-
1
Understanding and Improving Intelligence Analysis:
Learning from other Disciplines
12-13 July, 2012 * London, England * RAF Club
The purpose of this conference is to engage in a
cross-disciplinary discussion about the value of learning
from other fields to improve both the understanding and the
practice of intelligence analysis. It will also
create the network and infrastructure for an international
research collaboration for the study of
intelligence analysis.
Intelligence, like journalism, involves the acquisition,
evaluation, and dissemination of information. In
1949, Sherman Kent, described as the father of US intelligence
analysis, said:
Intelligence organizations must also have many of the qualities
of those of our greatest metropolitan newspapers. They watch,
report, summarize, and analyze. They have their foreign
correspondents and home staff. They have their responsibilities for
completeness and accuracywith commensurately greater penalties for
omission and error. . . They even have the problem of editorial
control. Intelligence organizations (should) put more study upon
newspaper organization and borrow those
phases of it which they require.
But the similarities between intelligence analysis and
journalism are not unique. Professionals in other
fieldsincluding medicine, the social and behavioural sciences,
history and historiography, anthropology and other disciplines
engaged in ethnographic research, econometric forecasting, and
legal reasoningalso face many similar challenges to those that
exist in intelligence analysis, including:
Difficulties acquiring information from a wide variety of
sources
Vetting and evaluating the information that is acquired
Deriving understanding and meaning from that information
Impact of deadlines, editing, and other production processes on
accuracy of analysis and assessment
Problems in dissemination and distribution to consumers or
customers
Managing relationship between producer and consumer (role,
responsibility, independence & objectivity)
Developing professional infrastructure (recruit, select, train,
& develop personnel; code of ethics)
Overcoming impact of changing technology and alternative
information distribution systems
How do practitioners in various non-intelligence fields overcome
these kinds of challenges? How are their
challenges similar to or different from those that exist in the
intelligence arena? What can be learned from
the comparison?
This event has been funded through a grant from the Brunel
University Research and Innovation Fund.
They are organized and hosted by Brunel Universitys Centre for
Intelligence and Security Studies in collaboration with University
of Mississippis Center for Intelligence and Security Studies.
-
2
Conference agenda Day 1: Thursday 12 July
8:00 Registration and Coffee
9:30 Welcome Part 1: Stephen Marrin (Brunel University):
Learning from Other Disciplines, including Medicine and
Journalism
10:00 Comparisons to Other Fields Part 1 Chair: Stephen Marrin
(Brunel University)
David Chuter (Center for Security Sector Management; Cranfield
University): Intelligence Analysis as a Type of Information
Processing
Michael Robinson (Deloitte and Touche, LLP): Intelligence
Analysis and Digital Forensics
Carl Jensen (University of Mississippi): Intelligence Analysis
and Futures Methodology
11:00 Break
11:30 Comparisons to Other Fields Part 2 Chair: Carl Jensen
(University of Mississippi)
Anne Bishop (Snell & Wilmer, LLP, Phoenix AZ): Intelligence
Analysis and Legal Reasoning
Anthony C. Cain (Air Force Research Institute): Intelligence
Analysis and Professional Journal
Publishing
William Lawhead (University of Mississippi): Seeing Is Not
Believing: Insights for Intelligence
Analysis from Professional Magicians.
12:30 Lunch
1:30 Intelligence Analysis and Social Science
Chair: Stephen Marrin (Brunel University) Stefania Paladini
(Coventry University): Bayesian analysis in intelligence and social
sciences: a tool
for all trades?"
2:30 Break
3:00 Intelligence Analysis and History Chair: Philip Davies
(Brunel University)
Melissa Graves (University of Mississippi): Intelligence
Analysis and Historiography
Howard Clarke (The Intelligence Solutions Group) Seekers after
Truth: Cross-Disciplinary Insights
for the Intelligence Profession from the Biblical and
Theological Studies Discipline
WJR Gardner (Naval Historical Branch, UK Ministry of Defence):
The Unreliable Memoirs of an
Applied Historian and Operational Analyst and
4:00 Break
4:15 Intelligence Analysis and Perception Chair: Melissa Graves
(University of Mississippi)
Patricia Rooney (National Ground Intelligence Center, US Army)
and Peter Ronayne (Federal
Executive Institute): Neuroscience in Intelligence Analysis:
Understanding How the Brain Works and
Its Impact on Analytic Decision Making
Musa Tuzuner (Intelligence Studies Research Center; Turkish
National Police Academy): Multi-
Level Cognitive Biases in the Chain of Intelligence FlowFrom
Source to Consumers Mandeep Dhami (University of Surrey):
Intelligence Analysis and Decision Science (Putting the
Science into the Art of Intelligence Analysis)
5:30 Day One Adjourns
-
3
Conference agenda Day 2: Friday 13 July
8:00 Registration and Coffee
9:30 Welcome Part 2
9:45 Evaluating Intelligence John Kringen (former CIA Director
of Intelligence; Institute for Defence Analysis): Judging
Intelligence Success and Failure
10:45 Evaluating Intelligence
Chair: Philip Davies (Brunel University)
Stephen Marrin (Brunel University): Evaluating the Quality of
Intelligence Analysis: By
What (Mis) Measure?
Rhiannon Gainor and France Bouthillier (McGill University):
Measuring Intelligence
Success: Conceptual and Methodological Challenges of
Intelligence Measurement
11:15 Break
11:30 Intelligence Analysis and the Dismal Science Chair: Julian
Richards (University of Buckingham)
Michael Herman (Oxford University): Intelligence Analysis and
Government Statistics
Nick Hare (UK Ministry of Defence): Intelligence Analysis and
Economics
12:30 Lunch
1:30 Improving Communication Chair: Julian Richards (University
of Buckingham)
Sean Newman (Fire Department of New York): How Adherence to
Journalistic Standards
Positioned FDNY Watchline at the Forefront of Fire Service
Analytical Intelligence
Douglas Bernhardt (South Africa: Wits Business School):
Intelligence Reporting: What
Works, What Doesn't and How to Fix It
Gabriel Sebe (Bucharest University): Political Marketing
Intelligence
2:30 Break
3:00 Applying Knowledge from Other Fields to Increase
Understanding Peter Nardulli and Dan Roth (University of Illinois):
Advancing our Understanding of Global
Patterns of Civil Unrest: An Interdisciplinary Effort
Kathleen Vogel (Cornell University): Current Intelligence
Reporting and the H5N1 Bird Flu
Virus: Insights from the Field of Science and Technology
Studies
4:00 Break
4:15 Practitioner views, summary, and next steps TBD
5:30pm Conference Adjourns
-
4
ABOUT THE SPEAKERS Douglas Bernhardt lectures in the subject of
Competitive Intelligence at Wits Business School,
Johannesburg, the University of Stellenbosch Business School,
and the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan
University Business School, Port Elizabeth. He is also an
adjunct instructor in Competitive Intelligence
for Mercyhurst University. Previously, Douglas served as an
adjunct professor of Business Intelligence &
Corporate Security at the European campus of the Thunderbird
School of Global Management. He has
also taught at IMD, Lausanne and the Rotterdam School of
Management. He is the author of three books,
including Competitive Intelligence: Acquiring and using
corporate intelligence and counterintelligence,
published in 2003 by Financial Times Prentice-Hall. From
1993-2001 Douglas served as Managing
Director for one of Europes leading competitive intelligence
consultancies, Business Research Group SA, in Geneva and London,
supporting the CI requirements for major firms in industries such
as
pharmaceuticals, telecommunications, and FMCGs. He was a member
of the Board of Directors of the
US-based Society of Competitive Intelligence Professionals
(SCIP) from 1996-1999. His early
commercial experience includes the defence industry and foreign
trade.
Anne W. Bishop is an attorney at Snell & Wilmer, LLP, in
Phoenix, Arizona. Prior to attending law
school, Ms. Bishop worked at the National Security Agency at Ft.
Meade, Maryland where she held
positions as a linguist and analyst, and taught intelligence
analysis to other analysts. Following a
fellowship working for a New York Congresswoman, she worked in
NSAs legislative affairs office, working with the House Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence Issues. Ms. Bishops legal practice
focuses on health care compliance, health care litigation, and
business disputes. She advises physicians
and hospitals on various health-care related issues. Ms. Bishop
is also a member of the privacy and data
security group. Ms. Bishop is a frequent writer and speaker on
health care compliance and legal ethics.
Ms. Bishop graduated in 1986 from the University of Pennsylvania
with a degree in international
relations & in 2006 from the Sandra Day OConnor College of
Law at Arizona State University.
Dr. Anthony C. (Chris) Cain is Chief of Academic Affairs at The
Air University, Maxwell Air Force
Base, Alabama. He received his M.A. and Ph.D. in Military
History from The Ohio State University, and
also holds Masters Degrees from the Air War College and
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University, as well
as a B.S. from Georgia State University. Dr. Cain is a graduate
of the Air Command and Staff College
(ACSC), and the Air War College. Prior to assuming his present
duties, he served as the Deputy Director
of the Air Force Research Institute (AFRI), Dean of AFRI, Chief
of AFRIs Outreach Division, founding Editor-in-Chief of Strategic
Studies Quarterly, Research Director and Dean of Education &
Curriculum at
ACSC, and as the Chief, Professional Journals Division &
editor of the Air and Space Power Journal at
the College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research and Education. Dr.
Cain is the author of The Forgotten Air
Force: The French Air Force and Air Doctrine in the 1930s
(Smithsonian Institute Press, 2002), as well
as book chapters and articles on issues dealing with airpower,
professional military education, effects-
based operations, regional threats from weapons of mass
destruction, & military history.
Dr. David Chuter worked for more than thirty years for the UK
government in the defence and security
area. He was involved, among other subjects, in the negotiations
leading to the Maastricht Political Union
Treaty, and subsequent discussions about a European security and
defence policy, as well as arms control,
weapons of mass destruction, and war crimes and transitional
justice. His last job was as Special Adviser
to the Policy Director of the French Ministry of Defence in
Paris. He took early retirement at the end of
2008 and is now an author, lecturer, translator and consultant
based in Paris. Dr Chuter is a lecturer at
Sciences Po in Paris, where he teaches courses in Intelligence
and Policy-making, and in Crisis
Management. He is also Senior Research Fellow at the Centre for
Security Sector Management at
Cranfield University, on whose behalf he teaches
security-related subjects in various countries, and Chair
of the Governing Board of the International Security Information
Service Europe. He is the author of four
books, and many articles, most recently Governing and Managing
the Defence Sector (2011). His current
research interest is the politics and practical problems of the
Rule of Law in the Security Sector.
-
5
Howard Clarke, MCS, CCA is an internationally experienced law
enforcement intelligence practitioner.
During his thirty-year law enforcement career Howard held senior
intelligence analysis positions with law
enforcement agencies in Australia and Canada. For the past
decade he has specialized in strategic
intelligence analysis applications in law enforcement and
homeland security and he remains active in
intelligence analysis training and consulting work. He has
taught extensively on strategic intelligence
analysis and open source intelligence issues in the U.K.,
Europe, Asia and North America and is a
published author on Insider Threat issues. He holds a Master of
Christian Studies from Regent College
International Graduate Theological School. Howard is currently
an intelligence analysis instructor at the
British Columbia Institute of Technology and the Justice
Institute of British Columbia in Canada and he
formerly held adjunct faculty status with Henley-Putnam
University in the U.S. He is a Lifetime Certified
Criminal Analyst, a former member of the Board of Governors of
the Society of Certified Criminal
Analysts (SCCA), a member of the International Association of
Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysts
(IALEIA) and the International Association for Intelligence
Education (IAFIE).
Dr. Philip H.J. Davies is a political sociologist specialising
in the study of national intelligence
institutions. He is Director of the Brunel Centre for
Intelligence and Security Studies (BCISS). In 2010
BCISS was awarded University Interdisciplinary Research Centre
status and now includes scholars from
across the University from departments and schools as diverse as
Engineering and Design, Economics
and Law in addition to its core team based in Politics and
History. During 2009-10, Dr. Davies headed
BCISS work on the new UK military Joint Intelligence Doctrine.
On this project, Brunel was selected by
the Ministry of Defence as a full partner with its Development,
Concepts and Doctrine Centre and
Defence Intelligence (former the Defence Intelligence Staff).
This work has involved both the
fundamental rethinking and reformulation of intelligence
doctrine (JDP 2-00 Understanding and
Intelligence in the Joint Operating Environment) but also the
articulation of an entirely new doctrine on
understanding (JDP 04 Understanding). Before that Dr. Davies ran
an ESRC-funded international seminar series entitled Intelligence
and Government in the 21st Century working in collaboration with
Dr. Robert Dover at Loughborough. He has also recently completed a
major and intensive comparative
study of British and American national intelligence has been
published by Praeger Security International
in 2012. In 2004 Dr. Davies designed and, until 2010, convened
Brunels highly successful MA in Intelligence and Security Studies,
including its ground-breaking Brunel Analytical Simulation
Exercise.
BASE is term-long practical in strategic intelligence assessment
in which students are divided into
drafting teams modelled on the UK Joint Intelligence
Organisation analytic staff and produce JIO-style
assessments on live, real-world topics using open sources.
Dr. Mandeep K. Dhami is a Reader in Forensic Psychology at the
University of Surrey. Previously she
held academic appointments at the University of Cambridge (UK),
University of Victoria (Canada), the
University of Maryland (USA), and the Max Planck Institute for
Human Development (Germany). She
has worked as a Senior Scientist for the Defence Science and
Technology Laboratory (MoD). Dr. Dhami
has a PhD in Psychology and an MA in Criminology. Her research
draws conceptual connections between
Psychology (esp. decision science and social cognition) and
Criminology. She has examined topics such
as decision making, risk, and forecasting. She has applied these
issues to the criminal justice system, and
more recently to the defence and security sectors (with a focus
on intelligence analysis and cyber issues).
To-date, she has over 65 publications, and is lead editor of a
book entitled Judgment and Decision Making as a Skill: Learning,
Development and Evolution published by Cambridge University Press
in 2011. Her research has won several awards including from the
European Association of Decision Making
and the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issue
(SPSSI, Division 9 of the American
Psychological Society). Dr. Dhami is Fellow of SPSSI (Division 9
of the American Psychological
Association), and is on the editorial board of several journals
including Perspectives on Psychological
Science. She has provided advice and consultancy to various
government bodies including the Home
Office, Ministry of Justice, Government Communications
Headquarters, and the Metropolitan Police
(New Scotland Yard).
-
6
Rhiannon Gainor is a PhD candidate at McGill Universitys School
of Information Studies, a McConnell Foundation Fellow in 2010/2011,
and a recipient of Qubecs Fonds de recherche Socit et culture
(FQRSC) grant. Her research interests are knowledge management,
competitive intelligence, and
information metrics. She has a Masters of Library and
Information Studies, and Masters of Arts in Humanities Computing
from the University of Alberta.
W J R (Jock) Gardner served in the Royal Navy for 30 years,
specialising in anti-submarine warfare.
He served on operational, analysis and intelligence staffs. In
1989 he was awarded an M Phil in
International Relations at the University of Cambridge, writing
a dissertation on Soviet nuclear ballistic
missile submarines. He was also the Editor of The Cambridge
Review of International Affairs. Leaving
the Navy in 1994, he joined the Naval Historical Branch as a
Historian and taking an especial interest in
World War II, antisubmarine warfare and intelligence. His
publications include Anti-submarine Warfare
(Brasseys, 1996) and Decoding History: the Battle of the
Atlantic and Ultra (Naval Institute Press, 1999). He has lectured
on naval historical and intelligence topics from Moscow to
Monterey. He is the
external examiner at Brunel University for the MA in
Intelligence and Security Studies, a member of the
Editorial Board of The Mariners Mirror and a Fellow of the Royal
Historical Society.
Melissa Graves, JD, MA serves as Project Coordinator and
Instructor at the University of Mississippis Center for
Intelligence and Security Studies. Among her accomplishments, she
and her co-developer
Walter Flaschka have designed and implemented the Days of
Intrigue, a realistic practical exercise that is
conducted yearly at UM and which involves numerous intelligence
community agencies. Ms. Graves
received her BA with a double major in English and
Communications from Hardin-Simmons College, an
MA in History from UM, and a JD from the UM School of Law. She
is presently pursuing a Ph.D. in
History. Her work will appear in upcoming publications,
including Introduction to Intelligence Studies
(Carl Jensen, David McElreath, and Melissa Graves) and
Intelligence Studies in Britain and the US:
Historiography since 1945 (ed. Christopher Moran).
Nick Hare is a professional economist, and has worked in a
number of roles in the UK Ministry of
Defence (MOD) since graduating in 1999 with an MA in Philosophy
and Economics from the University
of Edinburgh. He is currently head of the Futures and Analytical
Methods (FAM) team in the MOD. The
FAM team works to promote the aims of the Professional Head of
Defence Intelligence Analysis. This
involves encouraging analysts to use structured and auditable
methods to refine intelligence requirements,
identify assumptions, generate hypotheses and scenarios, test
hypotheses using data, collect information,
and describe conclusions using appropriate probabilistic
language. The FAM team also researches new
and developing tools and approaches that are of potential use to
intelligence analysts, and works with
other departments to promote professionalisation of analysis
across government.
Michael Herman served from 1952 to 1987 in Britain's Government
Communications Headquarters,
with secondments to the Cabinet Office (as Secretary of the
Joint Intelligence Committee) and to the
Ministry of Defence.. His Intelligence Power in Peace and War
was published in 1996 and has been
regularly reprinted. His Intelligence Services in the
Information Age was published in 2001, and he has
co-edited and contributed to Intelligence in the Cold War: What
Difference Did It Make (in publication).
He is currently an Honorary Departmental Fellow at Aberystwyth
University and an Associate Member of
Nuffield College Oxford, as Founder Director of the Oxford
Intelligence Group. He is an Honorary D.Litt
of Nottingham University.
-
7
Dr. Carl J. Jensen III. is a 1978 graduate of the U. S. Naval
Academy. He served in the Navy from 1978
until 1983, first aboard the nuclear fleet ballistic missile
submarine USS George Washington Carver and
then as an aide to the Commander of Submarine Group Five. Dr.
Jensen graduated from FBI New Agents
Training in 1984 and served as a field agent in Atlanta,
Georgia, Monterey, California, and Youngstown,
Ohio. In August 1992, Dr. Jensen reported to the FBI Laboratory
where he received certification as a
Racketeering Records Examiner. In June 1997, Dr. Jensen reported
to the Behavioral Science Unit at the
FBI Academy in Quantico, Virginia, where he instructed senior
police officials at the FBI National
Academy, conducted research, provided consultation, and served
as Assistant Unit Chief. Upon his
retirement from the FBI in 2006, Dr. Jensen joined the RAND
Corporation as a Senior Behavioral
Scientist. In 2007, he joined the Legal Studies faculty at the
University of Mississippi, where he currently
serves as director of the Center for Intelligence and Security
Studies. He is the 2012 recipient of the
Outstanding Instructor of the Year Award from the International
Association for Intelligence Education, a
2008 recipient of the Thomas Crowe Outstanding Faculty Award
from the University of Mississippi and a
2004 recipient of the Jefferson Award for Outstanding Research
from the University of Virginia. Dr.
Jensen holds a Master of Arts degree from Kent State University
and a Doctor of Philosophy degree from
the University of Maryland. He has instructed throughout the
world and is the author of numerous
articles, books, book chapters and technical reports.
Dr. John A. Kringen is a Research Staff Member with the
Institute for Defense Analyses in Alexandria
Virginia. He recently retired from the Central Intelligence
Agency after more than three decades of
government service. During 2005-2008 he served as the Director
of Intelligence at CIA where he
managed and led the activities of several thousand CIA analysts
and staff. Prior to becoming Director of
Intelligence, he served in a variety of managerial assignments
in that Directorate, including as Director of
the CIAs Crime and Narcotics Center. Beyond CIA, he served twice
overseas in Europe, most recently as a senior intelligence advisor
to United States European Command from July 2008 to August 2011.
In
the late 1990s, he was head of imagery analysis at the
predecessor organization to the National Geospatial
Intelligence Agency. He received a Ph.D. from the University of
Minnesota in 1978.
Dr. William Lawhead retired from the University of Mississippi
in summer 2012 after having completed
seven years as Chair of the Department of Philosophy and
Religion. He also completed forty-one years of
teaching philosophy, thirty-two of them at UM. Among the courses
he has taught are history of
philosophy, logic and critical thinking, and philosophy of
science. He has served on the advisory board
of the University of Mississippis Center for Intelligence and
Security Studies and has participated in and given papers at 5-Eyes
Conferences. He is a member of the International Association for
Intelligence
Education. He has published two books. These are a history of
Western philosophy, The Voyage of
Discovery, 3rd
ed. (Wadsworth, 2007) and an introduction to philosophy, The
Philosophical Journey, 5th
ed. (McGraw-Hill, 2011). He is working on a third book, Taking
Philosophy Seriously, for Oxford
University Press. Dr. Lawhead received his Ph.D. in philosophy
from the University of Texas, Austin.
Dr. Stephen Marrin is a Lecturer in the Department of Politics
and History at Brunel University in
London, England. He received his PhD and MA in foreign affairs
from the Department of Politics at the
University of Virginia. He has written about many different
aspects of intelligence analysis, including
new analyst training at CIAs Sherman Kent School, the
similarities and differences between intelligence analysis and
medical diagnosis as a source of ideas for improving the quality of
future intelligence
analysis, and the professionalization of intelligence analysis.
In 2004 the National Journal profiled him as
one of the ten leading experts on intelligence reform. He
previously worked as an analyst at both the US
Central Intelligence Agency and the US Government Accountability
Office, and taught in the Intelligence
Studies Department at Mercyhurst University.
-
8
Dr. Peter F. Nardulli is Professor of Political Science and Law
at the University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign, the founding Director of the Cline Center for
Democracy, and the editor of a book series with
the University of Illinois Press: Democracy, Free Enterprise and
the Rule of Law. He has been on the
faculty at UIUC since 1974 and served as department head in
Political Science from 1992 until 2006.
Nardulli is the author of six books on various aspects of the
legal process and empirical democratic
theory. He has authored a number of articles in journals such at
the American Political Science Review,
Public Choice, Political Communication, Political Behavior and a
number of law reviews. Nardulli is
currently directing a global study, the Societal Infrastructures
and Development Project (SID). SID uses a
number of technologically advanced, innovative methodologies to
examine the impact of political, legal
and economic institutions on a wide range of societal
development indicators (economic growth, human
rights, societal stability, environmental quality, educational
attainment etc.). Current projects involve
using data from the SID projects Social, Political and Economic
Event Database (SPEED) project to examine the impact on civil
unrest of such things as climate change, natural resources,
socio-cultural
animosities and political institutions.
Captain Sean S. Newman, a 16-year veteran of the Fire Department
City of New York (FDNY), has
worked most of his career in Manhattan, and is a charter member
of FDNY Center for Terrorism and
Disaster Preparedness (CTDP), opened in 2004. Captain Newman has
been editor and contributing writer
for FDNY Watchline since the intelligence products inception in
2008. Released in December 2011, he co-wrote the FDNY
Counterterrorism and Risk Management Strategy. Captain Newman
graduated with honors from the Center for Homeland Defense and
Security (CHDS) at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate
School with a masters degree in security studies. Aside from his
professional fire experience, Captain Newman is a former journalist
on the Reuters equities' desk in NYC.
Dr. Stefania Paladini is Associate Head of Department in
Strategy and Management at Coventry
University. Before joining academia she has spent 7 years
appointed as trade commissioner in East Asia,
where she has also obtained a PhD from City University of Hong
Kong in security studies. An economist
and a statistician by professional practice, she has also
published extensively on environmental and
economic security and given a number of policy briefings in
Italy at ministerial level. She has a long term
interest in intelligence studies, where she is now working on
the application of Bayesian analysis and
other quantitative methods.
Dr. Julian Richards successfully completed a doctorate in
political violence in Pakistan, at Cambridge
University, in 1993. He then spent nearly 20 years working in
intelligence and security for the British
government. In 2008, he co-founded the Centre for Security and
Intelligence Studies (BUCSIS) at the
University of Buckingham, where he teaches on two MA programmes
in Intelligence Studies and Global
Security, and supervises a number of PhD students. His
affiliations include Associate of the Pakistan
Security Research Unit in Bradford University, a member of the
European Ideas Network, and the
editorial board of the Spanish journal Intelligencia y
seguridad. Julian Richards is the publisher of two
books: The Art and Science of Intelligence Analysis (Oxford
University Press, 2010); and A Guide to
National Security: Threats, Responses and Strategies (Oxford
University Press, 2012); in addition to a
number of papers on a range of security and intelligence issues.
He is also a regular media commentator
on security and intelligence issues for BBC television and
radio, in addition to appearances on Al Jazeera
and the Islam Channel. His current research interests include
attitudes towards surveillance in
contemporary society; the rise of cyber-threats and
cyber-security; security issues in Pakistan and
Afghanistan; and violent extremism in Europe.
-
9
Michael Robinson is a Specialist Leader with Deloitte and
Touche, LLP, where he conducts computer
and mobile device forensics. Prior to joining Deloitte and
Touche, LLP, Robinson conducted forensic
examinations for the Federal Bureau of Investigation. He also
previously worked as the Chief Information
Officer of the U.S. Department of Defense's Business
Transformation Agency, where he was responsible
for all Information Technology and Information Assurance
activities, as well as forensic examinations.
Robinson is an adjunct professor at Stevenson University in the
School of Graduate and Professional
Studies, where is the program coordinator of the Cyber Forensics
degree. He is also an adjunct professor
at George Mason University, where he teaches mobile device
forensics.
Dr. Peter V. Ronayne is a senior faculty member at The Federal
Executive Institute (FEI), an executive
leadership education center within the U.S. Office of Personnel
Management. Pete formerly directed
FEIs flagship Leadership for a Democratic Society program,
co-founded FEIs Center for Global Leadership and FEIs Leadership
Horizons Series for the Senior Executive Service. He joined FEI
after studying, teaching, and researching at the University of
Virginia. Pete is a leading voice in the public
sector on generational and demographic issues and their impact
on leadership and organizations. He also
writes, researches, and speaks widely on issues of global
leadership, neuroscience and leadership, and the
future of public service and governance. A former Presidential
Management Fellow, Pete is an adjunct
professor at the University of Virginia where he teaches
undergraduate courses in world politics,
diplomatic history, and leadership. Pete is currently at work on
a biography of Secretary of State
Madeleine Albright to be published in 2013. He is also the
author of Never Again?The United States and
the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide since the Holocaust,
the first book to chronicle Americas complicated and conflicted
response to the crime of genocide since 1945. Pete earned a PhD
in
International Affairs at the University of Virginia and a BS in
Languages and Linguistics at Georgetown
University. Prior to his executive education career, Pete worked
in the fields of international emergency
medical assistance and international development, where he
worked on small-scale, sustainable and
replicable technologies for developing nations.
Dr. Patricia J. Rooney is currently the Director of Training at
the U.S. Armys National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC). Prior to
joining NGIC, PJ served as senior faculty at the Federal
Executive
Institute where she taught executive leadership courses with a
focus on neuroscience. Before Joining FEI,
PJ served in a number of leadership positions within the U.S.
Department of Defense (DoD). While at the
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), PJ was the Deputy
Director of the field operations
office co-located with NGIC. She led the National
Geospatial-Intelligence College as Deputy Director,
and has served as the Dean for NGAs School of Leadership and
Professional Studies. In addition to experience in the Federal
government, PJ served as a Senior Associate with SENSA Solutions,
working
with government leaders on strategic planning, business process
re-engineering, leadership change
strategies, and senior executive coaching. Before joining the
intelligence community, PJ served on the
faculty at the United States Military Academy teaching in the
Leadership and Behavioral Science
Department; and served as a counselor for Victims of Violent
Crime with the Metropolitan Nashville
Police Department. PJ earned a PhD in Education from the
University of Virginia, an MS in Strategic
Intelligence from the Joint Military Intelligence College, a MEd
from Vanderbilt University, and a BA in
Political Science from the University of North Carolina at
Chapel Hill.
-
10
Dr. Sorin-Gabriel Sebe teaches in the Department of Political
Science at the University of
Bucharest in Romania. He graduated from the Faculty of
Mathematics, University of Bucharest in 1986
(the graduation thesis: Non-Riemannian Geometries in Dislocation
Theory). From 1990 to 1995 he worked as a Research Associate at
GPM2 Laboratory in Grenoble, France, in the realm of
mathematical
modeling of irreversible phenomena. In 1996 he joined the
Faculty of Political Science, University of
Bucharest (FSPUB) and currently, beyond teaching, serves as
Vice-Dean. He received his PhD in
sociology in 2004 (the final thesis: Subjective Quality of Life
Modeling) from the Faculty of Sociology, University of Bucharest.
He was a general manager at INSOMAR (2004-2006). His research as
a
political science academic has primarily been concerned with the
processes associated to the
democratization of former non-democratic regimes, such as the
reform of the intelligence apparatus and
the development of a political market. He favors a
trans-disciplinary approach on research, having as
current interest the development of a curriculum for the study
of intelligence in academic settings, in a
political science faculty, in a former communist country.
Dr. Musa Tuzuner had a long and varied experience in the
intelligence field in Turkey. PhD in Political
Science (Kent State University, 2009 with Best Dissertation
Award); Assistant Professor, Turkish
National Police Academy (2009); Founding Director, Intelligence
Studies Research Center (2009) & Intelligence Studies Master
Program (2010), TNP Academy; current main interests: national and
international security behavior, theorizing Turkish foreign policy,
and international event data
developments. Most recent book: Intelligence Cooperation
Practices in the 21st Century: Towards a
Culture of Sharing (IOS Press, 2010). Most recent article:
Quantifying intelligence cooperation: The
United States International Intelligence Behavior (USIIB)
dataset, with Ersel Aydinli (Journal of Peace
Research 48(5) 673682, 2011).
Dr. Kathleen Vogel is an associate professor at Cornell, with a
joint appointment in the Department of
Science and Technology Studies and the Judith Reppy Institute
for Peace and Conflict Studies. Vogel
holds a Ph.D. in biological chemistry from Princeton University.
Prior to joining the Cornell faculty,
Vogel was appointed as a William C. Foster Fellow in the U.S.
Department of States Office of Proliferation Threat Reduction in
the Bureau of Nonproliferation. Vogel has also spent time as a
visiting
scholar at the Cooperative Monitoring Center, Sandia National
Laboratories and the Center for Nonprolif-
eration Studies, Monterey Institute of International
Studies.
-
11
Understanding and Improving Intelligence Analysis:
Learning from other Disciplines
12-13 July, 2012 * London, England * RAF Club
RELATED READINGS
Benson, Sumner. "The Historian as Foreign Policy Analyst." The
Public Historian 3, no. 1 (1981): 15-25.
(HISTORY/HISTORIOGRAPHY)
Converse, Ray & Randy Pherson. Intelligence and Medicine:
Parallel Cognitive Traps. Unpublished
paper. Pherson Associates. 2009. 1-6.
(MEDICINE/PSYCHOLOGY/COGNITION)
Fisher, Rebecca and Rob Johnston. Is Intelligence Analysis a
Discipline? Roger George and James Bruce
(Eds). Analyzing Intelligence. Georgetown University Press.
Washington DC. 2008. 55-68.
(LAW/LEGAL PROFESSION/LIBRARY SCIENCE/MEDICINE)
Heuer, Richards J. Adapting Academic Methods and Models to
Governmental Needs. Quantitative Approaches to Political
Intelligence: The CIA Experience. (Ed. Richards J. Heuer). Westview
Press.
1978. (1-10). (SOCIAL SCIENCE METHODS)
Johnston, Rob. Analytic Culture in the U.S. Intelligence
Community: An Ethnographic Study. Washingon,
DC: Central Intelligence Agency, Center for the Study of
Intelligence, 2005. (ANTHROPOLOGY)
Kerbel, Josh. Lost for Words: The Intelligence Communitys
Struggle to Find its Voice. Parameters. 2008. 102-112.
(MEDICINE)
Knorr, Klaus. Foreign Intelligence and the Social Sciences.
Research Monograph No. 17. Center of International Studies.
Princeton University. June 1, 1964. (SOCIAL SCIENCE METHODS)
Laqueur, Walter. "The Question of Judgment: Intelligence and
Medicine." Journal of Contemporary
History 18 (Oct. 1983): 533-548. (MEDICINE)
Leslau, Ohad. "Intelligence and Economics: Two Disciplines with
a Common Dilemma."
International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence
20, no. 1 (Spring 2007): 106-
121.(ECONOMICS/ECONOMIC ADVISORS)
-
12
Marrin, Stephen, & Jonathan Clemente. "Improving
Intelligence Analysis by Looking to the Medical
Profession." International Journal of Intelligence &
Counterintelligence 18/4 (Winter 2005-06): 707-729.
(MEDICINE)
Marrin, Stephen, and Jonathan Clemente. "Modeling an
Intelligence Analysis Profession on Medicine."
International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence
19/4 (Winter 2006-2007): 642-665.
(MEDICINE)
Marrin, Stephen. Intelligence Analysis: Structured Methods or
Intuition? American Intelligence Journal. Vol. 25.No. 1.(Summer
2007).7-16. (MEDICINE)
Nolte, William. "Thinking about Rethinking: Examples of Reform
in Other Professions." Studies in
Intelligence 52, no. 2 (Jun. 2008): 19-25. (GENERAL)
Pritchard, Matthew C. & Michael S. Goodman (2008):
Intelligence: The Loss of
Innocence, International Journal of Intelligence and
CounterIntelligence, 22/1, 147-164.
(ARCHAEOLOGY)
Rieber, Steven, and Neil Thomason. "Toward Improving
Intelligence Analysis: Creation of a National
Institute for Analytic Methods." Studies in Intelligence 49, no.
4 (2005): 71-77. (MEDICINE)
Rodgers, R. Scott. "Improving Analysis: Dealing with Information
Processing Errors." International
Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 19/4 (Winter
2006-2007): 622-641. (PSYCHOLOGY)
Spivey, Robin V. "The Devil Is in the Details: The Legal
Profession as a Model for Authentic Dissent."
International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence
22/4 (Winter 2009): 632-651.
(LAW/LEGAL REASONING)
Weiss, Charles. "Communicating Uncertainty in Intelligence and
Other Professions." International
Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 21, no 1 (Spring
2008): 57-85.
(GENERAL/SCIENCE/LAW)
Young, David. Scholarship, Intelligence, and Journalism. Reuters
Fellows Lecture. March 2004.
(JOURNALISM)
-
13
Paper and Presentation Abstracts Understanding and Improving
Intelligence Analysis:
Learning from other Disciplines
12-13 July, 2012 * London, England * RAF Club
Douglas Bernhardt (South Africa: Wits Business School):
Intelligence Reporting: What
Works, What Doesnt and How to Fix It: This paper argues that
however whatever the quality of the findings and analysis of an
intelligence deliverable, it will often fail to achieve its main
objective; that is, to provide
a decision-maker with product that he or she finds both
compelling and relevant to his or her specific decision
challenges. This occurs mainly for two reasons: (1) the
disconnect which often exists between intelligence consumers and
producers and (2) the packaging of finished intelligence as a set
of dry, colourless news and facts. This author, a long-time
practitioner and lecturer in the field of Competitive Intelligence,
has previously described
the phenomenon of the sub-optimal relationships which exist in
many firms between Competitive Intelligence units
and their executive customers. In this paper he not only
revisits and updates earlier discussions, but adds a fresh
dimension; one which centres around the process of persuasion.
In short, if an intelligence product is not persuasive
(think the PDB of 6 August 2001), it has no value; its just
another report to digest. This paper will consider the factors
which can and should make an intelligence briefing, or report,
persuasive; borrowing, in part, from the fields
of advertising and sales. It will also focus on the unique
contribution that human source information (HUMINT)
makes to intelligence analysis and reporting OSINT is important,
but its not enough. The paper/presentation we propose will explore
two principle topics: (1) what are the issues. involved in, and
what needs to be done to
overcome, the challenges inherent in the producer-consumer
relationship? and (2) what tools can we apply to
improve, and sometimes totally recast, the packaging and
delivery of intelligence product that makes a difference,
that serves as a springboard for its users to gain competitive
advantage? Although this presentation will be discussed within a
corporate sector context, the key lessons are equally relevant to
the domains of national security
and law enforcement.
Anne Bishop (Snell & Wilmer, LLP, Phoenix AZ): Intelligence
Analysis and Legal
Reasoning: This presentation will explore the similarities
between legal reasoning and intelligence analysis. The presenter is
a practicing attorney who spent about 15 years in the U.S.
intelligence community, working as an
analyst and linguist and training intelligence analysts. Ms.
Bishop will focus on the similarities in acquiring relevant
information, evaluating sources, and deriving meaning from that
information. In both intelligence analysis and legal
research, locating the relevant information is critically
important. Ms. Bishop will discuss access, search strategies,
and ways to validate search results. In addition, Ms. Bishop
will discuss the relatively static hierarchy of sources
that exists in the legal research realm. However, the bulk of
the presentation will focus on analytic techniques that
are central to legal analysis-- analogies, extrapolation, legal
reasoning, and the importance of context. Lawyers are
taught in law school to draw analogies between their current
cases and existing case law precedent. By creating a
compelling analogy, a lawyer is likely to prevail in a court.
Similarly, by drawing analogies to prior events, an
intelligence analyst can analogize what is transpiring today
based on similar prior events. In addition, Ms. Bishop
will discuss extrapolation and its value to both intelligence
analysis and legal reasoning. That is, in legal reasoning,
there is often no legal principal that is completely similar.
Lawyers learn to find a case that is analytically similar
and extrapolate the principles to the situation at hand.
Similarly, intelligence analysts can look at an existing set of
facts and extrapolate from known facts into the unknown. In
legal reasoning, lawyers look at two existing cases and
draw inferences regarding how those two cases fit together in
order to determine how a court should rue on a current
case. This technique could be used predicatively by intelligence
analysts. Finally, Ms. Bishop will discuss the
importance of context. Context is key in determining a legal
outcome. The same is true for intelligence analysis.
Determining the status quo is critical in both context in order
to figure out the potential outcomes.
-
14
Anthony C. Cain (Air Force Research Institute): Intelligence
Analysis and Professional
Journal Publishing: Publishing professional military journals
requires many of the same processes and decision capabilities found
in intelligence analysis. Professional journals, by their nature,
can narrowly
focus on technical or tactical subjects, but the selection and
editing of content requires broad knowledge
in several areas. For example, journals that focus on
operational issues may receive article submissions
that deal with the full spectrum of service or joint
capabilities. Journal editors will rarely be trained or
equipped to evaluate the credibility and merits of such a broad
spectrum of content. Therefore, creating
mechanisms to ensure the credibility and quality of journal
content form the essential tasks for
professional journal editing. Those same mechanisms could be
adapted to serve intelligence analysis
processes. Specific cases from the authors experience as the
editor of Air and Space Power Journal and as founding
editor-in-chief of Strategic Studies Quarterly will illustrate the
challenge and solutions
adopted to preserve the professional credibility of both
journals.
David Chuter (Center for Security Sector Management; Cranfield
University): Intelligence
Analysis as a Type of Information Processing Although
intelligence analysis is obviously a special case of the
collection, processing and use of
information, it is not entirely unique. Indeed, we carry out
analogous tasks to intelligence analysis all the
time, not only professionally, but in our personal lives as
well. Intelligence analysis can be seen as a type
of information processing which has a special combination of
characteristics, generally not found together
elsewhere. We can analyse all information processing under three
types of heading. The first is the degree
of applicability, which is to say how far the process is
designed to lead to an operational outcome. At one
extreme, practitioners of emergency medicine have a short period
in which to gather, process and act on
information in order to save a life. At the other extreme,
scientists, archaeologists or sociologists may
spend years on a research programme which simply validates prior
assumptions, and does not have any
operational output at all. Intelligence is in principle only
collected in response to specific tasking to
answer specific questions, and so in principle is a
high-applicability process. The second is the degree of
completeness of the information which can reasonably be desired.
Surgeons contemplating major, non-
acute surgery, will exhaustively research everything they can,
to make sure that what they do is as
effective as possible. At the other extreme, many decisions are
successfully taken in everyday life on the
basis of very incomplete information: if you arrive at an
airport and realize that you have left your adaptor
plug at home, you will decide to buy the first thing you see
that functions correctly. There are many
intermediate cases: historical research, for example, can never
in principle be complete or definitive, no
matter how long it continues. Criminal trials generally only
consider enough evidence to establish guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt, and some potential crimes may not
even be charged. Intelligence is by
definition always incomplete, and its reliability is always
suspect. The third is the need for and
expectation of accuracy. Most medical decisions have to be very
accurate, since otherwise the patient will
be harmed, and there are professional sanctions for those who
make mistakes. At the other extreme,
journalism and the productions of advocacy NGOs are seldom
expected to be fully accurate, and there are
few professional sanctions for inaccuracy or even downright
untruths. There are intermediate cases such
as investment advice, where there is an expectation of at least
broad accuracy, but few sanctions in its
absence. There are also cases (like the conclusions of juries in
criminal trials) where the degree of
accuracy is not knowable, and all one can ask is whether the
verdict is reasonable in the circumstances.
Intelligence is generally an area with high (and often
excessive) expectations of accuracy, and a great
requirement for it. The special combination of high
applicability, lack of completeness and significant
demand for accuracy makes intelligence analysis a special and
interesting case.
-
15
Howard Clarke (The Intelligence Solutions Group) Seekers after
Truth: Cross-Disciplinary
Insights for the Intelligence Profession from the Biblical and
Theological Studies Discipline Biblical hermeneutics, or exegesis,
is an interpretative activity that contains some significant
parallels
with important facets of the intelligence analysis endeavor. The
term exegesis refers to careful
investigation of the original meaning of texts in their
historical and literary contexts. The process involves
asking analytical questions about various aspects of the source
materials and their contexts, and it implies
careful, detailed analysis. As an analytic discipline, effective
biblical interpretation requires a capacity to
deal with challenging data sets, complex source evaluation
circumstances, and it seeks to provide insights
which will shape and influence the beliefs and actions of a
significant community (i.e. the consumers). In
principle, a process not dissimilar to the Intelligence Cycle is
employed and at various times and in
various contexts there is a need to utilize techniques which can
be construed as forms of HUMINT,
OSINT, and TECHINT. As a result of the significant analytic
challenge involved a growing body of
interpretative techniques and methodologies has developed over
many centuries. In the sense that
intelligence analysis is essentially concerned with the search
for truth and meaning (albeit in particular
geopolitical, security and various specific contexts) and the
communication of resultant insights to
decision-makers, then there are correlations to be drawn with
the sub-disciplines of biblical exegesis and
hermeneutics and the overarching theological discipline they
inform. Particular challenges that must be
addressed in biblical interpretation include: (1) the challenge
of distance of time the key events and communications to be
understood are separated from the contemporary interpreter by a
vast gulf of time;
(2) the challenge of cultural distance key actors and events
reside within an ancient agrarian, middle eastern context; (3) the
challenge of geographical distance requires an appreciation of the
geography of the Middle East at various points in history; (4) the
challenge of linguistic distance communication occurs in the
languages of Hebrew, Aramaic and Greek in the form those languages
took thousands of
years ago; and (5) various challenges around authorship and
sourcing. The successful exegetical practitioner, like the
proficient intelligence analyst, must: (a) understand the world
behind the communication being researched the context of the source
and the subject the source is reporting on; (b) Understand the
world within that communication the language and structuring of the
communication, what is the source saying and how is the source
saying it, and what meaning does this convey?; and (c)
understand the world before the communication the context of the
message recipient (the intelligence consumer if you like). This
paper will explore and discuss various areas of similarity and
dissimilarity
between intelligence analysis practice and exegetical practice
and will suggest some opportunities for
productive crossdisciplinary learning for intelligence
practitioners.
Mandeep Dhami (University of Surrey): Intelligence Analysis and
Decision Science
(Putting the Science into the Art of Intelligence Analysis) What
is the probability that Iran will have nuclear weapons in 2012?
What is the risk posed by
Anonymous to UK cyber space? Which al-Qaeda operatives should be
prioritized for further intelligence
gathering? These are some of the types of questions that
intelligence analysts must consider. The field of
Decision Science has existed for over 60 years, and is devoted
to understanding how people perform
some of the sorts of tasks that intelligence analysts are faced
with. For example, decision scientists ask:
How do people judge probability, perceive risk, and make
choices? How do people search and select
relevant information, and use (weight and integrate) it
appropriately when making decisions? Decision
scientists with backgrounds in disciplines such as Psychology
and fields such as Behavioral Economics
develop and test correspondence- or coherence-based theories.
They employ quantitative methods. And,
they consider normative, descriptive and prescriptive questions.
I shall discuss how past research from the
field of Decision Science can be used to shed some light on how
intelligence analysts might perform as
well as how their performance can be enhanced. In addition, I
explore how theories and methods from
this field can be usefully applied to understanding the art of
intelligence analysis.
-
16
Rhiannon Gainor and France Bouthillier (McGill University):
Measuring Intelligence
Success: Conceptual and Methodological Challenges of
Intelligence Measurement The purpose of intelligence practices is
to source and develop intelligence to inform a decision. While
there is a
significant body of literature dealing on how to implement and
design intelligence processes, little is known
regarding how intelligence makes a difference in organizations.
Measurement allows organizations to identify
deviations in standards, benchmark success, and whether
objectives are met. When an expert, equipped with
intelligence, advises a decision-maker, it can be difficult to
measure not only the role the intelligence played in the
decision, but the success of the decision. While intelligence
processes can be and are measured with some effort,
identification and valuation of intelligence outcomes and
impacts can be elusive. The fields of
competitive/business/strategic intelligence, intellectual
capital, and knowledge management struggle with the
challenge of how to measure what is intangible, subjective, and
frequently delayed in manifestation, as does the
larger intelligence field. Many organizations measure process,
inputs, and satisfaction, and sidestep the considerable
methodological challenges related to accurate measurement of
intelligence outcomes and impacts. The literature of
intangibles measurement provides some insights applicable to
intelligence measurement, such as identifying
standard practice, problems with conceptualization and current
measurement models, and best practices in
developing measures. The purpose of this paper is first, to
clarify terms and concepts related to measurement,
asking: what is measurement, why measurement is needed, and what
are the characteristics of good measurement, all within the context
of measuring intangible outcomes. The second purpose of this paper
is to identify from the
literature of intangibles measurement best practices and
frameworks for developing measures of intelligence success
that account not only for costs and processes, but also outcomes
and impacts. The intent is to identify conceptual and
methodological issues related to measurement and to offer for
consideration insights from various fields that should
inform measurement strategies in intelligence.
WJR Gardner (Naval Historical Branch, UK Ministry of Defence):
The Unreliable
Memoirs of an Applied Historian and Operational Analyst and The
sound practices of history and intelligence have much in common
and, it can be argued, each discipline can
learn from the other. But there may, in fact, be an even larger
range of disciplines which may not be quite so
obvious or indeed make quite such a clear contribution to proper
intelligence method and analysis. Arguably these
might range from art history to zoology; from paleontology to
psychology. In the relatively restricted compass of a
conference paper or presentation it is not possible to produce a
full description far less an evaluation of all these
potential relationships. However, this paper will attempt to
take some consideration of a number of other disciplines
whilst concentrating on the symbiotic relationships that exist
between intelligence and history, especially as it has
related to the experience of one historian and intelligence
officer. These would range from consideration of sources,
analytical methods, understanding the significance of derived
reporting and perhaps as importantly - its limitations and, lastly,
the essential skills needed in growing and maintaining an effective
relationship between producer and
consumer. It will be demonstrated that not only are there
theoretical advantages to be gained on both sides but there
is also a considerable track record of practitioners, moving
relatively seamlessly and successfully from one
discipline to the other, and also how many of the theoretical
and analytical practices of one field can be applied to
the other.
Melissa Graves (University of Mississippi): Intelligence
Analysis and Historiography Historians function similar to
intelligence analysts. They consume huge amounts of disparate and
oftentimes
questionably reliable material. Both must piece together
incomplete stories. With both intelligence and history, a
source can make or break ones ability to compose good analysis.
Historians and analysts both construct their particular version of
world based upon primary records. Likewise, they face inherent
perils of analytic biases,
particularly mirror imaging. Both understand that events and
people do not exist within a vacuum and they must
accurately and fully take into account many competing forces.
This presentation will discuss how the use of
historical methodology can assist analysts in looking at the
broader picture and understanding trends and
motivations. In each story they construct, historians examine
how race, class, gender, and religion affect key
players decisions. By looking at historical methodology,
analysts can glean tactics helpful to their own work.
-
17
Nick Hare (UK Ministry of Defence): Intelligence Analysis and
Economics At first glance, the overlap between 'economics' and
'intelligence analysis' should be significant. Both
disciplines are concerned with using evidence to test hypotheses
about behaviour, and with modelling of
the actions of individuals and systems through examination of
incentives at both micro- and macroscopic
levels. Why, then, is there relatively little practical
interaction and overlap between the two? Based on an
informal survey of the few individuals who, in the UK, have
worked in the intersection, I will present
some key similarities and differences between the professions of
economics and intelligence analysis. I
will propose some tentative hypotheses to explain these
similarities and differences, and identify some
key insights that each has to offer the other.
Michael Herman (Oxford University): Intelligence and Government
Statistics British intelligence and statistics have evolved as
government institutions over a similar periods as part of
the knowledgeable state, and useful comparisons can be drawn
between their institutions. Despite being pulled between
centralization and decentralization, both have moved towards
systems with central output
and influence on standards; but the moves are uneven. Statistics
now has a national statistician and
supervisory authority overseeing what is still a mixture of
central and departmental units: by contrast
intelligences professional authority has remained its central
committee system. Arguably statistics has moved in a natural
direction for governments knowledge producers, while British
intelligence retains the committee system formed as part of the
tri-service military structure with which it fought the Second
War
and moved into peace.
Carl Jensen (University of Mississippi): Intelligence Analysis
and Futures Methodology The National Commission on Terrorist
Attacks Upon the United States (also known as the 9-11
Commission) concluded that the U.S. intelligence community
exhibited a lack of imagination in failing to prevent the terrorist
attacks of 2001. Like intelligence analysts, futurists are
concerned with forecasting
future events; likewise, they must exhibit considerable
imagination in divining emerging or distant trends.
Over the years, futures research has produced strategies for
improving creative thinking. As well,
professional futurists have had to learn how to adapt their
creative forecasts so that they have utility for
concrete and pragmatic customers. This presentation will discuss
how the methods of futurists can be
integrated into the intelligence world, both in terms of
analysis and establishing and promoting dialogue.
John Kringen (former CIA Director of Intelligence; Institute for
Defence Analysis):
Judging Intelligence Success and Failure There has been little
public dialogue about the appropriate standards for evaluating the
performance of
intelligence organizations. In the United States, for example,
intelligence performance has typically been
judged on a case-by-case basis in the wake of perceived
intelligence failures -- with limited discussion or debate on the
standards being applied. What are realistic standards for
evaluating the performance of
intelligence organizations in an uncertain world? At a minimum,
they need to go beyond the notions of
surprise and embarrassment. What responsibilities do customers
and those entities responsible for
oversight of intelligence have for the performance of
intelligence organizations? In this regard, clear
guidance on such matters as intelligence priorities is critical.
Finally, what insights on appropriate
performance standards can be gained from examining practices
outside the intelligence enterprise? For
example, if major defense contractors in Europe and the United
States are often challenged in terms of
their ability to project their own delivery schedules, what
standards should be applied to weapons analysts
in the intelligence community? This PowerPoint presentation will
propose a framework for evaluating the
performance of intelligence organizations drawing upon debates
in recent decades about intelligence failure and relevant practice
in other professions
-
18
William Lawhead (University of Mississippi): Seeing Is Not
Believing: Insights for Intelligence Analysis from
Professional Magicians. To relate magic (conjuring) and
intelligence analysis seems like quite a stretch. However,
throughout history magicians have served their country by using
their professional skills in warfare and espionage. I
briefly mention some examples of how magicians have used their
knowledge to make contributions to these two activities.
But these two activities are not the same as analysis. What do
the skills and knowledge of professional magicians have to
offer to intelligence analysts? This paper will suggest that
they have a lot to teach us in the areas of deception,
perception,
and cognition. Deception The most obvious application of magic
to intelligence analysis is in the area of deception and
counterdeception. Here, the goals of the magician and the
analyst are opposite. The magician tries to deceive us and the
analyst tries to avoid being deceived or to uncover attempts at
deception. But, understanding the magicians techniques and
principles will be useful in understanding deception in the
intelligence arena. Barton Whaley is a political scientist
who is a leading authority and author on the topic of military
deception. He is also a magician and author of several books
on magic. Some of his insights, based on knowledge of magic,
will be discussed. Perception A greater knowledge of how
we experience the world will be useful to the analyst. Here,
magicians can instruct us. After all, magicians are able to
make us think we see things that arent there and make us not see
things that are there. Recently, neuroscientists have started doing
research on why magicians fool us. For example, scientists have
used eye-tracking technology on subjects
while they watched a magician perform in order to see what
causes the illusion. They found that the magicians use of
misdirection did not divert the gaze of the audience but diverted
their attention. This is related to the phenomenon of
inattentional blindness. We do not see objects in our visual
field (including the magicians sneaky moves) even though photons
from the object are reaching our retina, because of a manipulation
of our attention. Certainly, for the analyst,
staring at lots and lots of data is not enough. We have to be
concerned with how the data is being viewed and how our
attention is directed or misdirected. Cognition Related to the
previous topics is the issue of how the magician controls our
minds. While some people think that misdirection is the main
tool of the magician, other theorists think it is the way that
the magician plants assumptions in our minds or exploits the
assumptions we already have. Magician Roberto Giobbi says
Magic should be very easy, since our spectators fool themselves.
All you need to do is avoid any words, thoughts or actions that
interrupt this tendency. Since assumption checking is an important
technique for the analyst, an examination of how magicians use our
assumptions will be instructive.
Stephen Marrin (Brunel University): Learning from Other
Disciplines, including Medicine
and Journalism Revisits and extends call for research agenda
articulated at the end of the 2005 article Improving Intelligence
Analysis by Looking to the Medical Profession: Crossing
Professional Lines: Finally, the lessons that intelligence can draw
from an examination of the similarities and differences with the
medical profession indicate the
importance of looking to analogous professions for ideas that
can be adapted to an intelligence context. Doing so
might help improve finished intelligence production processes
and the incorporation of intelligence into
decisionmaking. Analogies serve a number of purposes, such as
aiding communication about difficult topics by
finding illustrative examples in other fields, or by more
directly affecting existing ways of doing business through
the incorporation of tools that exist to achieve similar
purposes in other fields. Many of the challenges intelligence
analysts face are not as unique as its practitioners believe,
but the insularity of the field prevents them from being
able to identify the lessons from other professions that could
be useful as models to follow. As a result, the first task
is to identify analogous professions, and examine them for the
lessons they might provide. Any profession that
encounters similar problems-such as medicine, journalism, law,
or law enforcement- may provide fertile ground for
deriving ideas to improve existing practices. Perhaps if
intelligence analysts adopted methods from analogous
professions-or adapted them to the unique requirements of
intelligence analysis-some of the obstacles they currently
face in accurately portraying their understandings of the
international environment could be overcome. (Source: Stephen
Marrin and Jonathan Clemente. Improving Intelligence Analysis by
Looking to the Medical Profession.
International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence,
18:(707-729). 2005 (pps 726-727).
-
19
Stephen Marrin (Brunel University): Evaluating the Quality of
Intelligence Analysis: By
What (Mis) Measure?: Each of the criteria most frequently used
to evaluate the quality of intelligence analysis has limitations
and problems. When accuracy and surprise are employed as absolute
standards, their use
reflects unrealistic expectations of perfection and omniscience.
Scholars have adjusted by exploring the use of a
relative standard consisting of the ratio of success to failure,
most frequently illustrated using the batting average
analogy from baseball. Unfortunately even this relative standard
is flawed in that there is no way to determine
either what the batting average is or should be. Finally, a
standard based on the decisionmakers perspective is sometimes used
to evaluate the analytic products relevance and utility. But this
metric, too, has significant limitations. In the end, there is no
consensus as to which is the best criteria to use in evaluating
analytic quality,
reflecting the lack of consensus as to what the actual purpose
of intelligence analysis is or should be.
Peter Nardulli and Dan Roth (University of Illinois): Advancing
our Understanding of
Global Patterns of Civil Unrest: An Interdisciplinary Effort
This paper deals with an area of increasing concern to intelligence
analysis: the study of civil unrest, including
destabilizing acts initiated by private citizens and disruptive
state actions. It is based on one component (the Societal
Stability Protocol, or SSP) of a six-year multidisciplinary
effort, the Social, Political and Economic Event Database
project (SPEED), which was initiated by and housed in the Cline
Center for Democracy. The paper will outline how
SPEED has used diverse technologies to enhance human capacities
to conduct core intelligence functions: the
detection, documentation, summarization and analysis of
destabilizing developments. The paper will consist of
three parts. The first will briefly outline: (1) the creation of
SPEEDs global news archive, which contains over 150 million
digitized news reports from a diverse set of news sources for every
country in the world for the post-1945
era; (2) the creation of its destabilizing event ontology, which
serves to focus the projects detection efforts; and (3) its use of
automatic text classification and event extraction technologies to
capture pertinent information within the
news archive. The second main section will present preliminary
results for a tool developed by Roths Cognitive Computation Group,
the Event Annotation Tool (EAT+). EAT+ uses advanced NLP
technologies in conjunction
with large amounts of training data to annotate key textual
passages (trigger words, actors, dates, places, etc.). The
technology underlying EAT+ will be outlined and success rates
for detecting references to a representative set of key
civil unrest events (generic political attacks, kidnappings,
assassinations, assembly of coercive forces, imposing a
curfew, declaring a state of emergency, restricting movement of
citizens, etc.) will be reported. The final section of
the paper will report on SPEEDs efforts to harness the analytic
power of SSP data through the use of various composite measures of
event intensity and event origins. This section will outline post
WWII trends in civil unrest
and state repression.
Sean Newman (Fire Department of New York): How Adherence to
Journalistic Standards
Positioned FDNY Watchline at the Forefront of Fire Service
Analytical Intelligence Captain Newmans presentation will show why
the FDNY*s weekly intelligence newsletter, Watchline, continues to
add readers and garner praise from across the globe by following
some basic rules of
journalism, such as concise headlines and lead sentences,
brevity, story selection, and the collective
editing process. Other topics to be discussed are feature
stories, deadlines and the importance of feedback.
Also, attendees will see how Watchline compares to some of
Sherman Kent principles.
-
20
Stefania Paladini (Coventry University): Bayesian analysis in
intelligence and social
sciences: a tool for all trades? Bayesian analysis is one of the
most versatile methods in social sciences, with its application
spanning from probability to finance to psychology. Incidentally,
it is also
one which relevance in intelligence is well known and
documented, at least since Sherman Kents times. In a now quite
famous text, Psychology of Intelligence Analysis, Heuer also
provided some interesting
examples of its potential and its worthiness for the job. Also,
he argued with reason, Bayesian reasoning
can significantly reduce the effects of cognitive biases, one of
the main problems in intelligence. Still,
Bayesian analysis application, in intelligence as much as in
social sciences, can be somehow problematic or difficult, for a
series of reasons first of all, challenges linked to its technical
complexity. It has been proved that even people mathematically
trained are generally poor in estimating conditional
probabilities,
which are the objects of Bayes Theorem. Furthermore, some of its
difficulties are linked to the quality of the prior information
available, as well as to the collection of suitable posterior ones.
However, by
reviewing the available literature and by conducting some
experiments in this sense it is the author's
impression that the instrument fails more than often due to the
fact that it is used to address the wrong
questions - and not because of its internal weaknesses. The aim
of this paper is to explore the issues
related to Bayesian analysis, to define when its use is
appropriate and in which term, both in intelligence
and in social sciences and to provide suitable evidence.
Michael Robinson (Deloitte and Touche, LLP): Intelligence
Analysis and Digital Forensics There are a large number of
similarities between the fields of intelligence analysis and
digital forensics.
Both disciplines collect data from a variety of sources, analyze
data to form actionable intelligence, and
report information to stakeholders in an unbiased and timely
manner. In the field of digital forensics,
analysis results in the formation of a report that can withstand
legal scrutiny and be incorporated in legal
proceedings/trials. While there are similarities in the goals
and objectives of the two disciplines, there are
resemblances in the current obstacles as well. Many of the
challenges encountered in digital forensics are
also occurring in intelligence analysis, for example, there is a
need to collect and process large amounts of
data (often terabytes) in a short amounts of time, there are a
limited number of seasoned practitioners in
the field, there is a finite pool of resources, there is a need
to provide qualitative indicators of reliability
and confidence to analyzed data, there is a need to provide
information in an easily digestible format for
stakeholders that have limited time to read them, and there is a
need to overcome misinformation that
appears from anti-forensics techniques. This paper/presentation
will examine some of the subspecialties
within digital forensics, such as media analysis, mobile device
forensics, and intrusion analysis, to
identify current obstacles and current solutions to these
mounting problems. Comparisons and contrasts
between the fields of intelligence analysis and digital
forensics will be made with an emphasis on
introducing solutions to overcome the current hurdles.
Patricia Rooney (National Ground Intelligence Center, US Army)
and Peter Ronayne
(Federal Executive Institute): Neuroscience in Intelligence
Analysis: Understanding How
the Brain Works and Its Impact on Analytic Decision Making:
Intelligence analysis is neither straightforward nor foolproof; it
is both an art and a science. Whether pursuing strategic warning,
current
intelligence or estimative intelligence, all analysts depend
upon neuro-psychological capabilities that are
in constant tension and competition with one another. Most
analysts know little about this neuro-tension
or the neurological processes that leave analysts vulnerable to
deception in their daily analyses. This
session provides participants with (1) an understanding of the
neurological tensions and cognitive
plasticity that analysts can draw upon for effective decision
making; (2) key cognitive fitness tools to
keep the decision-making apparatus in tip-top shape; and (3) an
understanding of intuition (art) and
rational, methodical (science) reasoning for analytic
conclusions.
-
21
Gabriel Sebe (Bucharest University): Political Marketing
Intelligence The aim of the present paper is to study the
interaction in conceptual and applied terms between the
intelligence realm and the political marketing field; it is
organized in four sections. The first section takes
into account two dimensions. The first focus on the succession
series interaction between intelligence and
other fields conceptually related with the political marketing
realm: journalism (Park, Lippmann, etc.),
public relations (Ivy Lee, Bernays, etc.), political science
(Shotwell, Lasswell, etc.), international relations
(Shotwell, Mitrany, etc.), etc. The shift induced by Vannevar
Bushs paradigm and Shannons information theory allows an
integration, imposing a conceptual platform related with the
informational
society concept; this is the second dimension. Now an explicit
relationship between Levitts marketing myopia, Kotlers marketing
concept broadening, Kotler and Singh marketing warfare setting,
Newman and Sheth political marketing mapping, Hunts
resource/advantage theory and some main issues from the
intelligence field follows. Putting Kents contribution in this
framework and taking into account the Kendall/Kent debate, someone
infers new perspectives on the knowledge transfer problem in terms
of
interdisciplinarity, multidisciplinarity and
transdisciplinarity. The second section introduces a
segmentation compatible with Downs political information and
Machlups knowledge production, adequated in terms of the
intelligence cycle idea Boyds OODA framework. In this manner it
becomes possible to take into account two process-like dimensions.
First the consideration of deliberation/decision
processes related with BI, CI, SI and their corresponding
counterparts from the political marketing field.
Secondly, the differences and similarities concerning the
meaning of analysis as usable knowledge transfer and fusion
knowledge dedicated to support a competitive decision process.
Beyond
terminological labels, the source classification problem, the
relevance criteria, the measurement of
meaning paradigms, the transparency/opacity policy, the secrecy
patterns, etc. and their associated
processes in terms of head building through education,
instruction, trening form the basis of the analogies
necessary for conceptual transfer between these realms. In fact
many problems treated in intelligence
terms cant be conceived without a political marketing
representation; the international relations trade/conflict problem
(Cruc, 1623; Polachek, 1980; etc.) is one example. Both
intelligence and political
marketing fields are transdisciplinary; they cannot replace each
other however together in a controllable
and rational knowledge fusion setting allow better solutions.
The third section maps the analogies
between the intelligence field components and political
marketing structured processes. Putting in
evidence some micro/macro principles it becomes possible to
relate the specific knowledge
representations of the intelligence market conceived as the
environment for both an intelligence economy
and a competitive political marketplace. Taking into account
some preceding considerations, a certain
segmentation of research (fundamental, applied, practical,
commercial) is put in correspondence with
distinct manners of learning generating different intellectual
profiles in terms of theoretical/practical
capabilities. In this manner we enlarge the meaning for both
usable knowledge and knowledge transfer
between theory and practice not only in conceptual, but also in
human resource terms, giving a meaning
for the concept of intelligence capital. The fourth section
concludes on the relevance of the political marketing intelligence
paradigm from Boyds destruction and creation perspective.
-
22
Musa Tuzuner (Intelligence Studies Research Center; Turkish
National Police Academy):
Multi-Level Cognitive Biases in the Chain of Intelligence
FlowFrom Source to Consumers: Improving intelligence analysis has
been attracting more attention in the last decade because of the
significant intelligence failure occurring in the world. Very few
scholars have examined
the cognitive bias factors negative affects on the intelligence
analysis. They believe that understanding cognitive biases
affecting intelligence biases would better serve to have efficient
intelligence product for
the consumers. However, in order to produce better intelligence
product, we need to understand the
Cognitive biases, not only in the intelligence analysis, but
also in the chain of Intelligence flow. From our
intelligence field experience, we have found a flaw in looking
for cognitive bias in the intelligence
analysis (Evaluators). By the time intelligence information
reaches the analysis level, a cognitive bias is
already embedded when going from Informers to Collectors and so
on. This is why detecting the
cognitive biases in the Evaluators stage is not adequate to
produce efficient intelligence for the
consumers. In order to find where the biases originate, we have
created a Manual for Detecting Intelligence Failure. In order to
detect multi-level cognitive biases in the chain of intelligence
flow Aydinli and I are collecting data (through interviews) from
intelligence practitioners in Pakistan, Turkey,
Iraq, and Lebanon. After analyzing this dataset, we will
classify the cognitive origins of the defects in the
intelligence flow: as individual origins of defects and
institutional origins of the defects. Then we will
discuss how these collection, evaluation, and sharing defects
can lead to intelligence failure.
Kathleen Vogel (Cornell University): Current Intelligence
Reporting and the H5N1 Bird
Flu Virus: Insights from the Field of Science and Technology
Studies In late 2011, virologists Ron Fouchier and Yoshihiro
Kawaoka encountered a swarm of government and
public controversy from their creation of novel variants of the
H5N1 bird flu virus. Prior to publication of
these experimental findings, the U.S. National Science Advisory
Board for Biosecurity (NSABB)
reviewed Fouchiers and Kawaokas scientific manuscripts. The
NSABB unanimously recommended that the, conclusions of the
manuscripts be published but without experimental details and
mutation data that would enable replication of the experiments. The
NSABB explained its justification as being based on security
concerns: publishing these experiments in detail would provide
information to some person, organization, or government that would
help them to develop similar viruses for harmful purposes. However,
once the NSABB made its decision public, other flu virologists
emphasized the difficulty of the
experiments and how these experimental results could lead to
beneficial new medical treatments. Other
scientists, however, have sided with the NSABB and warned of the
security dangers in publishing these
bird flu results. In the middle of this context, U.S.
intelligence analysts have been tasked by their
superiors to provide up-to-date security assessments of these
bird flu experiments as new information
about the experiments continues to emerge. These intelligence
analysts have struggled to make sense of
the positions held by the NSABB and different scientific
experts. These analysts have also encountered
challenges with how to gather and evaluate information in a
timely fashion to better assess the role of
explicit and tacit (know-how) knowledge in these experiments.
These intelligence assessments are needed
to better inform policymakers about whether to censor future
logical research findings and how to think
about emerging biological science threats. This paper will
discuss what happens when academic scholars
from the social science field of science and technology studies
(S&TS) are brought into unclassified
dialogues with U.S. intelligence analysts as these analysts are
writing their current intelligence reports on
these controversial bird flu experiments. This paper will
illustrate how S&TS research can provide new
insights for assessing the security threat from these
experiments and related biosecurity/WMD concerns,
how S&TS research can more broadly inform the analytic
practices that underpin current intelligence
reporting, as well as challenges that exist in bringing S&TS
ideas