Analytic Moral Philosophy in Finland

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1Moore (1956), p. vii.2See e.g. von Wright (1963) and Hancock (1974). Von Wright claims that metaethics and normativeethics coincide in the search for the criteria of evaluative concepts. The practical aim of metaethicalinvestigation is to provide us with standards by which we judge the goodness or rightness of actionsor the justice of social institutions. Hancock remarks that it is possible to regard basic normativeprinciples as definitional truths in the metaethical sense. Utilitarianism, for instance, is generallytaken as a normative ethical theory. Yet it is possible to treat Mills principle of utility, according to

Poznan Studies in the Philosophyof the Sciences and the Humanities.2003, Vol. 80, pp. 413 444

Mikko Salmela

ANALYTIC MORAL PHILOSOPHY IN FINLAND

1. THE MAIN TRADITIONS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY IN FINLAND

Analytic moral philosophy is often characterized by its meta-normative approachto ethics. This is, of course, a very loose and indefinite identification, on theother hand the tradition itself is loose and multifaceted, at least in its presentform. Yet there was once a stern and widely shared belief in a new, more reliableand scientific, method of ethics. G.E. Moore expressed this belief in his famousPrincipia Ethica(1903) as he claimed that the difficulties and disagreements inethics are mainly due to a very simple cause: namely to the attempt to answerquestions without first discovering precisely whatquestion it is which you desireto answer.1

Analytic ethicists have often blamed their predecessors and non-analyticcontemporaries for pursuing normative ethics, or casuistry, before they haveplunged sufficiently into those delicate and fundamental problems that lie behindthe normative questions about what is a morally good life and right action. Theseproblems include conceptual questions about the meaning of ethical terms, such

as good, right, and ought; logical problems about the nature of ethical rea-soning and argumentation; and epistemological troubles concerning the possibil-ity of knowledge and justification in ethics. These sort of problems kept analyticethicists occupied until the rise of applied ethics in the 1970s, although many ofthem were also anxious to deny the supposed neutrality of metaethical researchand emphasize the essential connections and interrelations between metaethicaland traditional normative investigation.2 Yet the dominance of metaethical,


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which acts are right in proportion as they tend to increase happiness, as an answer to the metaethicalquestion What is the meaning of the term right?3See Fllesdal (1997). Fllesdal considers several criteria in order to distinguish analytic philosophyfrom other currents of modern philosophy, such as phenomenology, existentialism, hermeneutics,structuralism, deconstructivism, neo-Thomism, neo-Kantianism, and neo-Marxism. Fllesdal claimsthat analytic philosophy cannot be characterized by reference to some method, doctrines, problems,or schools. It has, however, been strongly concerned with argument and justification. This means thatthe analytic/non-analytic distinction runs across the traditional classification of contemporary

philosophy. One can be an analytic philosopher and alsoa phenomenologist, existentialist, her-meneuticist, Thomist, etc. Whether one is an analytic philosopher depends on what importance oneascribes to argument and justification. There are, for example, phenomenologists who are moreanalytic, and others who are less, argues Fllesdal (1997, p. 14). His own example of a very analyticphenomenologist is Edmund Husserl. In a l ike manner, I shall in this paper consider Erik Ahlman, anethicist of phenomenological and existentialist background, as a precursor of analytic moralphilosophy in Finland. My reason for distinguishing Ahlman from the other Finnish phenom-enologists, such as J.E. Salomaa and Sven Krohn, is because problems of meaning and justificationin ethics have occupied him morethan his colleagues. Still, if we apply Leila Haaparantas (1998)criterion concerning general attitudes towards logic and metaphysics as a means of separating

analytical from phenomenological philosophers, then there is no doubt that Ahlman belongs to thelatter group. Also see Haaparantas contribution to this volume.4Westermarck held academic chairs both in Finland and England. First, in 1906, he was invited to theChair of Practical Philosophy at the University of Helsinki. A year later he was nominated to therecently established Chair of Sociology at the University of London. In 1919 Westermarck left hischair in Helsinki in order to become the Professor of Philosophy and the President at the recentlyestablished Swedish university of Turku, bo Akademi. He retired from his chairs in London andbo in 1930.

especially argumentative and justificatory, questions over normative pursuitsremained characteristic to analytic moral philosophy throughout the century,compared with other approaches of contemporary ethics, such as neo-Thomist,phenomenological, existentialist, or Marxist ethics.3I shall, therefore, take thismetaethical approach as my touchstone in my search for analytic moral phi-losophy in Finland.

There are three main traditions in Finnish moral philosophy in the 20thcentury. The most well-known ethicist of Finnish origin is no doubt EdwardWestermarck (1862 1939), whose concise article Descriptive and NormativeEthics is also reprinted in this volume. Westermarck was not only a philosopher,but also one of the leading sociologists and anthropologists of his time.4There

are some typically analytical concerns in his ethics, such as the meaning of moralconcepts, and the epistemological nature of moral judgments. However, Wester-marck regarded himself primarily as an empirical scientist, whose main interestwas, echoing the title of his magnum opus, the origin and development of moralideas. Westermarcks principal aim was to reveal the factual, i.e. psychologicaland sociological elements that constitute our moral evaluation. Therefore, evenif analytic philosophers have often read Westermarck from a logical-cum-


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5According to Stroup (1982, p. 208), to view Westermarck pre-eminently offering an account of themeaning of moral judgments is a distortion of the nature of his inquiry. Westermarck did notmaintain that moral judgments can be reduced or translated into statements about the equivalentemotional tendencies of the speaker. He used these verbs only rarely, and clearly not in their modern

logical sense. He rather explained, in a psychological sense, that moral judgments are based on orexpress moral emotions.6Rolf Lagerborg was the most original of Westermarcks Finnish pupils in ethics. His sociologicalethics combines elements from Westermarck and Emile Durkheim. See Lagerborg (1937).7See note 3 above.8Tenkku is the only person who has held all the chairs of practical philosophy in Finland: first at theUniversity of Jyvskyl (1965 1968); then at the University of Turku (1968 1972); and finally at theUniversity of Helsinki (1973 1980).

semantic perspective, their interpretations have not always done justice toWestermarcks intentions, as Timothy Stroup has pointed out in his Wester-marcks Ethics(1982).5Westermarcks scientific approach to ethics inspiredhis countrymen Rolf Lagerborg (1878 1956), Gunnar Landtman (1878 1940),and Rafael Karsten (1879 1956). However, their academic interests coincidedmore with Westermarcks sociological and anthropological pursuits.6Therefore,Westermarcks sociological ethics never quite became established in Finland.

The second tradition in Finnish moral philosophy is the phenomenologicalethics of value. This continentally oriented movement flourished in the first halfof the century with J.E. Salomaa (1891 1960), Erik Ahlman (1892 1952), andSven Krohn (1903 1999) as its leading exponents. Salomaa and Krohn relied

extensively on German phenomenologists Max Scheler (1874 1928) and NicolaiHartmann (1882 1950). Ahlman, too, started with ethical intuitionism. Hispersistent doubts about the epistemological validity of phenomenological intui-tion led him, however, to agree with Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889 1951) andlogical positivists on the noncognitive nature of moral judgments. As a profes-sional philologist Ahlman also sympathized with and shared these philosopherssemantic and logical interests in the language of morals. These aspects bringAhlman sufficiently near to analytic moral philosophy in order to be considered

as one of its precursors in Finland.7

Analytic moral philosophy proper was introduced to Finland by Georg Henrikvon Wright (b. 1916) in the 1950s. Von Wright acted at this time also as a Pro-fessor of Practical (moral and social) Philosophy at the University of Helsinki,and the ideas he put forward in his famous Gifford lectures at the University ofSt. Andrews in 1959 1960 and later in The Varieties of Goodness(1963) andNorm and Action(1963), matured during these years. Another prominent figurewas Jussi Tenkku (b. 1917), whose influence was mainly as a teacher. He had

studied philosophy in the United States at the Universities of Boston, Columbia,and Harvard after World War II.8Tenkku specialized in the history of ethics, but


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9Tenkkus publications in English include the dissertation The Evaluation of Pleasure in PlatosEthics(1956) andAre Single Moral Rules Absolute in Kants Ethics?(1967). Tenkku also publishedin Finnish a treatise on moral philosophy in Ancient Times and the Middle Ages.10Von Wright recognized this fact in his preface to The Varieties of Goodness. He there wrote thatthis treatise contains the germ of an ethics, that a moral philosophy may become extracted from it.See also William Frankenas detailed article Von Wright on the Nature of Morality (1989) in ThePhilosophy of Georg Henrik von Wrightin which he tries to carry out this extraction from vonWrights texts.

his disciples include Timo Airaksinen (b. 1947), who is Tenkkus successor atthe University of Helsinki, and the leading contemporary ethicist in Finland.9

G.H. von Wrights ethical thought developed under two charismatic teachers:Eino Kaila (1890 1958) and Ludwig Wittgenstein. Both rejected the idea ofethics as a truly philosophical or scientific discipline, even though if Kailatouched upon some metaethical and normative issues in his psychology and in hisless rigorous philosophy of life. Von Wright has, of course, far exceeded Kailascontributions in ethics. However, he resembles Kaila in not having produced afull-fledged theory of ethics.10It is, therefore, consistent to treat their ethicalviews as a distinct phase that precedes the extensive breakthrough of analyticmoral philosophy in Finland in the 1980s. Although different in philosophical

outlook, Erik Ahlman, Eino Kaila, and G.H. von Wright share the metaethicalemphasis in their quest of the morally good life.

2. ERIK AHLMANS NONCOGNITIVE INTUITIONISM

Erik Ahlman began his academic career as a classical philologist. He received hisdoctorate from the University of Helsinki in 1916 with a dissertation titled Das

lateinische Prfix com- in Verbalzusammensetzungen. A strong inner urge at-tracted him, however, toward philosophy which gradually exceeded hisphilological interests during the 1920s. In 1926 Ahlman was appointed Docent ofPhilosophy at the University of Helsinki, and in 1935 he was appointed the firstProfessor of Philosophy and Theoretical Pedagogics at the recently foundedJyvskyl Institute of Pedagogics (later the University of Jyvskyl). In 1948Ahlman returned to Helsinki as Professor of Practical Philosophy, but a terminalillness put an end to his life in 1952. Ahlman published seven books and several

articles on philosophy, mainly on ethics, philosophy of culture, and philosophicalanthropology. Although some of them are rather well known in Finland, the factthat they were written in Finnish has denied Ahlmans critical and fresh ideas aninternational audience.

Erik Ahlman is one of those philosophers, along with Plato, Bertrand Russell,and A.N. Whitehead, not to mention several others, whose thought contains two


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11von Wright (1989b), p. 16.12Ahlman refers to Kants Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Moralsaccording to which moral lawdescends from unserem eigentlichen Selbst. He also compares his varsinainen min to MaxSchelers Persnlichkeit and Sren Kierkegaards selv.13Ahlmans philosophical workbook 29.3.1936.

parallel but divergent veins. The first is analytic, acute, and logical; the other issynthetic, speculative, and metaphysical. This dualism originally converged withyoung Ahlmans two academic subjects, philology and philosophy. Consequent-ly, Ahlmans first, unprofessional contributions to philosophy were speculativemetaphysics laArthur Schopenhauer (1788 1860) and Henri Bergson (18591941), from whom he received his earliest influences. Later in the 1920s, asphilosophy took priority over philology in Ahlmans career, the two veins beganto merge in his philosophy.

G.H. von Wright has characterized G.E. Moore by saying that Mooreexemplified a rare combination of deep-rooted, almost dogmatic philosophicalconvictions and living doubt about any argument to defend them or to prove them

correct.11

The description would also fit Erik Ahlman. There is a deep intuitiveconfidence in the existence of a metaphysical self or Selbst12[in Finnish, varsi-nainen min], whose individually valid and absolute values can be disclosed bya veracious introspection. At the same time, there are also strong and persistentdoubts about the epistemological validity of phenomenological intuition and itscapacity to yield ethical knowledge. Ahlman ends up rejecting both cognitivismand objectivism in his critical intuitionism, which combines elements fromphenomenological, existentialist, emotivist, and even postmodern ethics. Non-

cognitive intuitionism is a rare position, but Ahlman supports it with semanticand epistemological arguments. It is in these arguments, set forth primarily in anextensive article Arvoarvostelmista (On Value Judgments, 1929), that theanalytic turn of Ahlmans thought comes to the fore.

Ahlman agrees that there is a semantic difference between factual and valuejudgments. It is true that moral judgments often look like factual statements intheir grammatical form. This is a beautiful painting looks like the sentenceThis is a yellow painting, he remarks. Yet the function of value judgments

resembles imperatives and emotive outbursts that are neither true nor false. Doesthis mean that Ahlman commits himself to the emotivist translation of evaluativeconcepts into ejaculations that express ones emotions and evoke others to emotelikewise? Yes, to the extent that value judgments do not describe moral proper-ties of persons, actions, policies, etc. They are always partly desires, commands,suggestions, Ahlman admits.13His account for the noncognitivity of moraljudgments differs, however, substantially from emotivism.


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14Edward Westermarck makes the same point in his Ethical Relativity(1932, p. 107). He remarks thatmoral disapproval may be evoked by the very sounds of words such as murder, theft,cowardice, and others which not merely indicate but also express the opprobrium attached to it.15Ahlman (1929), pp. 91 101. Ahlmans account resembles the exposition of the logical nature ofmoral judgments that G.H. von Wright put forward in his paper Om moraliska frestllningarnassanning (1954). See chapter 4 in this paper.16Ahlman (1929), p. 70.17Ibid., p. 71.

Ahlman observes that there are concepts in every language whose meaningincludes an evaluation. It does matter whether we refer to a group of humans aspeople, commoners, or rabble. The referent, i.e. the factual content of theword, a group of humans, remains almost the same, but there is a very differentevaluation attached to each concept.14Ahlman claims that such ethical andaesthetic terms as good, evil, valuable, invaluable, right, wrong,beautiful, and ugly are totally devoid of factual content. They have no othermeaning than the evaluative one that is based on emotion. Therefore, the questionIs it true that this intention is good? is not meaningful until we provide theevaluative concept good with a descriptive translation. There are two ways toproceed. Either we give the concept a psychological or sociological translation

according to which good means approved by me or approved by people ingeneral. Or we relate good to a norm, and define it as compatible with amoral norm. Neither translation, however, succeeds in establishing moral truths.The former translation fails because psychological and sociological translationseliminate the normative feature of the original statement. Descriptive truths aboutmoral evaluation are not moral truths. The latter translation entails a semanticproblem. It may be true or false that a singular moral judgment complies with thefundamental norm, but the norms themselves are neither true nor false.15But

even though we see no reason to apply the term true to value judgments, onewill not exclude the possibility that they might still be correct or objectivelyvalid in some sense.16Ahlman here refers to the intuitionist theory of justifica-tion applied by the phenomenologists.

The epistemological troubles of ethical intuitionism culminate in the jus-tification of fundamental moral norms. Ahlman suggests, along with phenomeno-logical ethicists, that fundamental moral principles are evaluations qualified withevidence. We shall have to begin with a sentence that is both evaluation and

norm at the same time: an evaluation from the psychological point of view and anorm from a logical point of view.17Ahlmans discussion reveals, however, theproblems with which this account is shot through. The problems of emotionalevidence are threefold: they concern the valuing subject, the object of valuation,and the content of valuation.


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18Ibid., p. 75.19Ahlmans criticism resembles here Edward Westermarcks scorn of intuitionism in his Ethical

Relativity(1932). Westermarck exposes fundamental disagreements in the views of highly respectedintuitionists, such as Henry Sidgwick and G.E. Moore. According to Sidgwick, the proposition thatpleasure is the only rational ultimate end of action is an object of intuition; according to Dr. Moore,also a professor of philosophy, the untruth of this proposition is self-evident. The latter finds it self-evident that good cannot be defined; but others, who have no smaller claim to the epithet of moralspecialists, are of the very contrary opinion. Westermarck, therefore, concludes that in the case ofmoral principles enunciated as self-evident truths disagreement is rampant.20Ahlman (1929), p. 77.21See e.g. Scheler (1973, p. 255): There is a type of experiencing whose objects are completelyinaccessible to reason; It is a kind of experience that leads us to genuinelyobjective objects andthe eternal order among them, i.e. to valuesand the order of ranks among them. And the order andlaws contained in this experience are as exact and evident as those of logic and mathematics; that is,there are evident interconnections and oppositions among values and value-attitudes and among theacts of preferring, etc., which are built on them, and on the basis of these a genuine grounding ofmoral decisions and laws for such decisions is both possible and necessary.

First, it is difficult to determine the real subject of moral valuation. Peopleseem to change their valuation of the same object from one time to another.There may even exist divergent and opposite valuations in different layers ofones self. Which of these valuations is, then, the authentic valuation of thesubject?, asks Ahlman.18The evidence may also be self-deceptive, and there isno way to ascertain that this is not the case. Even worse is the fact that myevidence, which is a certain psychological content, is likely to fade away as Isubject it to critical scrutiny. Further still, it seems that evident valuations varywith people, including intuitionist philosophers.19 Secondly, it is extremelydifficult to determine the proper object of valuation. Emotion, will, and imagi-nation shape and mold objects of valuation, bringing always different aspects to

the fore. Therefore, as we later value some object unlike before, this is mainlydue to more accurate or new knowledge of it. We do not, then, value exactly thesame object.20All these problems shook Ahlmans confidence in the phenom-enological Wesenschau according to which value-essences and their preferencerelations [Rangordnung] can be determined with exact and immediate cer-tainty.21

Ahlmans solution to the epistemological problems of intuitionism was non-cognitivism. It is based on a kind of existential or prescriptivist moral commit-

ment. A sincere and earnest commitment is the only method by which we canjustify our moral principles after the intuitionist verification has proved to beinsufficient. To be sure, intuitions are there, but it is up to our choice what to dowith them, where to rest the case about their authenticity and when to resume


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22Life-world (Lebenswelt) is not Ahlmans own expression. Instead, he uses human situation orhuman condition. The notion of life-world originates, naturally, from Edmund HusserlsDieKrisis der europischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phnomenologie(1936), to which

Ahlman does not explicitly refer.23Ahlman (1953), pp. 88 89.24Ahlman (1925), p. 146.25Saamisen ksitteen suhde pitmisen ksitteeseen (On the Relation of the Notions may andought),Ajatus 11, 1942. Ahlmans paper differs from G.H. von Wrights famous exposition ofdeontic logic not only on account of its informal approach but also because of the things that arepronounced obligatory, permitted, and forbidden. Von Wright (1957) states that these are acts, butAhlman seems to assume that these notions can be applied to both acts and facts.

action on some of them. Since act and value we must, that is our existential lot inthe human life-world.22

The self ends up standing on its own. It is incapable of receiving any ultimatesupport beyond itself. This is the human lot. It is only on this condition that ahuman can be a human being. I have said that the discovery of objectivemorality would annihilate morals in the most rigorous sense of the word, and Istill hold on to this claim. (Let it be admitted that if we strain the demand forhumanity so far that we must know the problematic nature of all morals andyet act morally it is not easy to be a human being. But one can answer bysaying that it is should not be easy.)23

In a sense it is, however, misleading to call Ahlmans noncognitivism his

solution to the epistemological problems of intuitionism glanced throughabove. It may, rather, turn out that noncognitivism was his original position fromwhich he launched his critique toward intuitionism, in spite of his constantsympathies with it. There is much textual evidence to support this interpretation.The most crystallized statement is perhaps an early aphorism from 1925. Ahlmansounds here like the postmodern ethicists Emmanuel Levinas (1906 1995) andZygmunt Bauman as he claims that if it was possible tojustifymorals, the resultwould be extinction of morals.24 Ethical commitment without objective

grounds might, thus, be no defeat after all. On the contrary, Ahlman seems tohave entertained a thought that it is the only method by which we can reach oursupposed metaphysical self, if there is one. It is an essential feature of moralsthat it cannot be justified. It is just through this fact that morals is connected withour deepest self, hints Ahlman in his unpublished workbook in 1936.

Ahlmans most obvious contribution to analytic moral philosophy in Finlandis, however, a short paper on the logic of deontic and evaluative concepts.25

Ahlman was not familiar with formal logic, and his arguments are mainly di-

rected against neo-Kantian logicians and Husserl. Husserl claimed that thenotions of ought to (sollen) and must not (soll nicht) are the basic deonticconcepts from which the notions of do not have to (muss nicht) and allowed


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26Ahlman (1942); (1938), pp. 27 36.27von Wright (1979), p. xxiv.

to (drfen) can be deduced by negation. Ahlman rejects this attempt becausethe latter are only contraries of the former notions, not contradictories, as Husserlsuggests. His own solution accepts both obligation and permission as basicdeontic categories. A must not be B implies that A ought not to be B, and Adoes not have to be B is equivalent to A is allowed not to be B. He alsoaccepts Heinrich Rickerts test for distinguishing value concepts from otherconcepts. If the negation of a concept yields two concepts either of which is avalue concept, then the concept itself is also evaluative. Finally, Ahlman employsboth this criterion and the earlier one about the deontic categories to prove thatindifferent is a genuine value concept. If something is not indifferent, it iseither valuable or worthless. Indifferent is also something that is allowed to be or

does not have to be, while its negation either ought to be or must not be. Boththese arguments intend to establish the conclusion that it is not legitimate to inferany permissions or claims about indifference from scientific, i.e. factual premisesonly. The value-neutrality of science means therefore, unlike many laymen butalso some scientists have tended to think, that it is beyond both indifference andpermission.26

3. EINO KAILAS FOUR PERSPECTIVES ON ETHICS

Eino Kaila is perhaps the most influential philosopher in Finland in the 20thcentury. He distinguished himself in both philosophy and psychology, and hisacademic legacy set the course for an entire generation of Finnish scholars, bothscientists and humanists. As an outstanding scholar and a most accomplishedlecturer Kaila conveyed fresh ideas and approaches to Finland. These includedexperimental psychology, Gestalt theory, the psychology of personality, philo-

sophical and mathematical logic, and logical empiricism, all of which mergedwith the broader mainstream of analytic philosophy after World War II. Kailathus became the originator of analytic philosophy in Finland, in spite of the factthat he disliked the label analytic. This antipathy sprang from his lifelongsearch for a synthetic philosophy that would unify the findings and theories ofmodern science.27

G.H. von Wright has claimed that Kailas intellectual temperament was suchthat he could not get deeply interested in problems of moral philosophy . It is

characteristic that he approached the subject matters of practical philosophy inthe first place with apsychologicalinterest, not with logical or epistemological


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28Ibid., p. xxiii.29Stenius (1964), p. 1.30Niiniluoto (1990), p. 15.31Russell (1946), p. 724.

ones, maintains von Wright.28Erik Stenius (1911 90), another established pupilof Kaila, has in a similar tenor associated Kaila with pre-Socratic philosophies ofnature, in opposition to Socratic moral, social, and political philosophy.29IlkkaNiiniluoto (b. 1946) also suggests that Kailas interest in the philosophy of natureconnected him primarily with aesthetics instead of ethics.30I have no intention torefute these estimations, but I still hold that there are some fundamental ethicalissues in Kailas thought, although it is true that he deals with them more often ina psychological and rhetorical, rather than, an analytic manner.

Eino Kailas relation to ethics was somewhat problematic. On one hand hestressed that severe and scientific philosophy is limited to epistemological andlogical analysis of scientific theories and concepts. He also emphasized the need

for a synthetic philosophy of nature that would unify the findings and theories ofscience. In this major project problems of human behavior belonged primarily tothe domains of biology and psychology. On the other hand, Kaila is also known,at least in Finland, as the author of Syvhenkinen elm[The Depths of Spiri-tual Life] and as an influential contributor to the cultural debate of his time. Theproblem lies in the fact that Kaila never explained the relation of these normativepursuits to his scientific philosophy. Is Syvhenkinen elma contribution tophilosophy, and if it is, what kind of philosophy does it represent?

The same question has also troubled other philosophers of analytic origin.One of them is Bertrand Russell, who published several essays, for instance onmarriage and morals, war and peace, or education. As an emotivist he confessedthat his moral judgments express his own desires and evoke similar desires in hisreaders. Yet, Russell was ready to admit that this is not an appropriate renderingof our moral experience. In opposing the proposal [to introduce bull-fighting tothis country] I shouldfeel, not only that I was expressing my desires, but that mydesires in the matter are right, whatever that may mean, he wrote.31I assume

that Kaila was faced with a similar dilemma, although he does not concede hisdiscontent with emotivism as readily as Russell. I claim, however, that we canderive this fact from the various perspectives that Kaila provides on moraljustification.

There are four interconnected accounts of the nature and justification ofmoral judgments in Kailas philosophy. The first, the emotivist one, is suggestedas part of his general critique of metaphysics. Kaila joined the logical positivistsventure to purge philosophy from meaningless sentences that cannot be verified

by either empirical or logical investigation. For this purpose he introduced the


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32Kaila (1942), p. 50 / Ahlman (1938), p. 34. Original italics.33Kailas conclusion is not altogether consistent with Ahlmans account. Ahlman tries to make adistinction between ordinary feelings and cognitive feelings of value. This distinction is quintes-sential to the phenomenological ethics that Ahlman knew very well. Max Scheler, for instance, makesa distinction between passive feeling-states (Gefhlzustnde) and active, intentional feelings(Fhlen von etwas), the latter being the source of ethical knowledge.34Kaila (1942), p. 53.35Kaila (1942), p. 52. Original italics.

Principle of Testability. It states that the real content of a synthetic sentence isthe sum total of the testable sentences which it implies. Synthetic sentences thatlack testable implications are empty and meaningless, in spite of the fact that theymay make grammatical sense. Kailas examples of meaningless sentences in-clude metaphysical theories about the ultimate nature of reality, phenomenologi-cal talk about essences, and ethical claims about objective and absolute values.

The explicit target of Kailas criticism is the ethical theory sketched by ErikAhlman in his treatise on axiological metaphysics, Olemassaolon jrjellisyysarvometafyysillisen ongelmana[in German: Der Sinn des Daseins als wert-metaphysisches Problem] (1938). Kaila holds that Ahlmans theory is crystal-lized in the sentence, according to which the fact that I feelthat a thing is

valuable or unvaluable does not imply that it really isvaluable or unvaluable.32

Kaila finds the quoted sentence meaningless in this particular theory, because theauthor i.e. Ahlman, to whom Kaila does not explicitly refer also suggeststhat our legitimate value judgments are based on special feelings of value. But ifour feelings satisfy the demand of testability of value judgments, nothing can bevaluable irrespective of feelings. Therefore, Kaila concludes that the quoted sen-tence is meaningless.33He then proceeds to provide an emotivist account of thesekinds of sentences.

Kaila agrees with the phenomenologist Max Scheler that values are given asobjective features of things in our natural, unreflected experience. This phe-nomenal objectivity of values is, however, perfectly consistent with their func-tional subjectivity: values are based on our emotional and motivational structure,which varies substantially between persons. This noncognitive origin of valuesexplains the empirical relativity of value judgments. It also reveals that a claimabout the being of values in spite of our evaluative feelings34,paceAhlman, isnot a genuine statement but a noncognitive expression of needs, wants, and

feelings. Kaila goes even as far as to equate value judgments with politicalpropaganda that employs incentives, suggestions, imperatives, signalsin oneway or another (instead of symbols).35

Rejection of Ahlmans theory implies that Kaila does not accept moral real-ism. It is noteworthy to stress that it does not entail total rejection of normativeethics. Kaila does not deny the testability of value judgments; he only blames


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36Kaila (1986), p. 188.37Kaila (1986), p. 189.38Kaila (1990), p. 92.39Kaila (1986), p. 189. Original italics.40Ilkka Niiniluoto (1986, p. 25) suggests this pragmatic interpretation in his preface to the thirdreprint of Syvhenkinen elm.

Ahlmans account for contradiction. A closer look suggests that Kaila does noteven attack the possibility of moral justification, but a more limited ontologicalissue concerning the existence or being of values. This brings out the questionwhether the principle of testability could somehow be applied to value judg-ments.

Practical testability is Kailas second approach to the justification of moraljudgments. It is an attempt to widen the limits of meaningful language towardmetaphysical and religious beliefs, whose real content is narrow or empty, butwhich may still motivate our action.36Therefore, Kaila suggests that outlooks onlife are testable by the results that they achieve by motivating action. A tree isknown by its fruit. Those outlooks are good whose fruit is good.37The origin of

this pragmatic point goes back to Kailas formative years as a philosopher whenhe was influenced by William James. Already in 1912 he wrote that we maytolerate metaphysical beliefs if they are necessary in order to reach the highestvalues of life.38This pragmatic criterion does not, however, remove the prob-lems concerning the acceptability of religious and metaphysical beliefs.

Kailas account of practical testability turns into an ethical question about theconsequences of our action. True is that which is good.An outlook on life istrue, i.e. acceptable, in so far as adherence to it leads to acceptable conse-

quences, writes Kaila.39

His standards of acceptable consequences include suchspiritual values as love of ones neighbor, truth, beauty, nobility, justice, piety,and holiness. These values are fundamental for Kaila in the sense that we cannottest their acceptability by referring to consequences that have been brought aboutby such metaphysical beliefs that are committed to these values, because ourargument would turn out to be circular. No remedy is provided by a pragmaticadjustment according to which spiritual values can be justified by the usefulconsequences they motivate us to bring about.40This interpretation runs into a

problem when we should set the criteria for useful consequences. If we end updefining them as spiritual values, as we are most likely to do with Kaila, theproblem of justification remains. Therefore, the idea of practical testability doesnot seem to solve the problem of moral justification.

The fullest statement of Kailas position in ethics is contained in the addresswhich he delivered on the occasion of the inauguration of the Academy ofFinland in 1948. In this paper he suggests that the core of morality is the Golden


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41Kaila (1992), pp. 453 454. See also Kaila (1986), pp. 279 281.42Kaila (1992), p. 454.43Kaila (1992), p. 453; (1986), p. 280.44Kaila (1992), p. 456.45Kaila (1992), p. 457; cf. Kaila (1986), pp. 280 281.46Kaila (1986), p. 281. Original italics. Cf. Kaila (1992), pp. 456 457.47Kaila (1992), p. 456. Original italics.48En gestaltpsykologisk betraktelse ver moral-filosofins centralproblem, Tidskrift fr psykologioch pedagogik3, 1947.

Rule, a norm of reciprocity among people. This norm is shared by several devel-oped systems of morality, including Christianity, Hinduism and Kantianism, aswell as positive moralities of different cultures. Its demands for equal treatmenthas an empirical foundation on the account of the fact that human beings occupyroughly symmetrical positions in the field of social relationships.41Kaila admitsthat in so far as our sense of morals and justice has some objective foundation,this foundation lies in the principle expressed by the Greeks as equally toequals.42He even admits that the Golden Rule seems to possess objectivevalidity and peculiar self-evident truth.43From these remarks Kaila concludesthat the principle of reciprocity may even be theoretically, objectivelyfounded.44

The rational foundation of morality cannot, however, provide a foundation forany theory of normative ethics. The principle of reciprocity cannot function as aguiding norm to the question Who is my neighbor?, i.e. whom should we treatequally.45Kaila agrees with his famous countryman Edward Westermarck thatthe boundaries of the community of neighbors have tended to widen in thecourse of history. Yet every individual differs from every other person, and thereappears to be no objective criteria for telling morally significantsimilarities anddifferences from insignificant ones. It is evident that instinct, emotion, and

drives and not by any means knowledge determine the social field thatthrough my conscience sets certain demands on me, contends Kaila.46He thusends up agreeing with the conclusion he attributes to Westermarck and otherprofound thinkers, according to which there is no theoretical, objective,scientificjustification and proof for any morality or justice.47

It may well be that Kaila put forth his ideas about the central problems ofmoral philosophy from the standpoint of Gestaltpsychology, as a paper of thistitle suggests48, and that the analytic approach to ethics as the logical study of the

language of morals was unfamiliar to him. Yet it is possible to raise a question:Could the principles of reciprocity and symmetry (of people in the field of socialrelationships) also qualify as logicalfeatures ofthe moral point of view?If thisis the case, if these features urge us to view morality in a certain light, thenKailas characterization can be seen as a kind of contribution to analytic and nor-


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49G.H. von Wright (1996, pp. 4 5) has in a recent manuscript suggested a parallel interpretation ofWestermarcks ethics. I, therefore, owe my interpretation of Kaila to him.50Kaila (1992), p. 412.51Kaila (1992), p. 421.52Bergson (1944, p. 113) speaks about an original impetus, that has carried life by more andmore complex forms to higher and higher destinies. Kaila was influenced by Bergson in his youth,although he rejected vitalism quite quickly. Bergsonian views, however, continued to influence him

mative ethics. It contributes to normative ethics in the sense that it proposescertain standards for the concept of morality, instead of merely discovering themthrough some kind of empirical investigation.49Kaila would also be correct in hisremark that logical investigation alone is incapable of answering the questionWho is my neighbor? On the other hand, Kaila seems to deny the conceptualautonomy of the moral point of view when he explains the demands of moralsense as expressions of ones position in the social field.

If the analysis of reciprocity has revealed a slight inclination toward norma-tive ethics in Kailas thought, further elaborations toward it can be found in hispsychological writings about the spiritual life. The Finnish expression syv-henkinen elm is a celebrated neologism that Eino Kaila invented for his scien-

tific and artistic purposes. It is often rendered as spiritual life in English, butthis translation (a literal translation of syvhenkinen would be deep-spiritual)does not capture the rich and deep variety of aesthetic, ethical, and religious,even scientific, phenomena and meanings Kaila covers with this concept.

The concept of spiritual life has two basic functions in Kailas thought. Onthe one hand, the need for spiritual life provided Kaila a psychological explana-tion for the various normative and traditionally esteemed fields of human experi-ence, such as the arts, religion, and morality. This descriptivemeaning of spiri-

tual life was an essential part of Kailas lifelong project to establish a monisticphilosophy of nature. On the other hand, Kaila was reluctant to reduce the ex-perienced normativity of spiritual phenomena to their psychological explana-tion. In this latter meaning spiritual life became a unifying normativeideal inKailas philosophy of life. The enchantment of spiritual life embraces thehighest values that a human life as a whole can possess, he even declared.50

Although Kaila rejected metaphysical and religious speculations aboutuniversal moral law, his own scientific theory of the development of spiritual

life resembles such metaphysical theories as Hegels idealism or Bergsonsvitalism. They are both confident that the highest values will be realized in thefuture course of history. The hero of Kailas account of history is biologicallife. During billions of years it has created ever more spiritual, i.e. complex,sophisticated, and organized structures and forms of life.51Kaila cites biologicaland physiological facts to support his theory, but his account of the dynamicimpetus of life also shares some Bergsonian features.52 Kaila, for instance,


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as a kind of antithesis to his naturalism. Ample evidence of their presence in Kailas thought isincluded in his Syvhenkinen elm[The Spiritual Life. Discussions on the Ultimate Questions.1943] This is a semi-popular work in which Kaila discusses various issues of the philosophy of life.The book consists of dialogues between two interlocutors, an artist and a scientist. These charactersrepresent two sides of Kailas personality, as he readily admits in the preface. Bergsonian ideas areentertained by the artist Aristofilos, but they are firmly rejected by Kailas favorite alter ego, thescientist Eubulos.53Kaila (1992), p. 421. A similar account can be found in Syvhenkinen elm. Kaila (1986, p. 282)

explains that he believes from a field-theoretical basis in a certain kind of reason in the evolutionof mankind.54Kaila (1992), p. 444. My italics.55See Kaila (1986), p. 174.56Kailas unpublished letter to Allan Sandstrm 8.3.1947. My translation and italics.57See Kaila (1942a). Kailas sympathy with Hegel and Snellman is based on the holistic traits in theirthought. Kaila suggests that we may interpret the Hegelian view of social life with the assistance ofmodern holistic biology. Hegelian concepts like objective mind [Objektiver Geist] or national

assures his readers that the law-like evolution of biological life also guaranteesthe development of spiritual life in the future.53

Facts do not imply norms or values, as the well-known principle of ethicsstates. Kaila agrees with this principle, as he writes that I have in several pub-lications employed the term spirituality to coin the highest degrees of humanexistence, not as an evaluation, but in a sense that, so it seems to me, can bedefined biologically.54Yet on other occasions, he seems to approach ethicalnaturalism, according to which moral facts can be founded on non-moral facts.Kailas favorite version of naturalism is evolutionist ethics.

There is no doubt that Kaila preferred spiritual life to a life concentratedaround the satisfaction of primitive needs or drives. The superiority of the former

way of life is based on its higher level on the scale of biological evolution.55

Thisscale also provides the standard for values.The eventual value and meaning of life may only be founded on an ever

continuing rise of value, a never-ending conquest of new values, higher thanthose that we already possess and that have turned into trivialities, on progress,i.e. on the rise of the level of organizationthat has no beginning and no end.56

The seed of Kailas ethical naturalism lies in this implicit definition of valuewith a descriptive notion of the level of organization. According to this account,

spiritual values are valid for us because they represent the highest and mostaccomplished level of biological evolution. On the other hand, evolution bringsforth ever more developed and accomplished levels of organization. Therefore,no value can possess eternal and ahistorical validity. A similar account of his-torically relative objectivityof moral judgments was advocated by G.W.F. Hegeland J.V. Snellman (1806 81), a Finnish Hegelian, whose ethical ideas Kailapresented sympathetically during World War II.57


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mind [Volksgeist] refer, according to Kaila, to emergent, non-additive laws of social behavior thatare not deducible from the laws of individual behavior. Moral rules are part of social laws, whoseconstant evolution effects also morality. Therefore, moral truths are relative and historical, althoughthey are experienced as absolute and objective in every particular phase of history. Kaila does notexplicitly agree with this interpretation of Hegelianism, but he does not reject it either.58von Wright (1963), p. 5; cf. von Wright (1989a), p. 51.59von Wright (1989a), p. 51.

Even if there are some echoes of the evolutionist account of moral justifica-tion in Kailas thought, one must emphasize that he did not develop these ideasany further. The ethical naturalism of Eino Kaila remained an outline whose fullimplications he did not perhaps even realize. On the other hand, it is evident thatan evolutionist theory of moral justification is inconsistent with the emotivistanalysis that renounces the descriptive and cognitive nature of moral judgments.The attempt to avoid inconsistency, together with Kailas positivist view ofethics as a discipline that does not belong to scientific philosophy proper, maypartly explain why, in spite of all these multifaceted clues, he did not specify hisposition regarding the thorny question of moral justification.

4. G.H. VON WRIGHT AND THE LOGICAL ANALYSISOF THE MORAL POINT OF VIEW

G.H. von Wrights diverse contributions to philosophical analysis of humanaction are well-known throughout the philosophical world. They include deonticlogic, a general theory of norms and values, a theory of action, and practicalinference, among others. All these topics have important bearings on ethics.

Since, however, my space is limited and the remaining topics will be touchedupon in other papers in this volume, I shall concentrate on those fields that aremost intimately related to von Wrights ethics. They center around his axiology,or general theory of values.

G.H. von Wrights ethics is a combination of metaethics and normativeethics. Unlike some his analytic colleagues, von Wright has always been awareof the interdependence of these types of philosophical investigation. In TheVarieties of Goodnesshe observed that the words we use in moral discourse are

in search of meaning.58That is, their usage calls for a clarification of theircriteria of application, as he stated elsewhere.59But since this conceptual questis conducted in ethics it also has a practical aim to provide us with the grounds orstandards whereby we judge good and bad and duty. Therefore by shaping ourmoral notions, i.e. explicating our conceptual intuitions in moral matters, we


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60Von Wright (ibid.) continues that a similar account applies to political and social philosophy.Concepts like democracy and social justice, legitimacy and sovereignty are as much in searchof meaning as the fundamental notions of ethics. To shape their meaning is to get to understandbetter our social situation and to develop standards for assessing the purposefulness of existing social

institutions. As a consequence of a deepened understanding of the meaning of society, our life inrelation to its existing forms may be one of acquiescence and conformism orone of dissent andrevolt.61von Wright (1943), p. 115.62Ibid.Translation by Knut Erik Trany (1989, p. 492).63Ibid., p. 116. Translation by Knut Erik Trany.64Knut Erik Trany has noticed the same tension in von Wrights early views. He finds them hardlyrepresentative of the ethical doctrines of most logical positivists in the 1930s and 1940s.

shape the way we react to the conduct of our fellow humans, which is the veryfunction of normative ethics.60

Early accounts

Von Wrights earliest contribution to ethics amounts to a few lines in anexposition of logical empiricism,Den logiska empirismen(1943). It is a veryoriginal combination of ethical emotivism or emotionalism, the general principlesof logical empiricism, and the phenomenological ethics of Max Scheler. VonWright contends with Edward Westermarck, Axel Hgerstrm, and emotivists

that value judgements express emotional reactions. Yet he claims that their talkabout the relativity and subjectivity of values does not exclude a factualuniversal validity as regards ethical and aesthetic valuations.61We can constitutevalue concepts on the basis of emotional reaction, and a close empirical scrutinyof those emotional reactions which are called forth by things subject to moral oraesthetic judgement will show these reactions to stand within a law-like, i.e.invariant relations to their external objects.62An empiricist may, therefore, evenagree with such objectivistic theorists as Max Scheler, who hold that values are

as objective as colors, shapes, and other sensible properties. That universalvalidity which, according to the empiricist theory, we can ascribe to value judge-ments, is not something weprescribe vis--vis reality, but on the contrary some-thing the real world forces upon us, concludes von Wright.63

Von Wrights early outline of the nature of value judgments appears to be astrange combination of epistemological subjectivism and metaphysical objec-tivism.64Value concepts are constituted on the basis of subjective emotions, butthese emotive reactions are so uniform that we shall have to interpret values as

some kind of secondary properties. This kind of metaphysical realism is com-


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67Ibid., pp. 54 57.68Ibid., pp. 65 68. We can investigate consequences and motives of acts, their useful or harmfuleffects on other purposes, their subsumption under virtues, etc. This kind of empirical investigationmay, however, run into conceptual difficulties. We are, for instance, forced to determine whether thisor that kind of act really is courageous or compassionate or useful for a particular purpose.69Ibid., pp. 66 67.70Ibid., p. 68.

rights. Von Wright doubts their logical connections to any sorts of imperatives.Therefore, the fact that evaluations cannot be identified with norms and evenless with imperatives is, in my opinion, not difficult to see.67

In the second part of the paper von Wright presents his own outline of thetruth of moral judgments. Within the confines of this article, however, there isonly space for the core of von Wrights insightful ideas. He first puts aside thepositivistic question of meaningfulness: ordinary language shows that moraljudgments play an important role in our linguistic communication, and this is suf-ficient proof for their meaningfulness. Von Wright then divides moraljudgments into two categories. We usually employ moral judgments to assertwhether our or other peoples acts conform with, or deviate from, already

existing moral standards. We may, for instance, hold an act good because itdisplays such criteriaor standardsof goodness as courage, compassion, or self-denial. Moral judgments of this type are true or false in the objective sense,because there are empirical methods to establish whether the act displays thosecriteria or not.68It is also misleading to claim that these judgments are based onemotion: they are based on facts and moral criteria, although their utterances areoften blended with emotional reactions.

Sometimes moral judgments concern those very criteria or standards we

usually take for granted in our evaluations. Judgments of this kind are familiar inlogical surroundings like our modern world that provide several standards formoral evaluation. We debate, for instance, whether an inherently vicious act isjustified if it increases the total amount of happiness in society. Von Wrightreadily admits that there can be no objective answers to these kinds of debates.The purpose of his example is, however, more moderate. It only intends to showthat the reasons we provide to support our moral criteria in ethical discussion arenot subjective or contingent in the conventional meaning of these concepts.69

Judgments about moral standards are neither true nor false. They lie beforetrueand false in the moral realm, von Wright contends.70The reason is notthatjudgments about moral criteria are based on emotions. They have, rather, logicalaffinities with definitions. From this affinity unfolds also the possibility ofscientific normative ethics.


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71Ibid., p. 69. Original italics.72von Wright (1989a), pp. 34 35; (1995), p. 8.73I must also exclude from a detailed discussion von Wrights contribution to the modern ethics ofvirtue. Von Wrights chapter on virtue in The Varieties of Goodnesshas provided an influential

impetus to the revival of this classical approach in ethics. Von Wright accepts the Aristoteliananalysis, according to which virtues are traits of character, not skills, dispositions, habits, or featuresof temperament. The role of virtue is to balance or eliminate the influence of passions on choices thataffect the choosing agents own good or the good of some other being or beings. Virtue helps one toact with dispassionate judgment concerning what is the right thing for him or her to do. The variousvirtues may, therefore, be characterized as forms of self-control. Hence, virtues are no ends inthemselves but instruments in the service of the good of man. Von Wrights account of self-controlas the key virtue has been criticized by David Carr (1984) and Philippa Foot (1989). They haveremarked that although some virtues, including courage and temperance, can be interpreted as formsof self-control, the same does not apply to all classical virtues, such as benevolence, wisdom, or

justice. Von Wright has later accepted this criticism. It seems to me one of the interesting featuresof the conceptual situation in the philosophy of virtue that virtue defies a unique, nontrivialelucidation or definition. The virtues constitute, I think, a nice example of family-resemblance inWittgensteins sense, states von Wright (1989c, p. 791). Foot has also criticized von Wright for hisinstrumental account of virtue which allows even burglars and robbers to display self-regardingvirtue in their pursuit of their own good. But there is no problem here according to von Wright. Toargue that true courage must have moral worth seems to me to be sophistry, he claims. But, hecontinues in his delicate manner, I may be mistaken. If I am, Foot is right in thinking that

It is common to all forms of normative ethics that they search for the stan-dards of moral values. The fact that a standard must in the end be set(imposed),does not, as we have seen, exclude the fact that one provides reasonsfor oneschoices. Neither does it exclude an antecedent rational reorganization of thatconceptual field, where reasons are sought for. There are no grounds forcategorically refusing to accept the scientific nature of such investigations.71Itmay well be that normative ethics is doomed to constant reformulation of itsbasic concepts, unlike more traditional disciplines, such as physics or biology.But this does not imply that normative ethics boils down to creative promulgationof values. Ethics as a discipline is connected both to metaethics by its conceptualinvestigation and to normative ethics by its practical aim to direct our lives. This

analysis of the nature of philosophical ethics became the core idea of vonWrights mature ethics.

The good of man and value-rationality

The Varieties of Goodnessis, according to von Wrights own evaluation, hismost personal and best argued scholarly work, although it has not had a wide-

spread influence on later research.72

It is an analytic treatise on the forms orvarieties of goodness, virtue, duty, and justice.73The central notion of the treatise


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something essential is missing from my attempted clarification of the self-regarding virtues, e.g.courage and temperance.74A partial explanation for this transition may lie in the criticism provided by Kurt Baier (1989,pp. 233 269) and Thomas Schwartz (1989, pp. 217 232) in The Philosophy of Georg Henrik vonWright. They show that welfare cannot be the proper equivalent of the good of man because thelogical properties of the two concepts differ from each other. First of all, welfare is a narrower notion

than the good of a being. Welfare, according to both Baier and Schwartz, is related to circumstancesthat guarantee the satisfaction of ones basic needs. Many kinds of circumstances may do equallywell for this purpose, even though their effect on the good of a being would be different. Baier alsoremarks that the expression good of man may mean two related but distinct things. Good of manmay either be something that is goodfora person. Or it may be some good that a person has, that ishis or her possession. Because welfare is only related to the latter interpretation, the good of manand the welfare of man cannot be synonymous. Secondly, the good of a person includes the things,such as food or a prize in a lottery, that enhance his or her good. This is not the case with welfare.Things that enhance ones welfare are not part of it themselves. Welfare is then logicallyequivalent to health and happiness. They all refer to a state, although von Wright claims the

contrary.75von Wright (1989a), p. 154; (1985), pp. 167, 186 187; (1980), p. 71.76von Wright (1963), p. 119.77Ibid.Von Wright (1989c, p. 803) has later specified that his position has affinities to utilitarianismin that it measures the moral value of an action in terms of the good and bad this action calls forth although it does this in a way very much at odds with the idea of the maximization of good.78von Wright (1963), p. 178; (1989), p. 803.79von Wright (1989c), p. 800.

is the good of man. It is a utilitarian notion that involves the meanings of wel-fare, happiness, and well-being. Later, however, von Wright has linked it ratherto happiness in a more Aristotelian sense, as a quality of a mans life over asubstantial part of it.74Both happiness, welfare, and well-being are necessary ornatural ends in the sense that the pursuit of their opposites unhappiness andill-being as intrinsic ends would be perverse and irrational.75

Von Wright denies the conceptual autonomy of morality. Whether an act ismorally good or bad depends upon its character being beneficial or harmful, i.e.depends upon the way in which it affects the good of various beings.76Moralgoodness is, then, a sub-form of utilitarian goodness.77This implies a teleologi-cal account of norms and duties. Duties, in general, are practical necessities that

promote or respect the good of some being.78

The existence of moral duties isbased on the fact that human beings in a hypothetical state of nature are roughequals, i.e. are endowed with roughly the same capacities for promoting andinjuring one anothers good.79It is, therefore, rational for every individual toaccept a general practice of not harming other persons good, on the conditionthat other agents adopt the same practice regarding him or her. The moral duty torespect this rational cornerstone of morality that von Wright labels the Principleof Justice, according to which No man shall have his share in the greater good


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80von Wright (1963), p. 208.81von Wright (1963), p. 209; (1989), p. 802. Von Wright seems to agree with Thomas Hobbes andhis modern follower David Gauthier (1986) that moral action can be motivated by purely egoistic,

self-regarding reasons. He even writes that we can imagine the men as thoroughly selfish, void ofany sense of justice or morality whatsoever. They have not the slightest desire to pay their due fortheir share. But the greedier they are on their share, the stronger will the normative pressure becomeunder which they are themselves to pay their due. This is a fascinating mechanism. In co-operatingfor the common end of imposing heteronomous other-regarding duties on others, men come to getthese same duties heteronomously imposed upon themselves. We can, in other words, make us apicture of a society, in which justice and morality are kept going even perfectly through self-interest. Von Wright rejects this straightforwardly egoistic motivation, but so does, too, Gauthier. Heinsists that there can, and indeed must, be an internalized, affective adherence to the moral principlesthat have been generated from the principles of rational choice in order for them to be truly moral. A

rational egoist finds participation in mutually advantageous co-operation intrinsically not merelyinstrumentally valuable for him- or herself, because it is only this co-operation that can bring himor her increased opportunities for a satisfactory life. The egoism of this motivation is sophisticated,but von Wright would probably still reject it because of its self-regarding justification of moralduties. (See also note 98.)82Another Kantian feature is von Wrights emphasis that the notion of moral goodness cannot bedefined in terms of beneficial consequences alone. It must be supported with morally good intention,that is, the intention to respect or promote the good of some other being for its own sake.

of a community of which he is a member, without paying his due, may come tobe practically necessary for an agent for self-regarding or other-regarding rea-sons.80Every action that follows the Principle of Justice is moral, but onlywhen ones action is motivated by autonomous other-regarding duty necessitatedby a will to secure for all the greater good which similar action on the part of his[or her] neighbors would secure for him [or her], does one act from a moral, i.e.disinterested and impartial, motive.81It is through this emphasis on right moti-vation that von Wrights moral theory is related to the Kantian, and charac-teristically German, Gesinnungsethik.82

A strong and persistent theme in von Wrights thought has been his attemptto find or build a connection between the ideas of morality and rationality. Von

Wright has always emphasized that the content of the good of man is, at leastpartly, a matter of personal choice. On the other hand, he has also stressed thatthe choices of an individual can still be more or less rational. This idea led vonWright in the 1980s to the notion of value-rationality. It is a form of practical,ethical rationality that von Wright has tried to revive in his own thinking.Although the notion of value-rationality originates from Max Weber, being atranslation from his Wertrationalitt, von Wright connects it rather to the formof rationality that Aristotle calls phronesis, in the meaning of a true and

reasoned state of capacity to act with regard to the things that are good or bad for


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83The Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle, 1140b 4 5, quoted from the translation by Sir David Ross.Von Wright translatesphronesisvariably as practical reason, practical wisdom, deliberation,value-rationality, or more extensively, comprehension of the right way of life. All theseexpressions point to the kind of rationality that enables us to evaluate the influence of human activity

on our total well-being.84von Wright (1985), pp. 180 184; (1987), pp. 21, 131; (1989), p. 161; (1992), p. 171. Von Wrightsinterpretation of Aristotles practical reason as an ability to deliberate different optional ends relatedto the good life is not, however, completely coherent with Aristotles own account. As von Wrightalso remarks, Aristotle denies independent deliberation of ends. In The Nicomachean Ethics(1112b12) Aristotle writes that we deliberate not about ends but about means.85von Wright (1985), p. 180.86Ibid., p. 175.

man.83Whereas the Aristotelian notion ofprohairesisis equivalent to instru-mental rationality, the choice of optional means to some given end,phronesis, onthe other hand, is concerned with the deliberation of the optional ends of humanlife. These ends are of a specific kind since they are not aspired to as a means tosome further goals but as intrinsic constituents of the good human life.84

Von Wright argues that we need value-rationality to complement and directinstrumental rationality. The hold of instrumental rationality is a problematicfeature in modern Western culture, because it tempts us to separate the questionsof ultimate ends from the sphere of rational argumentation and thus to suppressthe other form of rationality connected with ends, not as means to other, perhapsonly faintly comprehended ends, but as relevant to the purpose that philosophers

have called the good of man.85

The task of value-rationality is thus to bring the utmost ends of human life,buried under the instrumental way of thinking, into conscious, rational delibera-tion.

The point of value-rationality is to qualify the preferential choices of an agentwith knowledge of the causal consequences and prerequisites connected withattaining the optional ends. Von Wright considers the achievement of an end tobe a positive value. Means used in order to attain the end, in contrast, denote a

negative value. Rational deliberation is the procedure in which we simply com-pare the magnitude of these values. As von Wright puts it, we do this alwayswhile asking ourselves whether an end is (or was) worth pursuing. In otherwords, we ask whether an end is worth its price or not.86A reasonable agentdoes not pursue ends that require means that cost more than the rewards that theattainment of those ends would provide. von Wrights own example is a manwho has ruined his health because of his professional and social ambition andnow regrets his former preferences. His foolishness was that he did not antici-

pate the way he might have had to change his preferences. Consideration of hisreal preferences would, however, have been possible had he clearly paid


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87von Wright (1963), p. 181; (1983), pp. 83 84; (1985), pp. 181 182.88von Wright (1963), pp. 106 113; (1983), pp. 83 84; (1985), pp. 181 183.89von Wright (1963), pp. 112 113.90von Wright (1985), pp. 173 174; (1989c), p. 786. Von Wright admits that many reasoned prefer-ences are anchored, in the way of psychological motivation, in likings. To prefer safety to comfortmay be a purely subjective tendency. Von Wright argues, however, that this need not always be thecase. We may, for example, choose to do our duties, although we would prefer to amuse ourselves.

attention to the causal consequences that would follow from his action, claimsvon Wright. Now it was only the actualization of these causal connections thattaught him practical wisdom about the price of his end.87

It is by causal connections that von Wright sees objective reality controllingthe rationality of human ends. This kind of practical wisdom requires, however,complete knowledge over the causal connections related to optional actions.Relying on this knowledge, we should be able to evaluate and anticipate how theactualization of our ends will affect our valuation of these ends. Von Wrightadmits that this is a problem of all theories of teleological ethics, as he says thatwe all have to face some irrevocable and oppressive decisions, knowing theimportance of the decision without being able to determine all its consequences

and hence its influence on our good.88

Another problem of value-rationality thatcan, to some extent, be tackled is the weakness of will.Weakness of will, akrasia, is a serious practical problem connected with

value-rationality. This problem concerns especially strongly desired and easilyattainable ends, whose harmful side-effects will occur only in the distant future.One chooses an optional action whose consequences are desired in the short run,but whose long-term consequences turn it into an unwanted one. One can fallinto such irrationality either for lack of self-discipline or because of ones short-

sightedness. In the latter case one simply lacks the capacity for clear articulationof ones preferences.89But are there some ends that every value-rational andenlightened person with a strong will would choose?

Von Wright has tried to meet this problem by introducing a distinctionbetween intrinsic and reasoned preferences. Intrinsic preferences are based onmerely liking better, and are equivalent to tastes. I may prefer oranges to apples,because I like oranges better. Compared to intrinsic preferences, von Wrightsdefinition of reasoned preferences is only negative, because he considers rea-

soned all preferences that are founded on some other reasons than mere likingbetter. An example of a reasoned preference could be a preference to take a trainrather than to take a flight, because traveling by train is safer and cheaper thanflying, even though one might like flying better.90Leaning on this distinctionbetween intrinsic and reasoned preferences, von Wright has tried to give a moreadequate account of the good of man.


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91von Wright (1989c), pp. 786 789. Von Wright tries to bring together both intrinsic and reasonedpreferences in his notion of the overall good of man. He does not, however, even try to meet thequestion concerning the proportion between intrinsic preferences and reasoned preferences in theoverall good of man. He passes over the question by stating that whether a man will be better off(overall), if he consistently, instead of seeking his own (personal) good, lets his actions be guided bylove of his neighbor, is a question that cannot be decided on conceptual grounds. Von Wright iscompelled to put the question aside because of his general view on philosophical ethics. Thephilosophers task is limited to conceptual investigation of moral notions and their criteria of

application alone. It is not the task of the philosopher,asa philosopher, to censure people or society.His task is to reflect on the conceptual standards used in moral censuring and social criticism,maintains von Wright (1989b, p. 51). Conceptual clarification may provide more adequate tools formoral and social criticism, as von Wright readily remarks. Yet it cannot provide a sufficient basis fora normative theory of ethics. Von Wrights own pursuit of normative theory based on value-rationality illustrates this problem well.92von Wright (1989c), p. 796.93von Wright (1996), p. 3.

Von Wright introduced another distinction between the overall and themerely personal good of man in The Philosophy of Georg Henrik von Wright(1989). The notion of merely personal good depends on intrinsic preferencesalone. The broader notion of the overall good of man must, instead, be explicatedin terms of preferences, someof which are reasoned preferences of a specifickind.91The reason for these specific kinds of preferences is, according to vonWright, that they enhance another persons happiness, that persons merelypersonal good. These conceptual clarifications do not, however, guarantee thatevery individual would include those particular ends of happiness, welfare,health, friendship, and loving care, that von Wright has characterized as naturalor necessary, into his or her good. This conclusion is also confirmed by von

Wright himself. In the last resort the subjects own judgement decides whethersomething is or was good for him and thus counts as a positive constituent ofhis good, he maintains.92

There seems to be an internal tension between the subjectivist and objectivistaccount of value in von Wrights ethics. The idea of survival, health, welfare,happiness, friendship, and loving care as necessary, or natural ends, orneeds, represents an objectivist account of valuable goods. On the other hand,there is the firm metaethical subjectivism according to which genuine valua-

tions express a subjects approval or disapproval of an evaluated object.93

Theseslightly controversial accounts might be reconciled, if we interpreted vonWrights position as a kind of Humean uniformal subjectivism. Moral judg-ments would then be founded on subjective valuations. On the other hand, wecould expect considerable consensus on the valuation of many goods, on thecondition that ones valuations are universalizable, impartial, disinterested, andsympathetic to other peoples good. Von Wright has confirmed that there might


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94See Hancock (1974), pp. 8 9. Hancocks example is the principle of universalizability in R.M.Hares and Henry Sidgwicks ethics. Hare regards this principle as metaethical: it is a logical featureof the language of morals. Sidgwick, in turn, posits the same principle as a self-evident, normativeaxiom of equity. Similar considerations also hold for another of Sidgwicks axioms. We might readthe axiom of benevolence, according to which one is morally obliged to treat anothers good as equalin importance on ones own, as a metaethical account of the meanings of the term morally obligedand good, or as a logical feature of the moral point of view. In this way, one can build a rich

normative theory in the guise of metaethical inquiry.95von Wright & Aarnio (1990), p. 329.96von Wright (1996), p. 6. See also von Wright (1990), p. 329; (1989c), p. 800: The ultimatefoundation of morality is love. This view of morality could be called agapistic.; von Wright(1985), p. 196: if it is rational to think that loving care should be generalizable, it is also the demandof practical reason that we should try to develop it in ourselves and in people we educate. Thisdemand is expressed in the highest command of Christianity to love ones neighbor as oneself. Thisis the right kind of self-love in a generalized form.

be a plausible connection between natural or necessary ends and these criteriaof moral evaluation, although its exact nature needs further consideration. Buthow can we justify those particular criteria of moral evaluation mentionedabove?

The moral point of view

G.H. von Wright belongs to that tradition of modern analytic ethics in whichnormative principles of evaluation have been derived from the logical investiga-tion of both the moral point of view and of basic moral terms, such as ought.94

Von Wright agrees with Kant, Richard Hare, and Kurt Baier on universalizabilityas the core of moral language. Westermarcks account of impartiality and dis-interestedness of moral judgments expresses the same idea of universalizability,and at the root of Kants and Westermarcks thinking lies the Christian commandof love.95All these formulations emphasize the symmetry and reciprocity ofmoral subjects. Moral will is beyond egoism and altruism a disinterested andimpartial will to justice. It treats your neighbor as though his welfare were yoursand your welfare his. To have this attitude is to love your neighbor as yourself

This still remains, in outline, my position, von Wright summed up in 1996.96

The Kantian notion of universalizability and the Christian command of loverefer to the tradition that has molded our understanding of what it means to thinkmorally. This is the sole starting point from which the search for the moral pointof view can proceed, since there is no transhistorical perspective on morality.

So one can say that to regard morals as something universally binding,impartial and disinterested, is inherent in the way the Western culture hasunderstood morality. But to make this, as I said, a defining criterion of morality


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97von Wright & Aarnio (1990), p. 329.98von Wright (1997).99Nagel (1988), p. 111.100Ibid., p. 104.

in accordance with reason is of course a stipulative definition, an attempt to moldthe concepts of reason and morality so as to match each other.97

There is an interesting connection between von Wrights account of theconventionality inherent in the moral point of view, and his recent idea of com-munities of shared values. His example of a community of shared values is thetraditional European morality whose basic norms and values were based onChristian ethics. The cultural authority of Christianity has, however, been de-clining over the past few centuries.98One reason for this decline has presumablybeen the very recomprehension of those norms and values that have defined ourcommunity of shared values. The notions of universalizability, impartiality,disinterestedness, and sympathetic consideration of other peoples good, were in

the previous European community of shared values considered as normativedemands of moral evaluation. Furthermore, their objective validity was to beestablished by rational investigation. The modern antirealist account of theconventional or stipulative nature of these criteria seems to reduce their credibil-ity, both philosophically and psychologically.

Thomas Nagel has criticized R.M. Hare for including substantial claims intohis utilitarian analysis of the language of morals. But by making his main moralclaims part of the definition of morality, Hare excludes the search for their basis

from moral theory, which is where it belongs.99

I suspect that there is a similarkind of problem in von Wrights attempt to yield normative criteria from theconceptual investigation of the moral point of view. Or is it plausible to rejectsuch an established theory with a long but spotty history as classical ethicalegoism, merely on the grounds that it does not survive the logical analysis of thelanguage of morals?

Nagel remarks that if Hare were right in his claim that utilitarianism isincluded in the meaning of moral terms, then the most prominent alternatives to

utilitarianism could not even be consistently stated in moral language.100Theevident erroneousness of this conclusion reveals that there is no single andprivileged language of morals but several languages of morals, which mightperhaps be characterized according to the Wittgensteinian notion of familyresemblance. They all agree on the prescriptive and evaluative nature of moraljudgments, but acting on a principle and the universalizability of ones principlestogether with disinterestedness, impartiality, and the symmetric valuation ofevery persons good are criteria that meet with difficulties. They are more severe

requirements that are not part of every view of morality, such as classical ethical


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101Ethical egoism may be universalizable, but it denies the symmetry of moral agents by claiming(paceFrankena 1967, p. 18) that the individuals one and only basic obligation is to promote forhimself the greatest possible balance of good over evil. Egoistic justification of morality has

traditionally been accused of being self-contradictory or nonmoral: morality cannot boil down tomere prudentiality. David Gauthier has attempted to overcome the latter criticism in hisMorals byAgreement(1986). He claims that morality can be generated from the principles of rational choicesince the acceptance of mutual constraints is the most advantageous alternative for individualmaximizers of utility even from the non-moral point of view. Moral principles, chosen in the non-moral initial bargaining position, guide and constrain mutually beneficent co-operation. On theother hand, Gauthier admits that there must be an internalized adherence to these principles in orderfor them to be truly moral. Therefore, a rational egoist also attaches an intrinsic value to his or herfellow participators and the moral constraints that make the co-operation possible. This conclusion is,according to Gauthier, consistent with motivational egoism. Levinas (1985), in turn, rejects both

universalizability of moral prescriptions and the symmetry of moral agents. There is no symmetry orreciprocity in the ethical relationship, because the Other is always prior to me, and my responsibilityto Him or Her is unlimited. Universalizable rules and commands refute my responsibility to thisparticular Other hereand now. When I act on a moral norm I annihilate the radical otherness of theOther and reduce Him or Her to one of them, into an object of knowledge and, hence, power.Levinass position captures the altruistic element in morality better than, for instance, the Christiancommand of love. Love thy neighbor as thyself does not respect the otherness of the Other becausethe standard of other-regarding love is set by my self-love.

egoism, or the postmodern ethics of Emmanuel Levinas.101 Von Wrightsstipulative account of the moral point of view provides a better rendering of thisvariety than Hares. Yet, several views operate on what it means to think andjudge morally in our postmodern and post-Christian culture. It seems to me,therefore, impossible to decide the argument between rival moral theories byappealing to oneanalysis of the features that characterize the moral point ofview.

5. SOME CONCLUDING REMARKS

Although I have read Erik Ahlman, Eino Kaila, and G.H. von Wright through thetypical i.e. the logical, semantic, epistemological, and justificatory ques-tions of analytic moral philosophy, I hope that I also have been able to reveal, orat least hint at, how one-sided these interpretations are, especially regardingAhlman and Kaila. Both philosophers display analytic features in their ethicalthought, but other kinds of influences are so evident and strong that it would bemisleading to classify them into some analytic tradition. Actually, there was nosuch distinct tradition or movement in Finnish moral philosophy before von

Wright, nor after his first contributions on ethics and general theory of value inthe 1950s. Instead, the efforts of analytic philosophers, including von Wrighthimself, were mainly directed at the problems of philosophical logic, philosophy


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102See von Wrights interview in niin & nin 2/1995: Im inclined... to favor subjectivism overobjectivism, and Im at least inclined to be suspicious and skeptical towards any kind of objectivismin ethics.

of language, and philosophy of science. Nevertheless, von Wrights TheVarieties of Goodnessgave the first impetus for the rise of the analytic traditionitself and this has characterized moral philosophy in Finland since the late 1970s.Therefore, regardless of their analytic or phenomenological bent, all the above-mentioned ethicists, agree more than they disagree.

A characteristic feature of Finnish moral philosophy in the first half of the20th century is a relatively limited and homogeneous background. The influenceof the classics, Plato, Aristotle, and Kant, has been immense, together with theGerman tradition: Nietzsche, neo-Kantianism, and phenomenological ethics ofvalue. The various intuitive insights of Max Scheler, whom analytic philosophershave often underrated, provided inspiration even to Kaila and von Wright. Kaila,

in particular, was also influenced by J.V. Snellman, the greatest Finnish Hegelianof the 19th century, and thephilosopher of the Finnish national awakening.The strong emphasis on cultural tradition, and its decisive role in molding theidentity and cultivation, orBildung, of the individual are part and parcel of thisSnellmanian legacy that lived on in the Finnish society until the recent decades.Von Wrights philosophical influences have, naturally, also included suchpioneers or early classics of analytic moral philosophy as Edward Westermarck,Axel Hgerstrm, G.E. Moore, A.J. Ayer, Charles Stevenson, G.E.M. Anscombe,

and R.M. Hare. The influence of Christian ethics is also worth mentioning. Astrong and authoritative Lutheran tradition postponed the process of seculari-zation in Finnish society and culture until the recent decades. This might be onereason why both Kaila and von Wright hold the Christian command of love asthe foundation or core idea of morality, although their motivations are, of course,purely philosophical. This strong tradition of ethical realism may also provide apartial explanation for the urge that Kaila and von Wright, despite their explicitnoncognitivism and antirealism, have felt towards some kind of objectivity in

ethics.There seems to be a tension between Kailas and von Wrights cultural and

analytic enterprises. In theirpopularessays both Kaila and von Wright stress thevalidity of the traditional values of European culture: truth, nobility, beauty,justice, freedom, equality, and love for ones neighbor. Von Wright has evendeclared that we need objective values in order to overcome the foundationalcrisis of our culture. But neither Kaila nor von Wright has provided any theoreti-caljustification for the truth or objective validity of these cultural values. On the

contrary, they have been either reserved, or even resistant to objectivism inethics.102It is, of course, perfectly consistent to be an adherent of ethical sub-


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103My thanks are due to Dr. Mark Shackleton for revising my English.

jectivism and yet to deplore the fact that this position does not favor commonvalues of culture. But such a remarkable tension should perhaps invigorate onesattempts to create a theoretical position that can do justice to both subjectivistand objectivist elements in morality. Von Wrights insightful analyses of value-rationality and the moral point of view have paved the way for this kind ofresearch in the Finnish analytic moral philosophy of today.103

Department of Moral and Social PhilosophyP.O. Box 9 (Siltavuorenpenger 20 A)00014 University of HelsinkiFINLAND

E-mail: [email protected]

REFERENCES

Ahlman, E. (1925). Teoria ja todellisuus[Theor

Analytic Moral Philosophy in Finland

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