Arlington 11

8/12/2019 Arlington 11

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THE MORNING OF SEPT. 11, F ORT MYER (VA.) F IRE DEPT.firefighters Allan Wallace, Mark Skipper and Dennis Youngwere staffing Foam 161 at the Pentagon heliport in prepa-

ration for a scheduled afternoon visit from the president. Wallacehad just moved the 2000 Emergency-One Titan 4x4 foam unit(Foam 161) out of the garage and positioned it to face the heli-port. He and Skipper were completing their morning inspectionof the rig. Young was in the station, watching coverage of the

World Trade Center attack on television The remaining FortMyer firefighters—both on- and off-duty personnel—wereattending an aircraft crash refresher class at headquarters.

At 0938 HRS, Wallace saw a plane turn straight toward the Penta-gon. He had just enough time to yell for Skipper to run away fromthe foam unit. Wallace dove under it just as American Airlines

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The initial fire & EMS response

By Michael J. Ward

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Flight 77 slammed into the Penta-gon. The 757 was en route fromDulles International Airport to LosAngeles with 58 passengers andsix crew members aboard.

“When the aircraft hit, a fireballflew into the station [about 150yards from the impact site], intothe living quarters and collapsedeverything in the ceiling,” saysFort Myer Fire Chief CharlesCampbell. “The air-conditioningduct, the heating, the lights, theceiling tiles all came down aroundDennis [Young].”

The fireball also incinerated thefirefighters’ personal vehiclesparked at the heliport. As soon asit passed, Wallace crawled out

from under Foam 161. Hechecked on Skipper and Youngand climbed into the rig. It wasburning and extensively damaged,but Wallace was able to use thetruck’s radio to call Fort Myer dispatch and report the crash.

Dispatch alerted the firefighters attending the refresher class, andthey immediately responded in Rescue Engines 161 and 162 andarrived on scene at 0940 HRS. Other staff at headquarters rolled outin a reserve pumper.

When the fireball went over them, both Skipper and Wallace suf-fered lacerations and second-degree burns. Wallace also suffered arotator cuff tear in his shoulder. Despite their injuries—and wearing

just their station uniforms because their firefighting gear was cov-ered with burning jet fuel and debris—all three firefighters ran 150yards to the impact site. They immediately started removing peoplefrom the first-floor windows of the Pentagon.

Campbell says his foam unit crew assisted 10 people out of theburning first floor before the first wave of military and on- and off-duty emergency workers arrived to assist in the evacuation. Duringthe first hour of the incident, Fort Myer personnel also moved vic-tims to a south parking lot triage area and helped the National Air-port firefighting crews with water supply and firefighting.

After about 45 minutes of rapidly extricating survivors, Wallaceand Skipper were sent to a hospital for treatment.

The Fort Myer Fire Department was one of three jurisdictions inthe initial Pentagon response. The others were the Arlington County(Va.) Fire Department (ACFD) and the Metropolitan WashingtonAirports Authority (MWAA). Traditional fire department activitiesat multiple alarm incidents include the concept that the fire depart-ment ownsthe building until the fire is controlled. In the case of thePentagon, however, the fire departments partnered with the militaryand federal law enforcement in the first moments of the event. Theyshared all the work—assignments, information and duties.

Metropolitan Washington Airports AuthoritySept. 11, MWAA had 16 on-duty firefighters at Reagan National Air-port, just 0.6 miles from the Pentagon. Another dozen off-duty fire-

fighters were attending a college-run Fire Officer II class. CaptainMichael Defina was the acting shift commander.

Before the plane crashed into the Pentagon, many on-duty fire-fighters in the Arlington area, including MWAA personnel, werewatching the television coverage of the initial crash at 1 WorldTrade Center. Defina even interrupted the Fire Officer II class sothe participants could watch the live coverage. The Trade Centerincident generated significant discussion regarding the potential

size of the aircraft and the tactical problems facing FDNY.Class was cancelled around 0915 HRS, after a second plane hit 2

World Trade. Minutes later, MWAA Rescue Engine 335 and Medic325 responded to a multiple vehicle car crash at the upper level of Reagan National’s Terminal B. A diabetic driver in insulin shock hadslammed into other cars dropping off travelers. Although the airportwas not on general alert, Defina decided to respond to the vehiclecrash.

The driver of the vehicle was unconscious with profoundly lowblood sugar. The crews treating the patient had their backs to thePentagon when the plane struck. “I heard a dull roar. The noise didnot belong with the noise you were used to hearing within the air-port,” says Defina. “I turned and saw a smoke plume rise.”

At 0939 HRS the National Airport control tower transmitted,“Crash! Crash! Crash!” over the MWAA frequency and activated anairport alert, but there was confusion about the exact location of thecrash. At about the same time, the control tower also reported amissing inbound 757.

MWAA’s Foam 331 (an Oshkosh T3000 crash rig), SERV 329 (amass-casualty vehicle equipped to treat 150 patients) and Attack 323(a mini-pumper) responded from the fire station to assist RescueEngine 335 and Battalion 301 at the Pentagon. Medic 325 trans-ported the unconscious driver to George Washington Universityhospital in Washington, D.C. and then responded to the Pentagon.Paramedic Mike Fetsko says it was the quickest patient transfer he’s

ATTACK ON THE PENTAGON

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ever experienced. “They were waiting for us outside the emergencydepartment,” he recalls. “They immediately moved the patient ontoa gurney and told us to go.”

MWAA Captain Harry Hopkins arrived at the scene on SERV 329and was shocked to see two nude adults writhing in pain on thegrass. They were outside the Pentagon when the plane crashed andhad been engulfed in the fireball; it burned off their clothes and hair.

MWAA and Arlington County fire departments arrived about thesame time at 0942 HRS. They confirmed that one plane had crashedinto the west side of the Pentagon. MWAA worked with Fort Myerto extinguish the jet fuel fire at the point of impact as well as treatthe injured. Arlington County assisted Fort Myer firefighters withextricating survivors who could be reached from the exterior of thecomplex and began interior rescue and firefighting operations.

With a confirmed location transmitted, Foam 345 (an OshkoshT3000) responded to the crash site from Reagan National Airport.From Dulles Airport, MWAA also sent a second mass-casualty unit(SERV 362) and a foam trailer to the crash site.

Foam 331 arrived at 0944 HRSand Foam 345 arrived at 0948 HRS.The crash trucks took about 13 minutes to suppress the jet fuel fireenough to allow fire crews to enter the outer D and E rings of thefive-floor building and start a floor-to-floor search. (See PentagonComplex diagram, p. 28.)

MWAA Battalion Chief Tim Lasher describes the first two hoursof the incident as “hand-to-hand fire combat.”

Arlington County Fire DepartmentAt the time of the attack, ACFD fire units were responding to anactivated fire alarm in Arlington. In Engine 101, Captain Steve

McCoy and firefighter Andrea Kaiser wit-nessed the airliner crash into the Pentagon.They called it into Arlington fire dispatchand diverted from the first alarm torespond in the direction of the billowing

mushroom cloud of fire and smoke.Based on Engine 101’s initial report,Arlington County sent an augmented first-alarm assignment of four engines, twoaerials, both rescue companies and fourALS ambulances to the Pentagon. Battal-ion Chief Robert Cornewell (Battalion111) and EMS Supervisor 111, Ed Blunt,also responded.

Blunt arrived with the Arlington firstalarm about 0940 HRS. He encountereddozens of burned and injured occupants.“One gentleman had the majority of both

hands cut off. He was also burned consid-erably,” he says. “Most of the injuries wesaw were really severe burns—full-thick-ness with skin sloughing. Some people hadtheir clothes still burning.”

When ACFD Truck 105 arr ived onscene at 0940 HRS, the crew immediatelycalled in second and third alarms.

Inside the Pentagon, ACFD crews foundthe building in darkness, and the wallsseemed ready to buckle. Everything wasscorched, and debris was everywhere. Onthe second and third floors, charred peopleremained at their desks. “We just thoughtit was going to be chaos and hell, and itwas,” says Captain Stephen McCoy

ACFD Chief Edward Plaugher heard thenews in a credit union office; the creditunion staff was listening to the radio. Withthe first report of an explosion at the Pen-tagon, Chief Plaugher immediatelyresponded to the scene.

Aware of the terrorist nature of theattack, Arlington fire dispatch directedcompanies to stage in three areas: south




(Crystal City), west (Arlington Blvd.) and north (14th StreetBridge). Arlington personnel spent their first minutes on sceneremoving patients from the Pentagon’s outside ring, triaging andtreating dozens of injured and setting up for a massive, major,multiple-alarm event.

Media helps mobilize mutual aid When the first plane crashed into the Trade Center, Alexandria Fireand EMS Dept. Lieutenant Byron Andrews was supervising a newoperator practice driving on Truck 208, a 100' tiller truck. Andrews,a paramedic and past chief of the Sterling Rescue Squad (an award-winning volunteer EMS agency in Loudoun County, Va.), learned of the Trade Center crashes via his alphanumeric pager. He calledAlexandria Station 208 to suggest the engine captain turn on thetelevision. While still on the road, Andrews felt the rumble of theplane crash into the Pentagon. He could seethe smoke rising less than a mile away. Fol-lowing a directive from Alexandria dis-patch, Truck 208 proceeded to Station 206and awaited further assignment.

Alexandria responded to the Pentagoncrash under the area’s mutual aid agree-ment. The department staged its greateralarm companies south of Reagan NationalAirport. Its ALS units and EMS supervisorwent straight to the Pentagon. The suppres-sion companies were first dispatched to areported gas station fire in Crystal City thatproved unfounded. So the first Alexandriasuppression company to the crash site wasLight-Air 207, which arrived an hour and ahalf after the crash. The Alexandria compa-nies also responded to fill in at the vacant

south battalion Arlington fire stations.Meanwhile, the senior operation chiefs at

Fairfax County Fire and Rescue, west of Arlington, had interrupted their staff meet-ing at the fire academy to watch the TradeCenter coverage. When the second planehit the Trade Center, the senior chiefs real-ized the incident likely involved terrorism.They rapidly deployed from the academy,activated the internal emergency operationscenter at fire headquarters and beganpreparing for a countywide response to anypotential terrorist activity in the FairfaxCounty area and in anticipation of a USAR activation to New York.

Captain II Dean Cox is Fairfax CountyFire and Rescue’s resource managementsupervisor and a member of Virginia TaskForce I (VA-TF1)—one of two USAR/ OFDA international search-and-rescueteams. As soon as the second plane hit theSouth Tower of the Trade Center, he beganto mobilize VA-TF1. At Fairfax County FireStation 418, Captain Bernard Bickhamstarted the operational process to get the

team on the road. (Ultimately, VA-TF1 was one of five teams as-signed to the Pentagon. For more on the USAR response, see p. 28.)

Fairfax County also responded to the Pentagon under the mutualaid agreement. Deputy Chief Glenn Benarick (who was a battalionchief in September) assembled the Fairfax County first alarm unitsin a shopping center on Arlington Blvd. at the Fairfax/ArlingtonCounty border at 0944 HRS. Arlington Blvd. is the primary east-westhighway that divides Arlington County into north and south battal-ions. EMS supervisor Captain II Richard Yuras and Fairfax County’sEMS units bypassed staging and responded directly to the incident.Many of the fire suppression units filled the empty Arlington fire sta-tions in the north battalion.

Also at 0944 HRS, ACFD requested that the District of ColumbiaFire and Emergency Medical Services (DCFEMS) department send a

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T he Arlington County Fire Department (ACFD),along with other northern Virginia fire depart-ments and numerous police, rescue and mili-

tary agencies responded to the Pentagon on Sept.11, 2001, in response to notification that a 757 jet aircraft—hijacked by terrorists—had hit the building.

The response of FEMA’s Urban-Search-and-Rescue(USAR) assets to the Pentagon included the Red Inci-dent Support Team (IST) and five 65-person taskforces. The USAR teams assigned to the Pentagonincluded Virginia Task Force I (VA-TF1, from Fairfax County), Virginia Task Force II (VA-TF2, from VirginiaBeach), Maryland Task Force I (MD-TF1), Tennessee

Task Force I (TN-TF1) and New Mexico Task Force I(NM-TF1). VA-TF1 and MD-TF1 arrived on scene withinhours of the incident. TN-TF1 and VA-TF2 arrived thefollowing day, and NM-TF1 arrived on Sept. 18.

The specialized rescue capabilities of the Alexan-dria and Arlington Technical Rescue Teams and Mili-tary District Washington Rescue Unit (MDW) were alsoutilized.

The USAR teams provide rescue capabilities in alltypes of collapse situations, but are specificallytrained and equipped for search, rescue and recoveryoperations in reinforced concrete structures. The RedIST is one of three operational ISTs and comprises12–62 individuals (depending on the type and natureof the event) who provide coordination, planning andcommand for multiple task forces when they’redeployed at a single incident. Due to the magnitudeof the events at both the Pentagon and World TradeCenter, some Red IST members (including some VA-

TF2 member) deployed to New York and thus were not initially available at the Pentagon. To fill the open IST positions, a Forest Service Type I Incident Manage-ment Team was assigned to the IST.

Each USAR task force comprises rescue, medical,search and rigging specialists, as well as engineersand other personnel specially trained to operateself-sufficiently for 72 hours. All USAR personnel at the Pentagon operated on 12-hour rotating shiftsthat provided 24/7 incident coverage. For each 12-hour shift, 180 USAR personnel were available for operations, complemented by 60 additional militarypersonnel.

Collapse considerations The Pentagon structure is Type I (fire-resistive) columnand beam moment frame construction. This type of building has columns, beams and floors made of rein-forced concrete. The Pentagon has five exterior sides.

The five corners of the building are called wedges andconnect to the main structure by corridors. Each sec-tion of the building contains five interior rings. Eachinterior ring consists of four to five interior hallwaysthat divide the interior office space.

The aircraft entered the Pentagon at ground levelbetween the fourth and fifth corridors to the right of the helicopter landing pad and beside a set of trans-fer columns—two columns erected next to each other that support different sections of the building. Fortu-nately, this portion of the building was sparsely occu-pied because a renovation that included the additionof exterior reinforcement beams had just been com-

pleted. The relatively minimal loss of life and propertydestruction the attack caused can be attributed to thereduced occupancy and recent reinforcements.

However, the plane’s initial impact produced atremendous fuel-fed fire and caused severe damageto many of the first floor columns that supported thefloors in that wedge of the building. “Firefighters expe-rienced some of the highest radiated and convectedheat conditions ever,” says ACFD Assistant Chief of Operations Jim Swartz. “In some cases, firefightershad good visibility, but the heat limited their ability topenetrate the structure.”

The weakened structure and ensuing blaze eventu-ally caused the floors to fail along the inside transfer column line. When the left side of the structure failed,it created a severely angled “lean-to” collapse area.(A lean-to collapse is an angled collapse created byfailure of one side of the floor or roof section, whilethe other attachment point maintains a connection.)

The collapse zone involved five floors and measuredapproximately 70 feet across the front of the building and 100 feet into the impacted wedge. Additionalstructural collapse and fire damage was significant onfloors one and two, but generally reduced in severityfrom the first to the fifth floors.

During the first 24 hours, USAR efforts to shoreand search the collapse area were hampered byheavy fire and smoke conditions. As the smoke condi-tions cleared on lower floors, efforts to evaluate thestructural damage started as a part of strategy devel-opment for future task-force efforts.

Fire conditions continued at some level for several

USAR Activities at the PentagonBy Buddy Martinette

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days. However access to many portions of thestructure allowed USAR efforts to proceed ineither a structural triage or actual building stabi-lization mode. The strategy developed by ACFDcommand and FEMA USAR personnel includedprotecting rescue workers, preventing further collapse, creating a protected area inside thestructure by shoring areas with missing columns, performing body recovery and then

finally delayering the collapse portion of thestructure—removing debris from the top of thecollapse and proceeding to the bottom.

“The factors involved in initial size-up andstrategy took into account [that] the structurewas compromised by fire, compressive forcesand, finally, a collapse,” says John Huff, IST team leader. “In addition, the entire incident management group could not lose sight of thefact this was a crime scene, and evidencerecovery was critical.”

Size-up of the structure confirmed a severe-angle lean-to collapse of the first through thirdfloors had occurred along 70 feet of the building

just left of Corridor 4. The first and second floorsappeared to have pancaked in the collapsearea. These conditions presented well into thebuilding and generally followed the G columnline. This collapse occurred approximately 20minutes after the initial impact, thus reducing the probability of trapped victims. Commandpersonnel designated this area of the building Division A. Incident management systems desig-nate portions of the building geographically sopersonnel can coordinate and communicate on-scene activities. Generally, the front of the build-ing is designated A. Then, running clockwisearound the building, the left side is B, the rear C

and the right side D.Observations of the first floor indicated a

number of columns in the building were com-promised. The left side of the collapse area wasdesignated Division B and consisted of firedamage and explosively compressed materialsthat ran generally to Corridor 5. The unsup-ported or damaged columns ran from the front of Division B through the E, D and C Rings andinto the central AE Corridor. The right side of Division A was completely unsupported in acantilever position. The rear of the damagedportion of the building that ran between Corri-dors 4 and 5 was designated Division C.

The right side of the collapse area was desig-nated Division D and consisted of superficialroof and wall collapse that generally ran to theleft of Corridor 4 and extended toward the Divi-sion C area along interior column line H.

The angl e of col laps e in Division A wassevere, and the integrity of attachment points onthe lean-to portion was uncertain. Division Awas deemed unsafe for operation until a safearea in Division B could be established. Thisincluded shoring the area from column line 1




box-alarm assignment (four engines, two trucks, a rescue com-pany and a battalion chief) to stage and wait on the 14th StreetBridge, just north of the Pentagon.

The response to the Pentagon attack proved the largestmulti-jurisdictional event ever handled by the Washington,D.C., metropolitan area departments.

Initial size-up concernsOn scene at the Pentagon, fire and EMS personnel had to con-tend with a rapidly escalating situation:

• The plane, a 757 loaded with more than 6,000 gallonsof jet fuel, had crashed into a military facility, compli-cating the coordination of immediate activities;

• The Pentagon was undergoing renovations and theplane damaged part of the active construction site, ignit-ing another 2,000-gallon outside fuel tank at the site;

• Pentagon officials initially estimated 200–800 peoplewere in the impact area;

• Thousands of people—Pentagon employees, contrac-tors and visitors—were milling around the area; and• Reports indicated other planes might be incoming.

Within two hours, more than 300 firefighters had respondedto the crash site. Fire-rescue organizations provided continuous,24-hour service at the Pentagon crash site for 10 days. Responsi-bilities of EMS and fire personnel on scene included:

• Locating, triaging, treating and transporting theburned and injured;

• Thoroughly searching the involved part of the build-ing for victims;

• Extinguishing the fires: It took more than 24 hours toextinguish the burning roof;

• Supporting the activities of both local and USAR tech-nical rescue teams;

• Stabilizing the weakened section of the outer threerings: 14 structural columns were destroyed, and ittook almost three days to secure the collapse area;

• Supporting the Department of Defense and FBI withevidence documentation and body removal.

The victimsIn addition to the 64 crew and passengers aboard Flight 77, 125military service members, employees and contract workers diedin the attack. The death toll remained relatively low because theoffices in the outer ring remained sparsely occupied. In addi-tion, hundreds of disciplined, organized and action-orientedmilitary personnel and civilians in the complex immediatelystarted to rescue others in the involved part of the building.They saved hundreds of lives.

In some cases, Pentagon employees took the injured to med-ical care without consulting fire or rescue personnel. One sec-retary was away from her office and on the other side of thePentagon when the plane struck. Returning to her damagedoffice, she subsequently transported 15 wounded coworkers toa hospital in her pickup.

Within 20 minutes, all red-tag patients were en route to ahospital via air or ground. Responding fire and rescue personnel

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USAR Activitiescontinued from page 29

and intersecting at the H column line of Division B. This strategy helped ensure that any sliding of material in Division A would not result in a further collapse or decrease the structural integrity in Division B.

Additional strategies for USAR operations involved a primary and secondarysearch and assessment of all divisions and initial stabilization efforts in Division Bwhile working with the FBI on crime scene evidence collection and body removal.“The tactics and work processes in every case took into consideration the on-scene

responsibilities of fire, EMS, USAR and the military,” says Swartz. “The incident management system at the Pentagon was truly an integrated system and one of thereasons the incident was a success.”

After ensuring a safe area in Division B, efforts shifted to removing the floor andbeam assemblies in Division A. Rescuers acquired a concrete pulverizing machineto remove the concrete from around the rebar-reinforced sections of the building so floor and beam sections could be reduced to manageable sizes and weights.Crane and heavy lifting operations proved limited due to the size of the materialand the fact the concrete was heavily reinforced and not completely broken awayfrom the building.

As the angle of collapsed material was reduced in Division A and debris wasremoved from Division B, efforts at triaging other parts of the building revealedadditional shoring needs in the remainder of Division B on the first floor and thefront of Division B on the second floor. Simultaneously, debris and body removal

took place in Divisions D and C. These activities continued until all debris wasremoved from Division A, when final shoring was accomplished in this area onSept 19.

Other incident activities included crane operations, removing overhead hazardsin the collapse area, cutting metal material to facilitate debris removal, establishing dump truck removal processes for debris, water and other utility control efforts, ven-tilation, hazardous materials monitoring and search dog utilization.

The following summarize the shoring activities in Divisions A, B, C and D:First floor: Forty-two columns and two wall intersections were shored with 576x6 box cribs; 35 beams were shored with tees and vertical shores.Second floor: Six columns were shored with box cribs; five beams were shoredwith vertical shores.Hundreds of various public and private agencies were effectively coordinated to

bring the incident to a successful conclusion. The use of the incident management

system by ACFD and the subsequent cooperation among all the rescue groupsmade this one of the most coordinated collapse events in the history of the USARprogram. Their aggressive setup of command and subsequent control of emergencyscene operations proved of paramount importance to the ultimate success of theincident response. In a nutshell, their efforts were textbook incident command anda big reason the USAR response was successful.

As a direct result of teamwork, accountability and rescuer expertise, the Penta-gon USAR operations successfully ceased on Sept. 20 at 1900 HRSwith no signifi-cant injuries reported.

C.V. “Buddy” Martinette Jr. is chief of the Lynchburg (Va.) Fire and EMS Department and is inhis fourth year of the National Fire Academy Executive Fire Officer Program. He’s an Instructor IV with the State of Virginia Department of Fire Programs and Incident Support Team Opera-tions Officer and Task Force Leader for Virginia Task Force II. His USAR experience includes theColonial Heights, Va., Wal-Mart Collapse, deployments for hurricanes Floyd and Fran, the Mur-

rah Federal Building bombing and the Pentagon collapse.Martinette is a USAR rescue specialist instructor and lectures nationwide on specialized

rescue operations to public safety, military, industrial and law enforcement organizations. Hehas been active in course development for all areas of technical rescues and is best known for his course development and delivery in the areas of confined space rescue, trench rescue andstructural collapse operations.

Author’s note: The realization that you were just one of hundreds of people who responded toassist at a disaster does not bear much weight until someone asks you to write about theevent. It’s indeed unfortunate that all of the thousands of firefighters, police officers, militarypersonnel and countless volunteers who responded to the events of Sept. 11 didn’t get anopportunity to document their experiences for the emergency service community. That said, Idedicate this story to my friend Battalion Chief Ray Downey and the other FDNY firefighterswho lost their lives Sept. 11, 2001.


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triaged, treated and transported 91 patients,13 of whom went to the regional burn unit at

Washington Hospital Center. Six were in criti-cal condition; one died a week later. Another100-plus patients were lightly injured andtreated on scene.

On-scene complicationsAlthough the Pentagon response provedoverwhelmingly successful, some problemsdid occur. The news media created confu-sion for EMS and fire agencies in Virginiaand Washington, D.C. By the time AmericanAirlines Flight 77 had crashed into the Pen-tagon, a cacophony of unconfirmed reportsof other terrorist incidents dominated themedia airways. One report claimed a carbomb had exploded in front of the State

Department. Other reports indicated a firewas supposedly burning on the NationalMall, near the Washington Monument.

An example of the impact this confusioncaused can be seen in the activities of DCFEMS dispatch. About the same timeArlington County requested a box alarmfrom DCFEMS for the Pentagon, the SecretService called to report that a plane hadcrashed into the White House, and a boxalarm was dispatched there.

D.C.’s Engine 16 and Truck 3 are first-dueto the White House. Normally, they greet the

uniformed Secret Service officer at a closedaccess gate. When they arrived on Sept. 11,the access gate stood wide open. Next to thisgate, the media conduct their talking headshots, using the White House as a back-ground. Responding crews knew somethingwas up because they observed tripods andstepladders typically used by camera opera-tors abandoned on the hill. As Engine 16and Truck 3 pulled up, a uniformed officerwaved them off, telling them, “Get the f---outta here! There’s a plane coming in!”

Fortunately, no plane crashed into the White House. One reason for this false alarmmay have been a split-second decision by anair-traffic controller. When the hijackedplane turned into the Pentagon, it was on acollision course with an airliner leaving Rea-gan National Airport as scheduled. Withoutthe data from Flight 77’s transponder andnot knowing the intention of the hijackedplane, the controller ordered the departingaircraft to take a hard right, into the pro-tected airspace above the White House.







Unsolicited help: As Alexandria and Fair-fax County units proceeded non-emergencyto back up empty Arlington County fire sta-tions, they were startled by emergency appa-ratus from as far as 60 miles away driving bythem. Those units were responding to thePentagon without formal request. Theyhadn’t been included in the WashingtonMetropolitan Council of Governments’(COG) published multi-jurisdictional mem-orandum of understanding and remainedunaware of the mutual aid plan. Almostnine hours after the crash, unsolicited fireand rescue units continued to show up at thecrash site.

Recall of off-duty firefighters: “If you’renot dead, report to work.”—alphanumericpager message sent to Alexandria Fire Dept.members within an hour of the attack.

All Washington, D.C.,-area fire depart-ments have recall plans. Many increasestaffing by reducing their three- or four-platoon work schedule to two platoons. Forcatastrophic events, the department may callall off-duty members back to work. With theexception of Fairfax County, all departmentshad initiated a massive recall of off-duty per-sonnel within 180 minutes of the attack.

Two days after the crash, Fairfax County’sAssistant Chief Mark Wheatley explained hisdepartment’s strategic decision not to recallmembers in a telephone conference to the

B-shifters. The department’s concern was theability to handle a major event during uncer-tain times. There was a concern that othertargets would be struck. Example: Fairfax

County handled a lone terrorist with an AK-47 who killed two and injured three at theentrance to CIA headquarters in 1993. If Fairfax had deployed all resources by Tues-day afternoon, who would have been thereto handle operations on Thursday?

As a result of the Pentagon response most

departments discovered their recall plansneeded work. Some fire stations had fire-fighters reporting for duty, but no units tostaff. Arlington had its recalled firefightersride with the mutual-aid companies fillingthe Arlington fire stations. Although Arling-tonians swear the numbering and labeling of streets in their dense, urban county makesense, most of the fill-in companies neededboth a map book and an Arlington firefighterto get them from point A to point B.

ConclusionArlington County is preparing a comprehen-sive report on the incident scheduled forrelease later in 2002, but here are some pre-liminary lessons learned:

1. The incident management system works.Arlington County established a systemthat incorporated the activities of dozensof fire department, law enforcement,military and federal agencies. It allowedfor rotation of sector officers throughoutthe incident. Example:The Logistics Sec-

tor command position was covered, atvarious times, by a Prince WilliamCounty (Va.) chief officer, an AirportAuthority captain, a Fairfax County fire-fighter and an Arlington County civilian.

2. Site control must begin early. Within 36hours, the Department of Defense estab-lished effective control of the incidentsite, using photo ID cards, fencing andarmed soldiers.

3. Departments must ensure all staff haveappropriate and up-to-date photo identifi-cation. (Disasters attract people who pose

as emergency personnel.) State employeesfrom various Virginia emergency responseorganizations were surprised to discovertheir state identification cards hadexpired. Many emergency responders didnot have durable personal identificationto link them with their agency.

4. Departments must build depth into com-mand staff. Junior officers or senior fire-fighters must be capable of assumingmany incident management roles.

Michael J. Ward retired from the Fairfax County (Va.)

Fire & Rescue Department in July 2000 after 25 years inthe department. He also writes theFIRER ESCUE MAGA-ZINE Company Officer Development column. Contacthim via e-mail at [email protected].

Resources• Alexandria Fire and EMS Department—

http://ci.alexandria.va.us/fire/fire_home.html• Arlington County Fire Department—

www.co.arlington.va.us/fire/ • Fairfax County Fire and Rescue—

www.co.fairfax.va.us/ps/fr/homepage.htm• Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority—

www.metwashairports.com/rescue/ • Virginia USAR Task Force 1—

www.vatf1.org

The Building T he world’s largest office building, the Pentagon is a five-story, monolithic, reinforced-

concrete structure. When it was built in 1942, the production ramp-up for World War IImade it impossible to use steel girders in its construction. Instead, spirals of 4" rein-

forcing steel rods were cast inside the massive concrete columns. The ai rliner struck a segment under extensive renovation. The outside wal l had recently been

reinforced with blast-resistant windows, steel girder reinforcement and a Kelvar-style barrier. Theinterior featured a new fire sprinkler system with fire-resistant carpet, wall paint, drapes, ceiling tiles and other finishes.

Parts of the outer ring segment remained sparsely occupied due to the renovations. One con-tractor unwillingly got the chance to see the new system in action. He was walking in the new,empty wing when the plane struck the building. The pressure created by the impact picked himup and hurled him down a corridor. He watched ceiling tiles blow in front of him, like a wave at abeach. He was slammed against a wall, and the office door closed behind him.

The contractor suffered significant blunt injuries to both hands. His hands were also burnedwhen he tried to open the door: the fireball was right behind the pressure wave that threw himinto the office. A few minutes later, when a Pentagon officer assisted him out of the building, thesprinklers were operating in the hallway. —MW

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P H O T O A / P W I D E W O R L D P H O T O S / W I L L M O R R I S

A Pentagon victim is loaded into an ambulance11, 2001, after the building took a direct, devashit from an aircraft during a terrorist attack.

ATTACK ON THE PENTAGON CONT’D FROM P. 32

Arlington 11

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