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    Thinking with Bourdieu against Bourdieu: A 'Practical' Critique of the HabitusAuthor(s): Anthony KingSource: Sociological Theory, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Nov., 2000), pp. 417-433Published by: American Sociological AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/223327 .

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    Thinking with Bourdieu Against Bourdieu:A 'Practical' Critique of the HabitusANTHONYKING

    University of Exeter

    There are two strands in Bourdieu'ssociological writings. On the one hand,Bourdieuargues for a theoreticalposition one mightterm his "practical theory"which empha-sizes virtuosic interactions between individuals. On the other hand, and most fre-quently, Bourdieu appeals to the concept of the habitus according to which societyconsists of objective structuresand determined-and isolated-individuals. AlthoughBourdieu believes that the habitus is compatible with his practical theory and over-comes the impasse of objectivismand subjectivism n social theory,neither claim is thecase; the habitus is incompatiblewithhis practical theory,and it retreatsquicklyintoobjectivism.However,Bourdieu'spractical theorydoes offera way out of the impasseof objectivismandsubjectivismbyfocussing on theintersubjectiventeractionsbetweenindividuals.

    INTRODUCTIONOne of the central aims of Pierre Bourdieu's writings has been to overcome the perniciousdualism between objectivism and subjectivism, exemplified in France by Levi-Strauss andSartre, respectively (Brubaker 1985: 746; Jenkins 1993: 18).' As part of a wider 'theory ofpractice,' Bourdieu has famously developed the concept of the habitus to overcome thisimpasse of objectivism and subjectivism. As Bourdieu writes:

    These two moments the subjectivist and objectivist stand in dialectical relation. It isthis dialectic of objectivity and subjectivity that the concept of the habitus is designedto capture and encapsulate. (Bourdieu 1988b: 782)For Bourdieu, the habitus which consists of corporal dispositions and cognitive templatesovercomes subject-object dualism by inscribing subjective, bodily actions with objectivesocial force so that the most apparently subjective individual acts take on social meaning.Although Bourdieu believes that the notion of the habitus resolves the subject-object dual-ism of social theory, in fact, the habitus relapses against Bourdieu's intentions into the veryobjectivism which he rejects. Yet, despite the failings of the habitus, Bourdieu's contribu-tion to the agency-structure debate cannot be dismissed for there is a second strand inBourdieu's writing which is in direct opposition with the habitus. Much of what Bourdieudescribes under the name of "practical theory" and which he believes justifies the conceptof the habitus is, in fact, quite radically incompatible with the habitus. This second strandin his writing, which emphasizes virtuosic, intersubjective social practice, offers a way outof the structure-agencyproblemwithoutrelapsinginto eithersubjectivismor objectivism.

    'Bourdieu has written on a wide rangeof subjects,which includes social theory (1977a, 1990a), ethnography(1977a, 1979), education(1977b, 1988, 1996), culture(1993), and class andconsumption(1984). A smallcottageindustryhas grown up around the various fields in which Bourdieu has worked;for instance, concerninghisanalysis of culture, see Fowler (1996, 1997), or for his examination of education, see Archer (1983), Gorder(1980).Sociological Theory18:3 November 2000? AmericanSociological Association. 1307 New YorkAvenueNW,Washington,DC 20005-4701

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    SOCIOLOGICALTHEORYInhighlightingthose passages in Bourdieu's workwhich pointto a "practical heory" hatoffers a way out of subject-objectdualism,I wantto do to Bourdieuwhat he seeks to do toothers:to "thinkwith a thinkeragainstthat thinker" Bourdieu1990b:49).2 I want to thinkwith Bourdieu's"practical heory"againstthe habitus.The existence of these two contradictorystrands within Bourdieu'swriting not onlyprovides an illuminatingfocus on the structure-agencydebate, suggesting a way beyondthis debate, but the opposing strandsin Bourdieu's writing explain the notably mixedreceptionof his workby commentators.On the one hand,the critics who have focused onthe notion of the habitushave argued-rightly, as I intend to show-that this concept slipsback into exactly the kind of objectivism Bourdieu refutes (e.g., Schatzki 1987, 1997;Bouveresse 1995; Brubaker1985; Jenkins 1982, 1993; DiMaggio 1979; Garnham andWilliams 1980; Lamont and Lareau 1988; de Certeau 1988). On the other hand, certainother commentatorshighlightingthose passages of Bourdieu's work which I would termhis "practical heory"maintainthat he has gone a long way towardovercoming the dual-ism of structureandagency, presentinga genuineadvancein social theory (e.g., Wacquant1987; Harker1984; Taylor 1993). These commentatorsalso rightly point to the progres-sive, "practical"element in Bourdieu's social theory but ignore the implications of thehabitus.By recognizing that there are two separableand, indeed, incompatiblestrands nBourdieu'swriting, this division between his commentatorsbecomes explicable.3In a recentpaper,Evens (1999) has recognized the ambivalence at the heartof Bour-dieu's writingswhere Bourdieu insists that he wantsto overcome the subject-objectdual-ism but then persistentlyreverts into a sophisticatedform of objectivism.Engaging withBourdieu,Evens tries to point toward a non-dualisticsocial theoryfounded on intersub-jective, meaningfulpractice.For Evens, Bourdieu is a materialistwho has failed to takeinto account the fundamentalhermeneutic nsight that even the most materialaspects ofsocial life areinherentlymeaningful,renderedpossible only by wider culturalunderstand-ings. Thus, Evens prioritizes"ethics,"by which he means this wider value-ladenculturalhorizon (Evens 1999: 7), above materialpower which is at the forefrontof Bourdieu'ssocial theory.ForEvens, "practice s morefundamentallya matterof ethics than of power"(Evens 1999:6). Evens' argument or a hermeneuticandintersubjective ociology againstobjectivist notions like the habitus is substantiallyechoed here. However, like most ofBourdieu's critics, Evens sees only the objectivist side of his work,althoughhe maintainsthat Bourdieuis a very sophisticated objectivist (Evens 1999: 9), and Evens fails to rec-ognize the "practical"dimension in Bourdieu'swork thatpoints towardsthe very theorywhich Evens proposes.Given that the overwhelmingbulk of Bourdieu'sworkis informeddirectly by the habitus and is, therefore,objectivist, this is a wholly understandablemis-take,but,despiteEvens' own evidentrespectfor Bourdieu,it does not finally dojustice toBourdieu'swork norexplainBourdieu's ncredulityatthe accusationsof objectivismwhichhave reasonablybeen madeof his work. It is necessaryto recognize these two competing,conflicting strands n Bourdieu'swork even if the "practical" imensionis the subordinateundercurrent.By recognizing this "practical heory,"Bourdieu'swriting comes to offer a

    2It is difficult to isolate the exact passages of purely "practical heory"in Bourdieu'swriting because this"practicalheory"often sits side by side with arguments or the habitusand,even as we shall see in one example,in the same sentence (e.g., Bourdieu 1990a: 12). However,the passage which proposes"practical heory"mostconsistently is the first fifteen pages of The Outline of a Theoryof Practice, althoughthe whole of the firstchapterremainsfor the most parttrueto this position.A commitment o "practicalheory" s also revealedin TheLogic of Practices (1990a), Chapter6, "The Workof Time,"thoughthe rest of that book exemplifies Bourdieu'sconfused oscillation between the objectivisthabitusand"practical heory" (e.g., Chapter3, "Structures,Habitus,Practice").3Dreyfusand Rabinow(1993) have notedthe tension in Bourdieu'swork and have argued hat Bourdieucannotreally be takenseriously on his own terms.

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    THINKINGWITHBORDIEU AGAINST BORDIEUgenuine advancein social theory,makinga substantialcontribution o the resolution of theagency-structuredebate.

    BOURDIEU'S "PRACTICALTHEORY"4In the opening pages of the Outline, Bourdieu argues that the social scientist's peculiarposition as a (putatively) impartialobserver who is an outsider to the social processesunder observation has had a nefarious effect on sociology.

    So long as he remains unaware of the limits inherent in his point of view on theobject, the anthropologistis condemned to adopt unwittingly for his own use therepresentation f action which is forced on agentsor groupswhenthey lackpracticalmastery of a highly valued competence and have to provide themselves with anexplicit and at least semi-formalized substitute for it in the form of a repertoire ofrules, or of what sociologists consider,atbest, as a 'role', i.e. a predetermined et ofdiscourses and actions appropriate o a particular stage-part'.(Bourdieu 1977a:2)ForBourdieu, he"objective"andexternalpositionwhich the social scientistadoptsensuresthat the social life understudy is misrepresented.Since anthropologistsand other socialscientists are outsiders to the social realities which they are studying, they invariablyconstructmaps, models, and rules by which they orient themselves around this strangecultural andscape.The anthropologist"compensates or lack of practical mastery by cre-atinga culturalmap"(Bourdieu 1977a:2), but the anthropologist hen takes this (staticandtimeless) map (only of use andinterestto the outsider n the firstplace) as evidence for theexistence of an objective system of rules which imposes itself remorselessly on socialinteraction.In positing the existence of inexorable rules or systems, anthropologistshavenot gained an insight into the way individualsactively andknowingly engage in everydayinteractionswith the skill of virtuosos (Bourdieu1977a:79), but ratherhave imposedtheirown curiousandcontemplativerelation to that social life onto nativepractices.Since theyas visiting intellectualshave to think of social life in termsof rules andprinciples(becausethey do not know it properly), they assume that native agents share this curious intellec-tualizing position. ForBourdieu,nativevirtuosos do not act accordingto preciserules andprinciples nor do they have a need for such rules, knowing the practicesof their culturebetter thanany set of rules could describe.ForBourdieu,social agentsare"virtuosos" 1977a: 79) who are notdominatedby someabstract social principles but who know the script so well that they can elaborate andimproviseuponthe themeswhich it providesandin the light of theirrelationswith others.Bourdieudescribessocial actors as havinga "sense of the game," using football and tennisplayersas examples of this virtuosic sense. These playersdo not applya priori principlesto theirplay-only beginnersneed to do that-but rather,having an intimate understand-ing of the object of the game and the kinds of situations it can throw up, they have thepracticalflexibility to know when and how they should runto the net or into space (1992:19, 120-21; 1990b:62; 1990a:66-67, 81; 1988: 783). Crucially,the "sense of the game"refersultimatelyto a sense of one's relationswith other individualsand what those indi-viduals will regardas tolerable,given certainbroadlysharedbut notdefinitiveunderstand-

    4AlthoughI cannot sustainthe claim here, I would arguethat,while Wittgenstein, Merleau-Ponty,and Nietz-sche areimportant o Bourdieu's"practical heory," he key influence is the existentialphenomenologyof MartinHeidegger.Thereare numerousreferenceswhich Bourdieumakes to Heidegger(see, for example,Bourdieu andWacquant1992: 122, 137;Bourdieu 1990b:5) Commentatorshave also noted this influence (e.g., Fowler 1997:35; Schatzki 1987: 113).

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    SOCIOLOGICALTHEORYings. Bourdieu's discussion of honor among the Kabyle highlights this intersubjectivesense of the game (againstindividualisticrule-following):

    Thedrivingof the wholemechanism s not some abstract rinciple principleof isotimy,equalityin honor),still less the set of ruleswhichcan be derived from it but the senseof honor,a dispositioninculcated n earlieryearsof life andconstantlyreinforcedbycalls to orderfrom the group. (Bourdieu 1977a: 14-15, second italics added)Kabylian men's sense of honor is a shifting agreementestablished and transformedbynegotiationbetweenKabylianmen. Individualsdo not solipsisticallyconsult a priori ruleswhich then determinetheir action independently,but rather ndividuals act accordingto asense of practicewhich is established andjudged by the group.The final determinationofcorrect action is not whether one rigorouslyfollowed an a priori rule but ratherwhetherone's actions are interpreted as appropriate and proper by other individuals. Otherindividuals-the group-decide whether an action is acceptable or sanctionable,giventheirsharedsense of honor;theycall those individualsto orderwho have actedagainstthissocially agreed sense of honor.Consequently,because appropriateaction is informedbygroupagreementwhich is only a negotiatedandtemporary ettlement,there s anopennessto practice.

    [I]f practices had as their principle the generative principle which has to be con-structedin order to account for them, that is, a set of independentand coherentaxioms, then the practices produced according to perfectly conscious generativerules would be strippedof everythingthat defines themas distinctively as practices,thatis, the uncertaintyand 'fuzziness' resultingfrom the fact thatthey have as theirprinciple not a set of conscious, constantrules, but practical schemes. (Bourdieu1990a: 12)5

    The term 'fuzziness' is significant for it refers to Wittgenstein's critiqueof rules in lan-guage games. Wittgenstein arguedthat rules are always social and, consequently,under-standableonly within the context of a social practice.Illustrating his point, Wittgensteinposes and answersthe rhetoricalquestion:"What s the criterion or the way the formula smeant?It is, for example, the kind of way we always use it, the way we aretaughtto useit" (Wittgenstein1974: ?190). The applicationof rules is not determinedby theirintrinsiclogic, as rationalistphilosopherswould have it, but by social agreement.Consequently,individuals may be able to justify certain actions to the group which are not, in fact,"given"by the rules butwhich arerecognized by the groupas appropriate. n this way, thecommonly held sense of honor might change. However, while under "practical heory"rulesdo not close actiondown, the fact thatpracticeshave to be continuallyreferred o theinformaltribunalof the groupmeans that individualscan certainly not do anythingtheylike. They are constrainedby other individuals.Moreover,because individualsare frombirthembedded n social relationswith otherindividuals,any actionthey perform s inev-itably social because it is derivedfrom theirsocially createdsense of practicelearntfromother individuals.Consequently,since they learnhow to act from others(rather hanbeingimposed upon by an objective structureas the habitussuggests), their repertoireof per-mittedactions is circumscribedby a particularculturalhorizon.That horizonis certainlybroad and "fuzzy,"but there is a limit to imaginableaction within it because individualscan only decide uponcourses of action learnt from or minimallyderivedfrom otherindi-

    5As we shall see, this passage slips towardthe very objectivismto which the notion of 'fuzziness' is opposed.

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    THINKINGWITH BORDIEUAGAINST BORDIEUviduals with whom an individual has some form of relationship.Individuals can neverinvent a purely individualistic and asocial act-unless they are actually insane. Underpracticaltheory, individuals are constrainedby being embedded in social relations withotherindividuals, whose opinions decide upon and informthe legitimacy of their actionsbut they are not determinedby rules which exist priorto social agreement.The sameemphasison intersubjectivevirtuosityis highlighted n Bourdieu'scritiqueofstructuralistaccountsof gift exchange.

    All experience of practice contradicts these paradoxes,and affirms that cycles ofreciprocityarenot the irresistiblegearingof obligatorypracticefoundonly in ancienttragedy:a gift may remainunrequited, f it meets with ingratitude:t maybe spurnedas an insult. (Bourdieu 1977a:9)

    Rather hanmerely enactinganalreadyestablishedsystemof exchange by the following ofrules, individualsrenegotiatetheir relations with other individualsby manipulatingcom-mon understandingsaboutgift exchange in their favor.However,this critiqueof structur-alist accountsof gift exchange is not only relevant because it emphasizesthe virtuosityofsocial actors and the intersubjectivenature of social life but it also reveals thatpracticaltheory undermines the notion of objective social or economic structures.When sociolo-gists talk of objective social or economic structures, hey reify the complex andnegotiatedexchanges over time between individuals nto a static,timeless system which exists beforeany individuals.Supposedly objective "structures"onsist only of individualsinvolved innegotiated exchanges with other individuals.Although it might be heuristicallyuseful todescribea complex systemof exchangeas "structure,"heimplicationof Bourdieu'saccountof gift exchange is thatthis so-called "structure"s only the simplifiedreificationof com-plex, negotiated,andever-changingrelationsbetweenindividuals,who areconstantlyrene-gotiatingtheir relations with each other. On his practical heory, ndividuals areembeddedin complex, constantly negotiated networks of relations with other individuals; isolatedindividuals do not standbeforeobjective structuresand rules which determine heir actionsbut in networksof relations which they virtuosically manipulate.Bourdieu's "practicaltheory,"which is articulated n certain passages in his writingsuch as the opening pages of the Outline,has extremely important mplicationsfor con-temporarystructureandagency debatesbecause it points towarda social ontology whichobviates the dualism of structureandagency.In those opening pages of the Outline,Bour-dieu undermines the notion of objective, determiningsocial rules and social structurewhich arepriorto individuals who are isolated from their social relations with other indi-viduals and placed before these rules or structure.6 n place of these objective rules or6The allegiance to this dualistic ontology of objective social structureor rules, on the one hand,andisolatedindividuals, on the other, is widespreadand, indeed, is dominant in contemporarysocial theory.It is demon-strated in the works of Bhaskar (1979, 1986, 1991, 1993), Archer (1988, 1995), Porpora(1993), the realisttradition more widely (e.g., Sayer, 1992), Giddens (1984, 1988), and a host of other figures such as Layder(1981) and Mouzelis (1995). Giddens is interestinghere in that his structurationheoryis markedby the sametension as Bourdieu's writing where he recognizes the intersubjectivenatureof social life but overlays thisinteractiveontology-expressed in the conceptof "practical onsciousness"-with a dualisticone, expressedby

    his conceptof "structure." or a longerdiscussion andcritiqueof the dualisticontologies of these theorists-andparticularlytheir solipsistic foundations-see King 1998a, 1998b, 2000. Significantly,even though Habermashas importantlyemphasizedthe solipsistic basis of much Westernphilosophyandcogently argued or the need torecognize the centralityof social interaction n any seriousphilosophy (e.g., Habermas1987a), he himself slipstowards this kind of dualistic ontology of objective structureand isolated individual in The Theory of Commu-nicative Action (1987b) where he opposes the "life world" to the "system."The dominance of this dualisticontology in contemporary ocial theory todayrendersBourdieu's"practical heory" mportantbecause it, alongwith otherhermeneuticor Wittgensteinian heorists such as Gadamer(1975), Winch (1977) andTaylor(1995),offers a route out of the theoretical difficulties which arise out of this dualism of agent and structure.

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    SOCIOLOGICALTHEORYstructureswhich areimposeduponisolatedindividuals,Bourdieu's"practicalheory"high-lights the mutualnegotiationof social relationsbetween individuals.Social life does notconsist of a sychronic mapor system which imposes itself uponthe individual butonly ofpracticalandnegotiated nteractionsbetween individuals.By replacingstructure ndagencywith interacting,social individuals,Bourdieu has overcome manyof the dualisms of con-ventional social theory.On this "practical heory,"there is no longer the individual andsociety, the subjectand the object,but only individualsinteractingwith other individuals.However,even in proposingthis "practical heory,"which emphasizesintersubjectivevir-tuositywithin the context of widernetworksof individuals,Bourdieu,apparentlyunknow-ingly, slips away from its ontological implicationstoward the very objectivism which hesought to refute;even in the midst of "practical heory,"he still held onto notions of apriori, deterministicstructureson which individuals drew solipsistically.Never fully ban-ishing those conceptsfrom his writing,Bourdieuallowed themto gaindominanceover histhinking.The conceptof the habitusconstitutes the moment of regressioninto objectivismand, therefore,back into the very dualism of structureand agency which Bourdieu hadalready substantiallysuperseded.THE HABITUSWith his "practical heory,"Bourdieu overcomes the impasse of objectivism and subjec-tivism or structureandagency by highlightingthe virtuosic andindeterminate nteractionsbetweenmutuallysusceptibleandconstraining ndividuals.However,from this initial state-ment of "practicaltheory"he introduces the concept of the habitus which he believesfollows from whathe has initiallyarguedbutwhich, in fact, operateswith a quitedifferent,objectivist idea of social reality.The central reason for Bourdieu'sunwittingreversion toobjectivismis that he never fully renouncedclaims to certainobjective (timeless) featuresof social life in the vway hat his "practical heory" implied. This residue of objectivismbecomes particularlyapparent n TheLogic of Practices where objectivist claims remainunchallenged,even though they are logically incompatiblewith the ontology of Bourdi-eu's "practicaltheory."Thus, in defining what he considers to be a theory of practice,Bourdieuinsists that:

    [O]ne has to return o practice,the site of the dialectic of opus operatumand modusoperandi;of objectifiedproductsandincorporatedproductsof historicalpractice:ofstructuresandhabitus(Bourdieu 1990a:52)

    By opus operatum,which strictly means "the work which has been done" but which istraditionallyused to refer to the divinely createduniverse,Bourdieu refers to those objec-tive and priorcultural and structural eaturesof a society (which, like the universe, arebeyondhumans)while the modusoperandi the mode of operating-refers to the practi-cal strategieswhich individualsadopt.Thus,althoughBourdieuoriginally emphasizesthepracticalandintersubjectivenatureof social life, arguing(especially in his critiqueof thegift) againstthe assumptionof an autonomoussystem or set of social rules (anopus oper-atum,in effect), herehe makesa ratherdifferentclaim. Society no longerconsists only ofinteractionsbetween individuals,but ratherBourdieu sees society as a dialectic betweenpracticeand structure.Despite the implicationsand explicit claims of "practical heory,"Bourdieunever in the end sustains thatchallenge to objectivismand the concept of struc-ture but only says that we need to think aboutpractice as well as structure.We need toemphasize practiceand its relation to structurerather hanradicallyunderminestructureby consideringthe implicationsof the practicalandintersubjectivenatureof social reality.

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    THINKINGWITHBORDIEUAGAINSTBORDIEUAs we have seen, Bourdieu's nitial emphasison the intersubjectivepracticebetween indi-viduals rendersappeals to structureas the untenableandunnecessaryerrorsof intellectu-alizing and individualizing sociologists. Yet, here he reinstatesstructure,and the radicalimplicationsof his initial espousal of intersubjectivepracticeare lost. Bourdieu'stheoret-ical pusillanimity,when he fails to takethe implicationsof his "practical heory"seriously,markshis retreat o objectivism, and the habitusbecomes the key vehicle for thatretreat.Announcingthat surrender o objectivism, Bourdieudefines the habitus in the follow-ing way:

    The conditionings associated with a particularclass of conditions of existence pro-duce the habitus,systems of durable, ransposabledispositions, structured tructurespredisposedto function as structuring tructures, hat s, as principleswhich generateand organize practices and representation.(Bourdieu 1990a: p.53; also 1977: 78,84,85)7

    The habituscomprisesperceptualstructuresandembodieddispositionswhichorganizetheway individuals see the world and act in it; "thecognitive structureswhich social agentsimplement in their practicalknowledge of the social world are internalized,embodiedsocial structures"Bourdieu1984:468). Crucially, his habitus s deriveddirectlyfrom thesocioeconomic or structuralposition in which individualsfind themselves. Thus, individ-uals unconsciously internalize their objective social conditions, such as their economicclass, so thatthey have the appropriateastesandperformthe appropriate racticesfor thatsocial position:[T]he principle division into logical classes which organizes the perceptionof thesocial worldis itself theproductof theinternalization f the division of social classes.(Bourdieu 1984: 170)

    Bourdieuarguesthatindividualsdemonstratean "amor ati"(a love of destiny) (Bourdieu1984: 244) wherein they automaticallyfulfil the appropriate ole for theirobjective situ-ation. Individualsautomatically ive out an objective social destiny as a result of the hab-itus.8Not only does Bourdieuemphasize heexistenceof objectiveeconomic andconceptualstructures the habitus),but the interactional, ntersubjectiveelement of social life whichwas central to his "practicaltheory" is effaced by a solipsistic theory where the loneindividual is now attachedto an objective social structure.Thereareno "calls to orderbythe group"norany subtleconsiderationof thereactionsof otherswhenBourdieudiscussesthe habitus, nor does there need to be, for the habitus ensures that the individual willinevitablyact accordingto the logic of the situation.The originof individuals'actions liesnot in their nteractionwithother ndividualsbutin the objectivestructureswhichconfrontthem. It is to those structures,the opus operatum,not others, to whom they must nowdefer.

    Significantly,Bourdieuarguesthat the tastes which the habitusproducesand the kindsof social practiceswhich it determinesare deeply inscribed in the very bodies of individ-

    7Commentators ave also defined the habitus n this way (e.g. Garnham1986:425; Jenkins1993:81; Schatzki1987: 133).8In fact, as Schatzkihas noted, Bourdieuclaims that there is a directlinkage of taste to economic conditionswhich Schatzki rightly criticizes as a category error (1987: 131-2). Bourdieu has defended his notion of thehabitus(1992: 140) by asking critics to analyzenot his theoreticaldefinition of it but his use of it, for instance,in the 500-page work, The State Nobility (1996b). On my reading, thatwork in no way obviates the criticismsmade here or by othercritics.

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    SOCIOLOGICALTHEORYuals. Thus, Bourdieudescribes the way in which the tastes imposed by our class are notprimarilyintellectual propertiesbut are embodied by us so that we have an instinctivebodily reactionagainstthose things which do not fit our habituses (Bourdieu 1984: 486,478). Bourdieu,for instance,describes the bowed deportmentof Kabylianwomen whichdenotesphysically andsymbolicallytheirpolitical subordination n thatsociety (Bourdieu1979). Bourdieu'semphasison the body is a useful antidoteto the intellectualistemphasisof muchsocial theory,and his discussion of the physical manifestationsof taste and of thesymbolismof the body in social practiceseems both accurateandhighly illuminating.It istrue that the way we conduct ourselves corporally s centralto social life andthat,in fact,successful bodily conduct has to become second natureto be successful. We have to act"naturally"o be takenseriouslyas social actors.However,althoughBourdieu s correcttohighlight the centralityof the body to social life, his account of how the society inscribesitself on the humanbody is objectivistand determinist.9The habitus,which is determinedby the social conditionsin which anindividual ives, imposescertain forms of practiceandconduct on the bodies of individuals,who in the endunknowinglyembodythe "structuringstructure" f the habitus.This unconscious embodimentof social structureby means of the habitus s revealed invariouspassages.

    Each agent, wittingly or unwittingly, willy nilly, is a producerand reproducerofobjective meaning.Because his actions andworks are the productof a modusope-randi of which he is not the producerand has no conscious mastery, hey contain an"objectiveintention,"as the Scholastics put it, which always outrunshis consciousintentions . . . It is because subjects, strictly speaking, do not know what they aredoing thatwhat they do has moremeaningthanthey know. (Bourdieu 1977: 79)

    It is notablethat,in this passage, it is not simply that individuals have no control over theobjective social andculturalstructureswhich confrontthem, the opus operatum,but theynow also have "no conscious mastery"over even their modusoperandi, their individualsocial strategies. In arguingthat individuals are dominatedby objective social realities,Bourdieustrikinglyreneges on the claims which he madein his discussion in the openingpages of the Outlinewherehe explicitly rejectedthe reductionof social life to "arepertoireof rules" or a "role"with "apredetermined et of discourses and actions appropriateo aparticular stage-part'" Bourdieu1977a:2). This slide from his "practical heory," mpha-sizing intersubjectivevirtuosity,into an objectivist social theoryis nowhere moreclearlydemonstratedhan n a sentencefrom theLogic of Practices alreadycited above (Bourdieu1990a:8). Havingclaimed thatpracticesare"fuzzy"becausethey are not determinedby apriori rules but by intersubjectiverenegotiation,he writes in the final clause of this sen-tence that practices "have as their principle not a set of conscious, constant rules, butpracticalschemes, opaqueto theirpossessors, varyingaccordingto the logic of the situa-tion"(Bourdieu 1990a: 12). So keen is he to avoid a rationalistaccountof rule-following,where the rules determine action by force of logic, he asserts that social practicesare infact governed by unknown,opaquerules which social agents apply withoutthinkingandwithoutreally knowing. In directcontradictionwith his "practical heory,"he is not claim-ing that individualsknow a practiceso well that they do not need rules or thatrules areonly in the end loose descriptionsof practicesto which they are inadequatebut that therules or schemas which determinepracticeand which are physically embodied are now

    9See Evens 1999, 15-16.

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    THINKINGWITHBORDIEUAGAINST BORDIEUunknownto social agents. Such a formulationcompoundsthe intellectualisterrorbecauseobjective rules are still seen to determine social life but these rules are now not evenknown to the individualswho putativelyfollow them.

    In arguingfor the habitus,it is notjust that Bourdieureneges upon his commitmenttothe virtuosityof individualactors,which was one of the centralelements of his "practicaltheory."In addition, he renounces the ontological implications of his "practical heory"implicit in his discussionof gift exchange, which impliedthatsociety consistedonly of thecomplex interactions between individuals. Bourdieureturns instead to a dualistic socialontology of objective structureand subordinated ndividual.

    The habitus is the productof the work of inculcation andappropriation ecessaryinorderfor those productsof collective history,the objective structures e.g. of lan-guage, economy,etc.) to succeed in reproducing hemselves more orless completely,in the form of durabledispositions, in organisms(which one can, if one wishes, callindividuals)lastingly subjectedto the sameconditions of existence. (Bourdieu1977:85).The virtuoso (now only an organism) s reducedto a culturaldope while collective history,language, and the economy are given objective status and agency. The "productsof col-lective history"now reproducethemselves by imposing a habitusupon unknowingindi-viduals. Such an objectivist and dualistic vision is incompatiblewith Bourdieu'scritiqueof structuralistccountsof giftexchangewherehe demonstratedhatsystemsof giftexchangeare not things which have existence or agency in themselves but are only complex net-works of interactionsbetween individuals over time. The productsof collective history,language,andthe economy do notreproduce hemselves.Rather, ndividualsmaintainandtransform heirmutuallyconstrainingrelations with otherindividuals,and to argueother-wise is to fall into the very forms of intellectualizingreificationwhich Bourdieuinitiallyrejected.In fact, when Bourdieu connects the habitus to the "field," by which he means theobjective structureof unequalpositionswhich accumulatearoundanyform of practice,theflexibility which Bourdieuintends to be presentin the concept of the habitus-but whichin fact is ruled out by the concept-appears. The notion of habitus begins to lose itsrigidity. Individuals begin to transform their habitus strategically,given their relationswith others,in orderto establishtheirdistinctionfromothergroupsandindividuals in thefield. Thus, in the field of consumption and class, Bourdieu describes how the upperclasses have to adopt new fashions in the light of the diffusion of their tastes amongsubordinateclasses (Bourdieu 1984: 160-65). The connectionof the habitusto the field,which allows for a degree of intersubjectivestruggle and change, provides a richerandmore convincing account of social life which is much closer to "practical heory."How-ever, even by connecting the habitus to the field Bourdieu has not rid the habitus of itsproblems.His incorporationof the habitus nto strugglesaround he field andits opennessto change in these strugglesis at odds with his formaldefinitionof the habitus.Strictly,hecannotallow individualsthe choices or strategieswhich he gives themwhen he discussesthe field because any choice individuals can makearealways already given by the habituswhich is itself determinedby theirobjective,priorand,therefore,unchangeablepositioninthe field. If he is seriousaboutthe openness of the habitus to transformation,henhe mustreformulatethe habitus, rejecting the definitions cited above, and returnto notions like"the sense of the game" which featured in his practical theory and which emphasizedintersubjectivenegotiation.Moreover,the conceptof thefield is notwithout its difficulties

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    SOCIOLOGICALTHEORYfor it refers to objective structuresof power and materialinequality and, therefore,for-mally rules out the flexibility which the passages in which it is employed suggest. Bour-dieuargues hat"to think n terms o a field is to thinkrelationally" BourdieuandWacquant1992: 96) but not relationallyin the sense suggestedby Bourdieu'spracticaltheory.

    What exist in the social world are relations-not interactionsbetween agents andintersubjectiveties between individuals but objective relations which exist "inde-pendent of individual consciousness and will," as Marx says. ... In analytic terms afield may be defined as a network,or a configurationof objective relation betweenpositions. (BourdieuandWacquant1992: 97)

    The field's conception of these inequalities as objective, prioreconomic realities beforeany individualactionor consciousness cannotbe sustainedfor it suggests in Durkheimianfashion that society has some independentand metaphysicalexistence independentlyofindividuals. Consequently,althoughwhen connected to the field the habitus suggests aricheraccountof social life because it highlights the struggleinherent n social life, bothconcepts fail to provide an adequatesociology because they transformthe interactionsbetween individuals into objective, systemic properties which are prior to individuals.Once society has beenturned nto anobjectiverather hanintersubjective eality by theuseof concepts like the habitusor field, individualagency andintersubjectivenegotiationandstrugglearenecessarilycurtailed,even thoughthatmaynotbe the intentionof the theorist.Even so, Bourdieugenuinelybelieves thatthehabitusovercomestheproblemof subject-object dualismin social theoryand thatthe habitusis consistentwith his wider theoryofpracticewhichhighlightsindividuals'virtuosityandthe mutabilityof intersubjective ocialrelations. For instance, when questioned by Loic Wacquantabout the criticisms madeabout the determinismof his habitus,Bourdieuhas simply denied this determinism.

    LW: You thus reject the deterministicschema sometimes attributed o you with theformula"structures roducehabitus,which determinepractices,whichproducestruc-tures;"(Bidet 1979;Jenkins 1982; Gorder1980; Giroux 1982) thatis, the idea thatposition in structuredirectlydeterminessocial strategy.Circularandmechanicalmodels of this kindarepreciselywhatthe notion of habitusis designed to help us destroy.(BourdieuandWacquant1992: 134)

    Bourdieusees the habitusas allowing room for slippage so that it mediates between theopusoperatumof structure ndthemodusoperandiof practice,heavily constrainingsocialactionbut not definitively determining t. Bourdieuis rightto insist thathe meantto givethe habitusthis flexibility as it would be untenableto arguethat social life is completelydetermined-and against the implicationsof much of what he says. Yet, despite Bourdi-eu's claims of how the habitus s meantto operate,the definitionwhichBourdieugives thehabituspreventsit from doing anythingotherthaneffacing the virtuosityof social actorsand the intersubjectivenatureof social reality. If we read Bourdieu strictly, the habitusmarksthe momentwhen Bourdieucollapses back into the very sociological objectivismwhich he putativelyrejected,returningonce again to the dualistic social ontology of theisolated individual,on the one hand,andobjective structure,on the other.However,sincethere is a second strandin Bourdieu's writing, his "practicaltheory,"it is possible toreconstructwhatBourdieureally intended.It is possible to extracta social theoryfromhisworkwhichgenuinelyavoids"thecircularandmechanicalmodels"of objectivistsociology.

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    THINKINGWITH BORDIEU AGAINST BORDIEUTHE CRITIQUEOF THE HABITUSA. The Habitus and Social ChangeThe disjunctionbetween the habitusand practicaltheory in Bourdieu'swritings and thesociological superiorityof practical heoryover the habitus s graphicallydemonstratedbythe problemof social change as various critics have noted (e.g., Garnhamand Williams1980: 222; Gorder 1980: 344; Swartz 1977: 554, Wacquant1987: 81, Brubaker1985:759). The problem,as these critics have argued, s this: If the habitus were determinedbyobjective conditions,ensuringappropriate ction for the social position in which any indi-vidual was situated,and the habituswere unconsciously internalizeddispositions andcat-egories, then social change would be impossible. Individuals would act accordingto theobjective structuralconditions in which they found themselves, and they would conse-quentlysimply reproducehoseobjectiveconditionsbyrepeating hesamepractices.DespiteBourdieu's claim that the habitus enables "agents to cope with unforeseen and ever-changing situations"(Bourdieu 1977: 72), if his definition of the habitus is taken at itsword, then these new situations could never arise nor could the habitusallow any trans-formation n practice.Social practiceswouldbe determinedbyaprioridispositions,embod-ied unknowinglyby social agents, and consequently,theirflexibility andcreativityin theface of changing situations would be curtailed. Since the habitus imposes itself upon"willy nilly,"they can never construct new strategiesfor new situationsbecause they arenot aware of their habituses and, therefore,cannot begin to reinterpret hem. Moreover,since everyone in society has a habitus, individuals will never actually be faced withunforeseenand ever-changingsituations,because everyone else, informedby theirhabi-tus, would simply go on repeatingtheirsocial practicesandreproducing heirsocial rela-tions. Thus, the habitusrules out the possibility of social change. Significantly,the habitusformallyrules out any externalinterventionwhich has always been a key motor for socialtransformation ecause individuals n othersocieties, operatingunder heir own habituses,will be similarly constrained in their activities and will not seek out new contacts withothergroups. Clearly,suchrigidity,which is entirelyatodds with Bourdieu's ntentions, suntenable,but this reductioad absurdum s formally implicitin the habitus,demonstratingthe serious limitations of this concept.Inorder o circumvent he formalimmutabilityof thehabitus,Bourdieuhas to constructa theory of social change for the habitus,and, in doing so, he moves unwittinglyback tohis practicaltheory.In order to allow for the mutabilitywhich is manifest in social life,Bourdieudevelops the notion of the hysteresis effect (Bourdieu 1984: 142; 1996: 157;1990a:59).?OThe hysteresiseffect refers to the physicalphenomenonwherebythere is lagtime between the actual reversal of a magnet's poles and the point when that reversalbegins to take effect, the differentends of the magnetnow repellingnorthor south whereonce they attracted hose poles. Inrelation to the habitusand social change, the hysteresiseffect occurs when the habituslags behind the objective materialconditions which gaverise to it and with which the habitus has to catch up. The most striking example of thehysteresiseffect in Bourdieu'swritingis HomoAcademicus(1996a) whereestablishmentacademics in the late 1960s were still operatingwith a habitus which was anachronistic othe changing realities in higher education. Bourdieusummarizes this situation in a laterwork:

    The categoriesof perceptionthatagents applyto the social world are the productofa priorstate of this world.Whenstructuresaremodified,even slightly,the structuralI'?Harker1984) thinks the habitus is capable of explaining change by means of a notion of "slippage"; or"slippage"read"hysteresis," o which the following criticisms of the hysteresiseffect apply.

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    THINKINGWITH BORDIEU AGAINST BORDIEUnew social relations and practices in their relationswith each other,public discussion ofthe sense of the honor can transform he notionof honorin Kabyle society so thatit comesto define a set of practices as honorable which might have previously been regardedasdishonorable. Since, on Bourdieu's "practical theory,"social relations and the culturalunderstandingswhich inform those relations exist only insofar as individualsrecreateandagree upon them in their interactions with each other,social change is intrinsicto Bour-dieu's "practical heory"where it is an embarrassment o the habitus.

    B. The Reductiveness of the HabitusAlthough the habitus fails to provide an explanationof social change, its great strengthseems to lie, as certaincommentatorshave suggested (Collins 1989:463; Wacquant1987:81), in the fact that it does providea convincing account of social reproduction. nfact, thehabitus is inadequateeven to this taskfor it only explains social reproductionby casting ashroudof deadeningobjectivismover living interactionsbetween virtuosicindividuals.Itsaccount of social reproduction s a parodyof the actualprocess by which social relationsare sustained.Inplace of thecomplexrenegotiationof relationsbetweenindividuals,whichalways leaves room for transformation, he habitus reduces social reproductionto themechanicalimpositionof priorsocial structureonto the practicesof individuals,returningto the very systemic image of social life which Bourdieu nitially rejectedin his critiqueofstructuralist ccounts of gift exchange. Ironically, hereductivenessof thehabitusbecomesclearest in Bourdieu's own writings.Ina celebratedearly essay, Bourdieudescribes how thepracticalsense of honor nformsthe action of virtuoso social performers(1979). Bourdieudiscusses the case of a well-known man of honor whose newly built wall is stolen by an individualin Kabyle societywho is recognizedto have no honor,anamahbul(1979: 95-6). The man of honorrebuildsthe wall at his own cost andthen complainsto the brotherof the amahbul. The brotherofthe amahbul assumes that the honorable manboth wants him to complainto the amahbulandarrangecompensationfrom the amahbul.At the mereprospectof compensationfromthe amahbul,the man of honor flies off the handle, insisting thathe wants nothing of thesort, he just wants the brother o let amahbul know he has done wrong (1979: 97).12Theman of honor,whose wall has been brokendown, cannotbe seen to come into confronta-tion with an amahbul-or worse, to accept compensationfrom him-for that would beimplyingthat the honorableman was of equalstatuswith theamahbul.His honor would beirreparably mpugned,consequently.However, althoughthe man of honor cannot acceptany compensationor, indeed,anyrelationshipwith theamahbul, hrough helatter'sbrother,he does want to exert informaland, more importantly, nvisible pressureon the dishonor-able man to bringhim into line.The subtlety of this honorable man's actions following the demolition of his wall isnot given by a set of rules derived from any principleof honor which the man consults.The "reproduction" f his honorable social position does not in any way follow on fromthe implementationof rigid social rules, embodied in a habitus. This man constructs asequence of actions, given the fact that he is a man of honordealing with a dishonorableman, whereby he seeks to make the best of a bad situation.No rule or set of rules couldpossibly legislate for all the myriadof contingencies that might occur (as a result of thevirtuosic acts of other individuals, such as the amahbul), and the Kabyle themselves

    12Infact, Bourdieuarguesthatthe man of honor flies off the handlebecause the brotherof the amahbulbetraysthe principleof family solidarity(1979: 97). I disagreewith this interpretation ndby arguing or the incidentinthe way I do, everythingbecomes explicable in terms of the man's attempt o preservehis honorwithout extra-neous appealsto otherculturalunderstandings uch as family solidarity.

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    SOCIOLOGICALTHEORYhave no need of such a definitive rule. Honorablepracticesare not determinedby refer-ence to a rule but by reference to the opinions of those honorableKabylian men wholook to past practice and to the individual's standingto determine whether a course ofaction was honorable. The very difficulty for the man of honor is that it is an extraordi-naryand abnormaloccurrence. He has to invent his own strategy(not given by rules) inorder to effect some (invisible) sanction on the amahbul without the loss of face amonghis peers. Given his position and his understandingof honor in Kabyle society, the manof honor develops a novel strategyderived from his own self-understandingand his an-ticipationof how others will perceive this course of action. His sense of honor suggeststhis course of action to him, but unlike the habitus which imposes actions andcategorieson the individual, the man of honor could have adopted very different courses of action.He could have written off the wall completely, concluding that talking even with thebrotherof the amahbul was dishonorable.Alternatively,he could have been so certain ofhis own honor thathe could have reclaimed his wall from the amahbulas if that man didnot exist and, perhaps,even physically assaulted the amahbul in retaliation;since theamahbuldoes not deserve the respect due to men of honor,he could have been beatenlike a dog.Significantly, the man of honor could have created a strategyfor himself which haddisastrousresultsbecause it was viewed as inappropriate nd dishonorableby otherKaby-lian men. Such disasters arelogically ruled out by the objectivehabitus which insists on acompletefit betweenthe individual'spracticesand his objective circumstancesand,there-fore, reducessocial reproduction o an inevitability.Forinstance,the unwillingnessof theman of honorto confrontthe amahbulphysically andsimply reappropriatehe wall (treat-ing the amahbul with the dishonor he deserved) might have been takenby other men inKabyle society as a sign of weakness and, therefore,of dishonor.It is conceivable that theman of honor's strategy might be wrong, given its interpretationby other Kabylianmen.The habituswhich determines action directly,leaves no room for error,mistake,or con-scious enfringement or,under ts cold survey, ndividualsbecome like numbers n a math-ematicalequation n which therecan, logically, only be one answer.In social life, mistakescan happen;strategiescan go wrong. We can misjudgethe sense of the game establishedloosely andopenly in calls to orderfrom the group.The appropriateness f ourpractices-and of the Kabylianman of honor's strategies-is determinednot by their concurrencewith some a priori rule but ratherby whetherother individualssee it as socially appropri-ate andin line withcommunalnotions of social orderandlegitimacy.It is this widerpublicunderstandingwhich determinesthe acceptabilityof an action rather hanany rule itself.Since social reality consists only of interactingvirtuosos, there is never any original orpristinesocial orderto be reproduced.Moreover,the simplistic social reproductionwhichthe habitus envisions, where objective conditions are directly replicated, never occurssince virtuosos are continually renegotiatingand, therefore, subtly altering their socialrelations.The maintenanceof broad social stability,where social conditions remainrea-sonably similar-though always slowly changing-for significantperiods, is actuallythecomplex result of the interactionsof skilful individuals.

    CONCLUSION:BEYONDAGENCYAND STRUCTUREBourdieu'ssociology is anattempt o overcometheimpasseof objectivismandsubjectivismin social theory by explaining social life without resorteitherto facile (Sartrean)volunta-rismor to deterministic Levi-Straussian) tructuralism.Throughouthis writings,Bourdieuhasattempted o show how wider social realityis implicated n apparently ubjective,indi-vidual thoughtsandpractices.This is an importantproject,which Bourdieusuccessfully

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    THINKINGWITHBORDIEUAGAINSTBORDIEUachieves in those partsof his writingthatI have termedhis "practical heory."This "prac-tical theory"overcomes the impasseof objectivismandsubjectivismbecauseit recognizesthatappealsto the existence of objective social structureor culture are reificationsof par-ticularmoments nthesocialprocesswhichconsists, infact,of individuals nteractingmean-ingfullywith other ndividuals.On this"practicalheory," ociallife is themutuallynegotiatednetworkof interactionsandpracticesbetween individualswhich is always necessarily opento strategic ransformation.However, he dissolutionof objectivestructurentocomplex figu-rations of practicesbetween individuals does not involve a retreat nto subjectivism.13Onthecontrary,all individualpracticeandtheunderstandingswhich inform hatpracticeare al-ways social;theyarealwayslearnt rom others andperformed n reference o others,requir-ing the understanding f otherindividuals,even if a particular ndividualmightrejectandignore thatinterpretation.Thus, the amahbulmay ignorewhatKabylianmen think of himbut Kabylians'interpretation f him as lackinghonor has a severe effect on his social life.Theintersubjective ocial context nwhich we arealways already hrownconstrainsourprac-tices and ensures thatany practicewe perform s social-it is always derived from sharedunderstandings-but thatcontextdoes not determine xactlywhatwe will do orexactlywhatit is appropriateo do underany circumstance.We can neverperforma pristine,individualact (as Sartre'sexistentialismwrongly demands),but there is always indeterminacy n therelationsbetweenindividuals,which allows forintersubjectivelymeaningfulbut creativeso-cial action. The supersessionof theimpasseof objectivismandsubjectivism,of agencyandstructure,ies alongthepractical, nteractionalpathto which, atcertainmoments,Bourdieulucidly points.Unfortunately,or thegreaterpartof hisimpressiveoeuvre,Bourdieuhas failedto take his own greatest nsightseriously,and he hasslippedintothevery objectivismwhosepoverty he has done so much to highlight.ACKNOWLEDGEMENTSI am gratefulto ProfessorsBarryBarnes,RobertWitkin,CraigCalhoun,andtwo anony-mous referees for theircomments on earlier drafts of this article.

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    1'3AlthoughBourdieu believes that the phenomenological and hermeneutic traditions are subjectivist (e.g.,Bourdieu 1977:5, Ch.2; 1990a:25-26, 135, 140; 1990b: 125), in fact, his "practicalheory"offers a verysimilaraccountof social life offered by prominent igures in the interpretive radition.Thus, althoughI cannotexpanduponthe claim here, I would arguethose social theories which have been influencedby HeideggerandWittgen-stein and, above all, the hermeneuticphilosophy of Winch (1977), Gadamer(1975) and CharlesTaylor(1995)(and also Elias' figurational sociology, 1978), are compatible with Bourdieu's "practical theory" since theygroundsocial life in the meaningfulinteractionbetween individualsandreject appealsto objective structure.

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