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The plan appeases violent Latin American regimes spills over anddestabilizes every global hotspotFarah 12 [Doug. Senior Fellow at the Intl Assessment and Strategy Center. President of IBIConsultants. Transnational Organized Crime,Terrorism, and Criminalized States in Latin America: An Emerging Tier-One National Security Priority 2012, Strategic StudiesInstitute Publication. http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1117]Latin America , while not generally viewed as part of the stateless regions phenomenon, or part of the failed state discussion,presentsmultiple threats that center on criminalized states, their hybrid alliance with extra-regional sponsors of

terrorism, and nonstate TOC actors. The groups within this hybrid threat often rivals, but willing to work in temporaryalliancesare part of the recombinant criminal/terrorist pipeline, and their violence is often aimed at gainingcontrol of specific territory or parts of that pipeline, either from state forces or other nonstate groups . In areasoutside effective government control, the state is either absent or ineffective , contributing to the governance problem through corruptionand negligence. Only Colombia has made significant progress in recouping internal space for the government, and that progress is fragile and in dangerof being reversed.126 While the basic model of the pipeline holds up well, the emerging situation can be likened to new branches of the pipeline being built in regions where it previously had no access. The combination of ungoverned spaces, criminalized states, and TOCgroups poses a growing, dangerous, and immediate threat to the security of the United States. The traffic in drugs,

weapons, and humans from Latin American northward relies on the same basic pipeline structures to move. Thesame recombinant chains also move bulk cash, stolen cars, and weapons from the United States southward. Thisdemonstrates that these groups can successfully cross our border, and do, multiple times each day, in both directions. The pipelines are seldomdisrupted for more than a minimal amount of time, in part because the critical human nodes in the chain, and key chokepoints in the pipelines, are notidentified, and the relationships among the different actors and groups are not understood adequately. As noted, pipelines are adaptable and versatileas to productthe epitome of modern management systemsoften intersecting with formal commercial institutions (banks, commodity exchanges,legitimate companies, etc.), both in a physical and virtual/cyber manner, in ways difficult to determine, collect intelligence on, or disaggregate fromprotected commercial activities which may be both domestic and international in nature, with built-in legal and secrecy protections. Whilethesituation is already critical , it is likely to get worse quickly . There is growingevidence of Russian and Chinese

organized crime penetration of the region,particularly in Mexico and Central America , greatlystrengthening thecriminal organizations and allowing them to diversify their portfolios and supply routesa particular example being precursor chemicals forthe manufacture of methamphetamines and cocaine. The Chinese efforts to acquire ports, resources, and intelligence-gathering capacity in the regiondemonstrate just how quickly the situation can develop, given that China was not a major player in the region 5 years ago. Iranian, Russian, andChinese banks operating in the region all offer new ways to move money into unregulated channels that benefit 65 both terrorist and criminalorganizations, along with corrupt officials. At the same time, there is strong evidence thatstates of the Bolivarian Axis , led by Venezuela andincluding Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Bolivia,not only tolerate increased criminalactivities in their territories, but also sponsor nonstate

armed groups designated as terrorist entities by the United States, including the FARC in Colombia, and Hezbollah. These states appear to allowtheir stateless areas to be franchised out to these groups in order for the nonstate actors to both fund their activities and spread unrest throughout theregion. Of particular concern is the relationship of these Bolivarianstates , which support nonstate actors in the hemisphere, withIran , a state that has for many years funded, trained, and protected Hezbollah, one of the most effective and efficient nonstate (or quasi-state)terrorist actors in the world.The growing presence of Hezbollah in the Latin American drug trade both directly and through its proxies in West Africa and Southern Eurasiapresents a new and important threat to U.S. security . The only thing the Bolivarian nationsproclaiming 21st -century socialism an d the reactionary theocratic regime in Iran, have in common is a stated hatred for the United States and thedesire to inflict damage on the nation they view as the Evil Empire or the Great Satan. This is a new type of alliance of secular (self-proclaimedsocialist and Marxist) and radical Islamist organizations with a common goal directly aimed at challenging and undermining the security of the UnitedStates and its primary allies in the region (Colombia, Chile, Peru, Panama, and Guatemala).This represents a fundamental change

because both 66 primary state allies in the alliance (the governments of Venezuela and Iran)host and support nonstateactors , allowing the nonstate actors to thrive in ways that would be impossible without state protection. Given this reality , it is imperative thatU.S. intelligence community, military, and law enforcement agencies develop a much deeper and more nuanced

understanding of how the criminalized state/TOC/terrorist groups and foreign hostile state and nonstate foreign actors exploit the ungovernedor stateless spaces in areas of close proximity to U.S. bordersand the dangers they represent both in their current configuration, and their futureiterations. Understanding how these groups develop, and how they relate to each other and to groups from outside the region, is vitalparticularlygiven the rapid pace with which they are expanding their control across the continent, across the hemisphere, and beyond. Developing a predictivecapacity can be done based only on a more realistic understanding of the shifting networks of actors exploiting the pipelines; the nature and location ofthe geographic space in which they operate; the critical nodes where these groups are most vulnerable; and their behaviors in adapting to new politicaland economic developments, market opportunities and setbacks, internal competition, and the countering actions of governments. In turn, aneffective strategy for combating TOCmust rest on a solid foundation of regional intelligence which, while cognizant of the

overarching transnational connections, remains sensitive to unique local realities behind seemingly ubiquitous behaviors. A one-size-fits-all

policy will not suffice . It is not a problem that is only , or primarily, a matter of state or regional security, narcotics, money

laundering, ter67 rorism, human smuggling, weakening governance, democracy reversal,trade and energy, counterfeiting and contraband,immigration and refugees, hostile states seeking advantage, or alterations in the military balance and alliances.It is increasingly acombination of all of these.It is a comprehensive threat that requires analysis and management withina comprehensive,


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integrated whole-of-government approach . At the same time, however expansive in global terms, a strategy based on geopoliticsthefundamental understanding of how human behavior relates to geographic spacemust always be rooted in the local.

The signal of appeasement ignites a host of conflicts and collapseshegemonyCohen 3-19[Eliot. Director of Strategic Studies at Johns Hopkins. Eliot Cohen: American Withdrawal and Global Disorder The Wall StreetJournal, 3/19/13 ln] In Mr. Obama's second term the limits of such withdrawal from conventional militarycommitments abroad will be tested.In East Asia, an assertive China has bullied the Philippines (with which the U.S. has a 61-year-old defense pact)over the Spratly islands , and China has pressed its claims on Japan (a 53-year-old defense pact) over the Senkaku Islands. Atstake are territorial waters and mineral resources symbols of China's drive forhegemony and an outburst of nationalegotism. Yet when Shinzo Abe, the new prime minister of an understandably anxious Japan, traveled to Washington in February, hedidn't get the unambiguous White House backing of Japan's sovereignty that an ally of long standing deserves and needs. In Europe,an oil-rich Russia is rebuilding its conventional arsenal while modernizing (as have China and Pakistan) its nuclear arsenal.Russia has been menacing its East European neighbors , including those, like Poland, that have offered to host

elements of a NATO missile-defense system to protect Europe. In 2012, Russia's then-chief of general staff, Gen. NikolaiMakarov, declared: "A decision to use destructive force pre-emptively will be taken if the situation worsens." This would be the sameRussia that has attempted to dismember its neighbor Georgia and now has a docile Russophile billionaire, Prime Minister BidzinaIvanishvili, to supplant the balky, independence-minded government loyal to President Mikhail Saakashvili.In the Persian Gulf , American policy was laid down by Jimmy Carter in his 1980 State of the Union address with what became the Carter Doctrine: "Anattempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of theUnited States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force." America's Gulfallies may not have treaties to rely upon but they do have decades of promises and the evidence of two wars that

the U.S. would stand by them. Today they wait for the long-promised (by Presidents Obama and George W. Bush)nucleardisarmament of a revolutionary Iranian government that has been relentless in its efforts to intimidate and subvert Iran'sneighbors. They may wait in vain. Americans take for granted the world in which they grew up a world in which,for better or worse, the U.S. was the ultimate security guarantor of scores of states, and in many ways the entireinternational system. Today we are informed by many politicians and commentators that we are weary of those burdensthough

what we should be weary of , given that our children aren't conscripted and our taxes aren't being raised in order to pay for those wars, is unclear. The truthis that defense spending at the rate of 4% of gross domestic product (less than that sustained with ease by Singapore) is eminently affordable. The arguments against far-flung American strategic commitments take many forms. So-calledforeign policy realists, particularly in the academic world, believethat the competing interests of states tend automaticallytoward balance and require no statesmanlike action by the U.S. To them, the old language of force in international politicshas become as obsolete as that of the "code duello," which regulated individual honor fights through the early 19th century. We hearthat international institutions and agreements can replace national strength. I t is also saidcovertly but significantly that the U.S.is too dumb and inept to play the role of security guarantor. Perhaps the clever political scientists, complacent humanists,Spenglerian declinists, right and left neo-isolationists, and simple doubters that the U.S. can do anything right are correct. Perhapsthe president should concentrate on nation-building at home while pressing abroad only for climate-change agreements, nucleardisarmament and an unfettered right to pick off bad guys (including Americans) as he sees fit. But if history is any guide,foreignpolicy as a political-science field experiment or what-me-worryism will yield some ugly results . Syria is a harbingerof things to come . In that case, the dislocation, torture and death have first afflicted the locals. But it will not end there, asincidents on Syria's borders and rumors of the movement of chemical weapons suggest. A world in which the U.S. abnegatesits leadership will be a world of unrestricted self-help in which China sets the rules of politics and trade in Asia,

mayhem and chaos is the order of the day in the Middle East , and timidity and appeasement paralyze the freeEuropean states. A world, in short, where the strong do what they will, the weak suffer what they must, andthose with an option hurry up and get nuclear weapons .

Appeasement crushes US leadership and emboldens global rivalsHenriksen 99 (Thomas H. Henriksen, U.S. foreign policy, international political and defense affairs, rogue states, and insurgencies, Using Power

and Diplomacy To Deal With Rogue States February 1, 1999 http://www.hoover.org/publications/monographs/27159) At the dawn of a new millennium,the United States finds itself entering an era of neither war nor peace. Rather, itconfronts an uncertain and increasingly deadly world. We face not one arms race but many, in which weapons of massdestruction have fallen--or are falling--into the most desperate hands. Rogue adversaries covet nuclear, chemical,or biological capabilities to obliterate ancient enemies or to terrorize their way into the circles of the great powers.They arealso rapidly acquiring the long-range missiles to deliver awesome destruction to our allies' and our own shores. Acongressionally chartered Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States under the chairmanship of DonaldRumsfeld concluded in 1998 that Iran and North Korea will be able "to inflict major destruction on the United States" within five years and Iraq within ten.How the United States handles rogue states will be of decisive importance to America's well-being and global primacy. If it is judged timorous in the use of power, it will be open to challenge as its own vulnerability becomes apparent. Clausewitz, the famous Prussian military theorist, emphasized that war is to beunderstood as the continuation of politics by other means. Our adoption of severe remedies short of declared
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conflict must be seen as an extension of diplomatic instruments to realize our strategic goals.Power must beemployed to further diplomatic goals. Sanctions and criminal legal proceedings make up part of our arsenal .These initial steps can build international support for more draconian measures. Offensive military operations and othermeasures short of war are our best defense for peace and continued security.They represent political warfare, provided , ofcourse, that the United States has the tenacity and wherewithal to complete them once begun. By backing awayfrom realistic approaches we will demonstrate to our opponents that they can oppose us without cost. Our allies

will take note and go their own way . This turn of events will cause still further problems down the road.If the forcesof global disorder come to dominate the world scene, the human condition will be degraded, producing fertile soil forstill more extreme elements to take root.The alternative to American leadership is growing international anarchy.Unless we restore power, and the credibility it represents, to U.S. diplomacy, we await the dire consequences of

our feebleness .

Hegemonys a controlling impact nuclear war impossible with it andinevitable if it collapsesBWI 13(Brooks, Wohlforth and Ikenberry. Stephen, Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, John Ikenberry is the AlbertG. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University in the Department of Politics and the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, William C. Wohlforth is the Daniel Webster Professor in the Department ofGovernment at Dartmouth College Dont Come Home America: The Case Against Retrenchment, International Security, Vol. 37,No. 3 (Winter 2012/13), pp. 7 51)

A core premise of deep engagement is that it prevents the emergence of a far more dangerous global securityenvironment. For one thing, as noted above, the United States overseas presence gives it the leverage to restrainpartners from taking provocative action . Perhaps more important, its core alliance commitments also deter states withaspirations to regional hegemony from contemplating expansion and make its partners more secure, reducing their incentive toadopt solutions to their security problems that threaten others and thus stoke security dilemmas. The contention that engagedU.S.power dampens the baleful effects of anarchy is consistent with influential variants of realist theory. Indeed, arguably thescariest portrayal of the war-prone world that would emerge absent the American Pacifier is provided in the works of JohnMearsheimer , who forecasts dangerous multipolar regions replete with security competition, arms races, nuclearproliferation and associated preventive war temptations, regional rivalries,and even runs at regional hegemony andfull-scalegreat power war. 72 How do retrenchment advocates, the bulk of whom are realists, discount this benefit? Their arguments arecomplicated, but two capture most of the variation: (1) U.S. security guarantees are not necessary to prevent dangerous rivalries andconflict in Eurasia; or (2) prevention of rivalry and conflict in Eurasia is not a U.S. interest. Each response is connected to a differenttheory or set of theories, which makes sense given that the whole debate hinges on a complex future counterfactual (what wouldhappen to Eurasias security setting if the United States truly disengaged?). Although a certain answer is impossible, each o f theseresponses is nonetheless a weaker argument for retrenchment than advocates acknowledge. The first response flows from defensiverealism as well as other international relations theories that discount the conflict-generating potential of anarchy undercontemporary conditions. 73 Defensive realists maintain that the high expected costs of territorial conquest, defense dominance, andan array of policies and practices that can be used credibly to signal benign intent, mean that Eurasias major states could manageregional multipolarity peacefully without the American pacifier. Retrenchment would be a bet on this scholarship, particularly inregions where the kinds of stabilizers that nonrealist theories point tosuch as democratic governance or dense institutionallinkagesare either absent or weakly present. There are three other major bodies of scholarship, however, that might givedecisionmakers pause before making this bet. First is regional expertise. Needless to say, there is no consensus on the net securityeffects of U.S. withdrawal. Regarding each region, there are optimists and pessimists. Few experts expect a return of intense greatpower competition in a post-American Europe, but many doubt European governments will pay the political costs of increased EUdefense cooperation and the budgetary costs of increasing military outlays. 74 The result might be a Europe that is incapable ofsecuring itself from various threats that could be destabilizing within the region and beyond (e.g., a regional conflict akin to the1990s Balkan wars), lacks capacity for global security missions in which U.S. leaders might want European participation, and is vulnerable to the influence of outside rising powers. What about the other parts of Eurasia where the United States has a substantialmilitary presence? Regarding the Middle East, the balance begins to swing toward pessimists concerned that states currently backed by Washington notably Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabiamight take actions upon U.S. retrenchment that would intensify securitydilemmas. And concerning East Asia, pessimism regarding the regions prospects without the American pacifier is pronounced. Arguably the principal concern expressed by area experts is that Japan and South Korea are likely to obtain a nuclear capacity andincrease their military commitments, which could stoke a destabilizing reaction from China. It is notable that during the Cold War, both South Korea and Taiwan moved to obtain a nuclear weapons capacity and were only constrained from doing so by a still-engaged United States. 75 The second body of scholarship casting doubt on the bet on defensive realisms sanguine portrayal is all ofthe research that undermines its conception of state preferences. Defensive realisms optimism about what would happen if the United States retrenched is very much dependent on its particularand highly restrictiveassumption about state preferences; once we relax this assumption, then much of its basis for optimism vanishes. Specifically, the prediction of post-American tranquilitythroughout Eurasia rests on the assumption that security is the only relevant state preference, with security defined narrowly interms of protection from violent external attacks on the homeland. Under that assumption, the security problem is largely solved assoon as offense and defense are clearly distinguishable, and offense is extremely expensive relative to defense.Burgeoningresearch across the social and othersciences , however,undermines that core assumption : states have preferences notonly for security but alsofor prestige, status, and other aims , and they engage in trade-offs among the various objectives. 76 In


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addition, they define security not just in terms of territorial protection but in view of many and varied milieu goals. It follows thateven states that are relatively secure may nevertheless engage in highly competitive behavior. Empirical studies show that this isindeed sometimes the case. 77 In sum, a bet on a benign postretrenchment Eurasia is a bet that leaders of major countries will neverallow these nonsecurity preferences to influence their strategic choices. To the degree that these bodies of scholarly knowledge havepredictive leverage, U.S. retrenchment would result in a significant deterioration in the security environment in at least some of the worlds key regions. We have already mentioned the third, even more alarming body of scholarship. Offensive realism predicts that

the withdrawal of the America n pacifier will yield either a competitive regional multipolarity complete with associated insecurity, arms racing, crisis instability, nuclear proliferation, and the like, or bids for regional hegemony, which may be beyond the capacity of local great powers to contain (and which in any case would generate intensely competitive behavior, possibly including regionalgreat power war ). Hence it is unsurprising that retrenchment advocates are prone to focuson the second argument noted above: that avoiding wars and security dilemmas in the worlds core regions is not a U.S. nation alinterest. Few doubt that the United States could survive the return of insecurity and conflict among Eurasian powers, but at whatcost? Much of the work in this area has focused on the economic externalities of a renewed threat of insecurity and war, which wediscuss below. Focusing on the pure security ramifications, there are two main reasons why decisionmakers may be rationallyreluctant to run the retrenchment experiment. First, overall higher levels of conflict make the world a more dangerous place. WereEurasia to return to higher levels of interstate military competition,one would see overall higher levels of military spending andinnovation and a higher likelihood of competitive regional proxy wars and arming of client states all of which would beconcerning, in part because it would promote a faster diffusion of military power away from the United States. Greater regionalinsecurity could well feed proliferation cascades, as states such as Egypt, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Saudi Arabia all mightchoose to create nuclear forces. 78 It is unlikely that proliferation decisions by any of these actors would be the end of the game: they would likely generate pressure locally for more proliferation. Following Kenneth Waltz, many retrenchment advocates areproliferation optimists, assuming that nuclear deterrence solves the security problem. 79 Usually carried out in dyadic terms, thedebate over the stability of proliferation changes as the numbers go up. Proliferation optimism rests on assumptions of rationality

and narrow security preferences. In social science, however, such assumptions are inevitably probabilistic. Optimists assume thatmost states are led by rational leaders, most will overcome organizational problems and resist the temptation to preempt beforefeared neighbors nuclearize, and most pursue only security and are risk averse. Confidence in such probabilistic assumptionsdeclines if the world were to move from nine to twenty, thirty, or forty nuclear states. In addition, many of the other dangers noted by analysts who are concerned about the destabilizing effects of nuclear proliferationincluding the risk of accidents and theprospects that some new nuclear powers will not have truly survivable forcesseem prone to go up as the number of nuclear powersgrows. 80 Moreover, the risk of unforeseen crisis dynamics that could spin out of control is also higher as the number ofnuclear powers increases. Finally, add to these concerns the enhanced danger of nuclear leakage, and a world with overall higherlevels of security competition becomes yet more worrisome. The argument that maintaining Eurasian peace is not a U.S. interestfaces a second problem. On widely accepted realist assumptions, acknowledging that U.S. engagement preserves peace dramaticallynarrows the difference between retrenchment and deep engagement. For many supporters of retrenchment, the optimal strategy fora power such as the United States, which has attained regional hegemony and is separated from other great powers by oceans, isof fshore balancing: stay over the horizon and pass the buck to local powers to do the dangerous work of counterbalancing any localrising power. The United States should commit to onshore balancing only when local balancing is likely to fail and a great powerappears to be a credible contender for regional hegemony, as in the cases of Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union in themidtwentieth century. The problem is that Chinas rise puts the possibility of its attaining regional hegemony on the table, at least inthe medium to long term. As Mearsheimer notes, The United States will have to play a key role in countering China, because i ts Asian neighbors are not strong enough to do it by themselves. 81 Therefore, unless Chinas rise stalls, the United State s is likely toact toward China similar to the way it behaved toward the Soviet Union during the Cold War. 82 It follows that the United St atesshould take no action that would compromise its capacity to move to onshore balancing in the future. It will need to maintain keyalliance relationships in Asia as well as the formidably expensive military capacity to intervene there. The implication is to get out ofIraq and Afghanistan, reduce the presence in Europe, and pivot to Asia just what the United States is doing. 83 In sum,theargument that U.S. security commitments are unnecessary for peace is countered by a lot of scholarship , includinghighly influential realist scholarship. In addition, the argument that Eurasian peace is unnecessary for U.S. security is weakened bythe potential for a large number of nasty security consequences as well as the need to retain a latent onshore balancing capacity thatdramatically reduces the savings retrenchment might bring. Moreover, switching between offshore and onshore balancing could well be difcult. Bringing together the thrust of many of the arguments discussed so far underlines the degree to whichthe case for

retrenchment misses the underlying logic of the deep engagement strategy. By supplying reassurance, deterrence, andactive management,the U nited S tates lowers security competition in the worlds key regions, thereby preventing theemergence of a hothouse atmosphere for growing new military capabilities . Alliance ties dissuade partners from rampingup and also provide leverage to prevent military transfers to potential rivals. On top of all this, the United States formid able military

machine may deter entry by potential rivals. Current great power military expenditures as a percentage of GDP are at historical lows,and thus far other major powers have shied away from seeking to match top-end U.S. military capabilities. In addition, they have sofar been careful to avoid attracting the focused enmity of the United States. 84 All of the worlds most modern militaries are U.S.allies (Americas alliance system of more than sixty countries now accounts for some 80 percent of global mi litary spending), and thegap between the U.S. military capability and that of potential rivals is by many measures growing rather than shrinking. 85


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2nc uniqueness wallUS engagement with rouge regimes is low now but now is key tohardline. Engagement now would expand their economy andeverything the US has worked for would be pushed out of the

way. Prefer our evidence it indicates the meaning of a relation between the US and rogue states the aff evidence assumesother types of offers only our evidence assumes the squo.


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No Engagement Now General

Hardline against rogue states nowBoyle 6-24professor of international law at the University of Illinois College of Law (Francis, Obama Prepares to Wage Offensive, Firs t-strikeStrategic Nuclear Warfare against Russia, China, Iran, North Korea and Syria, Global Research, 6/24,http://www.globalresearch.ca/obama-prepares-to-wage-offensive-first-strike-strategic-nuclear-warfare-against-russia-china-iran-north-korea-and-syria/5340299) Since nuclear deterrence is not now and has never been the Obama administrations nuclear weap ons policy from the get-go, then by default this means thatoffensive first-strike strategic nuclear war fighting is now and has always been the Obamaadministrations nuclear weaponspolicy. This policy will also be pursued and augmented by means ofintegrated non -nuclearstrike options. (Ibid). Therefore the entire 2013 NPR and Obamas recent nuclear arms reduction proposals must beunderstood within this context of the United States pursuing an offensive, strategic first-strike nuclear war-fighting capability as augmented by non-nuclear strike forces: After a comprehensive review of our nuclear forces, thePresident has determined that we can ensure the security of the United States and our Allies and partners andmaintain a strong and credible strategic deterrent while safely pursuing a one-third reduction in deployednuclear weapons from the level established in the New START Treaty. Id. at 6. And we know now for sure that alltheBallistic Missile Defense (BMD) systems that Obama is currently in the process of deploying in Europe, Asia, andthe United States , on land, at sea and perhaps in Outer Spaceare designed to provide the United States with a strategic,offensive, first strike nuclear war fighting capability against Russia and China and Iran and North Korea andSyria for starters. The latter three because the United States has taken the position that they are not in compliance

with their obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty : the United States has relied increasingly on non-

nuclear elements to strengthen regional security architectures, including a forward U.S. conventional presence and effective theater ballistic missile defenses Id. at 9. So the United States government is currently preparing to launch, wage and winan offensive, first-strike strategic nuclear war against Russia, China, Iran, North Korea and Syria. All the rest is just palaver. Including by our Dissembler-in-Chief. An honors graduate of Harvard Law School.

Snowden proves US e ngagement with Latin Americas low AP 7-13(Associated Press, The Blade, July 13 2013, Snowden affair dampens already cool U.S.-Latin America ties,http://www.toledoblade.com/World/2013/07/13/Snowden-affair-dampens-already-cool-U-S-Latin-America-ties.html,PS) WASHINGTON America is pivoting to Asia, focused on the Mideast, yet the "backyard," as Secretary of State John Kerry oncereferred to Latin America, is sprouting angry weeds as the scandal involving intelligence leaker Edward Snowden lays bare alreadythorny U.S. relations with Latin America. Taking the opportunity to snub their noses at the U.S., Venezuela, Bolivia and Nicaraguahave already said they'd be willing to grant asylum for Snowden, who is wanted on espionage charges in the United States forrevealing the scope of National Security Agency surveillance programs that spy on Americans and foreigners. Ecuador has said it would consider any request from him. Relations between the US and these countries were already testy, but the

Snowden affair also stunned the Obama administration's effort to improve ties with friendlier nations in theregion like Mexico and Brazil. Snowden hasn't been the only recent setback. Leaders in the region harshlycriticized the U.S . earlier this week when a newspaper in Brazil , which was privy to some documents released by Snowden,reported that a U.S. spy program was widely targeting data in emails and telephone calls across Latin America .That revelation came just days after an uproar in Latin America over the rerouting of Bolivian President Evo Morales' plane overEurope amid suspicions, later proven untrue, that Snowden was aboard. And all this comes right after President Barack Obama, Vice President Joe Biden and Kerry have all made recent treks to the region to bolster U.S. engagement in Latin America. " Whatthe Snowden affair has done to the reinvigorated effort to re-engage with Latin America is to dump a pail of cold

water on it ," said Carl Meacham, a former senior Latin America adviser on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. "It won't stoptrade deals, cooperation on energy, but it's going to be harder for the president to portray the image that 'We are here to work with you.' It's a step back ." The U.S. has sought to downplay the fallout from the disclosure of information about its intelligenceactivities. State Department spokeswoman Jen Psaki acknowledged that the United States does gather foreign intelligence just likeother nations. "I can tell you that we have spoken with Brazilian officials regarding these allegations," she said this week. "We planto continue our dialogue with the Brazilians through normal diplomatic channels, but those are conversations that, of course, we would keep private." Psaki has also said that any country granting asylum to Snowden would create "grave difficulties in our bilateral relationship." While other nations may spy on their friends, the allegations have fueled anti-American sentiment alreadysimmering in the region. Venezuela, Nicaragua, Bolivia and Ecuador are led by populist leaders who have balked at any dominance

by the U.S. in the Americas and pursued policies that often run counter to Washington's wishes. Venezuela refers to the UnitedStates simply as "The Empire." " What they're saying is 'See, the U.S. hasn't changed. It doesn't matter who is in the White House, the U.S. is the same. The U.S. is the big imperial power ... they are not treating us as equals. Look,they are even spying on us ,'" said Meacham, who directs the Americas program at the Center for Strategic and InternationalStudies.
http://www.globalresearch.ca/obama-prepares-to-wage-offensive-first-strike-strategic-nuclear-warfare-against-russia-china-iran-north-korea-and-syria/5340299http://www.globalresearch.ca/obama-prepares-to-wage-offensive-first-strike-strategic-nuclear-warfare-against-russia-china-iran-north-korea-and-syria/5340299http://www.globalresearch.ca/obama-prepares-to-wage-offensive-first-strike-strategic-nuclear-warfare-against-russia-china-iran-north-korea-and-syria/5340299http://www.globalresearch.ca/obama-prepares-to-wage-offensive-first-strike-strategic-nuclear-warfare-against-russia-china-iran-north-korea-and-syria/5340299


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No Engagement Now Cuba

Hardline toward Cuba nowKovalik 6-28[Dan. Senior Associate with the AFL-CIO. Citing Lamrani, a US-Cuba relations expert. Trying to Destroy the Danger of a GoodExample: The Unrelenting Economic War on Cuba 6/28/13 http://www.counterpunch.org/2013/06/28/the -unrelenting-economic-war-on-cuba/]Imagine then, what Cuba could do if the U.S. blockade were lifted. It is clear that the rulers of the U.S. have imagined this,and with terror in their hearts. Indeed, Lamrani quotes former Cuban Minister of Foreign Affairs , Felipe Perez Roque,asquite rightly asserting: Why does the U.S. government not lift the blockade against Cuba ? I will answer: because itis afraid. It fears our example. It knows that if the blockade were lifted, Cubas economic and social development

would be dizzying . It knows that we would demonstrate even more so than now, the possibilities of Cuban socialism ,all the potential not yet fully deployed of a country without discrimination of any kind, with social justice and human rightsfor all citizens, and not just for the few. It is the government of a great and powerful empire, but it fears theexample of this small insurgent island. The next critical question is how can those of good will help and support the goodexample of Cuba in the face of the U.S. blockade. Obviously, the first answer is to organize and agitate for an end the blockade. As a young Senator, BarackObama said that the blockade was obsolete and should end , and yet , while loosening the screws justa bit, President Obamahas continued to aggressively enforce the blockade . He must be called to task on this. In addition,Congress must be lobbied to end the legal regime which keeps the embargo in place. In addition, we must support Venezuela and its new President, Nicolas Maduro, as Venezuela has been quite critical in supporting Cuba in itsinternational medical mission. And indeed,one of the first things President Maduro did once elected in April was totravel to Cuba to reaffirm his support for these efforts . It should be noted that Maduros electoral rival, Henrique Capriles

who led an attack against the Cuban Embassy in Caracas during the 2002 coup vowed to end support for, and joint work, withCuba.

No rapprochement appeasement is fundamentally incompatible with the political landscapeHanson and Lee 13(Stephanie Hanson, and Brianna Lee, Senior Production Editor, Council on Foreign Relations, "U.S.-Cuba Relations" January 31,2013 http://www.cfr.org/cuba/us-cuba-relations/p11113, RLA)Given the range of issues dividing the two countries,experts say a long process would precede resumption of diplomaticrelations. Daniel P. Erikson of the Inter-American Dialogue says that though " you could have the resumption of bilateraltalks on issues related to counternarcotics or immigration , or a period of dtente, you are probably not going to seethe full restoration of diplomatic relations" in the near term . Many recent policy reports have recommended that theUnited States take some unilateral steps to roll back sanctions on Cuba.The removal of sanctions, however, would be just onestep in the process of normalizing relations . Such a processis sure to be controversial , as indicated by the heated

congressional debate spurred in March 2009 by attempts to ease travel and trade restrictions in a large appropriations bill."Whatever we call it--normalization, dtente, rapproachement--it is clear that the policy process risks falling victimto the politics of the issue ," says Sweig. A fundamental incompatibility of political views stands in the way ofimproving U.S.-Cuban relations , experts say. While experts say the United States wants regime change, "the mostimportant objective of the Cuban government is to remain in power at all costs," says Felix Martin, an assistantprofessor at Florida International University's Cuban Research Institute. Fidel Castro has been an inspiration for Latin Americanleftists such as Venezuelan President Hugo Chvez and Bolivian President Evo Morales, who have challenged U.S. policy in theregion.

No U.S. Cuba engagement in the status quoCuba Confidential 13 (Cuba Confidential, Pastors For Peace Ramps Up Media Coverage" July 29, 2013http://cubaconfidential.wordpress.com/2013/07/29/pastors-for-peace-ramps-up-media-coverage/, RLA) What are the major barriers? The U.S. government still sees Cuba as a state sponsor of terrorism and remains firmlyentrenched in policies driven by a Cold War opposition to governments alignment w ith the Soviet Union. There aremajor barriers regarding the release of political prisoners on both sides, including a group of Cubans known as the Cuban 5. FiveCuban intelligence officers thwarted a terrorist plot hatched in Cuba against their country. They were arrested and charged withespionage and conspiracy to commit murder in 1998. Cuba sees their incarceration as an unacceptable, politically motivated moveand has demanded their immediate release. Conversely,Cuba continues to hold Alan Gross, a USAID contractor who wasarrested for espionage in 2009 and charged with acts against the independence or the territorial integrity of the state inMarch 2011. He is currently serving a 15-year sentence. The U.S. maintains a section in the Swiss embassy to Cuba buthas nothad formal diplomatic relations with the island nation for over 50 years. During a public address last year, CubanPresident Raul Castro said that he is willing to sit at the table with Washington to discuss any issue, as long as it is a conversation between equals. Any day they want, the table is set, Castro said.
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Travel scandal provesCBS 7-22(CBS News, American Express Settles With U.S. Treasury Dept. Over Cuba Travel July 22, 2013http://miami.cbslocal.com/2013/07/22/american-express-settles-with-u-s-treasury-dept-over-cuba-travel/, RLA)

American Express will pay the U.S. Treasury Department millions to settle potential civil liability for the morethan 14,000 tickets that were issued for travel to Cuba and countries outside the U.S. Officials announced Mondaythat American Express Travel Related Services, Inc. has agreed to pay $5.2 million after the Treasury Department found that foreign branch offices and subsidiaries of American Express issued about 14,487 tickets for travel to and from the island between December2005 and November 2011. Those bookings were an apparent violation of the Cuban AssetsControl Regulations.The rules issuedin 1963 prohibit financial transactions by banking institutions under U.S. jurisdiction in which Cuba or itscitizens have an interest. We voluntarily self-disclosed these bookings to OFAC (Office of Foreign Assets Control), and put inplace robust controls to ensure it would not recur, American Express spokeswoman Diana Postemsky said in a written statement . American Express can provide travel service arrangements for authorized trips to the island, but the bookings in question were neverapproved by the federal government. Its not the f irst time American Express has come under federal scrutiny for its handlin g ofCuba-related travel. The company was investigated in 1995 and 1996 for similar violations committed by a subsidiary that hadrecently been acquired, according to the Treasury Department.Federal officials said American Express showed recklessdisregard for the regulations. The apparent violations caused significant harm to U.S. sanctions programobjectives regarding Cuba, the Treasury Department said in announcing the settlement. The Treasury Department said American Express continued to book travel to and from Cuba for many of its corporate clients following the 2010 disclosure of the violations. The department said the company also never implemented the remedial measures it pledged to implement after the 1995and 1996 investigation. American Express is one of the largest travel service providers for authorized Cuba travel, according to the Treasury Department. U.S. citizens are prohibited from traveling to Cuba as tourists , though they cantravel for religious, educational or cultural visits if granted a specific license by the Treasury Department.So called p eople-to-people travel was reinstated by the Obama administration in 2011.

Asset control regulations prove no rapprochement nowHamm 13 (Catharine Hamm, The Los Angeles Times, "Travel to Cuba? Probably not worth the risk" March 31, 2013http://articles.latimes.com/2013/mar/31/travel/la-tr-spot-20130331, RLA)Treasury Department regulations say this: "The Cuban Assets Control Regulations , 31 CFR Part 515 (the 'Regulations'), wereissued by the U.S. Government on July 8, 1963, under the Trading With the Enemy Act in response to certain hostile actions by theCuban Government. Theyapply to all persons (individuals and entities) subject to U.S. jurisdiction as well as allpersons engaging in transactions that involve property in or otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of the United States." Its website goes on to say: "Criminal penalties for violating the Regulations range up to 10 years in prison, $1,000,000 incorporate fines, and $250,000 in individual fines . Civil penalties up to $65,000 per violation may also be imposed." InMorrison's case, complying with Treasury Department regulations is a good idea. She was inquiring on behalf of her 87-year-oldfather, who wants to make the trip. He is neither of Cuban descent nor qualified under one of the other categories that Treasurydeems as worthy of receiving a license. He just wants to go. Would you expose your older parent to such risks by flouting the law?There may be those who believe the restrictions are wrong. They may be thinking that an octogenarian who gets caught may make asympathetic test case. Given that neither Morrison nor her father knew about the restrictions, I don't think they intended to becomepart of a crusade. When I spoke with her, I recommended that they join a group that is licensed to travel to Cuba for people-to-people trips that are supposed to be more than Cuban cocktails and soaking up the atmosphere. Check with college or universityalumni groups or with Insight Cuba, among others. Even if you want to travel independently to Cuba (with or without alicense), just getting there may present problems . When I tried to view Tijuana to Havana on Kayak.com, I got this message:"Due to United States travel restrictions, we are unable to display travel itineraries that include Cuba." Riversidetravel agent Sonia Robledo told me last week that she tried to search for fares (at my behest), and she was also denied access. JanetMoore, owner of Distant Horizons in Long Beach, can see flights because the company works with groups that are licensed to travelto Cuba. She said she is approached daily by individuals who want to try to travel to Cuba without a license. "We say no," she said.The interest in Cuba, she said, stems partly from the theory of "forbidden fruit." But, she added, "Americans are genuinely interestedin what's going on in Cuba. It is a fabulous destination." Zachary Sanders may have thought so. USA Today's Laura Bly reported inJuly the outcome of his trip to Cuba from Mexico. He was ultimately fined $6,500 for his visit. In this case, it wasn't the fine as muchas it was the time it took to reach this conclusion: He traveled to Cuba in 1998.

Cigars proveDOT 13 (U.S. Department of Treasury, CUBAN CIGAR UPDATE 4/19/13 http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Documents/ccigar2.pdf, RLA)There is now an across the board ban on the importation into the United States of Cuban-origin cigars and other Cuban-origin tobacco product s, as well as most other products of Cuban origin. This prohibit ion extends to such productsacquired in Cuba, irrespective of whether a traveler is licensed by OFAC to engage in Cuba travelrelated transactions, and to suchproducts acquired in third countries by any U.S. traveler, including purchases at duty free shops. Importation of these Cubangoods is prohibited whether the goods are purchased directly by the importer or given to the importer as a gift. Similarly, the import ban extends to Cuban-origin tobacco products offered for sale over the Internet or throughthe catalog mail purchases . Prior to August 1, 2004, persons returning to the United States who were licensed under theRegulations to engage in Cuba travel-related transactions were authorized by general license to import up to $100 worth of Cubanmerchandise as accompanied baggage. Cuban tobacco and alcohol products were included in that general license. That generallicense was removed from the Regulations.Criminal penalties for violation of the Regulations range up to $1,000,000in fines for corporations, $250,000 for individuals and up to 10 years in prison . Civil penalties of up to $65,000 per violation may be imposed by OFAC.
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AT//US-Cuba Diplomatic Talks

Barriers overwhelmHaven 6-21[Paul. Staffer for the AP. Cuba, US try Talking, but Face Many Obstacles The Miami Times Herald, 6/21/13 ln] To be sure, there is still far more that separates the long-time antagonists than unites them . TheState Departmenthas kept Cuba on a list of state sponsors of terrorism and another that calls into question Havanas commitmentto fighting human trafficking . The O bama administration continues to demand democratic change on an island ruledfor more than a half century by Castro and his brother Fidel. For its part,Cuba continues to denounce Washingtons 51 -

year-old economic embargo. And then there is Gross, the 64-year-old Maryland native who was arrested in 2009 and is serving a 15-year jail sentence for bringing communications equipment to the island illegally.His case has scuttled effortsat engagement in the past, and could do so again , U.S. officials say privately. Cuba has indicated it wants to trade Gross forfour Cuban agents serving long jail terms in the United States, something Washington has said it wont consider. Ted Henken, aprofessor of Latin American studies at Baruch College in New York who helped organize a recent U.S. tour by Cuban dissident blogger Yoani Sanchez, said the Obama administration is too concerned with upsetting Cuban-American politicians and has missedopportunities to engage with Cuba at a crucial time in its history. I th ink that a lot more would have to happen for this toamount to momentum leading to any kind of major diplomatic breakthrough , he said. Obama should be bolder andmore audacious. Even these limited moves have sparked fierce criticism by those long oppos ed to engagement. Cuban-Americancongressman Mario Diaz Balart, a Florida Republican, called the recent overtures disturbing.

Substantive cooperation outweighs posturing no tangible

cooperationTaylor 6-18(Guy Taylor, State Department correspondent,U.S.-Cuba mail talks spark speculation of wider outreach The Washington Times,http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/jun/18/us-cuba-mail-talks-spark-speculation-wider-outreac/ )The announcement that U.S. and Cuban officials will hold landmark talks this week toward restarting direct mailservice between the two nationsprompted a mix of reactions on Monday on whether the Obama administration plans a broaderoutreach to the Castro regime in the presidents second term. Veteran Cuba watchers agreed that the development isunlikely to trigger a wider normalization in relations any time soon.But the notion that the talks slated for Thursdayand Friday could pull Washington and Havana closer than theyve been in more than half a centuryprompted a harshreaction from at least one Republican on Capitol Hill. Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen , Florida Republican, said that the White Houseis caving to pressure from Cuban leaders desperate to end trade restrictions frozen since the 1960s. The regime is once againmanipulating the U.S. administration in this game because it wants us to lift the embargo and make furtherconcessions , said Mrs. Ros -Lehtinen, a former chairwoman of the House Foreign Relations Committee and a staunch opponent ofeasing the stand-off that has defined bilateral relations since Cuban leader Fidel Castro agreed to house Soviet ballistic missiles in1961. Mr. Castro, 86, stepped down in 2008, and the top post is now held by his 82-year-old brother Raul. The State Departmentsaid Monday that the postal talks will occur well within policy boundaries set long ago by Congress. The talks will be led by R.Cabanas Rodriguez, the chief of mission at the Cuban Interests Section in Washington,and Lea Emerson, the U.S. PostalServices director of international postal affairs. Similar negotiations in 2009 failed to produce an agreement. Separate negotiations on issues such as immigration have been on hold during recent years amid tensions simmering between theU.S. and Cuba over the trade embargo and Washingtons unwillingness to remove Cuba from its official list of state sponsors o fterrorism. Washington has also demanded that Cuba release jailed American subcontractor Alan Gross , who was arrestedin December 2009 while working for a U.S. Agency for International Development-funded program.Cuban authorities gave a15-year prison sentence to Mr. Gross and accused him of illegally delivering satellite phones to individuals in the nationsJewish community.
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No Engagement Now Venezuela

Venezuela has cut off ties with the USBBC 7-20 (BBC News, July 20 2013, Venezuela 'ends' bid to restore full US ties,http://axisoflogic.com/artman/publish/Article_65833.shtml,PS)

Venezuela says it has "ended" steps towards restoring diplomatic ties with the US, after comments by the womannominated as the next envoy to the UN. Samantha Power said this week she would seek to combat what she called the"crackdown on civil society" in countries including Venezuela. She was speaking at a US Senate confirmation hearing on Wednesday. The remarks prompted an angry response from Venezuela's President Nicolas Maduro. "The Bolivarian Republicof Venezuela hereby ends the process... of finally normalising our diplomatic relations," said Venezuela's foreignministry in a statement. It objected to Ms Power's "interventionist agenda", noting that her "disrespectful opinions" were laterendorsed by the state department, "contradicting in tone and in content" earlier statements by Secretary of State John Kerry. Poorrelations Relations between the US and Venezuela have been strained in recent years. They last had ambassadorsin each other's capitals in 2010. Washington angered Caracas by backing the Venezuelan opposition's demandfor a full recount of the presidential election in April to replace Hugo Chavez , who died in March. Mr Chavez's anointedsuccessor, Nicolas Maduro, won the vote by less than two percentage points.

No diplomatic relations with VenezuelaRosenberg 7/28 (Matt Rosenberg, master's degree in geography from California State University, Northridge and a bachelor's degree in geography from the University of California, Davis. "Could U.S.-Venezuela Relations Be Worse?" July 28, 2013http://geography.about.com/b/2013/07/28/could-u-s-venezuela-relations-be-worse.htm, RLA)

Venezuela has announced that they will not longer even attempt to normalize diplomatic relations with the UnitedStates, following negative comments about Venezuela made by President Obama's nominee for envoy to the United NationsSamantha Power. A statement from Venezuela's foreign ministry read, "The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuelahereby ends the process... of finally normalising our diplomatic relations."

No rapprochement trade is maintained for strategic interestsRivera 13 (Michael Rivera, Intelligent Analysis on the Americas, "Calling it Quits?: How Strategic Interest OutweighsPolitical Rivalry Among Nations" 7/28/13 http://riveragroupinternational.wordpress.com/2013/07/28/calling-it-quits-how-strategic-interest-outweighs-political-rivalry-among-nations/, RLA)Relations between the US and Venezuela reached a boiling point on several occasions during the presidency of Hugo Chavez.Thetwo countries have been in conflict on a variety of issuesover the past 14 years, includinghuman rights, freedom ofmedia, capitalism, and ideology. Although some analysts were guardedly optimistic about the possibility of normalizedrelations between the US and Venezuela after the death of Chavez earlier this year,diplomatic fallout over the EdwardSnowden affair has reminded observers that the process of thawing such deep-rooted trust will not occur over

night. There may be little hope for an improvement in political relations in the near future, but how much do poor diplomatic tiesaffect commercial relations between countries in conflict? One would expect trade levels between the US and Venezuela to havediminished in recent years considering the fiery anti-imperialist rhetoric Chavez employed as president. U.S. Census data shows that bilateral trade levels have continued to increase since Chavez first took office in 1999. The annual total of American exports to Venezuela more than doubled from 1998 to 2012, while imports have quadrupled during that time frame to $38 billion. The UnitedStates has been a critical market for Venezuelan goods, as exports to the US accounted for over 39% ofthe countrys total exports in2012.This has not been dispelled by the fact that these two countries mutually expelled their respectiveambassadors in 2008. Domestic and foreign investors are guaranteed the same legal protections under the current Venezuelanconstitution. The same article of protection also states that exceptions are made for strategic interests, includingoil and other goods for public benefit. This exception obviously creates the legal pathway for nationalization. AlthoughMaduro has yet to invoke this policy during his time in office, his predecessor frequently nationalized firms to assert governmentalcontrol. American firms were not the only ones subject to having their assets seized during Chavezs time in office. Foreign oil companies have been frequently targeted ; but to say that Exxon Mobil and Conoco Phillips were singled out for being North American firms would an incomplete explanation at best. Oil was, and continues to be, the crux of the chavistaeconomic program. In addition to being its primary revenue stream, it is often used as a source of repayment for loans from China. Itis also used to support its alliances with countries like Belarus, Cuba, Iran, and Syria. Thus, a firm of any national origin with acontrolling interest in a key asset like energy, is far more likely to be nationalized than an American company with no assets of

strategic value for the Venezuelan government. Recent attempts to thaw relations have been thwarted by new obstacles, such as theongoing Snow den saga referred to earlier, as well as Venezuelan officials anger over Samantha Powers comments to the UNregarding human rights in the South American country. However, with over 500 American firms operating or represented in Venezuela, it is unlikely the freeze in relations between the two countries will have an impact on commercial ties. Venezuela,despite previous threats to cut off supply to the United States, remains one of the top oil suppliers to the UnitedStates. There is a degree of interdependence that even heated rhetoric by public officials cannot break.

Venezuela and US ties strained- Snowden and Samantha PowerMunoz 7-23 (Boris Munoz, The New Yorker, July 23 2013, Venezuelas View of the Snowden Affair,http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2013/07/venezuelas-view-of-the-snowden-affair.html,PS) The fragile truce was broken when Obamas nominee for United Nations ambassador, Samantha Power, promised before aSenate committee last Wednesday that she would stand up against repressive regimes and the crackdown on civil
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society being carried out in countrieslike Cuba, Iran, Russia, and Venezuela . The remarks infuriated Maduro, who, in a full bravado, responded, As president, my policy is zero tolerance for any attacks the Gringos m ake on Venezuela. Im notgoing to tolerate any sort of aggression against Venezuela verbal, political, or diplomatic. Thats enough! You there with your empire.No more meddling with Venezuela . Venezuela, he said, was suspending ongoing talks to improve

relations with the U.S . He also reaffirmed his willingness to give asylum to Snowden, since the right to asylum isan international humanitarian right, and Venezuela has always respected it. Maduro, that is to say,found it moreconvenient to step back to the previous status quo than to move forward and regularize the relations . By doing so,

he can claim thathe cares enough about the nationalistic values Chvez so firmly defended. As of Friday night, a sourceclose to the Maduro government said that it was highly unlikely that Snowden would go to VenezuelaHes not coming here.

No appeasement nowBercovitch 7-21 (Sascha Bercovitch, With Zero Tolerance to Gringo Aggression, Maduro Cuts Off Venezuela -U.S. Talks, July 212013, http://venezuelanalysis.com/news/9872,PS) Caracas, July 21st 2013 (Venezuelanalysis.com) The conversations that were started a month and a half ago between

Venezuela and the United States have definitively ended , Venezuelan President NicolasMaduro announced yesterdayat an event of the Strategic Regions of Integral Defense (REDI) in Cojedes state. My policy is zero tolerance to gringoaggression against Venezuela . I'm not going to accept any aggression, whether it be verbal, political, or diplomatic. Enough isenough. Stay over there with your empire, don't involve yourselves anymore in Venezuela , he said. Theannouncement comes after controversial statements from Samantha Powers , President Barack Obamas nominee forU.S. envoy to the United Nations, who testified to the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on Wednesday that she wouldfight against what shecalled a crackdown on civil society being carried out in countries like Cuba, Iran, Russia, and

Venezuela. In a statement written on Friday t hat marks the last communication between the two countries , Venezuelan Foreign Minister Elias Jaua wrote, The preoccupation expressed by the U.S. government regarding the supposedrepression of civil society in Venezuela is unacceptable and unfounded. To the contrary, Venezuela has amply demonstrated that itpossesses a robust system of constitutional guarantees to preserve the unrestricted practice and the respect of fundamental humanrights, as the UN has recognized on multiple occasions.

Snowden has already killed US-Venezuela coop AP 7-13 (Associated Press, The Blade, July 13 2013, Snowden affair dampens already cool U.S.-Latin America ties,http://www.toledoblade.com/World/2013/07/13/Snowden-affair-dampens-already-cool-U-S-Latin-America-ties.html,PS) WASHINGTON America is pivoting to Asia, focused on the Mideast, yet the backyard, as Secretary of State John Kerry oncereferred to Latin America, is sprouting angry weeds as the scandal involving intelligence leaker Edward Snowden lays bare alreadythorny U.S. relations with Latin America. Taking the opportunity to snub their noses at the U.S., Venezuela, Bolivia andNicaragua havealready said theyd be willing to grant asylum for Snowden , who is wanted on espionage charges in theUnited States for revealing the scope of National Security Agency surveillance programs that spy on Americans and foreigners.Ecuador has said it would consider any request from him. Relations between the U.S. and these countries were already testy, butthe Snowden affair also has acted as a stu n gun to the Obama administrations effort to improve ties withfriendlier nations in the region like Mexico and Brazil. Snowden hasnt been the only recent setback. Leaders inthe region harshly criticized the U.S. earlier this week when a newspaper in Brazil, which was privy to some documentsreleased by Snowden,reported that a U.S. spy program was widely targeting data in emails and telephone callsacross Latin America . That revelation came just days after an uproar in Latin America over the rerouting of Bolivian PresidentEvo Morales plane over Europe amid suspicions, later proven untrue, that Snowden was aboard. And all this comes right afterPresident Barack Obama, Vice President Joe Biden and Kerry have all made recent treks to the region to bolster U.S. engagement inLatin America. What the Snowden affairhas done to the reinvigorated effort to re-engage with Latin America is todump a pail of cold water on it, said Carl Meacham, a former senior Latin America adviser on the Senate Foreign RelationsCommittee. It wont stop trade deals, cooperation on energy, but its going to be harder for the president to portraythe image that We are here to work with you. Its a step back

Relations between Venezuela strainedNTD 7-24 (NTD Television, July 24 2013, Venezuela's Maduro Conditions U.S. Relations on End to "Imperialism,http://www.ntd.tv/en/news/world/south-america/20130724/81817-venezuela39s-maduro-conditions-us-relations-on-end-to-imperialism.html,PS) Venezuelan President NicolasMaduro told supporters on Tuesday (July 23)that better relations with Washington wasonly possible if the United States changed its tact towards Latin America. [Nicolas Maduro, President of Venezuela]:

"Do you want to have good relations with the United States? This does not depend on just us, it depends on the U.S.. If they canrectify their policy and are able to, which I doubt, there will be another position, we will renew dialogue.The government of theUnited States should reconsider its imperialistic attitude on Latin America and the Caribbean and its aggressiontowards Venezuela . When they rectify this, here we will wait with our hands stretched and as usual a smile. In a furtherstrain to relations, Maduro became the first to offer asylum to American fugitive Edward Snowden earlier thismonth.

US foreign policy has not worked relations are low now- SamanthaPower and Maduros election

AFP 7-24 (Agence France Press, Global Post, July 24 2013, US still up for warming Venezuela ties after fresh row,http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/afp/130724/us-still-warming-venezuela-ties-after-fresh-row#1,PS)


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The United States said Wednesday it is still open to improving ties with Venezuela after Caracas called off therapprochement , accusing Washington of meddling in its internal affairs. The two nations -- which were often at odds during the14-year rule of the recently deceased Hugo Chavez -- had hinted at warmer ties after a meeting of top diplomats last month. Butthen Venezuela reacted angrily to a statement by Samantha Power -- tapped to be the next US ambassador to the UnitedNations -- who vowed to stand up to "repressive regimes" and challenge the "crackdown on civil society being carried outincountries like Cuba, Iran, Russia, and Venezuela. " President Nicolas Maduro -- the handpicked successor to the leftist Chavez --then accused Washington of meddling in Venezuela's affairs, condemning its "imperialist attitude." Washington has yet torecognize Maduro's victory in a disputed April election to replace Chavez.

US-Venezuela relations low-4 warrantsPress TV 7-24 (Press TV, July 24 2013, No dialogue unless US changes imperialistic stance: Venezuela,http://www.presstv.ir/detail/2013/07/24/315416/us-must-end-imperialistic-stance-maduro/,PS) Improved relations with the United States does not depend on just us, it depends on them (US). If they can rectify (this) and areable to, which I doubt, there will be another position; we will renew dialogue, Maduro told a cheering audience in the Carib beanstate of Monagas on Tuesday. On Friday, Venezuela said it was ending efforts to improve t ies with Washington that started in earlyJune. The decision followed remarks by US President Barack Obamas nominee for US ambassador to the United Nations. Duringher confirmation hearing before a US Senate committee on July 17, Samantha Power pledged to oppose what she called a crackdownon civil society in a number of countries, including Venezuela. On July 18,Maduro denounced Powers remarks asoutrageous and demanded an immediate correction by the US government. Venezuela and the United Stateshave not exchanged ambassadors since 2010. But on the sidelines of a regional summit in Guatemala in June, US Secretaryof State John Kerry and Venezuelan Foreign Minister Elias Jaua agreed that officials would soon meet for talks that could lead toan exchange of envoys. But the strain in relations between the two nations have intensified following the US supportfor Venezuelan opposition leader Henrique Capriles , who disputed the results of the April presidential election, in whichMaduro won the race with nearly 51 percent of the vote against 49 percent for Capriles. In March,Caracas expelled two US

military attaches on charges of making attempts to foment instability in Venezuela. Recently , Venezuela hasoffered asylum to Edward Snowden , a former technical contractor for the US National Security Agency (NSA) who is wanted

in the United States for leaking details of Washingtons secret surveillance programs .

Strong stance against Venezuela now demonstrates resolveCardenas 13 (Jos Crdenas, assistant administrator for Latin America at the U.S. Agency for International Development under Bush Administration, Obama must stand firm on Venezuela Friday, Ap ril 19, 2013 - 12:14 PM,http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/taxonomy/term/4784) After an ill-advised overture to Hugo Chvez's government last November,the Obama administration has regained itsfooting with a strong, principled stance on Venezuela's contested election . Based on the razor-thin margin andopposition protests of irregularities, theadministration has yet to recognize as the winner Vice President NicolasMaduro ,Chvez's anointed successor,and has instead supported a review of the vote count. In appearances before both the Houseand Senate in recent days, Secretary of State John Kerry re-affirmed that position "so that the people of Venezuela whoparticipated in such a closely divided and important election can have the confidence that they have the legitimacy that is necessaryin the government going forward." He said , "I don't know whether it's going to happen. ... [But] obviously,if there are hugeirregularities, we are going to have serious questions about the viability of that government ." Kerry's statements brought the predictable howls of protest from Venezuela. "It's obscene, the U.S. intervention in the internal affairs of Venezuela,"Mr. Maduro said. "Take your eyes off Venezuela, John Kerry! Get out of here! Enough interventionism!" But no one should beintimidated by such false bravado. Maduro is in a panic . He knowshe cannot handle declining socio-economicconditions in the face of a reinvigorated opposition,dissension in his own ranks , and an engaged U.S. governmentstanding firm on principle regarding the legitimacy of his election. Of course,the administration will face a vociferouspublic campaign by chavista sympathizers pressuring it to accept Sunday's disputed result. Already, the feckless Organization of American States Secretary General Jos Miguel Insulza has backtracked from the organization's initial strong statement on behalf ofa recount and now has accepted the result. Recognition proponents will tell us the United States faces "isolation" in theregion if the administration doesn't recognize Maduro (only Panama and Paraguay have joined the call for a recount) and that itssupposed intransigence plays right into Maduro's hands, allowing him to whip up nationalist sentiment. Nonsense . Thoseproposing such arguments fail to recognize that governments are pursuing interests . Certain countries such as Brazil,Colombia, and even Russia and China, have benefited greatly from economic ties with Venezuela under Chvez and their short-sighted view is to try and keep that spigot open. Most citizens throughout the region, however, tend to be more appreciative ofprinciples, such as the security and integrity of one's vote. One can be sure that, in case of a disputed election in their own country,they would hope to count on external support for an honest accountingin their own electoral processes. Secondly, asthe election just demonstrated,Maduro is not Chvez , and his capacity to whip up anything but official violence against

Venezuelans protesting in the streets is extremely doubtful (Warning: graphic photos here). In short,no one should be misled bythe noisemakers. A continued firm stand on behalf of a clean election will resonate positively throughout theregion , sending a strong signal to all democrats that the United States does indeed care and that intimidation and

violence have no place in any democracy . It is not likely that such sentiments will sway Maduro and his Cuban advisors toaccept any sort of recount, butit will certainly place the United States on the right side of the debates andconfrontations to come.

More ev no rapprochement Villarreal 13 (Ryan Villarreal, journalist based in New York City Specializes in Latin America, Diplomacy War Or Political Theater? MaduroRamps Up Anti-US Rhetoric As Venezuelan Elections Approach, March 12 2013 , http://www.ibtimes.com/diplomacy-war-or-political-theater-maduro-ramps-anti-us-rhetoric-venezuelan-elections-approach)
http://www.ibtimes.com/diplomacy-war-or-political-theater-maduro-ramps-anti-us-rhetoric-venezuelan-elections-approachhttp://www.ibtimes.com/diplomacy-war-or-political-theater-maduro-ramps-anti-us-rhetoric-venezuelan-elections-approachhttp://www.ibtimes.com/diplomacy-war-or-political-theater-maduro-ramps-anti-us-rhetoric-venezuelan-elections-approachhttp://www.ibtimes.com/diplomacy-war-or-political-theater-maduro-ramps-anti-us-rhetoric-venezuelan-elections-approachhttp://www.ibtimes.com/diplomacy-war-or-political-theater-maduro-ramps-anti-us-rhetoric-venezuelan-elections-approach


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The U.S. and Venezuela have both expelled diplomats from each others countries amid high political tensions in theSouth American nation following the death of President Hugo Chvez last week, ahead of new elections.Hours before the Venezuelan government announced Chvezs passing last Tuesday,Caracas expelled two U.S. AirForce attach s . The U.S. followed in kind, dismissing two Venezuelan diplomats on Sunday.Around the world, when our people are thrown out unjustly, were going to take reciprocal action , Victoria Nuland,the State Department spokeswoman, said in a statement on Monday. And we need to do that to protect our own people. The Venezuelan government justified its action, saying that the attachs were engaged in efforts to destabilize thecountry during a time of political vulnerability.

It has been suggested that Venezuelas acting president and the socialist presidential candidate Nicolas Maduro expelled theattachs to appease supporters of his predecessor in preparation for elections scheduled for April 14.Maduro alsorecently accused the U.S. government of g iving Chvez cancer , from which he died after a two-year battle.Maduro is shoring up political support within Chavismo, said Carl Meacham, Americas Director of the Center for Strategic an dInternational Studies in Washington, the Miami Herald reported.


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2nc links wall (cuba)The link is predicated off your plan text. Engagement with rougeregimes in Latin America signal the US waving a white flag nsurrender and emboldens other rouge regimes around the

world. The plan is insufficient to alter Cubas desire to demolishUS leadership and influence in the region.


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Links: General


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2NC Link Run

The thesis of the DA is true best studiesCrescenzi 7 [Mark. Prof Poli Sci at UNC. Reputation and Interstate Conflict American Journal o f Political Science, Vol 51 N2. April 2007.Ebsco]Finally, the concept of reputation, learning, and adaptation has a long-standing presence in the study ofinternational relations (e.g., Dixon 1983; Farkas 1998; Huth 1988; Jervis 1976; Leng 1983, 1988, 1993, 2000; Levy 1994; Maoz1990, 1996; Mercer 1996; Press 2005; Reiter 1996; Snyder 1991). Learning is a key component of the theory presented below.Specifically,learning is assumed to be experiential in that states learn from the experiences and behavior of otherstates ; diagnostic in that states use the experiences of others to update their beliefs about the intentions of

others ; and vicarious, or diffuse, in that states learn from experiences in which they are not directly involved(Jervis 1976; Leng 1983; Levy 1994).

Best studies of credibility prove it influences international relationsGibler 8 [Douglas M. Gibler Department of Political Science University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa The Costs of Reneging: Reputation and Alliance Formation The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 52, No. 3 (Jun., 2008), pp. 426 -454]I argue above thatalliance formation provides an excellent alternative for testing the effects of state reputation .More isolated from the strategic selection of deterrence situations, with a public signal that remains relatively

constant across time, region, and even perhaps situation, state reputations formed by honoring or violatingalliance commitments offer many advantages for testing a seemingly intangible quality like reputation . Thus,

using a relatively simple research design, this article was able to establish what international theorists havesuspected, but empirical tests have thus far been unable to prove: reputations have important consequences for

state behavior .


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Link: Flip Flop

Hardline toward Latin America now thats a 1AC claim the planreverses the trend, which devastates US credibility and resolveEtzioni 11[Amitai. Prof IR at George Washington. The Coming Test of US Credibility Military Reviewhttp://icps.gwu.edu/files/2011/03/credibility.pdf 2011] THE RELATIVE POWER of the United States is declining both because other nations are increasing their power and because theU. S. economic challenges and taxing overseas commitments are weakening it. In this context,the credibility of U.S.commitments and the perception that the United States will back up its threats and promises with appropriateaction is growing in importance . In popular terms, high credibility allows a nation to get more mileage out of arelatively small amount of power , while low credibility leads to burning up much greater amounts of power. The Theory of Credibility One definition of poweris the ability of A to make B follow a course of action that A prefers. The term make is highly relevant. When A convinces B of the merit of the course A prefers, and B voluntarilyfollows it, we can refer to this change of course as an application of persuasive power or soft power. However, most appl ications of power are based either oncoercion (if you park in front of a fire hydrant, your car is towed) or economic incentives and disincentives (you are fined to the point where you would be disinclined to parkthere). In these applications of power, B maintains his original preferences but is either prevented from following them or is pained to a point where he will suspend resistance.Every time A calls on B to change course, A is tested twice. First, if B does not follow As call, A will fail to achieve its goals (Nazi Germany annexes Austria, despite protests bythe United Kingdom and France). Second, A loses some credibility,making B less likely to heed As future demands (Nazi Germany becomes more likely to invade Poland). Onthe other hand, if B heeds As demand, A wins twice: it achieves its goal (e.g., the United States dismantles the regime of S addam Hussein and establishes that there are no WMDs in Iraq), and it increases the likelihood that future demands will be heeded without power actually being exercised (e.g. Libya voluntarily dismantles its WMD programfollowing the invasion of Iraq). In short, the higher a nation s credibility, the more it will be able to achieve without actuallyemploying its power or by employing less of it when it must exercise its power. Political scientists have qualified this basic version ofthe power/credibility theory. In his detailed examination of three historical cases, Daryl G. Press shows that in each instance, the Bs made decisions based upon their perceptionof the current intentions and capabilities of A, rather than on the extent to which A followed up on previous threats. Thus, if A does not have the needed forces or if As interestsin the issue at hand are marginal, its threats will not carry much weight no matter how credible A was in the past. For exa mple, if the United States had announced that it would invade Burma unless it released opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi from house arrest (she was eventually released in November 2010), such a threat would not havecarried much weightregardless of past U.S. actions because the issue did not seem reason enough for the United States to invade Burma, and because the U.S. Army waslargely committed elsewhere. Another political scientist, Kathleen Cunningham, has shown that the credibility of promisesas opposed to the credibility of threatsis muchmore difficult to maintain because the implementation of promises is often stretched over long periods of time. 1 The bulk of this essay focuses on dealing with threats, ratherthan promises. Declining U.S. Power and Credibility Over the last few years, much attention has been paid to the relative decline of U.S. power, but much less has been said ofchanges in U.S. credibility. While there has been some erosion in the relative power of the United States measured since 1945 or 1990), the swings in the level of its credibilityhave been much more pronounced. When the United States withdrew its forces from Vietnam in 1973, its credibility suffered so much that many observers doubted whether theUnited States would ever deploy its military overseas unless it faced a much greater and direct threat than it faced in Southeast Asia. Additional setbacks over the next decadesfollowed, including the failed rescue of American hostages in Iran during the last year of the Carter administration and President Reagans withdrawal of U.S. Marines fromLebanon after the October 1983 Hezbollah bombing of U.S. barracks in Beirut. The bombing killed 241 American servicemen, but it elicited no punitive responsetheadministration abandoned a plan to assault the training camp where Hezbollah had planned the attack. 2 Operation Desert Storm drastically increased U.S. military credibility.The United States and the UN demanded that Saddam Hussein withdraw from Kuwait. When he refused, U.S. and Allied forces quickly overwhelmed his military with a low levelof Americancausalities, contrary to expectations. Saddams forces were defeated with less than 400 American casualties. 3 The total cost of defeating Saddam was $61 billionalmost 90 percent of which was borne by U.S. allies. 4 When Serbia ignored the demands of the United States and other Western nations to withdraw its hostile forces and haltethnic cleansing in Kosovo, NATO forces defeated the Serbs with little effort, losing only two troops in a helicopter training accident. 5 U.S. credibility reached a high mark in2003, when the United States, employing a much smaller force than in 1991, overthrew Saddam Husseins regime swiftly and with a low level of American casualties, againdespite expectations to the contrary. In the first phase of the warup to 1 May 2003, when the Saddam regime was removed and no WMDs were foundthere had been only 172 American casualties. 6 Only $56 billion had been appropriated for Iraq operations. 7 Those who hold that credibility matters little should paymind to the side effects of Operation Iraqi Freedom. After the U.S. invasion of Iraq, Libya did not merely stopdeveloping WMDs or allow inspections, it allowed the United S tates to pack cargo In short, the higher a nationscredibility, the more it will be able to achieve without actually employing its power 4 March-April 2011 MILITARY REVIEW planes withseveral tons of nuclear equipment and airlift it from the country. 8 The country surrendered centrifuges, mustard gas tanks, and SCUD missiles. It sent 13 kilograms of highly enriched uranium to Russia for blending down, destroyed chemical