Buddha Nature

Bibliotheca Indo-Buddhica Series-No' 103

BUDDHA NATURE

Sallie B. Kin$

SRI SATGURU PUBLICATIONSA Diaision of

INDIAN BOOKS CENTREDELHI-INDIA

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Published by :

SRI SATGURU PUBLICATIONSIndological And Oriental PublishersA Division of

IndianBooksCentre r- I f / n F4 0 / 5 , S h a k t i N a g a r , > b t ' o l - JDelh i -110007 :

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(INDIA) A, ' . . ' : - ' * , t-" ' i ,

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' . r".ue/b ,O 1991 Stale Uuiverstiy of New York ' ' {/ i},.. u , , , , .

* , ,'UFn

All Rights Reservetl ' U i-r- -'tru

The Publication of this Book in India is made by pemrission of

State University of New York Press.

First Indian Edition : Delhi 1992

ISBN 8r-7030-308-9

No part of this book may be used or reproduced in any mautrerwhatsoever without written pemrission except in the case of briefquotations embodied in critical articles and reviews.

Frintecl at:D.K. Fine Art hess, Delhi.

PRINTED IN INDIA

For mY Parents,James Forrest Kin$, Sr.

andCarolyn Prout Kin$

CONTENTS

Preface

Ahlrreviations

Chapter One: Introduction

A. The Role of the Buddha Nature Concept

B. TermsC. HistoryD. The Text of the Buddhct Nature Treq'tise

E. The Buddhct Nature Treatise and Chinese

Buddhist Thou$ht

Chapter Two: The Concept of Buddha Nature

A. Takin$ the Semantic Ascent

B. Refutatittn of Other Views

C. The Essence of Buddha Nature

1. The Buddha Nature as Three Causes

2. The Three Natures (Tristsabhdva)

3. Tathd,gataParbha

Chapter Three: Soteriolo$y: Buddha Nature as the

Practice of Buddhism

A,. A9rayapardrsTttiB. Dharmakdrya and Nirtsd1trt'

C. Trikd,ya: Sambhogakd.ya and Nirma4akdrya

D. The Relationship Between Person and Buddha

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xi

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29293040404248

5758657280

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BUDDHA NATURE

Chapter Four: Dereification of Self and Mind

A. The "Own-Nature" of Buddha NatureB. AtmaparamitaC. SelfD. Pure trl indE. Dhqrmakaya and "Self'F. Mind

Chapter Five: Ontology: N{onism vs. Nondualism

A. All Sentient Beings Possess the Buddha NatureB. The ParamirtiC. Sanya-AlunyaD. Buddha Nature Exists AboriginallyE. Unborn and Unchanging

Chapter Sk: Engaging in Spiritual Cultivation

Chapter Seven: Buddha Nature and the Concept of Person

A. The Ontological-Metaphysical DimensionB. The Existential DimensionC. A Final Question

Chapter Eight: Retrospective and Prospective

A. Retrospective: Summary of the TextB. The Buddha N&ture Treqtise and Chinese

Buddhist ThoughtC. Buddha Nature ThouAht and \\'estern Buddhism

Notes

Glossary

Index

83

E38692C)J

9.195

99

10310.11 0 71 1 11 1 2

1t7

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139144150

153

153

156169

t 7 3

185

201.

v l l l

Preface

It is a pleasure to express my gratitude for the help of the many

persons and institutions who supported my work. The National

Endoq'ment t'or the Humanities funded this project in 1985 with a

Summer Stipend that supported the early stages of the book. Portions

of this book appearecl in journal articles as Sall ie B. Kin$' "Buddha

Nature and the Concept of Person," Philosophy East and West 39, no.

2 (19S9), published by the University of Harvaii Press; and Sall ie Behn

King, "The Buddha Nature: True Self as Action," Religious Studies 2O

(198,1), published by Cambrid$e University Press. My appreciation

Aoes to these journals and presses for theirpermission to publish this

material.I especially thank Professor Leon Hurvitz tbr checkin$ many of

rn1' Chinese translations against the ori$inal. Thanks also to Professor

tr'linoru Kiyota tbr introducin$ me to Buddha nature thou$ht and

raisin$ the issue of monism for me, to Professor Thomas Dean for

thinking through philosophical issues with me' and to Professor John

Keenan for reading the manuscript and makin$ helpful su6!$estions,

especially on Yogacara matters (this despite the fact that he disa$rees

with rny major thesis). My thanks to the Series Editor, Kenneth Inada,

for recommending additions to the book that have considerably

strengthened it. \\rhatever shortcomin$s remain in this work are

clearly my responsibil i ty alone. Finally, thanks to mv husband for his

constant practical and moral support.

The romanization system used in this *'ork is the Pinyin system'

For the convenience of those more familiar with the Wade-Giles

s-v-stem, I have zrdded \\'ade-Giles -romanizations in parentheses after

the Pinvin romarrization the first time I introduce a f.amlliar term or

lx

PREFACE

name. A glossary of chinese characters can be found at the back ofthe book.

I have conceive<l of this book not only as a discr"rssion of Buddhanature thought, but also as an introduction to some importantthemes in chinese Buddhist thought. Th.ugh I require mosi of thebook to develop these themes, I have listed them at the end of theIntroduction so that the reader who is especially interested in thisfacet of the book may bear these themes in mind as she or he reads.In tbe final chapter i focus on rhese themes directlv.

Abbrewiations

Bl,{T Buddha No,ture Trestise (Fo Xing Lun)

IBK Indogaku Bukkydyaku Kenk5ra

Ratna!,otra Ratnap,otravibhdga

Taish6 Taish6 Shinsh[ Daizdkyd

xl

CTHPTER ONE

Introduction

A. The Role of the Buddha Nature Concept

fT\h" concept of Buddha nature, though little discussed in Western

|. surveys of Buddhism, is one of the most important ideas in East

Asian Buddhisrn. In its simplest form, the Buddha nature conceptprovides the answer to a question with which the ancient Chinese

were very much concerned: Are all beings capable of attainin$

Buddhahood, or are there some who will never be free of the

sufferings of. sarysdraP Buddha nature theory answers rvithout

equivocation: "All sentient beings possess the Buddha nature" and

thus are guaranteed the realization of Buddhahood. Not only human

beings, but all beings born and reborn in the six destinies-hell

beings, hungry ghosts, animals, fighting demons, human bein$s, andgods-are promised that Buddhahood awaits them. The belief in the

icctrflntika, the one forever incapable of attaining Buddhahood, is

expressly rejected. At its basis, then, the Buddha nature concept is an

optimistic and encouraging doctrine.When we look further into this notion, its optimism increases, as

do the philosophical problems attachqd to it. When one asks how the

promise of future Buddhahood is realized, what the present

mechanism for this future achievement is, the answer is that insofar

BUDDFIA NATURE

as we '(possess" the Buddha nature, we already are Buddhalike, we

already possess the attributes of a Buddha-wisdom and compassion.

This introduces the second level of the Buddha nature concept: Not

only will we be Buddhas in the future, we already are Buddhas now.

Buddha nature, then, is both the potential tQ realize Buddhahood

that is possessed by all and the already complete Buddhahood that is

ours in the present.

Obviously, we do not experience ourselves as Buddhas-perfectly

wise and compassionate bein$s-in our present condition of delusion.

Insofar as our Buddha nature is not experientially realized-insofar,

that is, as we experience ourselves as deluded bein$s-we ore deluded

beings and not, experientially, Buddhas. In such a case' our Buddha

nature is covered up or concealed from us by "adventitious defile-

ments," such as i$norance, hatred, fear, desire-all the Buddhist vices'

These defilements constitute our "ordinary" experience in surysara.

Buddha nature theory holds that these defilements are adventitious or

accidental; in other words, they are not necessary, not essential to the

human condition, but simply the products of past karma.

It is possible, however, to free oneself of that past karma and thus

of the power that the defilements have to construct our reality. Once

we are free of the defilements, our Buddha natur€ will become

experientially available to us. It, unlike the defilements, is essential to

the human condition; it is there for us always, whether or not we are

experientially in touch with it. The defilements are able to conceal

the Buddha nature from us only to the extent that we allow our past

karma to determine our lives. With meditation and meritorious deeds

we can free ourselves of our karma and realize our Buddhahood. Our

Buddha nature, then, is our true and essential nature and identity.

Buddha nature theory affirms that each of us is fully capable of

realizing-making experientially present to ourselves-this enli$ht-

ened nature that is our birthright as sentient bein$s.

This optimistic view of both human nature and of our ultimate

spiritual destiny was attractive to the Chinese. Indeed, the

acceptance of Buddha nature became normative for Chinese

Buddhism as a whole. The Fa-xian$ school (Fa-hsian$; Chinese

Yogvcdra) of Xuan-zang (Hsiian-tsan$) was rele$ated to a relatively

low status in the hierarchical rankin$s of Buddhist doctrine

constructed by leadin$ Chinese thinkbrs due to its affirmation of the

i.cchantika doctrine and rejeotion of universal Buddhahood.

2

INTRODUCTION

This acceptance of Buddha nature entered into the foundations ofthe indigenous Chinese Buddhist schools, especially Tian-rai (T'ien-t'ai), Hua-yan (Hua-yen) and Chan (Ch'an), in all of which it played amajor role. The influence of Buddha narure thought on the pure Landschool, with its emphasis on faith in Amida, is somewhat lessstraightforward. Seve ral texts of the tathiigatagar b ha-Buddha naruretradition,l such as the Snmatada:I Sirqthanarilct Sitra and the WuShang Yi Jing, make much of the fact that Buddha nature, as such, isinconceivable, and on this basis they recommend iaith in the Buddhawho teaches this doctrine as the appropriate religious pracrice. More-over, the t&thdgqng&rbhs.-Buddha nature doctrine of the four "perfec-tions" possessed by the Buddha's dharntakur^a and the very positivelanguage with which the Buddha, dhartnakaya, ninsanw, and the likeare lauded in texts of this tradition open the door to devotional prac-tices in Buddhism. Takasaki Jikidd goes so far as to say that ,,the coreof the tathdgatagarbha theory is in : . . the 'pure' t'aith in the Buddha"and asser ts that there is an "essent ia l in terre lat ion" amon$tathdgqtagqrbha theory, laudation of the Buddha, and stupa worship.2This claim of an essential interrelationship, however, applies only toone part ofthetathngatagarbha-tsuddha nature textual corpus, not, infact, to the text that is the subject of this study. It is true, though, thattexts of the devotional tqthag&ngc(rbha-Buddha nature tradition prob-ably contributed in a $eneral way to the developmenr of the clevotionalPure Land tradition. A direct link can be seen in Japan, where shinranstated that the actualization of fairh (the faith upon which all elsehinges in his Jddo Shinshn secr) is accomplished in the individual bythe action of the Buddha nature.l

As appropriated and developed by the t'our major indigenous schoolsof chinese tsuddhism, the Buddha nature concept traveled to the otherEast Asian Buddhist countries, where it played a vital role. In short, theBuddha nature concept is pivoral for all of East Asian Buddhism. Itstands at the foundarion of East Asian Buddhist concepts of humanbeing and spirituaiity and infbrms their understanding of the possibil-ities and ends of human life. It is an essential piece to the puzzle of EastAsian Buddhist thought and pracrice.

B. Terms

Any discussion of theconsideration of the term

n

term Buddhcr n&ture must beg,in withtuthdganEqrbha, to which it is closely

' 1

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BUDDHA NATURE

linked. The Sanskrit work tath&Ecttug(trbhq, is a compound of two

terms, tathqg,atq and garbha. Ta,thd.gata is itself understood as a

compound word that can be interpreted in two ways: as tatha +

agaia, "thus come"; or tatha + gcltct, "[hus gone." It is an epithet for

a Buddha, who is "thus $one" in realization from sqmscr'rq' to

ninsar.ta, and ,,thus come" fuom nirzoa4a to sarysara to work for the

salvation of all. The term P,arbha also has two meanin$,s, embryo and

womb. Thus, the term tathegatagarbha may mean either "embryonic

Tathagata" (i.e., the incipient Buddha) or "womb of the Tathegata,"

understood as that which possesses the essential attributes of the

Tathdgata in their fully developed form. The first meanin$ often is

<liscussed as the "cause" of the Tathagata, and the latter meanin$ as

the "fruit" of Tathagata. As "fruit," it represents the fulfillment of the

Buddha Path and is linked with such terms as dharrnakd'ya, nircdrya,

perfect wisdom, and realizatlon.

The Chinese decided $enerally to translate the term

nthdgatugarbha in the latter sense as womb of the Tathagata. In

Chinese, the term is rendered nt-lai'xtn$ (Japanese nyoraizd)' The

term nt-lai exactly renders t&thdgqn as "thus come," and a xan$' is a

storehouse. Thus the Chinese translation shows a preference for

conceiving the tathdgrttagarblw as the container of the Tathegata

(i.e., the womb) rather than that which is contained (the embryo)'

The Budd.ha I'{ature Treatise (hereafter BN?),4 the focal text of

this study, uses a distinctive device to maintain the double meaning

of the Sanskrit tq,thd*qtasarbha in Chinese. The author of our text

glosses ru,-lai-zanf, as (1) the contained, that which is held within the

storehou.e, and (2) the storehouse as the container (BN? 795c-

796a). The first meanin$ represents the understandin$ ol garbha as

embryo; the BNT specifies that that which is contained in the

storehouse, the embryo, is ordinary sentient bein$s' The second

meaning represents $arbha understood as womb qua the fruit of the

Buddhist path. This text likens the tathdgatagarbha in this respect to

jewels, which represent the Buddha's merits. These two readings thus

retain the bivalent sense of the Sanskrit P,arbha.The term Bud'dhq nlanffe (Chinese/o xin!,, Japanese busshd) is

closely related in meanin$ 6 tathdgqtagarbhct' Horvever, it is not the

chinese translation of the latter; in fact,/o xins, is a chinese term for

which the sanskrit equivalent is not rdadily apparent. This missin$

Sanskrit equivalent has been the topic of considerable discussion among

4

INTRODUCTION

Buddhist scholars.s Scholars now $enerally a$ree that the Sanskrit

equivalenr isbuddhsdhdtu. Takasaki Jikidb explains buddhadhdtu as

signifying: (1) the nature (dhatu : dharmata) of the Buddha, thus

equivalent to the term dharmakaya, and (2) the cause (dhatu :

hetu'1 oI the Buddha. lvloreover, he says, "the link between the cause

and the result is the nature @hAru) comrnon to both, which is nothin$

but the dharm&dhd,trtr."6 lt should be noted that this understandin$

claims for the Sanskrit buddhqdhafu the bivalence of the Chinese/b

x:in(,, embracing as it does the sense ol buddhadhdtu as cause of

Brrddhahood and as Buddhahood in fruition.

In passing we may also mention \\tralen Lai's observation that the

Chinese had a predilection for the use of the term xin!' due to the

use of the term xin$ (nature, or human nature) in the Confucian

tradition, where it represented the essence or core of human

personhood.T The Confucian tradition assumed that the essence of a

human being was a moral nature and debated the loftiness or

depravity of that moral nature. The tsuddhist use of the term xing in

Jo xing, unlike the Confucian use, is not concerned primarily with the

moral nature of the human bein$, although ethical implications are

imbedded in the notion. Like the Confucian use, however, the term/o

xrnf refers to what, in the Buddhist view, is essential in the human

being. Given the history of the term xin{, in China, it was a natural

choice for the translators of Buddhist texts. As the indi$enous

Chinese Buddhist tradition developed, the term nt-lai-zan!, rapidly

faded in prominence, whereas the term Jo xinS $rew to become

central for the entire tradition.

C. History

Buddha nature thought is rooted in the Indian Mahiydna

doctrinal tradition. It will be helpful for a proper understandin$ of the

Buddhn Nature Trestise to place it historically in the context of the

history of Yo$flciira, praifid,paramitd., Mddhyamika, and tat@a-

togarbha thought.

The Yogdcira School

An intellectual history of the Yo$icdra school cannot be $ivenwith any confidence at present. Not only are the authorship and dates

of a number of the major Yo$4ciira works subject to debate and the

BUDDHT\ NATURE

lineaS,e of ideas \vithin the school undetermined, the very ideasthemselves are subject to a great breadth of interpretation. For thisreason, our understandin$ of even the most basic history andprinciples of this school is constantly subject to revision.

The Yogdcdra school is based upon the works of trvo brothers,Asanga and \rasubandhu, fourth-century C.8., and a third figure,Maitreya (or Maitreya-ndtha), the histcrical status of whorn is subjectto debate but who is regarded as the teacher of Asanga.s Tibetantradition ascribes to Maitreya the authorship of five books: theMahayanasutralarikara, Madhydntatsibhdga, Dhqrmqdhqrma-tdvibhdga, Abhisamayd,lahkara, and Ratnogotratsibhdga (Uttara-

tantra). The first three of these are foundational to YogdcZra thoughtand represent pre-Asanga nY ogdcdra thought. The Abhisamuydlahk ara,on the other hand, is concerned with prajfidparamitq ideas; and theRatnagotransibhagct belongs to the tathdgatagxrbha line.

Asanga wrote a number of inrporrant Yoglcdra works, includingthe Abhidhqrmclsumuccctyq,, Mahayanasarytp,raha, ancl Vajrac-chedikd,prujiidparamit{t-sutra-Sqstrq-kdrika. In addition to hisliterary works, Asan$a is famous for convertin$ his youn$er brother,Vasubandhu, to Mahdydna and Yogdcdra. Following his conversion,Vasubandhu is said to have pored over the Mahdy6na literature,especially the prajfrdpdr&mita siitru literature and to have countedsutr@s in this categ,ory among his I'avorites.e Thereatler, the brothersAsanga and Vasubandhu, together with the historical or nonhistoricalMaitreya, were regarded as the lbunders of the Yogdcara school.

\tasubandhu's intellectual career had two major chapters. Heearly composed a commentary on San'dstivada teachin$s, his famousAbhidhqrmakoSa-bhd,s3a. After his conversion to Mahayana, \h-subandhu wrote voluminously, including Vim$qtikd-kdrikd, Trirn-Sikd-kdrika, Madl4tanta.vibhd,ga-bhasga, Mahdyd.nasutctlqir.kara-bhasSa, and Trisrsabhdva-mirde(a, as well as commentaries on manyMahaydna s{Ltrqs, including the Lotus (Sadtlharma-punQarika),M a hapari n insana and Da1abh um i ka. t'

Until recently, rnodern scholars have thought of the two great

Indian Mahayana schools, Madhyamika and Yogdc-ara, as inherentiyopposed to each other. Mddhyamika has been conceived as the Sunyaschool, the school characterized by the relentless critical dialectic ofNdgdrjuna that demolishes ali metaphysical views. Without substitut-in$ a "view" of his own, Nagarjuna demonstrates that due to the

6

INTRODUCTION

interdependence and hence mutual relativity of all things (as taughtin the early Buddhist prcltitycrsantutpada), all erttities are empty(Snrrya) of own-being (sr>abhdva)-the ability to "own" their ownbeing, the ability to be themselves by themselves-and hence arelacking in all independent identity and characteristics.

As part of his avoidance of estabiishing any constructive view ofhis own, Ndgdrjuna emphasizeci that 9ilnyatd, (emptiness) is not to bereg,arded as the Truth, but merely as a tool (upd.ya) to be used forsoteriological purposes; that is, the purposes of the Buddhistpractitiorrer striving for liberation. Silnyatd, itself is empty and surelynot any kind of ultimate. The teaching of emptiness, however, is notnihilistic, because as a teaching it promotes liberation and, moreover,is identical with the principle of. pratttyasamutpd.da or thedependent coarising of all things. Nevertheless, these balancingpoints did not prevent the Madhyamika school's standpoint frombeing viewed as negative. Given the school's emphasis on destructivecriticism, its refusai to advocate any "view," and its espousal of theterm $ilnya,td, this response was inevitable.

In contrast, the Yo$dcdra school, until recently, has been viewedby modern scholars as espousing a metaphysical view; namely,Idealism. Yotacdra was regarded as teaching that external objects arenot real as such, that the category of "objects" is empty, and thacwhat we take to be objects simply are constructions of the mind. Inthis understanding of Yogdcara, the Mind itself is real; in fact, the onlyreality. The apparent facr that.the advocacy of this view by theYogacdrins could follow on the heels of Nagirjuna's destruction of thevery possibility of holding metaphysical views at all has puzzled a:nddismayed many a Buddhist scholar. Recently the scholarly commu-nity, however, has determined that this picture of two antitheticalMahdydna schools has been overstated, that MZdhyamika andYo{acdra, at least irr their classical forms, are not in fact mutuallyincompatible in a philosophical sense.

First, as we have seen, Mddhyamika is not nihilistic and isnegative only in the form of its languaSe and dialectic; strictlyspeaking, its philosophical standpoint is not negative, becausenegativity is dualistic and 9unyata is the emptyinS of all dualisms.Thus, regardless of the philosophical status of Yogdcara, Mddhyanrikaitself cannot occupy a negative pole ih any typology of philosophicalpositions.

BUDDTIT\ NATURE

Secorrd, most scholars now believe that Yogacdra anci lvlddhyamikashould be seen as differing in emphasis, though not disagreeinS, onmajor points. Nagao Gadjin, fbr example, has long held that classical

I'{ddhyamika and Yogacdra should be seen as complementary rather

than antagonistic: the forrner stressing lo$ic and the dialectic of

6unyata, the latter stressing meditation and the understandin$ of

consciousness. Of course, later Yogacara and Nladhyamika thinkers

did come to argue as adversaries, but such was not the attitude of thefounders of the schools. Nagao summarizes the situation in the East

Asian context as lbllows:

In the Sino-Japanese Buddhist tradition, the Madhyamika and Yo$acara-\rijfldnavada tenets have been understood to be both parallel and opposite toeach other. The San-lun-tsun, the Chinese version of the Madhyamika, wasregarded as nihilistic,or an Emptiness School, and the Fa-hsian$-tsun, theVijidnavdda, was re$arded as realistic or arr Existence School. . . Thesetraditional but erroneous vieu's have now been revised by ntost modernscholars. Presently, the Madhyamika philosophy . . . is believed to be whollyinherited by Nlaitreya-niitha, Asan$a, and other Yo$icaras. ThePrajfiaparamitd stltras are equally revered as authentic by both schools,

and further, the doctrine of emptiness occupies an important position even

in the Yogdcara school.rl

Third, as Na$ao mentions, it is important to bear in mind that the

YoSdc-ara school, in its classical form, does rtot reject the emptiness

teaching of the Madhyamika school, but on the contrary integrates it

in an essential way into its own philosophy. As Na$ao stated, the

works of Maitreya, Aspnga, and Vasubandhu, in their ori$inal form,

have "wholly inherited" the emptiness teachings of the Madhyamika.

Thus the founders of Yogacara are not the opponents of MZdhyamika,

but their successors. We have seen that both Asairga and Vasubandhu

commented upon prajfrd texts and that Vasubandhu was so taken by

the prajftdp&rclmita literature that comin$ to terms with it formed

one of the pillars of his lvlahaydna cont'ersion. Their work, and the

works attributed to Maitreya, reflect an acceptance of (Snyata as

foundational, but with an interpretation and extension of that

thought in a fresh direction.With Sdnyard at its roots, what are we to make of the vierv that

Yo!6cdra teaches an Idealism that repards objects as false and the

mind as real? In brief, we must reco$nize the existence of more than

I

INTRODUCTION

one view within Yogacara. Minimally, we must distinguish betrveenthree chapters of YoSdcdra thought: (1) the original teachings ot'l\{aitreya, Asanga, and Vasubandhu; and the interpretations of theoriginal teachings made by (2) Dharmapdla and Xuan-zang and (3)Paramirtha.

Dharmapdla and Xuan-zang's work ma)r properly be calledIdealism. The importance of Xuan-zang in the East Asian tradition isone reason why the labei of ldealism has been attached to theYotd,cdra school as a whole. However, the idea that the yogdc4raschool as a rvhole may sirnply be labeled Idealist is mistaken ormisleading in two senses. First, it is a moot point whether Idealism ispresent in the texts of Maitreya, Asan!,a, and Vasubandhu in theiroriginal form. Contemporary scholars line up on both sides of thisissue. Second, it is definitell' not the case thar the yogdcdra ofParamArtha (Zhen-di, the translator of the present Buddhq, NatureTreatise) is ldealism.

Those scholars who ar$ue that Vasubandhu's views are notIdealist generally agree on an alternative vierv as to what is hisphilosophy of mind. Ueda summarizes his rrnderstandinA as follou,s:

Vikalpu or vi.ifinnapctrinamo refers to the consciousness of an ordinaryman, i .e., a man who is noi -vet enl ightened. The object rvhich is kno*,nthrough this vijfi.anaparinama is not a thing as it really is, but rather aconceptualized thing. In other words, this mind does not grasp the obiect asit really is, but raiher as a_ concept or namc. In truth, he does not take realexistence itself as the object, but instead takes the concept as the obiect andthinks that he is taking real exisrence as the object, not realizing $,hat he hasdone. . . . In cortrast to this, the mind of the Yogacara philosopher is callcdprct'jfii or nir-oikalpa jfianra (rvisdom "apart" or dift'erent in its nature fromdkalpa or vijiiamt). This mind does not kno*' an object throuShconception, but rather it knows directlv the obiect as it reallv exists(yqthabhiltartha).12

Janice Willis agrees with this assessment as applying to bothVasubandhu and Asan{,a:

[Tlhe I'imiarika lot Vasubandhul illuminates the ordinary being's chiefdelusion, namely,' his mistaking the commonly perceived universe ofappearance to exist as perceit:ed rarher than as a universe distorted b-vconceptualization of all sorts. Indeed, this overla-v of constructiveimaSinations (kalpand, vijnapti, vikalpa\ is all that we commonlv contact

BUDDHA NATURE

and cog,nize. We do not see the thing as it really is; we see only aconceptualized thing. And this is precisely Vasubandhu's point (as it hadbeen Asand,a's also). All that we commonly perceive is vijfiaptintdtra. It isonly "representation" or "just conceptualization." And because of this, it isnot ultimate realiw.I3

Whether this assessment fairly represents Vasubandhu's corpus asa whole will continue to be debated by the scholarly community. I amconfident, however, that this summary does represent the Vasubandhuthat Paramdrtha understands himself to be transmitting to China. Inother words, what "consciousness-only" means in Vasubandhu, as un-derstood by Paramartha, is a strong version of somethin$ we realize ina weak way in contemporary Western psychology and philosophy:

Ordinary human consciousness does not have access to a purely "ob-jective" reality. Our experiential world, the world we perceive and inwhich we live, is shaped in all moments of ordinary consciousness bywhat we project-our expectations, fears, memories, confusions, sus-picions, beliefs, and so forth-onto what is given to us. We do notexperience reality; we experience our personally shaped (and conse-quently distorted) perceptions of reality.

IJnlike Western thought, however, the raison-d'6tre of theYogilc-ara school is the belief that it is possible, and ultimatelynecessary, by means of meditation to effect a revolution in themanner of one's being conscious such that one no longer lives in adistorted perception of reality but can actually perceive reality As ItIs. This is the aim of Yotdcdra practice; it is toward this thatVasubandhu's writings, as understood by Paramdrtha, point. This alsois a prominent theme of the BN?.

The main points here, moreover, are in harmony with theemptiness teachings of Madhyamika. As part of the realization ofreality As It Is, this understanding of Yogdcdra includes a realizationof the falseness of the dualistic split between subject and object thatordinary consciousness believes is real. We have seen earlier that"subjectivity" participates in what we ordinarily take to be the"objective" and from this follows the emptiness of the "objective";that is, the deep dependence of the "objective" upon the "subjective."The same applies, in reverse, to the status of the "subjective." Whenone realizes the emptiness of the""objective," realization of theemptiness of the "subjective" follows in its wake. If there is no"object" to perceive, there can be no "subject" perceivin$. Hence the

l0

INTRODLTCTION

categories subject and object are mutually dependent and as suchdemonstrate each other's emptiness. A$ain, Janice Will is summarizes:"far from advocatin$, the superiority of thought over objects, Asanga'sexplication of Sunyata and tlre N{iddle Path involves the cessation ofboth sub.ject and object, both apprehender and thing apprehended."laWe shall meet this idea again in the BN?. The dualistic distinctionbetween "subject" and "object" itself is false; freedom frorn

experience in the form of this distinction constitt l tes access to

experienee of reality As It Is. This is subject-object nondualism.So t'ar I have emphasized the common ground shared b1'

N'{ddhyamika and Yogacara, their shared foundation in iunyctthought, but it is obvious that the two schools also differ on this very

subject. This difference can be summarized in t$'o points. First, forpedagogical reasons, Yoghcara authors did not like the negative form

of Nlddhyamika. In their experience this nefl,ativity frightened or

demoralized people. Since all Buddhist forms are upa5,ct anyr.r'ay, itmade no sense to espouse a form that drove people from the Dharmavvhen a more appealinS, form easily could be used. This sentiment isabundantly clear in man-v Yo$acara texts. Second, and moresubstantively, Yogacara authors believed that the llladhl'amikaversion of \{aha1'ana did not say er.erything it could say; it wasincomplete. Even today one can read Na$arjuna's Mulct-mndhyamaka-kfirika and debate forever about rvhether, for Nagarjuna,Buddhist practice gives access ,to reality As It Is. The Kdriketthemselves give us no basis tor deciding yes or no. This is a mark ofthe perfection of the Karik{l. A literary or logical perfection, however,is not sufficienr for most religious practitioners. Yogacdra authors feltit important to affirm the existential end spiritual benefits thatresulted from the practice of their disciplines. For these reasons, theytook up the language of Thusness (tathata) and reality As It Is

$tathabhutct), being careful to note that these pointed in thedirection of the experiential fulf i l lment of emptiness, not its negation.

Tathigatagarbha Lit er ary H istory

The tathhgataga.rbha literature, like the prajftdpdramita litera-ture, is not the property of an-v identifiable school in IndianBuddhism. In the former we have a body of texts introducing andexpanding upon a similar theme, the idea that "all sentient beings

1 l

BLTDDHT\ NATLIRE

posses the tclthdgataq,arbha." Although this theme and the set ofconcerns associated rvith it are readily identifiable in the texts, wecannot identify the authors of the texts nor even, with any specificity,the group a.mong whom the texts circulated at the time of theircornposition. The four most important early tqthdgqtagctrbha sutrqsare the Tathdgatagarbha sutrct, Srtmalade"ot-simhanddq-sutra,Anunntrsdpurqa,tv-a-nirde6a, and Mahd.parinin)ctnq-sutrct ls Thesetexts were composed in India between approximately 200 and 350C.8.16 That puts them before the time of Asanga and lhsubandhu.

The Tathagatagarbh{bsfutra may have been the first of thetuthAg,etag(trbha texts; it introduces the idea that "all sentient beingspossess the tathdgatagarbha" in a metaphorical and philosophicallyunsophisticated manner. The text consists of nine examples thatrepresent the relationship between the tathdgatugarbha and theadventitiorrs defilements that conceal it. Thus the tathd,gata!,arbha iscompared to $rain covered by the husk, a treasure buried under theground, a Buddha statue wrapped in a ra!, and so on; where thedefiiements are the husk, the ground, the rag-whatever covers orconceals that which is precious. Although these images are notphilosophically developed, as images they are appealing to theimagination and convey the basic idea of the universal immanence ofBuddhahood that nonetheless is experientially unavailable toordinary persons.

Other texts built on this basic idea, and sometimes on the imagesthemselves, in a much more sophist icated manner. TheSrimdlddezsi-siryhandd&-s'ntre, in which Queen Srimala instructsthe assembly, speaks in both a devotional and a philosophicall.v astutemanner oI a tathagatapprbha conceived in terms of positiveattributes. It is critical of a purely negative understandinSof 1unyatdand teaches that the tclthagcLtclEctrbha isboth 9ilnya (rvith respect toall defilements) and asunya, "not-empty" (with respect to theperfection of the buddhadhq,rmas). The garbha possesses the four

Sur.taparamitct, or perfections, of permanence, bliss, self, and purity.It is the intrinsically pure mind that is concealed by defilement. Thisrelationship betl'een the intrinsically pure mind and the defilementthat conceals it is incomprehensible, understood only by a Buddha.Llltimately, the farbha is identified vrith the dharmakdyo of theTathaSata; thus only a Buddha attains nirxiirya. This kind of elevationand laudation of the Buddha and his attributes is a popular theme in

t2

INTRODLICTION

much of the tathdgutc@arbha literature and often is seen as an

important foundation of lr'lahdydna devotionalism'

Ttre Anuncltvclpurnlttq-nirdeict is a short text with a simply

statecl bitt paradoxical theme: the absolute identification nf

t(fihcrlatugarbha, sattvadhatu (the totality of all sentient bein$,s in

their essential nature), and dharmakdrya or dhqrntadhdfu' The text

emphasizes that in order to become free of rvron$ views' one thing

must be known; namely, the sin$le dhqrmadhatu' The latter is

identified with the tathAgatug&rbha and the dhs'rmakdya' This

dharmakd;to, when bounJ by defilements. "drifting on the rvaves of

sarysd,ra," is called sentient beings. This same dharmakaya' when

filled with repugnance for the sufferin$ oL sarysd'ra, in putting aside

all desires, practicin$ the ten pAramitd, embracin$ the 84'000

Dharma $ates, and cultivatin! bodhisattva practices, is called

brsdhiscttrca.s. A$ain, this same dhannakaya, when free from all

defilements and utterly pure' is called Tath'dgata' Thus tbe

dharmakdyo is the realm of sentient bein$s, and the realm of

sentieni bein$s is the dhsrmakdya' These are two names with one

meanin$.l7 llence, whereas the Srimfrla-sd'trcl emphasizes the

trurrr"*nd"nce of the t&thcigangarbha in the Buddha' this text

emphasizes the immanence of tathdeat&garbha' in ordinary sentient

beings. These, of course, are not contradictory positions but

"ornf, l"-"rltary emphases, f,iven the basic t&thcig&tu9p'rbho doctrine

of concealed immanence; that is, ontolo$ical immanence joined with

eXistential transcendence'The Ma'hdparinirnana-sutro is a Mahayana alternative to the

Mahd.oarinibbclncr'suttanta ol early Buddhism'r8 The former text's

teachingls on the Buddha nature exerted enormous'influence on the

history of g,raahu nature thou$ht in China, especially the question of

the universality of future Buddhahood. The Chinese debate on the

quesrion was framed by the fifth century translations of the Ma'hd'pa-

rinirrcan}a-suta by Dharmakgema and Fa-xian (Fa-hsien)' The first

translation. that of Fa-xian, indicated that the icchantika, would not

attain Buddhahood. Despite the authority of this scripture, the $reat

monk Dao-sheng (Tao-shen$) do$$edly insisted upon universal Bud-

dhahood and consequently was ostracized from the San$ha' He later

was vindicated and elevated to prominence when the much lon$'er

translation by Dharmakgema was seen to include passa$es supporting

universal Buddhahood, even for theicchantiko.le with this resolved,

13

BUDDHA NATURE

chinese scholars settled into careful and extensive study of the text'steachings about what Buddha nature is.

Despite this important historical role, the Mahdparinirwa4a-sutro does not present any important innovation in t&thdgqtaga,rbhatheory comparable to the three texts already discussed. As rve ha'eseen, it tends to be rather unsystematic and seems to speak withmany voices. This very irnprecision, however, made the text a fruitfulone for later students and commentators, who were obliged to createtheir own order and bring it to the text. substantively, the textemphasizes the eternity of the Buddha, implicitly criticizing the ideathat ninsdqa means extinction, and linking this belief with the idea ofthe tathdgatagarbha.2o Within this framework, however, the textspeaks of Buddha nature in so many different ways that chinesescholars created a variety of lists of types of Buddha nature that theydiscerned in the course of their studies of the text.2l

The most important innovation of the text in the context of thedevelopment" ol ta,thd,gatasarbha-Buddha nature thought is itslinking of the term buddhqdhd"tu or tathdeatadhatu, which appearsto be used for the first time in this text, with the tathagatap,arbha.22we saw earlier that the chinese term fo rin6f best translates thesanskrit buddlwdhdtu or tathd,gatadhdtu, so this is a crucial pointfor Chinese Buddha nature thought.

These are the four most important tctthagatugarbha sutros of theearly period. This early tradition is summarized by an inportant ddsrrcr,the Ratnagotrursibhdga, also know as the Mahayan6ttarcttantresd,str& ar simply [Jttqrq,tantrq. In the west this text is perhaps the bestknown of the early tctthdgatugarbhq, texts (with the arguable excep-tion of the Srtmalada,sr-siltra, which has received recent attention).having been translated into English and studied by both obermillerand rakasaki.23 Modern scholarship has revised our beliefs about thetext of the Ratna,gotr(1. As we have seen, Tibetan tradition attributesthe Ratnapotrq to Maitreya, as one of the Five Books of the latter. onthe basis of his studies, Takasaki leaves the attribution of the Rqurc,e-otr@'s verses to Maitreya intact (thou$h unsure) but names sdramatias the author of the prose commentary of the text.2a He dates the textas we have it tc-r the early fifth-century c.E. and places the versessometime between Ndgdrjuna and Asanga.2s Sanskrit, Tibetan, andchinese versions of the text all exist, thoug$r the sanskrit text wasdiscovered only recently, with the edited version published in 1950.26

T4

INTRODUCTION

Although the basic verses are from Maitreya, the Ra'tna'$otra

lacks characteristic Yo$dcara teachin$s and is a text of the

tutha,gatqearbha stoup. The Ratrut$otre quotes extensively from the

first three tqthargetagctrbha sutras listed earlier and less extensively

from the Mahdparinitpa4&'sutrQ" It does quote two Yo$6cara texts,

Matfiyanabhid.harmq- sutra and Mahdydna,siltrdlcdtkd'ra, but with-

out referring to their specificaily Yo$dcdra teachin$s.27 In $eneral it is

a summary and systematization of then-extant tathatgdtagarbha

thou$ht.The Ratnagotra is noted for its discussion of the Three

Jewels-Buddha, Dharma, and San$ha-and clear elevation of the

Buddha as the Supreme Refu$e as compared to the Dharma and

Sangha. Like the Snmaladerst'sutra this manifests the tendency of

some tdthAeatug&rbha literature to provide a foundation for

Mahaydna devotionalism. There is a $lorification of the Buddha

followed by a discussion of the importance of faith at the end of the

text.The Ratnagotra also is important for its systematization of

tat@angarbho discourse around ten characteristics in terms of

which the tathdga,tdgarbha is discussed. These ten characteristics

reappear in the BNT together with considerable additions.2s As found

in the Ratnagotra, thev are: o\f,'n-nature (essential nature of the

tutha4atagerbha) i tathn gq,uTgctrbha as cause (of purification, i. e.,

realization); tqthA*qtegarbha as result (of purification, i'e., the four

Sur.wpd,ramitcl); function oI tathdgata'larbha (i.e., the ur$e towards

realization); yoga or union (with the Buddha's qualities of purity,

wisdom, and compassion); manifestation (of the tathdg&tagQ'rbha in

various classes of bein$s); states of manifestation (of the

tat@ata*qrbha amon$ ordinary persons, bodhisattoas, and the

Tathagata); all-pervadingness (of the tathd'gata,Parbha in these three

states); unchan$eability (of the tathfr,$ata$arbha in these three

states); and nondifferentiation ("f the tathdEata$orblw and

dharmakd,ya, T athegpta, ninsdq'a).zeThese are the early, important texts of tq,th&,gatagarbha thought.

We neecl now to consider the relationship of these ideas to the idea of

enptiness as found in tllre proiftdpdramitd literature' as we did with

the Yogdcira tradition. As with. the Yo$6cdra, we will see that

tuthagetuSarbha thoustt, at least as it is found in the Rafiw$otra

and closely related texts, is a successor to {finrya thou$,ht, a

t 5

BUDDIIA NATURE

development frcm within this tradition, r-ather than an antagonisticopponent standin$ without.

in his E'cnnyct Shislshi (History oJ Prqiiid Thought\, YamaguchiSusumu traces the development of Buddhist thqught from pratigta-samutpctd& and Sunyata to the tMhdgqngerbha thought of theRatnap,otra.3o He argues for a single traditiori in which the Buddhaspeaks of. pratl,tya-samutpada; Ndgdrjuna extends this idea to6inyutd; and the Rcttnctg()tra extends the same idea tonthAgcrtuE&rbhn. The Ratrwgotro itself invites us to see thiscontinuity. The text first quotes the Sfimdld-sdtra to the effect. thattathdgangdrbhe is not accessible to those outside of *finyarealization and then proceeds to claim its tathd,gete$arbha teachingsto be a corrective to the errors of those fledgling bodhisattsa^s whohave misunderstood 6inya teachings in a nihilistic or absolutisticmanner.31 This means that realization of emptiness is a necessaryprecondition to realization ol tctthdgatasarbha. However, a one-sidedly negative perspective betrays an incorrect apprehension ofemptiness that can be corrected by realization ol tathdgatagarbha.The role assigned Sunyata here is much like that assigned it in theYo{A.cAra evaluation: Sunyctta is essential, but must not beunderstood in a negative sense (and we may safely conclude on thebasis of all this concern that it frequently was so understood).

Like the Yogacara authors. the author of the Ratnag,otra ieelseven this is not enough; there is something positive to be realizedwherr one's vision has been cleared by {ilnyatd; namely, thetathdgata4arbha-dhqrmaka.va, resplendent with the f.our pu4apd,ra-mita ol eterniq/, bliss, self, and purity, identical to nirvd4a andrealization of the Supreme Truth. Thus the 6Enya teachings as theystand irr the prajfidpAremita teachings are true but incomplete. Theyrequire further elucidatiorl, which the Ratnnpctfro provides. This isreflected in the alternative name of the R&tnagotra, namelyLittqratqntra. The Ratnagotra assumes the pr&jfifr.paramitd, teach-inf,,s as the punsa or prior teachings; it itself is uttqr&, in the sense ofboth snbsequent and superior.32 Thus the Ratnagotra's tath.dgata-

farblw teaching does not negate but extends prajfrn teachings. Itboth corrects the misunderstanding of 6dnya as nihilistic andcompletes the message that 1furryata. merely begins by naming thesuperlatives that *unyato prepares the mind to perceive.

Yamaguchi's analysis of the relationship between prajfid, thought

16

BLTDDFIA NATURD

identities of the authors and eadiest enthusiasts for tathagatafarbhathou$ht are unknown, it was a portion of the Yo$acara communitywho subsequently took up the tathagutagarbha texts, studied them,and ultimately combined tathAgatagarbha ideas with their orvnYogdcara philosophy. Thus, some time atter the composition of theexclusively tq,thdEatqgerbho texts discussed earlier, a number ofsyncretic Y o$acdr a-tathdeatq*&rbho texts were written. ra prom i ne n texamples of such texts include the LahkdcJ&tdro"-sutra,rs theAwakenin! of Faith in Mahdyana (Da Sheng ei Xin Lun), and thepresent Buddhct l,{q,ture Treqtise.

This is not to say that all later Yog6c6rins embracedtq,thdEutqgqrbha thought. The school of Dharmapdla and Xuan-zangtended to keep its distance lrom tathd,gatagarbha ideas. This schoolmaintained the Eotr& theory, according to which dift'erent beings haddiffering potentials for spiritual attainment, depending upon thenature of the "seeds" or bija stored in the dtaya-tsijfid.na andresponsible for shaping the nature of ttreir subsequent births. In thisview each being belonged to one of the five gotre,, fixing his or herspiritual destination as Tathagata, prqtyekcrbuddhct, arhat, worldlyrebirth (icchantika or atyctntika), or indeterminate. The latter potra,"was undoubtedly created to fit the ekaydna [One Ve]riclel teachingof the buddhadhdtu fBuddha naturel into the triydna [ThreeVehiclesl model, for ir was maintained that the teaching of theBuddha that all beings possess the buddhedhdtu was intencred for rheedification of those who belonged to this indeterminate gotr61.,,toThus, though this teaching incorporates tq,thd*atagarbha doctrine ina minor way, it is an obvious patchwork of inherently contradictoryideas. Another area of incompatibility can be found in this school'semphasis upon the idea of an impure mind infected withunwholesome seeds that must be uprooted one by one through anindefinitely long period of yoga practice. This view is entirely alien tothe tathdgatagarbha-Buddha nature emphasis upon an innately puremind that needs only to manifest itself.37

Outside of this stream represented by Dharmapila were otherYogicirins whose views put them in a position to welcomeconsideration oi tathAgatasarbha thought. Who we^ : the authors ofthe most important Yogdcdra-tathete&tqgarbha texts is difficult tosay, but we do know the identities of d number of individuals whotranslated in to Chinese some combinat ion of yoS6,cara,

18

FI

III

i

INTRODTICTION

tathctgatagarbha,, or Yopacara-tathdgata$arbha texts. These men,Ratnamati (f ifth-sixrh-centuries), Gunabhadra (394-468). Bodhiruci.(sixth-century), and Paramartha (499-569), demonstrared in theirlife's work that they highlv valued this double srream..r8

Grosnick isolates three factors in non-Dharmapdla yogdcara thatrvere strfficiently compatible with t&thag&t&Earbha ideas to pave theway fbr syncretism.se All three are central features of yogacarathought, and all are prominent in the Bi{?. The first is the belief thatStanya teachings leave themselves open to a nihiiistic misunderstand-iqg and are incomplete as found in prajfid and N{ddhyamika rexts. Asdiscussed earlier, Yogacdra and ta,thdgatagarbhe, thinking on thispoint is remarkably close: They agree that it is vital ro convey thatBuddhist practice not onl)'frees one from delusion but also frees oneto realize Truth, Truth that is not nihilistic but atTirmative of thatwhich one will discover.

The second feature of Yogdcdra that Grosnick cites as opening itto tqthdgata4&rbhcl thought is subject-object nondualism. InYo$acara, subject-object nondualism is a feature of Thusness(tcnhatd). and Thusness is an expression for what one realizes at theend of the Path. It is in this affirmative function that bothsubject-object nondualism and Thusness are identified with Buddhanature in the Bi[?.

Finally, the Yogdcdra doctrine of trisv&bhanrc, the three natures,also appears prominently in a number of syncretic texts, includingthe BN?. Ttris docrrine in its Yogacira contexr explains therelationship between delusion and enlightenment. parikatpita-st: ab hcns a is delusion experi en ce, parini gpanna- srsab hctvct is enli$ht-enment experience, or seein$ thin$s as they are. Pqratqntra-svabhava, the dependent nature, is the $iven: When seen throu$hdelusion, it is purikalpita; when seen without delusion, it isparhiqpanna. Because the relationship between delusion andenlightenmenr is a weak point ol tathdgatagarbhct rhought (theSnmata-sntro is typical of nthagatagarbha literarure in avoiclingthis issue by stating "only a Buddha undersarrds this"). thetrisvabhdqrq, doctrine strengthened tathAgatagarbho thought bysupplementing its account of delusion and enlightenment. Moreover,used in this way, the trisrsobhdpo doctrine integrates perfectly rviththe dual Yogacdra-tathdgatagurbha insistence upon confirming thepositive nature of what one attains through Buddhist practice: One

T9

BUDDI-IA NATURE

attains Thusness (tathatd), or in other words, parinispanna'

svqbh.dvct.These three poirtts are prominent in the B,\t?. However, the most

familiar syncretic texts, the Lahkavatara-sutra and the Awakening

of Faith, are better known for amaigarnating the Yogacara concept of

d, laya- ts i j f tdna, the "storehouse consciousness," and the

tatlfiEategarbha. This association, however, is not a straightforward

matter. In the Awakening, the t&thcigetegqrbhe, is $iven at least tworoles. First, d,laya-vijfidut and the tathAgst&gqrbhe are spoken ofside by side in connection with the production of sclmsctrct: "On the

basis of the tathdgatsga,rbhfi, there is the mind of production anddestruction. Ala,ya-vijfrnna is the name fbr the harmonious joining oi'nonproduction-and-nondestruction' with'production-and-destruc-tion'such that they are neither one nor different."'to Later in the text,

after listing the superlative attributes of Thusness (tathatrT), we aretold that, because the latter possesses these attributes, it is identifiedwith both tathd,Eeteea.rbha and d,hannakdya.{1 It seems, then, thatin this text when tathdea,tegarbha is identified with tothatd itsinnately pure nature that is full of superlative attributes is connoted,whereas when it is identified with dlaya-vijftdrw its immanence andparticipation in the world of sarysara and delusion is indicated. TheAwakening is so terse, however, as to leave the exact relationshipamong d.laya-z:ijfi,ana, t&tha,td, and tathdgangarbha in need offurther interpretation by the commentators.

Although the Lahkdvcttd,r&-sutrcl is encyclopedic rather thanterse, its account of the relationship between tathag&tugctrbhct anddlaya-wijfidna also is ambivalent. In some passages it teaches astrai€;lrtforward identification of tethdgatugarbhn and dla5ra-,o7ifiAru\as follows:

Mahdmati, the Tathagata-garbha holds within it the cause for both good andevil, and by it all the forms of existence are produced. . . . [Wlhen a revulsion[or turning-backl has not taken place in the Alayavijflnna known under thename of Tathagaa-garbha, there is no cessation of the seven evoh.in€VijfrEnas. . . . For this reason, Mahimati, let those Bodhisattva-Nlahhsattvaswho are seeking after the exalted truth effect the purification of theTathagata-garbha which is known as Alayavijiana.{l

Such a passage as this, in which tclthdgdtagarbha and d.Iaya-z;iifidnaare identified, seems to effect this identification b1'canceling out the

20

INTRODUCTION

nthAger&Earbhct's orvn qualities of innate purity, rvisdom, and so onas discussed in the tathagatagqrbhq, texts.4r Here, the nanletuth&gqtcrgarbha merely is appended to the alaya's attributes.

Elsewhere in the text, however, the tathdgatctgarbha is spoken ofwith no connection to dlaya-vijftana, and here it retains its expectedcharacter: "Bv tranquil l i tv is meant oneness (ekdgru), and onenessgives birth to the highest Samddhi, rvhich is gained by entering intothe womb of Tathdgatahood ltathdgatagctrbhal, rvhich is the realm ofnoble wisdom realized in one's inmost self."aa We may'conclude thatrvhile the Lqhkctrsqtqrct embracres both t&thdEat&gqrbh& andalaya-vijiitTna, it has not given us a complegely worked throughphilosophy in which all the terms of its system are clearly understoodin their mutual relations.

Though the alaya-vijftd,na is mentioned in a minor way in theBAr?, this is an insignificant feature of out text. The BNT does,though, manifest profourrd influence from Yogacara thought, espe-cially fiom theYogdcdrabhnmi (attributed to Asanga) and, to a lesserdegree, from the M ahdydnasannpraha, the Mahayanasutralaitkara,and other texts. In addition to the three points discussed earlier (apositive interpretation of emptiness, subject-object nondualism, andtris,sqbhcta), the BN? very heavily emphasizes the Yogdcdra ideas ofThusness (tathata) and of a1rayapardrrfffi (transformation of thebasis), though the latter is interpreted in a way different t'rom thestandard Yogicdra understanding.

Paramrtrtha

Of the many translators of Buddhist scriptures that China sarv,Paramd,rtha (Zhen-di) (499-569) is considered to have been thegreatest of his time and ranks with Kumdrajrya and Xuan-zang as oneof the greatest ever.as He was born into a Brahman family in Ujjain(Ujjayini) in western India. After becoming a Buddhist monk andcompleting his studies, he traveled to Funan. There he was invited byemissaries of Emperor Wu of Liang to come to China to transmit theDharrna. This he did, arriving in China in 546. Soon after his arrival,a rebellion displaced Paramdrtha's patron, Dmperor Wu, leavin$Paramhrtha in a perilous and rootless position. Paramartha wasforced to seek out a more peacet'ul place'rvhere he could proceed withhis translations. Unfortunately, in neither the Lianfl nor the

2 1

BUDDFL\ NATURE

succeeding Chen (Ch'en) dvnasty'did polit ical conditions stabil ize inSouth China, and Paramartha was frequentl-v obliged to interrupr hisu,ork to move to a safe location. As a result, he "spent a rvretched lifetranslating s[tras Iand (astras] while rvandering from place to place,accompanied bv a small band of disciples."46 He tq'ice tried to leaveChina but the first t ime was dissuaded b.v his disciples. and thesecond time, thou5ih he set sail, was returned by strong u'inds and his"fate."47 Toward the end of his l i fe he attempted suicide but wasrestrained by the combined et'forts of monks and $overnmentofficials. Though he acquired tame tbr his rvork and monks traveled

S,reat distances to learn from him, he faced the opposition of powerfulmonks at court and was blocked from rnoving to the capital. He diedat the age of 70, with his disciples determined to transmit his work.

\\'hen one considers the kind of life Paramdrtha lived. it isdifficult to imagine how he managed to produce the number andqualitl' of works that he did, works whose message and intellectualpower were to influence the development of Chinese Buddhism forcenturies to come. Clearly, Paramartha was not only a brilliantscholar but, despite periodic struftlles with depression. dedicatedu'ith a religious devotion to his lifework. It also is remarkable that hecared to transmit such an optimistic line of thought as that of theYogacara and Yogdcara-tclth&g&tagarbhq, line, given the conditions inSouth China and the human behavior to which he was n'itness, whichmade the practical circumstances of his own life so difficult. He hadprecious little reinforcement from the "real" world of the pure mindor the innate and universal Buddhahood extolled in the w.orks -he

transmitted.Paramdrtha is one of the major translators who rendered into

Chinese both Yogdcdra texts and Yogdcdru-tathd.g,cltaearbhq, texts.There is no doubt that a major component of his missionary's zealwas his commitment to the transmission of these lines of Buddhistthought. His syncretic translations include, in addition to the BuddhaNsture Treq,tise: Wu Shan! Yi Jinp, a text not extant in any formother than the "translation" of which he may have been the author,and the Atc'okening of Faith in Mahdydna (Da Sheng Qi Xin Lun) ofwhich, again, he may have been the author. His Yogdcdra translationsinclude MadhyCtntavibhdgq-bhdsyq by Vasubandhu; the Ma-hdydnasamgraha of Asanga, and Mahayanasam$raha-bhas3a, Ya-subandhu's commentary on Asanga's work; Jue Dinp, Zan!, Lun,

22

INTRODUCTION

part of Asanga's Yogdcdrabhami; and Vasubandhu's VimSatikci and

Trirryiikct. As part of his evident devotion to Vasubandhu, lte

translated the latter's non-Yo$dcdr an Abhidhorrnako$s-bhdsga and

wrote a highly esteemed biography of Vasubandhu. He also translated

prajfid. and lt{ddhyamika works, includin$ the Dinmond Silta(llajracchedikd-prajfid,paramita-sfitra) and the Ratndra,li of

Nigdrjuna, works that, as we have seen, he probably would not have

regarded as competin$ with the Yo$dcdra and Yo$dcdra-

tuthd,gatagqrbhq. texts. Paramartha translated many other works-

we have over thirty translations from his turbulent twenty-three years

in China, and many others of his works were lost-but his $reatnessand importance lies for the most part in his transmission of Yo$acdra

and Yogdcdr a-t&tlfi,Eangqrbhq, texts.as

Paramartha's translations constituted crucial contributions to the

Chinese Buddhist intellectual world. Paramartha's translation of

Vasubandh u' s M ahdy arwsarygraha- bhds.ya stimulated the establish-

ment of the SheJun school, an important sixth-century school that,

together with the Di-lun (Ti-lun) school, focused the discussion of

Yo{ac:ara and Yogdcdra-tathaga,tugqrbha ideas. This discussion

contributed heavily to the development of the indigenous Chinese

Buddhist schools that developed durin$ the Sui and Tan$ dlrrasties.

Chih-yi andFa-zang, for example, were very familiar with Paramirtha's

work; Fa-zang's commentary on the Awqkenin! of Faith is re$arded

as the most authoritative of the many commentaries on that

important text. Without Paramdrtha's work, the evolution of Chinese

Buddhist thought would have been significantly altered.

D. The Text of the Buddha Nqh.re Treutise

The authorship of the Buddha Nq.ttffe Treatiseae is attributed to

Vasubandhu, and the Chinese translation is attributed to Paramdrtha.

Only the Chinese translation is extant; neither a Tibetan translation

nor a Sanskrit original survives. There is no reason to suspect that

the text might be a purely Chinese ori$inal, as it contains an

extensive refutation of several non-Buddhist Indian philosophical

schools, which would not be expected in a Chinese ori$inal. There is

a considerable degree of doubt, however, as to whether Vasubandhu

actually wrote the text. Takasaki and Hattori, for example, are

convinced that the text was not translated but actually written by

23

BTIDDTTA NATURE

Paramartha, on the basis of his knowledge oi the Rarncgotrcrcibhctga.soIt is true that there is an unmistakable overlap berween the BN? andthe Ratrwgotraz:ibhaga. The two texts have a f,ood deal of rnaterial incommon, and it is quite evident that the former was partialll' basedon the latter. Takemura, though, finds insufficient reason to overturnthe authority of the staternent recorded on the text that theauthorship is \hsubandhu's and the translation Paramartha's.sl It isdifficult not to be suspicious of Paramartha, however, inasmuch as heis S,iven as the translator of both the B,\? and the Wtt Shan! Yi Jiri!,neither of which is extant in other than its Chinese (Param6rtha)version and both of which contain extensive similarit ies u'ith theRatnagotravibhaga.

This is not the only difficulty rvith the texr of the tstr{?. Thecircumstances of the text's composition, translation (if i t rvastranslated), and transmission are all very l itt le known. There is norecord of the date or place of translation on the manuscript. Ui putsthe translation of the text between 557 and 569.sr Takemura puts itat approximately 558.s-l

One particularly troublesome aspect of the text is the existence ofseveral passa$es preceded by the term comme?il. It is uncertain whatperson or persons may have added these comments. Takasakibelieves that fragments of a lost commenrary on the BNT bvParamartha have been preserved here.sa Takemura makes aconsidered attempt to determine whether Vasubandtru, Paramartha.or someone else may have added these commentary like passa$es. Hebelieves each case has to be treated individuallv and that it is ven,difficult to be sure in one's judgment.

It is not my intention to further research the problem oi theauthorship of the BNT. The scholars mentioned here rvho argue forthe authorship of Paramartha are persuasive, as is the connectionbetween Paramartha, the BN?, the Ratnagotravibhaga, and the l4zuShang Yi Jing. It does seem likely that Paramartha was the author ofthe BN?, though this cannot be regarded as conclusively settied.Although it is impossible to identify the author of the rext withabsolute confidence, there is no doubt that the work was in scme wayin the hands of Paramirtha, either as author of the text as a whole. asauthor of the inserted comments, as translator, or in a combinationof these roles. In this l imited .ensb, we can identify the text asbelonging to Paramdrtha. fu such, it bears his stamD and is

24

INTRODLTCTION

representative of the Views that he bequeathed to later $enerations otEast Asian Buddhists.

The Bt{? is just one of many cases demonstrating the g,reatdiff icult-"- of deterrninin$ to what extent Paranrartha was thetransmitter of the ideas of others, such as Vasubandhu, and to rvhatextent he rvas the ori$inator of some of these ideas. Paramartha isknorvn to have interpolated passages dealing with tathaga,taparbhctinto Yo$acara texts he u'as translatin$ into Chinese without evenalertin$ the reader that he had done so. For example, a comparison ofParamartha's translation of Vasubandhu's Maha5,6nqsam$raha-bhasja, u'ith the Tibetan and Xuan-zan$ r'ersions of the text, revealsinscrtions of tathcigatagarbha ideas in Paramartha's rranslation thatare entirely lacking in the Tibetan and the Xuan-zang versions.ss

The same kind of thing may be at work in the Buddha NatureTreatise. Chapter Four of the B.\?, "Analysis of the Characteristics,"rvhich analyzes Buddha nature in terms of ten characteristics, is veryclose to that part of Chapter One of the Ramngotra, which analyzesthe tathagcttag,urbha in terms of virtually the same ten characteris-tics. The author of the Bi{?, however, has greatly expanded the textby adding Yogachra concepts, discussed at considerable length, to thetqth&gatagdrbhq discourse of the Ratnagotra. Assuming thatParamartha is the author of the Bi{?, we can see that he rvasresponsible rrot onl1, for transmitting Yogacera-tathagatagarbhcltexts, but also for effecting some of the synthesis himself-and inboth directions (adding tqthAgqng&rbha passates to Yogacara texrsand Yogdcara passages to tathclg,at&gqrbho. texts).

The Awqkening of Faith in the Mahaydna is another text"translated" bv Paramdrtha, attributed to another (A6vaghosa), inwhich the attribution is widely doubted, if not discredited outright.N{any scholars believe this text was a Chinese original. Will iamGrosnick, however, argues that Paramartha is the likely author of thistext.s6 fi as is quite possible but unproven, Param6rtha was theauthor of the BNT as rvell as the Wu Shan! Yi Jing and theAwakening oJ Faith in the Mahayana, he would deserve a large shareof the credit for the articulation of the Yogdcdra-tathctgcrtqgqrbhaideas that so heavily influenced the development of Chinese Buddhistthought^ But even thou$h we cannot be sure whether he authoredthese texts, rve do know that he chose to transmit them, thatYogacAra and Yogacar^-tqthalgcttclgarbhe teachings were focal con-

25

BUDDHA NATIIRE

cerns of his. that his choice of words as a translator determined in

larf,e measure the language in which these ideas were subsequently

considered (until the time of Xuan-zan|), and that he had a tendency

to "supplement" the texts he translated rvith his own thoughts. To

this extent at least his role in this historv must be credited. and a

si6inif icant role it is.

Within the corpus of Paramartha's works, the BN? stands out for

its importance for understanding Buddha nature thought. The BN?

held a position of considerable influence in the body of

t&thc1gqrcrgclrbha-Buddha nature texts transmitted to China. In

Sino-Japanese Buddhism there was a significant and sustained

controversy concernin$ the "existence" of Buddha nature; that is, the

issue of rvhether all bein$s or only some possess the Buddha nature

and therehy are assured the attainment of Buddhahood. In this

context. the BN? rvas well knorvn and seriously studied in China and

Japan because of its thorough elucidation of the Buddha natureconcept and its persuasive defense of the reality of Buddha nature.Ling-run (Ling-jun), for example, who was one of the early advocatesof the universal Buddha nature theory, quoted the BN? in his attemptto refute the view that some do not possess the Buddha nature.sTIt{any commentaries, both Chinese and Japanese, were written on theBII?, thou$h onlv one Japanese commentary suryives.ss

As Takemura points out, however, the very existence of such a"Buddha nature controversy" is based on an understandin$ of theBuddha nature quite antithetical to that concept as presented in theBitr?.se The controversy, that is, is formulated on an understandin$ ofthe Buddha nature as some kind of original principle or metaphysicalentity that 6an either exist or not exist. The essential theme that weshall see in the BN?, however, is that the Buddha nature is not ametaphysical thing or entity of any kind. It is thus, strictly speaking,improper to say either that it exists or does not exist, thouSh theauthor of the Bii? does assert, for soteriolo$ical reasons, that theBuddha nature can be said to exist in a sense that he specifies. Thisclear affirmation of the Buddha nature, and the philosophically anddoctrinally sophisticated manner in which it is expressed, enabledthe Bl{? to play the important role'it played in the Buddha naturecontroversy.

26

INTRODUCTION

E. The Buddha i{ature Treatise and ChineseBuddhist Thought

The importance of the BN? for Chinese Buddhist philosophy is

not limited to its philosophy of Buddha nature, narrowly conceived.

The text is remarkably useful todav as an introduction to the

Yogacara-related foundations of Chinese Buddhist philosophy. Many

of the views articulated in the text, and especially the overall

standpoint from which the author speaks, are very much in harmony

with widespread ideas in Chinese Buddhist thou$ht as they are

expressed in the various indigenous Chinese Buddhist schools. This is

especially true of Chan, but it also is true to a lesser de$ree of Tian-tai

and Hua-yan.Some of the themes that will emer$e in this book as the

philosophy of the BN? and that are important components of the

foundation of Chinese Buddhist thought are as follows:

1. An emphasis on the positive nature of realization; a view of

enlightenment as an experiential reality that goes beyond

emptiness.2. An optimistic concept of human nature based on the idea of a

universal, active Buddha nature.

3. An ontology based upon nondualism, as opposed to monism,

and expressed in the language of Thusness.4. Subject-object nondualism, the idea that mind and world arise

together in mutual creation, whether in a deluded or an

enlightened manner.5. A positive view of phenomenal reality, based upon the views

given in points 1 and 3.6. The concept of a pivotal conversion experience from delusion

to enlightenment or from impurity to purity.

7. The equation of Buddha nature and Buddhist practice (a view

that ultimately becornes more representative cf JapaneseBuddhism, in Dogen, than of Chinese).60

The clear and systematic expression of these themes in the BN?provides an accessible door into some of the most important, butoften puzzling, tenets of Chinese Buddhist thought. In this sense,'onecan think of this book as an introduction to themes that subsequentlywould become core Chinese Buddhist ideas. We are introduced to

27

BLIDDI{A NATURE

them in the Bi[T at the point of their importation from India to China(via Paramartha), prior to their appropriation by Chinese Buddhistthinkers. Because these ideas were established at the ground of thethen-emerging indigenous Chinese Buddhist schools and u'ere northe exclusive property of any one of these schools, the importance ot'these ideas for Chinese Buddhism is unusually broad. The elucidationof these thernes is one purpose of this book.

A second purpose of this book is to grapple u'ith the cornrnorlcharge that the notion of Buddha nature (or tathagatugarbhalintroduces into Buddhism the non-Buddhist, crypto-Hindu elemenr otatnntsctda (a vierv of an entitative, metaphysical self or soul) oridealistic monism. I wil l explore the extent to which it is possible todefend the Buddha nature concept from a purell' Buddhistperspective, in terms of purely Buddhist philosophical principles. Ibelieve this reflects the author's orvn understandinA of the Buddhanature.

I begin this project by discussing the Buddha nature concept inthe jarSon of the text itself. I hope to show in this u'a;- that the authorsimply does not think in either entitative or monistic terms, but baseshis philosophy from the ground up on entirel-v other principles. .\s m1'"Buddhistic" defense of Buddha nature relies upon my explanation ofthe latter in terms of action and practice, I also consider rvhat kindsof action and practice are considered especially disclosive of Buddhanature.

A final goal of the book is to engage the BN? in dialogue rvithcurrent Western thinkinS on the concept of human personhood. Theconcept of Buddha nature is probably the sing,le mosr importanrcomponent of East Asian Buddhist concepts of human personhood.As such, to the extent that it is possible to overcome the cultural $apbetween us, we could profit by hearing tliis Buddhisr response to theperennial and universal question of human being, In Chapter 7 I rvillengage in cross-cultural philosophy by addressing Western philosoph-ical questions about human personhood to the BNT's Buddha natureconcept.

28

CHAPTER TWO

The Concept of Buddha Nature

A. Taking the Semantie Ascent

55IIfhy did the Buddha speak of Buddha nature?" (787a). In

YV mid-sixth century China, the question of the status of

Buddha nature is phrased in this way, and with these words the

Buddha liature Treatise be$ins. The author does not open' as we

might expect, with the more strai$htforward but naive question, What

is Buddha nature? Instead, he takes the "semantic ascent"l -he

directs the focus of the inquiry to the lan!,ua$e with which the

tradition speaks of Buddha nature and away from the Buddha nature

itself. Had the author be$un by askin$, What is Buddha nature? he

would have begied the very questions in which he was most

interested. This form of the question presupposes a Buddha nature

that "is" "sbmethin$." But the ontolo$ical and metaphysical status of

the Buddha nature are two of the issues that the BiV?'s author feels

are most misunderstood by others and on which he focuses from the

beginning of the text. By takin$ the semantic ascent, he structures

the question in such a way that no such questions are be$$ed'

Why, th'en, did the Buddha speak of Buddha nature? The Buddha,

says the author, spoke of Buddha nature to help people overcome five

shortcomings (inferior mind, arro$,ance, delusion, slanderin$ the

29

t]T'DDII.\ NATI'RE

truth, and attachmenr to self) and to produce in them five ' irtues(dil igent mind, re'erence, rvisdom [prcfif lal, knou,ledge lif ir1nal, andcompassion) (787a). In short, the Buddha spoke of Buddha nature rohelp humanir)' put an end to ignorance and attain enlightenment.This is an important point: The teaching of Buddha nature does notessentiall;- indicate the existence and describe the nature of"somethin$" that "is." Ne'ertheless, it r 'as important tbr the Buddhato speak of Buddha nature tbr the same purpose that all the Buddha'steachings sen'e; namely, aiding sentient beings in their quest forenlightenment. The author of the BN?, l ike the Buddha (he claims),\\ 'ants to speak positi 'ely of Buddha nature, but without leading thereader to concei'e of the Buddha nature as "something" that "is."Horv he resolves this difficult- is the subject of this chapter.

B. Refutation of Other \riews

The author of the BN? is concerned that his readers' minds mavbe tull of notions ol atman and ancttmctn, misconceptions of Buddhanature, and so on and that these ideas n'i l l interfere with the correcrunderstanding of Buddha nature he rvants to preserlt. Thus he beginsby contrasting Buddha nature with such competing conceptions andcrit icizing rhe latter, thereby clari l i ' ing what Buddha nature is not.only on this basis, he feels, can he go on to discuss in a constructi 'emanner horv the term Buddhq nature actually does function. Thuswe begin with a discussion of u'hat Buddha nature is not, argued inthe context of a refutation of competin$ views.

The author's first mo'e is to refute both the vierv that the Buddhanature exists and the vieu'that it does not exist. The way in whichthis is done is epical of the logic of the BN?. \vith respect to Buddhanature, sa1's the author, if you say either that it exists fu,,ou) or that itdoes not exist (tcru) you go astray. Let us consider these imporiantterms.

You and wu are two of the most thoroughlv studied u.ords in theclassical chinese language, especiallf in their philosophical mean-in$s. Basically, you means "ha'e" or ,,there is., ' Wu is the opposrte,meanin$ "lack" or "there is not." Thus the terms indicate thepresence or absence of a thing or things. philosophicall l"

1'ou and te,uearly took on the extended, abstracr " senses of existence andnonexistence, something and nothin$. These are used, tor example,

30

THE CONCEPT OF BLIDDTL{ NATI.,RE

in the Daoist (Taoist) philosophy oI Laozi (Lao-tzt) and Zhuan{zi(Chuang-tzu). However, 1'ou is used primarill- with re$ard to concrete

things; the Dao (Tao),l i (principle), and other such abstractions only

occasionally are covered by you, but usually are lpu or neither you

nor vru.2 "The English word 'Nothing' implies the absence o{ any'entit)',' the Chinese uru only the absence of concrete things. . . . But

if the Tao is Nothing, then Nothin$ is a positive complement of

Somethin$, not its mere absence."3 Yolt', unlike other verbs and

adjectives, is not negated by the term bu, "not," but forms a pair with

its contrary, rrtu, "similar to such pairs as long and short, left and

right, Yin and Yang."+ Thus, especially in Daoist philosophy, wu may

have a positive, constructive content, unlike the En$ish nothin{, or

nonexistence. That this is so is illustrated by the Daoist teachin$ that

it is in being a combination of somethin g Oou) and nothin$ (tou) that

such things as doors and windows are useful.s In fact, tou has such apositive nature that in Daoism it is considered the source or ben of all

manifested things. We shall shortly speak again of this concept, ben.

The author's most fundamental concerns in the B|'{T are,

soteriolog,ically, to promote practice and chan$e, and, philosophi-

callv, to explain realit-v, human bein$, and human transformation in

dynamic, process-oriented terms that ultimately derive from the

experience of practicing Buddhism. On the basis of this agenda, he

argues that neither the concept of existence Oou) nor of

nonexistence (tllu) can account for the point of his interest; namely,

that some here and now are realizins their Buddha nature and some

are not. Insofar as he wants to encourage the practice of Buddhism,he must criticize the view that there is no (tpu) Buddha nature, aview that naturally tends to discoura$e efforts to attain what might be

unattainable. Insofar as he is a Buddhist, he sees change as the basic"given" from which philosophy must begin. He therefore must

criticize the view that all "have" Cvou) Buddha nature in a

substantialist sense.The concerns for practice and for the imperative of basin$

philosophy on the givenness of change are mutually related concerns.

If, he ar$ues, one says there is no Buddha nature, then one will never

be able to attain Buddhahood, as this would mean that there was an

unbridgeable gulf between the ordinary being and Buddha, eachlrozen into its own nature. The corollary to this is that if one says

there is Buddha nature, then the idea of the chan$e or transformation

3 1

BI 'DDIIA N.\TURE

inherent in practice *'ill be lost. \\4r-v practice the Buddha way it' o'ealready is Buddha? Thus. the ideas of both there being and not beinga Buddha nature rnust be rejected, as either equall l, rvould lreezerealit l" into a static state of being.

Bein€ and nonbeing are seen as static categories in Buddhistthought' As such thev are unacceptable terms tbr explaining realitybecause thev do not allorv for the self-transformation ,hut

"nirt ir,rt".the Buddha Wav. As our author puts it, neither existence (!ou) nornonexistence (.o'u) can be "transformed." "\\ 'hat is cannot bedestrol 'ed, *'hat is not cannot be produced" (7BBc). This, of course.applies to Buddha nature as rvell. Thus, the author sa},s, Buddhanature is nothin6i "f ixed" (dinE). Reality, and that rvhich constiruresreality, is ot' a dynamic, everchan6ling nature. To think of rt as"fixed"-u'hether as bein$ or as nonbeing-is a basic mistake.Ontology takes second place to practical necessity; primaryimportance is given to rvhat is soteriological, the self-transtbrmationof l iberation. ontological notions sen,e primarily to provide atheoretical explanation as to horv self-transformation or chan$e ispossible. In the B-\?, the basis of this explanation is establishecl withthe rejection of the static notions of being and nonbeing.

so far this t.vpe of logic souncls like l{iddle path logic-the twoextremes of being and n,nbein$, eternalism and annihilationism. aredenied. Horve'er, rvhereas in sinyuvurla thought the rrroblem ofbeirrg a.nd nonbeing is resol'ed in tire dialectics of itny'ta oremptiness, here in tathagatagarbha_Buddha nature thought, thecase is rather different. The issue of the being or nonbeing of tsuddhanature is concluded in the BN? as follows: "ln accordance withprinciple (Dao li), all sentienr beings universally and aboriginallypossess the pure Buddha nature. That there should be one whoeternalll' failed to obtain parinit-oana is not the case. This is whyBuddha nature most assuredly aboriSinally exists (ben you); thereason being, that is, that it has nothing to do with either being ornonbeing" (788c) .

The author begins this passage by appealing to ,,principle,"

literallr' "wa1'-principle." Thus, thou$h the statement does, as theauthor notes, refer to scripture (Tathagatagarbha Sutrq,.\, the authoralso u'ants to ground his teachings in what he feels simply is true, therval'things are. n4rether or not a Buddhd had come into the worid topoint it out to us. This is ti?ical of tq,tha^ataAarbha literature.6

32

TTIE CONCEPT OF BLIDDFLA' NATLIRN

The author also rvants to indicate with this that rvhat he is sayin$

is an actively affirmative truth; that is, a positive qualitl' of reaiity,

which may be spoken of in affirmative lan$ua$e' hon'ever obliquely'

He is sayin$, in effect: The world is not chaotic, rve need not be lost in

i t . There is a pr inc ip le. d iscoverable bv humarts. mani iest inB, the

order of the universe. l lv realizinp this principle (rnore closelv, b;-

bringin$ ourselves into accordance rvith this principie) rve ma1'

discover this truth of the ur.riverse, which also is the truth of our on'n

nature. This is a reason for rejoicin$, and the author of the BArT felt it

imperative that this be made clear.

What is the meanin$ ot the statement that tsuddha nature "most

assuredly abori$inally exists"? The abori$inal existetrce, berr 1'otr,

spoken of here, is altogether different trom ordinary existence.

Literally, ben - "root, source, ori$in" - plus -l 'ou - "existence, bein$" -

the term conrrasts rvith you in the sense ot' f inite existellce; that is,

the process of cornin$ into bein$ and perishinp, in time. Ben ltru thus

contrasts with both existence' or bein$ Ll'orr)' artd nonexistence' or

nonbeing (tou), both in the finite sense. An ir. lteresting parallel carr be

found in the Daoist concept of to'u. Daoist rhirrkers distin$uished nvo

senses of the term vru.. (1) "that primal uldift 'erentiated state that

preceded the later state of manifested thin$s (r'u)[r 'ou]" and (2) "the

perpetual alternation of the absence of somethip$ (tc'u) as coltrasted

to the presence of something t)tu) [r'oul'" The former "tt'as not a

mere ,nothing' for it contained all future possibilities for $'orld

manifestation."T This sense of tctu also rvas called ben w'u, "ori$inal or

root nonexistence" to distin$uish it from the second sense of merell'

contin$ent nonexistence.The term ben you used in the BN? may have been int'luenced by

the Daoist ben wu. In both, the term tren is attached to the verb to

distinguish the existence or nonexistence in question from the

merely contingent variefy. Both ben you andben tou (independently)

stand opposed to the existence-nonexistence pair. Benyou, however,

does not carry the connotation carried by ben to'u in the Daoist usage;

namely, the sense of referrin$ to that out of which all else emer$,eci in

a temporal sense.Ben you, moreover, plays a role in tctthdg&tqgqrbhq-Btddha

nature thou$ht similar in an imporlant way to that which 9ilnyatd'

plays in Sfirrya thou$ht. In both cases, the two extremes of bein$ and

nonbeing are rejected, and we are lgft with a term that indicates the

33

BUDDHA NATURE

conceptual insufficiency of those extremes. Yet how different are the"flavors" of the two terms! The authors of the tqtha.gata1arbhaIiterature were intent on putting into some kind of positive languagewhat they took to be the ultimate rruths of Buddhism. They clearlyfelt that the 6hnya language was negative, or that it would inevitablybe perceived as such. In short, we have two linguistic paths, both ofwhich proceed through negation of conceptual extremes. but one ofwhich ends with the term 9ilnya and the other with a "Buddhanature" that "aboriginally exists."

This, then, is 6unya dialectics with a difference. According to theBN?, both the view that Buddha nature exists and the view that itdoes not exist are to be rejected because both imply that Buddhanature is something capable of existing as other things exist. Toborrow Gilbert Ryle's terminology,s to so conceive Buddha nature isto make a category mistake; that is, to conjoin the kind of existenceproper to things such as trees and stones with the very different kindof existence pertaining to Buddha nature. One thereby confuses theontological status of Buddha nature with that of trees and stones.Buddha nature, unlike the latter, is not a thing in the world. Rather,as a term, it serves to affirm the potential of all sentient beings torealize Buddhahood. Thus to say "Buddha nature exists" is veryunlike saying "stones exist." To indicate this difference between thetwo uses of the term exist, the author refers to the existence ofBuddha nature as aboriginal existence, emphasizing that it has norelation to the ordinary concept of existence or its negation.

The author's next step in clarifying the nature of being of theBuddha nature is to refute the idea that Buddha nature is a kind ofown-nature (svabhd,va, zi xirg). The author does this by arguingagainst the existence of any own-natures at all, as follows.

For example, what formerly is a seed subsequently produces a $rain plant.The "former" and "subsequent" st4les of this Sgain are neither one nor two,neither exist (you) nor do not exist (unr). If they were one [i.e., the samel,then there would be no "former" and "subsequent." If they were different,then whet was ori$nally lrain could subsequently be a bean. Therefore, theyare neither the same nor different. Due to . [the confluence of] thedestruction of the cause and the production of the effect, own-nature neitherexists nor does not exist. [That is,l because the cause perishes, own-natutedoes not exist, but because the effect is produced, it does not not exist.Because et the time of thecause there is not yet an effect, you cannot sayown-nature exists. Because the production of the effect is certainly due to

34

THE CONCEPT OF BLIDDIL\ N.\TL'ITE

the cause, you cannot sa-v it does not exist. In this .sense , culrse and eftcct.reflection and understandin$ reach completion toAether. ancl therefore *-esay there is no o\4'n-nature. (793a)

The idea of own-nature is refuted because it does not alloli, tbr theprocess of chan$e as seen in the $rowth ot' a plant or in an), processhavin$ a former and a subsequent stage. The author, as a Buddhrst,conceives of an own-nature as bein$ eternal precisely in the sensc otunchan$in$. Therelbre any phe:romenon or event that in an1,\\.av rsdynamic or in process is judged to be empty' of an own-nature.Because, according to Buddhism, all is in f'lux, nou,here rvill one findan own-nature. Buddha nature is no exception to this all-encompassin$ rule.

The author offers us here no new ideas or perspectives. \Vhat hegives us is straight Middle Path logic emphasizing the process of tluxand the interdependence of cause and eft'ect, of former andsubsequent stages. He concludes the section by affirming in the mostorthodox manner, "Know, therefore, that all thin$s are Thus trul5,without own-nature. only true emptiness is their essential nature"(793c). In this way the author affirms that his forthcoming teachingsconcerning the Buddha nature do not trespass on the inviolableteaching that there is no own-nature. He anticipates that histeachin$s may resemble an own-nature view. Hence, early in thetreatise he discredits this view in order that such a misunderstandinanot develop.

The auth6r next prepares the reader to understand the status ofhis Buddha nature teachings in the context of the Mahayanaemptiness doctrine, specifically, the emptiness doctrine of theNlddhyamika two truths (satyadvaya) theory. To do so, he must firstdiscredit a certain misunderstanding of the two truths doctrine andthen offer his own interpretation of that doctrine. His interpretationis presented in the form of a synthesis of Madhyamika two truthstheory and Yogdcdra three natures (trisrsabhdva) theory.

The Madhyamika two truths theory teaches that all of reality isencompassed by two levels: the relative or worldly (samvrti) and theultimate or supreme (pa,ramdrtho). Though ordinarily translated as"truth," the sagta of sa,tyadzsaya embraces both epistemolo$ical andontological qualities; it is the key rerm in a theory of experientialreality. Saryooqti-saiyo is said to be whatever is enveloped and

. )J

BUDD}IA NATURE

obscured; i$norance; existence, understood in terms of the kle*a-desire, hatred and delusion; conditioned co-origination (pratttya-samutpdda); and the realm of what is empty (6ilnya). Parmctrtha-satya is said to be the cessation of the modes of "1" and "mine" and ofbelief in person; tranquility, understood as"the cessation of thepersonal world; what does not arise or cease and is not dependent;known by wise saints in and through itself; the reality of. sarytsTti asits emptiness; the Middle Path; lib<lration.e

Like the Mddhyamika theory, the trisrsabhdva theory is con-cerned with experiential reality and thus is simultaneously epistemo-logical and ontological. The parikalpita nature is both the common-sense view of the world constructed by the deluded mind and thatdeluded mind itself; it is the interpretation of experience in terms ofthe wholly imaginary categories of subject and object, names andconcepts. The paratantra nature is both the fact of conditioned co-origination (prqtityasamutpdda) and the recognition of that fact. Fi-nally, the pariniqpanna nature is the Thusness of reality and thecognition of Thusness and therefore is perfect and absolutely true.

The author begins this section by announcing that he wishes to "re-fute the biased views [errors] of be$nners on the Maheyenapath" (793c).The misunderstanding at issue is the vierv that "according to worldlytruth (sar?o.rtisatya) all thin$s exist $rt^r); according to supreme truth(paramdrthasatya) all thing do not exist (rou)" (793c). The rnisunder-standing of supreme truth (peremd,rtfutsatya), or emptiness, in a nihil-istic manner is especially troublesome to the author here.

This t'irst level of misunderstanding is rejected in f'avor of thetbllowing sugllested correct understanding of the rwo truths. "That alldhqrmas lack own-nature is suprenie truth. To speak of the existenceof own-nature within [the actuality of] the absence of own-nature iscalled worldly truth" (79Qc). The difference between the two truths,then, is not a difference between things existing or not existing, nor isit simply the difference between the existence or nonexistence of anown-nature. Rather, it is emphasized that worldly truth is constitutedby falsely speaking of an own-nature as existing when in fact it does not.

No sooner is this second-level understanding of the two truthsproffered, however, than it, too, is called into question, especially theunderstanding of supreme truth given therein. Is it sufficient, theauthor asks, to speak thus of supreme truth as no more than theabsence of own-nature? It is not, for in recognizin$ supreme truth as

36

THE CONCEPT OF BUDDHA NATURE

the a,bsence of own nature, we are still speaking and thinkin$ on the

level of worldly truth, on the level of the duality of the presence and

absence of thin$s, includin$ own-nature. Given that the lan$ua$e and

concepts of worldly truth are inherently deficient, they rnust

represent a deficient perspective frorn which to speak of supreme

rruth. Therefore, this second-level understanding of the two truths

also must be transcended.We thus are brought to the third and final position, representing

rhe author's o*'n understandin$ of the two truths. Especially

important is his understanding of supreme truth. In expressing this

understanding he rejects the dualistic lan$ua$e of bein$ and nonbein$

characteristic of the position of worldly truth in favor of his own

characteristic formulation: Neither bein$ nor nonbein$ is the case.

The two truths theory cannot be called [a theory ofl bein$ (j"ou), nor can itbe called [a theory ofl nonbein$ (uu), because neither bein$, nor nonbein!, isthe case (feiyoufei tnru). The reason why the supreme truth can be calledneither [a theory ofl bein$ nor of nonbeing is that becauce it ne$ates (taru)both person and thin$ it cannot be called [a theory ofl bein$, and because itreveals (rian) the two forms of emptiness [of person and thingl it cannot becailed [a theory ofl nonbein$ [insofar as emptiness is not the sarne asnonbeingl. The same is true of worldly truth. Because of the discriminatin$nature (parikalpita) it cannot be called [a theory of] bein$, and because ofthe relative natvre (para,tantra) it cannot be called [a theory ofl nonbein$'Furthermore, supreme truth establishes neither bein$ nor nonbeing withrespect to persons and thinSs. [Bein$ and nonbein$l are neither one nor two

[i.e., neither the same nor differeptl. Emptiness [bothl is and is not. Thesame is true of worldly truth. One cannot definitively establish nonbein$,

[simplyl on the basis of the discriminating nature. Nor can one definitivelyestablish being, [simply] on the basis of the relative nature. (793c-794a)

The most important point here is that the tou or negation

intrinsic to the previous two attempts at discussing supreme truth is

now eschewed in favor of an approach which rejects the dualistic

being vs. nonbeing approach. To establish this point, the author

combines the three natures and two truths theories, as fbllows:

Two Truths

wo.rdly (saryt:rti)

supreme (parctmdrtha)

Three Nq.turesdiscriminating@arikulpital Irelative (par&tantra) J

[true (pariniqpanna) - not named I

37

BUDDTL\ NATLIRE

However, rather than demonstratin$ the superiorin, of supreme truth(and, by implicarion, the parinispqnn& nal','e) o'er u,orldly truth, asusually is the case, he places both truths at the same level: Neithertruth "can be called" a theory of either bein$ or nonbei'f,. In the caseof worldly truth, this is because the recognition of the discriminatingnature implies an affirmarion of nonbeing since the discriminatingnature is totally false, whereas the reco$nition of the relative narureimplies an at least partial affirmation of being since the relativenature is partially true-things are interdependent. Thus, since bothbeing and nonbeing are affirmed in worldly truth, rhe tu,o negate eachother, and neither can stand.

In the case of supreme truth, bein$ cannot stand because personsand things are negated (tc'u); that is, neither is said to be ultimatelvreal. I'et nonbein$ also cannot stand, becatrse the dual emptiness ofperson and thing after all, is, revealed (xian). This indicates for theBAr?'s author that not only is emptiness or the supreme truth nr.rt amatter of pure ne$ation or nihilism, but to the contrary, it can, andfor soteriological purposes should, be described in the most positive,affirmative terms possible. He wants to clemonsrrate that supremetruth is not just a negation of worldly truth (the ideas of person andthing); it also functions positively to reveal something. His particularconcern is to emphasize the positive qualiqv of this function.

The author concludes by stating that t'rom rhe perspective ofsupreme truth, not only do being and nonbeingi not apply to the

. phenomena of experience, they also are neither rhe same nor' different; that is, they are nondual. .This may be explained as follows.Because being and nonbeing are denied on the grounds of their beingboth aflirmed and denied (e.g., in the case of supreme truth,nonbeing is affirmed with respect to persons ancl things, but deniedwith respect to emptiness), clearly their identit ies, which should bebased on mutual exclusion, are jeopardized,, and it is no longerpossible to see one as rhe negation of the other. That is, ordinarily, toaffirm nonbeing is to negare being, but here one simultaneouslyaffirms nonbeing (thereby implicitly negating being) and deniesnonbeing (thereby implicitly affirming being). Thus, from theperspective of supreme truth, nonbeing is at once both afTirmed anddenied, hence it is at once both being and nonbeing. The sameapplies to being.

Moreover, says the author, emptiness ,,both is and is not, (konp

3B

THE CONCEPT OF BLTDDHA NATURT)

you bu you). This is the final salvo against an1'who might mistakeemptiness for nonbeing. The treatment of emptiness in this text bothargues against this particular mistake and opens the way for adiscussion of emptiness in positive terms. For the BN?,s author,emptiness, or supreme truth, has a positive, "being,ful" quality to it. Itis not just the negation of worldly truth; it also functions positively to"reveal" somethin$.

In sum, three points have been established in this section.

1. It is incorrect to say either that Buddha nature exists or doesnot exist, though it is correct to say Buddha narureaboriginally exists, as long as this is undersrood as anaffirmation of each person's potential to realize Buddhahoodand not as a kind of existence that can stand in contrast tononexistence.

2. Buddha nature is not an owrr-nature; an own-narure cannot befound where a phenomenon, such as a person, is in process.The idea of an own-nature therefore is to be discredited andthoroughly distinguished from the notion of Buddha nature.

3. Emptiness is not merely a matter of negation; supreme rruthdoes not merely negate worldly truth. The contents ofemptiness or supreme truth cannot be so limited as to beexhausted by functioning in a destructive manner; there alsomust be a positive revelation in emptiness. Therefore,(implicitly) because emptiness is not exclusively negative, itneed not conflict with a Buddha nature that, though not anown-nature, is affirmed as existing aboriginally.

The import of these three points is this: Though Buddha naturecannot be said to exist or not to exist, it is in accordance withprinciple to realize that all possess it and hence to affirm it. Note herethe key role played by the author's understanding and manipulationof language. when the two extremes of existence and nonexistence(or being and nonbeing) are negated, and as a result the principles ofidentity (A is A), noncontradicrion (nothing can be both A and not A)and excluded middle (everything is either A or not A) no longer are robe relied upon, the laws of language based on those principleslikewise are no longer to be assumed..At such a point, we are wideopen to a new use of language. Ndgdrjuna stepped into this languagevoid and filled it with 6&nya language. The BNT's author stepped into

39

BUDDFL{ NATLIRE

the same void and filled it with a very different kind of language, alanguage that could speak positively of such things as Buddha narureand tathdgatafprbha. The author makes his point clearly andsuccinctly in this key passa$e: "Attachments are not real, thereforethey are called vacuous. If one $ives rise to these attachments, truewisdom will not arise. When one does away with these attachments,then we speak of Buddha nature. Buddha nature is the Thusness(zhen ru) revealed (xian) bv the dual emptiness of person and things.. . . If one does not speak of Buddha nature, then one does notunderstand emptiness" (787b). The author is uncompromising onthis point. Emptiness is not limited to a negative function. it clearsthe way only so that something positive, Buddha nature, may berevealed. One who does not affirm Buddha nature simply has notsufficiently penet4ated emptiness.

C. The Essence of Buddha Nature

We now turn to an account of the Buddha nature per se, whichthe author discusses in terms of three concepts: three causes,trisvctbhava (three natures), and tctthagat&gerbha. We will examineeach of these in turn.

The Buddha Nqture as Three Causes

The three "causes" are three aspects of Buddha nature in itsfunction as cause of the attainment of Buddhahood. The three are

$iven as the cause of attainability, the prcryog& cause, and thecomplete fulfillment cause. They are discussed as follows.

The cause of attainability is the Thusness revealed by the dualemptiness [of persons and thin$sl. Because of this emptiness, one "canatt^in" bodhicitta, prayopa, and so forth, up to the dhannakdya at the endof the Path. That is wh-v this cause is called can uttain.

The prayopa cause is called bodhiciro. With this mind, one can atrainthe thirtv-seven limbs df enlightenmenr,lo the ten srages (dasabhirni) of. rhebodhisattva, the ten perfections (paramita), the auxiliary aids to practice,lrand, at the end of the Path, the dharrnukrtya. This is called the prayopacause.

The complete fulfillment cause is "prayoga. With rhis prayog(4 oneattains complete fulfillment of both the cause and the fruit [of Buddhanaturel. By fulfillment of the cause is meant virtuous and wise action.

40

THE CONCDPT OF BUDDHA NATURE

Fulfillment of the fruit is constituted by the three virtues of wisdom, thecutting-off of delusion, and loving-kindness.

Of these three causes. the essential nature of the first is unconditionedThusness. The essential nature of the latter two causes is conditionedresolution and action

Within the cause of attainability are three kinds of [Buddhal nature: thenature which dwells in itself, the emergent nature, and the attaining nature.The record says, the nature which dwells in itself is [Buddha naturej in thestage of the ordinary person who has not -vet begun Buddhist practice; theemergent nature is [Buddha nature] in the stage of the Buddhist practitionerfrom the first awakening of mind up to the completion of the Path; theattaining nature is [Buddha nature] in the stage of the person who hascompleted the Buddhist Path. (794a)

According to this passage, Buddha nature should be understood

as three kinds of cause. These three, however, all stem from the first

cause, the cause whose nature is Buddha potentiality as such and

whose essential character is unconditioned Thusness. This consti-

tutes the text's first fully developed direct statement as to what the

Buddha nature is: Thusness making possible Buddhahood. As the

description of the three causes proceeds, we can see that this initial

urge toward the self-realization of the Buddha nature is the basis that

progressively develops into bodhtcitta, prayog&, and fulfillment, in

turn.The latter two causes, which are based on the first, simply are

constituted by various aspects of Buddhist practice, or "conditionedresolution and action."r2 Bodhicitta, although not explained in thistext, generally is understood as the mind that has awakened to aknowledge of the reality and loftiness of Buddhahood and that aspiresto the attainment of that Buddhahood which it $impses. As such, itrepresents the beginning of the bodhisatnsa's career. Prayopa has anarrow and a more $eneral meanin$, both of which we see reflectedhere. In the narrow sense, prayo$a refers to preliminary orpreparatory practices on the Buddhist path, such thin$s as thethirty-seven conditions and the auxiliary aids. In a broader sense,prqryogct means progress based on endeavor, that is, Buddhistpractice as such. This latter sense is reflected in the preceding text indescribing prayoga as including the ten stages, the ten perfections,and the eventual realization of dharrltakd,ya. The Chinese renderingof praryoga is jia-xin!: xingz, the active practice or cultivation of theBuddha Way that is.Jia, progressive or additive. It is noteworthy that

41

BIJDDTIA NATURE

the author of this text equates bodhicitta andprayopa. Bodhicitta, ormind of wisdom, is a term that may appear at first to refer to a mentalentity of some kind. However, it is equated with prawga, a term thatclearly refers to action, practice, and doing. The complete fulfillmentof the potential of Buddha nature, moreouer, is accomplished byprqyo$a, or Buddhist practice and is manifested in virtuous and wiseactions.

Three kinds of Buddha nature are thqn listed (in the lastpara{raph of the quotation) and correlated with three stages ofdevelopment on the path of Buddhist pracrice. A Buddha nature that"dwells in itself is the kind of Buddha nature found in those whohave not yet taken up Buddhist practice; thic Buddha nature "dwellsin itself in the sense that it is latent and not yet manifest. A secondkind of Buddha nature, the "emer$ent nature," is found in allpractitioners of Buddhism, from the newest beginner to thebodhisutttso on the brink of Buddhahood, whereas a third kind, the"attaining nature," represents the sta{le of the final completion of thePath. Insofar as all of these stages develop from the first cause ofBuddha nature, they all are grounded in unconditioned Thusness.

Tlw Three ltIo&res (Irisvabhiiva)

The second category given as revelatory of the essence of Buddhanature is the three natures. In this text, two sets of three natures arediscussed, the three natures or triscJabhaoa (son xing), and the threeno-natures (san wu eing), both classic Yosdcdra ideas. The latter arediscussed first.

The three no-natures are: the no-mark nature, the no-birth nature. andthe no-reality nature. These three natures together exhaust the Tathagataneture. In what sense? To$ether they constitute its essence.

what is meant by tlie no-mark nature is the fact that all dharmas arejust names and words; their own-nature lacks marks and form. The no.birthnature means that all dharmas are brought irito being by causes andconditions; they cannot produce themselves. since neither self nor othercompletes [productionl, it is called the no-birth nature. The no-realitynature means that because all things lack the mark of reality, tlere is noother possessor of reality from which [realityl can be attained. e9aa4)

In the present context, the function of'these three no-natures is toidentify the essential nature of the Tathasata, or Buddha, nature with

42

THE CONCEPT OF BUDDTTA NATURE

emptiness in order to legitimize it in terms of orthodox theories of

the emptiness of all thin$s and to turn aside potential objections that

the Buddha nature is a crypto-Hindu entitative mind or soul. We have

seen this approach in the text already: Before the author says what

Buddha nature is, he is caret'ul to say what it is-not. It is quite evident

that he is arguing, at least in his own mind but probably also in

reality, with more 1unya-oriented opponents who would accuse him

of un-Buddhist activity.After these preparatory comments, the author moves on to a

discussion of the three natures as such; that is, the trisrsabhfiva of

Yogac-ara theory: the discriminating nature, pa'rikalpita stsabhfuvq

(fen-bie-xing)i the relapive nature, psrd'tantrq xsabhansa @-ta-xing); and the true \ature, pariniqpanna scrsbhtusa (xhen-

shi-xing).I{e first defines the $eneral meanin$ of each term.

The discriminating nature is established on the basis of the use of thelanguage of provisional speech. If there were no such terms, then thediscriminating nature would not come into bein$. Therefore you shouldknow that this nature is merely a matter of verbal expression, in reality it hasno essenoe and no properties. This is what is called the discriminatin!,nature.

The relative nature is the principle (Drc-li) that manifests as thetwelvefold chain of conditioned origination (pratitya-sa'mutpdda). Becauseit serves as a basis bti-zhi) for the discriminating nature, it is established asthe relative (1,t-ta) nature.

The true nature is the Thusness (zhen-nt) of all thin$s. It is thenondiscriminatin$, wisdom realm of the wise. For the sake of purifyin$ the

[firstl two natures, realizin! the third [i.e., liberation], and cultivating allvirtues. the true nature is established. (794b)

The three natures theory is important for the understandin$ of

the subject-object relationship it provides. This, of course' is standard

Mahayana Buddhist material, but it may fairly be said that the three

natures theory manifests the Buddhist position on this issue rather

clearly. For what exactly is a nature (ccine\, and in what way can

there be said to be three of them that somehow Qonstitute reality? Do

these natures constitute states of mind or thin$s?

The beginning of an answer to this question may be sought in the

following quotation. In answer to the question, "what would be lackin$

if there were no true nature?" the reply is $iven, "If there were no

tnre nature, then all the various kinds of pure realms (ii"g1 would

43

BUDDH,A NATURE

not be attained (de chen!)." (795b). In other words, it is the truenature that makes realization possible. . There are three mainelements in this sentence: the true nature, the pure realms, and theattaining. ordinarily, one might assume that the nature in question isconstitutive of personhood or subjectivity inasmuch as we know it isfundamentally linked with Buddha nature. If this were assumed, thenwe would tend to think that the "realms" were sombthing likesubjective states of being, attainable only beca1rse of the potentialrepr-esented by the true nature. However, the term used for "realms,"ji^gz, ordinarily means the objective realm, one's environment, theobjects of one's senses and co$nition, precisely in contrast to thesubjective realm, which is rendered with the term zhi. Therefore, thesimple attribution of subjective qualities to the true nature becomessomewhat problematic. Is this true nature then, some kind of qualityin the world, objective to persons, that one may or may not discover?The terms for "attainin$" also contribute to one's indecision, as theyliterally mean "obtain" plus "complete, fulfill." Thus we have twopossible interpretations for this sentence: (1) If there w€r€ rlrr(subjective) true nature, one would never experience certain states ofpurity; or (2) if there were no (objective) true nature, the ,,pure"quality of the world would not exist. In fact, both meanings areintended simultaneously.

This passage is an excellent example of the perspective ofMahdydna Buddhist thought insofar as neither objective reality norpurely subjective states are being referred to as such. Rather. thesubject of the sentence cuts across this distinction. it concerns livedreality, or experience, with experience understood as "experience of'something, as immediately and simultaneo,usly subjective-objective:our experience is subjective in the sense that an element ofawareness is present, and it is objective in the sense that there is.a"content" in that awareness, we are aware ,,of somethind,." In thispassage, the author is indicating a certain quality that life may have.Life is able to have this qualiry borh because the world (objectivereality) is the way it is (Thus) o,ndbecause we are the waywe are. Ifeither of these qualities were missing, life would not have this quality.Although this may sound to the reader like a complex way of talkingabout the same subjective states that were earlier reiected. closerexamination shows this not to be thl case, for this wouli be to renderthe sentence according to (1) and to ignore (2). such a reading would

44

THE CONCEPT OF BUDDHA NATURE

do justice neither to the inescapably objective quality of itngz nor tothe importance of the Thusness of all phenomena or things.Therefore, what the passage is intended to express is the immediatelygiven, lived reality that includes both objective and subjectiveelements. The author's perspective is one in which the two areimmediately and inseparably present.

In short, all three natures indicate ways in which (1) realitypresents itself to persons, and (2) persons experience reality. The twoelements are inherent in each nature; each has both subjective andobjective qualities. The discriminating nature, then, indicates both adeluded person and a fragmented reality, with delusion defined as theexperiential reality based on language. The relative nature indicates aperson with partial understanding of the way things are and a realityin which all things are interdependent and relative. The true natureindicates both the way things are (Thus) and the undeludedbeholding of the way things are. The author of the BNT, I submit,describes each of these natures as somethin$ "primitive," in thesense that each is $iven to human experience as a whole, as a unit,and only with reflection upon our experience do we realize that whatis given as a primitive whole may be described with terms ofsubjectivity and otrjectivity.l3 The union of the two in experience isprior to the separation of the two in analysis. The three naturesrepresent both a person's nature and reality's nature, as aninseparable, primitive unity, in the sense that they are boundtogether in rvhat is phenomenologically given. Our world is the way itis because of the way we are; we are the way we are because of theway our world is. The two arise together and are mutually creative.However, it is stressed that this interplay may be broken bytransforming oneself and the way one perceives the world, somethingover which one has total control and for which one's responsibilityalso is total. Thus, by changing the way one thinks-perceives-experiences, one simultaneously transforms not only the way one is(one's "being," in an active sense), but the way the world is as well(the way it presents it.self to one). There is no sense that the world is"out there," objective to and separate from me. I create it, and itconditions me: The interplay creates a complex mesh that is not to bebroken.

This being said, one still would like further clarification of theontological status of each of these three natures. The author provides

45

I]UDDFIA NATURE

us with such a clarification when he discusses the three natures interms of the relative "realiqy" (sht1) of each nature.

Each of the three natures is real (shi1) in some sense. How so?1. The essence of the discriminatin$ nature has eternally been

nonexistent (wu suo you) and yet it is not the case that it [totallyllacks realir,v. Why? The names and words [that constitute thisnaturel stand.

2. The essence of the relative nature exists and yet is not real. lt exlsts$tou) on the basis of deluded consciousness, its or$an, and its field,but insofar as it is not Thusness. it is not real (s/ril). Why? Becausethe idea of conditioned ori$ination stands, in comparison to thediscriminating nature it is called existent. But in comparison to therrue nature it does not "really" exist (/ef shi you). This is calledexisting bur not being truly real $tou bu zhen shi).

3. The essence of the true nature is the essence of Thusness (ru-nr), inwhich bein$ and nonbeing are real (zhen)because neither beinA nornonbeinS is rhe case (fei you;fei wu). (794c)

Each of the three natures participates in reality to some extent.Given the above analysis of the subjective-objective character thatthey possess. this perspective was inevitable: All are experientialreality, however deiusory. Thus the discriminating nature possessessome degree of reality to the extent that the words which constitute itstand (literally, "are not upside down") as names and words. That isto say, though this experiential reality is fundamentall_v out of touchwith reality as it is (Thus), still one can create a false experientialreality on the basis of verbal cognition-experience. Because a personactually lives and experiences that way, we must admit that itpossesses reality to that extent.

In the case of the relative nature, deluded consciousness andconditioned oripination are what stand; that is, are experientialreality. This reality is a purely relative reality: more real than thediscriminating nature, less than the true nature. This relative realityapplies in both an ontological and an 6pistemological sense: It isrelatively more true to see reality in terms of the processes ofconditioned origination than in the terms of entitatively orientedverbal cognition-realiry- is more like that and therefore one'sexperience is more real. However, this is still delusion and unrealitvwhen compared with the true nature.

Another perspective on the relative nature is offered elsewhere in

46

THE CONCEPT OF BUDDHA NATURE

the text: "The relative nature is of two kinds: pure and impure. Theimpure relative nature comes into bein$ on the basis of discrimina-tion. The pure relative nature comes into being on the basis ofThusness" Qgac). We have here a rather different perspective fromthat just discussed. The first analysis establishes a pt'ogression: Therelative nature is relatively more real than the discriminating natureand relatively less real than the true nature. According to the present

analysis, however, the relative nature, or conditioned ori$ination,actrrally is the only realiqv. Insofar as one experiences it in the modeof discrimination, the discriminating nature is operative; insofar asone experiences Thusness, the true nature is operative. In otherwords, the relative nature, which is the only possible given, is purified

by Thusness and sullied by discrimination.These two perspectives seem somewhat irreconcilable. The

author's intention, however, may be within the reach of speculation.laThe first analysis clearly shows the author's interest to establish thetrue nature as supreme, to portray the enli$htenment it represents assuperior to the other two natures. The second analysis returns us to abasic Mahayana tenet: There is only one world, the world ofinterdependent phenornena, which can be experienced in an entirelydelusory, part.ially delusory, or enlightened fashion. The ordinaryworld is not to be left behind; there is no superior, hidden world ofpurity to be attained. If the author's concern is to maintain both ofthese positions, then this awkward double analysis of the relativenature becomes comprehensible. Such reconcil iation as there is inthe text for these two analyses is. found in the statement that the pureaspect of the relative nature is equivalent to Thusness, or the truenature. In this way the relative natlrre may remain the only reality,rvhereas in its pure aspect (as supreme Thusness) it in effecttranscends itself in its impure aspect.

Finall-v, the true nature is the "Thusness in which being andnonbein$ are real," due to the very fact that "neither bein$ nornonbeing is the case." The dualistic categories of being and nonbeingboth are neS,ated as a preliminary step, but in the end they arereaft ' irmed via the Thusness intrinsic to them both. That is, being andnonbeinp are emptied of any intrinsic reality. What one can see whenthose cate$ories are out of the way is the Thusness of what is or, inother words, the Thusness of the reality flux. In this way, thediscussion of the true nature itself noints back to the fundamental

47

BLTDDHA NATURE

reality of the relative nature: Thusness is not transcendent of bein$

and nonbein$, it is their true nature.How does all of this apply to the concept of Buddha nature? It is

important to remember that all three natures are constitutive of the

Buddha nature; this is easier to see insofar as ihere ultimately is one

nature, the relative, in pure (the true nature) and impure (the

discriminating, nature) aspects. The very sli$ht reality accorded the

discriminating nature reinforces the si$nal emphasis $iven to the

omnipresence of Buddha nature. In fine, thou$h, the pure relative

nature : true nature gives us our clearest ima$e of the Buddha

nature as manifest in a nondistorted fashion. The true nature, like

Buddha nature, is fully real yet uncharacterizable by either existence

or nonexistence. Its reality is known by its functions: purification of

the first nature, liberation. and the cultivation of all virtues. Finally,

its nature is equated with Thusness: the realty of thin$s as they are

and knowledge of that reality.

Tuthfrgatagarbha

The final constituent of the essentials of Buddha nature is the

tuthfug,&tagarbhct. Because the latter is itself a close synonym of

Buddha nature, this is a crucial component for our understandin$ of

the Buddha nature. For this reason, the entire text on the subject will

be presented. interspersed with interpretation. The text reads:

There are three aspects of tathdgata'garbha which should be known:the contained (suo she zdng), hiddenness, and the container (twr4 shezang).

1. Garbha as that which is contained. The Buddha calls this theThusness that dwells in itself (zhu zi xing ru'-nt). All sentient bein$,s are(shr;2) the tathd.gatu,garbha (ru-lai-zan'p). There are two meanin$s ol Thtts

1ru. in ru.-lai-zangll. The first is the knorvledge of Thusness Qu-ru'zhi) andthe second is the realln of Thusness (tu-ru'iinf). Since the two standtogether. we speak of the Thusness of Thusness (ru-ru). Comc ll'ai innt-lni-zanpl means cominS from itself, in comin$ to arrive, and in arrivin$ toattain. This is what is called Thus Come, Tarbdgata (ru'-lai). Hence, althoughthe Tathagata natve Qu-lai mn€) is a causal name, it should [alsol be aname of fruition. (795c)

Tathd,gatagarbho has three aspepts, which can be examined one

at a time. We begin with the assertion that the term storehouse (zong

tnnt-lai-zan!) can be interpreted as meaning "the contained"; that

48

T

ii

THE CONCEPT OF BUDDTIA NATURE

is, that which is contained rvithin the storehouse. This, in turn, is

specified as the "Thusness which dwells in itself." This echoes thepassa$e in the section on Buddha naiure as the three causes in which

the fundamental cause of attaining Buddhahood rs given as Thusness.

As in that passage, where Buddha nature as Thusness embraces allsentient bein$s, here also, as the next line of the text tells us, all

sentient bein$s are the tctthagatagarbha. In other words, the

essential nature of every person is Thusness and as such all

constitute the tathtigcttqEqrbha.Thusness, then, is the fundamental basis of the tathagata4,arbha.

The author expands on the rneaning of this Thusness by identifyin$ it

as the sum of two elements: the knowledge of Thusness and the realmof Thusness. The term trarrslated here as "knowledge" (zhi) is, as

mentioned earlier, a standard term for the subjective, whereas

"realm" Amgl is a standard term for the objective. Ordinarily the zhiis the coSnizer anci the jingz the co{nized. In the case of theknowledge of Thusness (nt-rtt-zhi) and the realm of Thusness(ru-ru,-jinS), the former is the knnwing that accords with theprinciple of Thusness, and the latter is the known that accords withthat principle. Because, the author says, the two "stand to$ether," the

term Thusness as nt-nt, is coined to embrace them simultaneously.

As such it represents thc unity of their mutualiry. All of this-theru-rrr Thusness with both its subjective and objective constituents-is given in explanation of the single "Thus" of tathagat&gq,rbha (the

nt ol ru-lai-z&ng).The discussion of Come (lai in nt-la,i-zang,) brings up the issue of

the extent to which tathaqatueqrbha (and Buddha nature) should beunderstood as the cause of Buddhahood or as the fruit, Buddhahooditself. The author picks up the thread of standard t&thdgcttugarbhctthought, where it often is said (following Sanskrit etymology) that the

larbha ol tathagatagarbha can mean, on the one hand, seed orembryo (i.e., cause of attaining Buddhahood) or, on the other hand,womb or matrix (containing the various Buddha virtues; i.e., fruit oreffect). The author believes the term Tathagata Mtnffe (or Buddhanature) generally is taken to connote causation and now aims to showthat the term equally connotes fruition. He does this by means of ananalysis of the word come.

The author represents come as meaning coming from itself(which the context'indicates means from Thusness) and simulta-

49

BUDDHA NATURE

neously arriving and attaining the fruit of liberation. He argues thatcomin$ already entails arrivin$ (because one has not come anlrvhereunless one has arrived somewhere) and arrivin$ already entailsattaining (because when one arrives at a place one has attained thatnew situation). Thus where there is coming there is attaining-where

there is cause there is effect. T&th&gqrag&rbhq, therefore, issimultaneously the cause and the fruition of Buddhahood. Thisjustifies the earlier statement that all sentient being,s, including theunenlightened, are tclthdgatagerbhe,.

What one artains is essentially not rwo, it is only differentiatedaccordin$ to puritv and impurity. In the causal stage, because one abandonsthe two kinds of emptiness, one gives rise to ignorance. Because it is mingledwith the kle6a, it lrhe tathagatagarbhal is called polluted. Although ir is notimmediately manifest, it certainly is due to become manifest, and thereforeit is called attainable. At the fruirion srage, by uniring with the two kinds ofemptiness, there is no further delusion, the kle*a no longer pollute, and onecafls it pure. When the fruit is manifest, we call it att(Lined.

. We can compare it to the nature of water. Water, in its essence, isneither pure nor impure. We only use the words pure and impure in rhepresence or absence of dirt. When mud and sediment are stirred up thewater is not clear. Although it is not clear, the water's pure nature has notbeen lost. When, by some means, it is settled, then purity is attained.Therefore know that the words pure and impure refer only to the presenceor absence of dlrt. It has nothing to do with the nature of the water itselfbeing pure or dirtv. One should understand this.

The two kinds of Buddha nature are also like this. Both are the sameThusness. There is no difference in their essence..It is just that when oneabandons the principle of emptiness, one arouses doubt and attachment.Because of impuriqv and confusion due to the kle6a, it [Buddha nature] iscalled polluted. When one does not abandon the two kinds of emptiness andthe single mark of Thusness, then one does not give rise to ignorance and thekle6a do not pollute; therefore one provisionally designates it as Wre.(795c-796a)

The Buddha nature is always nondual and unchanging: The causaland the fruition stages are not different in any essential aspect. Onegains nothing new at the fruition stage; one simply stops alienatingoneself from one's true nature. BUddha nature in purity (attainment)

does not differ from Buddha nature in impuriry (delusion).

As for the term garbha (zang), a"ll sentient beings universally existwithin the Tathdgata's wisdom (za,i nt-lai zhi nei) and therefore it is called

50

I

III

I

THE CONCEPT OF BUDDHA NATURE

the womb (zang). Because the knowledge of Thusness (nt-nt zhi)corresponds to the realm of Thusness (r.u-rtt jing2), there is certainly nosentient being, who is excluded (chur). The realm of Thusness is alsoencompassed (suo she chi) by the Tarhagara, and therefore it is called thecontained [i.e., "embryo," suo zan!]. Senrient beirrgs are (tcei) thetuthagangarbha,

Furthermore, larbha has three meanin$s. The first shows theincomparability of the true realm (zheng jing), because apart tiom this reamof Thusness (nt-nt jin$ there is no other realm that surpasses it. Thesecond shows the incomparability of the true practice (z,hen! xing), becausethere is no other superior wisdom that may surpass this wisdom (zhi). Thethird makes manifest the incomparabiliry of the true fruit [of practicel,because there is no fruit that surpasses this one. This is why we speak ofincomparabililv. Because this fruit encompasses (nenp she zan!) all serrtienrbeings, we say that sentient beings are (toei) the tathAg&ngarbha. (796a)rs

Beginning with the second paragraph, we find a list of threecategories that the storehouse encompasses: the realm of Thusness,Buddhist practice, and the fruit of practice or attainmenr ofBuddhahood. We should note that this list seems to indicate that theitems encompassed by the storehouse constitute the so-calledstorehouse itself. After all, how could any kind of entity hold orcontain the realm of Thusness? Therefore, the storehouse is not akind of shell within which various items accumulate. The storehouseis no kind of entity at all; it is simply the sum total of all those thingsthat it encompasses. The very title of this first secrion onffihA,ga,krEarbho glosses the term storehause rvith the phrase "thatwhich is contained," profferin$ the latter as an alrernarive name forone aspect of the former.

Thus the storehouse, in effect the tathd,gategctrbha itself, isconstituted by these three categories. First is the realm of Thusness,or all of reality truly experienced. Note once again the rejection of asubject-object split here. The tathagatagarbha (and Buddha nature)cannot be purely a principle of subjectivity; it cannot be any kind ofself cut off from the world, because one of its components embracesthe world-or the realm of Thusness-itself. The second componentis Buddhist practice, which is equated with wisdorn. Note here thatbecause wisdom is employed as interchangeable with Buddhistpractice, it cannot be interpreted as representing any kind of static orsubstantial basis of subjectivity (subh as a pure mind or self). Theterm toisdom is used to represent the kind of subjectivity in action

51

BUDDTIA NATURE

cultivated in Buddhism. In other words, practice is a kind of doin$;'

and wisdom is a particular practice-acting or doin$ wisely' Finally,

the third item constitutive of the storehouse's "store" is the fruit of

practice; namely, realization of the Buddha nature to$ether with its

virtues. This fruit encompasses all sentient bein$s; all sentient bein$s

are the t&thae(ttag(trbha in the sense that they are alI bein$s whose

true nature is Buddhahood.The first para$raph of the precedin$ passa$e emphasizes very

heavily the "storehouse" meaning, to the extent of playin$ on the

spatial metaphor by sayin$ that all sentient beings are "within" (neti)

the Tathagata's wisdom. However, the very fact that the storehouse is

identified with the Buddha's wisdom indicates that the spatial sense

is no more than metaphor. Sentient bein$s are encompassed by the

Tathagata's wisdom in the sense that all possess the tqthAgq,ta,garbho.

Because the knowledge of Thusness and the realm of Thusness

correspond to each other, and the realm of Thusness also is

encompassed by the Tathegaa, it is not possible that any sentient

being not be a part of this universal encompassment. In the two

senses that sentient bein$s are encompassed within the Tathagaa's

wisdom and that they are encompassed within the realm of Thusness

(recall that Thusness is the essence of the tathfr$etagerbha) sentient

beings sre the tathd,g,ata.g,erblw. Again, note that sentient bein$s are

said to be that which is contained within the storehouse as well as the

storehouse itself. Clearly, the storehouse is its contents.

2. Hiddenness. The Tathagata itself is hidden and unmanifest; that iswhy it is called a larbha [i.e., embryo]. The term Thtl"s Come (Tathagata,nt-l.ai)has two meaninls. The first represents the idea that Thusness [itselflis not inverted-that is, we call false thoughts inverted; when there are nofalse thoughts, we speak of Thusness. The second represents the idea ofeternal dwelling. This Thusness nature comes from the [Buddhal nature thatdwells in itself. HavinS come it arrives, and havin$ arrived it attains. Theessence of Thusness never chan$es; in this sense it is eternal. When theT^thagale- nature dwells in the staf,e before Buddhist practice is begun, it isconcealed by hle6a. Because sentient bein$s cannot see it, it is called theparbha. (796a)

This passage is relatively strai$htforward. The basic point is that

the storehouse is hidden in the sens€ thet sentient beinSB who have

not yet realized it have no direct, personal knowledge of it. For them

52

THE CONCEPT OF BUDDHA NATURE

it is concealed by the kle(a or defilments (delusion, an$et, $reed, and

so on) symptomatic of human i$norance. This is standard

tethdgetugarbha doctrine. This passage also repeats the theme

discussed earlier; namely, that the Thusness nature' or Buddha

nature, is the same in the causal and fruition stages. This is concealed

from the ignorant by false thou$hts and kleja, but the Buddha nature

itself is untouched by this condition and drvells in the fuliness of its

maturity, even in the person who has not yet be$un to practice

Buddhism.

3. The reason for speakin$ of th e larbha, as container (n'en$ she) is that

all rhe countless merits of the fruition stage, when d'arellin$ in the time of the.,attainability" stage [rhe causal sta$el, are completely enclosed. If we spoke

of attaining the nature only when arrivin$ at the time of iruition, that

lTathegatal nature would be noneternal. why? It is because there is no

beginning of the attainment that we know that [the Tath1gata naturel'

aboriginally exists. That is why we call it eternal. (796a)

The third meaning of tathagata4arbha as "the container"

represents the fuifillment of the Tathdgata nature, the realization of

Buddhahood with its infinite Buddha virtues. In fact, however, it is

misleading to speak of attainin$ Buddhahood as the Buddha nature

exisrs abori$inally without be$innin$. Even before the pracrice of

Buddhism is begun, the Buddha nature is full and conplete with all

its virtues.Let us now summarize the most important points concernin$ the

tuthagdngurbha. First and foremost, the tdthdgamEqrbh& is

Thusness. This was expressed in many ways: The first syllable of the

word tathdgatagq,rbha (ru-tai-xang) was identified with Thusness

(ru-ru); the first aspect ctf tathdgatctgarbha, the contained, was

directly identified with Thusness as both the knowled$e of Thusness

and the realm of Thusness; and the tathdgclt&garbha was equated

with a Buddha nature that, whether polluted or pure, is ever the same

Thusness. Clearly, this identification of the tqthagang,a'rbha with

Thusness is a central point; what is its si$nificance?

The identification of tathagangorbha and Thusness means that

the tathfrgatagarblw cannot be a principie of selfhood in a seif that is

absolurely distinct frorn the world. We will discuss the concept of

Thusness further in Chapter Five, brlt it is clear even now that

Thusness, as the knowledge of Thusness and the realm of Thusness,

53

BUDDHA NATURE

encompasses both self and world (or better, compels us to revise ournotions of self and world by asserting their mutuality andinseparability). The identificatio n ol tathagatagarbha a'd Thusnessalso means that the essential nature of the tattrugcltcrgarbha enrails astate of experiential reality in which the world, in effect, manifestsitself as ir is and is seen as it is. Thusness arrd tathagcttagarbha, then,are principles both or enlightenment and of absolute reality.

A second theme is a list of three components of thetathagangarblra: Thusness, the practice of Budcihism, and the fruitof practice; that is, realization or liberation. This is highlyreminiscent of the list of rhree cause of Buddha nature we looked atearlier; namely, the cause of attainability (which is Thusness). theprayogq cause (or practice), and the complete fulf i l lment cause (orattainment of the fruit). In both cases we see a very simple model.The essenfial narure of Buddha nature or tathdgatagarbha isThusness. This is the ground of the possibiriry of oui (successfuily)practicing Buddhism. The ultimate outcome of Buddhist practice, ofcourse' is realization ot'the goal of Buddhism, or the fruit of practice.Buddha nature and tathdgatagarbha, then, as Thusness are realrtyand the correct apprehension of reality. As portrayed in this tripartitescheme, they are the foundation of the possibility of practice, thedoing of the practice itself, and the ultimate guarantee of itssuccessful fulfillment.

A third theme of the ruthagatagarbha marcriar is the author'semphasis upon the essential identity of the nthagatagarbhct in thestages of cause and fruition. Let us recail a passage quoted earrier:

The two kinds of Buddha nature are also like this. Both are the sameThusness. There is no difference in their essence. It is just that when oneabandons the principle of emptiness, one arouses doubt and atrachmenr.Because of impurity and confusion due to the kre6a, it IBuddha 'at'rej iscalled. polluted. When one does not abandon the two kinds of emptiness andthe sin$e mark of Thusness, then one does not give rise to ignorance anc thekle6a do not pollute; therefore one provisionalry designates i as pure. (796a)

This paralleis the discussion of the pure and impure relative natur.e inthe tnsvabhZoc section. There is one basic given_here, Buddhanature (or tathagaagarbha); there, the reiative nature. Xf oneabandons the all-important princiRle of emptiness, one proclucesdelusion and thereby effectively liies in pollution. The essential

54

TI THE CONCEPT OF BTJ'DDHA NATURE

.character of the basic given (Buddlia nature, relative nature),however, is untouched; it remains essentially pure and unchanged.This talk of puriry, though, is ultimately unacceptable. purity is arelative term and as such has no relation to the unchan$ing Thusnessof Buddha nature.

The final important theme enunciated in this section is theassertion that all sentient beings "are" the tqthdEats,garbha. Threetimes in this part of the text we are told that sentient beings "are" thetqthdgc,tqgarbha; not once are we told that they,,possess" it. This isto be understood in the sense that sentient beings are identified withThusness and as such are capable of being identified with thetathAgatagarbha, the storehouse or totality, in effect, of Thusness (asboth wisdom and realm, subject and world).

Ler us conclude this chapter with a list of five meanings ascribedthe Buddha nature in the BN?, which may summarize some of themain points of our discussion. Three of the meanin!,s given here arejust stated without comment, but the last two are accompanied by theinterpretation of the unidentified commentator of the BN?.

1. It reaily exists (zhen shi you).2. lt can be perceived by upd3n.3. Having been perceived,.its merits are inexhaustible.4. It is [correealed by] the beginnin$ess shell with which it is [bothl

disunited and united. The commentator says, beginninSless meansthat defilements, karma and retribution are all without a start andtherefore we say they are bepinninpless. As for distnited, becausethese three are in opposition to the dharmakftAa, we say they aredisunited. We say they are united because these three arise independence on the dharmakaya. ls f.or shell, these three coneeal(neng zanil the dLnrmakaya and theretbre are called slwll.

5. The be!,innin$ess, excellenr nature wirh which it is associared is itsDharma. The commentator says, it is called beginnir4.tess because,the naturally attained prajfid, great compassion, meditation- anddharmaknya all aboriginally exist, The essence and the functionshave never been separatb and therefore we say they are associated.As for "the excellent nature with which it is associated is itsDharma," [ir is explained thus]. By virtue ol prajftd' the own-natureoI the dharma&rlya does nor change; by virtue of meditation, thenature possesses awesome merits; and by virtue of great compassion,the nature benefits [othersl. Therefore rve say this excellent nature isits Dharma. (8llb-c)

These five meanings more or less summarize the author's view of

)5

BUDDTIA NATURE

Buddha nature. First, he begins with the straightforward statement:The Buddha nature really, truly exists. Here he does not choose to say"it both exists and does not exist," or "it neither exists nor does notexist." It really, truly exists. This, of course, is still in contrast to thestatus of ordinary phenomena that partake of the unreality of delusionand defilement. Yet to say plainly that the Buddha nature reaily existsis a good example of the use of language in this text. The attempr tospeak positively, if not rapturously, of that which t'ulfillment of theBuddhist path reveals is certainly characteristic ol tathdgcttug,&rbhaand Buddha nhture rhought and is one of the main elernents of dis-tinction between it and Sunyazsdda thoug\rt. Thus, the Buddha naturereally exists: It may function as a constant support for the often wea-risome reality of daily Buddhist practice; it offers hope and the assur-ance that the effort of practice is not being made for "nothing." Itattests to the reality of Buddhism's soteriological promise.

Second, Buddha nature can be perceived by updrya. Updya isBuddhist practice. This statement affirms that practice is not themere elimination of ignorance, but yields positive results.

Third, having been perceived, the merits of the Buddha narureare inexhaustible. This statement, like the first two, is a positivedeclaration of the intrinsic value of the "Buddha fruit," the fulfillmentof Buddhism's soteriological piomise.

Fourth, Buddha nature is concealed by the beginningless shellwith whieh it is both disunited and unitbd. This meaningdemonstrates why practice is needed if we already possess theBuddha nature. Thus like the preceding sratemenrs, ir too jusrifiesBuddhist practice.

Finally, the beginningless, excellent nature with which it isassociated is its Dharma. Here we find once again very positivelanguage used in discussing the Buddha nature. The "essence"referred to is the dharmakaya or Buddha nalure. The "functions" arep'rsjfin, Ereet cornpassion.and rneditation. In saying that these twocate$ories are inseparable or associated, the author intends to conveythat they are interchan$eable.16 Thus the "essence" of Buddha natureis its functions; that is, the actions constitutive of great compassion,meditation, and prajfi.d are the "essence" of Buddha nature. Action,then, (or "functions") is the essence of Buddha nature, and theparticular character of this action is soteriological: the salvation ofoneself and others.

56

CHAPTER THREE

Soteriology: Buddha Nature as the Practice

of Buddhism

f ike emptiness, the Buddha nature concept is deeply soteriolo$i'

LJcal: in other words, it fundamentally has to do with the ultimate

transformation of the Buddhist practitioner.l Buddha nature in its

causal aspect is that by which one attains such transformation. In

this mode, as we have seen, it is essentially unconditioned Thusness

as the foundation of our future Buddhahood, but it also embraces the

conditioned action of bodhicitta and praryogo. In addition to its

causal role, Buddha nature is simultaneously the already present

fulfillment of the transformed state; this is Buddha nature in its

fruition aspect. In its ultimate form it is the dhanrwkaya, perfect

wisdorn, nirr.:,d,r.ta.Pr<lxirnately, then, Buddha nature is the conjunction of means

and end: Buddhist practice in all its forms and stages. In Buddhist

practice we have the means by which Buddha nature attains

self-realization and, simultaneously, the manifestation of the Buddha

nature itself in its purity. As the author of the BN? sees it, the $oal of

Buddhism is to realize radical self-transformation; Buddha nature is

both the means of this transformation and the manifestation of the

transformed state.

J /

BUDDHA NATURE

A. ASrayapardt:qtti

The term d9r ay a7t ar avqtti (xhuan -yi). literally,, transfo rmation ofthe basis," is a Yo$6cdra term. In that context, its meanin$ isexplairied as follows. Transformati,on (zhrnn, also ,,turning,"

"revolution") has two meanin$s: "transformin$', in the sense ofgetting rid of something, and "transformation" in the sense ofattaining something. Basis (p) refers to the eighth consciousness inYogdciira theory, the d,layavijft.d,na. The latter is the ,,storehouse"

consciousness that stores the karmic seeds produced by past actions,which in turn determine the future dispositions of individuals. In the"transformation" of the dlayavijfidtw, the seeds of defilements(kleia) and discriminatory knowledge are discarded, whereas the two"fruits" of bodhi (wisdom) and nirtsana are attained. Thus for theYogdcdrin, the storehouse, or dlayavijfifilw itself is what istransformed, or in some understandin$s, destroyed.

The meaning of a*ayapardrsqtti in the present text is ratherditferent. The author of the BN? introduces the d.Sra1;apard$ftti intohis discussion by describing it as the supreme purity revealecr whenall limitations on the understanding have been removed; it is the"purity of the original nature" (ben xirtg); that is, the Buddha nature.(801b) Thus what is undergoing transformarion in the understandingof the BN?'s author is not the dlayatijmana but a person'srelationship to the Buddha nature. The author builds on thisbeginning to produee a complex account of the d9rryap&rtu)fttinotion within the context of Buddha nature thought. We begin with adiscussion of four characteristics of dsrayapardvqtti.

1. The productive basis (sllrlg yi) is the continuins basis of the Buddha'snondiscriminatory Path. If there urre no such condition IasdSratnryr&Ittil, the nondiscriminatory path would not be produced.Because there is reliance on this condition, we name this aspect the basisthat produces the Path (Dao sheng yi).

2. The destructive basis (mie y) is the utter extinction and nonbirth of alldelusions and habits due to their lack of ba.sis [in reality]. Except byrelyrng upon the dsrayaryrdoftrd's urter destruciion of delusion, iherewould be no differencb in the extinction of delusion by #dva.kas,pratyekafuddhas, and Buddhas. But b,ecause they are not the same, weknow this laaragupardvrJtrl is the basis of the utter extinction ofdelrrsion.

58

SOTERIOLOGY: BLTDDHA NATURE AS THE PMCTICE OF BLIDDHISM

3. The fruit of well-matured contemplation. well and c.rrectly penetratingIThusnessl, showing reverence over a long period of time, anduninterruptedly and completely cultivating the Thusness that one knows,these are the fruits ol dirayapardv1ti. If one is on the path,d'srayapdrdvrtti is the cause. If one has completed the path, it is calledfruit. If the dSrayapardvftti were not this , fruit of wel!-maturedcontemplation. all Buddbas, of their very. nature, would have torepeatedly marure their contemplation, repeatedly destroy [the kle6al,and repeatedly purify [themselvesl. Because this is not so, we know thatthe dSrayepardvrtti is the fruit of weli-matured contemDlation.

4. The dhamnd.fuiru's mark of purity. Because all false thoughts are utterlyextinsuished in it. this dharmrtdhaat, surpasses that which can bee-rpressed in reasoning or in speech. Therefore, we take purity to be acharacteristic of the dhannadhatu. This is the extinction of the activitiesof the mind and the cutting off of the way of speech. It is ineffable,because it is the attainment of the unattainable principle of Thusness(z,hen-nt li). (801b)

The first characteristic illustrates that a1rayaparavfifi is thebasis on which the Buddha Way is founded. Without thea{rayaparavftti there would be no Buddhist path, no practice ofBuddhism. lt is the condition by which the path comes into being"The second characteristic draws on the standard tathdgatagarblnteaching that all defilements, such as ignorance, are basically unreal,havi'g no basis in realitl'. In other words, they are simply an absenceof truth or reality, rather than the real presence of defilement and assuch they are utterly extinct and unborn. The d*ra,yapardt1ti iscredited with being the basis for this extinct, unborn status ofdefilement. Delusion has no real status in the "purity of the originalnature" (Buddha nature) that the a1rayapctrctvftti is.

Rather cryptically, the author posits this pure d,srayapartu)ftti inwhich delusion is unborn ds the reason for the difference between thepaths of Sravaka, pratyekabuddha, and Buddha. Based on theexposition in other parts of thetext, his reasoning seems to be thatthe *rdzsaka and pratyekabuddh.q, think of themselves as havingactually destroyed defilements, whereas a Buddha realizes thatdefilements are unborn and moreover has fully realized the positivenature of the d.srayapard,vTtti; namely, the itharmakEta.

In the third characteristic, d,9rayapardvqtti is portrayed as bothcause and fruit of Buddhist practice, but most important as the doing

59

BUDDHA NATURE

of the practice itself, whether in the earlier or later smges. Thischaracteristic, in namin$ the acts of showin$ reverence andcultivating Thusness as fruits, even implies that the ability to practice

authentically is itself a fruit, thereby blurring the means-ends, orcause-fruit distinction. This naturally leads to the fourth characteris-tic, in which d9rayapardvqtti is identified with the ineffabledharmadhatu and with Thusness.

In short, asraryapardoftfi represents Buddhist practice. As theproductive basis it is the basis of the Buddhist Path, a synonym forBuddhist practice. The term basis, (a*ra,ya) then, does not refer hereto a substantive basis, but the basis or foundation of a particular formof action, Buddhist practice. A-{rayapardgrtti as the destructive basisaccounts for the negative aspect of Buddhist practice, the extinctionof defilement. In accordance with tathagata.garbhn thoufht, theextinction of defilements is constituted by the realization of theirultimate unreality. The third characteristic, the fruit of well-maturedcontemplation, represents the positive aspect of Buddhist practice:practice as the realization of Buddhist truths. Thus this characteris-tic, 'ivhich represents the heart of Buddhist practice as such in all ofits stages, emphasizes the Path of Buddhism and Buddhist practice asinherently positive: One attains the maturity of contemplation,reverence, and knowledge. Finally, the a9rayapara,oqtti representsthe culmination of Buddhist practice, the realization of Thusness, ina condition of freedom from turbulence and verbalization.

In this way, the four aharacteristics represent a9ra,ya,pa,ravqtti asBuddhist practice from its beg,innings to its mature fruition. As such,it is consistently portrayed as being of an active character. Any ideathat the "transformation of the basis" refers in sorne literal sense tothe transformation of a substantive thing must be rejected for this textin th.e light of its direct identification of a9rayopardtsytti with thedoing of Buddhist practice.

In a short passage that strongly supports this interpretation, theauthor goes on to ascribe two general meanings to a1raryo,paravqtti:It stands for separation from desire and the cause of separation fromdesire. Separation from desire is identified with the Third NobleTruth, Cessation (of suffering, i.€., ninsd4rr), and the cause ofseparation from desire is identified with the Fourth Noble Truth, Path(801b). Again dAra,yepa.rdpftti is identified with the Buddhist Pathand the attainments made by treading that Path.

60

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SOTDRIOLOGY: BUDD}L{ NATURE AS THE PMCTICE OF BUDDHISM

This theme is further emphasized in a discussion of seven

"names" given the asrayapardryrtti dhsnnakdya' Dharmakdyu ls a

term lrsed irt this text to represent the Buddha nature in its stage of

fruition. In examinin$ the seven "narnes" discussed in this passa$'e,

we will see once again that the dsrayapardwTtti dharmakdya is a

term expressive of buddhist practice, understood in this case as the

transformation inherent in realizin$, one's Buddha nature'

(1) The first name is perishin6l Ghen mo); that is' the perishin$ of

the skandhq,-attachment -skandha cycle. The five skq,ndha $ive rise

to the four attachments2 and these in turn $ive rise to new skandha'

or in other words, rebirth. This is a cycle that can continue

indefinitely. However. "Within the dharmctkaya' neither cause nor

fruit exists; therefore we speak of 'perishin$' (chen mo)' Attachments

are opposed and cured and thet"fore are defunct (chen)' As for the

skandhct, the fruit of retribution is exhausted and so we say they'are

gone' (mor)" (802c) .- 6 The second name is stillness Ai iing); that is' the stillness of

all actions.

All snryskr:ta dharmct [conditioned' thin$s] are called

&ctians {xfngz\, because they are conjoined with the four

states. These four are birth, chan$e, abidin$' and destruc-

tion. All saryskqtd dharma, irr relation to the past are

conjoined with birth' in relation to the future are con'ioined

with destruction, and in relation to the present are

conjoined with chan$e and abidin$' They ate called,qctions

becatlse they never rest from activity' The Tathdgata's

dhannakdycl, thou$h' is not like this' In the past it was not

born, in the future it will not be destroyed' In the present

there is no illness and oid a$e. It eternally and tranquilly

abides. unborn. it is called still (Jil); undestroyed, it is

called quiet Aingt ). (802c)

(3) The third name is discarding (qi she\; t.hat is' discardinS

remnants. The Srdvaka and pratyeknbuddhct have several remnants

attached to them, specifically kle6a and karma' The Tathdgata's

asrayapardvqtti d'harrnakaya has alread-v "crossed over" s&n'tsdra

(i.e., discarded karma) and utterly extin$uished all kle$a and delu-

sion. All paths of spiritual cultivation have been tread' Thus with

sctntsctra cast aside (qi) and putting aside (she) the Path (in the sense

6 1

BIIDDTIA NATURE

of a raft,eing put aside once one has crossed the stream and itsusefulness is past), *the d,harntq,kdya al,oneabides in the fulfillment ofthe four perfections" (of briss, self, purity and eternity) (g02c-803a).

(4) The fourth name is transcend,in! (euo du); that is,transcending the two kinrls of suffering. Because in the dharmakdyathere is ncrne of the gross suffering of it "

iraooka and. pratyekabud-dha, we use the term surp&ssing (guo). Because there is none of thesubtie suffering of the bod,hisorioli.".,four kinds of rebirth), we usethe term crossin! over (du\. Thus the clhartnakdya g.;r'U"r""athese two kinds of suffering. (g03a)

(5) The fifth name is elimination (ba ciu); that is, theelimination of the d,tajtaz:ijfi.dna:

The meanin g of alaya is [found in the combination ofthe conceptsJ ,,basis,,and ,,hidden.,, It is the ,o".""-fa"rrl oiso,msara because it produces the four kinds of ,r"i f_r.;The four taints are two kinds of kle6q, karma,"rra t"iriU"_tion. The firsr of rhe two kinds of klesa is all

"i"*..lrr-origr"'is in ignorance, and the signless liberation gu," i, ii, "r.".The second is all ftle6o other than 'iews. It is originatedfrom desire and cured by rhe rvishless fiU"r"ti""!"?".'ifr"

source of karma is the nature of thrxinp)because the nature of the ";;HH:?.ffi:Tffil#the self view (shen jf un). The source of retribution is one:AII of samsd.rct is.rerribution. lt [samsdra] ."1;;. ""

ifr"dlayavi.ifidna fbr its source; because it is not separatedfrom this vij,fi.d,rn, retribution is nor terminated.In the dhannakdS,a [horvever] the two time periods areextinguished by.means of two paths, and therefor" rv" ,O""f.of "elimination." The two paths are: (1) Nondiscrimrridrr*

wisdom_thisdoes away with present delusions ""a

p"rifi",the dharrnakdya; itis called the knowledg" ,f

".ir#r"".i.fone's defilements]. (2) Subsequent nondiscrimi.,utlrrj *lr-dom-this prevents any future delusions from ever uiiri.rgand fulfills the.dharmakaya; it is the knowl"d;";l;;.i;_filernentsl shall never arisJ again. ,,plucking o,rr;iaoii.,ir"purifying, the e.xtinliuishing of present delusions. ,,Remov_ing" (chuz) is the furfill**r, ,h" severing of future delu-sion. Hence rhe name eliminqtion (g03ai

62

SOTERIOLOGY:BUDDIIANATURDASTHEPRACTICEOFBI.IDDHISM

(6) The sixth name is relietsing Qi2); that is, relievinS, the five

fears. The five fears are (a) Suilt, as when a person does somethin$

evil and is filled with dread day and night; (b) fear of the blame of

others, as when a person has done something wron$, and fears that

other persons or gods saw it; (c) fear of punishment; (d) fear of bein$

born into an evi! birth, on the basis of one's present evilness; (e) fear

of the many r/irtuous ones-because one's own karma is impure and

one's discernment is not deep, one fears those who have accumulated

virtue. However, "one who has realized the dhsrm,akdya is free of the

five fears; thus we say the dhannakaya is the relievin$ of the five

fears" (803a-b).

(7) The final name is severin$ (duan); that is, severin$ the

retribution of the six destinies or $nti.3 "The term fati has many

rneanings; we will briefly speak of two: . ' (1) the place where

sentient beings are reborn; (2) the place where karma acts. With

these two meanin$s the term pati is established. The Tathagata's

d,harmakd,ya does not return to these Eclti . .. therefore we name it

setsering the six 6iati. we speak of the Tatha$ata's dharmakctya when

there is this condition" (803b).

All of these seven names express the ne$ation of various aspects

of the life of bonda$e and sufferin$. severed, undone, extin$uished,

and overcome are (1) the skandha-attachment'skandha cycle, (2)

determination by the condition of time, (3) karma and kle6a, (4)

suffering, (5) the d,lu;;^avi.iii.d.na, as the sourae oI sarysara, (6) fear,

and (7) rebirth amon$ the six destinies. These acts of severin$ and

extinf,uishing constitute the d{ra5tltparavqtti' A$ain its active nature

is readily apparent. In fact, all but one of the seven "nanles" is itself a

verb. These seven, then, are names for actions that Buddhist

practitioners undertake to achieve.

The d'h,armakaya,, on the other hand, represents the sta$e in

which these seven categories of suffering and fear are undone or

rernoved. Horv is the clhartnakaya described herein? (1) It has no

relationship to causation; (2) it has no relationship to timei (3) it is

utterly free of rebirth, klcia, or delusion: (4) it is utterly free of all

suffering; (5) freedom from delusion is its purification and its

fulfillmejrt; (6) it relieves the five fears; and (7) it is cut off from

rrbirthlAlthough all of this is expressed'ne$atively, there are also the

statements that (3) the d.hqrmakaya alone abides in the fulfillment of

63

BUDDHA NATURE

the four perfections, and (2) it abides eternally and tranquilly. Weshall returrr later to further discussion ol the dharrnctkciyo. For now,suffice it to say thatlhe dharmo,kdyo does indeed represent the stageof fruition in which the actions undertaken by the d,Srayapard,vrtticcme tc maturify.

What, in the end, is this d*rayaparawqtti? In the BN?,a{rayapardvqtti'is given as manifesting the character of Buddhanature. We have seen that it represents Brrddhist practice. Buddhistpractice here does not mean any set rituals, meditations, or ethicalobservances, but rather the process of the self-transformation of theindividual progressing from a self-centered, ignorant mode ofbeing-behaving to the selfless, awakened, compassionate rnode of aBuddha.

But what, more literally, are we to make of the termaSrayaparavqtti, "transformation of the basis"? What is this ddr<ryoor basis? To answer this question we need to look over the precedingmaterial and ask ourselves what is undergoing transformation. Thean,swer is, the person. Thorrgh the asraye, concept as used in othertexts unarguably is related to the YoSacara concept of thed,layavijfrdna, the preceding discussion clearly illustrates that,according to the Bl{?, it is the person who is undergoingtransformation. In fact, to transforrn the tilaycrcijfidrta, (or "do away"with its negative functions) is only one of seven "names" or functionsascribed the d,{rayapararqtti dharmakaya. It is but one way ofspeaking of the process of self-purification and spiritual cultivationrepresented by the terrrr dSrayaparaz.sytti dharmakdyu. The sevennames are rnutually complementary, different forms of languageemphasizing various aspects of self-transformation. Thus, to say thata9rayupardurtfd means the transforrnation of the alayavijfiana is tochoose a traditional form of language, heavily laden with theoreticalBuddhist concepts, to speak of the radical spiritual transformation ofthe person. To speak of. the asrayaparctvrtti as the utter eliminationof fear, or the ending of rebirth, likewise accomplishes this end. Weare offered a variety of lin6iuistic options to help clarify a process ofpersonal transformation, the effects of which are profound andfar-reaching.

In this text, therr, d,9rayaparaurfff is best interpreted as (1) theradical transformation of the person. (Z; luaahist practice, and (3)the transformation of the person's relationship to the Buddha nature.

64

SOTERIOLOGY: BUDDFIA NATURE,{,S THE PRACTICE OF BUDDHISM

A,rayapartu fffi demonstrates that the affirmation of the Buddha

nature is an affirmation of every person's potential to radically

translbrm himself or herself.

B. Dhnrmskfrya and I'{insdc.tu

In the precedin$ section we said that dhqrmakal'o represents the

culrnination of the process of oiraynparavrtti or Buddhist practice;

in other words, dharnwkd.ya represenrs the realization of Buddha-

hood. As such, the affirmation ol dhq,nnakdyo plays the irnportant

role of affirming the capability of the self-transformarion process to

reach a culmination. In what follows, dharmakaya and ni'TJar.xL' are

treated as synonymous terms. Each affirms the reality and the

desirability of the Buddhist $oal. As such, they represent the terminus

of the dsrayapararurttt: process. As we shall see, however, the

dhannukdrya also stands for "the purity of the ori$inal nature" and

thus represen$ the aboriSinnl existence of the Buddha nature' It

manifests the eternally true natufe of things and is 1ot just the end of

a process. As shall becorne evident, dha'nnakdrya and ninsd4'a

manifest the preeminently positive value associated with the tsuddha

nature. Thus, they justifv the process of self-transformation itself .

First, let us denronstrate that the dhsrmakdya does represent the

culmination of Buddhist practice rather than a metaphysical entity.

The outstanding characteristic of the dharmakaya is said to be "all

suffering being at rest." Its "flavor" is constituted by nonbackslidin$

and serenejoy (803b). It is clear from the text that these are qualities

that apply to persons, not to any transcendentai absolute: "If there is

someone who trains in the proper practice and seeks to perceive this

truth (/o), when he realizes it, he obtains nonbackslidin$ and serene

joy" (803b).Another approach to the nature of the dharmakaya is aftbrded us

by the following challen$e to its realty. The objeccion is raised: "How

do you establish these characteristics and meanin$s concernin$ the

dharmaka5,cl? If it is as you say, the dha'nnakd'ya must be

nonexistent (tou), since it cannot be apprehended. If a thing, is not

perceived b)'the six consciousnessesa then surely it is nonexistent,

like a rabbit's horns" (803c).

This question erroneously assumeb that the cihannnkdya is a thing

that should Lre empirically perceptible. To defend its reality, the au-

65

BIJ'DDFIA NATURD

thor interprets the question of the "existence" of the dha,rm,q.kd,ya asa question concerning the possibility of achieving the goal of ninsd4a.This he does by identifying the dhnrmsknyawith the "fruit" of ninsdna."You say that the dharmakd,ya does not exist because it is not per-ceived by the six senses. This idea is contrary to the truth. Why?Because one can realize ninoarla by shilltul means. contemplation,invocation [of the Buddha's namei, and correct practice are calledskillful means. Because of these skillful means, the dhormakdya canbe known and can be perceived" (803c). Thus, throu6fi proper prac_tices, one can realize ni'.sd,4a- that is, the dharmrtka,ya- andrherebyknow its reality. This is the first reply, and a perfecily pragmatic one:you shall know the dharmakaycr by its fruit, nirttdya. ,,If. thedhnnnakaya were nonexistent (vru), then all correct practices shouldbe in vain. Taking right views as the foremost pracrice, and includingin addition such good things as morality, concentration and wisciom,the correct practices thar one cultivates are not empty (bu kong) orfruitless. Because these correct practices do yierd fruit, we know thatthe dharmakdya is not nonexistent" (804a) . The dlwrmakaya is notnonexistent because it is known in experiential fruit.

This text's approach to nitloa4ra is similarly pragmatic. Theauthor begins this secrion by arguing that ninsa,4a is not the end of aprocess of spiritual cultivation, for then it would be somethin$produced (suo sheng). Because it is nor caused (wu qnn) it can besaid that it "abides eternally" (805b). This kind of language is qypicalof texts related to the tathd,lataga,rbhq traditicrn. In this tradition,speaking ot eternity is an affirmarive langua[ie manner of character-izing the unconditioned, which another tradition might prefer to callthe unborn. of more interest to us is the following passage in whichthe author discusses the practical, functional facers of ninsctrla.

Because lnirudqnl abides eternally, surpassing such marks as form, etc., wesay it is not form. Because it is not separate from the purity, etc. of the formmark, we say it is nor nor-form (fei fei se). Because ir is attained by greatmeritorious functioning (da gong yorq)s and nondiscriminati'e wisdom, wesay it truly exists (zhen you). Because of the path that is completed bysupra-mundane vi$or and because it is attained by Buddtra, we know it really .exists (shf you). As the strre says, "Bhikpus, this Dharma really exists. lt isunbcrrn and does not arise. It is not made and is unconditioned, (wuvei).Therefore know that ninsava.really and.eternally abides."6 This Dharnm isthe Tathagata's d'srayapara,rtti. That is why it is named the cnd ofdhdranl;7 it is also called yoga. (B0Sc) e /-{

Ni66 R l" l . f l t f i r - { , ' j s(.6eL5f ' \ t m r F F r r q t I t G

SOTERIOLOGY: BUDDHA NATURE A8 THE PMCTICE oF BI'DDHISM

The most irnmediately obvious feature ot' this passage is its portrayaloI nirnd4a (and therefore of d,hq,rmakdya and a,rayaparavrtti) instrongly positive terms. Its erernity and reality, *o."ou"i, validate thepractice of the Buddhist path of which it is the culmination.

The passage begins with a somewhat Sfrnyavdcla_like portion,where it is stated that nircdrya is neither form nor not-fb.ir, This,however, is done with an interesting twist. That it is not form is clearenou$h, but that it is nor nor-form is due to its identity with puritland the like qualities of form. such a perspective is characteristic oftathagatagarbha thoughr with its doctrine of the unreality-;ar is,the real nonexistence-of all defilements, of any'thing ,ihu, *lgt,besmirch the purity of what is. Because all impurities, all d.efilemenrcare unreal, what is-form_is simply Thus, with nothing to mar itsThusness; hence, its unity with nirtscinn, qualitativelll as well asontolo$ically. I{ote it is 'ot that ni.a4a is emptiness and hence so isordinary reality. Rather, nimsa1a is purity and hence so is ordinaryreaiity. The affirmative stance of the Buddha nature position isall-embracing.

Throughout the passage, niroana is spoken of in terms ofBuddhist practice and the Bucidhist path. Again and again it isemphasized thatnit.uar- is real because it is attained, anJthat it isattained in the practice of the Buddhist path. At the end of thepassage, nirndr.ta is directry identified with practice, specifically withyoga, rvith asraya,pardvTtti (which, as we sarv earlier, is thefoundation of the Buddhist path, the destruction of defilements, thefruit of mature contempration and the attainment of Thusness) andwith dhdrenr (recollection, meditation, and wistrorn). in this

"on,"*,the unnamed siltra asserts that the "unborn" and ,,unconditioned,,ninsar'tn really exists. Its eternity, then., its unborn and uncondi-tioned nature' points to its treedom from the conditioned world ofsamsaric delusion' its identity wlth nondiscriminatory wisdom andr nusness.

In the end, d6rayap&rA,ortti, dharrrtakaya,, ninsaqa are all termsused to convey various aspects of the dynamics oi the s"Jah"

"ui"r".They portray a Buddha nature that, iinally, is a rnetaphor for thevalidity of the Budclha way and a justification fbr Buddhist p-"ti"". ttfunctions ihus to validate guddhlst practice not by sening as asubstantial, metaphysicar ground for the.mechanics of: release'no. rvglorifying the figure of the Buddha and thus enticing those artracred

67

BUDDFI,A NATURE

to practices of worship. Rather, Buddhist practice is validated by

atresting to the desirability of the goal (the role of the dlwnnskdya-

nin],ana. part of the Buddha nature concept) and the capability of

each person to reach that $oal. In all respects, thou$h, the Buddha

nature concept revolves around Buddhist practice. The latter is the

final raison d'€tre of the Buddha nature concept. The fundamental

message of the Buddha nature concept as expressed in this text is

practice, self-transformation, r ealizat\on.

Several other characteristics of the dharmnkaya aflord us further

insight into the soteriolo$ical character of this fruition stage of the

Buddha nature. First, the dharmakii,yo is characterized as the Middle

Path, which is explained as meanin$ "separation from extremes." six

examples of s'r!h negating of extremes are $iven; we will here

examine one.The section is introduced with the remark, "as there are six sorts

of Middle Path, [the dharmawityal rernoves itself from six pairs of

extremes" (809a). In other words, the dhs,rmakfryct is the Middle

Path; that is, the cure for hurnanity's sufferin$, the path of

self-transforming action. Our example is entitled "the extremes of'producin$'

$lc,u ru,o) and 'not producin$' (wu xuo)" and is directly

concerned with the meanin$ of practicin$ the Buddha Way'

Producin$: Someone gets a notion and says, ..If I wish to cultivate

wisdonl (zhi hui),I must first produce (zuo) a thought, for only then will the

matter be completed." Not producin$: someone gets a notion and says,

"wisdom is not an activit-v (shd3) and not a skill (nen$'Why? Because

discernment (iie) and delusion are contradictories; that is, when discern-

ment arises, delusion naturally disappears' It is not the case that

discernment actively removes [defilementl. Therefore, I say wisdom is

neither an activity nor a skill."In order to avoid these extremes there is esmbiished the parable of the

oil lamp. As it says in the sritro,s "KdSyapa, it is like a burnin$ lamp: the

lamplight havin$ arisen, darkness is extin$uished' And yet although that

tat"ptigtrt did not produce (zuo) the thought, 'I am able to extinguish the

darkness; the darkness is extin$uished because c,f me,' it is certainly because

the light arose that the darkness was extinguished. Theref<;re, althouph the

lamplight does not produce a thought, it is not true that there is no actlvity

or skill. wisdom is also thus. It does not produce the thought, 'I am able to

extin$uish delusion,' and yet it is also true that it is because of wisdom

arising that delusion is extin$uished. Thbrefore, know that it is not true that

wisdom is neither activiry nor skill."

68

SOTERIOLOGY: BLTDDFIA NATURE AS THE PMCTICE OF BLTDDHISI'I

[Comrnentl If one says he produces the thought, "l am able toextinguish delusions," this is called increasinf," and is the extremist Iviervlof "producin$" (lou zuo). If one says, "rvhen rvisdom arises, ignoranceself-destructs-and not because of rvisdom," this is called decreasing and isthe extremist [r'iervl of not producin$ (rou ztu.t). In order to avoid theseextremes, we say that the arisin$ of wisdom cioes not produce thoup,ht. As forthe production and nonproduction of thought, it is not the case that it

Iwisdom] produces Ithoughtl; therefore there is no increase. Neither is it thecase that it does not produce [chan$el; therefore there is no decrease. Thisis called the \l i t idle Path. 1xoog1

The author's intent in this example appears to be to establish that

the dharmakaya (or Buddha nature) is active and pla-vs a part in

effecring change (in not beirr$ tou zuo) but that its activity does not

take place within the scope of karmic larvs of cause and effect (in not

being you %uo). ln ne$atin$ the latter extrelne, the author is

indicating that wisdom, though an activity, is nonphenomenal, that

is, nonsamsaric, because it is that which cuts throu$h the karmic

linka$e of cause and effect, rather than bein$ subsumed by it.

Yet it is equally important for the author to establish that wisdom

is an activitv or t irnctioning (shi3), that is, a doing, and that it does

have the skill or abiliry (neng) to effect change. It is not fortuitous

that rvisdom arising, defilements are extinguished; it is definitely

because of l'isdom's presence that defilements are undone. Yet theauthor hesitates to speak of this in a directly causal fashion, as

causatiorl is the law of s&msqr& and karma, whereas wisdom ispreciselv the breakin$ of this bonda$e. To ne$ate the two extremes inquestion, the author is obliged to walk a fine l ine. To think in terms of"increasin$" or "producin$" is to think in karmic or samsaric terms,u'hich do not apply to wisdom, and to think in terms of "notproducin$" is a "decreasin$" or nihilistic kind of thou$ht, inasmuchas the efficacy of the Buddha Way is denied-and this too isinappropriate in the context of understanding the nature of wisdomor the functioning of Buddha nature. The effective and activefunctioning of the tsuddha Way within, though not subject to,

sarysdra is the Middle Path that the author describes. The sin$lepoint that steers hirn along this path is his understanding of the

soteriologically active nature of. the dhnnnnkarya or Buddha nature.A second characteristic with soteriological significance ascribed

the dharrnakayct is the tact of the two trdths being "neithei the same

nor different."

69

BUDDTL{ NATLTRE

If the supreme and worldlv truths are the same, then ordinary persons,upon perceiving worldly rruth, should penetrate the supreme truth. But ifthey penetrated the supreme truth, the-v should be sages Iinstead of ordinarypeoplel. But as they do not perceive the supreme truth, the two truths arenot one.

If you say the tu'o truths are differrent, than sages, perceiving l'orldlytruth, should not penetrate supreme truth. But if they did not psnsg1.1.supreme truth, they would be ordinary people. Therefore, because sagesperceive [both truths], [the trvo truthsl are not different. Thereiore, u,e know[the two truthsl are neither the same nor different. (809a)

The theme of this characteristic is the harrnony between Thusnessand phenomenal reality. With respect to the variety of things, "whenyou consider the penetration of Thusness you cannot say they aredifferent, but because of worldly distinctions, you cannot say they arethe same" (809a). On the one hand, because Thusness andphenomenal reality are not different, they are mutuaily identifiable.Just as "form is emptiness and emptiness is form," so "Thusness is'phenomena

and phenomena are 'fhusness." On the other hand,

because they are not the same, one is not reduced to the other, andeach maintains its own'significance.

The example of the two truths broaches the implications of thislogic for practice of the Buddha Way. The two truths (or, seeing thingsaright and seeing things through delusion) cannor be simply idenrifiedor there would be no need of practice. Yet they ultimately also cannotbe kept distincr, for the bodhisctttpa must act in and through theworldly reality of delusion. The fact, then, that worldiy truth and su-preme truth, phenomena and Thusness are not the same means thatpractice and liberation are necessary; the fact that they are not dif-ferdnt means that liberation is something real and worth striving for.

A third soteriological characteristic of dharrrmkdyct is calledseparcrtion hom banrier s.

There are three kinds of barrier: (i) the kle6a [defilementl barrier-thearhat who obtains the wisdom of liberation overcomes this barrier; (2) thedh5dna [rneditationl barrier-in overcoming this barrier, ttrhats and pra-tyekabzddhas obtain complete liberation; (3) the all-wisdom barrier-this iswhat the badhisattcra path breaks through. By overcoming this barrier, theyrealizesambodlri [the Buddha's wisdoml. In these three stages, the Tathagata'sdharmakaya only contends with threeobstacles; it is not itself defiled. (810a)

Here we again see the dharma,kayo discussed in terms of practice

70

SOTERIOLOGY: BLDDHA NATURE AS THE PMCTICD OF BUDDIIISM

and, especially, realization. The dharmakays is constituted in theovercoming of various barriers or milestones of pro$ress in theBuddha Way. At the first stage, the dharmakdyct is constituted inovercoming defilement. At the second stage, we see a shift in the logicof the concept of borrier. The dhydna "barrier" is not somethingundesirable or polluting (as kle5o), but the opposite. "separating"from this barrier must be accomplished by fulfilling it; this is not somuch a barrier as a milestone. The same may be said of the third"barrier," sombodhL The "breaking through" of this barrier isequivalent to the fulfillment of the Buddha path. Thus, in allinstances, the dhqrmakaya is constituted by the realization inherentin progressing on the Buddha Way. Furthermore, realization is only amatter of progressing in practice and nothing more. As thedharmakdya or Buddha nature is not defiled in any of these stages ofpractice, neither is it purified in any real way by realization. There isno change in nature on the Buddha path, only various stages ofprOgress in comin$ to know one's nature.

The fourth and final characteristic oI dhnrmakdya cited by the au-thor is "the purity of the dharmakdyadhdtu" (the realm of rhedhannahaya). What is this "purity" attributed here to the dhannn-kayadlwu and invoked so often in thii rext in speaking of Buddha na-ture,dhnrmakfrya, and the like? The author here fills out the meaning ofthis term figuratively, using four images-gold, warer, space and bodhi(enlightenmenr), each of which is interpreted in four different ways. Theexplanation oI the dhanrutkdyadhdnt's purity is as follows.

1. The first four meanings are (a) the d,harmakdya is unchangeable, likeSold; (b) Thusness is pure, like water; (c) supreme truth is formiess, likespace; and (d) mahd,parinirard\ra is completely manifest, like bodhi.

2. The second four meanin$s are (a) the super powers transform, like gold;(b) compassion nurtures, like water; (c) own-narure [Buddha naturel,like space, does not reject senrient beingp; and (d) prajfrd clarifies andpurifies, like bodhi.

3. The third four meanings are (a) the cause [of enlightenment] is pure andundefiled, like gold; (b) the superior path is cleansing, like water; (c)liberation is freedom from bondage, like space; and (d) the fruit-essence[iberation] is manifest, like bodki.

4. The fourth four meaninls are (a) the nature of bliss is to benefit [othersl,

7 l

BIIDDFIA NATURE

as does gold; (b) the cssence of puritf is limpiditl', like that of u"ater; (c)

the virtue of eternitv is indestructibilit""", like that of space; and (d) the

meaning of sef (uro) is nonattachnleni, as in bodhi. (810a-b)

First notice the string of terms subsumed within the

dharmakdyadhd,tu notion : dharmakdycr, Thusness, supreme truth,

ma,hapariniT-ad\w, super powers, compassion, o\.'n-nature (or

Buddha nature), prajfia, the cause of enli$,htenment, the superiorpath, liberation, the'fruit-essence of liberation, and the lbur Bud.dha

virtues or pdramita (bliss, purity, eternity, and self). \!'hat is found

here is a list of the various superlatives used in this text or, othenviseput, a list of the fruits of realization. The "purity" of the

dharmakayadhatu, the realm in which Buddhisnr cornes to fruition,

then, consists in the absence of defilements in these fruits. I{ence,

there is no change (a source of suffering), no adherence to forms (a

manifestation of ignorance), no binding or attachment. Rather, there

is transformative power (the ability to act on behalf of others.), the

nurturance of compassion, nonrejection of the plight of sentient

beings in sq.msara, and so forth. Thus, the two main characteristics

of purity seem to be the absence of any defilements in one's own

behavior and mental processes and action on behalf of the liberation

and welfare of others. This, of course, is none other than the practice

and realization of the bodhisatnsa path, as manifest in prujfid, and

kantnd.

C. Trika.ya: Sambfuttakaya and l{irmfiryakfirya

According, to the BN?, the trikaya, or three Buddha bodies, arerelated to the Buddha nature as follows. Buddha nature is divided into

two "natures": the Buddha nature that dwells in itself (zhu zi xing

xin!) and the emergent Buddha nature $in chu xing). Three Budciha

bodies - dha rmakaya, sambho gakaya, and nirtndnakdya - "all be-

come complete because of these two natures" (808b;.to In other

lvords, the trikdya are subsumed within the Buddha nature.

Specifically, the dhsmwkaya is identilied with the Buddha nature

that dwells in itself, whereas the sambhogakd,ya and nirmarlakaya

are identified with the emerg,ent Buddha nature (808c). Thus the

dharmakaya represents what the Buddha nature is in itself, whether

reco$nized or unrecognized, and the other two kdya represent what

72

SOTERIOLOGI': BLTDDFL{ NATLIRE AS THE PMCTICE OF BLIDDHISM

i t is as it comes into its own. somanifest fbrm of self-knorvledAeothers.

Havin€, alreadl' discussed thesambhogakc,ycr next.

to speak, the Buddha nature in itsand action for the liberation of

dhqrmakava. we will examine the

Because of the breadth and greatness of its power and functions, thiskrlya aboriginally possesses three virtues: great wisdom (praifia), Sreatmeditation (samadhi), and great compassion (karu4a)Jt The essentialcharacteristic of great u'isdom is nondiscriminative knowledge $nnrw). The

essential characteristic of great meditation is uncreated mentation (tut nn

ln); i.e., mentation that has left behind [the dualir,v ofl leavin$ [the world;i .e., saving oneself l and entering [the world; i .e., savin$ others]. The

essential characteristic of great compassion is the abilitv to remove Isentientbeingslfrom [sufferingl and save them.

For the mentation of sentient bein$s to be caused to attain perfect

fulfillment, three thing,s are necessary: pleasure in the Dharma, the six super

. powers (sbhi.irta),rj and the giving of aid by removin$ [sentient bein$s from

their sufferinf1. Thus great compassion removes [sentient bein$sl from thethree evil paths of sufferingrr and establishes people and detsas in great

peace. Great meclitation brings about the arisin$ of faithful joy bymanit'estinp the six super powers. Wisdom takes pleasure in the Dharma and

realizes liberation. This is what is calied the sambhofafuiyo. (810c)

This is the entirety of the text on sqmbhogpkdya, a discussion

that revolves entirely around the nature of its functioning or activities

and has not a single word that implies in any way that the

sambho!,a.ktiyu is any kind of substantive entity. It is constituted

exclusively by actions, soteriolo$ical actions. The characteristics

constitutive of this kaya are introduced in terms of the greatness of

their influence and activities; that is, their power and ability to effect

change. Wisdom is constituted by nondiscriminative knowledge,

pleasure in the Dharma, and the realization of liberation. Knowled$e,

pleasure and realization are actions, not thin$s; their meanin$

perhaps would be conveyed more accurately if they were translated

verbally as knowing, enjoying, and rea.lizin$. Wisdom, as described

here, is a manner of being-in-the-world ahar^cterized by irondiscrim-

inative apprehension of what is, the taking of pleasure in the

knowledge of what is, and the active self-transformation of. realizint

freedom. This aspect of the sambhogakdrya, then, constitutes its

soteriologicai functions for the practitioner.

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BUDDFIA NATTIRE

Meditation is constituted by so-called uncreated mentation (touzuo yn), which means a manner of apprehension and being-in-the-world free of the dualiry of concepts of self and other, samsdrqand nirnar.rcr,. To be free of such dualistic thinking is both amanifestation of one's freedom and one of the bases that makespossible acts for the benefit of others. It also produces the six superpowers that, in turn, result in the development of faithful joy (inothers). Paranormal activities, as is implied here, are not ends inthemselves, but are justified insofar as they encourage others in thepraetice of Buddhism. The active, soteriological character ofrneditation, then, is partially directed toward the salvation of othersand partially is a manifestation of the practitioner's own dynamic,liberated state.

Finally, compassion, of course, removes sentient bein$s fromsuffering and establishes them in peace. Obviously, this element inthe sarnbhoSakaya's makeup is purely constituted by action for theszllvation of others. In sum, the sambhogakd,ya is not a thing, entity,or substance of any kind. It is a particular set of actions that manifestthe practitioner's own liberated state-in such actions as nondualis-tic cognizing and paranormal activities-and that aim to releaseothers from bondage.

The following description of the nirrna4akdya bears certainsimilarities to that of the sambhopakaya. "Great compassion is thelnimtfu.nkdyo'sl basis. Meditation transmutes it into manifest form.Wisdom causes it to have five kinds of abilities: (1) it causes thearising of repugnance and fear [towards sarysaral; (2) it causes

[people] to enter the Noble Path; (3) it causes [people] to discard oldattachments; (a) it brings about faithful joy in the great Dharma; and(5) it causes [peoplel to receive the prediction of g,reat bodhi" (810c).fu for the sambhogakd,jta, here also the'three main characteristicsgiven for the nirmd4aku"'a are wisdom, meditation, and compassion.In this case, compassion is the raison d'6tre for the existence of thiskdya, samdd"hf power enables thiskd,ya to take form (i.e,, incarnate),and wisdom provides the direction for this kEsa's actions. Again, asfor the other kdya, here too this kdya is entirely constituted bysoteriological functions, this time entirely for the benefit of others.And again there is no thing, entity, or substance of any kind here,only a set of actions.

Following this passage on ninndr.tahdya are listed fourteen acts

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SOTERIOLOGY: BLIDDFI-A NATURE AS THE PMCTICE OF BUDDHISM

performed for the benefit of sentient being,s. These specify the mostsignificant events in the lif'e of the Buddha (birth, leaving home.defeat of lvlara, enlightenment, turning the wheel of the Dharma,parinim;aqq4 and so on). Sakvamuni Buddha's life as nirmanakaya isitself portrayed as a compassionate act.

The section on the trikdya includes a detailed discussion of theeternity of the three Buddha bodies. I will translate this passage in fullbecause the assertion of eternity produces the suspicion that theBuddha bodies are eternal things. This selection, hower.er, demon-strates quite clearly that although the Buddha bodies are eternal, theyare not eternal things. The eternifv of the trikdya is based upon thesame soteriological functioning noted earlier.

Furthermore, because these three bodies alwa,vs perform acts of profitto the world, it is said that they abide eternall-v. This eternal abidins rests onten kinds of cause and condition. . . .

1. They are eternal because of the boundlessness of causes andconditions. Having for innumerable eons cast away body, life, andproperty, they embrace the true Dharma. The true f)harma rsboundless, inexhaustible, inextinguishable. In turn, this inexhaust-ible cause molds the inexhaustible fruit. The fruit is rhese samethree bodies, and thus they are eternal.

2. They are eternal because of the boundlessness of sentient beinAs. Atthe time la bodhisatnsai first gives rise to the thought ofenli$htelrment, he takes the four (reat vorvs,la and gives rise to theten inexhaustible vows,ls Isayin{l "lf sentient bein$s are inexhaust-ible, my vow [to save them] is inexhaustible; rvhen sentienr beingsare exhausted [ i .e., al l savedl, onl l ' therr is my vo*'exhausted."Because sentient beings are inexhaustible, the nirmdnakaya iseternally within the world, endlessl-v guiding senrient being,s.

3. They are eternal because of the boundlessness of great compassion(mahafunuTa). If all bodhisattvas have great compassion andeternally act to save sentienr bein$s, if in their hearts there is nolimit to givin$ aid and they long abide in samsdra withour enteringnin:dint, how much more is the Tathagah with all his meritsconsummated eternally present in great compassionl Saving [allbeingsl with perpetual kindness-how couid there be a limit to it?This is why we speak of eternity.

4. They are eternal because the four bases of super powejrs(addhi-pada)16 are boundless. Even rhose within the world whoobtain the four bases of super powers are able to live long lives offorty lesser eons. How much mofe, then, can the master of greatsuper powers, the Tathagata, abide for a million eons, freel-v living

/ J

BUDDHA NATURE

such a lon$ life and widely deliverin$ sentient bein$s' This is why we

sPeak of eternirY''5. They are eternai because of the boundlessness of nondiscriminative

wistiom. Far from $raspin$ sa'msdra arrd nircd4a as two' they are

always united i., tii" tttpi"*e truth' They are both unmovin!' [a

characteristic oi ninsar]al and not dep{rting [from sar.nsara] and

thus w€ know theY are eternal'

6. They are eternal b""ut"" they are always in sc;mfirlhi' Even in the

world there are those who, obtainin[ samid'hi, are impervious to

water, fire, embers, drowninp,, knives' and arrows' llow rnuch more

will the Tathd$ata, constantly in samd'dhi' be incapable of sufferin$

harm! This is why we speak of eternity'

7. They are eternal because they are serene and pure' Serenity is the

Diamond Mind, able to do away with the dwelling place of

ignorance, with the final thought [upon enterin! nirt:d4al' with

impermanence and with sufferin$' Because there is no sufferin!'' it

is called serene. As the Buddha fruit is completely manifested, it is

. called pure. This path of liberation is therefore called eternal'

8. The-v are eternal because' althou$h actin$ within the world' the

eight essential thin$s17 are not sullied' Althou$h the Buddha bodies

return to [the realti of those who havel not yet completed.the path

and are joined with sarysdra, they are not sullied by defilements

nor do they have false thou$hts' This is why we say they dwell

eternallY.9. They are eternal because they are the sweet dew of immortality

lamTtal; they are still, and are far distant from Mdra [the Lord of

beathl. The sweet dew causes people to be longJived' superhuman'

and immortal. The Diamond Minc discards ignorance, the final

thought [before niruar't'al and delusion' and thus obtains the

Buddhafruito{eternalbl iss.Becausethereiseternalbl iss,thereisstillness; and because there is stillness' they are far distant from

MZra. To be far distant from tr{6ra is to abide eternally'

10. They are eternal because they are not of the nature of production

and destruction. It is not the case that the dfumna'kA'ya ori$inally

did not exist but now exists [i'e', is producedl' nor did it ori$inally

exist but now, does not exist [i'e'' is destrol;edl' Although it acs

("l"gtl within the three periodsls it is not o/ the three periods (/ei

san shifa).Why? The dhannakaya abori$inally exists; it is not the

case that it begins now to exist' It transcends the three periods and

so we call it eternal (811a-b)

F o r t h e m o s t p a r t ' t h e t e n . . Q a u s e s a n d c o n d i t i o n s ' ' f o r t h e

e t e r n i t y o f t h e t h r e e B u d d h a b o d i e s e m p h a s i z e s o t e r i o l o g j c a l

fu"ror*-pructice and action-as thd foundation of this eternity' The

second and third examples have the eternity of the Buddha bodies

76

SOTERIOLOGY: BUDDI{A NMURE AS THE PRACTICE OF BUDDHISM

rest on the eternity of salvific acts performed by the Buddhas'

Assumin$ that the number of sentient bein$,s is inexhaustible' the

vows ancl $reat compassion of a Buddha require him to en$a$e in

endless aci. of teaching and other forms of help. These acts bein$

endless, so are those Buddhas, but only in the sense that a Buddha is

an endless series of acts for the welfare of others. This is not different

in the Buddhist context, from pointin$ to the continuity over time of

an ordinary person, rvho also is constituted by his or her acts, without

the need to assume an underlyin$ thin$ performin$ those acts'

The fourth and sixth examples are alike in invokin$ the

performance of man'els demonstrating transcendence of physical

to'do as proof of eternity. This assumes that the practice of yoga

develops as a b-v-product (to the enli$htenment which is its aim)

certai; supernormal conditions, includin$ longevity and impervious-

. ness to accidental harm. This, of course, is a poor demonstration of

eterniqv and only tan$entially relevant to this discussion insofar as it

implies the Buddhas' freedom from the ordinary limitin$ conditions

of embodiment. This freedom, however, need not point to the

existence of any statie, entitative thin$ and should not be so

unrJerstood. Freedom from ordinary physical limitations is compati-

ble with Buddhas understood as dynamic series of acts realized in a

nonordinary manner (which, indeed, the trikdya doctrine already

assumes).The seventh and ninth examples to$ether equate freedom from

delusion with the eternity of the Budclha bodies. The seventh example

identifies eternity with the serenity and purity consequent upon the

vanquishin$ of ignorance' impermanence, and sufferin$' This means

that eternity is a synonym f.or nirwfu.tn simply as the ne$ation of

samsaric delusion and sufferin$. This interpretation is confirmed by

the identification of this nirvanic condition with the "path of

liberation" (jie tuo Doo). we rnay recall in this context the important

BN? theme that States that Buddha nature is both cause and fruit;

a fu ryc lpa rav r t t i i sbo th theabandonmen to fdes i re ( theTru tho fCessation; i.e.,nit'octrw) and the cause of the aband<lnment of desire

(the Truth of Path).The ninth example repeats the theme of identifying eterniqv with

freedom from i$norance, addinS, the metaphorical element of the,,sweet <lew" of immortality and the mltholo$ical figure of Mara, the

Lord of Death. The "sweet dew" of immortality is the food of the $ods.

I I

BIJDDHA NATURE

In Buddhism it eonnotes the sweet taste of liberation from sannsara;that is, life-anddeath. It points not to a static state of being (indistinction to dying), but to nirc;ctrlct understood as freedom fromlife-and-death (as opposed to extinction). The references to thesweet dew and to distancing from Mera thus reinforce the notion ofthe Buddha's condition of discontinuity with saqnsd,ra. The mentionof eternal bliss anticipates a topic (the four pdrumitd,) to be coveredin the next chapter. srrffice it to say that this eternal bliss may beunderstood as bliss pdramitd. which in rurn is identified with thesanfidhi that overcomes attachment to false emptiness. Attachmenrto false emptiness is a condition in which one is committed to beliefin emptiness as nothingness, or a negative ultimate truth. Thesamddhi overcomes both the atternpt to find bliss in sarysdra andthis attachment to false nothingness. As such, it is a Middre pathcondition beyond dualisric affirmation and negation; in transcendingdualism it is blissful.

Finally, the eighth example, like the second and third, refers rothe Buddha's compassionate acts for the werfare of sentient beings.Here the point is that this action proceeds without sullying the ,,eightessential things": that is, one's own ongoing religious p.u"ti"" and theclarity resulting from it. In the backgrorrnd of this idea is the basictdthdga,tagarbha doctrine of the essential purity of thetuthngetuEarbha (here the Buddha body), unsullied by irs conracrwith defilements (here its engagement in samsaric rife). This examprevery directly portrays the action in the world performed by theBuddha bodies as the source of their eternity: The Buddha (orBuddha body) is essentially pure, or fully ltself, in the midst ofsoteriological action.

The above illustrate the most important theme of the te' ,,causesand conditions" for the eternity of the Buddha bodies; namerv, thateternity is necessitated by never ending soteriorogicar practice andaction (including both one's own practice and liberation and actingfor the welfare of others). There are exceptions to this generalpattern. The first reason given for eternity names the eterniry-of theDharma as the cause of the eternity of the Buddha bodies, *hi"h

"."the fruit of this cause. The Dharrna, of course, is not a substantivemetaphysical entity, nor simply the Truth,.but also the way things are(empty-Thus) and the path of realization. Thus rhe Dharma ls an

78

SOTERIOLOGY: BLTDDHA NATURE A"S THE PMCTICE OF BUDDHISM

epistemological, ontological, practical, and soteriological basis consti-tutes the foundation of the eternity attributed to the Buddha bodies.

Two other "causes and conditions" of the eternity of the trikayado not seem to speak essentially in terms of soteriological practiceand action. These are the fifth, which speaks of nonduality, and thetenth, which is concerned with nontemporality. The nonduality ofsarysdra and ninsdna is due to their mutual emptiness. Therefore,eternity is not grounded here in a substantive metaphysical entity butin its contrary, the absence of such an entity, the emptiness of anyattribute posited for either. Nondualistic wisdom is able to realize thenondistinction between the two and hence the Buddhas, in a sense,are able to participate simultaneously in both. In this condition. weare told, lies the Buddhas' eternity. Nondualism based on emptiness,then, is the source of eternity here.

, The tenth reason, concerning temporality, is much like the firstand fifth. The nature of the dharmakEta is neither samsaric(conditioned, produced) nor nihilistic (not existing, destroyed), yetthe author of the BNT, characteristically, wants to speak positively ofit. The key phrase of the tenth reason for speaking of eternity is thestatement that although the dharmakdya, "acts,' within the threetime periods, it is not "of" them; that is, it is not of a temporalnature. As in the fifth reason, its acts are thernselves of a nirvanicnature, though they occur within the framework of sarysdro, here inthe sense of temporality. Like the Buddha nature, the dhormnkdTn,sexistence is aboriginal-real in a sense having no relationship toeither being or nonbeing-and like the Buddha nature, its realityconsists in its acts.

In sum, althotrgh asserting the eternity of the Buddha bodies,none of the ten reasons for eternity gives evidence of a thing or entitythat lasts eternally. Instead, we see the author's characteristic desireto speak positively of the "fruit" of realization; hence, a positive con-ception of minsdrla, as freedom from i$porance, from time, from everykind of limitation. !'ery much evident is an emphasis upon the Buddhasas bein$s who en$age in ceaseless soteriological action, both expressingtheir own enlig,htenment and acting for the welfare of others. Finally, wesee an emphasis on the Buddhas'nondualistic participation innhwdrlrland sarytsdra, their Thus-Gone-Thus-come nature. None of these rea-sons for speaking of the Buddha bodies as eternal steps outside widely

79

BLTDDHA NATURE

accepted Mahdyana principles. None of these reasons requires us toconstrue the Buddha bodies as endurin€ entities.

D. The Relationship Between Person and Buddha

A Buddhist text's depiction of the relationship between theBuddha and the ordinary person provides significant insight into thesoteriology of that text. The BN? is no exception to rhis rule. llherelationship between the Buddha and the ordinary person asportrayed in the BN? defines the parameters of liberation in the sensethat Buddha is depicted here as the supremely liberated person, nomore and no less.

The BN? typically distinguishes three categories of sentientbeings: ordinary persons, bodhisattvcts, and Buddhas. The BN?clarifies the relationship among these three classes by discussing thenianner in which Buddha nature can be said to pervade oi bedifferentiated amon!, them.

We begin with the "Den'asive" (tong) aspect of Buddha nature.The pervasiveness of Buddha nature is seen in the Thusness (yuqt)and the purity of all things. Each of these two qualities, in tunt, isfurther explained. "worldly Thusness (su n"r.) is true Th'sness (srrenru); true Thusness is worldly Thusness. The two Thusnesses, true andworldly, are not distinguishecl as different." As for purity, ,,There aretwo aspects to the meaning of purity. (1) There is Thusness (ru-n )within the cause-because the Thtrsness that has not yet attained theunblemished fruit ion stage is not itself blemished: and (2) there is theidentity of the purity of cause and fruit-because within the causethere is unblemished purif.v and arriving at fruition there isunbiernished purity" (805c).

What we see in both the Thusness and the purity characteristicsis the nondifferentiation between ordinary or "worldly" reality (alsoequivalent to the "causal" stage) and "true" reality (also equivalent tothe "fruition" sta$e.) In short, there is but one Thusness and itpervades all things uniformly.

Havirrg established this unity, 'the

author goes on to discuss thedifferentiation of Buddha nature arnong the three classes of sentientbeings. "within this Buddha nature three kinds of sentient beings aredifferentiated: (1) those who do not perceive and realize the Buddhanature-these are called ordinary persons; (2) those who do perceive

80

SOTERIOLOG\': BLIDDTIA N,\TTIRE AS TIIE PMCTICE OF BUDDHISM

and realize the l luddha nature--these are called sages; (3) thoservhose realization reaches the ultimate purit-v of this principle-these

are called the Thus Come (Tathaq,ata)" (805c-806a). Clearly thiscategorization scheme is not a gotru.r-t)rpe theory in which somepersons are innately capable cf realization and others are not. It wasestablished in the discussion of the pen'asiveness of Buddha naturethat Buddha nature is omnipresent; all share in it, and all shareequaliy in Thusness. The present differentiation of Buddha natureamdng classes simpl-v recognizes the realitl' of different stages ofawareness amon$ humanity and explains it in terms of the de$ree towhich one has reahzed one's oln Buddha nature.

Elsewhere, the text speaks of three "stages" rather than threeclasses of sentient beings; rramely, (l) the impure (i.e., sentient be-ingp), (2) the pure (i.e., bodhisottvas), and (3) the supremeiy pure(Buddhas). To dernonstrare that this does not confl ict with the asser-tion of the universal pen'asiveness of Buddha nature, a quotationle

follorvs, indicating that all three "stages" are constituted by thedharrnadhatu (the realm of Truth, equivalent to Thusness). The realmol"serrtient beings, it states, is this dharrnadhatu when covered bydefilements and suffering rebirth. The realm ol bodhiscttarcs is thissanre realm of sentient bein{,s 'rvhen they have beccme averse to thesufferings of samsaru and practice the bodhiscttt.vct path irr relianceon the 84,000 doctrines of the Buddha and all pararnita. Finally, thethird stage (that of the Buddhas) is described as tbllows:

This realnr of sentient beings, havinS cast off all kleda coverings, gonebeyond all sutfering and rvashcd a*'ay all defilernents, beinEi naturally and tothe utmost degree clean and pure, being that which all bein$s desire to see,having entered and dwelled in the subtle and superior ground, the ground ofall-knowledge, and of universal nonobstruction Ior harmon-v]., havin$ arrivedat incomparable abiliry, and having attained rhe !,reat, spontaneous power ofthe Dharma King-l call [beings rvho achicve this] ?hus Come (Tathdgata).(306b)

It is notervorthy that the BII? refers only once here to the

tlhannadhatu; narnely, upon introducing the stage of sentient beings.

Thereafter, the remainin$ tu'o stages are introduced as variations of

the sentient bein$ "realm," rather t lan as manifestat ions of the

Dharma "realm." This emphasizes the extent to which the author is

thinking of the Buddha as a sentient being. The essential nature of

81

BUDDHA NATLTRE

the Buddha and of the ordinary person is the same, whereas thedifferentiation between the two is purely a matter of practice and itsfruit of realization. Both the points of identity and of differentiation,moreover, serve to encourage pracrice. The identity between personand Buddha is constituted by their shared Buddha 'ature; thisidentity serves to encourage practice by virtue of its optimism. Thedifference between person and Buddha also is constituted by Buddhanature-the degree to which each mnkes reql in pracrice his or herown Buddha nature; to overcome the difference, practice lsabsolutely necessary. The rnessage is clear: you are Buddha. but 'ouare not Buddha unless you practice. This is no paradox: The Buddiristtradition has always asserred that a Buddha couid be identified byBuddhalike behavior, paradigmatically wise and cornpassionatebehavior.zo

82

CTLAPTDR FOUR

Dereification of Self and Mind

f n arguing for an urrderstanding of Buddha nature as active, part ofImy task must be to demonstrate that Buddha nature is nor asubstantive self or mind of any kind, nor any other kind of thing orentity^ N{any passages in the Buddhct Ne,ture Treqtise demonstratethis by using a term that sounds as if it represents an entity but thenproceedin$ to dereifo the term and demonstrate an active orfunctional meaning tbr it.

A. The "Own-Nature" of Buddha Nature

A tirst example may be found in the BN?'s treatment of what itcalls the o,@n-n&tut'e (zi xing) of Buddha nature. LanSuape of thissort cannot help but lead one to think, ar least initially, that the termis used to refer to a substantive self or mind. This text, however,makes a point of conjoining such a term with descriptions of exactlythe opposite import.

In the BN? the own-nature of Buddha nature is characterized bvthree traits (796b-+):

(1) It possesses power like that of the wish-fulfilling mani jewel,which gives one what one wants on the basis of one's wanting it. TheBuddha nature, like this, is naturall/ self-fulfilling; one cultivatesrealization of the Buddha nature because the Buddha nature

83

BUDDFTA N,\TLIRE

intrinsically moves torvard its own self-realization. \2) It is

characterized b-v nondifferentiation in the sense that ordinary

persons, sages, and Buddhas all are essentially alike insoiar as the

nature of the mind of each is pure and replete with the Buddha

virtues, differing only in stage of realization. This shared qualiry- of the

minds of all is explicit ly cornpared with emptiness: It is l ike an

earthen, a siiver, and a gold vessel; althou$h they differ in form, they

are essentially alike insofar as the nature of each is emptiness and

empriness is not subject to differentiation. (3) It is characterized by

the nurturant quality of compassion for all.

In all this there is no substantive self or mind, despite the use of

"own-nature" lan$ua$e. The first trait portrays one aspect oi the

dynamic character of the Buddha nature: its tendency to move

toward its own self-realization. This is not to be understood as a

characteristic that the Buddha rlature, as entit-v-, possesses; the

Buddha nature is this tendency toward self-realization, tt l is soterio-

logical tunction. Likewise the third characteristic represents action

that the Buddha nature is, in this case cornpassionate action.

The second characteristic attests to the universality of the

Buddha nature. This trait may appear to be more troublin$ for my

thesis, insofar as it is based upon the shared purity and intrinsic value

of the minds of all ordinary persons, sages, and Buddhas, and thus

may seem to imply the existence of a substantive mind constituted by

an uncharr$in$, pure essence. But as the reader wili recall from other

parts of this book, purity is expiained by such a phrase as

nondiscriminative wisdom (i.e., mental functioning free of discrimi-

nation: "Because all false thou$hts are utterly extin$uished in it, thisiiharmadhd.tu surpasses that which can be expressed in reasonin$ or

in speech. Therefore, we take purity to be a characteristic of the

dharmadhatu" 80lb) and the Brrddha virtues, as u'e shall see, are

explained by such things as seeing realitl' aright and ceaselessl.v

workin$ for the salvation of others. In both cases, substalit ive

sounding terms actually refer to kinds of mental tunctionin$, and rve

do not find this functionin$ ultimatell' dependin$ upon any entity

that can be distinguished from the functionin$ itself. N{oreover, in thepassage presently under examination, the purit i ' and virtue of the

human, sage, and Buddha mind is conipared to emptiness. Althou$h

the author does not want to imply rvith this that the sentient mind is

84

DEREIFICATION OF SELF AND i{IND

lacking in virtue, he does mean to say that its virtue lies precisely in

the freedorn constituted by its emptiness.This reading is corroborated by the following excerpi, taken from

the same passage. Subsumed within the discussion of the Buddha

nature's own-nature, the tathag&ta1qrbh(l is discussed as follows:

"Tathdgatagarbhu: the meaning of this {arbha is own-nature. No

d,hqrmas are outside the Tathagata's own-nature because its mark is

arurtmun. Therefore it is said, all dharmas are the tathdgqnectrbhct"

(796b). In this passa$e, far f'rom representing a substantive entity,

own-nature is identified with the very contrary of substantive

self-identity, not-self or Q,natm(tn It is this very lack of a substantive

self that makes possible the ttniversality of the tathdqcltagctrbha. lt is

implied that if the nthdgatugarbha had a nature of its own of any

kind, this nature would differentiate it from other things. Thus its

universal nature, paradoxically, rests upon its lack of nature or

emptiness and it is this quality which represents its "own-nature."

These three characteristics of the own-bein$ of Buddha nature

are further S,lossed in the text as expressin$, respectively' (1) the

inconceivability ot'the Buddha nature, (2) that one should realize it,

and (3) the infinity ol its virtues (797a). This conveys the idea of the

Buddha nature from the perspective of the ordinary person. One

understands that one cannot comprehend it, and yet that it is

desirable that one realize it, inasrnuch as to do so will transforrn one

into an infinitely virtuous (wise and compassionate) person.

We have seen the term own'nature tsed in one other place al-

ready; namely, in the analysis of the purify of the dhqrmakdyadh.dtu.l

One meaning of this purity was $iven as "own-nature [which I $oss as

Buddha naturel, like space, does not reject sentient bein$s (810a)." Here

again we simply see own-nature identified with an essential' character-

istic behavior of Buddha nature, compassionate action on behalf of sen-

tient bein$s.In the BN?, then, no connotation of substantiveness is attached

to the own-nature concept. This nonsubstantiveness is a function of

understandin{ Buddha nature as Buddhist practice. The Buddha

nature concept sen'es both to entice people to engage in Buddhist

practice and to represent the potential, activity, and fruition of that

practice itself. The "own-bein$" of Buddha nature perhaps is best

understood as the distillation of that practice; in representin$ the

essence of Buddha nature, it manifests the essentials of Buddhist

d5

BI:'DDH.A NATLIRD

practice. Just as the latter convey no substantiality, neither does theformer. Because there is no Buddhist practice apart from personspracticing Buddhism, persons in the act of practicing, are all there isto be found here as a foundation or "basis" for the edifice ofBuddhism.

B. Atmapdramitq

Some of these themes are developed in a more complete form inour second case, the discussion ol d,tmaptiramitd,, or self pa,ramitd.The self paramitd is one of four pdram,itd-purity, self, bliss, andeternity-that are understood as meritorious qualities inherent in thedharmakaya. The f,our paramit& ^re found in tc.tlfi4&n1&rbha'literature, where they are explained as an extension of early Buddhistteachings, as follows. Theravdda Buddhisrn characterizes reality withthe Three Marks of impermanence (anitya), sutfering (duhkha), andnot-self (andtman). These were sometimes accornpanied by a fourthcharacteristic, impurity (asubha). The reaching of the Four Marks bythe Theravada was the correction of four "upside-down" views held bythe ignorant, who believed that permanence, bliss, self, and puritycould be found in samsara. Tathagatagartrha theorists accepted thistradition as far as it went, but asserted that it was incornplete. Theythen extended this teaching, with a twist characteristic of their logic.

The four upside-down [views are the followingl: Where there is trulynothing eternal (within form and the five skarulha), giving rise to an €ternit-vview. where there is truly suffering, giving rise to a bliss view. \{rhere there rstruly no self, {iving rise to a self view. \Vhere there is truly impurit-v, givingrise to a purity view. These are called the four upside-down [views]. . . .

In order to correct these four, the four not-upside-dorvn [viewsj aretaught. What are these four? [1] Form and the live skandha in pasr, pres€nr,and future will certainly perish; therefore, they are really not eternal. Thusone truly gives rise to the realization of noneternify. [2j At the time ofsuft'ering, there is suffering. \ltren pleasure perishes, there is suffering. Thusone abandons the three time periods as suft'ering . . . and in this producesthe reaiization of sufferin$.2 [3] Noneternity is cause. Noneternity is effect.By the completion of cause and effect the dependenr nature (paratartu-a) ismaintained. Effect is not independent, and neither is cause: whether in pasr,pres€nt, or future it is still not finished with its preceding cause. Therelbrethe dependent nature is also not independent. outside of cause and effectthere is no remaining dharma that could be a self. Therefore no-self is thetruth and one produces the realization of no-self. [4] rhere are two aspects

86

DEREIFICATION OF SELF AND MIND

of impurity, in form and nonform. Impurity in form has three [manifestationsl:the be!,inning, middle, and end. In the be$innin$ when one first enters thewomb, the foetus is impure. In the middle, after one has left the womb,eating and drinkin!,, to possess property, and to beai children, all areimpure. At the end, after one has left the body and the substance of the bodydecays, it is extremely impure. As for nonform, whether joy or $,rief, whetherevil or neutral, whether connected with desire, all are tied to thought andpassion and are thus nonform. By virtue of this fact, they are also impure.Therefore the sage gains penetratin$ insi$.ht into the three realms [and sees]that all are impure. Thus the five sha,ndh.a are truly impure and oneproduces the realization of irnpurity.

These four are all true. Therefore they are not-upside-down. But withrespect to the four virtues (eterniry, etc.) of the Buddha nature, these fournot-upside-downs must a$ain be reinverted. In order to correct the upside-

. down [qualiry inherent in the "no-upside-downs"J there are established thefour virtues of the Tathagata's dlwrmakd.ya. These four virtues are eternity

firamitd, bliis paramitd, sell pdrarnitd, and purity pArdmitd. (798a-b)

The teachin$s of no eternity, no bliss, no self, and no purity,

though acknowledged as true, are too negative for the authors of

tathd,gatasarbho literature to leave alone. As ahvays, tlte latter areconcerned to explicitly affirrn the positive nature of Buddhistrealization. The four pd,ramitd certainly fulftll this role, but they in

turn run the risk of appearing too affirmative, too tan$itrle, too muchlike qualities that an entitative dharmakdya possesses.

This issue highlights the importance of the fact that thediscussion of the four pdramitd is contextualized in the BIV? (as well

as the Ra,tnagotravibhfuga) in terms of Buddhist practice. We shouldrecall here that Buddha nature is both cause and fruit of realization

and hence practice is both the seeking and the expression of

realization. The BN? lists four kinds of person with four kinds ofwrong view (or barriers to the rcalization of the truth). These four

kinds of wrong view may be cured, respectively, by four practices.

These corrective practices. or "cures," in turn, are considered

"causes" of four "fruits." These four fruits are the four pdratnitd, orperfections, also given as the four Buddha virtues that constitute the

Buddha's'dharmaka,ya. The relationship of the f.our pd,ramitd to

their respective persons, obstacles and "causes" or cures may. bepresented in the form of a table.3

Of course, the elevation of the characteristics of purity, self, bliss,and eternity to the level of the highest truth by the authors of the

ta,thagatagarbha literature dvas a radical departure.-at least in terms

87

BUDDHA NATURE

Person Type

7. Icchantikct

2. Non-Buddhist

3. Sratsaka

4. Pratyekabuddha

Obstacle

Disregard andhate ofMahdydna

Adherence toself view

Fear ollsarysura

Disregard forthe welthre ofothers

Cure = Cause

Faith andpleasure inN{ahdydna

Praiftd

Thesamcldhithatovercomesfalseemptiness

Compassion(.kannrd)

Fruit(Pdramitd)

Purity,Subha

Self, atman,

Bliss, Sukhcr

Dterniq',nityu

of the language used-from the Buddhist tradition beginning withSakyamuni and continuing through Sunyctvticlu. The irem of pi.esentconcern is the perfection of self or atmaparo,mitd. As there couldhardly be a doctrine more central to the Buddhr.r's teaching thanandtmqn, absence of self, this neu' revelation of a perfection of seif atthe end of the Buddhist parh, characreristic of the Buddha'sdhannakdya itself, was, at rhe least, a darin! use of language, \ltratwas intended by it? Here is how the Bi/? explains itseli.

All non-Buddhists, in their various ways, eonceive and grasp a self (uro)in those things that lack selfl namely the five skantlhas,a e.6i., form, etc. yetthese things such as form ditfer from what one grasps as the mark of selfltherefore, they are eternally lacking in self. IHowe'er,l u.ith the wisdonr ofThusness, all Buddhas and bodhis^ttoas realize the perfecrion of not-self(antttmapdramita) of all things. Because this pert'ecti.n of not-ielf arrd that'which is seen as the mark of not-self are nor ditTerent, the Tathagata sa.vsthat this mark of the eternal not-seli is the true, essential nat're lzhen tixint) of all things. Therefore ir is said thar the perfection of not-self is self. Asthe srtro verse says,s

The dual emptiness is already pure;[In thisl is realized the not-self, rhe supreme self.

88

DEREIFICATION OF SELF AND NIIND

Because the Buddha realizes the pure natureNot-self turns on itself (zhuan) and becomes self.All non-Buddhists perceive and grasp a self u'ithin the five skandha.

Overturning that attachment to self as vacuous and cultivatin$prajfiitpdrantitd, ofle realizes the suprerne not-self that is identical to theperfection of self (armaparamitd). This is the fruit [of the practice ofpra.ifiaparamital that you shor-rld knou.. (798c)

The essential point here is that the new teachinsol dtmapdremitctis not in contlict with the old o,ncrlmlr,lr teaching, but on the contraryis the fulfillment ol it. The very andtman itself, when taken to itsextrerne (i.e., when perf'ected) is the crfmapqr&mit&. This teachin$ islogically parallel to the {unyarsdda teaching that emptiness or 9ilrryais the characteristic or the own-beinf, (x:abhdva) of all things. InS&nya dialectics this is a way of stating the apparent paradox that theown-being of all things is to lack orvn-being. ln tathAgatagarbha andBuddha nature literature this same apparent paradox is taken asrevelatory of the way things are; that is, "Thus." Hence thischaracteristic of not-self, when seen as revelatory of Thusness, turnson itself, or perhaps better, turns full cftcle (zhua??, to turn around.to revolve) and as churq,cteristic oJ the wqy thin$s are is indicatedwith the positive term sefi u'hich may be taken as meaning"own-bein$"; that is, the "own-bein$ of Thusness."

Though the language is new, the content of this message is not.

What we have here is a variation on the theme enunciated previously,

"Buddha nature is the Thusness revealed by the dual emptiness ofperson and things. . . . If one does not speak of Buddha nature, thenone does not understand emptiness" (787b). Non-Buddhists are as

wrong as ever in seeing a self in the chanf,ing, phenomena of worldly{lux. Yet the Buddhist who stops with characterizing this flux asempty does not really understand emptifress, unless he or she realizes

that this emptiness is a characteristic of reality, and as such,possesses a positive nature. The perfection of the realization ofelnptiness, or the lack of self in things, is to realize to the fullest

extent the qualities of this positive nature. Thus, thou$h anfrtm&nand d,tmapdra,mitd are logical equivalents, what is implied by theauthor is the inferiority of the former as a term indicative of thevitalizing potential of spiritual realfuation. That is, there is asoteriological difference, but no logical difference, between the twoterms. Thus d,tmapdramitd is no more a substantive entity than is

89

BUDDHA NATURE

ctnAtman, and the dhannakdya (or Buddha nature) represented byatmap&r(rmftti is consequently likewise free of substantiality.

Perhaps even more significant is the pivotal role played in thetable by the third column items, in the case of dtrna,pd,rantitfi,,wisdom. Each of these-faith, wisdorn, samfr.dh| compassion-is anaction. In each case this action is identical with, or better,constitutes, the perfection. In the case of dtmnpdrarnitd, the wisdomof realizing the lack of self in all things constitutes the perfection ofself. The same principle applies in the case of each of the fourperfections. Consider the fourth perfection, eternity. Exactly as we

saw in the discussion of the trihdrya,6 the perfection of eternity is

demonstrated here to be constituted by the act of compassion. Asindicated in the table, the pratyekah.tddha is prevented from

becoming a Buddha by his or her disregard for the welfare of others.This obstacle is overcome by the cultivation of compassion. The

suffering and delusion of sentient beings is endless, so thecompassion required of a Buddha aiso must be endless. It is thislimitlessness of a Buddha's compassion that constitutes the Buddhanature's perfection of eternity. It is rwthing bur infinite compassion.There is no eternal "thing," Buddha nature or other. There is simplyan unrelenting series of acts.

Elsewhere in the text, the author directly defends the use of theterm etrlvrparqnxitA by drawing on one of the most orthodox ofMahdy6na themes.

There are two kinds of cause and condition [due to whichl we say thatthe Tathagata's dharma.knya possesses Atmapdramifi. First, because it isdistantly separate from non-Buddhist one-sided gpspinS of a [selfl view,there is no attachment to self [implicit in this concept]. Second, because itis distantly separate from what the Two Vehicles [*r&.nka andpraryeha,btrd-dhal one-sidely gasp as not-self, there is no false grasping of not-self.Because both views are eliminated, we speak oI dtma@ranitn. (799b)

In case there is any doubt as to the meaning of these words, theauthor soon cornments on this passage (along with his parallel

treatment of the other three pdramild), declaring: "This is obtainingentry into the Dharma gate of nondrraliQy'' Q99e).In support, theBNT quotes the SnmalAleoi.s&tra! The quotation specificallyaddresses the eternity pdra,mitd,, but the author's comment appliesequally to the other threepdramit6 as well. "'If you view all events as

90

DEREIFIC,ATION OF SELF AND MIND

noneternal, this is called nihilism. It is not called a correct view. Ifyou view ninsd4a as constantly present, this is called eternalism. It is

not a correct view.' This is why the Tathegata's dharrnakdrya is

separate from these two views and is named the $reat eternitypdremitd,.. . . This is attainin$ entrance through the Dharma gate of

nondualism, which is neither one nor two" (799c).

In short, this is Middle Path thinking: One-sided negation of self

misses the tr{iddle Path as much as does one-sided affirmation of self.

Atmapdramrtd occupies the Middle and corrects both. In this

crif.icism of do$ged adherence to a,n&unan there is an echo of the

author's disquiet with those who overemphasize emptiness. He does

not miss any opportunity to assert that negation cannot be theculmination of the Buddhist Path.

In this context, it is useful to recall that early Buddhism also was

concerned with an incorrectly one-sided understanding of the

and,tman doctrine. The following is a quotation from the Sabbdsava-sutta. of Majjhima-nikdya, No. 2.

When he [the unwise personl reflects unwisely in this way, one of thesix false views arises in him:

1. I have a Self: this view arises in him as true and real.2. I have no Self: this view arises in him as true and real.3. By Self I perceive Self: this view arises in him as true apd real.4. By Self I perceive nonself: this view arises in him as true and real.5. By nonself I perceive Self; this view arises in him as true and real.6. Or a wronE view arises in him as follows: This my Self, which speaks

and feels, which experiences the fruits of $ood and bad actions nowhere and now there, this Self is permanent, stable, everlastin!,,unchangin$, remainin$, the same for ever and ever.7

The dtmapd.ra,mitd, of the BNT thus is squarely in the venerable

Buddhist tradition of denying thatandtma,?r. means "there is no self'

in the simple dualistic sense of a denial of the view "there is a self."

Andtman can be equated with neither of the dualistic poles; it is a

Middle Path doctrine that, as both the BN? and the Maiihima-nikdyaquotations well show, is intended to produce freedom altogether from

any kind of view whatsoever on self, whether positive or negative, towhich one could become attached. In this context, the dmw,pdramitdlanguage of the BN? should be seen'as a corrective to what wasperceived as the excessively negative lan$ua$e of 6ttn'yansd'da and

91

BUDDIIA NATURE

should not be seen as taking up adualistic pole.

C. Self

position on the positive side of the

A different, but also striking, use of the term sef already was seenin the discussion of the purity of the dhnrmahayadhaal3 rhere oneof the meanings of ttris purity was given as ,,the meaning of sef (uo)is nonatrachmenr, as in bodhi" (810b). The thinking behind thisstaternent seems to be closely related to that of the d.tmapdramitd., inwhich "self is identified as "the perfection of not-self," via the powerof prajtulpdramitA, meaning the realization of the emptiness ofthings. The author of the BIV'? seems to want to ,,sunyatize,'

or negatethe theory of and"tman just as prajfi.d,pdramitd negates anypossibiiity of a self theory. In both of these explanations, the term sefis identified rvith intellectual and emotional nongrasping; that is, actsof mental freedom. one implication of this position is that grasping adoctrine oi anrttnzcrn as Truth is not representative of liberation-hence the tendency in this text to play rather freely with words likeAtnlan, andtman, o,ntttmaparamitd, and dtma,pd,ramita.

The most important point to be made about this passage for ourpurposes is that sef consists in the act of nonattachment. Thoughnegatively stated, this is an act insofar as it is composed of thepropensity fo behave in a nonattached manner. It should be recalled,rnoreorrer, that this "perfection of self" languagie is used in the contextof a discussion of practice, and in fact the "perfection of self is $ivenas one of the fruits of practice. Hence, the perfection of not-self thatis self is the person (as series of acts) transformed by virtue ofBuddhist practice culminating in realization.

D. Pure Mind

Our fourth case concerns the notion of ,,pure mind" and itssubstantiality or lack thereof. we may examine this notion in thecontext of a discussion of two practices, the cultivations of thePrinciple of Thusness and of the Plenary Thusness. Here we will seethe interrelatedness of the teachings concerning Thusness, Buddhistpractice, the true understanding of mind, and the positive vaiuereadily ascribed to realiry-.

9'2

DEREI}-ICATION OF SELF AND MIND

The cause of abandoning desire obtains compretion when conioinedwith two practices. These two rrractices are the cultivar.ion of the principle ofThrrsness and the cultivation of plenary Thusness. In the world therc areoniy t*'o things to be known: people and things. one who is able to penetratethese two [kinds ofl emptiness eternally realizes the true pinnacle ofThusness. Hdnce this is called the principle of Thusness. The ultimatePlenary Thusness proi:res the scurce, attains to the [tmel nature, andpenetrates the source of the dharmadhatrr; thus it is spoken of as theultimate.

The cultivation of the principle of Thusness dces not misuse personsand things. \Vhy? Beeause people and thinAs are, irom the beginning,characterizec by the 'tmost wo'drousness (rniao ji) and by tranquilliry.They neither increase nor decrease in number; thev have nothinA tn Jo witheither being or nonbeing (li you ti tou). The mark of tranquilliry indicatesthat the own-natu!'e is pure, all delusions being, from the beginninf,, unborn.seeing the duai emptiness [of people and things] is what is called the markof tranquilliqv. The inherently pure mind $,i xing qing.iin|xur) is called theNoble Truth of Path. The non€rasping of the pure mind in which delusionnever arises ie called the Noble Truth of Cessation. (802a)

This passage is begun withr the virtual equation of ernptiness andThus'ess in the Principle of Thusness. Then, in line rvith the"'fhusness is what is revealed by ernptiness" theme of this text, theauthor goes on to indicate that a kind of positive knowleclge followson the heels of the realization of emptiness; namely, in thecultivation of Plenary Thusness. The latter, then, is the fulhiess of theformer; the former is the gateway, the latter, the realm into whichone enters through that gateway.

The Thusness of people and things may be seen from rwoperspectives: (1) From the ultimate standpoint, it is simply rheutmost *ondrousness; and (2) frorn the mundane standpoint, inwhich thourghts of delusion and noncelusion arise, one describes ir astranquil (i.e., pure), all delusions that nxight sully the purit-v being notreal. These qualities are ascribed to persons and things as tl-rey arehere and now, not as they rnight be. It is not that these itting, have tobe "purified." Rather, if one sees correctly, one v,,ill realize that allthings already are not only "tra'quil" (this is a sur-tyansdda-likeinsi$ht), but also the utrnost in wondrousness, marvelousness.excellence (miao). The latter insight is characteristic of Buddhanature thought and the Br\?.

The cruciai point of the passage for'our presellt concern is fo'ndin the final trvo sentenres: "The inherently pure mind is called the

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BIIDDHA NATURE

Noble Truth of Path. The nongrasping of the pure mind in whichdelusion never arises is called the Noble Tnrth of Cessation." Here wesee one of the rare references in this text to somethin{ ealled mind(xin). However, this "mind" is immediately identified, in the firstsentence, with the fourth Noble Truth, Path. As we saw in ourdiscussion of d6rayapa,rd,vqtti,e the Truth of Path is equated with the

"cause of abandoning desire"; that is, the cause of. realization (801b).

Because the author links this cause of realization with the fourthNoble Truth, we may know that this "mind," as cause, is cause in thesame way that bodhicitto, and pray,oga were said to be causes of

Buddha nature,lo by representing effort, or the treading of the Pathitself. Thus. this "mind," as cause, is the activity involved inrealization. From the Buddha's day on, the Path is not a thing to betread, but a way to-behave, a cornpendium of attitudes, endeavors,and behaviors. Hence the "mind" of this context is not a substance inany sense, but a way of bein$,, the way a person "is" who is on thePath.

This reading is confirmed by the second sentence, where thethird Noble Truth, Cessation (earlier identified with "abandoninf,,desire"), is identified, not with "mind" this time, but with itsequivalent, a certain action or manner of mental functionin$,ne$atively stated as "nonfrasping." Thus, "cessation" is realized bythe cessation of a certain behavior, $raspin$, or in other words, theattainment of mental behaviors free of grasping. In short, though theterm mind is used, it is to be understood as a manner of beinS and aset of mental behaviors. rather than as a substantial entitv.

E. Dhsrmakirya and "Self'

Fifth, we may consider a passage in which the author discussesnine instances of prapafrccr. or false theorizin$, concerning tbe self(too). These are all negated by the functioning of the dharmakaya.Thus the latter, far frorn being a self, serves rather to deliver us fromviews of seif and represents the absence of such views. The nine falsetheories concerning the self are as follows (summarizing 803b--c):

1. The theory that a self pervades all five skondhas.2. Taking one of the five ska,ndhtis as the self.3. All nihilistic and eternalistic views.

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DEREIFICMION OF SELFAND MIND

4. The theory that the self will not be reborn. This is a nihilisticview.

5. The theory that in the realms of desire and form the self existsas fdrm (se). This is an eternalistic view.

6. The theory that in the formless realm the self exists as eitherperception, mind, or Dharma. This is an eternalistic view.

7. The view that in all three realms (desire, form and theformless), with the exception of the heavens of no thought andneither thought nor nonthought, thought is the self. This isan eternalistic view.

8. The view that nonthought is self; that is, in the heaven of nothought, the ggasses, and trees, and so on are self. This is aneternalistic view.

9. Taking the AkaniStha heaven (the last dhyana' heaven) as self.

The section concludes: "Because [persons] with these variouslydeluded minds will not ^ttain nircdr.tn, these [viewsl are calledprapafwa. When one gains insight into and realizes the d'hamuhdya,no further prapa:fi.ca, arises" (803c).

Here we see the dhamwh,aya as freedom from views of self. Ineach of the nine cases, it is the self view that binds. Thedlwrmakayg, then, is in effect the Noble Truth of Cessation withrespeet to any and all f.orms of pra,pa,fico, which here means self view.Thus here in the BN? with its affirmation of dtma@ramitrt, as in themost orthodox Nikdya or prqifrdpdro,mitn text, it is theories of selfand attachment to self that bind us. Buddha nature thouglht, like therest of Buddhism, aims to release us from this bondage. Thed,harmaknya (or Buddha nature), as the Truth of Cessation,represents the active releasing from bondage that constitutes theBuddha Way. Hence not only is Buddha nature not a substantiveentity, not a self or an entitative mind, but the cessation of all selfviews. As such, its character is active and soteriolo$ical.

F. Mind

Sixth,.we need to look at the BN?'s use of the term mind (xin).This text does not often use this term and where it does, it oftencould substitute a term such as person without any appreciablechange in meaning. For example, in the discussion of the eternity of

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T]IIDDTIA NATLIRI]

the trikayall the phrase Diamoncl Mind u,as rrsed. Ler us look ar thatpassage again. "[The trtkdyal are eternal because the-v are the srveerdew of imrnortality (am1ta); they are sti l l , and are far distant fromlvfdra. The sweet dew causes people to be long-li'ed, superliunran, andimmortal. The Diamond Mind discards ipnora'ce. the final thought[before niraanal and delusion. :rnd thus obtains the Ruddha fnrit oieternal jov" (811b).

The Diamond lvlind here nientioned is evidentll- no "Nlind" srrchas is construed in an idealistic monism, but on the trasis of the textualevidence appears to represent the person of realization; that is, theperson fulf i l l ing the Buddha Path. This "mind"--or person-is sbownsolely in the acts of dispelling igrrorance and sufferinS and enjovingthe fruits of serenitl- and jo;* that result. Thus we are not presentedhere with a monistic r{ind of idealist metaphysics nor with a dualisticmind opposed to a bodl'. \Vhat is portrayed is a,n acting person.

Another exarnple aflain requires us to look at a passa$e alreadyseen. "The own-nature, pure mind is called the Noble Truth of l,ath.The nongraspinp of the pure mind in rvhich delusion never arises rscalled the Noble Truth of Cessation" (BrJ2a). In this case, thoughsomething called a pure mind is rnentioned, it is imme<liatelyidentified with two of the Noble Truths, already indicating that itcannot be taken as a substantial thing. Rather, b). r'irtue of the twoTruths that it represents, it is an expression for rhe series of acts thatconstitute engaginS in practice of the Buddha Way" and for the"nonact" of non{,rasping. The identif ication of pure mind withnongrasping is an echo of the equation of true self and nongraspingnoted earlier. In both cases, a substantial sounding ternr, mfnd or.sefi is rendered nonsubstantial b-v its identification x,ith beha'iorsand actions.

The single instance of use of the term minc! that is the mosrdifficult to explain as nonsdbstanf ial is found in a passage of the BN?borrowed from the TathagaruEarbhct s.utrct. giving nine similes forthe corrdition of the t&thag&tugqrbha in the midst of defilement. Thefourth of these similes l ikens the "mind" covered by defi lement to theconditions of pure gold I 'allen into fi l th (807c). This simile. takenfrom n'hat is considered the earliest text ot' t(rthegqtalarbha thought,reflects the lack of sonhisticarion of that text, the similes it emplirysbein$ somervhat clumsy attempts at conveyin{ a doctrine so diff icultthat the Sri.'ze,lade,ur Sfitru. simpil,- labels the problem ,,inconceiv-

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DEREIFICATION OF SELF AND MIND

able" and $oes on: the doctrine, that is, of the relationship between

wisdom and ignorance. hr this simile, the "pure mind" does seem to

bear substantial qualities, especially in its comparability to pure $oldas a thing occupying space and capable of bein$ physically covered.

By borrowing this simile, the BN? inherits the problems associated

rvith it, including the implication that it affirms a substantive mind.

However, imrnediately followin$ the statement of the sirnile, a few

remarks are added that make it clear that no substantialiry should tre

assumed here. After renderin$ the simile of the pure $old fallen into

filth, the text continues, "The person free of desire is also like this;

the defilements oh the surface of the mind (shan6i xin fun'nao)pervert the mutas. That is rvhy this simile is related" (807c). In

characteristic t'ashion, the author of the BNT relates the simile of the

gold co the condition of the practicinS Buddhist, explainin$ the

former as a metaphor lbr the latter. It is the teachin$ about the

hurnan condition that is bein$ promoted here, whereas the simitre

with its apparent metaphysical implications is not to be taken as any

rnore than an attelnpt to clarify the former. \\here it rnisleads (and it

does mislead to the exterrt that it implies substantiality) it is not to be

adhered to. As a carryover from the clumsy rnode of expression of the

Tathdgatagarbha Silrra it is incorporated into the BN?. Horvever, the

author of the BN? attelnpts to brin$ the simile into line with his effort

to clarify the human condition and the path of Buddhahood. Thus,

the example of pure gold fallen into filth likened to the "mind" amidst

defilements is an apt simile insofar as it sheds light on the human

existential condition. However, like all similes, its fit is not perfect,

and we should not permit the simile to extend so far as to indicate

any substantiality to a human "mind," a notion that runs eounter to

the teaching and perspective of the BN?.

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CHAPTER FN'E

Ontology: Monism vs. Nondualism

f s Buddha nature-t&thagataparbha thought a variety of monism?rrhis quesrion has been discussed in the literature by a number ofscholars in the recent past, many of whom believe that it is monistic.Obermiller, for example, stares thet the Re,tn&Eovawibhd4a, atathagatagarbha text closely related to the Budclha Nanrre Treatise,is an "exposition of the most developed monistic and pantheisticteachings of the later Buddhists."l Nagao stares, "the tathagatagarhhaseems to me to occupy a supreme position-a position akin to that ofBrahman or Atman, or other Absolute Being,' in Brahmanicalphilosophy."2 In his introduction to the RatnagotrarsibhA4a, Takasakiasserts that "for explaining the possibiiity of anyone's acquiring . . .Buddhahood, . . . morristic philosophy was used as the bu"kgro,r-rrd."tOgawaa and Yamaguchi,s on the other hand, view tathagitagarbhathought as an extension of the li'e of thought leadinl forrn theconcept of conditioned origination (pratttyasamutpdda) to 6urrya,thought. Thus, they do not see it as monism. Finally, Rueg! stressesthat tathdgatagctrbh.e thoughr is not monism because it is basedupon nonduality, rather than nronism.6

First, it is necessary to specify the rneaning of the term monismas it rvill be used here. Generally speaking, there seem to be twomeanings to the term, a stronger and a weaker.T According to the

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BL I)DTL\ NATUT{E

stronger meaning, all of reality can be reduced to one basic

substance, in the sense of somethin$ rvith independent existerrce or a

nature of its own. This form of monism includes both rnaterialism and

ideaiism. The weaker sense of monism holds only that all of reality

can be explained in terms of a sin$le principle or that one can rnake

staternents about reality as a whoie. There otrviousiy is a gteat deal of

diff'erence between these two meanin$s, artd in fact very many

varieties of philosophical and religious thou$ht would have to be

considered monistic accordin$ to the second definition. Even

lv{adhyamika (6unya) thought itself would have to be considered

monistic in rerms of the weaker definition. inasmuch as it speaks of

all of realitf in terrns of the single principle, Silnyatd.

Interesting,ly, when Obermiller describes tctthdg&ng&rbha

thought as monistic, he in fact is linkin$ it with N{ddhyarnika thou6frt,

which he explicitiy labels monistia.s Thus he is discussin$ both

t&thqg(ltag&rbha and stutya thou$ht in terms of the weaker sense of

monisrn. As noted earlier, howet'er, Ogawa and Yama$uchi avoid

characterizi ng tothdgqtagarbhu thou$ht as monistic precisely by elu-

cidar-ing tethagat&Ecrrbha thought in terms of Tsrati$tasamwtpad'a-9arry*a thought.

Now if oue wanted to deny that tqthdgcttagarbha thou$ht is

rnonisrn in the sense that Obermiller meant it (i.e., the weaker

sense), one could not do so by means of comparin$ it or linkhr$ it

with Stnya thought. Nor could one do so in terms of. prati$tasamut-

pdda, because this too is an attempt at explainin$ all of reality by

means of a single principle. I take it, then. that the weaker sense of

monism is not at issue here, and that the stron$er sense is what we

are concerned with. This is the form of the issue to which Ogarva,

Yarnaf,uchi, Ruegl,, and Nagao were addressin$ themselves'

The question. then, is this. Does Buddha natureqothd$angarbhn

thought establish arr ,\bsolute c.omparable to the role played in

Brahmanical Hinduism by Atrnan-Brahman? Is the Buddha nature, in

short, ciose kirr to the Atman-Brahman oi Hinduism? Do the two

perforrn similar functions in the two systerns'i Is this variety of

Buddhism, then, a forrn of crypto-Hindu thou$ht, reflectin$ more the

influence of Hinduism on Buddhism than the internai dynamic of

Buddhism's working out of its own sogrces?

Without explicitly comparin$ the two sets of teachin$s, I shall

argue against the view that the Buddha nature thouglht of the Buc! {ha

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ONTOLOGY: MONISI{ VS. NONDUALISM

Il{sture Treatise can be conceived as a rrarier}- of monism akin toBrahmanical absolutism. I will structure my argument around aconsideration of five themes found in the Bi/?, the language of whichseems to indicate that the Buddha nature is a substantive entity orabsolute. Following the analysis of these themes, I will return toGadjin Nagao's contrary view thet the tathagangarbha is a form of"Absolute Being" and dissuss his views in the light of my ownunderstanding of the Bi{?.

Some of the apparently monistic concepts and themes present inthe BN? are the following:

1. The very cornmon statement, essential to all tathdgatagarbhct-Buddha nature thou$ht, that sentient bein$s "possess" or "are"the tathdgcttagurbha-Buddha nature.

2. The concept of the tsuddha virtues or pdrq,mitA, !is., purity,self, bliss, and eternify, attributed to the dharrnakd,ya.

3. The concept of the pure nature and its lack of essentialrelationship with the dgantukakle1e,, or adventitious defile-ments; the latter are said tobe 6unya. in the sense of "unreal,"whereas the former is said to be aSilrryq in the sense of "real."

4. Statements (related to the preceding) that tqthdgcltagarbha,Buddha nature, dhamtakdya, or dharmqdhdtu "really exists"(shi you) or "aboriginally exists" (ben you).

5. Statements that the tqthAgqnEarbha or Buddha nature isbeyond cause and conditions and is'eternal, quiescent,unborn, rrnchan$in$, and so on.

These indicate the locus of the issue; all five themes are to befound in the Blf?. Although initially they do seem to indicate that theBuddha nature (or its equivalent, t&thAgatagqrbha, dharmakAya,dharmndhAtu, etc.) is a substantive absolute, I will argue against thisinterpretation. How then are these passages correctly to beinterpreted? I will sr'g€est three kinds of readings appropriate tothese passages: (1) Some will appear to be fundamentally soteriolog-ical in intent, and thus have nothin$ to do with either nlonism ornonmonism; in other words, some passa$es may earry no ontologicalimport at all, but may be of an entirely different order. (2) Otherpassa$es that do have ontological import may be understood asnondualistic,e rather than monistic. (3) Finally, some passages maybe seen as diseussin$, actions, rather than substances, and thus,

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again, are not of ontological import other than negatively. \'ariouscombinations of these three themes will be .'rund in the five types ofpassage to be discussed.

It will be useful to remember from the beginning a passage from

the BN?, quoted earlier: "Buddha nature is the Thusness revealed by

the dual emptiness of person and things." This passage indicates not

only the difference between 9fr,nya and Buddha nature thought, but

also is central to an understanding of the latter as nondualistic rather

than monist ic . The equivalence of the Buddha nature,

tathdgangarbha, dharmndhatu, and so on with Thusness is key

because Thusness is not a monistic concept. The word for Thusness

in Chinese, r1t, means "like, as." "Ju lntl, 'like, as much as,'

comparing qualities and actions rather than things, is related to jan

[ranf , ' thus'(l ike this, as much as this). As a noun, one may take ju

[n^r] as 'being as (not "whdt") it is."'1o Although it does have an

ontological quality to it, Thusness refers to hoto somethinE, is, ratherthan what it is; it speaks of an adjectival quality of things rather thana nominative thingness as such. All it means is that things are "asthey are." In a sense it is a pure tautolo$r, a simple "ttlus" attributedto all things. As The Av:akening oJ Faith in the Mahayanc says,ll theword Thusness is not a term that has the qualities or attributes ofbeing "this" or "that"; it is a word by rvtrich words are undone, a wordthat points at our language and indicates that it will not do. Yet the

term Thusrrcss does not have the negative connotations oI Sfinrya, aterm that functions in a similar way to 'lundo" lantua$e. Hence toequate the Buddha nature with Thusness is to indicate that there is

somethin$ positive about it-one wants to say it is "real," it"eiists"-but the use of the term Thusrwss serves to remind us that

the direction in which our minds begin to move upon hearin$ the

terms real and erists will not be a totally appropriate one.The main points of the Thusness concept as used in the BN? may

be summarized as follows.

l- Thusness is that which is revealed by emptiness. It is the true

nature of reality that one is capable of seein$ once allpreviously existing ideas and habits of perception have beert

cleared from one's mind by the discipiine of emptiness.2. It is the conjunction of persons correctly perceivin$ the world

as it is, and the world presentin$ itself to persons as it is. It is

r02

ONTOLOGY: MONISM VS. NONDUALISM

therefore nondualistic-it is prior to a division of experienceinto the categories of subject and object or mind and world.

3. Thusness allows positive language to be used in discourseabout the nature of reality. In both a linguistic and anontological sense it is affirrnative of phenomenal reality.Whereas 9ttrrya dialects emphasize what is not the case,positive Thusness langua$e emphasizes what is the case.Ontologically, what truly is, is affirmed in Thusness.

4. Thusness is not dualistic, because a comrnonsensical belief inseparate, individual entities is negated by the emptinessthrou$h which one passes on the way to Thusness. Nor is itmonistic, because reality does not reduce in Thusness to anysingle principle; Thusness is not a thing, nor even a principlethat can be conceived as an all-embracing One, as it functionssolely as a pointer to the true apprehension of what it.Thusness is nondualistic, because it neEates both dualism andmonisrn.

5. The term Thusness, as used in the Bi/?, has a soteriologicalfunction and as such epitomizes the optimism of Buddhanature thought. It represents the goal of the religious life aseminently deirabie and real, without setting the practitionerup to be attached too soon to any specific notions of what thatgoal is like.

Let us now turn to the apparently monistic themes just enumeratedand see what can be made of them.

A. AII Sentient Beings Possess the Buddha Nature

First we need to discover what is .intended by the repeatedcontention that sentient bein$s "possess" or "are" the Buddha nature.As was seen earlier, this does not indicate that persons possess"somethin$" and that by virtue of that "sornething," they are able tocomplete the Buddha Way. In the chapter on Buddha nature, we sawthat the author directly refutes the supposirion that the Buddhanature is an dfinan, making it clear that it is not something to whichone can straightforwardly attribute existence, not something thatsimply "is." On the positive side, it is characterizedby such things asbodhicitt*ya5nga,, the true nature (pariniqpanna- wo,bltfrsa), and

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BUDDHA NATURE

tclthdg&tagctrbha. Bodhicitict-prayoEo is Buddhist practice or progresson the Buddha Way. The true nature is identified with the Thusnessof all things, incorporating both the way realiry presents itself topersons and the way persons experience reality. The termtsthdgat&E&rbha was subjected to a complex analysis through whichtwo particularly salient ponts became apparent: (1) The statementthat sentient beings are the tqthdgcttclsorbhct is Lrased on Thusness.(2) The storehouse (the garbha or tathd.gatagarbha) is constitutedsoiely by that which it contains; namely, the true realm of Thusness,true practice or wisdom, and realization of Buddhahood. In sum, theBuddha nature, as an amalgam of these three constituents, is shownto be (1) identifiable u'ith Thusness, thus ontologically nonsubstan-tial, and (2) the active practice and realization of Buddhahood.Buddha nature, therefclre, essentially is constituted by action andhence is a kind of "doing" rather than a substantial thing; asThusness, it is the inseparable conjuncticn of reality presenting itselfto persons "Thus" and persons experiencinp reality "Thus." There isno place for a substantial absolute here.

' Remember also rhat the statement, "all beings possess (are) theBuddha natvrela,tha,gatagarbln" is interchangeable with the state-ment, "all beings are capable of realizing Buddhahood." As the BNfsays, "ln accordance with principle, all sentient beings universallyand aboriginally possess the pure Buddha nature. That there shouldbe orre who etern4lly failed to obtain parinirrcd,r.ra is not the case"(788c). Buddha n&a)re rneans "potential Buddha"-not as a type ofbeing, but as practice (i.e., realization) that is an action or series ofactions. It is in accordance with the principle of the Way-Thusness-that this be so. Thusness is all embraeing, it exciudes noone. All are capable of performing this act, seeing things Thus, seeingreality present itself Thus.

B. The Pdrqmitd

The second theme concerns the Buddha virtues or pQramitd,.r2These are presented in the BID as the end-product of a soteriologicalprocess, and this is the key to their proper interpretation. They arethe "inversions" of the four views to which they correspond and.areconstituted by the four practices used to correct the errors. Thus, forexample, purity pdramitfr is not a quality that the dlwnrnlenya

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ONTOLOGY: MONISM VS. NONDUALISN,l

possesses per se. Rather, it is the inversion of dispara$ement of thelvlahayana and is constituted by faith in the Mahayana. Thus itsmeaning is entirely soteriological; it is defined entirely in terms ofpractice.

As for the atmaparamita, the same principle holds. It is simplythe result of the cultivation of prajfidpd,ramitct and the inversion of

attachment to an(ftm{Ln The Bt{? portrays this in terms of threestages of practice. The erroneous stage is that in which one sees a selfin phenonrenal existence. This is overcome in the second stage, inwhich one realizes that there is no self to be found in phenomenal

existence. The third sta$e is the perfection, or the lo$icai extremeone might say, of the second: Now one sees that this characteristic ofnot-self is the true, essential nature of all phenomena (this is still in

accord with 6rln3,'o thought) and as such may justifiably be called sef(798c). This third stage discussion of a "self," then, really is no morethan an extension to the logical extreme of the perspective of thesecond stage. As such, it is seen as the culmination olprajfinpd,?'clmitapractice. Moreover, although the term sef may seem to echo theperspective of the first,.erroneous stage, the content of the third stageis in fact the opposite (or the inversion) of that of the first.

Another point to note concernin$ the use of the term se$ as aparamita, (as well as the tise of the terms purity, trliss, and etentity)is its usefulness-soteriologically-for shock value. Recall how the

Heqrt S&trct, for example, earlier negated such things as the Four

Noble Truths, wisdorn, nirttd,Tta, and so on. In the case of both Srlnyaandtathdgatagarbha-Buddha natlrre thought, language is being used

to "sunyatize." Boih the Heart Sfi,tra and the BN? take the terms that

are used in the Buddhist community of the time (for the authors of

the prajfidp&rs,mitq literature this was the Four Noble Truths, etc.;

whereas for the tqthngangerbho-Buddha nature theorists, it rvasprecisely the terms used in the prajfid. literature themselves), Apurpose in both cases, perhaps, was to shock the tsuddhistcommunity. For the tathagatugarbha-Buddha nature theorists, the

idea was to shake anyone who had a too-secure or too-simplistic

understandingof {ilnyatd4 that is, anyone who "grasped" 9inyata as

the "Truth." Yet perhaps they believed that anyone who really

understood Sunya thought would not be.shocked or dismayed by this

rnove, insofar,as the tqthfigatuearbhs-Buddha nature theorists were

simply further applying the identical principle of 6onyatd.

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BLDDFIA NATURE

On a purely linguistic level it is undeniable that there is a rather

"being,ful" quality to the four paramito ascribed to dharmethdrya.

However, one would be no more justified in believin$ that the four

pdramita refer to the substantive characteristics of an entitative

thing than one would be justified in attributin$ an "unbein$ful"

nature to the meanin$ of, 9firrya terms. Both suspicions are equally

mistaken on a purely philosophical level; thou$h, if tathagatagarbhq-

Buddha nature theorists are ri$ht, there is somethin$ to these

attributions on the emotional level. These differin$ emotional

connotations are the effect of the kinds of lan$ua$e used by the two

systems. As we have seen, the author of the BN? re$ards the positive

form of language as a more effective updya.

Furthermore, it is et'ident that, in addition to representin$ the

end-product of a soteriolo$ical process and being a peculiar use of

language. the paramitd are ontolo$rcally nondual. Let us takci the self

pdramitd a$ain as an illustration. Note that the not-self is equated

with the self: "this mark of the eternal not-self is the true, essential

nature of all things. Therefore it is said that the perfection of not-self

is self' (798c). This paradoxical lan$ua$e reveals the u'orkin$s of

nondualistic thinking as follows. The perfection of self is found in

overcoming the dualism of self and not-self. The self pdramitd. is the

true and essential nature of all thin$s (sounds like a self) at the same

time that it is the utmost ne$ation of self, ana'tma'pdramita, the

perfection of not-self. This is a good example of the perspective of

Thusness, the Thusness revealed by emptiness. Self is utterly

ne!,ated, it is completely empgv, and yet this is how thints "are"-one

ends on this positive note. This is the truth of thin$s, the essence of

thin$s; yes, they are "Thus." Thusness, thou$h, always proceeds by

way of emptiness. Cne must first negate the commonsensical realist

perspective, emptying this perspective of its view of thin$s as discrete

entitites, but then realize that not only is form emptiness (as

6dnya,sdd,a might be accused of emphasizin$), but that emptiness

also is form and not apart from it. One returns very solidly to form,

remembering its emptiness, but reco$nizin$ it as the totalit)' or

fullness of what is.Just as the duality of self and not-self is transcended with ttre

nondualistic term perfection aJ sg{f, so the duality of form and

emptiness is transcended with the nondualistic term Thtrcness.

Buddha nature thought as taught in the BMI is $rounded in the

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ONTOLOGY: MONISM VS. NONDUALISM

perspective and language of Thusness: a nondualistic ontolo$y

expressed in positive-sounding language. After all, one can almost

imagine the Buddha nature theorists mtrsin$, once nondualism is

realized, it might as well be expressed in positive-soundin$ lan$ua$e

as in negative-sorrnding lan$ua$e, inasmuch as the former is a

superior encouragement to practice, $ivin$ the (correct) impression

that there is something u.'orth strivin$ for at the end of the path.

Rueg,'s masterful study was important in pointin$ out the

siSnificance of the distinction between monism and nondualism forparticipants in the debate concernin$ whether or nottcrthfrSa.taea,rbha.-

Buddha nature thought is a form of monism akin to Brahmanism.13 In

monism (in the .strong sense), all phenornena in their manifoldpluraligv are reduced to the transcendent One. In nondualism,phenomena are not thus reduced: Their plurality remains real. Such

is the case in the Buddha nature thought of the Bl{?. There is no One

to which phenomena could be reduced. Form is emptiness and

emptiness is form; there is nothing else apart from the plurality ofphenomena. They are empry, but they Are "Thus." The perspective ofThusness is the very opposite of monism insofar as the immediategivenness of the plenitude of phenomena is the locus of Thusness.

C. Sanya-Afunya

Our third problern area concerns the pair of terms 9fi.nya (empty,

and in this context, "unreal") and a9urryta (nonempty, and here,

"real"). The latter term is associated in the BN? and other

tathdgctt&g{rbha-Buddha nature texts with the tathd,gataEarbhs,

the Buddha nature, and the dharmakEtn, which are said to be

innately "pure." In addition, to explain the condition of ordinarypersons who are ignorant, confused, anci greedy, the concept of thedfantukakle1a, or foreign. adventitious defilements, is used. Al-though the tathdgataparbha (Buddha nature, dhannakdryo) and theagantukakleSa have existed agelessly in conjunction, they have noessential relationship with each other. Persons'delusions and hatredare said to have no basis in reality, but to be the unreal products ofi$norance. Thus, a person is "really" the pure tclthdgataearbhrt orBudriha nature, but falsely ("unreally") thinks of himself or herselfotherwise because of the activities of tlie unreal kle6o.

Some examples of this kind of thing in the BN? follow. In the very

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BUDDFIT\ NATURE

beginning of the Blrr we are told, "Attachments are not real,therefore they are called vacuous. If one gives rise to theseattachments, true wisdom rvill not arise. \\rhen one does away withthese attachments, then we speak of Buddha nature" (7g7b).Attachments are not real (bu shi); Buddha nature is. .\iain, ,,If thedharmakdya lvere nonexistent (tou), then all correct practicesshould be in 'ain. Taking right views as the foremost practice, andincluding in addition sueh good things as morality, concentration andrvisdom, the correct practices that one cultivates are not empty (bukong), or fruitless. Because these correct practices do yield firrit, *"know that the dha,makdya is nor nonexistent" (804a). Dlwrmakaya,the practices that lead one to it. and the fruits of those practices areneither nothing (tou) nor empty (kong). AEiain, ,,training

in the Wayis not a vain error (bu kong fuo),, (S05c). Finally, quoting theSrtmd,Iddmt Sutrcl, the BN? asserts, ,,World Honored One, thetathdgatagarbha is not empry (bu kong) because of the wisdom thatit does not abandon and from which it is inseparable, as well as theinconceivable and incalculable Buddha virtues. IThereforel we knowthat the tathdgatagarbha, because of the Tathagata's virtues, is notempty" (811c-812a). Here it is stated as plainly as one could wishthat the tathdgatagarbha is not empty due to the reality of theBuddha virtues or paramitd (purity, self, bliss, and eternity).

As seen in the discussion of the first issue, the rermtathdgatagarbh' or Buddha narure does not ret'er to anlthingsubstantial, but rather indicates each person's potential to achieveBuddhahood (this being a matrer of activity) and identifies eachperson as Thusness (hence, as ontologically nonsubstantial andnondual). lvloreover, although the text says that the tathdgatagarbha,the dhctrmqkarya, and the Buddha virtues or pdramitd (purity, self,bliss, and eternity) are a(Enya, this does not mean that they exist inany substantial sense. Rather, the attribution of the a1unya qualifiercan be seen as part of the inversion process exemplified by the fourpctrctmitd. Thus, iust as purir.v is the inversion of the impurit,vperceived in phenomena, so the a'tinya nature of this purity is theinversion of the 9frnya nature of the impurity. In fact, it would havebeen inconsistent for the tathagatagarbha-Buddha nature theoristsnot to ascribe a9unyata to the dhqrtmakEta and paro,mira; As we sawin the case of the self pd,ramit&, not-self is the property that "really,'(in an a{unya manner) describes phenomena, and it is because of the

108

ONTOLOGY: MONISM VS. NONDUALISM

reqlity of this property that one may speak of the self pdramitd. lnthis sense, the Sttnya-a9ilnya concept presents nothing philosophi-cally new that w-as not already present in the notion of the paramita.Whereas the paramitd express the contents of the culmination ofpractice, the a*unya notion is a linguistic tool used to furtheremphasize the reality of the fruits of that practice.

Another way to understand the term a*ilnya is to realize that thelogic of the Bt{? follows rhe patrern of Silnya thought, but adds acharacteristic twist of its own. According to *tirrya thought, Silnya isempty of any own-mark; that is, {finya is empty of the mark of 1ilnya,and therefore it is not graspable as such.la Mddhyamikans use 6dnyato destroy all views; they "sunyatize" Sunyata to deconstruct thelatter, to be clear that 9finyata is not Truth nor a valid view.Tathd,gatagarbha-Buddha nature theorists, in contrast, say thatbecause Silnya is empry of the mark of *ilnya, it must be said of9funya that its emptiness is real. This strikes one as exceedin$yStrange logic at first. Yet the move made by these theorists parallels inform, though not in content, that of the. Madhyamika: In both, *ilnyais "sunyatized." For tatha$&t&gctrbhc-Buddha nature thought,thou$h, when one "sunyatizes" Silnya, one inevitably ends up witha*d,nya. The logic is strai$htforward: to "sunyatize" drinya is tointroduce a9ttnya.

In other words, it is by virtue of the very unreality of all thingsthat one must say that their unreality is real. The two are two sides ofone coin. It is by virtue of the dynamics of emptiness that we mustspeak of the nonempt.v; the former necessitates the latter. In my view,there is no distinguishing this kind of dvnamic from the Mddhyamikadynamic that equates ninldqrt and sanlsara. There too it is not amatter of substantialist monism, because emptiness is and must beform, every bit as much as the reverse is true. It is not a matter of onereducing to the other, but of each indicating the necessity of theother. The dynamics of ta,thd,gatagarbha-Buddha nature thought arevirtually the same as in 6unya thought, though the particular formsthese take appear at first to be diametrically opposed.

As for the relationship between the "pure," not-empty Buddhanature or d,harmakaya and the empty (unreal), adventitiousdefilements, it may not be out of place here to comment briefly on thephilosophical status of this relationship. The relationship betweenthe pure Buddha narure or tathagatagarbha and the impure

109

BUDDH,A NATLIRE

defilements is undeniably a philosophically weak point in thistheory.rs The BN?, for its part, has little to say about thisrelationship. other tathdgatagarbhq, texts that address the relation-ship directly exolain it by not explaining it; that is. by saying that therelationship is inconceivable.

Ler us, however, speculate as to another possible avenue ofinterpretation not found in the texts themselves. We may approachthe issue experimentally by considering this doctrine as an attempr [oexpress what is experienced in practice. If this doctrine is lookedupon as a statement of an existential, rather than a purely notional,truth, it might appear to be more philosophically respectable. Apossible interpretation is as follows. Defilements and ignorance areinfinite; if one tries to "cure"' them on their own level, as it were,attempting onq by one to eliminate the various manifestations of thispervasive set of dispositions (a selfish act here, a hostile act there),one will never succeed in bringin$ the matter to an end. Rather, onemust pluck out this set of dispositions by its roots, ,,overturnin€," (asin aSrayapard,oftti) the whole person who so behaves. Thus, the gulfrepresented in tathdgutagarbhs theory between the ,,pure', natureand the adventitious defilements may represent the hiatus found in aperson's own practice of self-transformation between deluded acts, onthe one hand, and nondeluded acts. on the other: two sets ofexperienced reality in a single person that are so opposiie in naturethat one may be unable to conceive of any real relationship, any pointof contact between the two.

The virtue of this kind of interpretation is that it fits manyscholars' belief that Yogl,cara thought, in general, is based uponYo{dcara meditative practice. Moreover, the implications for ourpresent issue of monism also are significant. As I have stressedrepeatedly, Buddha natrrre is not'an entify of any kind. Nor, for thatmatter, are klesa. Buddha nature is Thusness and certain kinds ofactions. Kleset are otber kinds of actions. Insofar as neither is anentity, there is no possibilit"v of the two relating as things relate; thereis no question of one entiqr displacing, coexisting, or being amanifestation of another entity. Thus there is no question of a needto find a philosophically sound way to corrceptualize the relationshipbetween a monistic Buddha nature entity and akle1q, entity, the typeof question, that is, that causes ehdless trouble for Indianphilosophers in their attempts to relate the real Brahman-Atman with

1 1 0

ONTOLOGY: MONISM VS. NONDTIALISM

the world ol so,rysdra. If the relationship between Buddha nature andkle.5o is purely a matter of the relationship in practice between twosorts of behaviors, the \bgicdra experience would seem to be that thetwo sets of behavior do not relate; there is an unbridgeable hiatusbetween the two. The practitioner leaps over the gulf experientiallyupon realization of Buddha nature without ever "relating" deludedbehavior to the enlightened. It must be admitted that the textsthemselves do not put the matter this way and this interpretation ispure speculation. It is, however, consistent with the position of theBN?.

D. Buddha Nature Exists Aboriginally

Our fourth point is related to the third. There are passages in ourtext that describe the tathdgatugarbha, Buddha nature, ordharmakdya as really existent (shi you) or aboriginally existent (benyou). Again, do these indicate that the Buddha nature is somethingsubstantial that "exists"? The answer to this question is similar tothat indicated in the a9ilnya issue. Partially, it is a matter ofinterpretation: To say that the tathd,$ataearbha or Buddha nature"exisrs" is to say that there is truth to the claim that all can attainBuddhahood. Partially it is a matter of the Thusness perspective andof preferred lantuaSe use: If the tathdgataearbh.e or Buddha nature,as Thusness, transcends the two poles of being and nonbeing (i.e., if itis nondual), one may as well say that it is real, it exists, as say that itdoes not exist, especially when cognizant of the encoura$in$ natureof the former statement for the practitioner.

This position is well illustrated in the BiVT. In the section refutingHlnayanist views, the author first refutes both the view that theBuddha nature exists lvou,l-because that might lead some toimmediately identify themselves with the Buddha, without going

through the effort of practicing the Buddha Way and actuallybecoming a Buddha-and the view that the Buddha nature does notexist (tnu)-because this rnight lead others to expect that no matterhow much they practiced, they never could become a Buddha. Heconcludes with the following: "ln accordance with principle (Dao li),all sentient beings universally and. aboriginally possess the pureBuddha nature. Th.at there should be one who eternally failed toobtain pariniroarya is not the case. This is why Buddha nature most

1 1 1

BUDDHA NATURE

assuredly aboriginally exists (ben you); the reason being, that is, thatit has nothing to do with either being or nonbeing" (78lc).

The decision to say that the Buddha nature exists aboriginalryappears to be a pragmatic one; this is the statement that will mosrencourage practice. yet it is also quite clear that this does not meanthat the Buddha natu!:e "exists" in the normal sense; abori$inalexistence has nothing to do with either being or nonbeing. Why?Because it has to do with persons' actions or practice of the Buddha\\hy, rvhich is not essentially something ontological, arrd because ithas to do with chan$e or transformation, rvith what appears ,,Thus,,,which is never thinglike but always in flux. fn" o"tfogy of Rrr*essentially is related to the soteriology of practice. Hence to say thatthe Buddha nature (abori{inally) ,'exists"

is the lr*ry oppo.it" of$ivin$ it a substantial or thinE;like character. Rather it is to

"rr"o,r."g"practice, to indicate the primacy of practice, and simultaneously todeny of reality that it accuratelv can be described with the terms andconcepts of being and nonbeing. As u,ith persons, so with things. The'dual_emptiness"

of persons and things reveals what might be calledthe "dual Thusness" of persons ancl things. This very revJation of theThusness (of both) is the Buddha natuie that '(aboriginally

exists.,,Realitl' and perso.s are not ultimately separable in this kind ofthought; both are part of the vision of Thusness that is alwaysexpressecl in positive terms. The language of existence is preferred, ina conrext that emphasizes the inapplicability of dualistic existence-nonexistence concepts.

E. Unborn and Unchanging

. The final fo.-- ?f--

expression apparently indicating thattathagatagarbha or Buddha nature in'olves a substantialist monistictheory is fournd in those passages stating that the tott agomgorOno,dharmakaStc\ ninsaqa, or Buddhu .rut,rr" is beyond caule andconditions, is unborn, quiescent, eternal, or unchan$in$. Forexample, the Bi/? declares, ,,The

TathaSata,s dhar*"AZyi . . .eternallv and tranquilly abides. unbcrn (tou sheng), it is called ,stiil,;undestroyed (wu mie), it is called ,quiei ', (g02c).

Also, "The dharmakctya is unchangeable, like gold,, (g10a). Andfinally, nir--a4a "eternally abides (chcid zhz),, (80!c). Do not thesepassages indicate that we ha'e here a rnonistic substance, capable of

t12

ONIOLOG\': MONISM VS. NONDLTALISI\,{

transcending the larv of conditioned originatio n (pratrtyct samutp&d&)?This seems to be a negation not only of 6unya thought, but of earlyBuddhist thought as well.

However, rather than being a negation of such trasic Buddhistthought, this sort of language is the logical extension ot it. Theprajfidpdrqmitct literuture, for example, says that all dharmas, orthin$s, are "unborn." In prajfid thou$ht, all thin$s are unbornbecause there is no own-nature (sr:abhavo) to be born or to die. It isby virtue of the dynamics ol 1ilrrya (based on the principle ofprqtityclsamutpdda) that this quaiifier "unborn" is logically necessi-tated. The theory oI pratlgtasamutpada indicates that ail rhingscome into existence (are "born") due to causes and conditions, andyet, by virtue of that very principle, everlthing is said to be empty ofown-nature (insofar as they are dependent), hence unreal (not trulyexistent as independent entities), hence incapable of birth and deathor for that matter of not being born and not dying. Thus, the meaningof. unbor"n is "unrelated to the dualism of birth and no-birth"; it isnecessitated by every step of pr&tityasamutpddct-{inyc thought.

The exact same process is at work in tathuE&tclg(rrbho-Buddhanature thought, for the authors of this literature intend no dit'ferencein the purely conceptual content of the terms unborn and eternal.Both mean "outside the realm of cause and condition"; tloth arebased on and necessitated by prutity&s&mutpdda-$tnya thought. Ifone were to call the tathAgatuparbha-Buddha nature theorists'"eternal" attribute beingf'ul, one would also have to call theprajfiaparamitd,'s "unborn" attribute nihilistic. Both labels would beinappropriate, as both the "eternal" and the "unborn" attributes areintended to manifest nonduality. The difference between them is that

.the prujfid.paramitct does so in apparently "ne$ative" lan$ua$e,whereas tqthagqrc.g&rbhcl-Buddha nature thought employs appar-ently "positive" lan€,ua€,e.

In sum, our five problem areas are resolved as foliows.Ontoiogically, they indicate nondualism rather than monism. Theyare rnarked by a world-view in which reality is conceived in terms ofactions rather than substances, and by frequent use of ,,positive"

sounding language, the meaning of which does not differ essentiallyfrom the more "negative" sounding lan$uage of the Sunyu tradition.Often they are soteriological, rather than strictly philosophical, inintent.

1 1 3

BUDDHA NATURE

One recent challenge to the preceding understanding thatt&thdgangerbha-Buddha nature thought, as represented by theBN?, is not monistic should be noted. The eminent scholar GadjinNa$ao, in his study, "What Remains,"ro hbels the tathdgqt&g&rbha asa monistic pure bein$. I{e proceeds by comparing several texts on thesubject of emptiness and nonemptiness. Of these texts, one is fromthe Nikiya, three are from the Yo{dc6ra school (and are written byVasubandhu and Asanga), and rhe fifth is the R&tnagotratsibhaga, atext closely related to the BN?. Nagao concludes that the latrer'sconcept is different from that of the other texts. It is valuable ro studyhis remarks, because the references he makes to the Rauwgo-tratsibhaga are all to themes shared by the BN?.

In the former four texts, says Na$ao, "what remains" in emptinessare hindrances to realization (such as the body or discrimination),whereas "what remains" in the Ratnagotra are the "pure" Buddhaqualities (virtues). In the Ratnagotra, he says, it is a matter of"arithmetic subtraction"; once you have "destroyed" the kle6a,, allthat remains is "pure being."rz Thus, he sees the tqthdgatugarbha asa monistic pure being, which remains when the defilements havebeen "subtracted." Furthermore, he states that this position of theRatnagotra is "fatal," because it would seem ro lay the foundation forthe notion that kleSa and bodhi are identical.r8 The implication isthat this notion threatens the conrinuation of practice of the Buddhaway.

Let us examine this matter more closely. Nagao speaks of"destroying" the hindrances, but in the Ratnagotra and the BN? thehindrances are unreal, they do not exist-how could they bedestroyed? (The BN? itself makes this point directly.) Moreover, hespeaks of the Buddha virtues as "transparent" pure bein$. Thus, heinterprets the a9ilnya notion as meaning that the Buddha virtues areutterly distinct and separate from 6ilnya,. Yet we have seen that theterm a9tinya is used in the BN? to represent the inversion that is thefulfillment of Sfirrya. In fact, this is the logic of the BN? throughout:Buddha nature also is revealed by way of SOnya. SAnya is the basis ofeverlthing in the BNf nothing is apart from it-the a*unya end ofthe path is the fulfillment of it. Nor can the notion ot' ,,arithmetic

subtraction" stand scrutiny. One cannot subtract "nothing,' (i.e., tnenonexistent defilements) from "neither nothing nor something,' (i.e.,Thusness). The logic of the BN? is based on the nondualiw of

TT4

ONTOLOGY: MONISM VS. NONDLIALISM

Thusness and clearly is not a matter of eliminating an undesirableelement and ending with a positive "somethin{,."

Finally, Nagao's fear that the tathdgqtu{,arbha theory will lead tothe identification of kleSct and bodhi (d,elusion and wisdom) andthereby eliminate the theoretical justification of pracrice is fore-stalled in the BN?. Of course, Nagao is right, in a sense, insofar as hehas put his finger on the weakest point of tathAg&to,go;rbha-Buddhanature thought: the relationship between the "pure" tethnganEqrbhfrand the defilements that cover it (or in other words, the relationshipbetween wisdom and delusion). However the author of the BN?, forone, is at pains to demonstrate why the Buddha nature doctrine notonly is no threat to practice, but actively justifies and encourages it.This is one of the central themes of the texr. For example, the authorargues that one cannot say either that the Buddha nature exists orthat it does not exist precisely because of the necessity ofencouraging practice and emphasizing its desirability. The larter alsostands out as the formative motive behind the writrrrg of the BN?. TheBuddha nature itself, especrally as d,9rayapardrsytti, is directlyidentified with Buddhist practice. Thus Nagao's fear, althoughjustifiable, is not borne out in the context of the BN?, the core themeof which is the inestimable value of Buddhist practice and the veryidentificatron of Buddha nature with practice.

I conclude that the Buddha narure thought of the BN? should notbe understood as monistic.

1 1 5

CTAPTER SIX

Engaging in Spiritual Cultivation

A r I have emphasized throughout this book, the BN? articulates,( r the Buddha nature concept as a metaphor for Buddhist practice.This approach allows the author to affirm the Buddha ,rut,r." withoutpositing the existence of a reified self akin to the Atman ot'Brahmanism. Moreover, the identification of Buddha nature andBuddhist practice, coupled with the glorification of the former,powerfully validates and encourages the undertaking of Buddhistpractice. What, then, of this practice itself? How, in practical terms,does one engage in practice so as to rearize the Buddha nature thatone already is? or, because cause and fruit are identified in theBuddha nature, perhaps we should ask, what actions are paradig_matic of the self-expression of Buddha nature? Does the BNT Aive usany guidance on this subject?

There is a good deal of marerial in rhe BII? on engaging inBuddhist practice, ranging from quite down-to-earth, L.r.riun"advice on the kind of friends one should seek, through a discussion ofvarious bodhisatasct practices, up to quite abstract material on themost advanced of the bodhisattrsa bhamt. All of this material seemsto fall well within the norms of well-established Mahdyana practices;indeed, some of it draws from early Buddhist traditions. Though theBN? offers this material in a disorganized fashion, scattered hele and

717

BUDDTIA NATURE

there throu$hout the rext, I propose to be$in with the advice given to

the beginner and then focus on the material that seems to be the

focal point of the author, the material that seems direcced to the

audience of Mahayana practitioners to whom he addressed himself. I

intend to select the most practically oriented rnaterial of this

sometimes quite abstract discussion.

To begin, the foundations of successful Buddhist practice are

quite straightforward and commonsensical.

There are rwo insi$hts: insi$ht into the sufferin$ and faults of saqsara;

and insight into the bliss and merits of ninl,dna. By a person's factor of

puriry, by his or her pure nature' these insip,hts attain completion'-Thislf""to, of purity" is [composed ofl (1) a constituent of merit; (2) a

constiruent of liberation; (3) a constituent of penetration [of Thusnessl.(1) Merit: Good roots from former lives can influence this life. when all

roots are com-pleCe, one can bear the Dharma vessel-l (2) Liberation: Havin$

been a virtuous disciple already in the past, one can influence future lives

and attain the fruit of liberation. (3) Penetration: one can penetrate

Thusness by means of the Noble Path.These [three] are called the factor oJ purity. With the factor of purity as

the condition and the pure [Buddhal nature as the cause, people complete

these insi$hts. It is not done without cause and condition' (800a)

Here the role of conditions as valid components of the Buddhist Path

is stressed. Thou$h the unconditioned Buddha nature itself is sin$led

out as the ,'cause" of attaining insi$ht, it is clear that, in the author's

mind, this cause alone, exalted thou$h it may be, will not come to

fruition without the active presence of the basic Buddhist necessities-

merit, virtue, and the treading of the Noble Path-as conditioning

influences.The mundane foundations of Buddhist practice are funher

elucidated in the followin$ discussion of the "Lovr cakru,s" or four

wheels, four commonsensical conditions for success in the practic'e of

Buddhism.2

The four cakras are (1) to dwell in a country that is in accord with the

Dharma; (2) to rely upon Dharma friend(s); (3) to possess self-discipline of

one's own mind; (4) to have planted good roots in past lives' ' ' '

(1) To dwell in a $ood place is [to livel in a place where a $ood persbn

lives, cultivating correct practice. If one lives there, constantly seeins this

person, one will attail ^t enli$htened mind' (800a)

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ENGACING IN SPIRITUAL CULTIVATION

(2) The second cakra is to be near a Dharma friend(kalyd1tamitra). A kalyd.namitra has seven characteristics, summa-rized as follows. She or he iq (1) giving, (2) honorable, (3)

trustworthy, (4) able to speak effectively, (5) able to endure, (6) ableto speak of the profound Principle, and (7) able to give peace to good

friends and to establish them in good conditions. These sevencharacteristics are embraced by three more general qualities, all ofwhich a kalydqamifra must possess: (1) sympathy, (2) intelligence,and (3) patience. Sakyamuni is the paradigm of the kalyd4amitra(800b).

(3) [The third cakra isl to possess self-discipline of one's own mind. Thecorrect teaching and practice is at the time of hearin$, no scattered mind; atthe time of thinking, no disparaging mind; at the time of cultivating spiritualpractice, no inverted mind. If one doesn't discipline one's own mind, a !,ood[dwellingf place and a kalyd4amita are of no use.

(a) [The fourth cakra,l to have planted good roots [i.e., meritl in thepast, is the constituent of liberation. Cultivate good roots. Good roots arefaith, 6iro, hearing, giving, and wisdom. Faith is fught Mindfulness(samyaksmrti) of the Three Jewels. Stla means not to stray from the goodPath. Hearing [encompasses] one's own hearin!, causin$ olhers to hear, notcausing others to hear what is contrary [to the Truth], and not being anobstacle to others'hearing. Because of these four kinds of hearing, today theworld is able to hear [the Dharma], reflect upon [the Dharma], and cultivatespiritual practice. [HearingJ can be a sufficient Dharma vessel for [these]three modes of attaining wisdom. [Next,l giving is of two kinds. Because onehas in the past given material things to others, today one's desire isvanquished. Because one has in the past given of the Dharma to people,today one's ignorance is destroyed. Therefore by this cause andcondition, one attains the fruit of liberation. [Finally,] regarding wisdom,because in former lives this person has already chosen, reflected upon, andunderstood the Three Jewels and the Four [Noblel Truths, in this iife she orhe attains [the ten knowledges, froml worldly knowledge through erhaustiveknowledge and no-birth knowledge.3 (800b)

The text goes on to say that without merit from past lives, the otherthree cakras are ol'no use. Moreover, if any of these four.cakras islacking, liberation will not be attained (800c).

The first two cqkras indicate the importance of having both ateacher and apracticin$ community, however small, around one. Oneneeds exposure to the Dharma from such people, instruction byexample as much as by word. Although Sakyamuni is the

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paradigmatic kalydr.tamitro, others may fill that role to a lesserextent. The list of characteristics of a katydryamitra gives thepractitioner practical guidance in determining what is a spirituallywholesome and what an unwholesome influence, whom she or heshould seek or shun.

The third cakra is self-discipline of one's own mind. The firstelement in this cakra, "no scattered mind" at the time of hearin$,refers to a disciplined mind, a mind that has been disciplined by calmor concentration such that the practitioner is capable of listening toteaching on the Dharma with undivided attention. This, then, isadvice to cultivate concentration; this is the foundation of meditationpractice in early Buddhism, but here this concentration is thefoundation of listening practice.

The second element in the thira ::akrct is "no disparaging mind"at the time of thinking. This stops short of somerhing we will discusslater; namely, cultivation of "faithful joy" in the Mahdydna. Here theauthor limits his advice to an admonition that the practitioner nottake liShtly or carelessly dismiss the teachings received, when he orshe pauses to reflect upon them, but rather, open-mindedly andseriously consider their value.

Finally in this cakra, we have "at the time of cultivating spiritualpractice, no inverted mind." This means simply that when oneen8a8es in spiritual practice, sincerity is essential. One's intentions,motives, values, and so on should be in harmony with one's actions.

The fourth and last cakrct advises us to cultivate good roors,which are defined as faith, 6TIa, hearing, giving, and wisdom. Faithhere is simply the maintenance of mindfulness of the Three Jewels.,SZh is mentioned only in passing, apparently indicating that it isassumed and virtually $oes without saying. Hearing, in contrast, isvery much stressed. This is reminiscent of Mahayana sfitra emphasisupon the importance of spreading the new (Mah6yana) word; thisMahdydna 9dstra author appears to feel the same urgency. Theinclusion of giving, both material and spiritual, in this list returns usto a traditional foundation of practice. By portraying giving as apractice with both material and spiritual elements and with bothpractical and spiritual consequences, the author succeeds inrepresentin$ it as a practice for everyone, in all circumstances, withany aspiration. Finally, wisdom, as disgussed here, would seem to benot so much itself a "good root," but rather the fruition in this life of

L20

DNGAGING IN SPIRITUAL CULTIVATION

the good roots of faith and practice sown in former lives. However,because the wisdom discussed is Hinayanic wisdom, the authorimplies that Hinaydnic wisdom ir "

gooa root for the cultivation ofMah6y6nic wisdom.such are the foundations of successfur spiritual practice. I wouldjudge that none of what we huu"

"ou"r"d so far is targeted by theauthor as a point that he especialry wants to emphasize. This has arlbeen more in the way of fackgrouna il"t n" assumes already ispossessed by people coming! to him for the instruction found in theBN?. It is a kind of .ummary of

"r."rrti"l faith, moral discipline,mental concentration,. merit, and supporting conditions. Note thatvery little has been said about meaitution tndeed, o.airra.y irJ""^,""thought in the form of reflection

"po"

-ii" Buddha,s teachings hasbeen endorsed. This indicates thai the BN?,s author accepts thetraditional idea that the cultivatio., or ruitt -in the sense of adegreeof confidence and trust in the Buddha, his teaching, and thecommunity he founded_and morality_in the sense of ,-"f-"orrt.of,generosity to others, and virtue of all kinds_must p*""au ,n"cultivation of meditationar practicer ;;. se. Discursive reflectionupon the Dharma is one of several essential ingredients,"-*"

"rA,stages of practice, helping to determin" *t "trr"", """

;,li'""J*a".

flfiltrtt, effort, and discipline n"""u"ury to the treading of the\oble

We now turn to more advanced practices that typify the form ofspiritual cultivation advocated by ttre rr,rr rn" fotowing practice,the foundations of which *"." "i.,troa*"d

,r, Ct upter Four, is afour-part practice composed of the crrltiuution of faithful joy in theMahdyena, prajfia, meditative "orr"*r.ri,on, and mahdkaruqd.Because this practice is tied to one of tt

" *o.t emphasized themes of

il,!o;_lr, it stands out as especially significant. The basic idea is as

There are four [classes]_of people_th e icehantika, the non_Buddhist. thesrdvaka' and the nratvekabudiha-;;;-;;"re of four kinds of obstacle,do not see rhe Buajha. *,;;;.-wh;".""irr" four obstacles? (1) Theicchantika's obstacle is disregard *i rr"""a .r the Mahayana. To correcr:*'ilff#::ha

taueht the b;dhis;;;;;; or curtivating raithrur joy in

(2) The non-Buddhist's obstacle is giving rise to a serf view with regard to a,

127

BI]DDTIA NATURE

dfutrnras. To correct this, the Butldha taught the bodhisattua practice of

cultivating PraiiidPdrarnittl'

(3) The obstacle of the iraooka is to fixedly grasp onto the thought of

duhkhau'ith re!,ard to samsdra, such that [sraosakas developl a mind that

i. Ji.g,r*"a wiih and fearful oi Isarosdral' To correct this' the Buddha

taught the bodhisatttsa practice of cultivating the samfrrlhi that destroys

ii"f!"t "*p,iness. Those on the first [bodhisattool stage and above can

attain this samddhi and destrol' such views as the false emptiness view'

When one enters tbis insi$ht, [one sees that emptinessl is neither identical

with bein!, or nonbein{,, "J""putu'"

from bein$ and nonbein{'' To illustrate:

ir is like the insight iito bottL absolure and $,orldly [Truths] at the ei$hth

stage. . . .

( ) The pratyekabucldLm's obstacle is disre$arding activities trenefiting

."n,i"rr, beinjs and creating a mind that rejects sentrent bein$s To correct

this,theBuddhataughtthecult ivat ionoftheborlhist l t tva,smdha'kan'uuJ.The aciivit-v of the bodhisattcsa's mahikant\a is to benefit others' This

shorvs that the prutyek(tbuddha only ha-s an individual insight into cause

and condition. He has no mind to save others, hence no mahdkatllna' The

Srdpaka is also like this'

To overcome these tour obstacles' we take faithful joy and the rest as four

kindsofcause.Byhavin$al lbodhisattc)( lscult ivatethesecauses,theyattain,i," p.r." paramiia of thJ suprem e d'harmakaya' These are called the causes

oith" grrddh^ nature's puriqv such persons attain the name Buddhn's child

(.797 c-798a)

The endorsement by this text of the quaternity of faithful joy in

the Mahdydn a, prqinct, meditative concentration' and m&hAkanlno'

is taken from the Ratna$,otravibhaga' The latter text' however' only

names the four practices without commenting on them' The BN?

devotes considerable space to the development of these ideas' Thus

both theRatna$ot ramater ia landthecreat iv i t yo f theBN? 'sauthor

shaped the formulation of the four practices that we will discuss here

as the practices especially emphasized by the Bi{?'

Cu l t i l sa t ionhere t rans la tesx iu -x i ,wh ichconnotescons is ten t

and repeated enp,a$ement in practices intended to nurture one's

spirltual potential. The concepiof Buddhist practice we see,reflected

in this scheme requires a multifaceted approach in which one

nurtures several human capacities conducive to spiritual $rowth' This

four-part program of Buddhist practice reflects the traditional

Buddhist idea of bhqtsqna, spiritually nurturant practice inclusive of

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ENGAGING IN SPIRITUAL CULTTVATION

a multitude of forms.a Meditation alone is not all there is to Buddhistpractice; rather. meditation is one of several kinds of practice that

address the various aspects of human being, all of which are helped byguidance and nurturance. In the present case, faithful joy addresses

crur emotional and volitional faculties; praififr and meditative concen-

tration as discussed herein address primarily the nature of our con-

sciousness, inclusive of our noetic and perceptual faculties; and

mahd,karu,nd. addresses our instrumental and active faculties.

Though 6ila, moral discipline, is notably absent from this list ofquali."ies to be cultivated, we have seen that the basic moral

disciplines already are assumed as prior practices readyin$ one for

the practices specifically encouraged in this text. This reflects the

traditional concept of moral discipline as the foundation of practice.

Of course, an element of morality also is implicit in mnhd,kant4fi,

though rhis is not morality in the sense of restraint or discipline.

Ma,hd,kannla, is spontaneous engagement in the world for the sake of

the salvation of others.In sum, then, in our author's rnind, the tour cqkrag inclusive of

the traditional disciplines of self-restraint, giving, and so on, are thefirst steps in practice. Then, at the sta$e on which he focuses, come

faithful joy as a kind of foundation for Mahdydna practice, specificprajfiit and meditation exercises, and finally, compassion. Let us look

further at the particulars.The four practices that have been highlighted are the "causes" of

rhree virtues, as follows: "The cultivation of faithful joy in the

It{ahdydna is the cause of the purity of the d.ha,rmakdyo; this should

be known. The crrltivation of prajfid and meditative concentiation(chan ding) bring about the virtue of a Buddha's wisdom; this should

be known. The cultivation of the bodhisattva's mahdkaru,nd is the

cause of the virtue of lovin€, kindness; this should be known" (801a).

Furthermore,

The cultivation of faithful joy in the Mahayana is like a vessel in whichthere is limitless meditation and wisdom (dinE hui). Because it is completelyfilled with the Great Jewel [the Dharmal, it resembles a vessel.

The cultivations of pruj'iia and mediative concentration are incompre-hensible; since they are the foundation of lthe dharmakdya'sl mefits, praiflais like a pure jewel and meditative concentration is like a wish-fulfillin$ jewel.

The cultivation of the bodhisaitt;a's mah.dhanna is like pure waterbeeause a sin$e t4ste nourishes all sentient bein$s in the world. (801a)

t23

BLIDDIT{ NATURE

Let us consider the key terms in these practices. Faithfuljoy is acompound Chinese term xin le, composed of "faith" * , lo-v, bliss,"and meaning faith and pleasure in the Dharma or the happinessinherent in Buddhist taith. The rerm is used by the pure Land andYog6cara schools, each in its own way, but here its meaning is bestunderstood from its use as a corrective practice for the icchantika.Icchantikqs hold an "upside-dorvn" viel: thev find jo1' and pleasurein samsarct and in the five skandhq.-whose nature is truly duhkha,the opposite of pleasurable-and for this reason turn their bacx onBuddhism. The icchantika who seeks joy in sctmsarct is destined tobe disappointed and should drop the "upside-dou'n" view motivatingsuch an attempt. The Bi{?'s author argues, though, that to seesarysaru as duhkha is onl_v half a correction. In the N{ahd1'ana onecan find a joy that is based upon something real, namely. the Buddhanature, which is both freedom irom duhkha and the positiverealization of the tbur great virtues including "bliss pnrnmita." Theicch&ntike's search for joy' per se is not misguided; it is misguidedonly insofar as it is doomed to failure because the icchantfka rsseeking joy in salnsdra, rvhere none is to be found. Thus faith in thetr{ahdydna is jo-"'-ful or pleasurable because it gives a reliable andconstant joy, rather than a doomed and constantly erodingpseudo-joy. This faith is not a creedal faith nor a faith in sometranscendent Good. Faith in N{ahdydna is existential release from thesorrow of seeing one's fleeting joys forever slipping through one'sfingers. This is rvhat the text means in speaking of talthful joy as"purity": lett ing go of the false, of the delusory and sorrow-prciducin$dream, coupled u'ith the freedom and joy attendant to realizing thereal. \\rhat is false cannot produce joy; u'hat is real, can. Hence,NIahar'Ena faith is jor'.

Faithful joy is compared to "a vessel in which there is l imitlessrneditation and rvisdom (ding hui)" because "ir is completely filledrv i th the Great . lewel I the Dharmal . " Fai thfu l jov is the 'essel , theDharma vessel; it is that rvhich makes possible the carrying fornard otthe Dharma. Without t 'aith, one rvould not engage in meditation andconsequentll 'not attain rvisdom. The Dharma is embodied in all ofthese-faith, meditation, and wisdom-and u'ithout any one of them,the Dharma would not exist.

The cultivations of prujfiaparctmitA and meditative concenrra-tion are grouped together as the.iervell ike causes of Buddha's rvisdom.

t24

ENGAGING IN SPIRITLIAL CI,ILTN'ATIO){

The cultir.'ation of pra-iiiaparamita is a tu'o-tiered practice thatrefers, f irst, to practice to engender in the non-Buddhist recognitionthat there is no self in samsara and, second, to the deepenin$ of thisinsight into realization of the self pctramita nature of this universalnonexistence nf self.

The third item in the set of tbur is named less definitell ' than theother three. It usuallv is named as the samddhi that destroys falseemptiness, but sometimes. more $enerally, as meditative concentra-tion. The latter is chan din!,.literali1' dhyana,-samddhi. Both dhyanaand ssmadhi are used in a variety of rvays bv different groups and atdifferent times. Dhyana mav be used in a specific sense as transicabsorption (in several u'ell-defined levels), or it may refer tomeditation in general, mental cultivation, or the examination of themind and mental objects, especially in a condition of mental sti l lness.Samadhi tends to refer to the cultivation of mental concentration.the sti l l inp of the activit ies of the mind, the development ofone-pointedness of mind. The compound chqn dinA means thecombination of these trvo.

The samddhi that destroys false emptiness is a specificcultivation recommended for a specific purpose: as a cure for thoservho are attached to a one-sided, nihil istic vierv of emptiness. Thissqmddhi is related by our author to the attainment of passagethrough the "emptiness l iberation gate." The usual understanding ofthe latter is that it is simplv insight into the emptiness of all things onthe basis of conditioned origination. Our author, however, under-stands it as a gate representin$ freedom from a neAative vierv ofemptiness.

There are arrogant people u'ho $rasp emptiness as a vielr'. This is thereal emptiness true liberation gate. This emptiness liberation pate, arisin$from graspin{ cmpt iness, is [atqachment to the v ieu' that ] a l l th ings arenonbcin$; a l l is empt iness. This at tachment to empt iness is contrary r r_rreali4'. Because it is contrary to realit)-, both cause and effect, that is, thetu'o Truths of Path and Principle, are lost Iin itl. Having become atrached rothis emptiness, one t'alls into false nothingness. This kind of attachmentarises by means of emptiness and in this rval' produces a false vieu..

[General l l 'speaking, ] a l l fa lse v ie$'s can be ext in$uished by means ofempt iness. But th is ' ieu 'ar ises on the basis of empt iness and thereforecannot be correcfed. Ilecausi of such a per-son. the Buddha said, ,,Ka61..apa.

ifa pcrson $ives rise to zi self r.ie$'. though that vie*. is as large as NIt. Sumeru,I prornise to sanction him. \\hv? Bccause lthat viel'l czrn be destroved. But

125

BUDDIIA NATLIRE

this cmpt iness v iew of the arro$anr person is l ike onc-quarter 0 i t l te t ip of n

hair. I quickly rebuke it and certainly do not promise sanction."'r (797b)

The apparent fact that there were people who understood

emptiness in a one-sided, ne$ative manner has been discussed rvith

concern several times in this text. Consider the placement of this

"santadhi to destroy false enrptiness" in the company of this quartet

of practices. Faith is universally accepted as the starting point for a

Buddhist practitioner. It is axiomatic that one must have a certain

amount of confidence and trust in the Buddha's word and in the Path

before one will be willing to take the first step on that Path.

Prajfidpd,ramit{1, of course, is the foundation of Mahdydna thou$ht

and practice. and compassion is equally universally accepted. In this

company of unquestionable pillars of the Mahdydna Path is entered

this particular samdd,hi. Obviously a matter of focal concern finds

expression here. The sq'md'dhi that destroys false emptiness is the

fulfillment of the thematic statement cited earlier: "Buddha nature is

the Thusness revea.led by the dual ernptiness of person and thin$s. . . .

If one does not speak of Buddha nature, then one does not

understand emptinegs" (787b). W'ithout realization of Buddha nature'

emptiness has not been understood. The cure for those stuck halfway

is the somddhi that destroys false emptiness. This sarnddhi is called

an insight Qluan). It is an insi$ht constituted by a nondualistic,

hence nonne!,ative apperception of the true nature of emptiness as

"neither identical with being or nonbein$' nor separate from bein$

and nonbeing." Despite its importance, this samddhi is not loftily out

of reach. Those on the first bocllrisett\)& stage and above, that is,

anyone who has engendered bodhicitta, the Thou$ht of Enlighten-

ment, can attain it. Insofar as this insi$ht "is like the insi$ht into both

absolute and worldly [Truths] at the ei$hth fbodhisatn:a] sta$e," its

consequences, quite evidently, are found in the practitioner's

freedom frorn a dualistic view of sarnsd,ra and ninsd,vn, such that he

or she courses without obstruction in both. As the BNT typically puts

it: "These people all travel the Path of the equality of. sarpsdra and

nirtsdlta (pin7 denP zhi Dao\. They drvell in the condition of

not-dwelling. Although they course in samsd'ra. they are not sullied.

Although they course in niroalta,. they are also not 'pure' [in a

dualistic senseJ. But t'recause of m'q'hdkaru4a, they do not reject

sctrp,san'a; because of. prajfta, they do not reject nimsd4a" (797c).

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ENGAGING IN SPIRITUAL CULTTVATION

Thus when one passes throu$h the emptiness liberation gate (thanks

to the samaclhi that destroys false emptiness), mahakant4a lies

directly ahead.Mahdkantryo is "great compassion'"

the Buddha's virtue of lovin$ kindness

water, dtre to its ability to nourish

discrrssion of this term until the rest

It is linked, aPProPriatelY, to(en\ and is likened to Pure

all. I will postpone further

of the textual material on

mnhakctntna is introduced later'

The set of four practices is further elucidated as follows:

There are four aspects to the meanin$ of child of the Buddha: cause'

condi t ion,basis ,andccrmplet ion.(1)Therearetwocauses[of real iz ingone'ssrarus as ,,child of the Buddha"l: Buddha nature and faithful joy. of these

two. Buddha nature is unconditioned; faithful joy iS conditiohed. Faithful joy

as that which attains Buddha nature is the cause of completion because it

manifests and completes the true cause nature [i.e., Buddha naturel'

Faithfui jo,v as prnyo{a is the productive cause because it gives rise to all

practices. (798a)

Note here the sensitive and useful distinction drawn between

asarr.tskrta, unconditioned Buddha nature, and sq,ryskrte, condi-

tioned faithful joy. This distinction holds in fruitful tension two

aspects of Buddha nature theory that could seem mutually

contradictory.6 On the one hand, the identification of Buddha nature

as unconditioned and as the ultimate source oL realization (of Buddha

nature) is funtlamental to this text. Moreover, it is consistent with the

idea that Bucldha nature is both cause and effect and as cause already

is perfect and complete. On the other hand, the author of this text

very much wants to validate Buddhist practice in the ordinary'

mundane sense, and this is nicely accomplished with the validation of

conditioned faithful joy-the acknowledgement, in other words, that

the practitioner is intentionally en$a$in$ in specific acts chosen

because they promise to lead one to the desired $oal, acts tested by

tradition and found to be effective to that end. This tension between

the inherent perfection of the Buddha nature and the necessity for

.practice becomes, of course, a major paradox in Chan' resulting

Lccasionally in a breakdown of the tension such that one pole of the

paradox, the necessity of practiea is rejeated' As we have seen' in the

blff guaanu nature is identified with Buddhist practice; thus neither

the inherent perfection of Buddha nature nor the necessity of

t27

BUDDHA NATURE

practice can be foresworn without the loss of the central theme of thetext. The author deftly handles this tension here by the simple deviceof naming both conditioned practice and unconditign"a grraah"nature as the dual causes of rearization. Note that faithful joy is the"productive cause" precisely because it produces practice.

(2) The condition [of realizing one's status as ,,child of the Buddha,,] isprajfifrparamird. Because it is the condition of all uncdnditio.,J-eritr, itproduces the individual bodhiscrttvcts.(3) The basis [of rearizin! one's status as ,,child of the Buddha,,] is theso'mddhi rhat destroys [the grasping of a farsel emptiness. The attachmentsof a person who takes pleasure in u"rng $tou) are severed because there is

[in beingj no condirion for 'having' utis"s,-purity, etc. The bodhisatnsa whocufrivates the samddhi that destroys [the lrasping of a false] "_piir,"* ""nremove that grasping [to emprinessJ by the powei of tnis

"amaiht. ih"t rswhy the bodhisatnsa,s dharmakaya is firm, rather than *"uL. (ZSgri

Here the $raspin$ of, or attachment to, emptiness is set up as aparallel ro the grasping of being. The act oi grasping itseri is theproblem, and this is overcome by the samadii that "destroys

falseemptiness' This freedom from all forms of attachment makes thebodhisattvct's dharmaka3ta strong, and thus this samddhrr can serveas the foundation or basis of one's status as child of Buddha._

"(4) The completion [of realizing one's status as ,,child of the

Buddha"l is the bodhis'ttrsa's mahaklrurpa, because it profits othersin endless engagements. Because Thusness is limitless and sq,ttvq,sare innumerable, the profiting activities [of mahdkant4.dl arso arelimitless" (798a).

This statement on mahdkant4fr follows the pattern we by nowexpect, so let us pass immediately on to a subseqrr"rr, purrug" i'which agreat deal more is said of mcthdkctnt4a, including some veryinteresting things. "The meaning of mahdkanr4a has thlee aspects:its essence, its greatness and the distinctions Ibetween ii andkaru4d,l. 1. Its essence is prajfid. prajftd has two aspects:nondiscriminating, supreme wisdom and discriminating, *o.tatywisdom. We take discriminating wisdom as the essence ofmahdkararya, because mahdkant4fr. is the condition of the upliftirijof sentient beings" (796c). To link prqjfid and kant4.a, o, *irdo_and compassion, is the standard Mahdydna message. This passage,however, goes beyond this familiar slogan to examine the functional

L28

ENGAGING IN SPIRITUAL CULTIVATION

implications of this linkage. Usually prajftd is considered to functionin a nondiscriminating, nondualistic manner; indeed, it has been solabeled many times in this text. Here, however, prajfid, is attributedtwo aspects: "nondiscriminatin$, supreme wisdom and discriminat-ing, worldly wisdom." This in itself is remarkable; we are told here inunmistakable terms thatprajfid, is inclusive of, though not limited to,discriminating, worldly wisdom.T Moreover, discriminating wisdom isre$arded as the "essence of mq,hq,karuno, because mahdkant4fr. isthe condition of the uplifting of sentient beings." Thus when prujfid islabeled the essence of nzq,hokcnu,4.a, it is really discriminating,worldly prajfifr which the author has in mind. Of course, this isenlightened discrimination, but discrimination nonetheless. Thismakes intuitive sense. The bodhisoffea must grapple with theexistential condition of sentient beings, which prominently includesdiscrimination, to be of any help to the latter. Moreover, thebodhisatasa's disinclination to turn his back on sarp,sa,rq, discussedearlier, naturally entails that he also not turn his back on worldlywisdom; that is, the wisdom that functions in the context of sarysd.ra.

2. There are five aspects to the meaning of the $reatness [ofmahdkaruadl. . . . (1) [It is great because its practice incorporateslgiving supplies for body and spirit (sarybhdra): the two practices ofsarybhara [i.e., material and spiritual giving] can produce greathappiness, virtue, wisdom and meditation. (2) [It is great] becauseits mark is the abiliry to have insight into the three f.orms ol duhkha\and to save all sentierit beings [from sarysd,ral. (3) [It is great]because of its place of practice: it takes the three worlds of sentientbeings as its place.e (4) [It is great] because of its impartiality: it givesrise to an impartial mind regarding the condition of all sentientbeings. (5) [It is greatl because of its supremacy: nothing surpassesthis spiritual cultivation. (796c)

The first aspect of the greatness of mahdkctru4d makes clear thatboth spiritual and material giving are part of compassion. These twoforms of giving are not even ranked, but referred to by a single,inclusive term. The "impartial'mind" mentioned in the fourth aspectrefers to a mind that regards all persons as inherently equal,specifically in the sense that no person is more or less deservin$ thanany other'of the bodhisattuo's compassion, of relief from suffering, ofmaterial help and of spiritual instruction.

3. There are eight distinctions lbetween ktntnA andm^thdkant4dl. (1)

729

BUDDTN NATURE

Distinction in inherent nature: the boundlessness of karund hasnonanger as its nature; mahdkaruryd has nondelusion as its nature.(2) Distinction in mark: kantnrt has the suffering irrherent induhklw as its mark; mahikant1rd has the three duhkhas as itsmark. (3) Distinction in place of activity: kanlnfr. has the desirerealm as its field; mah.dkantryd penetrates all three realms. (4)Distinction in sta{le: karund takes the fourth dhyd,rut as its stage;lomahAkantnA takes the no-outflow 'Iathagata fruit as its stage. (5)Distinction in the sphere [in which it is expressedl: kant4n lismanifested byl ordinary persons and [those in] the Ttvo Vehicles

[Srdvaka and pratyekabu.ddfuil; mahdkaru4d [is manifested] onlyby bodhisattvos and Buddhas. (6) Distinction in virtue: karund,takes freedom t'rom desire and from the desire realm as its vlrtue;mahnkanna takes freedom from desire and from all three realms asits virtue. (7) Distinction in [efficacy of] salvation: fum.ufi only hasthe heart-mind to relieve sufferin!,, it does not take action to relievesuffering; mahakaru4A has both the hean-rnind [to relievesufferingl and the activities fto that end]. (8) Distinction in beingultimate and nonultimate: hatana can reiieve sufferin$ for a shortwhile, but it cannot truly save; mahdkanuftd can eternally savebecause it never abandons [the sufferingl. (796c-797a)

The primary objective of this list of distinctions obviously is to shorv

how and why mahdkarund is superior to karu4d^ Many of thesepoints are self-evident, but a few require some comment. Accordingto the first distinction, though kq,runfr, is "boundless," its inferiorityas compared to m.qh.o,kq,ra4d is related to their difference in essentialnature: ka,ntpo's nature is essentially nonanger, whereas that ofmahdkaran.td is essentially nondelusion. The idea, evidently, is thatanger may be eliminated u'hile some delusion remains, but if delusionis uprooted, anger has no foundation and cannot arise. 'Ihe idea ofkorund as freedom from anger is consistent with the fourthdistinction, in which konqa is associated with the founh d,hydrw,which is characterized by freedom from emotion or, in other words,equanimity, and by mindfulness. The sixth distinction adds thatknruna also involves freedom from desire. Thus it would seem thatfreedom from desire and freedom from anger go hand in hand andthat the two are expressed positively in equanimity.

The seventh and eight distinctions seem at first to be mutuallyinconsistent, but I believe the point is as follows. The seventhdistinction shows that mahdkannlt $oes not separate the compas-sionate heart-mind from compassionate acts. In the case of kararyfr,

130

ENCACING IN SPIRITUAL C]I'LTNATION

however, various conditions can interfere rl'ith the expression in

action of a compassion that is sincerely felt ' There are plenq' of cases

in which u p"rron ieels kantrw but does nothin$' This is explained b-v

the point with which this discussion of mahah'oruno be$an: the

"rr"rr"" ol mrthdkqru,4fr is prajfid' What could interfere with the

expression in action of a cornpassionate feelin$? contradictor,v

feetings, such as one of many fornrs of self-interest' or perhaps the

inability to determine a useful course of action are sources of such

blockage, and these are the kinds of thin$s that praiiiu *'ould

e l im ina te .Thee i$h thpo in t t ss im i l a r : a l i t hecompass ion in thewor ldis no guarant"" Li effective actio'; prajfiii-d\scriminatin$' worldly

wisdom, that is-is necessary to know the ri$ht action to tahe under

the circumstances ar hand in order to help others alon$ the Path

toward ultimate liberation.

[iut please ncrte, though karunfr is throu$hout compared with

m;ohf ,kanryd ' tothedeir inrentof theformer,norvhereis i tsa idthatkantndas such should be dismissed' Such an idea would never occur

to the au'.hor of the BN'?. To the contrary,kctrunct rnay be inferior but

it is still "boundless." It may be the practice of orciinary persons'

Srdr>akq. and praryekabuddhs, but its expression in action is still

sa rybhd ra . l tmaybea re la t i ve l yea r l ys ta$e ,bu t i t i s s t i l l pa r to f t heBuddhistpath; i tconst i tu tes. .$oodroots ' 'p lantednowthatwi l ibeartrruit in one's own spiritual practice in the future'

Let us leave the quaterniry of faithful jo"v, prajiia' meditative

concentration. and mahfrkaru4fr and turn to a final set of passa$es

that also are characteristic of the BN?'s instructions on practice.

These passages are introduced in the context of a discussion of

a$raryaparaiqtti, which the reader will recall is a synonym in this text

for the Buddha nature understood as Buddhist practice. The

d$ra,yaparaeTtti, we are told here, is constituted by two categories;

n"*"Iy, the abandonment of desire, which is equivalent to the Truth

of Cessation, and the cause of abandonin!, ciesire, which is equivalent

to rhe Truth of Path. This shows very clearly that d"6ro,yapard'vftti is

both cause and fruit of realization. For present purposes' we will

concentrate on the causal aspect of dgrayapardvqtti',,The cause of abandonin$ desire embraces the Path of seein$

Truth and the Path of spiritual cultivi'tion; these are for the purpose

of attaining the dharntakirya" (801c). This refers to a traditional

131

BUDDHA NATURE

scheme of stages of practice on the Buddhist path. Accordina to thisscheme, there are three stages of practice. The first is the"path ofseeing. This stage is initiared with the arising of the Thought ofEnlightenment and corresponds to the firstbodhisattoq, bhanai. rhesecond stage is the Path of spiritual cultivation, which consists ofcutting, off delusion and developing further insight into the Truth; itcorresponds to the second through the tenth of the bodhiscttftsq,bhnmi. The third stage is that of one who has realized the ultimateand has nothing further to rearn; it is manifesred in the Tathagatafruit. Here the BN? tells us that the "cause of abandoning desire,,embraces the entire Buddhist path, short of the final ,,"g",

"u, which

there is nothing further to learn. The passage conrinues by speakingof the goal of practice and that which obscures it:

We speak of the _ nondiscriminating wisdom of this realm [ofdharmakAyal as resembling the sun, in th.ee ways. Because of itsno-outflow purity, it resembles the disc of the sun. Because it compretelyilluminates all realms, it resembles the sun's brilriance. Beca,.rse lt canoppose and cure all that crouds the Truth, it resembres the sun's rays.

comment: "all that clouds the Truth" refers to thought in its entirety,and the adversities of kle6q, karma, and retribution. ,,ThouEyht in ltsentirety" takes &le6a-seed as cause, desire for the objects of the f]ve sensesas condition, and incorrect thought as simultaneous cause. Together thesethree are called, thought in its entirety. They cloud and conceal deatity [suchthat onel does not see it and does not know it. upon the arising of ih" orr"realm of the dfuinrutkaya rhar is free from desire, you wilr seI urrJ k.,o*this. (B0tc-802a)

lrltimately, then, the "cure" for delusion is the dharmakdya itself,just as we saw above that the ultimate "cause" of realizing one'sstatus as Buddha's child is the unconditioned Buddha nature. Bur iustas we saw in that context that conditioned faithful joy also had anessential role to play, so here certain practices are recommended.

How does one see and know the Tathdgata's dharmakd3n that is freefrom desire? [one sees and knows itl in the Reality of thinkini in *rri"i orr"sees neither thoughts nor objects. objects are called parikatfin-soaottar,n.Thou$hts are called paratantraf-s;abhan:al. Because one sees neither the,parikolpita- nor the ,Wratantra_s{abhdrsa, it is called prini,qparuw[wabhaoa,l: seeiry! and knowing the one realm [of an^r

"nail. ""

Moreover, thoughts are persons [as subjectsf; objects are ihimws. Notto see persons and dharmag thoughts and objects, is called the noo

r32

ENGAGING IN SPIRITUAL CULTIVATION

emptinesses. The Tathagata sees and krrows all dharmas like this becausehe has penetrated the bhiltatathata and [realizedl the universal sameness[of all things]. The nonincrease and nondecrease of subject and object iscalled insi|,ht into universal serneness. This insi$hr can overcome obstaclesto seeing Realiry As ltls (zhen shi). As inclusive of the Path of seein{, and thePath of spiritual cultivation, it is the general cause of the Tathegata'sattainment. (802a)

In other \\'ords, in this tbrmulation, insight into the emptiness of

both subject and object is virtually the be all and end all of Buddhistpractice. From the beginning of Buddhist meditation theory, it

consistently was held that insight (rsipaSyanfr, Ch. guan) rather than

concentration (6amntha) was the key to the attainment of

enlightenment. Concentration was a tool for the better production of

insight. This emphasis on the importance of meditative insi$ht lies

behind the meditation teachings given in the BN?. In the present

passa$e, "insight into universal sameness" is stressed as the key to

enlightenment. In the quaterniqy of practices discussed earlier, the

"samddhi that destroys emptiness" was uniquely emphasized, andthis sctmddhi was specifically identified as an "insight."

In this context, we should note that there aiways is a very ciose fit

between the meditative insi$ht practices recommended by a text and

the philosophical views expressed in that text.rl This is clearly evidentin the BN?. We already have seen that the "sq,mddhi that destroysemptiness" is the practical fulfillment of the BN?'s stress upon the

necessiqv of attaining positive realization by way of the ne$ations of

Sttnyata. Similarly, the stress here upon "insi$ht into universal same-ness" brings out the importance in the BN? of Yogdcara philosophy. In

the latter, adherence to the belief in both the self and the objective

world constitutes delusion. As the above quotation indicates, the erad-

ication of this delusion frees one to see Reality As It Is; that is, another

"positive realization." When recommendin$ the "samcrdhi that de-

stroys emptiness," the author is particularly tar$etin$ persons with

negative views of Sdnyata, a \rery troubling and prominent form of

delusion from the author's point of view. The "insight into universal

sameness" is more universally recommended for anyone with the corn-

monsensical, "realist" view entailing an existential corrrmitmellt to a

universe composed of "selves" and "thin$s."

In this sense, the cause of abandonin$ desire attains completion whenconjoined with two practices. These two practices are the cultivation of the

133

BI.]DDTL\ NATURE

Princip le ot ' Thusness and ther ct r l t iYat ion of l , lena4'Thusness. In rhe $ 'or ld,

there are onl l ' r$.o rh inAs t ( ) hc kno$'n: people and th ings. ( )ne $ho is able to

penetrate thcse t$rr Ik inds ot ' l entpt i t ress eternal lv real izes the t rue pinnacle

gf Thusness. l lcnce th is is c: r l l t . t l the Pr i r rcfp/c r2 l Thrrsrres.s. The ul t i l -nate

Plenan' Thusness probes the s() t r rce. : l t ta ins to the I t rueI t tature. and

penetrates the source ot the r l f t t r r r r l r r r l l t t l f t t r thus i t is spoken of as the

ui t inratc. . . .

The hnonlcd[c o i [ ' lcr r t ry" l 'h t rsr tess: The i l l t in late and exhaust ive

knon'ledge of all rertlnrs is crtllcd tlte krrrrt'lcri{g tt'Plcnury Thtrsnes.s. . . ,\ll

Tathagata dh<rrrtttts, in this seltsc. :irt callecl Plcrrtrry Ihlr.snc.s.s. The tirst

stage br . rc lh ist r t t ' l . ( r ar ta ins thcse nvo i i r r rnrs 0 i i kno$iedge I i .e. . kno$' ledge of

the Pr incip lc of Thr ' rsness i r r rd ( ) i [ ) lunan'Thtrsnessl ]Jecause shc or he

penetrates the al l -cnconrpassinr l r l f t r r rnr t r r lhrTt t r pr incip le, both snrnsdrrr and

nir . r 'drr t r arc knrxyl . (S0la-S0lb)

To realize cllrannakclyo, then, olre ctlltivates t\\'(.) kirrds ot knou'led$e,

of the Frinciple of Thusness and of Pler.ran'Thusness Knou'ledge of

the Principle of Thusness is kno\\ ' ledge of Thusness as such: the

positive realization of' the true nature of all thin$s, b1' u'av of

5r1n1'1r16's negating of coltventional views. h.nou'led$e of Plenary

Thusness takes this fundamental realizatiorl and extends it blr

probing its contents vis-d-r' is the entire universe, the clharmctdhdtu'

Thus to knos' the Principle of Thtrsness is to hnorv the fundamental

principle; knou'ledge of I ' lenaq' Thusness is the application of that

principle to all things. or the infinite particularization ot'the $eneral.

These t*'o [t 'orms ofl knosledge are seli-realized: the knou'ledge isattained b1'oneself havin$ attained understanding. i t is not zrttained irom

another. Onll ' bv oneselt ' does one attain real izat icrnt i t is rrot caused by

another. This is called self-realization of knou'ledge and correct vie*'s.

lforeover, these trvo Iforms of] knou'ledge have tsrt nlarksNonattachment is to see the inherent puritl' of the realm of sentient bein!,s.

It is the mark of the knorvledge of the Principle of Thusness. Nonobstructionmeans l imit less penetrat ion of al l realms and l imit less insisht into them. It is

the mark of the knowledge of Plbnary Thusness. Again, these trvo Iforms of]

knowledge have tn'o meanin$s. The knou'ledge of the Principle of

Thusness is the cause; it is the cause of the production of snrnsdro and of

ninsdr.w. The knowledge of Plenary Thusness is fruit insotar as in thisprinciple js completed all-sufficient knowledge of the Tath6$ata's ultimate

and n'orldly dharmas. (802b)

Realization of the Principle of ihusness, then, recal ls us to the

pdra:mitd of purity: the world is not inherently flawed, as the Sravakct

134

ENGAGING IN SPIRITUAL CULTTVATION

believes. With the realization of Thusness, one can see the lotus inthe mud. This realization is charaeterized by nonattachment, which Iinterpret as meanin$ nonattachment to both nin:d,rya, and samsara,due to the realization of their intrinsic nondifference. Nonobstructionis described as the Tathagata's all.knowledge; it is knowledge of allrealms and all dharmas, on both the worldly and the ultimate levels.In these two realizations, then, we see the characteristic BN?emphases on the goodness of the world, the positive nature ofrealization, and the harmonious mutual validity of worldly andultimate knowledge. This double validation of the worldly and theultimate results in practice in a person who would be nonattachedand nonobstructed in both the mundane and the supreme realms.Such a person also would be adept in the practical wisdom ofmshdkarund.

135

CTL{PTER SEI'EN

Buddha Nature and the Concept of Person

puddhism has a profound and thoroughll ' developed set ofLlteachings on human being. One might rvell arg,ue that thequestion of human being is the question par excellence rvith whichthe Buddhist tradition as a rvhole stru$lles. According to thetraditional account, the point of departure for the Buddha's ownsearch, discoveries, and teachings was the dilemma of the humancondition. Nloreover, \ 'ast numbers of Buddhist texts speak out of oraddress human experience as such, consciously focusin$ upon it assource of both question and answer. Nonetheless, many questions amodern \\resterner asks as a matter of course about human bein$ arenot directl.v addressed in the Buddhist texts. Of course there areimportant reasons for this. Our concept of and assumptions abouthurnan individualit-v are profoundly different from Buddhist views ofthe same. Our two worlds of discourse about the value and meaningof incarnate, finite existence, the course of history, the meanin$ ofsuffering, and the nature of possible human greatness are set up onentirely different foundations. Thus for a contemporary Westerner toask the question, What is a person? \\'hat is human being? of aBuddhist text is to set oneself up to receive an answer that does notsatisfy the intent of the question. Yet, although Buddhist views andassumptions differ so markedly from our own, Buddhist texts reveal

137

CTHPTER SEVEN

Buddha Nature and the Concept of Person

puddhism has a profound and thoroughll' developed set ofI-lteachings on human being. One might rvell argue that thequestion of human being is the question par excellence u'ith whichthe Buddhist tradition as a rvhole struglles. According to thetraditional account, the point of departure for the Buddha's ownsearch, discoveries, and teachings was the dilemma of the humancondition. Nloreover, \ 'ast numbers of Buddhist texts speak out of oraddress human experience as such, consciously focusin$ upon it assource of both question and ansrver. Nonetheless, many questions amodern \Vesterner asks as a matter of course about human bein$ arenot directly addressed in the Buddhist texts. Of course there areimportant reasons t'or this. Our concept of and assumptions abouthuman individualir,"- are profoundly different from Buddhist views ofthe same. Our two worlds of discourse about the value and meaningof incarnate, f inite existence, the course of history, the meanin$ ofsuffering, and the nature of possible human greatness are set up onentirely different foundations. Thus for a contemporary Westerner toask the question, What is a person? \\trat is human being? of aBuddhist text is to set oneself up to receive an answer that does notsatisfy the intent of the question. Yet, although Buddhist views andassumptions differ so markedly from our own, Buddhist texts reveal

137

BLIDDHT\ NATURE

in their o\{'n \\'ay a preoccupation with the human condition as lntentas that of our own hyperindi' idualistic, anthropocentric culture.

with such a shared fixation, it is inevitable that persons on bothsides of the cultural boundaries will attempt to gain light from the otherside on this subject, despite the incommensurabiliqv of each other,squestions and answers. This chapter is such an attempt. Herein l willengage in dialogue the BN?, in an attempt to wrest from the texr an_swers to two categories of questions: its view of the ontolo$ical natureof human being and its 'iew of the existential status of human beings.In the course of the discussion I will ask such questions as, what rolesdo individualiry and freedom play in the view of human being portrayedin this text? \Vtrat value, if any, does an individual human |ersonalitypossess? Is there anything of value in human history?

clearly, the text itself does not speak in these terms; these are thequestions of a twentieth-century, philosophically inclined Amerrcan.Acknowledging that the text itself neither speaks this language norshares my concerns, in this chapter I wil l put my questions to the textand attempt to extract from the text its implications for the subiect ofmy concern. In other words, I cannot claim that the author ti tn"Bi/? makes the statements I will give as responses ro my questionsabout human being, but I do claim that these views are implicit inand follow from the statements he made about Buddha narure.Granting that human freedom requires us to expect the unexpected,I nonetheless believe that, if the author of the BNT were here todayand could engage in dialogue with me, as long as my interlocutorremained consistent, something close to the views I wil l articulate inthe course of this chapter woulcl emerge.

- First' let me specif"v that I use the world person as an equivalentof "human person." Insofar as I am seekin$ to discover what the rexthas to say about the nature of human being, there is, at first 1$ance, asomewhat poor fit between this intention and the concept of*g,radh"nature. The bottom-line statement in the Buddha n"t,rr" textualtradition is "all sentient beings (sattva, zhon! sheng) possess theBuddha nature." Entailed by the Buddha narure concept in particurarand the Buddhist perspective in general is the view that humanbeings as a class belong in the larger world of sentient existents andshould not be singled out as ontologicaily discontinuous with re!,ardto other existents. This is a very important and well-known point inBuddhist thou6yht: human beings are not an ontologically separate

138

BUDDF{,\ NATURE AND TTIE CONCEPT OF PERSON

class, insofar as sentient bein$s migrate amon$ the six destinies (the

realms of hell bein[,s, demons, hun$ry $hosts' animals, humans, andgods) in dependence upon their karma. The dominant Western belief

that humans are a special class, distinct forever from animals belorv

and God above, of course, stems from the Biblical tradition.

On the other hand, Buddhism alu'ays has reco$nized that there is

a unique feature of the human condition that althou$h it dcles not put

us in an entirely separate class, does make the hu$an race special

with respect to Buddhist soteriolo$y. This special feature is the

capabllity we have to understand our condition and respond in such a

way as to radically alter the parameters of our existence. This ma1'

account for the fact that in the BNT, the text repeatedlv speaks in

terms of the three .categories of ordinary persons (fut ,hr),bodhisattva.s or sages (pu sa or sheng ren). and buddhas Ub) (e.9.,

806b). Thus in the mind of our author, too, it is necessary to sin$le

out human beings (or at least anthropotnorphic bein$s) to speak of

our condition and our potential. Because the text repeatedll 'uses this

framework for its analysis, there is no great $ap bet*'een its

perspective and my question, \\hat is a (hurnan) person'/

What is a person, according to the Buddha l,lature Treatise't

There are trvo dimensions to this question, an existential dimension

and an ontolo$ical-metaphysical dimension.r Tri discover rvhat a

person is accordin$ to the latter dimensicin requires of us that rl'c

elarify what it rneans to say that a person "exists." \\'hat is the nature

of this existence? What is the meaning of the rvcird per.sr;n in the

phrase persorlcil existence? To ask vvhat a person is irl an existential

sense is to ask what behaviors-in the broad sense ot all ph1'sical and

psychological acts-are characteristic or paradif,matic for huntatr

persons. Horv would we characterize the essence of human

character? What possibil i t ies belon$ intrinsically to human beinp,s,

and in what way are these possibilities actualized't Of course, because

the text does not pose these questions in this rvay, it also docs not

answer them in an explicit manner. \\rhat follows is m1' ourt

interpretation of the implications of the textual material for these

questions posed from the outside, by a person who lives in a culture

dominated by another world-view.

A. The Ontological-Metaphysical Dimension

There are two main points to the Bl{?'s understanding of thc

139

BUDDHA NATURE

ontological nature of a human person:-First, a person is not an entityof any kind, but consists of actions; and seconcr, a person does notexist in contradistinction to a world, but is correctly conceived asinseparable from world. We will begin with the first point.

when I say that the author of the BN? speaks of the ontologicalnature of a human being as a series of acts, I mean that he identifiesthe person wiih a particular series of physical and psychological actsand indicates that this is the entirety of the person; there is no entitythat performs the acts. This, of course, is the classic Buddhistposition from very early times.

The following examples, culled from previously discussedpassages, will demonstrate the way in which the BN?'s views apply toa concept of the person. I can do no more than give a handiul ofexamples; if one were to read the BN? itself, one would find that thisperspective of the person as a series of actions pervades virtuallyevery line of the text. Moreover, the text does not struggle toward thisposition as to'vard a conclusion, but speaks out of this perspective asa starting poinr.

First example, the true nature, as a term descriptive of Buddhanature and hence of human being, is exprained in terms of threekinds of action: purification (of the deluded and relative natures),litreration, and the cultivation of the Buddhist virtues. It is not athing, but rhese acts.

second example, the second component of tathagatagarbrn isgiven as Buddhist practice, which is equated with wisdom. Becauseu'isdom is employed as interchangeable with Buddhist practice, itcannot be interpreted as representing any kind of static or substantialbasis of subjectivitv (such as a pure mind or self). practice is a kind ofdoing, and wisdom is a particular practice-acting or doing wisely.

Third example, d,9rayapardvTtti is defined as Buddhisi practice.Naturally, this means it is of an active rather than an entitativenature. Because Buddhist practice here means the process ofself-transformation of the individual progressing from dllusion toawakening, the transformation of the basis means the transforma-tion of the person. The Buddha nature, then, is not that which livesthe Buddhist life: it is the active, verbal doins or living of the life.

tr'ourth and fi'al example, the text identifies the Buddha narurewith the four fu4a,paramita, or suprelne perfections, one of which isqtmqpdremitd', perf.ection of self. Although this sort of language

740

BI.IDDIIA NATURE AND THE CONCEPT OF PERSON

makes the Buddha nature sound like an entitlr par excellence, the

text removes the possibility of such an understandin$ by explaining

cltmcrpclrcrmittr as the aetive realization of the emptiness of all thin$s;

in other words, it simply gives the name dtmdpd'ramita to

experiential praifid,pdramita. "Nl the non-Buddhists perceive and

grasp a seif within the five skandhas. Overturnin$ that attachment to

self as vacuous and cultivatins prajfidp&r&mitd, one realizes the

supreme not-self which is identical to the self-paramitcr'

(atmaporamita, wo bo-le-mi). This is the fruit [of the practice of

pr aj fid.gt d,r amitai" ( 7 98c ).The second important theme concernin$ the ontolo$ical nature of

the person is the view that a person does not exist in any way

separate from a world. The perspective of the BN? is plainly opnosed

to any such subject-object split. In the BN?, personal bein$ always is

continuous with the bein$ of a world. The tristsabhdx:a are three ways

(actually two, insot'ar as the three reduce to a pure and an impure

paratantra) in which the person experiences what is $iven (the

world) and what is given (the world) presents itself to the person- In

fact, even this way of speakin$ fails to do justice to the continuity

between person anci world. A person is a series of events that, in the

lansua[e of subjectivity, are called experiences. But experience, in

fact, is not a matter of pure subjectivity. Experience is always

"experience of' somethin$. Dxperience ordinarily is conceived as the

point of contact between a subject and an object. But in the BN?

these two are portrayed as a sin$le, primitive $iven, unified in itself,

and divisible only upon secondary analysis. Ontolo$ically, then, a

person is this primitive $iven: an experiential world or a personal

world.The inseparability of subject and world is conveyed also in the

concept of Thusness. This is captured rather nicely in the following

passage: "All sentient beings ^re (shiz) the teth$atclgarbhq

(nrlai-zang). There are two meanin$s of 'Thus' (nt in nt'Iai-zan!).

The first is the knowledge of Thusness (ru-'ru'-zhi) and the second is

the realm of Thusness (n"t-ru-iinE). Because the two stand together,

we speak of the Thusness of Thusness (nt-nt)" (795c). Here we see

the conjunction in the sin$,le term n -nr of the knowledge of

Thusness (zhi, a standard term for the subjective) and the Thusness

"reafm" Qin!, a standard term for the bbjective). Althou$h ordinarily

the zhi is the cognizer and the jin{, the co$nized, in the case of

t4l

i}['DD}{]\ N,\TLTI{E

Thusness, the trvo "stand together," and the term Thusness as ru-ruis coined to embrace thern simultaneously. As such it graphicallvrepresents their inseparabil it-v.

Finally, in a section devoted to the elucidatiorl of the N.{iddle path.the author of the B-\? provides an example intended to discredit thepractice of "discriminating the grasper and the grasped airdconsiderin$ them tr-r really exist." In other words, the intention hereis to discredit the idea of discrete subjects and objects.

Disc.riminating grasper and grasped and taking them realll, to exist: lnthe .strtro, the Buddha uses a ma$ician as an illustration to drau' us awayfrom these two extremes.: "Ka6yapa, it is like a magician who conjuresmagical images. The tiSers that he makes turn around and devour themagician. KASyapa, when bhihsus u'hose method of contemplation is likethis contemplate an object, what appears [to theml is merely emptv. Hence,there is nothing to the'real 'and no real i ty to the false."

How then can one escape the extremes [of grasped and grasperl, and b1,rel-ving on the manot|ifiaru $,i shi)r create consciousness-only wisdom?consciousness-only *'isdom (toei shi rhi) is the u'isdom Iconstituted by theunderstanding that] all sense data lgurtal lack an essence. When thisconsciousness-onl-v u'isdom is perfected, it turns around and extinguishes itsown root; namely, manot;ijfidna. Hou'is this? Because the sense data lackessence, manotsi.iiidrtct is not produced. With the manovijiiar?a notprcrduced. consciousness-only wisdom self-destructs. Manorsijiianta is likethe ma{,ician; consciousness-o'11' wisdom is like the ma!,ical tiger. Becausemaruxsijfiana produces consciousness-only wisdom, *,hen the contempla-tion of consciousness-onlf is perfected, it can turn and destroy m anrn:ijiiarur,.\\hv? Because sense data lack bein{ (tou). Thus mcnouSfrdna is notproduced, just as in the example the ma$ical tiger turns and devours themagicien. As Arvadeva says in vcrsc,

Throughout the three realnrs,r the origin of manotsiiiianaIs ahval's to be found in sense data.\\rhen one perceives that sense data have no essenceExisting seeds arc naturally extin{uished_(8{)9b--c1s

This example ablv demonstrates the text's assertion of thenonduality of the $rasped "object" and the $raspin$

,,mind." The

argument adheres closely to Yogacara doctrine. Yogi.cara agrees withMddhvamika that all sense data are inherently unreal, that is, lackingin any nature of their own, and that a Buddhist should practice inorder to realize this. The peculiarly Yogicara point is that sense ciataare unreal because they are produced by the mind. It is crucial to

742

BIIDDHA NATIIRE,\ND THE CONCEPT OF PERSON

realize, thorr{,h, that the mind l ikewise is produced by the sense data.If there were uo sense data "objects," there would be no co$nizin$ofsense datzl and hence, immediately, no co$nizer qua separate self.

Thus rve rely on the manozsijfTdna, or ordinary consciousness, toproduce so-called consciousness-only wisdom, the knowledge thatsense data or phenomena lack essence, hence ultimately lack reality.In other rvords, starting trorn the stage of ordinary consciousness atrvhich the practirioner finds himself or herself, as a skil l ful means oneengages in unspecified meditative practices that enable one to see thenonexistence of essences in phenomenal reality. Once one has donethat, however, this new awareness one has en$endered possesses thepower to turn on that which produced it, ordinary consciousness, anddestr<tf it. \\ 'hv? Consciousness-only wisdom sees there are noobject-things "out there." It, in effect, directs manot:i j frana to seethis. With no objects from u'hich to separate itself, marrovijfiana, inturn, becomes incapable of discriminating itself as a separate thingwith its own self-contained essence-identity. In other words, if thereare no ob.iects, there can be no subject; the existence of each iscompletelr- dependent upon the existence of the other. Thusmanrx;i.ifiane, as a sense of a separatelv existin$ self, is destroyed.Once this happens, though, the so-called consciousness-only wisdomself-destructs. \\rhy? First, it was simply a skillful nteans for thepurpose crf undoing the self-delusion of manovijfiana. Second, itsexistence was derived lrom manorijfid,na; the latter produced it.

\\rhat, then, is the nature and status of the subject in this theory?It is clear that with sense data as its cause, the manovijffano consiststotall.y in cognizing activit-v. That is, no sense data, no cognizing; nocognizing, no cof,nizer. The cognizing, then, is the cognizer; in otheru'ords, there is no entity-c(tfnizer here, only acts of co$nizin$ thatproduce an i l lusory sense <lf self. As for consciousness-only wisdom, itis plain that this is far from an ultimate in this text. It is no more thana skil l ful means thar self-destructs once its task is accomplished.trloreover, the very u'ords consciousness-only (which are the wordsthe text uses) are misleading as used in the BN?. Though the phraseis appropriate inasmuch as the sense data "objects" lack anindependent essence and hence are unreal, or do not exist, the realteaching of this passage is thar the cognizer and the cognized, subjectand object, are interrelared even to ihe extent of being mutuallydependent. They arise and disappear together. Hence, consciousness-

143

BLIDDFIA NATURE

onb does not mean "consciousrless-yes, objects-no" (and certainlvnot "mind-yes, matter-no") but rather, it implies ,,cof,nit ion only"or "co$nizing only," with both "consciousness" qua mind and sensedata qua objects of consciousness negated.

As an illustration of the ontological status of a human person, thisexample indicates several things.

1. It manifests the nondualiqv of cognizer and cognized, orsubject and object. It does not reduce objects to an ultimatesubjective base. but asserts the absolute dependence, relativ-ity, and ultimate unreality of both.

2. It demonstrates the active nature of the person; there is no"mind" here, but certain kinds of co$nitions and wisdom.

3. The practical consequences of "consciousness-only rvisdom"consist in the elimination of delusion. Thus, as an i l lustrationof Buddha nature. we see again in this example an emphasison the teaching that Buddha nature means the practice (oreng,agement in the activity) of becominA Buddha. This activitv.again, is what a person is.

Incidentally, as representative of the BN?'s stand on thenondualism of subject and object, this example reinforces theargument of Chapter Five that the position of this text cannot beidealistic monism. Subject and object are mutually dependent:mutually unreal in delusion, inseparably self-revelatory in Thusness.This is nondualism.

B. The Existential Dimension

Let us now take up the question of human personhood in theexistential dimension. A little. reflectic'n quickly will reveal that, inthe vierv of the BN?'s author, one cannot speak of the humancharacter or of paradi$,matic human behavior as such without onepreliminary point. Existentially, human beings are of two basic types:deluded and enlightened. Once one has divided humanity (in whichcategory I include the BN?'s three divisions of ordinary beings, sages,and Buddhas) into these two camps, one then can proceed to makemeaningful statements about characteristic human behaviors.

As evidence of this, recall the authdr's treatment of the classicYo$dcara concept of the tn'spabhansa, the three ',natures" that, as we

744

BLIDDFIA NATURE AND THD CONCEPT.OF PDRSON

have seen, represent three ways in which persons perceive worlds

and worlds present thernselves to persons. In rvorkin$ throu$h these

three rratures, our text stressed the readil$ according to which the

rniddle nature, pcffatcrntrq, is divided into two sLrbcategories, an

impure and a pure p&ratT,ntra. The fornrer is identifiable with the

nuirrr" of delusion, parikalpite,, whereas the latter is identified with

the pure parinigpanna. In this way the tripartite trisvabhtirsa theory

becomes a theory that divides humaniry into two categories'

The characteristic that assi$ns persons to one category or the

other is so-called puriry and impurity, or delusion and enli$htenment.

our author has in mind a model of human bein$ in which deluded

beings transform themselves into enlightened bein$s upon the pivot

ol asrayaparctvl:tti, which I earlier translated as "the transformation

of the person" but which I can now translate as "conversion,"6 in the

sense that a'rayaparavrtti convefts the person from a deluded bein$

into an awakened bein$. Thus we have two cate$ories of person,

before and after asrayaparavrttL 7

1. Before "conversion," then' we have the "impure" clr deluded

existential mode of human bein$. \!'hat characterizes human bein$ in

this mode? In whichever existentiai mode a person finds himself or

herself, a human beirr$ alwal's is identifiable with Buddha nature' The

significance of this for the deluded person is twofold. There is the

universally valid promise of eventual Buddhahood. More interestin$

for present purposes are the Buddha nature doctrine's implications

for a theory of human nature. Ii the Buddha na{Lrre is the essentia-l

nature of a human bein$, then there is, on this level and in this

context, a universal sameness shared by humanity ac the core ol our

identity. \\'e are all intrinsicall-v enlightened and compassionate

beings and not just in porential but ahvays and aiready in present

reality, though all appearances end self-knorvled$e rnay be to the

contrary while in the deluded existential mode. To the extent that

this hidden reality is not yet manifest, thou$h, the sarneness that it

implies is all the greater. We can speak of it only as wisdom and

compassion and cannot specify its character l'urther; active manit'es-

tation is required for that.

on the other hand, what does distin$uish us one from another are

our individu eL k:arma and klesa, the .past history and defilements that

together are responsible for the creation and constitution of our

bodies as well as what we in the West, from a very different

r45

BIJDDI{A NATURE

perspective, call our various personalities. To the extent that a personexists in the deluded existential mode, that person's individualcharacter traits, beliefs, habits, tendencies, values, mannerisms, andso forth simply are kleSa. They are all based upon a fundamentallydeluded or warped perspective upon oneself and reality and coulC notexist as they are without that foundation. They also, from theperspective of Buddha nature thou6fit, are unreal and ultimatelynonexistent. The text tells us many times that the kfe6o have nobasis in reality.

We therefore have a situation in which persons in the deludedexistential mode can be differentiated one from another only byvirtue of the kle1a that constitute their personalities and haveconstructed their bodies, but the kleSo themselves are unreal andtherefore cannot serye as any real basis of differentiation. The klesa,therefore, have no Value in constituting a person's identity. In theexistential mode of delusion, then, a person can truthfully beidentified with the universally identical Buddha nature but cannottruthfully be identified with the distinctive kle6q that constirure thatperson's individuality.

The implications of this are as follows. Within the puwiew ofBuddha nature thought, the person in the deluded existential mode isahistorical and lacking in individuality. History and individuality arecomposed by the kle*a that constitute a person's personality; becausethese are simply negligible, so are history and individuality aspertaining to persons in the deluded existential mode. Second,autonomy and freedom are largely, though not entirely, ne$igible forthe deluded person. Most of the deluded person's actions are drivenby karma and as such identifiable with the realm of kteia and utterlylacking in real freedom. However, there is one important exception tothis statement. The drive to spiritual freedom impelled by the Buddhanature is an act of authentic freedom. Buddha nature and Thusness,having nothing to do with the realm of karma and kle6o, can serye asthe basis of acts of real freedom. Hence, to the extent that one acts insuch a way as to free oneself of karma andkleiq one's acr is free. Tothe extent that one's actions are the product of past karma and kle6a,those actions are not free. By definition, though, the deluded personhas not yet under$one "conversion.?' Such a person therefore will bedefined largely by unfree acts.

In sum, the person in the deluded existential mode is not a

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Ii

BIJDDTIA NATURE AND THE CONCEPT OF PERSON

person as we ordinarily use the term. There is no real historicalir-v orindividuality accruing to the "person" and precious little freedom.What we consider to be the basis of individual personhood is writtenoff as unreal. What is real is the universal sameness of Buddha narure;in this sameness, individual personhood, as we ordinarily use theterm, cannot be found. Thus before "conversion" and while in theexistential mode of delusion, a person is not a person.

2. \\'hat, then, of the person after "conversion," the "pure" orenlightened person? Again we must begin by stating that the person isthe Buddha nature. Thus also in the existential mode of enlighten-ment there apparently is this degree of universal sameness. But howfar, in this mode, does this sameness extend? The fact that we are allthe Buddha nature means that we are all characterized by clearseeing and altruistic behavior. But persons in the enlightenedexistential mode, unlike persons in the deluded mode, have made thisBuddha nature manifest in real acts of clarity and altruism. Thismanifestation in action, therefore, brings the Buddha nature into therealm of particularity and individuality. No two acrs of clarity orcompassion are alike. Hence once the Buddha nature moves into therealm of manifestation it no longer is appropriate to speak ofuniversal sameness, because the Buddha nature is no more thanthose particular acts of clarity and altruism and no entify of any kind.

In other words, the person is the Buddha nature as manifest inparticular actions and only as manifest in those actions. Thus historyand individuality, which were lacking in the deluded existentialmode, enter the constitution of the person now, in the enlightenedexistential mode. The particular behaviors, mannerisms, even thepersonality of the person, now possess reality and value. Moreover,the actions of the person now possess complete autonomy andfreedom. What the person does (physically, psychologically) has norelation to the world of karma and kle9a but is entirely a spontaneousmanifestation of the always free Buddha nature. The person, then, isreally and fully a person at this sta$e, after "cirnversion" and uponentry into the enlightened existential mode.

I must emphasize this remarkable point: "Conversion" andenlightened behavior not only do not rob a person of individuality,but in fact constitute its very possibility for the first time. Comparethis with the classic position of the Hindu lJpaniqqds in which, uponenlightenment, the person loses whatever individuality he or she had

747

BLTDDHA NATURE

by mer$in$ into the Oneness of Brahman-Atman, "as when rivers

flowing towards the ocean find there fihal peace, their name and form

disappear, and people speak only of the ocean."8 The position of

Buddha nature thought is the precise converse of this. Buddhistpracrice constitutes the possibility for discbvering and actualizins

individuality for the first time. One becomes a person upon

enlightenment. One $ains freedom. The history that one constructs

with one's particular actions is a real thing.This, in the end, is the result of the position epitomized in the

Buddha Nantre Treqtise's line that states that Buddha nature is

manifest in Thusness; one realizes it: 'Attachments are not real,

therefore they are called vacuous. If one gives rise to these

attachments, true wisdom will not arise. When one does away with

these attachments, then we speak of Buddha nature. Buddha nature

is the Thusness (zhen-ru) revealed (xian) by the dual emptiness ofperson and things. . . . If one does not speak of Buddha nature, then

one does not understand emptiness" (787b).

In the view of the BN?, Buddhist practice gains one somethin$,

and that something is realiqv: One finds reality irt oneself and in one'sworld. And this reality possesses absolute value. Just as the lo$ic of

Buddha nature thought compelled the author ultimately to speak of

an etrnapdramita in which the negativiry of arwtman and *ilnyatd

was simultaneously inverted and fulfilled, so here the negativity of the

karma and klefu-based realm of history and individuality is invened

and transformed into a realm in which history and individuality are

real and valuable. Here though, unlike the andtman-cttm'apdramitd'inversion, the history and personhood that one creates are somethin$

new. Atmaparq,mitd is simply the completely adequate understand-

ing of a,nd.tman The free acts of a real individual creatin$ himself or

herself moment by moment are the construction of a historical world

that never before existed, even in potential.

3. We need now to consider the existential status of the pivot

between the two existential modes of delusion and enli$htenment;namely, dsrayapardvftti or conversion. The status of d*a,ya'pardeftti

is not worked out as tully in the text as one would prefer, but in the

end if falls into the category of the existential mode of enlightenment.A9raya,pard,vftti, it is said many times, is "pure": it is the purity of

the dharmadhntu, the purity of the Buddha nature. As pure, it falls

squarely on the side of enlightenment. It also, however, is identified

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BUDDHA NATURE AND THE CONCEPT OF PERSON

with Buddhist practice: It is the basis of the Buddha Way; the

foundation of the extinction of delusion; the fruition of practice as

manifest in goodness, reverence, and knowledge; and it is the

attainrnent of Thusness. In these respects, its nature mi$ht at first

seem to be one transitional between delusion and purity, but that in

fact is not the case. When, as the text says, one is "on the Way,"

asrayapa,ravftti is the cause. When one has "completed the Way," it

is called Jtuft. Nonetheless, this d*ra.yapord,vqtti finally must be

understood as belonging totally on the side of purity and enlighten-

menr, in short, of fruition. It is cause in the same way that the

Buddha nature is cause: it always is fully complete with all its virtues

intact. It serves as cause of one's bein$ "on the Way" or, in clther

words, as cause of the Buddha Way in the sense that, like Buddha

nature, it is the purity of Thusness impellin$ one to practice

Buddhism, impelling one to seek freedom and the realization of

personhood. A9rayaparavqtti is capable of servin$ as a pivot

between the two existential modes precisely because it is purity in

the act of causing one to be on the Buddhist Path. Like bodhicitta,

which also is identified with the Buddha nature, it can be a first act

on the Buddhist Path. But even as a first act, it already is compieteiypure; it is purity that moves one to perform that first act of steppin$

onto the Path, and the act itself is constituted of purity.

There is in this notion thatdira,5:aparavTtti is identifiable both aspurity and as Buddhist practice an anticipation of Dd$en's iater

concept of Buddhist practice as rcalization. In the BNT, d9rarya'pard.vTtti is called pureboth in its role as cause and as fruit. But, as

we have seen, as cause it already is in fuil possession of its character

as fruit. We have here, then, a notion in which every authentic act of

Buddhist practice is itself of the nature of fruition, the nature of the

end of the Path, of puriry or realization. A genuine act of Buddhistpractice, whether the first awakening of the desire to practice, an

advanced state of sanwdhi, or the dedication of oneself to the

salvation of others in perpetuity, always is a manifestation of Buddha

nature as such, which always is of the character of ftlll and complete

clariry and altruism. Purity and Buddhist practice, then, are alike.

Thus d,srayaparavqtti, although always of the nature of purity and

fruition, nei'ertheless ca.n be identified with Buddhist practice.

Now insofar as the crucial event that separates the deluded

existential mode from the enlightened existential mode is the act of

t49

BUDDHA NATURE

conversion, d,€rayapardrrrfri, this conversion itself must be crucial tothe concept of personhood embraced by the BN?. This act ofconversion that engenders real personhood is in effect the foundationof personhood. If any statement can apply to both modes of theexistential dimension, and thus epitomizes the existential nature ofhuman beings as such, it is that we are bei'$,s whose nature is totransform ourselves, to undergo radical transformation at the veryfoundation of personhood; namely, at the foundati<-rn of act-genesis.The deluded existential mode is the drive-however convoluted-toward that event, whereas the enlightened existential mode is thedynamic manifestation of that event, the ongoing manifestation offree personhood.

C. A Final Question

A final, and important, question remains to us. When we combineour insights on the existential and ontological aspects of humanpersonhood as suSlested by Buddha nature thought, one apparentinconsistency remains. Buddha nature thought universally affirms"all sentient beings possess the Buddha nature." If, though, as I haveargued, Buddha nature is not an entity, but rather certain kinds ofacts and if in the de.luded d'xistential mode such enlightened acts bydefinition do not appear, what is the status of Buddha nature for theperson in delusion? If, in short, Buddha nature is not an entity and ifit is not manifest in acts while one is deluded, in what sense can it besaid to be there at all for the deluded person? It would seem thatBuddha nature could not be present under such conditions. yet theBuddha nature tradition specifically asserts that the deluded alsopossess Buddha nature. How can this be?

The beginning of an answer to this question is the acknowledge-ment that in the deluded existential mode Buddha nature is reallyjust a promise. When, from time to time, the deluded person actsfreely out of Buddha nature, then in that act of ,,purity,"

Buddhanature is fully manifest, fully realized. outside of such moments, it isonly a promise. That this must be so can be seen when one placesBuddha nature thought in the larger context of Buddhist phirosophy.In Brrddhism, "reality" always means "experiential reality." To ascribereality to anything outside experignce would certainly violate themost basic Buddhisr principles. so to the extent that, in delusion,

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BUDDHA NATURE AND THE CONCEPT OF PERSON

Buddha nature is outside experiential reality (our experiential reality

is the concealinskle(a), it is not in any-real way present. It is present

only as promise. In this light, we can look once a$ain at the passage

quoted earlier from the BN?; "Attachrnents are not real, therefore

they are called vacuous. If one $ives rise to these attachments, true

wisdom will not arise. When one does away with these attachments,

then we speak of Buddha nature" (787b). While the attachrnents are

experientially present, we do not speak of Buddha nature. Only whenwisdom is experientially present do we speak of it.

This view is confirmed by Sung Bae Park in his study of doctrinal

and patriarchal faith, when he writes: "\\'hereas doctrinal faith is the

commitment that 'l can becorne Buddha,' patriarchal faith is theaffirmation that'I am already Buddha.'Therefore, patriarchal faith is

not to be re$arded as a 'preliminary' to enlightenment, as is doctrinal

faith, but as equivalent to enlightenment itself. To arouse patriarchal

faith is to become instantly enlightened." e Thus insofar as thepatriarchal faith that "I am already Buddha" is equivaient to therealization of enlightenment, one cannot authentically affirm "l amalready Buddha" until one is enlightened; that is, until oneexperientially knows one's Buddhahood. The same is true of the

affirmation, "I, a deluded person, possess the Buddha nature."These statements take us close to the solution of our problem.

While in the deluded existential mode, Buddha nature is present aspromise in two senses, which must be distinguished. First, of course,is the promise of future Buddhahood affirmed for all. Second, andmore important for the present question, is the promise that Buddhanature is present to the deluded person ??ote in the sense that it canand will appear in its fullness and purity now if only the deludedperson will open his or her eyes and see it. Thus to say that Buddhanature is present "only" as a promise while in the deluded existentialmode is not to negate that it is, in fact, present and real at all timesand in all conditions. But it is up to the deluded person to see thatrealiqv, to "realize" the reality of the Buddha nature for him or herselfnow, in the present moment.

In this context, we should recall that in the B^V? the Buddhanature is consistently identified with Buddhist practice. Thus allappearance of contradiction or inconsistency is removed when wethink of Buddha nature as equivalent tb the Buddhist praptice of.those still enmired in the existential dimension of delusion. Thus

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BUDDTIA NATURE

Buddha nature can be present now, in its fullness and purity, eventhough it is not an entiry of any kind and even though one is enmiredin the condition of delusion insofar as it is manifest in acts ofpractice, or in other words, insofar as, and no farther than, one,sactions bring that Buddha nature into the world of experientialreality.

r52

CHAPTER EIGHT

Retrospective and Prospective

A r u retrospective, I will first present the BN?'s self-summary,

fawhich seryes as a conclusion to the'text and brin$s closure to a

number of its major themes. As a prospective (from the time of the

appearance in Chinese of the Bi{?, that is) I wish to offer two thin$s:

first, rny obsen'ations on the teachin$s of the BN? in relation to

subsequent developments in Chinese Buddhist thou$ht; and, second,

a few brief remarks on the BN? in relation to current developments in

Western Buddhism.

A. Retrospective: Summary of the Text

The author gives us a summary of his teachin$ in the tidy form offour meanings of Buddha nature, which serve as the bases for fournames for Buddha nature, which in turn serve as correctives or

teachings appropriate to four classes of persons.

The first meaning of the Buddha nature is its "inseparability from

all Buddha dharmas both before and after [realizationl" (811c). The

Buddha dhrmnas are numberless meritorious qualities of the Buddha

nature or dfuirtnakdrya. The text states that because of the Buddha

d,harmas, the tathdgatagarbha is "not empty," (bu kong) and bein$

"not empty" indicates the inherent presence of the Buddha dha,rmq,s.

The second meaning of Buddha nature is, "[this nature], under all

153

I]LDDFIA NATURD

conditi(,ns, is Thus" (812a). This is "because all phenomena lackown-nature." l 'hat is, the emptiness of all things is their Thusness andvice versa. Btrddha nature is found in this condition. which isuniversirl. third, l luddha nature "has nothing to do with falsethoughts or invertecl teachin$,s," and fourth, "the ori$inal nature

[Buddha nature] is sti l l" (812a). Sti l l here is explained as meaningneither produced nor destroyed.

On the basis of these meanings, or qualit ies, are established fournames for the Buddha nature. (1) By virtue of its inseparabil it-v fromthe Buddha dharmas, it is called the dlwrmakaya. (2) Becauseunder all conditions the nature is Thus, it is called Tathagata (ThusCome). (3) It is called the supreme tnlth becavse it is neither falsenor inverted. (1) Because it is aboriginally sti l l , i t is calledparinir-oclna" (812a). Buddha nature then, is, the supreme truth, thenature ot things as they are (Thus), the freedom from all error(paririruaryr-r), and the ernbodiment of all the excellent qualitiesattendant crn realizatio n (dhqrme.kayq).

Next is taken rrp the progressive realization of the Buddha natureb-v four classes of persons. First, the dharmakur^a (fa shen) name ofBuddha nature is explained to be the correction for ordinary persons'.,'iern's of self (shen jian). The term shen has two common meanings inBuddhism: "body," and "person" or "self." This first conjunction of at1'pe of person (the ordinary person) with a name of the Buddhanature (dharmakd.ya) is a restatement of a point that has been madeearlier. If ordinary people can rid themselves of their pen'erted viewsof the "me" and the "mine." they wil l penetrate the realm of Dharma(.dhqrmqdharu). Upon perceiving this realm the-v will have foundsomething indestructible. Bein$ eternal, it deserves the name tntesel,f (zhen shen) or, equivalently, dharmukayct (fa shen). Thus, whatordinary people grasp as self is not real and as a corrective the termdharmakaya is used.r

The second name, Tathagatc4 is a corrective to the inverted viewsof the lfinayana. The Hrnayana, says the author, do not reco$nize thatthe Tathdgata is eternal, blissful, self, and pure. They think only of thenegation of these qualit ies on the phenomenal level. Hence theirvieu's and practice are inverted and they do not attain the fruit of theTathdgata path. They think only in terms of the causal stage, in whichthe wronS views of ordinary persons (like seeing self where there is noself) have to be corrected. However, the bodhis&ttoa knows that this

154

RETROSPECTNIE AND PROSPECTN'E

causal stage is not to be separated from the fruition stage, in whichthe virtues of self, eternity, and so on are realized. Hence, theHrnaydna think only of leaving this world; that is, leaving (qu) and notreturning (lclf). The bodhisatasa, on the other hand, knows thatleaving and returning are inseparable. Hence the bodhisa.ttoa speaksof the Thus Gone (ru qu, tathd + gete; i.e., Tathdgata), and the ThusCorne (nr lqi, tathq + dgqtct; i.e., Tathigata), but the term ThusCome stands especially as a corrective to the Hlnaydna.

The supreme Tntth is the corrective name for those with"scattered and turbulent minds"; that is, the early stage bodhisa,ttve.Two tlpes of confusion are exhibited by these fledgling bodhisatttsas.One thinks that emptiness is nothingness, that things only exist byvirtue of discrimination, and that when the latter ceases, all thingswill be "empty"; that is, nonexistent. The other thinks that emptinessis something-that really exists. something that should be cultivatedand attained. As a corrective to these views, the supreme truth isenunciated. This tmth is here given in verse:2

There is not a single thinE to be removedAnd not a single thing to be added.\Vhat is should be perceived as it is;Seeing the real, liberation is attained.

Becarrse adventitious defilements are empty,They have no connection with the dhannadhatu.The Supreme dharmas, not bein$ empty,Are inseparable from the dharmadhatu. (8I2b)

Thus the Buddha nature, or Dharma realm, is empty of defilementsbut not empty of the supreme dhqrmcts (the Buddha's innumerablemeritorious qualities): "Because there is not one thing that can beremoved, it is empty, and because'there is not one thing that can beadded, it is not empty" (812c). Thus this emptiness is a fullness andthis is what the bodhisanva must learn.

Nimsd.ztn is the name directed to bodhisctttncs in the tenth orfinal stage of their training. By definition, only a Buddha attainsn,insurp. This, therefore, is the one name, or level of realization, thatstands beyond the reach of the advanced bodhisa,ttuq,. Nircdna isspoken of here in distinctly positive terms as possessing all merit,infinite merit, inconceivable merit, and ultimate, pure merit. Itclearly is far from the mere cessation of suffering!

t 5J

BLTDDFL\ NA'IURE

B. The Buddha lio,ture Treatise and ChineseBuddhist Thought

Buddha nature ideas are found in all the four major indigenousschools of Chinese Buddhism: Tian-tai, Hua-yan, Chan, and PureLand. The concerns of the Pure Land school, however, diver$edconsiderably from those of the former three schools, and conse-quently there is much less direct attention given to Buddha naturethought (as well as other important philosophical principles) in thisschool. In Tian-tai, Hua-yan, and Chan, thoug,h, Buddha naturethought plays a rnajor role.

The first of these schools to develop as a school, the Tian-tai ofthe Sui dynasty, affirmed Buddha nature as one of its focal tenets.Both the school's founder, Zhi-yi (Chih-i), and his teacher, Hui-si(Hui-ssu), were very well versed in the tathdge,t&gqrbhe, and Buddhanature literature, though the fortunes of Buddha nature thoughtvaried over the life of the school. Hui-si spoke directly and extensivelyof Buddha nature as such; it clearly was a major component of hisworld-r'ierv. Zhi-yi was less an advocate of traditional tsuddha naturelanguage, preferring to speak of arr all-embracing l{ind in whichsubject and object arise together nondualistically, an idea thatnonetheless clearly is rooted in the farnily of ideas found in Yogacaraand Buddha nature thought. Zhan-ran (Chan-jan), the sixth Tian-taipatriarch, revived the Tian-tai school in the eighth-century, againemphasizing the idea of Buddha nature. His work was prized inTian-tai lineages throughout East Asia.

The Hua-yan school is very closely tied to t&thdgatugctrbhq*Buddha nature thought. It incorporated several streams of thought,one of which was the She-lun school, which itself had developed onthe basis of Paramartha's translation of the Mahayanasa,mpraha.Moreover, its major thinker, Fa-zanS (Fa-tsang), was an expert onteth&Ecttugarbha and Buddha nature literature, and wrote what isre$arded as the most important comrnentary on the syncreticAtoakening oJ tr'aith in the Mahdydna. He frequently cited this text,along with others of. the tathagatugarbha tradition, as authorities forhis own ideas. In his commentary he hierarchicallv ranked what heconsidered to be four schools of thought in Indian Buddhismaccording to his assessment of their profundity and completeness.The lowest rank was held by the Hinaydna, which was succeeded in

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RETROSPECTN'E AND PROSPECTN/E

turn by the Mddhyamika and the Yogdcdran Fa-xiang (Fa-hsiang)school oI Xuan-zang (Hsiian-tsang), whereas the highest level wasoccupied by the tathd,gatagarbho "school."3 The rationale for thishierarchy seems to be a desire to affirm the value of the phenomenalworld. It also may reflect the understanding articulated in theRatnagotrarsibhaga and the BN? to the effect that prajfid thought,with its ernpha-sis on ernptiness, is incomplete. because it onlynegates error, whereas tathd,Eang(rrbh&-Buddha nature thought iscomplete, insofar as it both negates error (with its incorporation ofthe negations of emptiness) and manifests reality (with its affirmationof Thus n ess and tathd.gataparb ha-Buddha nature ). a

Fa-zang created a mind-boftlling, systernatic philosophy based ont&thLlgcrtugarbha ideas, but going beyond them. The Awakeninp ofFairlr instructs the reader in the One Mind in which pure and impure,sams&ra and Thusness intersect. Fa-zangaccepts this, interpreting itas a doctrine of the intersection of the phenomenal and the supremeprinciple. In his system, however, this is only a step toward thetrltimate vision of a universe of dhqrmadhdtu in which all particularswithin the universe not only are mutually interpenetrating, but eachalso cont-ains the whole dharmsdhatu, also known as the One Mind.s

The influence of Buddha nature thought was most significant ofall in the development of the Chan school. The yogdcira-tathdEcttagqrbha text, the Lair"kdrcat&ra Sutra, is prominentlyassociated with the early history of Chan: Bodhidharma is supposedto have handed a copy of the text to the second patriarch, Hui-ke(Hui-k'o), commending it to him as a uniquely trustworthy guide.Thereafter, many of the early Chan monks lectured on the basis ofthe text and wrote comments on it.

Buddha nature thought was more important in some individualsand subsects of Chan than others. It was especially prominent in theEast Mountain tradition of Dao-xin (Tao-hsin) and Hong-ren(Hung-jen), Chan's fourth and fifth patriarch, respectively.6 Forexampie, *'e have the following. "Hun!,-jen said to the Great Master[Tao-hsin]:

'What is one-practice samddhi? It is realizing that theDharmakdya of the Buddhas and the nature of sentient beings areidentical.' The Great Master [Tao-lhsin understood then thatHung-jen had entered directly into th'e one-practice samidhi and hadperfectly reached the deep Dharmadhatu."z

The connection of these words with the tathdgatagarbha

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BLTDDN{ NATLTRE

treatise, the f{o Increase, No Decrease Sitra (Anfunntvdpilr-n{tt\)an-irde(a), is apparent; the preceding message also was transmitted bythe BA?. Such ideas as these in early Chan were passed on to later$,enerations in the important meditation manual, Zuo-chctnfi, whichcontains passages like the tbllowing: "to seek the pearl, we should stillthe rvaves; if rve disturb the water, it will be hard to get. When theu'ater of meditation is clear, the pearl of the mind will appear of itself.Therefore, the PerJect Enlightenment Sutra says, ,unimpeded,

immaculate wisdom always arises dependent on meditation.'"8The "pearl of the mind" made inaccessible by the waves is an

obvious metaphor for the concealed Buddha nature. This imagecombines the use of rvaves to represent delusion in the Awqkening ofFaith in the Mahdyd,na and the Tathdgatagarbka Sutra's represen_tation of the tathdgataparbha as a precious jewel. The method ofpracticin6i meditation follows from this theory. For the Zuo-chan yi,the "esserrtial art" of meditation is as follows: ,,Do not think of any$ood or evil whatsoever. \\rhenever a thought occurs, be aware of it. . .; as soon as vou are arvare of it, i t wil l vanish. If you remain for along period forgetful of objects ., you will naturally becomeunified."e Here, enlightenment is inherent; one need only attainfreedom from thou!,ht. that is, delusion, and it wil l become apparent.

The Platlbrm Sutra attrlbuted to the Sixth patriarch, Hui-neng,usually is said to represent a major turn in Chan thought, rvith theearlier preference tbr the Lqhhatscttctra Sutra replaced in him by apreference for the Diamond Sil.tra and the prajii.d teachings. This isconfirmed by the emphasis on negation in the Platfunn Sutra inpassages such as that in which Hui-neng asserts: "Good friends, inthis teaching of mine, . . . all hat'e set up no-thought as the maindoctrine, non-form as the substance, and non-abidin$ as the basis."ro

But this pra-ifld-like series of sweeping negations does not preventHui-neng from affirmin{, in the following passage, some mosttraditional teachings from mainstream tctthapatagarbhq-Buddhanature thought. Hui-neng by no means negates the Buddha narureteachings that rvere so important in the thought of the patriarchs whopreceded him. "lf someone speaks of 'r ' iewing purit"v,' [then I wouldsa1'l that man's nature is of itself pure, but because of false thoughtsTrue Realiry is obscured. If you exclude.delusions then the originalnature reveals its purity."tt On the basis of this kind of idea, to s€ethe [Buddha] rianffe (Chinese jran xin!, Japanese kenshA) became a

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RETROSPECTNE AND PROSPECTI\T

synonym for enlightenment in the Chan and Zen traditiolr to thepresent da,v.

I hope it has been apparent throughout this book that tsuddha

natLrre thought is not .iust a matter of assertin$ the existence of a

Buddha nature but, especially in the s)'ncretic form in which it

appears in the BNT, is a full philosophical system. inclusive of

ontology, epistemology, and soteriology. In the Introduction to this

book, I mentioned a number of themes found in the Buddha I'{ctture

Treatise that came to have widespread si$nificance in the indi$enous

schools of Chinese BudChism. I have discussed all of these themes in

the course of this book. but it will be useful to return to them here to

summarize those ideas found in the Bl{? that subsequently became

important on so widespread a scale in the Chinese (and ultimately,

the East ^Asian) Buddhist world. I do not mean to impl;- that these

ideas became widespread as a consequence of their occurrence in the

BNT; the Bi/? represents here many texts bearin$ these important

ideas. Furthermore, though Buddha nature ideas were one major

stream on which later Chinese Buddhist thought drew, the followin$

themes were not derived exclusively from Indian Buddhist sources.

Chinese Buddhism is a synthesis of Indian Buddhism and native

Chinese traditions; a number of the followin$ themes have their

counte!'parts within the indi$enous traditions. I limit m-vself in the

following discussion to merely pointin$ out parallels between the

BN?'s major themes and similar themes in the indi$enous Chinese

Buddhist schools, in the hope that this study can highlight the

importance of these themes for Chinese Buddhism as a whole and

shed some light upon them.

7. The Posr'fioe l{nhre of Realisation

The first theme in importance for the Bl{? and for Chinese

Buddhism is the emphasis upon the positive nature of realization, the

view of enlightenment as an experiential reality that goes beyond

emptiness. In India, Ndgdrjuna \f,'as one of the $reatest ever followers

of the apophatic path. the path.of the vio netativa in religious

language use. With his commitment to helpin$ humanity to become

free of the bondage produced by thoughts, he directed Buddhistsaway from any tendency to conceive of reality or liberation in any

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BUDDHA NATUFE

terms whatsoever, much iess in terms that carried a positive valueconrrotarion. Although Ndgdrjuna was carefui to create a system inwhich, technically, reality and liberation were beyond either positiveor negative conception, the form of his discourse was sufficientlynegative to provohe a critical reaction by Indian yoSdclra andtctthalgat&$qrbha authors. These were convinced of the need toclarify the status of liberation such that it would be clear that it was agoal worth st-riving for.

This view entered China in the texts transmitted by paramartha,among, others. We have Seen that it permeates the BN? frombeginning to end. On the opening page of the treatise, the authorstates his primary theme: "Buddha nature is the Thusness revealed bythe trvin emptiness of person and things. . . . If one does not speak ofBuddha nature, then one does not understand emptiness" (ZB?b). Atthe end of the text, the author succinctly summarizes what hisintentions were in writing the BN? and what he hopes he hasconveyed. He wanted, he writes, "(1) To manifest the inconceivable,aboriginally existent reahn: (2) to show what can be attained by thecultivation and practice of the Way; and (3) to reveal that theattainrnent of the way results in infinite merits and ultimateperfection" (8 12c-813a).

Chinese Buddhists, for their part, universally agreed in their con-ceptions of rhe ultimate human atr-ainment that "freedom from" suf-fering was not enough; all the indigenous schools articulated and/orartistically expressed visions of liberation in positive terms as "free-dom to" see realityAs It Is, or "freedom to" enter the Happy Land. Thiswas not a negation of N6g6rjuna;9ttrrya views were quite important inthe foundations of Tian-rai, Hua-yan, and Chan. All of these schools.though, went beyond 9frryta language to express their supreme visionin various positive constructions, such as "three thousand worlds im-manent in a moment of thought" (Tian-tai); or as the dlwnnadhAat inu'hich all phenomena freely interpenetrate (Hua-yan); or as Chan's"this mind is Buddha mind." These three schools, then, all aggeed withthe BN? that the vallue of. Sfr,r,.yatd was to take one be.vond .ffiqyntd,

tothe disclosure of reality itself, seen aright.

2. Thc Optimistic Concqtion of Hwnan llature

The second important theme of the BN? is its optimisticconception of human nature based on the idea of a universal, active

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Il

RETROSPDCTN'E AND PROSPECTNE

Buddha nature. In Buddha nature theory no person, no nratter now

depraved in behavior, is to be dismissed as morally, spiritually' r:r

humanly worthless. Each person is a Buddha, not only potentially'

but actuallY.Againsi the Buddha narure tradition, Xuan-zang's Fa-xiang school

endor,sed a plurality of ineluctable spiritual destinies, includin$ f'uture

Buddhahood for some, but prat-vekabuddhahood, arhathood, and a

hopeless destiny of endless wanderin$ in samstu'a for the res'.. In this

vierv, humarl nature is. varied, and consequerltly the abiliqv of

education arrd discipline to mold a person's future attainments is

limited.Jusr as the chinese carefully wei$hed the ar$,uments of Xun-zi

(Hsiirr-tzu) and lv{encius on the inherently bad or $ood morai nature

of humanity, so they also carefully rveif,hed the Fa-xian$ school's

theory of multiple destinies against the Buddha nature tradition's

contrary endorsernent of universal Buddhahood' As they found' as a

people, in favor of Mencius' optirnistic view of inherent human

gooirr"r., so they found in favor .f Buddha nature' 'fhe acceptance of

Itr" universality of Buddha nature by the Chinese Buddhist

community as a whole contributed to a loss of status tbr Xuan-zan$'s

Fa-xiang school. Due to the latter's adherence to the theory of

*rrltiptJ spiritual clestinies a'd its rejection of universal Buddha

.ru,,rrl, this school was relegateci to the status of "quasi-Mahayina" by

a thinker such as Fa-zanf when he constructed his hierarchy of

Buddhist teachin{,s.I hasten to add that neither the Confucian nor the Buddhist

tradition is as naive as it mi$ht sound from this account. Althou$h

each claims, respectively, that we are born morally $ood or spiritually

Buddhas, the importance of this position for both traditions is the

resulting imperative to brin$ into tan$ible manifestation what is

present in our conceaied "nature"; hence, the importance in each of

spiritual self-cultivation or education'

3. !,{ondrwlism and ?husness

Third, the BNT presents us with an ontolo$v based upon

nondualism, u, oppor"i to monism, and expressed in the ian$ua$e of

Thusness.Monisrn isanappropr iatedesi$nat ionfor lndianBrahman-ism. It is completely inappropriate to apply it to the views of the BNT

161

l l t ' [) i) l l ,\ NAl'LrRl.]

arrd l iken'ise has no place in an1'of the tour rnaior indigenous ChineseBuddl-rist schools. The perspective ot' nondualism avoids both monisrnand dualism. Philosophically, Thusness and nondualism begin frornthe assumption of the emptiness crit ique, and as a consequence rhe)'reject the dualism of ordinary belief in separate entit ies. Hou'ever. asthe suprerne l inguistic tool of }\ ' lddhyamika discourse, emptiness itselt 'stands in danger of receiving the label monistic. Because emptiness isa single principle capable of explaining all of reality', some scholarssee in it a rveak ibrm of monism.l2 I believe that such a readirr$ ot'emptiness is n'ron$ insofar as emptiness self-destructs upon use. Butin either case, by movin$ arvay from emptiness as an even apparentlvultimate philosophical principle to embrace that rvhich emptinessfrees us to see-realityAs It Is-nondualism and Thusness re.jecr anr.tendency toward even this conjectured rveak tbrm of monism.Nondualism, then, explicit ly rejects both dualism and monism. It isthe ontological term that correlates with the experience of f 'husness.This experience, as expressed in the BN?, is based on the realizationthat emptiness merely clears the way for a correct apprehension oireality As It Is. Thusness, then, desi$nates the u'a;- thin$s are seen b1'those who are capable of seeing clearll ' , the reality As It Is into u'hichone enters when free of delusion.

Tian-tai, Hua-yan, and Chan are ali explicit about theirnondualism. The classic Tian-tai position is its famous formula of theThreefold Truth: (1) all things are empr)'; (2) thev do, however. havea real temporary or phenomenal existerrce; (3) being both emptl 'andtemporary is the nature of all thin$s and is the N{ean. Nlcrreover, eaclrof the three truths interpenetrates the other t$'o, such that eachembraces all and all are implicit in each.

The Hua-yan version of nondualism is expressed in its vision ot'the dharrnctdhatu, the total universe seen aright, as shi-shi-wu-ai,the mutual nonobstrucrion of all phenomena. One reaches this visionas the culmination of a process of progressivel)' deepening insight:One begins from the comrnonsensical perspective; this beginningview is quickly negated at the second level, at u'hich one gains insightinto emptiness; one next realizes the interpenetration of emptinessand phenomena; and finally one leaves emptiness as such behind tospeak only of phenomena seen aright; that is. tree of dualism.

The genius of Hua-yan is its avou'al that in the phenomenarevealed in this concluding insight resides absolute value. Hua-varr

762

RETROSPECTN'D AND PROSPDCTNts

cosmology is based upolr an appreciation of the idea that emptiness'

or the interrelatedness of things, inrplies an interdependent universe'

Because the uliverse is the sum total of each and every one of those

interdepen<lent parts, a chan$e in any one of them would constitute a

change in the universe as a whole. In this sense, the value of the

unive-rse as a whole resides in each individual component' or in other

words, each component inherently possesses supreme vaiue. As a

result of this cosmolo$y, Hua-yan thinkers are in a position to $lorify

the most mundane Particular.C h a n a n d Z e n m a s t e r s a d o p t v i r t u a l l y a l l f o r r n s o f e x p r e s s i o n

without accepting any of them as final, emphasizin$ sometimes one

aspect, sometimes another' as useful for teachin$ purposes'

Sometimes, it must be admrtted, larr$ua$e of onetress appears' This

reflects the fact that one crucial aspect of enlightenment is

overcoming the sense we have of bein$ selves separate from all that is

not-self. So the contemporary Japanese SdtO Zen master Shunrlrr

Suzuki writes: "When you are you' you see thin$s as they are, and you

become one with your surroundings'"r: Much more common is

lan$ua$e in which oneness' emptiness, Thusness, and the like are

forgotten (as in Hua-yen) and ordinary phenomena are $iven as

e*Jmpla.. of ultimate reality without further ado, as we shall see in

the fiith theme. Still, the very willingness to embrace all these forms

of discourse is evidence of the acceptance of a nondualistic

perspective. Shunryrr Suzuki has $iven a relatively direct statement of

,hi, p"r.p""tive, which should be understood as qualifying his above

quoted remark:

Each existence depends on somethin$ else Stricrl-v speakin$' there are no

separate individual existences. There are just many names for one existence'

Sometimes people put stress on oneness' but this is not our understandin$'

We do not emphasize any point in particular' even oneness Oneness is

valuable,butvar iery isa lsowonderfu l ' I$nor in$var iety 'peopleemphasizetheoneabso lu teex i s tence ,bu t th i s i saone -s idedunde rs tand ing . In th i sunderstandin$ there is a $ap between l'arielY and oneness But oneness and

variety are the same thing, so oneness should be appreciated in each

existence. That is why we emphasize everyday life rather than some

particular state of mind. We should find the realiq' in each moment' and in

each phenomenon.ra

The influence of Hua-yan can be ."".r h"r" in suzuki's statement that

163

BUDDIL.\ NATURE

"oneness should be appreciated in each existence," follou'ed bv hisemphasis upon the value of everydal- l i fe and of each phenomenon.

The free play with the concepts of pluralitv and oneness evident

in this quotation is a quite characteristic ChanlZen trait. Thou$h I

said earlier that nondualism rejects both dualism (i.e., plurality) and

monism (oneness) and that is the case, here Suzuki affirms bothplurality and oneness. We already have seen in the Bli?, thoug,h, that

one achieves the same result by affirming both pluraliw and oneness

as one achieves by denyin$ both. As contradictory terms. their sense

depends upon their mutual negation. With either double affirmation

or double negation, the two are emptied. Here Suzuki implies thatvariety and oneness are two aspects of nondual Thusness seen, as itwere, from two different perspectives, neither of rvhich should be

construed as absolute. Finally, thou$h, Suzuki negates the crincept ot'

either variety or oneness by identifving the trvo.

1. Subject-Object Nondualism

Western understanding of Chinese Buddhism has been too longpla$ued by our misf,uided attempts to interprct it ir.t tururs of thephilosophy of idealism, as rve knou' it in the Westerir tradition. It is

important for a correct understandin$ of Tian-tai, Hua-yan, and Chan

thought that we read it not in terms of idealism, but in terms ofsubject-object nondualism, the vieu' that rnind and u'orld arise

together in mutual creation, whether in a cleluded or an enlightcnedmanner. This vierv is transmitted b-v the Bl/?.

The Bi{? adopts the Yogacdra vien', according to \\.'hich correctunderstandin$ of experience is that it is ahvays "experience-ot"'; that

is, the ("subjective") arvareness of ("objective") content of some

specific kind. In delusion, n'e lo<lk back on the rnoment of experiencethat has .just occurred and retlectively anall 'ze it into two

components, the subjective and the objective. In tact, hou'ever, these

two, as separate categories, come into existence Onll 'rvi1l this zrct of

anall ' t ic bifurcation. In experience as such, that is, in the ntornent

when present experience occurs, experience is the inseparahle,"primitive" unity "experience-of." One important goal of practice is

to cease livin$ in the act of arrall 'sis of past experience, to cease theconsequent identif ication u'ith the "subjective" half of our experi-

ence, and to l ive instead in the present moment r;t ' preret' lective

16.t

RETROSPECTNE AND PROSPECTND

experience in which "self' and "world" are not yet separated. Thisdone, "self' and "world" are no lon$er experienced as separate nor asentities; in fact, the terms are rendered useless. Instead, one "is" thismoment of prereflective experience, u,hich is experienced as amoment of action, of process. The content of the present moment ofexperience is one's identity in the present rrroment.

This perspective is prominent in Chan; indeed, much of Chanlanguage is incomprehensible without an appreciation of this concernfor a return to prereflective experience. The famous Chan masterLin-ji (Lin-chi) developed a system for instruction in Chan called the

Jour processes of libercttion from subjectivity and objectiviry. Theseare: take away the person but not the objective situation, take awaythe objective situatiou but not the person, take away both the personand the objective situation, and take away neither the person nor theobjective situation.ls In each c,f these, and indeed in this veryapproach, we see the same kind of plafulness rve saw in Suzuki'streatment of variety and oneness; by playing so freely with thecategories "person" and "objective situation" in this manner, we seethe nonabsoluteness of each and the incorrectness of each asconceived from the perspective of subject-object nondualism.

Some illustrations of these four positions might be as follows.First, the "objective situation only" approach can be seen in "when afro$ becomes a fro$, Zen becomes Zen."r6 In the absoluteness of afrog fu It Is one finds Zen, or enlightenment, or Thusness. Second,teaching wittr reference to person only is well-illustrated by Lin-ji'sfamous challen$e, "Show me the true man without rank!" Third, theuse of blows and shouts to jolt the mind illustrates teaching withreference neither to person nor objective situation. Finally, the fourthapproach, speaking of both person and objective situation, isdemonstrated in a poem by Ddgen:

Being-in-the-world:To what might it be compared?Dwelling in the dewdropFallen from a waterfowl's beak,The inraSe of the moon.r1

Here hurnan being is portrayed with the image of the moon ofenlightenment present in the phenomenal dewdrop. This fourthexample conveys the mutuality of subject and object, of person and

165

IIL'l )l)l l,\ .\"'\ f t'ltl-l

ob.iectir;e situation. \\ 'e rttal ' sar'. l ttttvcvcr, t ltrtt ;r l l four ot' these

apprciaches are nleans of poiutirtg ut, attd trattscertclin$, the error of

the ordir.rarv dualistic c()ncepti()n of sulr. lectivitv and objectivity.An<lther i l lustratiort ot' the uoudualit;- ot' sutrject and object in Zen

is found in Zen master Do$en's ShdbOgenzO gertjdkflan:

Conveying thc self to the m1'riad beings tt-r authenticate thern is delusion;The m1'riacl things advancin{ to authenticate the self is enlightenment.To studl'the Buddha \\'af is to study the self;To studl'the self is to forget the self;To lbr$et the sclf is to lrc authenticated b-v the myriad thin$s.r8

Llpon realization of the Buddha Way, the delusory belief in a self

separate from others and separate from world is lost. One no lon$er

experiences as a bein$ cut off from everythin$ else, but as an

awareness in rvhich "self' and "world" arises simultaneously and in

inscparable mutual i t l ' .

5. .{ Positdue l'iess of Phenomenal fteality

The BN? expresses a positive view of phenomenal reality, as is

evident in the perspectives of the first theme (a positive view of

realization) and, especially, the third theme (un ontology of

nondualism and Thusness). The BNT itself does not reach the

culrnination of this line of thought in which a concrete particular

from everyday life is given as a manifestation of the ultimate; that

form of expression remains for the indigenous schools of Chinese

Buddhism to develop. What the Bl/T does do is to $ive a consistent

and powerful philosophical account of the more abstract point that

ultimate reality is to be found in the Thusness of phenomenal reality.

This positive apprehension of phenomenal reality will make possible

in China Buddhist forms of expression in which ultimate realiry/

errlightenment is given as manifest in an everyday aspect ofphenomenal reality.

Chinese Buddhist's readiness to create a this-woddly Buddhism

was no doubt influenced by the this-worldliness of the indi$enous

Chinese philosophico-religious systems, Cor-rfucianism and Daoism. It

lvould have been difficult to create such a Buddhism, however, had

there not alread.v been qualities in Buddhism that pointed stronf,ly in

1 6 6

R.ETROSPECTNE AND PROSPECTNE

this direction. It remained to the Chinese to draw on these elements

and creatively envision their implications.

We already have seen some philosophical examples of Chinese

Buddhist affirmation of phenomenal reality in the Hua-yan vision of

the dhq,rrnadhatu as shi-shi-tcru'ai and the Tian-tai threefold Truth

in which any one of the three, temporariness for example, can

represent all. We need not repeat these exampies here. A

nonphilosophical example expressive of absolute value realized in the

phenomenal is the development in China and other East Asian

countries ot' this-worldly Buddhist or Buddhist-inspired art in which

artistic representations of phenomenal realit"v (as opposed to

Buddhas, for example)le are given as expressions of enlightenment.

Very famous are the Chan or Zen (and Daoist) inspired landscape and

still-life paintings, poetry, $ardens, tea ceremony, and so on. Two

other examples in which phenomenal reality represents enlightenment/

ultimate reality are seen in a Chan sayirr$ and a Chan anecdote.

Layman Pang Yun says, "spirit-like understandin$ and divine

functioning lie in carryin$ water and choppin$ wood."zo In a

well-known anecdote, the Buddha $ives a lecture that consists

entirely in holding up a flower. Mahdk4Syapa's smile in response to

this act becomes the paradi$matic example of transmission of the

Dharma for the Chan sect.The contemporar1 Vietnamese Zen master Thich Nhat Hanh

continues this latter theme very simply in the course of discussin$

how to set up a home meditation room: "lf you want to have a statue

or a painting of a Buddha, please be choosy. . . . A Buddha should be

smiling, huppy, beautiful, for the sake of our children. . . . If you don't

find a beautiful Buddha. wait, and have a flower instead. A flower is a

Buddha. A flower has Buddha nature."21

6. Enlightenment qs a Pivotal Conpersion

The BN? conceives of enlightenment in terms ot a pivotal

conversion experience from delusion to enlightenment, or from

impurity to purity. This is shown in the text's.use of the Yo$dc-ara

trisrsabhdtsa and dsraryapardprtti teachings. The author presents

trissabhdt:a as two modes in which persons perceive the world and

the world presents itself to persons, the so-called pure and impure

aspects of the relative nature (the impure relative nature bein$

r67

BUDDHA NATURE

delusion and the pure relative narure bein$ enli$hrenment).ASrayaparAvrtti lrc sees as the pivot on which the practicingBuddhist o'ertrrrns the most deeply established existenrial habits a'dattains the abil it l ' to see reality, aright.

, seng-zhao (seng-chao) spoke of "sucrden" enlighte'rnent before

the BN?' appeared in China. The Bi{?, lbr its parr. 'el,er speaks interms of a "sudden" enlightenment. Nonetheless, it sti i l seems t'air tcrsay that the ideas found in rhe BrV? (as expressed in the -BN?. a'delsewhere) contributed to the ongoing de'elopment oi this conceprand to its importance in later chinese Buddhist schools. l ' this text,f irst, we have the teaching that u,e are all inhere't ly Buddhas, thatperfection in its complete and marure state is present in us all.Secorrd, we have the dsravapa,rar;ytti concept ot a pi'otal con'ersionexperience; and, third. the reading ol trist:ebh(tuei as indicative ofcrvo human existential modes of delusion and enlightenment l inkedby the pi'otal asrayapararrti. Here are three of the critic-al rarvingredients of the sudden enlightenrnent idea in the form it rvoultltake in the Chan school.

7. Buddha Nature Is Buddhist practice

The estabiishment of rhe equation of Buddira nature andBuddhist practice is one of the great achievements of the Bii?. Theimportance of this achievement is (minimally) twoford. First, itundercuts any possibility of _concei'ing of Buddha narure as an entityof arry kind, as a tlindu-like Atntan or even as a purely mental process.Thus it renders invalid charges that the Buddha narure teachingviolates Buddhist anatm&n teachings, that it reifies process, that itsen/es as the foundation of a monistic system, or even that it supportsmental-physical dualistic thinking. second, it provides a solidphilosophical defense against those later chan polemicists who woulddestroy Chan b-_v rejecting practice on the grounds that they alreadywere Buddha, anC so had no need of practice. Cf course, i iwas thisvery question-Why is there a need to pracrice Buddhism if we are allinherently Buddhas?-which vexed D6gen sufficientry to cause himfor years to scour Japan and china, or *"ll as his own mind, in search<;f an answer. The answer he ultimately found taires off from the pointat u,hich the BN? leaves us: the identity of Buddha nature andpractice.

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RETROSPECTNN AND PROSPECTN,ts

C. Buddha Nature Thought and Western Buddhism

\\:hen one consitlers the encounter of Buddhism vrith the \!-est,especiall.v in the context of the development of this encounter inJapnn :ind in America, two on$oing events stand out as especiallyimport.nt: Buddhist-christian dialogue, as it is found in the Kyotoschool of philosopiry, the society for Buddhist-christian studies, andelser"'here; and western Buddhism. I belie'e that, in dift'erent ways,theoreticians and practit ioners in both of these contexts face in thequestion of human being (including the question of its transformabil-ity) rhe probable ke1' to the meeting of the trvo mutually alien worldsand to the success of their respective enterprises. In the question ofhrrrnan bein$ n'e ha'e a matter of deep, shared concern matched withradicaliy disparate assumptions, ccncepts, and values. we alsc havethe 'ery f'undation of Buddhist philosophy itself, hence, the key tothe difference between the trvo world-viev,'s. This subject, althcughtheoretically thorny, is at the heart of what must be resolved to bringthe two worlcis into rnutual comprehension. This no doubt rvill be along process; indeed, thouSh the Ky'oto School to a certain extent hasbegun to grapple philosophically with this question, it is evident thatit rvill be some time before adequate answers can be developed.ze As,Buddha nature forms the core of the Bast Asian Bucldhist concept ofhuman being, the role of Budclha nature thought in this investigationmust be large. In this is a first point of contemporary sisnificance forthe stuCy of the Buddha nature concept.

Hard on the heels of the question of huma' being and, moreover,conceptually Cependent upcn it, bomes dialoSue on ethics, theoreti_cal and applied, another area of shared existential concetrn couoledwi t l l mutua! incommensurabi l i ty . one rcadi ly can see that outstand-ing among the features of ttre west to which representatives ofB*ddhism, both Asian and \Vestern, will ha'e to respond is theindividualistic huma'ism that permeates western philosophy andsocial institutions. Buddha nature thou$ht has important resourceslbr meeting this challenge, and in this lies a second point ofcontemporary significance of Buddha nature thought.

I will not specrrlate as to what Asian Buddhists will make of thechallenge of western humanism, but the conjunction of westernhumanism with the teaching of Buddha narure rnarks a point onrvhich Buddhists in the west almost certainly rvill build. Irr the second

169

BUDDTI,A NATURE

theme. we saw that one of the implications of the Buddha nature

teaching is that "each person is a Buddha, not only potentialiy, but

actually." An American cannot help but note that this "actually" has

not yet been realized for its humanistic potential by the Buddhist

w-orld. Coming from a tradition of individualistic humanism, we read

a Mahdy6na text with references to Buddha nature and the

bodhisattsa ideal and see in it an imperative to social action. Asians

may not have seen such an imperative, but with our traditions we can

do no other.Why East Asian Buddhists have been rnoved to act as little as they

have in the social arena is a vast and complex issue that cannot be

treated here.23 I will mention only the sin$le point that the texts

prized in the East Asian Buddhist traditions have tended to

emphasize such thin$s as nondiscrimination and nonconceptual

wisdom, which are difficult to reconcile with the complexities of

resolving competing claims, for example, or balancin$ needs against

resources, which require that one be very precise in distin$uishin$

particulars, that one make informed jud$ments, and that one re$ard

such activities as important and valuable. As we have seen in the

BN?, however, the old texts do occasionally refer with approval to

forms of awareness that fit quite harmoniously with such practical

demands. In our text, discriminatin$, worldly wisdom is the lbrm of

prajfid identified as the essence of. mqhdkantnd' and mah.dkantqa

itself is prized as superior to hantryi' precisely because of its practical

efficacy. Such statements as these no doubt will be mined in the

future, at least by Western Buddhists, as the latter strive to create a

theoretical basis for the social actions in which they already are

engaged and that they conceive in the li$ht of Buddhist teachin$s of

compassion.There is no doubt that the very existence of such a thing as

Western Buddhism will result in the further investi$ation of such

teachinSs as Buddha nature and the bodhisattrsq' ideal, considerable

reflection on the implications of these teachin$s for the modern

worid, and the practice of these teachin$s in the realm of social

action. Indeed, there already exists "Dn$a$ed Buddhism," the active

engagement in society and its problems by Buddhist practitioners

both as an essential element of their practice and as one of its

fruits.24 It is no risk to predict that this tendency in Western

Budd.hism will continue to grow.zs

170

RETROSPECTN'E AND PROSPECTNE

One of the primary aims of interreli$ious dialo$ue is for each

partner to critically assess itself in light of the challen$e posed by the

other; to become clearer about itself, its stren$ths, and its lacunae;

and then to move ahead, in the inspiration of its own past and the

challenge of the encounter with the other, as well as the demands of

the modern world. The world is shrinkin$ and we are all forced, more

than ever, to take serious account of each other. The encounter of

Buddhism with the West is one form of this encounter in which the

taking seriously of each other is happenin$. In taki-,g each other

seriously, precious new fruits are brou$ht into bein$ as individuals

within each culture slowly are transformed by the process of seein$

more clearly that which another culture brin$s to one's attention and

expressing in a new form the $enius of one's own culture.

RETROSPECTIVE AND PROSPECTNE

One of the primary aims of interreligious dialo$ue is for each

partner to critically assess itself in light of the challen$e posed by the

other; to become clearer about itself, its stren$ths, and its lacunae;

and then to move ahead, in the inspiration of its own past and the

challenge of the encounter with the other, as well as the demands of

the modern world. The world is shrinking and we are all forced, more

than ever, to take serious account of each other. The encounter of

Buddhism with the West is one form of this encounter in which the

taking seriously of each other is happenin$. In taki-,g each other

seriously, precious new fruits are brou$ht into bein$ as individuals

within each culture slowly are transformed by the process of seein$

more clearly that which another culture brin$s to one's attention and

expressing in a new form the $enius of one's own culture.

NOTES

Chapter 1. Introduction

1. As discussed later, the concept of Buddha nature is very closell- related tothat of the tathdgatagarblut, with which it is almost synonymous.

2. Takasaki Jikid6. "Stnrcture of the Anuttara6rayasttra (Wu-shan$-i-ching),"Indogaku Bukky1paku Kenkyt [hereafter. IBKI B (March 1960): ,14.

3. For a discussion of thls point, see Alfred Bloom, Shinran's Gospel of PureGrace, Association for Asian Studies: Mono!,raphs and Papers No. 20(Tucson: IJniversiry of Arizona Press. 1965), Chapter 4, "Faith: ItsDefinit ion."

3. fu Xin! Lun, attributed to Vasubandhu and translated by Paramdrtha,! Taishd Shinshu Daix6ky6 31. no. 1610: 787-813.

5. Formerly it was believed that the equivalent Sanskrit term for/o xin! mustbe buddhata or buddhatva; that iS, Buddhahood or Euddhaness. However,upon comparison of the Chirrese versions of texts containing the term /oaing witir their Sanskrit and Tibetan equivalents, it became apparent thatthe term/o xing did not correspond to the Sanskrit buddhata, buddhansa,or their Tibetan equivalents. Rather, what emer$ed was more complex.

Ogawa lchijo ["'Bussho' to buddhatva," IBK 17 (Ilarch 1963): 544-5451and Shinoda Masashige ["Bussho to sono gengo," lAX 11 (1963): 223-2261,for example, compare the Chinese text of the Ratrwgotatsibhdga with itsSanskrit counterpart and find thatfo xing was used to translate compounds

173

f)

'7

BUDDIIA NATURE

of the ternr dhatu (.nature, element, realm. principle; e.g., Btddha4hd,tu,Tarhdgata-dhatu, etc.). lotra (family,lineage), or S,arbha. Ogawa sees thesethree as of equal status and synonymous meaning and so holds that we cansafely take Buddha, nature to have one meaning rather than several; namely,the term tathagdtagarbha and its equivalents. Shinoda, on the other hand,sees the dhdtu and gotro groups as the standard bases for the "Buddhanature" translation, with parbha and the remaining terms as exceptions tothese standards. Nloreover, he explains the basic meaning of both dhdtu andgota as cause, as in "the dhan is the eause of the arisin{ of the threejewels-Buddha, Dharma and Sangha" and "all merits are born of this fofra"(quoted form the Ranu,gotravibh&ga). However,/o xing means not only thecause of the Buddha, but also the "essential nature" of the Buddha,enlightenment, and this the term Eotra cannot convey. Shinoda concludesth^t dhdtu, as equivalent to dh,armakdya, dharmntd and tathatd, includesthe "fruition" sense of the Buddha, as well as the "causal" sense, and can betaken as the most appropriate equivalent for Buddha nature. Thus/o acrrqEwould most exactly translate buddhad,hfrtu,

Takasaki Jikid6, ["Dharmatd, Dharmadhatu, DharmakEya andBuddhadhatu-Structure of the tlltimate Value in Mah?iyiina Buddhism,".IBI{14 (March 1966): 78-941 agrees with Shinoda's view and clarifies it. Heexplains dh.dtu as meaning originally "that which places or sustainssomething," and hence, like dharmn, it can stand for rule, principle or tnrth(ibid., p. B1). In the Abhidharma literature it was raken to mean element,essence, or essential nature. Subsequently, the terrn dharmndhatu came to.be interpreted as (1) the natwe (dhd,tu) of things (dha,rma), or the truthconcerning thin6is, and (2) the totality of phenornena or things. It is alsogiven as meaning (3) the origin or cause of the Buddha's teachinpB, theDharma. Thus, with (1) and (2) as the fruition meaninf,,, and (3) as cause, hefinds the tern dhd,ru to have the bivalence attribured to it by Shinoda.

Takasaki, "Structure of the Ultimate Value," pp,9l-92.

Whalen \Vai-lun Lai, "The Awakening of Faith in Mahdy?ina (Ta ch'enSch'i-hsin lun): A Study of the Unfolding of Sinitic Mahayana Motifs" (Ph.D.dissertation, Harvard University, 1975), pp. 107-115.

The debate concernin$ Maitreya is succinctly summarized by Janice DeanWillis in her On Knowint Reality: The Tatnsdrtha Chapter oJ Asairg,a'sBadhisatttsabhumi (New York: Colurnbia University Press, 1969), pp. 52-53(note 42i.

Stefan Arracker, Sa;en Works oJ Va-subctndhu: The Bu.ddhist PsychalogicalDoctor, R.eligions of Asia Series Number 4 (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1984),p . 19 .

I have emphasized 6d,stra literatrrre in my exposition of Yogicara roots, butof course sdtra literature also played an impoftant role. In addition to thepreviously mentioned Mahfrparinin'drq- s&tra and Da"6abh&mikd,- sdtra,other sttros associated with the Yogaciira school include theSsryd.hininnocarln-s6tra, the Aea,ttirnsaker,-sfitra (including the DaSablnl-mikd-s{ttra and the Gan&tvyuha-silffa), and the lahkdtscttdra-srZtra. Asdiscussed later, the pra:jfrfrparamitd sutra. literature group also plays a

10

t74

NOTES TO CHAPTER 1

critical role in the development of Yo$6cira thought and should not be

associated solely with the Midhyamika school'

11. Ga4iin M. Na$ao, "From Madhyamika to Yo{dcdra: An Analysis of.MMK'

xxw.rs and-MV, 1.1-2," Jortrnat oJ the Internntional Association oJ

&tdd,hist Studies,2 no. I (1979):29.

12. Yoshifurni ueda, "TVo Main Streams of Thouglrt in Yo$,iicdra.Philosophy,"

Philosoph.y East a:nd West 17 (1967): 162-163.

13. Willis, On f\twtoinE Reality, pp. 34-35.

14. Ibid., p.132.

15. For this historical ourline, in addition to my own readin$, of the

Uthfigotagarbha texts, I have drawn mostly from Takasaki Jikid6, Nyororzd

Shdsd-no rt",ito (tot yo: Shunjusha, 1974); Takasaki Jikid6, A Sn'dy on the

Ranugotravtbt igo (Utt*ot*rtra) Beitt4 a Trentise on tlw Tatlfisata4arbha

Theod oJ Malnyana Buddhism, Serie Orientale Roma No' 33 (Rome:

Istituio lialiano per il Medio ed Estremo oriente, 1966); and william Henry

Grosnick, ,,D6gen,s View of the Buddha-Nature" (Ph.D. dissert4tion,

University of Wisconsin-Madison' 1979).

16. The Anena.todptmw,tt;anirde.Sa is extant only in the sixth century chinese

translation of Bodhiruci; neither a sanskrit nor a Tibetan text survives.

Ho*"o"r, fra{,ments of the text in sanskrit survive as quotations_in the

notr,,goiro,tilftfrga and other texts, so most scholars agree that the text

fo.-"ity existed in Sanskrit. The Sanskrit title is a reconstruction from the

Chinese.

17. Fo Shw Bu Zet$ Bu.liatt Jin$, Taish6 16, no. 6681 467b'

18. This text is extant only in Chinese and Tibetan but Sanskrit fra$ments have

been recovered.

19. The question of universal Buddhahood and the status of the iechantika in

the Lfoll:d,parinhx:dq*.sttr4 is still, for modern scholars, a moot point. It

may be detrated whether the siltro attains a consistent position on this issue.

20. See Grosnick, "Dogen's View," p. 32 f.

21. Ibid., pp. 128 ff.

22. See Takasaki Jikido, "The Tulfilatagarbha Theory in the Malti,?0,rifti'r',a, .na'

stiaro'." IBK 19, no. 2 (March 1971): f01f1024'

23. Yevgenii Y. Obermiller, Ttrc Sublime Sry'* of tle e'reat' !^e\9lc to

WtinAorr, Beb{ a Monnt of Buddhist Monisn (Shan$hai: 1940); and

Takasaki,A Sadg on tlw Rana$otatsibhrt$a.

24. Takasaki, A Strtdy ort tlw Rar4ottottibhfta, p9' 9 and 62'

25. Ibid., pp.6142.

26. Ibid., p. 5.

175

BUDDHA NATURE

27. lbid., p. 33. For my summary of the Ratrurgotra, I rely most heavil), onTakasaki's study in ibid.

28 The-v-also appear in altered form in the Dharmq"d.hdn;atsiseqa-6dsfra and thel|u Shanf yi Jing (Anuttard6raya_siltra). Ibid., pp. a5_53.29. See ibid., pp. 199 and 200_267,

J0. I'amag'chi Susun.r, Hannya Shisri_shi (Tok-vo: Hdzokau, 1951), Chapter 6,"N1'oraizd Shiso."

Jl. See Takasaki, A Study on the kttnagotarsibhfiga, pp.296 ff .32. Yarnaguchi, Ilannya Shdsds/ri, p. BB.

33 This is rhe view of .Iohn ?. Keenan, Introduction to The Realm o! Awakening:A Translation and ftydy: ct! The Tenth Chapter of Asanga,s *,iu"*or*".*o,trans. Paul J. Griffiths,

folia\i Hakamaya, John p. ft""nu.,, ""a

pu,rf f,.Swanson; texts by paul J. Griffiths an, Noriaki H"k;;t;iNu*-Vo* "nAOxford: Oxhrd Universiqv pre_ss, 1969;, pp. SO_+S.

34 This is the view of G-rosnic'k, -D.ogen's view," pp. 26 ff and,76 ff. Grosnick,however, reco{nizes the ptausibiritly of the crmpeting view. He notes that theM ahdyana's{t trciktnkara

"on tui n. both yosacnr a- and tathngatajarb hateachings and goes o'.ro stare, ,,it is jusi possible *rut iti--jiorrp ofpractitioners who promulgated the tathagitagaibhc was u"trlotiv o"pr.t of

"largcr group knorvn loosely as th-e ,yogacariri..; po, p.;;.-;;;; i,5ilur,"trearises of Asanga and vasubandhu, iire history "i

it "

,"r,o"i-iii'i,-"", r"called a school at rhat time), is difficulr to t.a"".,, Ibid., p. 29. . -- -'

35 The date of the I'ahkdpat(trq-sit?'a is uncertain. consequently, it may havebeen cornposed either- before or after tne prose portion of theRamagotrutibhaga. See Grosnick, ibid., p. 27, note 43.. 1 6 . I b i d . . p . 8 1 , n o r e 2 1 .

37 . Ib id . , p . 83 .

,18 . Ib id . . p . 77 .

39. Ibid., pp. 84 ff. I follow Grosnick ̂ in listing the three themes he isolares;horvever, my interpretation differs from his.-

40. Da Sheng QiXin Lun, Taishl 32, no. 1666: SZ6b.

41. Ibid., p. 579a.

42. .ds trarrslated by DaisetzJeilaro Suzuki, Th.e Lahhdvatdra glfitra (London:Routtedge arrd Ke{an paur, 1 932 ; reprinred '""il";; eo ;;;ii'ilir'.lr g zsr,pp. 19G-192.

43' It should be noted, that the $tmaradqt-siltra arso speaks of thetathtrgata,garbfta as the source of both sarps'ra ,a-nd, nbtsdr.w, though itstressestheideaoftheinnate|yp|rretathagdtagarbha.

44. Suzuki, Lahhn$atAra Siltra, p.21. My addition in brackets.

176

I_

NOT'DS TO CTTAPTER 2

45. For the following sketch of I'aram?irtha's life, I relied heavily on the accountin Diana Y. Paul, Phil'osoplry o.f Mind in Sixth-Century Chirn: Param.drtha's'Etsolution ol Consciousness' (Stanford: Stanlbrd Unrversiry Press, 1984).Chapter 1. The reader will find there a rnuch longer and more detailedaccount of Paramdrtha's life.

46. Kogen Mizuno, Buddhist Sutros: Origin, Derelr-tpment, Trsnsrnission(Tokyo: Kdsei, 1982), p.99.

47 . Ib id . , p . 33 .

48. Paul lists thirry*-tx'o works attributed to Paranrartha, togethei \\'ith textualinformation, Philosopht- oJ l,Iind, pp. 175-178.

49. Fo Xing Lun, Taish6 31, no. 1610: 787-613.

50. Takasaki Jikido, "structure of the Llltimate Value," p. .i5. His citation ofHartori .

51. Talienrura Sh6h6, Bus.shSron Kenkla (Tok-vo: Hyakkaenkan, i978), p. 37.

52. Lri Hakuju, Hoshoron Kenk5u (Tokyo: Iwanalnishoten, 196C), p. 366.

53. Takeinura, Busshoron Kenkyu, p. 6.

5'1. Takasaki Jikido,- "Bussh6ron," in trI izuno Kdgen, Nakamura Hajime,Hirakarva Akira, and Tarnaki K6shiro, eds., Buttenkaidaijiten,2d ed. (Tokyo:Slrunjhsha. 1,977), pp. 145-146.

55. Grosnick, "Dogen's Vieu'," p. 78. Takasaki,A Stud-1' on the Ratru4;otravibha{,a,n ( 2H . - - .

56. William H. Grosnick, "'Ihe Categories of I'i, Hsiar,.f, and Yunf: Evidencethat Paramirtha Composed the As'a&ening oj Fatth," Journal oJ thelnternadornlAssosiationqf Buddhist Studies 12, no. I (1989):65-92.

57. Grosnick, "Dogen's View," p. 120.

58. Takasaki, "Bussh6ron," p. 144. Extant is "Bussh6ron Setsugi" bv Kenshh.

59. Takemura, Busshdron KenkTw, pp 3-4.

60. William Grosnick gives three main themes of Buddha nature theory inChina: subject-object nondualiqv; the idea that the world of phenomena ispresent within enli$htenment; and the coextensiveness of Buddha natureand practice. He sees these expressed most clearly in Tian-tai and Chan.Grosnick, "D6gen's View," pp. 181-182.

Chapter 2. 'fhe Concept of Buddha Nature

1. The shift from talk of things to talk of words, recognized as freeing adiscussion from certain ontological presuppositlons. See Willard Van OrmanQuine, lVord and Object (Cambridge, lr{A: lvt.l.T. Press, 1960), pp.27O If.

2. A. C. Graham, "'Bein!,' in Western Philosophy Compared with Shih/Fet andYlt/Wu in Chinese Philosophy," Asia Major 7 (December 1959): 99.

t77

1

4 .

6.

'7

8.

9 .

10.

BUDDTIA NATURE

Ibid., p, 100.

Ibid.

Ibid., pp. r0G-101.

The Tathngata.garblta s&tra, for example, states wheth€r or not a Buddhacomes into the world, all beings dwell in the tath.agatuEarbha. Da, FangDeng Ru I'ai ZanE Jing, Taishi 16, no. 666: 457c.

Arthur E. Link, "The Taoist Antecedents of Tao-an's prajna Ontologl,"History of Religitnrs 9 (1969-70): 187-188.

Gilbert Ryle, ?he Concept ol Mird (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1949), pp.22-23.

Selected and condensed from the list of meanings in Mervyn Sprung, ed.,TheProblem of Two Tnrths in Buddhism and, Vedanta (Dordrecht. Hbiland: D.Reidel, 1973), pp. 4344.

The four subjects of contemplation, the four kinds of right effort, the foursteps to super powers, the five spiritual faculties and their five associatedpowers, the seven levels of bodhd (wisdom), and the eight constituents of theEightfold Noble Path.

Any supplementary aid to Buddhist practice, as opposed to a necessaryaspect of that practice.

Note the positive value assigned to conditioned action here. This point willbe discussed in Chapter 6.

This use of the term prirnitive was suggested by P. F. Strawson inIrdivi.dwls: An Essay in Descript&se Metaphysics (London: Methuen,1959), pp. 101 ff., where he describes "person" as a "primitive concept" towhich both states of consciousness and bodily characteristics are ascribed.

For this analysis I draw from Alan Sponberg (who applies it to the sameproblem in Kui-ji's writintp), "The ?rdsrcbhdoa Doctrine in India and China:A Study of Three Exe$gtical Models," Buhhyi Bru*a KenbnTjo Kdy6 2l(1982): 97-119.

Clearly, @en was not the first to state that sentient beinlp "are" ratherthan "possess" the Buddha nature.

This is typical of tlre author's use qf the term sryratimt to indicatedissimilarity, throughout the section from which the passage is taken.

Chapter 3. Soteriolofy: Buddha Nature as the Practiceof Buddhism

l. SoterioloAf is s-onceived in this way by Frederick J. Streng in Emptitcss: AStr"tdy in Religiorn Meanh4 (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1967), passim.

2. The four attachments are desire, false views, false morals. and ideas of self.

178

1 1 .

12.

13.

14.

15.

16.

5 .

6.

1

1 1 .

t2.

10.

NOTES TO CHAPTDR 3

The six destinies are hell, and the worlds of the hun$ry $hosts, animals,

n^sura (demons), humans, and dqsa (heavenly spirits).

Each of the five senses has its own consciousness, plus one for the

consciousness with thou$hts as its objects.

Meritorious activities of body, mouth, and rnind; i.e., Buddhist practice'

I have not been able to lorate the source of this quotation.

Dhi,rani embraces the practices of smrti (recollection)' meditation, and

wisdom.

8. Referred to as Ban Dirt$, JinE bfi meanin$ Boo J i Jing. Takemura, Bnsshoron

Kolhyfi, p. 157.

9. Compare this to the title and therne of the AnurwtvA'pinptvanirde{o (No

Irrcriase, No Decrea,se Suta) (Fo Shtut Bu ZenP Bu Jian Jin{, Taishi 16,

no. 668, pp. a66-a68).

The sambhogahfrya is the "enjoyment" or "communai" body manifest in thepure Buddha lands and visible to advanced bodhisattrsas. Ni?1,rrtu.takaya is

ihe "transformation" body in which the Buddha appears amon(' ordinarypersons.

Or unconditioned wisdom, meditation, and compassion.

The abilities to see everlthin$, hear everlthinE, know the thou$hts of others,

know the previous lives of oneself and others, perform various wonders and

know that the defilements are extinct. see Har Dayal, The Bodhisatttsa

Drctrirc in Brildhist sanskrit Literature (Dethi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1932),pp. 106 ff.

13. The hells and the worlds of the hungry ghosts and animals'

14. To save all of the innumerable sentient bein$s, to eradicate all deiusions andpassions, to penetrate the infinite Dharma, and to fulfill the Buddha Way'

15. As spoken by Samantabhadra in tie Hua-5mn-sfitra, they are (1) to worship

all B;ddhas, (2) to praise the Tathd!,atas, (3) to perform pi.J'a worship' (4) to

repent and removskarmic hindrances, (5) to make all one's talents accord

wlth the joyful and m€ritorious, (6) to turn the wheel of the Dharma' (7) topuriiv aliBuddha lands, (8) to alwavs follow'Buddhism, (9) to always make

sentilnt beinfp prosper, and (10) to return one's merits for the gpod of all'

Ding Fu-Bao,-Fo Xue Da Ci Dintr (Taipei: 1946), p. 2091. Also see Dayal,

bdhi.sttoa D@trhe, P. 66.

16. These are four bases of super powers, developed by unitint, intenseconcentration and effort with (1) desire, (2) enerA/, (3) thought' and (a)

iovest{lation. See ibid., pp. 104 ff.

1?. Namely, "instruction, doctrine, knowled$e or rryisdom attained, cutting an'ay

of delusion, practice of the religious lifg, progSessive status, [andl producint-

the fruit of slintliness." William Soothill and Lewis Hodous, A Dictima,ry oJ

Chircse Buddhist Terms (Taipei: Ch'en$Wen Publishin$ Co., 1970), p' 38a'

t79

1 8

1 9

BUDDTIA NATURE

The three periods are past, present, and future.

Attributed in the 8N? ro the (Fo Shuo) Wu Sturng yi Jirq (Taish6, no. 669:468477) but in fact closely paralleling a passage in the Fo Sfun Bu Zen! BuJian Jin! (Taish6, no. 668: 466-{68).

5. Similar verses are found in the Ratnagotravibhd,ga and theM ah(ry an@ silt d,lahkdra.

6 In Chapter Three.

?. As ciced in Walpola Rahula,Grove Press [19591, 1974),

B. In Chaptet Three.

9. In Chapter Three.

10. See Chapter Two.

11. See Chaprer Three.

20. The tradition also mainrains other identifiers, such as the physical marksand the super powers.

Chapter 4. Dereification of Self and Mind1. In Chaptel Three.

2. The text in this section on sufl'ering is corrupt and I take some small libertiesin the translation.

3 9f D Sefort Ruegg, tc Thdarie du Tathrigatagarbha et du Gotra (paris:Ecole Frangaise d'extr6me orient, 1969), p. 368, for a Sanskrit version ofthischart based on the Ratnaeotravibha.ga.

4. The tive are rip,, [orm; vedantA, sensation; sarryjiifi, perception; saryskdrd,impulses (volition, dispositions, etc.); and vijfidna, consciousness.

What the Buddhtt Taught, rev. ed. (New york:p . 1 0 1 .

Chapter 5. Ontology: Monism vs. Nondualism

tr . Yevgenii Y. Obermiller, The Subli.rne Seierrce, p. 82.

2. Gadjin tri. Nagao, " 'What Remains' in Sdnyata: A yogdcira Interpretarron ofEmptiness," in Minoru Kiyota, ed., Mahayana Buddhist Meditatitvn: Theq,tantl Praetice (Honolulu: Universiry Press of Hawaii, 1978), p. 81.

3. Takasaki, A Study on, thz Raowgovavibhdga, p.28.

4. Ogawalchii6,Nwraisl 8,sshd rw Kmhjn| (Kyoto: Nakayamashobd. 19Z6).pp. 341, passim.

5. Yamaguchi Susumu, HanrryaSftdsdshd (Tdkyo: Hdz6kan, l95l), Chapter 6.

6. Ruegg, Th6otie,pp.29l and361.

180

NOTES TO CIIAPTDR 6

7. The following is derived from Roland t{all, "Monism and Pluralism," in PaulEdwards, ed., The Encyclopedia of Philsophy, Vol. 5, pp. 363-5.

B. Obermiller,The Sublime Scierrce, p.81.

9. In this I agree with Rue$tr|, whose work contributed to my vier'.

10. Graham, "Being in Western Philosophy," p. 102.

tt. Da Sheng Q, Xin Lun, Taishb 32, no. 1666; 576a. Cf. Yoshito S. Hakeda,trans., The Awakenin{, oJ Faith (New York: Columbia Universiry Press,1967), p. 33.

12. Discussed in Chapter Four.

13. Rue&!, Thenrie, pp.29l and 361.

14. Cf. ibid., pp. 379 f. RueSl,'s analysis contributed to my understanding here.

15. See Peter Gregory, "The Problem of Theodicy in the Awakening of Faith,"Reli$iau.s Stu.dies 22: 63-78.

16. Nagao Gadjin, "Amarerumono," In'dogakubukhryogakukenkyt 4l (1968):

2J-27. l$t En$lish version of this article is available as Na$ao, "'WhatRemains'in S0nyat?i," pp. 66-82.

17. "Amarerumono," ibid., p. 26b.

18. Ibid., p. 27b.

Chapter 6. En$a$in$ in Spiritual Cultivation

1. One who can bear the Dharma vessel is one who is fit to praetice Buddhism

2. The idea of these four foundations to practice is an old Buddhist tradition,stemmin$ baok to the Ahguttara-Nikaya and other texts. Takemura,Busshlron Kenh5nr, p. 307.

3. The ten knowledges are an outline of the Hrnayana path and are given in theAbhidharmaho$a of Vasubandhu. The list be$ins with (1) the worldlyknowledge of the ordinary person who has not yet betun the practice ofBuddhism and progress up to (9) "exhaustive" knowledge, in which allklefuhave been extinguished and the Four Noble Truths have been realized, and(10) no-birth knowledge, in which one realizes that one has concluded theprocess of knowing the Four Truths, cutting off karma and kle(a, realizin!ninsdqa, and cultivating the Path, and that there is nothing further to bedone. With the tenth knowledge, one has completed the Hinayiina path' Fohle Da Ci Diar., W.2197-219E.

Paramdrtha renders the first knowledge as "worldly Right Views" (sftizlwtt$.jialn), but in this context I believe he is referrin$ to the first of the tenknowledges.

4. On bhfioand, see Alan Sponberg, "Meditation in Fa-hsianS Buddhism," inPeter N. Gregory, ed., Trditiotrs oJ Meditation in Chinese Bu'd.dhism,Kuroda Institute Studiec in Eact Asien Buddhism No. 4 (Honolulu: Universityof Hawaii Press, 1986), p. 19.

181

BLIDDiI\ NATURE

5. The quotation is similar to orre in the Da Bao Ji Jing (Maharatnukutasutra).

See iakasaki, A Srurl-rr on the Ratrw!,otrat:ibhd'fa, p. 204; and Takemura,

Busshdron Kenkyu, pp. 129 and 265.

6. I take the idea of .'fruitful tension" from oral comments made by Robert

Gimello at a nleeting of tlte American Academy of Reiigion.

7. Fred Streng has pointed out a passage inthepraiflapdramitA literatu,re with

similar implicati,ons: "without losin$ himself in his concentration, he Ithebodhisattrsal ries his thou$ht to an objective support (for his cornpassion)and he detirmines that he will take hold of perfect wisdom [u"hich is

essentially skill-in-meansl, and he u'ill not realize [emptiness, because its

realization is not the final goall. tr{eanwhile, however, the Bodhisattva does

not lose the dharnias which act as the wings to enlightenm ent." Perfection oJ

Wisdom in Eight Thousand Lines and lts Verse Summary (Aqsaha'

srika-prajfidpdramitd-raora- Eurub samcaya' Edtha), trans. Edward Conze(Berkele" Four Seasons Foundation, 1973), p. 222. Cited in Frederick J'

Streng, ,,selfhood wirhout Seifishness: Buddhist and Christian Approaches to

Autheiitic Living," in Paul D. In$ram and Frederick J. Stren$, eds',

Buddhist-christian Dialogue : Muutal Renev:al and Transformation ( Hono-

lulu:Universiry of Hawaii Press, 1986), p. 191.

g. The three kinds of. duhkha are duhkhu-duhkhata (ku-ku) the sufferin$

inherent in duhkhrt: htnn-ku, sufferin$ in response to the passing of

pleasure; xin},-ku, suft'erin$ in response to imperrnance. The desire realm

iras all three kinds of.dr^rhftha, the form realm has the latter two, and the

nonforrn realm. the last. Fo Xu'e Da Ci Dian, p. 320.

9. The three realms of desire, form, and nonform.

10. The f.o:urth dhytuut stage is characterized by mindfulness and equanimity

and is free of ail emotlon. See Edward Conze, Bud.d,hist Meditatiott (Londc,n:

Allen and Unwin, 1956; New York: Harper and Row, 1969)' p' 118'

11. Several scholars have made this point. See, for example, Peter N. Gre$ory,

"lntroduction" and Alan Sponber$, "Mediation in Fa-hsian$ Buddhism," both

in Gregory, Traditions of Meditatian.

Chapter 7. Buddha Nature and the Concept of Person

1. For the idea of these two dimensions I am indebted to Joaquin P6rez-Rem6n,

Self and Non-SeIJ in Darly Buddhism, Reason and Reli!,ion, No' 22 (The

Hague: Moutorr, 1980).

2. The author refers to the text as Baa Din! Jin$ bfi it should be Bao Ji Jin6.

Takemura, Bttssh6ron KenW, P 356.

3. Manrxsijfiina is given here as the consciousness responsible for discriminat-

ing between "self' and "not-self."

4. The realms of desire, form, and the formless.

5. Ar,vadeva, Gtnng Bai Lun Ben. Takemura, Bttsshiron Kenkyt, p' 359'

6. I take this translation from Ararnaki Noritoshi's paper presented at the

182

NOTES TO CFIAPTER I.]

Lr.S.-Japan Conterence on Japanese Buddhism, 1985. I do not intcnd trf i tany Christian connotations.

This division of humanity into trvo camps may seem to fit poorly u'ith theBr\?'s own division of humaniry, as mentioned, into three canrps; ordinarypersons, sages, and Buddhas. Even these three, however, really break downinto the same two camps, "those who do not perceive and realize the Buddhanature" (ordinary persons) and "those who do" (sa$es and tsuddhas).Buddhas and sages fit in a general \r'ay into the same category of beings rvhodo perceive and realize the Buddha nature. the only difference between thembeing that. in the case of Buddhas, their "realization reaches the ultimatepuriqv" (805c-806a). In short, the same line of demarcation fits this set ofthree: purity and impurir.v, delusion and enlightenment.

Juan Mascar6, trans. The Upanisha,rls (NIiddlesex, England: Penguin Books,1965), the Pra6na Upanigad, p.74.

Sung Bae Park, Buddhtst Faith and Sudden Enlightenment (Albany, \\':SLINI' Press. l98J). p. 19.

Chapter 8. Retrospective and Prospective

1. Ihis and the follorving sections on classes of persons are summarized fromBMI, p. 812a-c.

2. The following verse is found in nine N{ahhydna texts. See Takasaki, A Studyon the Ratnagotravibhdga, p. 300.

3. Takasaki, Nyorsizd Shis6 no Keisei, p. 3. In other listings, Fa-zang continuesto list the tathdgangarbhn tradition as superior to Hinayana, Madhyamika,and Yogdcdra, but is irself superceded by two categories: the "SuddenTeaching" exemplified by the silence of Vimalakirti in rheVimalaklrti-siltrctand associated with the Chan school, and the "Complete" or "PerfectTeaching" of. the Hrta-yan-siltra (Atsatarysaka), with which the Hua-yanschool especially is associated. Few scholars today would agree $'ithFa-zang's characterization of the tathdgatagarbho tradition as a schoolcomparable to Midhyamik a and Y ogd.car a.

4. See Peter Gregory, "Chinese Buddhist Hermeneutics: The Case of Hua-yen,"Journal of the American Acad.emy of Religion 51, no. 2 (June 1983):23t-249.

5. See Francis H. Cook, Ihn-yen Budd.hism: The. Js.pel Net oJ Indra (UniversiryPaik and London: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1977), especiallyChapter 3, "The Indian Background of Hua-yen."

6. This point is discussed in two articles in Gregory, Traditions oJ Meditation:Bernard Faur6, "The Concept oi One-Practice Samadhi in Early Ch'an," pp.99-128; and Carl Bielefeldt, "Ch'ang-lu Tsung-tse's Tso-ch'an I and the'Secret' of Zen Meditation," pp. 129-161.

,7. Translated by and cited in Faur6, "Concept of One-Practice Samadhi," p.

105. His brackets and ellipsis.

183

t 8

l 9

BUDDFI,\ NATLTRE

8. Translated and cited b-v Bieleleldt, "Ch'anS-lu Tsung-tse's Tso-ch'an /," p. 138.

e lb id . . pp . 136-1J7.

1t). Philip \ampolsky, The Platfurnt Sutra oJ the SLxth Patriarch (Nex'\'ork:Colurnbia LTniversit) ' Press, 1967), pp. 137-138.

1 1 . I b i d . , p . 1 J 9 .

12. See Obermiller, The Sublime Science, p. 81.

13. Shunryu Suzuki, Zen Mind, Beginner's Mind (New \brk: Weatherhill, 1970;paperback, 1973), p. 83.

14 . Ib id . , p . 119.

15. See Chang Chung-Yuan, Original Teachinps of Ch'an Buddhism (New York:Vintage Books, 1969), pp. 97-101.

16. Shunryrr Suzuki, Zen Mind, p. BJ.

17. As translated by T. P. Kasulis, Zen Action Zen Person (Honolulu: Universityof Hawaii Press, 1981), p. 103.

As translated by Francis H. Cook, "D6gen's View of Authentic Selfhood andIts Socio-ethical Implications" in William R. LaFleur, ed., DOgerf Studies,Kuroda Institute: Studies in East Asian Buddhism No. 2. (Honolulu:University of Hawaii Press, 1985), p. 133.

This is not to say, of course, that artistic representations of various Buddhas,.bodhisattzsas, scenes of the Pure Land, and so on did not also proliferate inChina.

From the Transmission oJ the I'amp (8.263), as cited in Fung YuJan, AHistory oJ Chinese Philosophy, vol. 2, trans. Derk Bodde (Princeton:Princeton University Press, 1953; paperback edition, 1983), p. a03.

Thich Nhat Hanh, Being Peace (Berkeley: Parallax Press, 1987), p. 1}4.

See Hans Waldenfels, Absolute Nothingness: Foundations Jor a Buddhist-Christian Dialotue, trans. J. W. Heisig (New York: Paulist Press, 1980;German edition, Breisgau: Verlag Herder Freiburg, 1976), C,hapter 7,"Emptiness and the Appreciation of World, History and Man."

There are prominent exceptions to this $eneralization, of course, such asthose seen in the Japanese Soka Gakkai tnday.

24. For more information on Engaged Buddhism, see Fred Eppsteiner, ed,., ThePath of Compassion: Writines on Socially Enqaged Bu.ddhism, 2d ed.,(Berkeley, CA: Parallax Press, 1988).

25. It is not only the encounter with Western expectations that causes Buddhismto develop in this direction. The leaders of the Engaged Buddhism movementinclude two Vietnamese, Thich Nhat Hanh and Cao Ngoc Phuong, and aTibetan, the Dalai Lama. Their concerns for an Engaged Buddhism obviouslydo not stem from the same soufce as an American's, but from theirexperiences of the plights faced by their countries in the modern world.

184

20

2 l

22

23.

GLOSSARY

ba

ba chu

Bao Ding Jing

Bao Ji Jing

ben

ben wu

+fr,fnffiH]FHEi*

ftr

ffiffi

185

BIJ'DDHA NATURE

ben xing

ben you

bu

bu kong

bu kong guo

bu shi

BusshOron Setsugi

fffi*€'

64*,6*ffi6Hffifsffiffi#

Chan (Zen)

chan ding

chang

chang zhu

chen

chen rno

186

ilHilHEffiffi&ifitH

GLOSSARY

Cheng wei Shi Lun ffiftrffiffi

chul fr

chu2 ffi

Da Bao Ji Jing

Da Fang DengRu-lai Zang Jing

da gong yong

Dao

Dao li

Dao-sheng

Dao sheng yi

Dao-xin

de cheng

AHEiffi

^F+mxffiffiADSH

Da Shens Qi Xin Lun t5Fru{Hffi

HHNHHEH&{fiH{Htsffi

187

Di-lun

ding

ding hui

DOgen

du

,duan

en

fa

fa shen

Fa-xian

Fa-xiang

Fa-zang

fan fu

188

BUDDTTA NATURE

tr*elts

€#H,E

Htr

Bl*l*gi*Fr*tHl*trFl,*

fan fu xing

fei fei se

fei san shi fa

fei shi you

fei you fei wu

fen-bie-xing

fo

Fo Shuo Bu ZengBu Jian Jing

Fo Shuo WuShang Yi Jing

fo xing

Fo Xue Da Ci Dian

GLOSSARY

IL,*ffi)F}Ftr,/F=fr1*'FH€.'F€.'FftilEIltffi

ffiffi7lH7iffiffi

ffiffiftr{fiffiffiftffiqF-ft#n

Hguan

189

BUDDHA NATURN

Guang Bai Lun Ben Ftrffi6

suo ffi

suo du ffiH

Hong-ren

Hua-yan

huai ku

Hui-ke

Hui-neng

Hui-si

j i 1

j i2

.1i jing

190

9AB+ffiffigffiqH(H)BEffi,8

ffiwffifi$

GLOSSARY

Jta

j ia xinE

jian xing

j ie

jie tuo Dao

jing 1

j ing 2

Jue Ding Zang Lun

Kensh0

kong

kong you bu You

ku ku

Kui-ji

/JrTfrt1F,ffffiffiffiHffif,#,,5I

*€ffiffi

HilIIE*a4a##H#

191

lai

Lao-zi

li you li wu

Lin-ji

Ling-run

mtao

miao ji

mie yi

mo1

mo2

ner

neng

192

BUDDTIA NATURA

7ft#+#€'ffiftffig!siH

wwtfiffi{*p

x

rufrE

neng she

neng she zang

neng zang

Pang Yun

ping deng zhi Dao

pu sa

ql

qi she

qu

ru

ru-lai

GLOSSARY

HEffifEtrffiHEffi

ffiffi+s2H#ffi

nfr,K

!t!Fts*

193

BI.IDDHA NATURE

ru-lai xing

ru-lai-zang

ru qu

ru-ru

ru-ru jing

ru-ru zhi

san xrng

san wu xing

SE

Seng-zhao

shang xin fan-nao

she

She{un

194

fr*ffifr]Kffifr*,NWfrfrffi,frmg

=ffi=ffiftB{H#l',tlFfSf$ffiffi

shen

shen jian

sheng ren

sheng yi

shi 1

shi '2

shi 3

shi-shi-wu-ai

shi you

shi zheng jian

Sh0bOgenz0Geni0k0an

su ru

suo she chi

suo she zang

CLOSSARY

HHNgA

e{fiHEIE,

sgsffiffi

H€.ff8.F,

fi,if;[EffinffiA*

6mFfffif+Ffiffiffi

195

suo sheng

suo zang.

Tian-tai

tong

wer

wei shi zhi

wo

wo bo le mi

WU

wu mie

Wu Shang Yi Jing

. BTIDDFIA NATURE

ffiEffiffi

X€E

f;rEffigftfirfi#gftilftrtff.hffiffi

196

wu sheng

wu suo you

wu wei

wu yin

wu zuo

wu zuo yi

xian

xrn

xin le

xing 1

xing 2

xing ku

xiu-xi

GLOSSARY

ft4ffiFf€trFftElffitFtr{fH

ffid.{H#f+'11'11F-

WH

197

Xuan-zang

Xun-zi

yi

yi shi

yi-ta

yi-ta-xing

yi-zhi

yin chu xing

you

you bu zhen shi

you zuo

zai ru-lai zhi nei

zang

198

BUDDTIA NATURE

s#++-Elf

{ftHffit&tu{fi{uffi{*ItEItrHa€.6HHH#

EfrMgNffi

Zhan-ran

zhen

Zhen-di

zhen-ru

zhen-ru li

zhen shen

zhen shi

zhen-shi-xing

zhen shi you

zhen ti xing

zhen you

zheng jing

zheng xing

zhi

GLQSSARY

lEf*+

R

HffiHMHfr4BHgHHHHfSHH€HHfEH€.IEH

IE{Tg

r99

BUDDHA NATURE

zhi hui

Zhi-yi

zhong sheng

zhu zi xing ru-ru

zhu zi xing xing

zhuan

zhuan-yi

Zhuang-zi

zi xing

zi xing qing j ing xin

zuo

Zuo-chan yi

HHHffit*.ftHffifrfrEHffiffiHffi{ft#THffiHffiiFi$,L.ffSilHffi

200

INDEX

Aboriginal existence (ben you): of

Buddha nature, 32-34; andnronism, 111-112

Adventitious defilements: See kle*a

Alayavijmarn: and dh{tnnakaya, 62 ;and tathdg,atagarbha, 2Q

Anfrtman,30,85-90; inMajjhima-nikdya,9l

AnurwtcJdpilryransa,-nirde(a, 13, 1 58Asanga,6, 845ra5,1,64A9rayapard.r;6ti (zfutan-yi) : and

Buddhist practicer 59-65; anddhamwdhatu, 59-60: existentialmode of. 14&-150: fourcharacteristics of, 58-60; andhumarr transformation, 64-65; andThird and Fourth Noble Truths, 601in Yognciira, 58

A*raya:paratsqtti dhnmwkdya, 6l--64A$trnya (not empty): Buddha

dharmas as, 153, 155; Buddha

nature as , 107-111; inA .Dnmotdoeul-sutra. rJ

Atman, 30, 100. See clso Self (ta'o)Atmaparamitd: See self parctmitdAwakeninp, of Faith in the

MahaS'crwr, 158; concePt ofThusness in, 102; and Fa-zan$,156-l57; in Yogacdra-tathdgatugdrbha thought, 20

Bodhieiitg,4O42Brahamanism, 1OLrBuddhadhatu, 5, 14Buddha nature,,l-5; and aboriginal

existence (ben you),32-34, 39; andBrahmanism, 100; and Buddhistpractice, 3l-32, 4142, 57,151-152; as cause and fruit , 57;and Chinese thought,3, 156-168;conditioned and unconditioned.4142, 57; and defilements,109-111; in deluded existential

207

BUDDFIA NATURE

mode, 150-152; and devotional ism,J; essence and functions, 55-56;existence and nonexistence, 30-32;and faithful jo.v, 127-128; fivemeanings of, 55-56; as found inordinary persons, badhisattvas. andBuddhas, 80-82; and humantransformation, 31-32, 57; andmonism, 99-115; and nonduali ty,50; and own-nature (srcbhdpa),34-35, 39; puriry and impuriry, 50;three kinds of, 4742; andThusness, 102; universaliry of, 1-2

Buddha nature thought, 27 -2E,

156-168; and Western Buddhism,169-171

Buddhrt Nature Treatise: author of.24; an<l Buddha nature controversy,26; and Chinese Buddhist thought,27-28; textual problems in,23-24;and Yogdcdra, 21

Buddhist practice: andadra.yapardtsTttf , 58-60; andBuddha nature, 151-152, 168;conditioned, 127-l2B; and fourclasses of people, 121-122 andwisdom, 51

Cahras (wheels). four, 118-121Category mistake, 34Chan (Ch'an): historical relation to

Buddha nature thoug,ht, 157-159;and need for Buddhist Practice,L27, 168', nondualism of, 163-164;positive view of phenomenal realityin, 167 ; subject-object nondualismin, 165-166

Consciousness-only, 9-10; andsubject-object nondualisrn. 142-144

Cultivation (xiu-xi), 122-123

Dao-sheng (Tao-shent), 13Dao-xin (Tao-hsin), 157Deluded existential mode of human

being. 145-147

202

Devotionalism, 3, 13, 15Dharani,6(>67Dharmakaya: as active, 691' and

dsra)&parapftti, 6l-61 ; as Buddhanature that dwells in itself. 72: andBuddhist practice, 65-72; andfreedom from views of self. 95: asMiddle Path, 6&-69; as name ofBuddha nature, 154; and ninsd4a,66; and realizaiion, 7G-71; and TwoTruths, 69-70

D harmakay adhdtu, 7 | -7 2Dharmapdla, 9Dialogue, interreligious, 169, 17 |Diamond Mind, 96Discrirninating nature (parikalpin

s'sabhat:a),43, 46DdSen, 149, 165-166, 168

Dnrptiness (6unyatd,): and abori$inalexistence, 34; and Buddha nature,35; erroneous views of, 36-37, 155;and negativi ty, 16,34,36; andYo!6cdra,7-ll

Emptiness, fulfillment of: in Buddhanature, 4O; in Ranwgotravibhiga,16-17; in I 'oghcdra, l1; inY ogactu a-tath.dgatagarb ha thought,1 9

Empty, not: See a6tmyaEngaged Buddhism, 170Enlightened existential mode of

human being, 147-148Enlightenment: and individuality,

147-148; as pivotal conversion,167-168; positive nature of, 19,38-39, 159-160

Dternity of trikaya, 7 5-30Existence $xru) and Buddha nature,

30-32, 55-56

Faithful joy, 121, 123-124, 127-128Fa-xiang (Fa-hsiang), 161F a-zant (Fa-tsang), I 56-f 57Fo xinS,4-5,74, 17!174, note 5

INDEX

Gorra theory, 18Great compassion: See Mahdfut'runaGrosnich, William, 19, 25

Heart Sufta, l0sHong-ren (Hung-jen), 157Hua-yan (Hua-yen): historical relation

to Buddha nature thou$ht,156-157; nondualism of, 162-163;positive view of phenomenal realityin, 168

Hui-neng, 158Human nature, 160-161

Icclnntika,l-21 inM ahdp arinins dTta - siltr a, 13

Idealism, 7-10, 1'64Individualiry, 746-148Insi$ht into universal sameness,

132-133

Kalydl.wmitra, 119KIe6o (defilements), 2, 50, 52-53,

109-1 1 1thowledge of Thusness, 48-49, 51

Lai. \\rhalen. 5LanSua$e, posit ive,3,56, 103, 106Lcthkdssatdra- siltra, 2O-21, | 57Lin-ji (Lin-chi), 165Lin$-run (Lin$-jun),26

Madhyamika: ne$ativity of, 7, 11; andYogdcdra. 6-11

Maha.kanaa (great compassion),122-t23,126. 127; and kan't4d',129-131 ; and prajfid, 128-129

Mahaparininsdl.ta,- siltro, l3-l 4Maitreya (Miatreya-ndtha), 6, 8Manovijfidna, 142-144N{arks. four. 86-87Meditative concerrtration (chan

ding), I23,724-L25tr{iddle Path. 68-69. 91

Monism. 99-115r and ChineseBuddhist schools, 161

Nagao Gadjin,8, 99, 114-115NdgZrjuna, 6-7Nih i l i sm,7Ninrn4ak@a,72, 74-75Ninsdna,65-67, 155No Increase, No Decrease Sutra'

(Afrilnatt d,purnrTn; anir de 3 a), | 3,158

Nondualism, 50, 90-92, 106-107,l6l-r64

Nonexistence (uu), 30-32, 33

Obermiller, Yevgenii, 99, 100Ogawa lchiid, 99, 100Own-nature (x:a,bh.dtsa), 34-35, 39Own-nature of Buddha nature, 83-86

Paramdrtha (Zhen-di): lite of ,21-22;questions concernin$ his role,25-26: translations by, 22-23; andYogdcdra history, 9-10; as Yogacarainterpreter, 17

Pdramitd,, four: and Buddhistpractice, 87-90; and monism,1O4-107; and nondualism, 106-107

Parinircdna, \54Park, Sung Bae, 151Person: compared to sentient being,

13&139; existential nature of'144-150; ontolo$ical nature of,139-144 ; and subject-objectnondualism, l4l-144

Phenomenal reality, positive view of,t66-167

Plenary Thusness, 93, 134-135Prajfid, discriminatin$, 12&-129, 17 OPrajfiapdramitd: l2l, 128; as

Buddhist practice, 8&90, 105,t24-125

Prctti5)asanurtpdda, 7, 16, 99Prdyoea,4042Principle of Thusness, 93, 13'1-135

203

BUDDHA NATURE

Pure mind, 93-9.1, 96Puritr': of Buddha nature, 50, 84-85;

ol dharn akayadhatu, 7 1-7 2

Ra,trutgo tr avib haga (M ahtryan\ rtaratantraqdstra), 14-15, 1 l4-1 I 5

RealiqvAs It Is, 10-11, 133, 160Realm of Thusness, 48-49, 5lRelative natur e (paratantra

st-rnbhdt'o), 43, 46. 47Rue{$, D. Sevtbrt, 99, 107Ryle, Gilbert, 34

So,mddhi that destroys falseemptiness, 122, 725-127, 12t)

Sarybhdra,729Sambhogakdya, 7 2, 7 3-7 4Self (too): as non-attachment, 72,92:

nine false views of, 94-95Self. pdramita: as fulfillment of

anatman. 88-90; and monism,105-106; and nondualism. 90-92:as non-reified, 86-92

Semantic ascent, 29-30She-lun school, 156Shinran, 3Soteriolo$v, 57Srtmaladet:t- simhonadrt- sitra, 3, 12 :

on a(inya t1thagangqrbha, 108Subjcct-ohject nondualism: in

Chinese Buddhism, 164-166; andthe "insight into universalsameness,i' 132-133; and persons,l4l-144; and three narures(tristsabhdzsa), 43-45; in Yrgdcara,lCLl 1; in YoSacira-tuthaeatagarblra thought, 19

Sudden enlightenment, 168SrZnyo thouSht: and monism, 100Sinyatd: See emptinessSupreme trurh,36-40, 154, 155Suzuki, Shunryu, 163-164

Takasaki Jiliid6, 14, 23-24,99Takemura Sh6ho. 24

204

T athegata (ru-Iai), 48-50, 154-1SsTathrtgatagarbha : and dkrya*ijfirtnn,

2O; and Buddhist practice, 54; ascause and fruit, 49-50, 54-55iChinese translation of. 4: ascomponent of Buddha nature,4&-55; and devotionalism. 3: andemptiness, 15-17; purity andimpurity, 50; Sanskrit term, 3-4;and Thusness 51, 53-54; asThusness that dwells in itself,4849

Tath.d,gataga,rbha liter ature, 1 l-1 7Tathdgata4arbha- sutra, 12, 9 6-97,

158Three causes of Buddha nature,

4042Three natures (.tristsabhdrsa): and

Buddha nature, 35-39, 42-48: inY ogdcar a-tathasataqarbhn thought,t 9

Three no-natures, 4243Thusness (tathatd), 102-103; and

Buddha nature, 4042, lO2,li4tand tath.dgatagarbha, SJ-54; andthree natures (trisr':abhdt:a), 43,45-58; worldly and rrue, B0; inYogacira, ll

Thusness of Thusness, 4t]49: andsubject-object nondualism, 147-142

Tian-tai (T'ien-t'ai): historical relationto Buddha nature thought, 156;nondualism of,162; positive view ofphenomenal reality in, 167

Transformation of the basis: SeeASrayapardrsTtti

Trikdya: and Buddha natrre,72-73;eternity of, 75-80

Trispqbhdpa: See Three natures(trisroo,bh/J)a\

True nature (parinispanrwstsabhdrsa), 4344, 46, 47 48

Two Truths (satya&:aya), 35-39

Ueda Yoshifumi, 9

INDEX

Ui Hakuju,24 Yama$uchi Susumu, 16,99' 100

Unborn, Buddha nature as,.112-113 Yo$dcira, 5-11; and ldealism, 7-10;

lJpaniqads,147:148 interpreters of, 9, 17; andMadhyamika, 6-1 1; srltra literature'

Vasubandhu,6,8 174-175, note 10

western Buddhism, t6g-l7r YoflcT^'tatragatagarbha thou!'ht'

Willis, Janice, 9, 11Wu Shant Yi Jing,3

xinEf (nature), 5 Zhan-ran (Chan-jan)' 156

Xuan-zan$, (Hsiian-tsan$), 9, 17-18 Zuo-cha:rt yi, 158