Chaney, P. (2014) Instrumental Europeans? Minority Nationalist Parties' Discourse on the European Union: The Case of UK meso-elections 1998-2011, Perspectives on European Politics

Instrumental Europeans? MinorityNationalist Parties’ Discourse on theEuropean Union: The Case of UKMeso-Elections 1998–2011

PAUL CHANEY

Cardiff School of Social Sciences, Cardiff University, Wales, UK

ABSTRACT Traditionally, minority nationalist parties (MNPs) have employed the notion of Europein order to advance an alternative to centralized administration within the unitary state. This studyexamines whether earlier claims of MNPs’ repositioning on the European Union (EU) are supportedby a discourse analysis of manifestos in UK meso-elections. The findings confirm a significant shift inMNPs’ framing of EU policy at the regional level; no longer advanced as a principal route toautonomy, voters are latterly invited to view the EU more as a fiscal-support mechanism. Thewider significance of the findings is in pointing to post-devolution instrumentalism and anideologically fluid phase in MNP attitudes to the European project. In the wake of staterestructuring, meso-elections present new discursive opportunities for MNPs to seek a mandate tobuild on the degree of self-government already attained through the (re)creation of regionalpolities without principal reliance on the goal of ‘independence in Europe’.

KEY WORDS: European Union, minority nationalist parties, electoral discourse, issue-salience,framing, manifesto

Introduction

Over recent decades, increasing European integration has presented minority nationalistparties (MNPs) with shifting political opportunity structures through which to pursuegreater levels of autonomy for stateless nations. Earlier studies of the 1980s and 1990sidentified MNPs as the most pro-European party family (Gomez-Reino Cachafeirio,2002; Hix & Lord, 1997; Ray, 2003). Yet, as analysts point out, MNPs’ embracing ofthe European Union (EU) is not without political risks: ‘the future of ethnoregionalistparties depends on the balance of power between the European and ethnoregional cleavage’(De Winter & Tursan, 1998, p. 14). Underlining the latter point, scholars allude to the factthat ‘in more recent years, there is increasing evidence that some regionalists are less enthu-siastic about all aspects of integration’ (Jolly, 2010, p. 23). Existing research has tended toconcentrate on EU- and state-wide contexts, and there has been an absence of systematic,

Correspondence Address: Paul Chaney, Cardiff School of Social Sciences, Glamorgan Building, King Edward VIIAvenue, Cathays Park, Cardiff, CF10 3WT, Wales. Email: [email protected]

Perspectives on European Politics and Society, 2014http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15705854.2014.900987

© 2014 Taylor & Francis

longitudinal empirical data at the regional level. This is a key knowledge gap because sub-state elections are a context in which MNPs are faced with the challenge of managing theEuropean and ethno-regional cleavage. Here, we address this lacuna using an originalmixed methods approach. Quantitative analysis of parties’ changing attention to the EUis complemented with qualitative analysis of the language associated with what PeterLynch and Lieven De Winter (2008, p. 604) cogently describe as the transition fromMNPs’ ‘permissive Europhile position to a more… Eurotepid position’.

This study’s accent on language furthers understanding of how MNPs frame policy onthe EU as part of their efforts to attract electoral support and thus fulfil their constitutionalgoals. In turn, it also tells us how they manage the immanent tension between regionalautonomy and supranational integration. In this respect, it reveals whether MNPs stillregard the notion of Europe as a non-negotiable cornerstone of ethno-regional identity poli-tics (Crook, 1997; McCargoa & Hongladaromb, 2004), as advanced by earlier influentialparty figures, who (as in the case of Plaid Cymru founder Saunders Lewis) invoked thenotion of a common ‘European civilization’ (Davies, 1994, p. 591), or whether theyview the EU merely as a means to furthering autonomy (Cf. Kopecky & Mudde, 2002).In other words, it tells us whether MNPs’ current approach is one of ‘instrumentalEuropeanism’. Instrumentalism here draws on the philosophy of John Dewey (Dewey,1925, 1984). It privileges ideas as instruments of action, their worth gauged by their use-fulness to a given end. Preferring the term experimentalism to pragmatism, Dewey empha-sized practical purpose and successful adjustment. It is a standpoint that regards ‘method asinstrumental rather than final’. Thus, instrumentalism emphasizes adaptation and ‘workingideas that may clarify and illuminate the actual and concrete course of life’ (Dewey, 1984,p. 77). In this way, it resonates with incrementalism in policy theory (Lindblom, 1959),whereby, over time, ‘policies result from a pluralistic process of interaction and mutualadaptation’ (Bevir, 2007, p. 96).

As noted, the absence of comparative, longitudinal analysis of the language used byMNPs on the issue of the EU marks a lacuna in contemporary understanding of nationalistpolitics. Hitherto, existing work in the field has variously drawn on social attitudes data,party membership and expert surveys (Ray, 2003), attention to state-wide and EUballots (Bergbauer, 2010) as well as interviews and the ‘grey’ literature of parties (Cham-pliaud, 2011; Tarditi, 2010). In contrast, this article uses mixed methods to conduct criticaldiscourse analysis of MNPs’manifesto discourse in regional elections. In conceptual terms,the importance of manifesto discourse is explained by mandate theory (Hofferbert &Budge, 1992). This underlines the role of discourse in shaping political behaviour anddetermining parties’ electoral fortunes. Moreover, it asserts that when in government,parties should implement the policies that they promised when running for office – asalient factor given that all four main MNPs studied here have held government officesince devolution in 1998–1999.

The evidence of state-wide ballots shows MNPs to have traditionally employed thenotion of Europe in order to advance an alternative to centralized administration withinthe unitary state. Against this backdrop, the advent of meso-elections presents new discur-sive opportunities to seek a mandate to build on the degree of self-government alreadyattained through ‘phase-one’ devolution (i.e. the (re)creation of regional polities), notleast by articulating the goal of ‘independence in Europe’. In addition, the present analysisalso addresses a knowledge gap on how the attempt to facilitate regional engagement underthe EU’s Committee of the Regions (CoR) initiative (Van De Knaap, 1994) plays out in the

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programmes parties place before voters in meso-elections. Thus, it illuminates how MNPspresent the EU to the very people that the CoR was designed to engage when it was estab-lished in 1994 as an assembly of representatives of sub-national authorities (such asregions, counties, provinces, municipalities and cities).

In order to explore these matters, the following discussion examines MNPs in the UK.This is a propitious locus of enquiry because devolution in 1998–1999 resulted in the (re)establishment of meso-level legislatures in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. It is asingular context because in one polity, Northern Ireland, the two main MNPs’ consti-tutional ambition is unification with another EU state (Ireland). In contrast, MNPs inScotland and Wales seek independence.

In summary, the principal research aims are to explore how policy proposals on the EUare framed in MNPs’ electoral discourse and to examine how the issue-salience of the EUchanges over time. Associated aims include analysing the extent to which there are con-trasts and commonalities in MNPs’ electoral discourse; whether Europe is a party-politi-cized issue in each meso-electoral system; and whether MNPs exhibit ‘issue-ownership’of Europe in regional elections. Accordingly, the remainder of this paper is structuredthus: following a discussion of the literature on multilevel governance, minority nationalistparties and electoral discourse, attention turns to the research methodology. This is fol-lowed by presentation of the findings in relation to the main research aims. The paper con-cludes with a summary of the core findings and their implications.

Multi-Level Governance, Minority Nationalist Parties and Electoral Discourse

Existing studies of minority nationalist parties and the EU span a number of strands includ-ing national identity and European integration (Carl, 2003; Marks & Wilson, 2000); ideol-ogy and party attitudes towards political union (Avci, 2011; Hakan, 2011); dualconceptions of citizenship; the EU, MNPs and environmental policy (Dawson, 2000);and EC directives on minority language rights (Pertot, Priestly & Williams, 2008).Against this backdrop, scholars have advanced the (albeit contested) notion of parties’‘Europeanization’ (or the relationship between European integration and party programmesand practices) – in order to explain their adoption of a pro-Europe disposition (Gaffney,1996; Mair, 2006). According to Robert Ladrech (2002, p. 396), ‘one of the most explicittypes of evidence of Europeanization will be modifications in party programmes’. This is areciprocal, iterative process whereby ‘policy and programmatic references to the role of theEU…will become more sophisticated over time, as recognition of the impact of the EUbecomes clearer’. In turn, it is in part shaped by ‘the extent the EU itself becomes politi-cized in national politics’ (Ladrech, 2007, p. 396). Politicization here refers to the wayin which policy issues – in this case, Europe – develop to be electorally salient, therebyrising and falling on the political agenda and becoming the subject of inter-party compe-tition (Carter, 2006; Converse & Dupeux, 1963). Issue-salience is the indicator used toassess such competition. It refers to the importance of a topic for a given party in a particu-lar election as indicated by the number of policy proposals (RePass, 1971; Selck, 2007).

Existing analyses of state-wide parties’ attention to the EU in unitary state and Europeanelections point to ‘the unexpectedly low amount of references in party manifestos and lackof sustained analysis in most party programmes’ (Ladrech, 2002, p. 21). One explanationfor this is that ‘the EU is, in a manner of speaking, increasingly a political liability structurefor certain mainstream political parties’ (Pennings, 2006). In contrast, as a range of scholars

Instrumental Europeans? Minority Nationalist Parties’ 3

has noted, for MNPs, the EU presents new and alternative political openings for pursuingnational self-determination (Guibernau, 1996; Hepburn, 2006, 2008; Lynch, 1996) – aswell as a means to challenge the hegemony of the central government (Marks & Wilson,2000). Accordingly, they have been subject to particular attention in party programmesin both state-wide and European elections. Earlier analyses also point to other ways inwhich the EU may advance MNPs’ autonomist ambitions – such as through economic inte-gration, which may boost the viability of ‘regional’ economies. Given these potentialbenefits, the research expectation is that the following analysis will evidence MNPs’attempts to secure ‘issue-ownership’ of Europe. This refers to parties and candidatesusing discursive politics to present themselves as the dominant party on a given topic byappearing at once more engaged and competent than their rivals in addressing givenissues (Petrocik, 2006, p. 825).

Notwithstanding earlier claims over the Europeanization of MNPs, as noted, more recentwork has pointed to a degree of nationalist disappointment stemming from the limited voiceafforded to them by the CoR – or ‘Europe’s flawed offer’, as Klaus-Jürgen Nagel (2001,p. 62) memorably described it. This has been compounded by a range of factors, includingEuropean policy-makers’ perceived failure to apply the principle of subsidiarity to a redis-tribution of policy competences between tiers of government within the EU; internaldecision-making conflict in the CoR along national and partisan lines (Hönnige &Kaiser, 2003); and ongoing debate as to whether stateless nations seceding from unitarystates would be denied automatic EU membership. The CoR is not the only EU governanceissue to affect MNPs’ policy on supranational integration project. It has also been shapedby a series of crises that the EU has been through in recent years. Examples include thenegative referenda on the Constitution (Walker, 2003); extended disputes about theLisbon Treaty (Syrpis, 2008); and the financial crisis affecting the Euro (Jorg, 2013). Inaddition to these, party attitudes to the EU have also been affected by domestic matters,specifically holding government office – a transition experienced by all of the MNPs dis-cussed here. Its significance is explained by accountability theory (Ferejohn, 2003), whichasserts that elections are effectively ‘opinion polls’ on the performance of the party orparties forming the previous administration – and whether they delivered the policy pro-gramme that they were elected on. Applied to the case of the MNPs, in the short term atleast, government office may lead MNPs to place greater emphasis on domestic policydelivery than constitutional matters. The combination of the foregoing EU and domesticfactors means that although minority nationalist parties may not have completely rejectedthe idea of a Europe of the Regions, it is possible that a new pragmatism is evident in theirstrategies. It is to the discourse associated with these developments that attention now turns.

Data and Methods

This paper makes a methodological contribution to the field by heeding earlier calls(Jütersonke & Stucki, 2007) for policy research to combine aspects of traditional quantitat-ive analysis with qualitative discourse analysis. It must be acknowledged that as a principaldata source, manifestos have limitations. For example, party policy proposals are alsoexpressed in speeches, debates and other documents. Yet, as an extensive body of electoralstudies attests, they constitute the principal political texts that reflect a party’s priorities andissue positions, thereby allowing systematic analysis over time. In the present case, elec-tronic versions of MNPs’ manifestos in meso-elections during 1998–2011 were analysed

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using appropriate software.1 Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland were selected in order toprovide a unitary state case study that allowed for a comparative focus to draw out contrastsand commonalities between regions with strong support for MNPs (Scotland) and rela-tively weak support (Wales) – as well as to explore the case of Northern Ireland, wherethe MNPs’ ambition is for unification with another EU state (Ireland). Accordingly, thepresent mixed-method electoral discourse approach to nationalist parties’ discourse con-sisted of a four-stage process, as follows:

1. Following established content analysis procedures (Topf, 1994), appropriate soft-ware was used to record the number of incidences of key words (‘Europe’, ‘European’,‘EU’, etc.) in order to identify manifesto text related to Europe. These were then recordedin a database of manifesto extracts.

2. All database text extracts were subsequently divided into ‘quasi-sentences’ (definedas ‘an argument which is the verbal expression of one political idea or issue’) (Volkens,2001, p. 198). Dividing sentences in this manner controlled for long statements that con-tained multiple policy proposals.

3. In turn, each quasi-sentence was subsequently classified using an inductive codingschema (Joffe & Yardley, 2003) consisting of key policy frames (e.g. governance, socialand economic development, promoting local interests in the EU, etc.).2 This was derivedfrom the academic literature on MNPs and Europe (see References).

4. In order to increase reliability, the coding process was independently repeated by aresearch assistant. Divergent views on the coding emerged in <2.4 per cent of cases (thiswas resolved by discussion between coders). In this way, the use of frame analysis(Rein & Schon, 1994) facilitated exploration of how, as key political texts, manifestosenable parties to construct (or ‘frame’) policy proposals on Europe.

The present use of frame analysis is appropriate because policy programmes are effectedthrough, and need to be understood in relation to, political narratives (Shenhav, 2005;Smith, 2002). Accordingly, the following enables exploration of the narratives associatedwith MNPs’ changing relationship with the EU in the pursuit of regional autonomy. In thisrespect, examination of policy frames reveals how sometimes disparate elements of dis-course can be shaped into a meaningful story that defines political change. The foregoingmixed methodology can also be seen as a response to earlier calls for social research to‘humanize’ quantitative data by focusing on language and meaning related to specificphenomena, notably from political actors’ perspectives. Attention now turns to the researchfindings (Blumer, 1969).

UK Devolution and Minority Nationalist Parties’ Electoral Discourse on Europe

1. Issue-Salience and Framing across Meso-Polities

Analysis of the issue-salience of the EU in MNPs’ election programmes across regionalpolities reveals a significant decline from the levels recorded at the outset of devolved gov-ernance in 1998–1999. This lends credence to earlier work suggesting MNPs’ repositioningon Europe (Hayward, 2004). Just over two-thirds of all MNPs’ references to the EU (67.8per cent) were made in the first two regional ballots (1998–1999 and 2003). Underliningthe pronounced decline, just 15 per cent was made in the 2011 vote. The data also underlineMNPs’ issue-ownership of the EU, for, across regional polities, the four MNPs account foralmost two-thirds (63.9 per cent) of the total manifesto discourse on the EU. However, such

Instrumental Europeans? Minority Nationalist Parties’ 5

a snapshot measure fails to capture fully the party politicization of the EU in meso-elections. Notably, the data provide some evidence that, for state-wide parties, the EU isviewed as less of a political liability at the regional level (compared to unitary state andE.U. elections). They also reveal increasing politicization because the proportion of totalEU references made by state-wide/unionist parties increases from 31.4 and 28.1 per centin 1998–1999 and 2003, respectively, to 47.1 and 45.6 per cent in 2007 and 2012,respectively.

Across the regional polities, there are notable contrasts in the way that Europe is framedin the respective MNPs’ election programmes (Figure 2). Underlining the role of the EU asa vehicle for securing greater levels of autonomy, ‘governance’ is the lead frame overall(27.5 per cent of all MNP references on Europe). Yet, there are significant inter-partydifferences in the frame’s use by the four MNPs (P = <0.001);3 notably, Plaid Cymruaccounts for over half (57 per cent) of the total. One interpretation of this is that MNPsin nations with limited electoral support for independence (as in the case of Wales)make comparatively greater use of the EU to espouse autonomist proposals than those innations with greater levels of public support for secession (e.g. Scotland). The reason forthis being that, in the former scenario, the EU is the only realistic option open to MNPsin the pursuit of self-government.

The next most popular frame in MNP discourse on Europe is ‘aid/social and economicdevelopment’. Again, statistically significant differences are apparent in MNPs’ framingpractices (P = <0.001),4 with Plaid Cymru accounting for 40.7 per cent of all referencesunder the frame, followed by the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP), with33.9 per cent. The frames ‘promoting local interests in the EU’ and ‘agriculture/rural devel-opment’ are jointly ranked third (both 8.8 per cent of all references). Whilst Plaid Cymruleads in the use of the former frame (53.2 per cent of all such references; P = <0.001),5 theScottish National Party (SNP) makes most use of the latter (48.9 per cent of all such refer-ences; P = <0.001).6

Figure 1. Issue-salience of Europe in MNPs’ manifestos: Scottish, Welsh and Northern Irish elec-tions, 1998–2011 (N = 534)

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WhenMNPs’ policy framing on the EU is examined over successive election cycles, it isclear that the decline in issue-salience is also accompanied by convergence around‘residual’ policy frames. As noted, the most pronounced decline is in the ‘governance’frame. This accounted for 39.4 per cent of all MNP references in the 1998–1999 ballots,yet declines by almost a quarter (24.4 percentage points) by the time of the 2011 vote.Allied to this, over the same period, the tropes of ‘cooperation’ and ‘promoting local inter-ests in EU’ also fall (by 14.2 and 16.4 percentage points, respectively). In contrast, there is asignificant increase of almost a third (+29.2 percentage points) in the proportion of all-partydiscourse centred on the ‘aid/social and economic development’ and ‘infrastructure’frames. In terms of changing MNP attitudes towards Europe, these ‘discursive shifts’point to the EU latterly being viewed not so much as a constitutional vehicle towards inde-pendence, but more as a fiscal-support mechanism (McGowan & O’Connor, 2004).Against the backdrop of these cross-polity trends, attention now turns to the MNP discoursein each polity.

2. Scotland

Earlier studies have outlined how, in the immediate post-war period, the SNP ‘saw inter-national organizations as offering a stable environment for small countries in a potentiallyhostile world’ (Mitchell, 1998, p. 108). As Lynch (1996, p. 29) observes, this markedsomething of a ‘reconciliation between [Scottish] sovereignty and [European] integration’,whereby Europe was seen as less of a threat and potentially more economically advan-tageous to Scotland than the UK union state. Subsequently, however, the SNP assumedan ambiguous position, at times exhibiting hostility to the European Economic Community

Figure 2. Party policy framing on Europe in regional manifestos: Scottish, Welsh and Northern Irishelections, 1998–2011 (N = 534)

Instrumental Europeans? Minority Nationalist Parties’ 7

EEC/EU based on fears that integration might threaten its goal of independence (e.g. ‘Scot-land has suffered too much already from centralisation in Britain. Centralisation CommonMarket style could be a death blow to our very existence as a nation’ (SNP, 1974, p. 16). Inthe 1980s, the Party’s position shifted once again ‘from hostility towards the EU, expressedas a commitment to withdraw an independent Scotland from the organisation, subject to areferendum vote, to making membership of the EU the cornerstone of its self-governmentpolicy’ (Dardanelli, 2003, p. 10). This transition was encapsulated in statements like ‘inde-pendence in Europe: make it happen now… [it is] the only policy which will bring stabilityto Scotland’ (SNP, 1992, p. 2). It endured in state-wide elections through to devolution in1999. In this way, as Eve Hepburn observes, the SNP moved to a ‘more sovereigntist pos-ition that demanded “independence in Europe”’ (Hepburn, 2006, p. 134).

Against this background, cross-party analysis of post-1999 Scottish elections reveals thatalmost a half (47 per cent) of all manifesto references to the EU was made by the SNP com-pared to just over a fifth (22.7 per cent) by both Labour and the Liberal Democrats. Theright-of-centre Conservative Party made just 7.5 per cent of references (P=<0.001)(Figure 3).7 The data also reveal a significant cross-party decline in the issue-salience ofthe EU (as measured by the mean number of quasi-sentences) – the total in the 2011ballot is just 38 per cent of that during the period, 1999–2007. In part, this can be seenas a function of the ‘toxicity’ of Europe as a policy issue in the light of the financialcrisis in the Eurozone as well as the three unionist parties’ concentration on domestic con-stitutional issues in response to the SNP government’s plans to hold an independence refer-endum in 2014.

Further light on the shifting electoral politics of the EU in Scotland is provided by quali-tative analysis of the framing of the SNP’s policy proposals. Greatest attention centres onthe ‘governance’ frame. It accounts for almost a fifth of the SNP’s manifesto referencesoverall (19.7 per cent). Many of these quasi-sentences are concerned with structuralarrangements. Examples include: ‘Scottish-European Assembly will be a forum forMSPs, MEPs and members of the Committee of the Regions. The Assembly will act asa base point for a process of networking and alliance building throughout European insti-tutions’; ‘we will establish mechanisms to influence and monitor European policy

Figure 3. Issue-salience of Europe in party manifestos: Scottish elections, 1999–2011

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developments and provide direct contact with EU institutions’; and ‘the SNP proposes astructure for government that learns much from best practice in Europe’ (SNP, 1999, p. 30).

The impact of Europe on the economy is an enduring trope in the Scottish discourse (e.g.‘by definition a devolved Parliament is limited in what it can do. With Independence inEurope… Scotland would be able to pursue a macro-economic policy designed to meetScotland’s needs’) (SNP, 1999, p. 21). Thus, ‘aid/social and economic development’ isthe second-ranked frame (18.2 per cent). It is also a ‘residual frame’, meaning that,despite the overall drop in the EU’s salience, it continues to hold a key position in theSNP’s post-2007 manifesto discourse. For example: ‘we will take forward the recentlyannounced… national skills development programme to strengthen Scotland’s workforce… using £64.6 million of European Structural Funds’ (SNP, 2011, p. 39). Reflecting itsrural support base (Hassan, 2009, p. 71), ‘agriculture/rural development’ is a further keyframe (17.4 per cent of references). For example, ‘our strategy for rural Scotland is builtupon radical reform of the land laws, a strong voice in Europe…We will prioritise Euro-pean representation on farming issues’; and ‘independence in Europe is essential for Scot-land’s rural industries and rural communities’ (SNP, 1999, p. 19).

Notably, in the first years following devolution in 1999, the SNP’s discourse underlinesthat the (re)creation of the Scottish Parliament and greater autonomy in Europe are part of a‘constitutional continuum’. For example: ‘the process of independence – the Parliament is avital part of that process. The process will only end with independence within the EuropeanUnion’ (SNP, 1999, p. 10); and ‘we are committed, if elected to govern, to a referendum onindependence within the first four year term of an SNP government, so that Scotland canmove on from devolution to full membership of the European Union’ (SNP, 1999, p. 15).The ‘comparator’ frame is also to the fore in the Party’s discourse. This refers to instanceswhere manifestos offer a European rationale and/or comparison to support their publicpolicy proposals (rather than present a contrast with policy and public services elsewherein the UK). It is a notable feature of the 2003 manifesto, where the policy vision is one of amodern European nation with the highest standards of social welfare provision in the EU.For example, ‘our health service could and should match the best in Europe’ (SNP, 2003,p. 3); and ‘we will introduce a norm for language learning based on the European Union 1+2 model’ (SNP, 2011, p. 23).

Earlier studies have underlined MNPs’ prioritization of the environment as a policyissue. For example, John Dawson notes that ‘the intertwining of subgroup identity andenvironmentalism is not a new phenomenon; a special attachment to the land, flora, andfauna of a particular region has often played a role in nationalist writings and has frequentlybeen used to reinforce mobilisation to nationalist or patriotic causes’ (Dawson, 2000,p. 27). Others support this assessment, noting how public ‘policy has been an importantforce for nation-building in multinational states such as Britain’ (Kpessa & Lecours,2011, p. 14). The present analysis confirms this to be the case in the SNP’s manifesto dis-course – for the environment is the third-ranked frame and accounts for almost a fifth (17.4per cent) of references. Examples include: we will become ‘Europe’s Green EnergyCapital’ (SNP, 2007, p. 18); and ‘we are working hard to make Scotland Europe’s greenenergy powerhouse’ (SNP, 2011, p. 21).

In summary, the election data support Peter Lynch’s identification of a ‘more ideologi-cally fluid post-devolution period’ (Lynch, 2009, p. 625). Moreover, they confirm theidentification of ‘a clear consensus around support for independence in Europe andsupport for a pragmatic approach to achieving this goal’ (Mitchell, Bennie & Johns,

Instrumental Europeans? Minority Nationalist Parties’ 9

2011, p. 138). Specifically, the SNP’s position after devolution can be summarized as com-prising two phases: before and after the 2007 election. Before, there is strong support forthe EU, which is typified by statements such as: ‘independence in Europe is our gateway tothe representation we deserve. With Independence, our Ministers will sit at the top table inEurope fighting for the best deal for Scotland…we support an enlarged EU as a confed-eration of nation states’ (SNP, 2003, p. 2). Subsequently, there is a ‘cooler’, more criticalstance. This suggests prescience by Klaus-Jürgen Nagel (2004, p. 68), who concluded:

party elites may see the insistence on independence in Europe as sterile… It bindsthe party to a confederal or at least intergovernmental interpretation of the EU. Inline with the doctrine, leading SNP politicians have… sometimes rejected thegrowth of European Parliament influence on decisions in the name of preventing aEuropean superstate. It is therefore important that some innovators already try a cau-tious revision of the nationalist standpoint, against traditional sovereigntists (some ofthose may even change back to anti-Europeanism).

Thus, whilst the post-2007 discourse still espouses independence within the EU, there isa detectable shift in position marked by general opposition to greater powers and policycompetencies at the supranational level as well as claims for redrawing policy boundaries(e.g. ‘the SNP will…work for withdrawal from the Common Fisheries Policy’ (SNP,2007, p. 73); and ‘this will require a change of approach at a European level’ (SNP,2011, p. 39)).

3. Wales

From its beginnings in 1925, Plaid Cymru envisaged Wales as a European nation (Morgan,1971). Yet, the party’s first leaders rejected the notion of ‘independence’ as Plaid’s primaryobjective, preferring instead to advance the goal of greater autonomy over political and cul-tural affairs within a context of supranational cooperation in Europe (Butt Philip, 1975).However, it was in the 1980s that Plaid became more disposed towards European inte-gration as a means to furthering its demands for autonomy. This was eventually articulatedin the formulation of ‘full national status for Wales in Europe’ (Plaid Cymru, 1990, p. 14).Thus, Plaid’s vision was one of a post-union state in which Westminster’s sovereigntywithered as powers were transferred to the regional tier and a second chamber in the EUrepresenting regions and historic nations (Nagel, 2004). Accordingly, as Jenny Carl(2003, p. 486) observes, the key aspects of the discourse that accompanied devolution in1999, such as effective governance and prosperity, were ones with the potential to ‘berealised in Welsh society through European integration and Welsh influence in Europe’.

Cross-party analysis of post-1999meso-elections inWales reveals that Plaid Cymru dom-inates on the issue of Europe (Figure 4); strikingly, two-thirds (66.5 per cent) of all mani-festo references were made by the party compared to just over 10 per cent by the state-wide parties – Labour, the Liberal Democrats and Conservatives (11.9, 11.6 and 10 percent, respectively) (P = <0.001).8 Importantly, despite such MNP issue-ownership, latterly,the data reveal a significant decline in the issue-salience of Europe in Plaid’s election pro-grammes. Over two-thirds of references (68 per cent) were made in the first two regionalelections and just 14.6 per cent in the 2011 vote. To explain this shift, it is necessary toexamine the party’s policy framing. Here, the overall lead frame, ‘governance’, is of key

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importance. It accounted for 39.4 per cent of total party references to Europe.Whilst the pre-scriptions in Plaid’s 1999 manifesto mark it out as the most detailed/Euro-oriented MNPmanifesto following UK devolution (Chaney and Fevre, 2001), paradoxically, somesuggest it was the EU that was responsible for the subsequent discontinuity. For example:

it was in large measure the party’s exposure to the realities of European political insti-tutions – through the Committee of the Regions in the early 1990s and the EuropeanParliament after 1999 – that led it to moderate its most zealously pro-European rheto-ric paving the way, in 2003, to its adoption for the first time of ‘Independence’ as itslong-term constitutional aim for Wales (Wyn Jones, 2009, p. 131).

Thus, over three-quarters (83.5 per cent) of quasi-sentences coded under the ‘govern-ance’ frame were made in the 1999 and 2003 elections (and just 5.8 and 10.5 per cent,respectively, in the 2007 and 2011 ballots). Plaid Cymru’s ‘European regional integration-ist’ discourse was typified by statements such as: ‘the European Union must become demo-cratic. Each of the natural communities – the nations and historic regions – should becomea basic unit in the process of integration. This is in line with the principle of subsidiaritywhereby decisions are taken at the lowest and most effective level’ (Plaid Cymru, 1999,p. 14). Yet, such language is subsequently replaced by an emphasis on ‘the independencein Europe’ trope. For example: ‘we remain committed to an independent Wales as a fullmember of the European Union. We understand that this longer-term constitutional stepis a decision that will rest ultimately in the hands of the people of Wales’ (Plaid Cymru,2007, p. 16).

As in the Scottish case, frame residualization is evident in the Welsh elections. Whereascombined references under the ‘governance’ and ‘aid/social and economic development’frames accounted for 55.1 per cent of EU references in Plaid’s 1999 manifesto, theymake up 81.5 per cent in the party’s programme for the 2011 ballot. Notably, in recentyears, Plaid’s policy prescriptions on Europe are significantly less detailed; thus, in contrast

Figure 4. Issue-salience of Europe in party manifestos: Welsh elections, 1999–2011

Instrumental Europeans? Minority Nationalist Parties’ 11

to the 1999 and 2003 elections, frames such as ‘equality/progressive values’ and‘cooperation’ fail to receive attention in the 2011 programme. These findings reveal thata discursive transition applies to the post-1999 period. In the first two devolved elections,the EU commanded significantly higher salience with detailed proposals spanning thebreadth of all 10 policy frames; latterly, they are clustered in relation to just four. Asnoted, underpinning this transition is the party’s changing vision of future autonomy andgovernance relations with the EU.

The notable decline in Plaid Cymru’s references to Europe in its electoral discourse canbe related to the changed political circumstances of post-devolution Wales. Mindful of itshistorical marginalization in UK politics, Plaid Cymru’s campaign for the first meso-elections in 1999 was principally concerned with establishing itself as a major politicalforce in the regional legislature. This resulted in the most comprehensive policy pro-gramme ever issued by Plaid. Whilst the issue of independence in Europe resurfaced,the diversions of bitter infighting following poor electoral performance in 2003 saw exten-sive policy consultations with the party’s membership. The result was that attention to con-stitutional matters in Europe was replaced by more voter-friendly policies (such as oneducation, language rights and the economy). The failure of Plaid Cymru to make aserious electoral breakthrough in 2007 led to the party entering into a government coalitionwith the Labour Party. Again, this resulted in a downgrading of autonomy issues as theparty concentrated on maximizing domestic policy gains as a price for entering thecoalition. The latter included a commitment to holding a referendum on boosting law-making powers for the regional legislature and introducing new legal measures tosupport the Welsh language. The experience of holding government office meant that con-stitutional issues were again afforded a much lower priority than policy delivery in theparty’s 2011 election programme.

4. Northern Ireland

As in the other regional polities, the Northern Ireland MNPs’ policies on territorial govern-ance are contingent upon historical factors as well as local socio-economic specificities(Chaney, 2013). However, unlike Scotland and Wales, there is not one local minoritynationalist party competing mainly with state-wide (Tory, Labour, Liberal) and (essen-tially) pro-European parties, but two. Moreover, instead of pursuing independence, theyare calling for unification with the Irish Republic.

Thus, the two MNP parties have contrasting narratives on the EEC/EU. In the case of theSDLP, it has had a long-standing commitment to European integration since its founding in1970. This is reflected in post-devolution manifesto discourse aimed at securing issue own-ership of the EU in the context of regional elections in the province. Examples include: ‘theSDLP was the first party to call for membership of the European Economic Community asit was in the 1970s’ (SDLP, 2003, p. 14); and ‘E.U. Affairs… The SDLP is the only majorand consistent advocate of EU membership amongst all the parties in the North’ (SDLP,2007, p. 19). In contrast, over the past two decades, Sinn Féin’s relationship with theEU has shifted from opposition to European integration to one of critical engagement(Frampton, 2004, p. 48). As Agnès Maillot (2009, p. 559) observes, this ‘Europeanizationof the party is clearly shaped by the motives, context and dynamics of the domestic arena asmuch as the European one. It is exemplified in the de facto prioritizing of the ‘critical’ overthe ‘engaged’ elements in Sinn Féin’s approach to European integration.’

12 P. Chaney

Cross-party analysis of post-1998 Northern Irish elections reveals that the SDLP dom-inates on Europe and accounts for almost two-thirds (60.2 per cent) of all party manifestoreferences (Figure 5). The other parties contesting the election afford limited attention tothe issue. As Jonathan Tonge (2005, p. 27) observes, ‘the preferred conception of theEU held by the UUP, DUP and Sinn Féin is broadly that of a “non-interfering” body pre-siding over a Europe of essentially independent states’. Notwithstanding a modest rise insalience in the 2003 vote (+11 percentage points), Sinn Féin accounts for under a fifth(19.5 per cent) of total references. In part, the reason for the EU’s low salience lies in apolitically-sensitive re-positioning of the party:

for Sinn Féin, the European dimension has provided a useful context within which todilute its original claims to unfettered Irish sovereignty. The zero-sum gameapproach of Irish versus British has been reconfigured to allow a broader set of inter-governmental relationships, a pooling of sovereignty within the EU and a reconcilia-tion of the peoples of Ireland within a European framework (Tonge, 2005, p. 17).

On the other side of the political spectrum, Unionist parties pay limited attention toEurope in their election programmes (the DUP make 7.2 per cent of all party referencesand the UUP, 13.1 per cent). Notably, as in the case of Scottish and Welsh MNPs, thereis a marked decline in the salience of Europe in the SDLP’s post-1998 election pro-grammes; almost three-quarters (71.7 per cent) of references were made in the first twoballots, and just 15 per cent in the 2011 ballot.

Qualitative analysis confirms that when the two Northern Ireland MNPs are compared,there are notable contrasts and commonalities in the way that the election discourse onEurope is framed. For both, the principal frame is ‘aid/social and economic development’,accounting for over a half (51.2 per cent) of Sinn Féin’s Europe discourse and 28 per cent ofthe SDLP’s. For example, ‘Sinn Féin will work to…Maximis[e] access to other EU funds,such as the Joint European Support for Micro to Medium Enterprises’ (Sinn Féin, 2011,

Figure 5. Issue-salience of Europe in party manifestos: Northern Ireland elections, 1998–2011

Instrumental Europeans? Minority Nationalist Parties’ 13

p. 9); and ‘the SDLP will make sure that, along with the Republic and other peripheralregions of Europe, EU economic policy takes into account our interests’ (Sinn Féin,2003, p. 18). This finding supports earlier analysis that ‘there is a tendency within NorthernIreland towards “recognition of the EU as a cash cow” rather than its acceptance as a gov-erning entity’ (Tonge, 2005, p. 17). In contrast, the parties’ use of the governance frameunderlines the contingent nature of MNPs’ discourse on Europe. Unlike MNP parties inScotland and Wales, where ‘governance’ is the lead frame, it receives limited attentionin the case of the SDLP and Sinn Féin. This is because for Sinn Féin, the politicalvision is not ‘direct’ independence within the EU, but, rather, a redefined relationshipvia (re)union with the Irish Republic. In the case of the SDLP, it ‘has adopted a post-nation-alist position, denying traditional concepts of the nation state and sovereignty… [insteadopting for] support for neo-functionalist (post nationalist) processes of European inte-gration, based upon “spillover” from economic to political spheres, [a position] which ulti-mately could render bi-nationalism redundant’ (Tonge, 2005, p. 19). Accordingly, thegovernance frame accounts for only 3 per cent of Sinn Féin’s discourse and 9.8 per centof the SDLP’s. Thus, the former’s critical stance is typified by statements like: ‘SinnFéin is an internationalist party. We are working to re-establish Irish sovereignty over inter-national affairs in the context of a future United Ireland… [we will] continue to work withothers in Europe who believe that Another Europe is possible, in favour of progressive pan-European cooperation in a Europe of equals and against the further consolidation of anunequal militarised EU superstate’ (Sinn Féin, 2007, p. 43).

A notable feature of the Sinn Féin discourse is that ‘language/culture’ is the joint second-ranked frame (11.9 per cent), with particular emphasis placed on European policy on safe-guarding minority language rights. For example, we will seek ‘ratification of the EuropeanCharter for Regional and Minority Languages by the British government with respect toIrish’ (Sinn Féin, 1998, p. 4); and ‘Parity of esteem… [we] endorse stronger and morecomprehensive clauses of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages’(Sinn Féin, 2003, p. 12). Such prominence underlines the party’s dissatisfaction with theexisting policy framework and protections extended under current Northern Irish legis-lation (Crowley, 2008). In a broadly similar vein, ‘equality/progressive values’ is theSDLP’s third-ranked frame (10.5 per cent), whereby equality and conflict resolution arearticulated in the context of EU policy (McLoughlin, 2009; Tannam, 2005). In the latterregard, as Katy Hayward notes, the EU has had a beneficial effect: ‘it is not so much theactors or structures of the European Union but the actual process of European integrationitself that has served to transform factors that would previously have contributed to the con-flict into bases for cooperation across ideological, political and territorial borders’(Hayward, 2004, p. 32).

Partly as a reflection of its geographical support base, compared to Sinn Féin, the SDLPgives twice as much attention to the ‘agriculture/rural development’ frame (the party’sthird-ranked frame; 10.5 per cent of references). It is explicit in underlining its view thatlocal interests are best served by dialogue between Dublin and Brussels, rather thanBelfast and Brussels. For example, ‘as with agriculture, Northern needs are often better rep-resented by the Irish government during European negotiations… ’ (SDLP, 2011, p. 37).Yet, it is also a reflection of both MNPs’ awareness that ‘while the EU has played a role in… advancing cross-border cooperation, its role has been determined by British-Irishpolicy’ (Tannam, 2011, p. 149). Analysis of SDLP and Sinn Féin discourse over successiveelection cycles also provides further evidence that, notwithstanding the singular nature of

14 P. Chaney

Northern Ireland’s MNPs, residualization around key frames is a phenomenon applying toall MNPs across the UK’s three meso-polities. Thus, during 1998–2011, there is a markeddecline in the ‘governance’ frame (–67 percentage points) and a significant increase in the‘aid/social and economic development’ frame (+59 percentage points). The latter is reflec-tive of MNPs’ discourse being shaped by the EU’s role in extending fiscal support in thewake of the economic turbulence faced by the Irish republic over the past decade (Barrett,2011, p. 35).

Conclusion

Analysis of MNPs’ electoral discourse in the wake of devolution in the UK providesempirical evidence to support earlier suggestions that a new pragmatism is shaping partyprogrammes in relation to Europe (Cf. Hepburn, 2008; Nagel, 2001; Tarditi, 2010). Thepresent data confirm MNPs’ issue ownership of Europe in meso-elections and show thatthey account for over two-thirds of all EU manifesto references. When patterns of salienceare examined over successive electoral cycles, it is also clear that a discursive shift hastaken place as MNPs have adapted the way that they frame their policy proposals onEurope. In the case of the SNP, prior to 2007, the party exhibited strong support for theEU. Subsequently, a ‘cooler’, more critical stance is apparent. This is associated with aquestioning of the confederal, or at least intergovernmental, interpretation of the EU anda cautious revision of the SNP’s standpoint. The post-2007 discourse still espouses inde-pendence within the EU, but there is a detectable shift marked by general opposition togreater powers at the supranational level as well as claims for redrawing policy boundaries.

In Wales, two phases are also evident. In the early years of devolved governance, PlaidCymru’s vision was for an autonomousWelsh nation assuming a full role in a Europe of theRegions – in other words, a post-union state in which Westminster’s sovereignty witheredas powers were transferred to the regional and supranational tiers. Whilst the ‘European-integrationist’ prescriptions in Plaid’s 1999 manifesto marked it out as the most detailed,E.U.-oriented MNP manifesto following devolution, paradoxically, it is the experienceof engaging with the institutions of the EU that then led to a swift and significant discon-tinuity in the party’s position – one marked by a new pragmatic discourse and a re-groupingaround ‘the independence in Europe’ trope.

In Northern Ireland, MNP parties’ constitutional goal is (re-)unification with the IrishRepublic. Accordingly, attitudes towards the EU are shaped by the territory’s unique con-stitutional history. By the time of the first modern-era ‘devolved’ elections, Sinn Féin’sposition shifts from opposition to one of critical engagement. In the case of the SDLP,the party has retained its long-standing commitment to European integration and itspost-devolution manifesto discourse evidences its issue-ownership of the matter. As inthe other devolved polities, a new pragmatism is evident; there is a marked decline inthe salience of the EU in the SDLP’s post-1998 election programmes; almost three-quartersof references were made in the first two ballots. In the case of Sinn Féin’s election pro-grammes, the EU has comparatively low salience throughout, which is unique amongstthe MNPs studied. This can be explained by the party’s politically-sensitive repositioningwhereby the European dimension has provided a useful context within which to modify itsoriginal claims to unfettered Irish sovereignty and move towards a pooling of sovereigntywithin the EU.

Instrumental Europeans? Minority Nationalist Parties’ 15

Critical discourse analysis shows MNPs’ policy on the EU to be fluid and contingent ona range of factors including the constitutional history of each territory and their influence ineach sub-state political system. Nevertheless, key commonalities can be identified. Frameanalysis shows there to be a residualization process at work. In each polity, this has takenthe form of a discursive transition involving convergence around ‘residual’ policy frames,notably a significant reduction in use of the ‘governance’ frame and corresponding growthin the ‘aid/social and economic development’ frame. According to this more cautious MNPstance, European supranational cooperation is not so much viewed as the constitutionalvehicle towards independence, but operates more as a fiscal-support mechanism. Thewider significance of the findings is in pointing to post-devolution instrumentalism andan ideologically fluid phase in MNP attitudes to the European project. In the wake ofstate restructuring, meso-elections present new discursive opportunities for MNPs toseek a mandate to build on the degree of self-government already attained through the(re)creation of regional polities without principal reliance on the goal of ‘independencein Europe’.

Notes1 NVIVO 9.2 Frames used in the coding process were: governance; aid/social and economic development; comparator [i.e.using European and other international examples as an index to reference sub-national progress/proposal];equality/progressive values; cooperation; language/culture; infrastructure; promoting local interests in EU;environment; agriculture; and miscellaneous.

3 Chi Square = 86.497, df = 3, P = 0.0034819.4 Chi Square = 35.085, df = 3, P = 1.2e-7.5 Chi Square = 24.234, df = 3, P = 0.00002232.6 Chi Square = 21.681, df = 3, P = 0.000076.7 Chi Square = 89.918, df = 3, P = 0.0115606.8 Chi Square = 303.401, df = 3, P = 00055487.

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