

Ch. 5: Setting theStage

Ch. 5: “The Theory”

Ch. 5: Millgram’sChallenge

Ch. 5: Hampton’sChallenge

Ch. 5: Korsgaard’sChallenge

Harman’s Relativism

◮ Harman’s idea is to “save” ordinary moral discourse byinterpreting our moral judgments as elliptical for theagent-relative judgments (stemming from some instrumentalreasons).

◮ Motion discourse as a paradigm. What holds of motiondiscourse, should hold of morality as well.

◮ Joyce: the analogy does not hold, since

(1) there is no new discovery in the case of morality, and..(2) moral discourse is essentially (or unnegotiably) non-relative.

5 / 41

Page 6: Chapter 5: Internal and External Reasonsfaculty.philosophy.umd.edu/PGreenspan/Crs/chs. 4-5.pdf · Chapter5: Internal andExternalReasons Julius&Aleks Ch. 4: Harman’s Relativism Ch.

Chapter 5: Internaland External Reasons

Julius & Aleks

Ch. 4: Harman’sRelativism

Ch. 5: Setting theStage

Ch. 5: “The Theory”

Ch. 5: Millgram’sChallenge

Ch. 5: Hampton’sChallenge

Ch. 5: Korsgaard’sChallenge

The Aims of the Chapter

◮ William’s main argument: Any theorythat supports non-instrumental reasonsnecessarily makes a mistake.

No non-instrumental account of practical rationality ⇒ Moralerror theory.

◮ Joyce’s aims: (1) describe the theory, (2) cricize theopposition.

6 / 41

Page 7: Chapter 5: Internal and External Reasonsfaculty.philosophy.umd.edu/PGreenspan/Crs/chs. 4-5.pdf · Chapter5: Internal andExternalReasons Julius&Aleks Ch. 4: Harman’s Relativism Ch.

Chapter 5: Internaland External Reasons

Julius & Aleks

Ch. 4: Harman’sRelativism

Ch. 5: Setting theStage

Ch. 5: “The Theory”

Ch. 5: Millgram’sChallenge

Ch. 5: Hampton’sChallenge

Ch. 5: Korsgaard’sChallenge

A Little Bit of Reasonology

(1) Objective rational reasons

(2) Subjective rational reasons

(3) Irrational reasons

(4) “William’s-style” reasons

7 / 41

Page 8: Chapter 5: Internal and External Reasonsfaculty.philosophy.umd.edu/PGreenspan/Crs/chs. 4-5.pdf · Chapter5: Internal andExternalReasons Julius&Aleks Ch. 4: Harman’s Relativism Ch.

Chapter 5: Internaland External Reasons

Julius & Aleks

Ch. 4: Harman’sRelativism

Ch. 5: Setting theStage

Ch. 5: “The Theory”

Ch. 5: Millgram’sChallenge

Ch. 5: Hampton’sChallenge

Ch. 5: Korsgaard’sChallenge

A Little Bit of Reasonology

(1) Objective rational reasons

(2) Subjective rational reasons

(3) Irrational reasons

(4) “William’s-style” reasons

Definition (Williams)One has a reason to φ if and only if one would be motivated to φ

after the process of fully informed [and] correct deliberation.

◮ (1) = (4)?

◮ Of course, Joyce goes for (2) [= normative reasons].

◮ ‘[..T]here are many different normative systems, and thereforemany different kinds of normative reasons. [..] However, withSmith I will use “normative reason” in restricted sense, tomean something that is justified according to practical

rationality.’ [Joyce][p. 70, fn. 21]

8 / 41

Page 9: Chapter 5: Internal and External Reasonsfaculty.philosophy.umd.edu/PGreenspan/Crs/chs. 4-5.pdf · Chapter5: Internal andExternalReasons Julius&Aleks Ch. 4: Harman’s Relativism Ch.

Chapter 5: Internaland External Reasons

Julius & Aleks

Ch. 4: Harman’sRelativism

Ch. 5: Setting theStage

Ch. 5: “The Theory”

Ch. 5: Millgram’sChallenge

Ch. 5: Hampton’sChallenge

Ch. 5: Korsgaard’sChallenge

Joyce’s real interest

◮ William’s argument against external reasons.

Definition (External Reason)An external reason claim is one that is applied to the subject ofthe ascription regardless of what his desires are.

9 / 41

Page 10: Chapter 5: Internal and External Reasonsfaculty.philosophy.umd.edu/PGreenspan/Crs/chs. 4-5.pdf · Chapter5: Internal andExternalReasons Julius&Aleks Ch. 4: Harman’s Relativism Ch.

Chapter 5: Internaland External Reasons

Julius & Aleks

Ch. 4: Harman’sRelativism

Ch. 5: Setting theStage

Ch. 5: “The Theory”

Ch. 5: Millgram’sChallenge

Ch. 5: Hampton’sChallenge

Ch. 5: Korsgaard’sChallenge

Joyce’s real interest

◮ William’s argument against external reasons.

Definition (External Reason)An external reason claim is one that is applied to the subject ofthe ascription regardless of what his desires are.

◮ For Williams smth. is a reason only if its consideration could(potentially) motivate the agent.

◮ Joyce:

◮ this is OK, as lons as we focus on normative reasons;◮ all normative reasons are internal.

10 / 41

Page 11: Chapter 5: Internal and External Reasonsfaculty.philosophy.umd.edu/PGreenspan/Crs/chs. 4-5.pdf · Chapter5: Internal andExternalReasons Julius&Aleks Ch. 4: Harman’s Relativism Ch.

Chapter 5: Internaland External Reasons

Julius & Aleks

Ch. 4: Harman’sRelativism

Ch. 5: Setting theStage

Ch. 5: “The Theory”

Ch. 5: Millgram’sChallenge

Ch. 5: Hampton’sChallenge

Ch. 5: Korsgaard’sChallenge

The Argument

◮ How does an internal reason explain an action?

◮ .. one can tell a story about psychological causation – acertain desire + a certain belief cause a certain action.

11 / 41

Page 12: Chapter 5: Internal and External Reasonsfaculty.philosophy.umd.edu/PGreenspan/Crs/chs. 4-5.pdf · Chapter5: Internal andExternalReasons Julius&Aleks Ch. 4: Harman’s Relativism Ch.

Chapter 5: Internaland External Reasons

Julius & Aleks

Ch. 4: Harman’sRelativism

Ch. 5: Setting theStage

Ch. 5: “The Theory”

Ch. 5: Millgram’sChallenge

Ch. 5: Hampton’sChallenge

Ch. 5: Korsgaard’sChallenge

The Argument

◮ How does an internal reason explain an action?

◮ .. one can tell a story about psychological causation – acertain desire + a certain belief cause a certain action.

◮ Now, suppose that I have a (external) reason not to drinkcoffee because it is tapu. How can this reason explain myaction?

12 / 41

Page 13: Chapter 5: Internal and External Reasonsfaculty.philosophy.umd.edu/PGreenspan/Crs/chs. 4-5.pdf · Chapter5: Internal andExternalReasons Julius&Aleks Ch. 4: Harman’s Relativism Ch.

Chapter 5: Internaland External Reasons

Julius & Aleks

Ch. 4: Harman’sRelativism

Ch. 5: Setting theStage

Ch. 5: “The Theory”

Ch. 5: Millgram’sChallenge

Ch. 5: Hampton’sChallenge

Ch. 5: Korsgaard’sChallenge

The Argument

◮ How does an internal reason explain an action?

◮ .. one can tell a story about psychological causation – acertain desire + a certain belief cause a certain action.

◮ Now, suppose that I have a (external) reason not to drinkcoffee because it is tapu. How can this reason explain myaction?

◮ .. clearly, I must have“internalized” it in some way, i.e.,

◮ I must believe that the coffee is tapu,

13 / 41

Page 14: Chapter 5: Internal and External Reasonsfaculty.philosophy.umd.edu/PGreenspan/Crs/chs. 4-5.pdf · Chapter5: Internal andExternalReasons Julius&Aleks Ch. 4: Harman’s Relativism Ch.

Chapter 5: Internaland External Reasons

Julius & Aleks

Ch. 4: Harman’sRelativism

Ch. 5: Setting theStage

Ch. 5: “The Theory”

Ch. 5: Millgram’sChallenge

Ch. 5: Hampton’sChallenge

Ch. 5: Korsgaard’sChallenge

The Argument

◮ How does an internal reason explain an action?

◮ .. one can tell a story about psychological causation – acertain desire + a certain belief cause a certain action.

◮ Now, suppose that I have a (external) reason not to drinkcoffee because it is tapu. How can this reason explain myaction?

◮ .. clearly, I must have“internalized” it in some way, i.e.,

◮ I must believe that the coffee is tapu,◮ .. but this alone doesn’t seem to be enough.

14 / 41

Page 15: Chapter 5: Internal and External Reasonsfaculty.philosophy.umd.edu/PGreenspan/Crs/chs. 4-5.pdf · Chapter5: Internal andExternalReasons Julius&Aleks Ch. 4: Harman’s Relativism Ch.

Chapter 5: Internaland External Reasons

Julius & Aleks

Ch. 4: Harman’sRelativism

Ch. 5: Setting theStage

Ch. 5: “The Theory”

Ch. 5: Millgram’sChallenge

Ch. 5: Hampton’sChallenge

Ch. 5: Korsgaard’sChallenge

Humean conception of action (orthodoxy)

◮ In a nutshell: action requires beliefs & desires.

◮ Virtues: simplicity, explanatory breadth, and apparentintuitiveness.

15 / 41

Page 16: Chapter 5: Internal and External Reasonsfaculty.philosophy.umd.edu/PGreenspan/Crs/chs. 4-5.pdf · Chapter5: Internal andExternalReasons Julius&Aleks Ch. 4: Harman’s Relativism Ch.

Chapter 5: Internaland External Reasons

Julius & Aleks

Ch. 4: Harman’sRelativism

Ch. 5: Setting theStage

Ch. 5: “The Theory”

Ch. 5: Millgram’sChallenge

Ch. 5: Hampton’sChallenge

Ch. 5: Korsgaard’sChallenge

Humean conception of action (orthodoxy)

◮ In a nutshell: action requires beliefs & desires.

◮ Virtues: simplicity, explanatory breadth, and apparentintuitiveness.

◮ The opposing view is commited to “besires”.

◮ “Direction of fit” against the naive besire theorist.

◮ Against the more subtle besire theorist.. all we have to is toimagine the desire element and the belief element of somegiven besire coming apart.

16 / 41

Page 17: Chapter 5: Internal and External Reasonsfaculty.philosophy.umd.edu/PGreenspan/Crs/chs. 4-5.pdf · Chapter5: Internal andExternalReasons Julius&Aleks Ch. 4: Harman’s Relativism Ch.

Chapter 5: Internaland External Reasons

Julius & Aleks

Ch. 4: Harman’sRelativism

Ch. 5: Setting theStage

Ch. 5: “The Theory”

Ch. 5: Millgram’sChallenge

Ch. 5: Hampton’sChallenge

Ch. 5: Korsgaard’sChallenge

Millgram’s Challenge

◮ Against Williams’ presupposition: Millgram describes a casein which (purportedly) S has a reason to φ, but φ cannotexplain any of S ’s actions:

17 / 41

Page 18: Chapter 5: Internal and External Reasonsfaculty.philosophy.umd.edu/PGreenspan/Crs/chs. 4-5.pdf · Chapter5: Internal andExternalReasons Julius&Aleks Ch. 4: Harman’s Relativism Ch.

Chapter 5: Internaland External Reasons

Julius & Aleks

Ch. 4: Harman’sRelativism

Ch. 5: Setting theStage

Ch. 5: “The Theory”

Ch. 5: Millgram’sChallenge

Ch. 5: Hampton’sChallenge

Ch. 5: Korsgaard’sChallenge

Millgram’s Challenge

◮ Against Williams’ presupposition: Millgram describes a casein which (purportedly) S has a reason to φ, but φ cannotexplain any of S ’s actions:

Archie is insensitive towards people around him. Thisinsensitivity deprives him of certain satisfactions (say, fulfillingfriendships), but due to being insensitive Archie cannotappreciate their values.

18 / 41

Page 19: Chapter 5: Internal and External Reasonsfaculty.philosophy.umd.edu/PGreenspan/Crs/chs. 4-5.pdf · Chapter5: Internal andExternalReasons Julius&Aleks Ch. 4: Harman’s Relativism Ch.

Chapter 5: Internaland External Reasons

Julius & Aleks

Ch. 4: Harman’sRelativism

Ch. 5: Setting theStage

Ch. 5: “The Theory”

Ch. 5: Millgram’sChallenge

Ch. 5: Hampton’sChallenge

Ch. 5: Korsgaard’sChallenge

Millgram’s Challenge

◮ Against Williams’ presupposition: Millgram describes a casein which (purportedly) S has a reason to φ, but φ cannotexplain any of S ’s actions:

Archie is insensitive towards people around him. Thisinsensitivity deprives him of certain satisfactions (say, fulfillingfriendships), but due to being insensitive Archie cannotappreciate their values.

◮ Joyce considers: (1) Archie’s reason for fulfilling friendships,and (2) his reason to go to counseling.

19 / 41

Page 20: Chapter 5: Internal and External Reasonsfaculty.philosophy.umd.edu/PGreenspan/Crs/chs. 4-5.pdf · Chapter5: Internal andExternalReasons Julius&Aleks Ch. 4: Harman’s Relativism Ch.

Chapter 5: Internaland External Reasons

Julius & Aleks

Ch. 4: Harman’sRelativism

Ch. 5: Setting theStage

Ch. 5: “The Theory”

Ch. 5: Millgram’sChallenge

Ch. 5: Hampton’sChallenge

Ch. 5: Korsgaard’sChallenge

Millgram’s Challenge

◮ Against Williams’ presupposition: Millgram describes a casein which (purportedly) S has a reason to φ, but φ cannotexplain any of S ’s actions:

Archie is insensitive towards people around him. Thisinsensitivity deprives him of certain satisfactions (say, fulfillingfriendships), but due to being insensitive Archie cannotappreciate their values.

◮ Joyce considers: (1) Archie’s reason for fulfilling friendships,and (2) his reason to go to counseling.

◮ Archie1, Archie2, . . ., Archien, Archie+

◮ in the background: (a) Archie1 isn’t stuck, (b) Williams-stylereasons

◮ Importantly, Archie+ is not the exemplar, but theadvice-giver.

20 / 41

Page 21: Chapter 5: Internal and External Reasonsfaculty.philosophy.umd.edu/PGreenspan/Crs/chs. 4-5.pdf · Chapter5: Internal andExternalReasons Julius&Aleks Ch. 4: Harman’s Relativism Ch.

Chapter 5: Internaland External Reasons

Julius & Aleks

Ch. 4: Harman’sRelativism

Ch. 5: Setting theStage

Ch. 5: “The Theory”

Ch. 5: Millgram’sChallenge

Ch. 5: Hampton’sChallenge

Ch. 5: Korsgaard’sChallenge

Hampton’s Challenge

◮ Williams style internalism:

◮ Internal reasons = ... correct deliberation ...

21 / 41

Page 22: Chapter 5: Internal and External Reasonsfaculty.philosophy.umd.edu/PGreenspan/Crs/chs. 4-5.pdf · Chapter5: Internal andExternalReasons Julius&Aleks Ch. 4: Harman’s Relativism Ch.

Chapter 5: Internaland External Reasons

Julius & Aleks

Ch. 4: Harman’sRelativism

Ch. 5: Setting theStage

Ch. 5: “The Theory”

Ch. 5: Millgram’sChallenge

Ch. 5: Hampton’sChallenge

Ch. 5: Korsgaard’sChallenge

Hampton’s Challenge

◮ Williams style internalism:

◮ Internal reasons = ... correct deliberation ...

◮ Hampton’s challenge: Explicating ”correct deliberation” leadsto a dilemma

◮ First Horn - Circularity: Correct deliberation = ... internalreasons ...

22 / 41

Page 23: Chapter 5: Internal and External Reasonsfaculty.philosophy.umd.edu/PGreenspan/Crs/chs. 4-5.pdf · Chapter5: Internal andExternalReasons Julius&Aleks Ch. 4: Harman’s Relativism Ch.

Chapter 5: Internaland External Reasons

Julius & Aleks

Ch. 4: Harman’sRelativism

Ch. 5: Setting theStage

Ch. 5: “The Theory”

Ch. 5: Millgram’sChallenge

Ch. 5: Hampton’sChallenge

Ch. 5: Korsgaard’sChallenge

Hampton’s Challenge

◮ Williams style internalism:

◮ Internal reasons = ... correct deliberation ...

◮ Hampton’s challenge: Explicating ”correct deliberation” leadsto a dilemma

◮ First Horn - Circularity: Correct deliberation = ... internalreasons ...

◮ Second Horn - Self-undermining: Correct deliberation = ...external reasons ...

23 / 41

Page 24: Chapter 5: Internal and External Reasonsfaculty.philosophy.umd.edu/PGreenspan/Crs/chs. 4-5.pdf · Chapter5: Internal andExternalReasons Julius&Aleks Ch. 4: Harman’s Relativism Ch.

Chapter 5: Internaland External Reasons

Julius & Aleks

Ch. 4: Harman’sRelativism

Ch. 5: Setting theStage

Ch. 5: “The Theory”

Ch. 5: Millgram’sChallenge

Ch. 5: Hampton’sChallenge

Ch. 5: Korsgaard’sChallenge

The first horn - Cicularity

◮ Joyce argues:

◮ Internal reasons are ”involved” in correct deliberation, but”correct deliberation” is not defined in terms of internalreasons. Therefore, there is no circularity.

24 / 41

Page 25: Chapter 5: Internal and External Reasonsfaculty.philosophy.umd.edu/PGreenspan/Crs/chs. 4-5.pdf · Chapter5: Internal andExternalReasons Julius&Aleks Ch. 4: Harman’s Relativism Ch.

Chapter 5: Internaland External Reasons

Julius & Aleks

Ch. 4: Harman’sRelativism

Ch. 5: Setting theStage

Ch. 5: “The Theory”

Ch. 5: Millgram’sChallenge

Ch. 5: Hampton’sChallenge

Ch. 5: Korsgaard’sChallenge

The first horn - Cicularity

◮ Joyce argues:

◮ Internal reasons are ”involved” in correct deliberation, but”correct deliberation” is not defined in terms of internalreasons. Therefore, there is no circularity.

◮ But might there be further circularity problems with regard towhen and how we ought to deliberate? For instance:

◮ ”When I am in calmer circumstances, then I may have reasonto deliberate because doing so is conducive to the satisfactionof my desires. Not just my actual desires, but those that Iwould have after correctly deliberating under conditions offull information. Isn’t that circular?”

25 / 41

Page 26: Chapter 5: Internal and External Reasonsfaculty.philosophy.umd.edu/PGreenspan/Crs/chs. 4-5.pdf · Chapter5: Internal andExternalReasons Julius&Aleks Ch. 4: Harman’s Relativism Ch.

Chapter 5: Internaland External Reasons

Julius & Aleks

Ch. 4: Harman’sRelativism

Ch. 5: Setting theStage

Ch. 5: “The Theory”

Ch. 5: Millgram’sChallenge

Ch. 5: Hampton’sChallenge

Ch. 5: Korsgaard’sChallenge

The first horn - Cicularity

◮ Joyce argues:

◮ Internal reasons are ”involved” in correct deliberation, but”correct deliberation” is not defined in terms of internalreasons. Therefore, there is no circularity.

◮ But might there be further circularity problems with regard towhen and how we ought to deliberate? For instance:

◮ ”When I am in calmer circumstances, then I may have reasonto deliberate because doing so is conducive to the satisfactionof my desires. Not just my actual desires, but those that Iwould have after correctly deliberating under conditions offull information. Isn’t that circular?”

◮ Joyce’s answer: No, because here nothing is defined.

26 / 41

Page 27: Chapter 5: Internal and External Reasonsfaculty.philosophy.umd.edu/PGreenspan/Crs/chs. 4-5.pdf · Chapter5: Internal andExternalReasons Julius&Aleks Ch. 4: Harman’s Relativism Ch.

Chapter 5: Internaland External Reasons

Julius & Aleks

Ch. 4: Harman’sRelativism

Ch. 5: Setting theStage

Ch. 5: “The Theory”

Ch. 5: Millgram’sChallenge

Ch. 5: Hampton’sChallenge

Ch. 5: Korsgaard’sChallenge

The second horn - the self-undermining objection

◮ The objection: Correct deliberation= ... external reasons ...

◮ First interpretation: ”correct deliberation” is the kind ofdeliberation that we ought to partake in.

◮ Joyce: We ought always to act in accoradance with correctdeliberation, but not always deliberate correctly.

27 / 41

Page 28: Chapter 5: Internal and External Reasonsfaculty.philosophy.umd.edu/PGreenspan/Crs/chs. 4-5.pdf · Chapter5: Internal andExternalReasons Julius&Aleks Ch. 4: Harman’s Relativism Ch.

Chapter 5: Internaland External Reasons

Julius & Aleks

Ch. 4: Harman’sRelativism

Ch. 5: Setting theStage

Ch. 5: “The Theory”

Ch. 5: Millgram’sChallenge

Ch. 5: Hampton’sChallenge

Ch. 5: Korsgaard’sChallenge

The second horn - the self-undermining objection

◮ The objection: Correct deliberation= ... external reasons ...

◮ First interpretation: ”correct deliberation” is the kind ofdeliberation that we ought to partake in.

◮ Joyce: We ought always to act in accoradance with correctdeliberation, but not always deliberate correctly.

◮ Second interpretation: Instrumental normative requirementscan be formulated wide scope and narrow scope. The widescope reading entails external reasons.

◮ narrow scope: If A has desire D, then A has a reason to takethe means to satisfy D.

◮ wide scope: A has a reason such that: if she has a desire D,then take the means to satisfy D.

28 / 41

Page 29: Chapter 5: Internal and External Reasonsfaculty.philosophy.umd.edu/PGreenspan/Crs/chs. 4-5.pdf · Chapter5: Internal andExternalReasons Julius&Aleks Ch. 4: Harman’s Relativism Ch.

Chapter 5: Internaland External Reasons

Julius & Aleks

Ch. 4: Harman’sRelativism

Ch. 5: Setting theStage

Ch. 5: “The Theory”

Ch. 5: Millgram’sChallenge

Ch. 5: Hampton’sChallenge

Ch. 5: Korsgaard’sChallenge

The second horn - the self-undermining objection

◮ The objection: Correct deliberation= ... external reasons ...

◮ First interpretation: ”correct deliberation” is the kind ofdeliberation that we ought to partake in.

◮ Joyce: We ought always to act in accoradance with correctdeliberation, but not always deliberate correctly.

◮ Second interpretation: Instrumental normative requirementscan be formulated wide scope and narrow scope. The widescope reading entails external reasons.

◮ narrow scope: If A has desire D, then A has a reason to takethe means to satisfy D.

◮ wide scope: A has a reason such that: if she has a desire D,then take the means to satisfy D.

29 / 41

Page 30: Chapter 5: Internal and External Reasonsfaculty.philosophy.umd.edu/PGreenspan/Crs/chs. 4-5.pdf · Chapter5: Internal andExternalReasons Julius&Aleks Ch. 4: Harman’s Relativism Ch.

Chapter 5: Internaland External Reasons

Julius & Aleks

Ch. 4: Harman’sRelativism

Ch. 5: Setting theStage

Ch. 5: “The Theory”

Ch. 5: Millgram’sChallenge

Ch. 5: Hampton’sChallenge

Ch. 5: Korsgaard’sChallenge

The self-undermining objection II

◮ Joyce: there are no wide scope normative requirements,because that would lead to an implausible proilferation ofreasons.

30 / 41

Page 31: Chapter 5: Internal and External Reasonsfaculty.philosophy.umd.edu/PGreenspan/Crs/chs. 4-5.pdf · Chapter5: Internal andExternalReasons Julius&Aleks Ch. 4: Harman’s Relativism Ch.

Chapter 5: Internaland External Reasons

Julius & Aleks

Ch. 4: Harman’sRelativism

Ch. 5: Setting theStage

Ch. 5: “The Theory”

Ch. 5: Millgram’sChallenge

Ch. 5: Hampton’sChallenge

Ch. 5: Korsgaard’sChallenge

The self-undermining objection II

◮ Joyce: there are no wide scope normative requirements,because that would lead to an implausible proilferation ofreasons.

◮ How bad would this proliferation of reasons be? Maybe notso bad, after all.

◮ Wide scope instrumental requirements have the advantagethat, if we have some devious end, we can satisfy therequirement by giving up the end.

31 / 41

Page 32: Chapter 5: Internal and External Reasonsfaculty.philosophy.umd.edu/PGreenspan/Crs/chs. 4-5.pdf · Chapter5: Internal andExternalReasons Julius&Aleks Ch. 4: Harman’s Relativism Ch.

Chapter 5: Internaland External Reasons

Julius & Aleks

Ch. 4: Harman’sRelativism

Ch. 5: Setting theStage

Ch. 5: “The Theory”

Ch. 5: Millgram’sChallenge

Ch. 5: Hampton’sChallenge

Ch. 5: Korsgaard’sChallenge

The self-undermining objection II

◮ Joyce: there are no wide scope normative requirements,because that would lead to an implausible proilferation ofreasons.

◮ How bad would this proliferation of reasons be? Maybe notso bad, after all.

◮ Wide scope instrumental requirements have the advantagethat, if we have some devious end, we can satisfy therequirement by giving up the end.

◮ Third interpretation: Even if we accept the narrow scopeformulation we can ask for a reason to follow this (narrowscope) principle.

◮ ”In even asking th second question the questioner is evincingan allegince to instrumentalism” (123)

◮ ”the questioner does not properly understand what the word”reason” means.” (123)

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Chapter 5: Internaland External Reasons

Julius & Aleks

Ch. 4: Harman’sRelativism

Ch. 5: Setting theStage

Ch. 5: “The Theory”

Ch. 5: Millgram’sChallenge

Ch. 5: Hampton’sChallenge

Ch. 5: Korsgaard’sChallenge

Korsgaard’s Challenge

◮ Korsgaard’s idea: After a process of correct deliberation allagents will converge on th esame moral desires.

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Page 34: Chapter 5: Internal and External Reasonsfaculty.philosophy.umd.edu/PGreenspan/Crs/chs. 4-5.pdf · Chapter5: Internal andExternalReasons Julius&Aleks Ch. 4: Harman’s Relativism Ch.

Chapter 5: Internaland External Reasons

Julius & Aleks

Ch. 4: Harman’sRelativism

Ch. 5: Setting theStage

Ch. 5: “The Theory”

Ch. 5: Millgram’sChallenge

Ch. 5: Hampton’sChallenge

Ch. 5: Korsgaard’sChallenge

Korsgaard’s Challenge

◮ Korsgaard’s idea: After a process of correct deliberation allagents will converge on th esame moral desires.

◮ Joyce’s reply: Korsgaard needs to explain the relevant cases.And she can’t.

◮ ”let him consider Harman’s Mafia hit man, and tell us exactlywhat deliberative defects this imaginary agent is sufferingfrom.” (124)

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Page 35: Chapter 5: Internal and External Reasonsfaculty.philosophy.umd.edu/PGreenspan/Crs/chs. 4-5.pdf · Chapter5: Internal andExternalReasons Julius&Aleks Ch. 4: Harman’s Relativism Ch.

Chapter 5: Internaland External Reasons

Julius & Aleks

Ch. 4: Harman’sRelativism

Ch. 5: Setting theStage

Ch. 5: “The Theory”

Ch. 5: Millgram’sChallenge

Ch. 5: Hampton’sChallenge

Ch. 5: Korsgaard’sChallenge

Korsgaard’s Challenge

◮ Korsgaard’s idea: After a process of correct deliberation allagents will converge on th esame moral desires.

◮ Joyce’s reply: Korsgaard needs to explain the relevant cases.And she can’t.

◮ ”let him consider Harman’s Mafia hit man, and tell us exactlywhat deliberative defects this imaginary agent is sufferingfrom.” (124)

◮ Korsgaard’s first argument: An action must be in line withone’s self-conception.

◮ Joyce: The mafia man’s actions are in line with hisself-conception as ’member of the family’.

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Page 36: Chapter 5: Internal and External Reasonsfaculty.philosophy.umd.edu/PGreenspan/Crs/chs. 4-5.pdf · Chapter5: Internal andExternalReasons Julius&Aleks Ch. 4: Harman’s Relativism Ch.

Chapter 5: Internaland External Reasons

Julius & Aleks

Ch. 4: Harman’sRelativism

Ch. 5: Setting theStage

Ch. 5: “The Theory”

Ch. 5: Millgram’sChallenge

Ch. 5: Hampton’sChallenge

Ch. 5: Korsgaard’sChallenge

Korsgaard’s Challenge

◮ Korsgaard’s second argument: An action must be in line withone’s self-conception as a human.

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Page 37: Chapter 5: Internal and External Reasonsfaculty.philosophy.umd.edu/PGreenspan/Crs/chs. 4-5.pdf · Chapter5: Internal andExternalReasons Julius&Aleks Ch. 4: Harman’s Relativism Ch.

Chapter 5: Internaland External Reasons

Julius & Aleks

Ch. 4: Harman’sRelativism

Ch. 5: Setting theStage

Ch. 5: “The Theory”

Ch. 5: Millgram’sChallenge

Ch. 5: Hampton’sChallenge

Ch. 5: Korsgaard’sChallenge

Korsgaard’s Challenge

◮ Korsgaard’s second argument: An action must be in line withone’s self-conception as a human.

◮ Joyce’s reply: Valuing one’s conception as a human does notimply valuing everybody’s humanity. At least, one would needan extra argument to make that transition.

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Page 38: Chapter 5: Internal and External Reasonsfaculty.philosophy.umd.edu/PGreenspan/Crs/chs. 4-5.pdf · Chapter5: Internal andExternalReasons Julius&Aleks Ch. 4: Harman’s Relativism Ch.

Chapter 5: Internaland External Reasons

Julius & Aleks

Ch. 4: Harman’sRelativism

Ch. 5: Setting theStage

Ch. 5: “The Theory”

Ch. 5: Millgram’sChallenge

Ch. 5: Hampton’sChallenge

Ch. 5: Korsgaard’sChallenge

Korsgaard’s Challenge

◮ Korsgaard’s second argument: An action must be in line withone’s self-conception as a human.

◮ Joyce’s reply: Valuing one’s conception as a human does notimply valuing everybody’s humanity. At least, one would needan extra argument to make that transition.

◮ Korsgaard’s third argument: reasons need to becommunicable. Therefore, they cannot be agent relative.

◮ Joyce: Agent relative reasons are communicable. Just as a Ican communicate that this piece of property belongs to meand not to you I can communicate that this reason is mine annot yours.

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Page 39: Chapter 5: Internal and External Reasonsfaculty.philosophy.umd.edu/PGreenspan/Crs/chs. 4-5.pdf · Chapter5: Internal andExternalReasons Julius&Aleks Ch. 4: Harman’s Relativism Ch.

Chapter 5: Internaland External Reasons

Julius & Aleks

Ch. 4: Harman’sRelativism

Ch. 5: Setting theStage

Ch. 5: “The Theory”

Ch. 5: Millgram’sChallenge

Ch. 5: Hampton’sChallenge

Ch. 5: Korsgaard’sChallenge

Korsgaard’s Challenge (continued)

◮ Korsgaard’s fourth argument: reasons must be justifiable toeveryone. Therefore, they can’t be agent relative.

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Page 40: Chapter 5: Internal and External Reasonsfaculty.philosophy.umd.edu/PGreenspan/Crs/chs. 4-5.pdf · Chapter5: Internal andExternalReasons Julius&Aleks Ch. 4: Harman’s Relativism Ch.

Chapter 5: Internaland External Reasons

Julius & Aleks

Ch. 4: Harman’sRelativism

Ch. 5: Setting theStage

Ch. 5: “The Theory”

Ch. 5: Millgram’sChallenge

Ch. 5: Hampton’sChallenge

Ch. 5: Korsgaard’sChallenge

Korsgaard’s Challenge (continued)

◮ Korsgaard’s fourth argument: reasons must be justifiable toeveryone. Therefore, they can’t be agent relative.

◮ Joyce’s reply I: In one sense, agent relative reasons arejustifiable to others.

◮ ”Ortcutt well-understands that A1 has a very good reason tokill him, and no particular reason to refrain. But that, ofcourse, doesn’t mean that Ortcutt has to like it.” 129)

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Page 41: Chapter 5: Internal and External Reasonsfaculty.philosophy.umd.edu/PGreenspan/Crs/chs. 4-5.pdf · Chapter5: Internal andExternalReasons Julius&Aleks Ch. 4: Harman’s Relativism Ch.

Chapter 5: Internaland External Reasons

Julius & Aleks

Ch. 4: Harman’sRelativism

Ch. 5: Setting theStage

Ch. 5: “The Theory”

Ch. 5: Millgram’sChallenge

Ch. 5: Hampton’sChallenge

Ch. 5: Korsgaard’sChallenge

Korsgaard’s Challenge (continued)

◮ Korsgaard’s fourth argument: reasons must be justifiable toeveryone. Therefore, they can’t be agent relative.

◮ Joyce’s reply I: In one sense, agent relative reasons arejustifiable to others.

◮ ”Ortcutt well-understands that A1 has a very good reason tokill him, and no particular reason to refrain. But that, ofcourse, doesn’t mean that Ortcutt has to like it.” 129)

◮ Joyce’s reply II: Not even the moral reasons favored byKorsgaard are sharable and justiable to all:

◮ ”Perhaps A1 and his ”family” think that ordinary law-abidersare naive fools.” (131)

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