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A L L Y N A N D B A C O N I N T E R A C T I V E

F O R

Information in Action

M. Jimmie KillingsworthJacqueline S. Palmer

D E M O N S T R AT I O N V E R S I O N

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Ethical, Political, and Cultural Issues in Technical Communication

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2

CHAPTER OUTLINE▼ ▼ ▼ ▼ ▼ ▼ ▼ ▼ ▼ ▼ ▼ ▼ ▼ ▼ ▼ ▼ ▼ ▼ ▼ ▼ ▼ ▼ ▼ ▼ ▼ ▼ ▼ ▼ ▼

CHAPTER OBJECTIVES▼ ▼ ▼ ▼ ▼ ▼ ▼ ▼ ▼ ▼ ▼ ▼ ▼ ▼ ▼ ▼ ▼ ▼ ▼ ▼ ▼ ▼ ▼ ▼ ▼ ▼ ▼ ▼ ▼

Collaborating with Others in the Context of Production

Issues of Access and Integrity in the Contextof Use

The Wider Context: Dealing with CulturalDifferences in International Communication

Expanding the Audience-Action Analysis and Profile

After you have worked through this chapter,you should be able to do the following:

■ Recognize the need to work with othersin producing effective technicalcommunications and develop ethical aswell as efficient procedures for managingcollaboration

■ Recognize the value of free access toreliable information, abiding by ethicallyrational procedures for using informationin decision-making processes

■ React sensitively to cultural differencesin communication practice, makingallowances whenever possible for socialand cultural demands in the use ofinformation

■ Add ethical, political, and cultural “filters”to your audience-action analysis

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hapter 1 showed how any act of communication is embedded in a seriesof social contexts. You begin your work in a context of production, col-

laborating with fellow workers in developing an information product to beused in an entirely different context. Using an audience-action analysis in thepre-writing phase of your work helps to align the demands of the context ofproduction with human needs in the context of use. Developing an awarenessof the user’s needs in a model of your rhetorical situation before you begin to writeis a first step toward strengthening the analytical and productive skills requiredin good technical communication.

This chapter provides an opportunity for an extended look at the social con-texts of technical communication. Relating to others in acts of communicationalways creates practical problems and also raises ethical issues that affect youboth as a colleague of other people in your work environment—the context ofproduction—and as a supplier of information to clients in the context of use.This chapter challenges you to become both a good team member and a reliablecitizen in the world of technical communication. To achieve these goals, we in-vite you to add ethical and cultural “filters” to your audience-action analysis,developing good pre-writing habits that hone your skills as an interpersonalcommunicator.

The ultimate goal of ethical analysis in technical communication is to de-velop good policies for the development and use of information. Because it leadstoward policymaking, ethical and cultural analysis overlaps with the politics ofinformation, which deals with the power that different individuals and groupsare able to exert on each other in rhetorical situations. We will see that ethicaland political issues change somewhat when considered from the different van-tage points of the context of production and the context of use.

Collaborating with Others in the Context of Production

Almost every survey of professional writing done in the last two decades sug-gests that technical writers typically produce documents collaboratively. A1982survey done by Lester Faigley and Thomas P. Miller, for example, showed that73.5 percent of all respondents “sometimes collaborate with at least one otherperson in writing.” Lisa Ede and Andrea Lunsford, in a survey of 1400 profes-sionals in industry, business, education, and government, found a similar fre-quency of collaboration.1

Technical communication researcher Deborah Bosley defines collaborativeauthorship as “two or more people working together to produce one written

24 PART ONE CONTEXTS FOR TECHNICAL COMMUNICATION


C

1. Lester Faigley and Thomas P. Miller, “What We Learn from Writing on the Job,” College English44 (1982): 557–69; Lisa Ede and Andrea Lunsford, Singular Texts/Plural Authors: Perspectives on Col-laborative Writing (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1990), especially Chapter 2.

document in a situation in which a group takes responsibility for having pro-duced the document.”2 Responsibility is the key word; everyone connected withthe project has a share in it. Collaborative authors must do the work of writingtogether and receive whatever credit or blame accrues to the project after it isproduced.

But the locus of responsibility is not the only thing affected by collabora-tion. The very process by which documents are produced can also change. In-dividual authors may still spend a great deal of time alone, bent intently overcomputer keyboards or yellow legal pads. Increasingly, however, collaboratingauthors are blending the activities of writing and speaking to share their rolesas researcher, author, editor, and document designer with others. Some collab-orators even sit at keyboards and compose together with the help of softwaredesigned for computer conferencing and collaborative writing. The question,then, is not if technical communicators collaborate to produce their documents,but rather how they do it.

Two Models of Collaborative Authorship

When most Americans—reinforced in their individualism by years of education—are asked to work in teams, their first impulse is to resist the idea. Their secondimpulse is to divide the big task into little tasks that can be handled individu-ally. Classical economics (as conceived by Adam Smith), workplace tradition,and the century-old practices of “scientific management” support this division oflabor model for group writing. Division of labor is the hallmark of “Fordism,”the use of assembly lines with minute tasks assigned to highly specialized work-ers. The model is known for its efficiency—its productivity and speed.

However, division of labor has begun to lose much of its appeal in indus-try as the workforce becomes more educated and demands more meaningfulwork. Today, a new model is moving to take center stage in industrial manage-ment practices—an integrated teams model. All team members work together atevery stage of a developing project and maintain a view of the whole project,from beginning to end, in all its complexity and all its component parts.

For collaborative writing projects, the division of labor and the integratedteams models offer distinct advantages and disadvantages. Tables 2.1 and 2.2summarize the pros and cons of each model.3

In most situations, the integrated teams approach works best, because it re-sults in a product with fewer “seams” and more consistent quality. But there aredegrees of integration. Rarely are writing teams fully integrated. Although

CHAPTER 2 ETHICAL, POLITICAL, AND CULTURAL ISSUES IN TECHNICAL COMMUNICATION 25


2. Quoted in Ede and Lunsford, Singular Texts/Plural Authors: Perspectives on Collaborative Writing15.

3. The tables are derived from M. Jimmie Killingsworth and Betsy Jones, “Division of Labor or In-tegrated Teams: A Crux in the Management of Technical Communication?” Technical Communica-tion 36 (1989): 210–221.

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TABLE 2.1Advantages and disadvantages of the division of labor model of collaborative authorship.

Advantages Disadvantages

1. Few meetings are required, allowing individu-als to proceed at their own pace and to work onother projects as time permits.

2. All individuals have clear tasks to accomplish,with little overlap or confusion among roles.

3. Theoretically, at least, the people best able tocarry out each task are assigned to that role (thebest researcher does the research; the bestwriter, the drafting; the best artist or softwarespecialist, the graphics; and so on).

4. Evaluation of individuals is easier, since it isobvious who has done what job in producingthe report (if the art is bad, the artist is toblame, for example).

5. Production is usually faster than in models thatrequire fuller integration of team members.

1. Strong project management is required to keepall individuals on task and to pull everythingtogether in the end. In student projects, a leadermust emerge. Others may come to resent theleader. And the leader may grow resentful athaving to take up the burden of keeping theproject on track.

2. Resentment may also arise if some members ofthe team think others have easier assignments,so they come to care less about the project anddo not give their best effort.

3. A weak link in the team can cause the entireproject to appear weak in the end. Even ifeverything is strong in the final product but thegraphics, the product as a whole suffers.

4. Because each member cannot see the project asa whole developing, the product may lack co-herence or evenness, so in the end the projectmanager must put in extra effort to “smoothout the seams.”

Source: Used with permission from Technical Communication, published by the Society for Technical Communication, Arlington,Virginia.

TABLE 2.2Advantages and disadvantages of the integrated teams model of collaborative authorship.

Advantages

1. Everyone in the project has a clear idea of howthe project as a whole is going, so the parts ofthe product generally fit together better. An in-tegrated team equals a better integrated product.

2. All individuals tend to feel “ownership” in theproject and thus feel better about making afuller commitment to it.

3. Team members can compensate for “weaklinks,” so final quality tends to improve.

4. In the process of sharing roles and specializedknowledge, team members can arrive at a bet-ter understanding of matters outside their ownareas of specialization.

Disadvantages

1. More time is required for meetings.2. Individuals must be willing to devote addi-

tional time to developing good personal rela-tions within the group.

3. Individuals may be unclear about their roles inthe project or may feel that they are being ma-nipulated by stronger team members.

4. Hard-working team members may resent slack-ers who don’t show up for meetings, and soforth.

5. The product must be evaluated as a whole be-cause it is a true team effort, so it is difficult toaward individual praise or blame.

Source: Used with permission from Technical Communication, published by the Society for Technical Communication, Arlington,Virginia.

some writers work best with their coauthors when they actually sit down to-gether and write sentence after sentence, many find such a prospect daunting.You may prefer to have an initial meeting, do some document planning andoutlining, then divvy up assignments, agreeing to get back together before youwrite very much or proceed very far on the project. Then, with bits of writingand research notes in hand, you can sit down with your team members and goover each idea in greater detail.

In other words, combine the two models: The integrated team model pro-vides the foundation for the process, but at various points the team divides thelabor at hand. Notice that this hybrid approach avoids the rigidity of the olddivision of labor model, with its assignment of hard and fast roles based on spe-cialized abilities, but it compensates somewhat for the slowness and ineffi-ciency of “writing by committee.”

Table 2.3, based on responses to the Ede and Lunsford survey, shows thatin practice, many collaborators combine the two models for planning, drafting,and revising a document. All six approaches listed in the table borrow elementsfrom both the division of labor and the teams model.

The Ethics of Collaboration in the Process of Developing Information Products

Like any other social activity, collaborative authorship involves ethical con-siderations. Ethics has to do with an individual’s sense of what is right andgood in any social situation. Even communicators who perform effectively andefficiently—who write well, speak clearly, and have a strong sense of the rhetor-ical needs in a given situation—still face some difficult challenges when ethi-cal problems arise. Questions of team members’ responsibilities, rights, and



TABLE 2.3Professional approaches to organizing writing teams.

1. The team plans and outlines together. Each member drafts a part. The team com-piles the parts and revises together.

2. The team plans and outlines. One member writes the entire draft. The team orgroup revises.

3. One member plans and writes a draft. The group or team revises.4. One person plans and writes the draft and submits it to a team of revisers who

work without consulting the original author.5. The team or group plans and writes the draft. A single team member revises it

without consulting the other team members.6. One member assigns writing tasks. Each member carries out individual tasks. One

member compiles the parts and revises the whole.

Source: From Ede and Lunsford, Singular Texts/Plural Authors, 63–64.

privileges can cause a project to grind to a halt if they are not answered to every-one’s satisfaction.

Within the context of production, the main concern is for individuals to rec-ognize and carry out their responsibilities to the organization for which theywork and to the colleagues who rely on them. Since collaboration is the normfor developing information products in technological societies, the ethics ofteamwork come into play with every project.

From the start of a project, team members should reach an agreement abouttheir processes of interaction. Who is responsible for doing what? This agree-ment should be part of either a code of conduct set forth in company policy orthe terms of a contract or management plan. Is there a clearly defined teamleader? What are the processes by which the team comes to a final decision? Itmay seem better to answer these questions as they arise in the course of work,but in fact, you can save a great deal of time and worry by laying out someground rules early on. Questions such as these should be foremost in your mindas you do the exercise in ethical analysis at the end of this chapter and the ex-ercise on writing a management plan at the end of Chapter 3.

Consider as binding all agreements you make at the beginning of a project.For example, if you have agreed to complete your part of a writing assignmentby Tuesday, and on Monday you suddenly feel the demands of a last-minuteassignment from another project, don’t forget that your team is counting onyou. If you need help, ask for it, but do not simply set aside your responsibili-



Team members may work on pieces of a project individually, then integrate the resultsof their work at regular team meetings.

ties and arrive at a team meeting empty-handed, with nothing to offer but ex-cuses. Make plans to complete work with time to spare so you can avoid thiskind of problem.

On the other hand, try to be flexible with your demands of others. Offerhelp when the need arises. Be firm with deadlines, but be understanding whensomeone makes a reasonable request for additional time. Never react tooquickly when someone reports a personal shortcoming. Listen to the reasons in-volved and try to sympathize, adjusting the schedule where possible.

If a team member becomes entirely unproductive or destructive to your ef-forts, however, at some point you will have to take corrective action. After try-ing to solve the problem by adjusting the schedule or conceding to some of theperson’s demands, consult with other team members about how they have re-acted to the troublesome partner. If you are in agreement with them over thenature of the problem—late work, for example, or work that does not meet thequality standards of the group—approach the person with suggestions for morereliable performance. If the problem continues, seek arbitration. In student pro-jects, go to the course instructor and request a team conference. In the work-place, talk to your supervisor about the need for additional authority to dealwith the problem. If you are the team leader, you have an added responsibilityto ensure the effective functioning of the group.

Problems may arise from factors other than weak performance on the partof a single member. Personal differences between two team members or officepolitics may cause conflicts. For example, the members may be competing for anew position that is about to come open in the department, so they feel that theymight get ahead in the race by making the competition look bad, degradingtheir opponent’s contributions to the team project and taking every opportunityto criticize the other person harshly. Obviously, such behavior has no place inthe rational performance of a job. But people are not always rational. They maynot even be aware of their own motives for behaving as they do toward others.Their fellow team members would do well to recognize conflicts early on, urgecooperative action, and if necessary seek arbitration quickly without waitingfor the conflict to totally destroy the team’s ability to function.

Conflicts may also go deeper than simple differences between conflictingpersonalities. They may arise from an inability to deal with workplace diversity.As education extends its reach to new social classes and groups—as morewomen, minorities, and recent immigrants enter the world of high technology,for example—and as technical communication seeks to reach a global market,you are much more likely to have team members with backgrounds, habits, andvalues quite different from your own. Team efficiency demands that you listencarefully and react sensitively to contributions that may seem odd at first, per-haps because they are delivered in language that is unfamiliar to you or withemotions that seem unreasonable to you.

For example, you may be surprised to hear a team member describe a pro-ject for building a waste incinerator on a rural site as “unconscionable.” Such



language may appear to be out of place on a team whose main considerationsare economic and technical. But what if you learn that the speaker grew up nearthe proposed site, had a family that had lived there for generations and formeda deep attachment to the site in question? When such emotions are involved, itis very difficult to look at decisions with the coldly rational eye of economic andtechnical considerations. And what if the situation is intensified further by theethnic background of your colleague? Let’s say he is a Native American whosetribal traditions teach that the site in question has sacred value. He may bestruggling with problems of identity, trying to reconcile his loyalty to his homecommunity with his determination to be an effective scientist or technologist. Ifyou and his other colleagues treat the matter of site location insensitively, youmay become a focal point for his conflicted feelings, the very symbol of thethings he has been taught all his life to avoid. One day you may find that he re-jects everything you suggest for no clear reason. The project grinds to a halt.

To take another example, imagine that one day during a coffee break, amale member of a five-person team with only one female member tells a jokeabout the length of women’s skirts. When work resumes, he notices that thewoman team member has fewer contributions to make. “Is there a problem?”he asks. “No problem,” she says. But in fact she is feeling that her “otherness”in the group, obvious to everyone from the start, is now painfully apparent. Hergender has been brought to the forefront. She might have said, “I don’t appre-ciate sexist jokes,” but that would have brought even more attention to her. Ina field like engineering, where women make up a small minority of the workforce, her situation would be all the worse. She’s supposed to be “one of theboys.” Now she feels alienated. Her effectiveness is diminished and her self-confidence shaken, all because of a “harmless” little joke. It wasn’t even dirty!Yet in some contexts, it could be considered a serious ethical violation, an in-stance of sexual harassment. Policies on harassment often prohibit actions thatcause people to feel singled out because of their gender. Even if such actiondoesn’t violate policy, however, it does hurt. And it violates most codes ofethics, even one as seemingly cold and rational as utilitarianism, which urgesthat we judge the consequences of our actions by how well they further the in-terests of all involved, always aiming toward the greatest good for the greatestnumber. It is never in the best psychological interest of a person to be treated asa social outcast or to be made to feel uneasy.

Ethics demands that we treat fellow workers with respect, even if we havetrouble sympathizing with their perspectives. On communication teams, re-spect translates into clear behaviors. During the process of developing infor-mation products:

■ Listen carefully to what others say, and try to put yourself in their place.■ If you can’t sympathize with other team members, ask them to help explain

their views on the conflicts you are experiencing.■ If the conflict still remains, seek outside arbitration, and abide faithfully by

the results and agreements that come from this arbitration.



Rather than trying always to win, to get what you initially think is best, tryachieving consensus among your partners, finding ways to meet as manypeople’s goals as possible. You do not always have to agree with other people,but you should always treat their position with respect, consider it fairly, andreject it only after careful consideration and negotiation.

Even when the development of your information product is complete, youstill have some ethical obligations to consider. You need to make sure that theright people get credit for their contributions to the team. When you write thepreface or acknowledgments in a technical document, for example, or whenyou report to supervisors on your activities, always credit the people whohelped put the document together—and not only your team members, but alsothose who served as sources of information, and support people such as edi-tors, librarians, artists, and printers. Showing respect in these ways is not onlythe right thing to do; it is also quite practical. It paves the way for effectivecooperation on the next project.

Issues of Access and Integrity in the Context of Use

As you begin to think beyond the context of production, about what users willdo with your information products, new ethical and political concerns come tolight. Again we are dealing with people’s obligations and rights, but the focusshifts somewhat. In the context of use, we focus on issues of access and in-tegrity, our client’s right to know and to act on information, and our own oblig-ation to provide reliable information in an appropriate form.

In a modern democracy, reliable information and the freedom to act on thatinformation are directly connected to political power. Whoever has access tothe best information has the power to act effectively or to control action. Tech-nical communication—the purpose of which is to provide access to up-to-dateinformation for action and decision making—therefore carries a large ethicaland political burden. The stakes are high for all participants. If the aim ofdemocracy is to distribute opportunities for exercising power widely amongthe people, then it stands to reason that open access to information is the bestpolicy.

But life in a democracy is not so simple. Since citizens have the right to pur-sue their own interests, they may need to limit access to information at times toadvance these interests. If, for example, I have a design for a new microchip thatwill make millions of dollars for my company, don’t I have a right to keep theinformation about the design secret until the product is released? Most peoplewould say yes; the market system would fail if producers were not granted thiskind of competitive edge.

Under certain conditions, however, there may be limits on my freedomto guard product information, designs, or research. In times of war or other



emergencies, for instance, the government may decide that all informationabout high technology is pertinent to national security, so I would have to grantaccess, at least to qualified government agents.

Utilitarian Ethics

In their attempts to resolve conflicts between public and private interests, tech-nical decision makers generally rely on utilitarian ethics. The British philoso-pher Peter Singer defines utilitarianism as the philosophy that requires a personto “choose the course of action that has the best consequences, on balance, forall affected.”4

Utilitarianism is certainly not the only ethical perspective operating inmodern democracies. Alternatives include consensual ethics, which defines thegood as the solution that everyone in a group can agree on at a given momentin time, and the ethics of inherent value, which argues that goodness is univer-sal and that only one choice can ever be viewed as right, once the blinders ofindividual interest and political bias are removed.

But utilitarianism dominates the technical scene, partly because technicalinformation lends itself to making choices about costs and benefits. The bestchoice, according to utilitarianism, is an action that furthers not only the actor’sown interests, but everyone else’s as well—the classic “win–win” situation. Un-fortunately, win–win situations are rare in the competitive marketplace. In-stead, most ethical players seek to minimize suffering or avoid erecting barriersfor others as they act to achieve their own desires.

Ethical Rationality

Even with these seemingly simple goals in mind, making ethical decisions isnot easy. There are no simple formulas for calculating ways to minimize thehurt or maximize benefits for people who are interested in our information andour actions. Instead, we must reason through our decisions about proper actionand very often debate the advantages and disadvantages of different courses ofaction. In these activities, we call on rationality.

Rationality is more than simple logic. As every reader of science fictionknows, “logical” behavior does not necessarily lead to ethical actions. It mayseem entirely logical, for example, to slaughter a third of the world’s popula-tion to relieve the pressure on strained resources. But even if we set aside thepremise that all human life is inherently valuable, the policy is not ethical. It isobviously not in the best interests of the one third that gets slaughtered, noreven in the best interests of the slaughterers, who would probably suffer guilt



4. Peter Singer, Practical Ethics, 2nd edition. (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press,1993) 13.

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or some other form of psychological pain from the action. By almost any codeof behavior, wanton mass murder is wrong.

To be rational, a decision must consider certain underlying principles forhuman action—that life is inherently valuable, for example, or that all citizenshave a right to pursue happiness. Rationality also requires a method for arriv-ing at decisions about the fitness of principles and policies so that people canadjust their form of personal and political governance to accommodate histor-ical change. The Constitution of the United States is a rational ethical system,as are the by laws of an organization or the policies and procedures of a com-pany. These systems not only tell us how to act but also provide means forchanging the standards of action.

Figure 2.1 shows a model for making rational, ethical decisions about tech-nical communication issues. Each element in the model represents a phase inthe process and a problem to be solved:5

■ Data: In technical decision making, the first question is always the same:Where can we get the most reliable data? In every instance, we rely on rele-vant facts that we or others have gathered through experimentation or by ob-serving related actions in the past.

■ Information: Next comes the analytical problem. How do we select amongthe facts and arrange them into relevant categories?

■ Knowledge: This presents a synthesizing problem. What are the possible so-lutions (options for action) based on the available information? We can stateeach option for action as a position or a claim, a reasoned argument that,given certain information, we should act in a certain way.

■ Backing and Warrants: This is really a constellation of problems and ques-tions. Responses to these questions constitute a rational, ethical filter for se-lecting final options from among the many possibilities generated in theknowledge-making part of the process. To what authorities does the deci-sion have to answer? What is the backing—principles, laws, precedents, andpolicies—of those authorities? What warrants—values, rules, and assump-tions—have they used to make past decisions? Which of those decisions arerelevant to this one?

■ Decision: This is a judgment problem. Ultimately, we must decide which po-sition is best, technically and ethically, drawing on all of the solutions wehave recognized up to this point.



5. This decision-making model is based on philosopher Stephen Toulmin’s description of rational-ity and on the concept of information development summarized nicely in Knowledge-Based Systems:A Manager’s Perspective by G. Steven Tuthill and Susan T. Levy (Blue Ridge Summit, PA: Tab Books,1989), 32. For a clear account of Toulminian rationality, see Stephen Toulmin, Richard Rieke, andAllan Janik, An Introduction to Reasoning, 2nd edition (New York: Macmillan, 1984). We developedthe use of the model to describe decision-making processes in technical communication in collabo-ration with Professor Patricia Carlson of Rose Hulman Institute of Technology and Dr. Susan Dres-sel, formerly of Los Alamos National Laboratory.

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http://www.abacon.com/ie/killingsworth/wlp033c.htm

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The most rational and ethical way to use the model is to solve each prob-lem in order: Keep your mind open until all the information is in; analyze andweigh the information; consider many possible options for action as they relateto the precedents, policies, rules, and principles of relevant authorities; and fi-nally decide on a formal position from which to act.

In real life, however, decision makers often skip the first set of problems,make hasty decisions based on scant information, and then scramble to sub-stantiate them by digging up appropriate warrants and supporting informa-tion. In his book Who Will Tell the People?, political journalist William Greidersuggests that this kind of rationality is not really legitimate; it is pseudo-rationality. He argues that it is unethical to make judgments before gatheringdata and information. If you get the steps out of order, he says, you are morelikely to overlook, ignore, or distort evidence that goes against your position.In Washington, D.C., information service organizations working for lobbyists,and even senators and representatives, often hunt up facts that support their



WarrantsValues, rules, assumptions

Decision

Basis foraction

Knowledge

Possiblepositionsfor action,based onavailableinformation

Information

Data arrangedin categories

Data

Facts gatheredthrough past orpresentexperimentationor observation

BackingPrinciples, laws, precedents, policies

FIGURE 2.1

An ethical decision-making model.

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clients’ positions, ignoring or subverting any information they find that under-mines their position.

This sort of rationalization is very different from true rationality. Rational-ization mimics rationality but only makes excuses for action; true rationalitygives good reasons for action.

Ethical technical communication depends on our preserving—and observ-ing—this difference. In creating information products, we ought to work fromthe most complete data set available, developing information carefully andfully in the research phase. When we present information in documents such asrecommendation reports and proposals, we should develop positions andclaims with the idea that many options for action have good claims on the at-tention of our information users. Although we may begin with a favorite posi-tion, we should strive for objectivity. Even objective writers cannot entirelyeliminate bias when human judgment is involved, but we can present our au-dience with clear reasoning about the many choices involved. The decisions werecommend should therefore consider as many options as possible and make astrong case that the final recommendation has the greatest benefits for the mostpeople and creates the fewest disadvantages.

Values in Technical Communication

Every different context of production and context of use has a set of values thatprovides the backing and warrants for making good decisions. In addition,some ethicists argue that technical communication has its own set of values thatdistinguish professional communicators from people who fill other roles—frommanagers, for example, or politicians. One possible set of values for technicalcommunicators appears in Table 2.4. As you review the cases in the followingsections, and as you work through the exercises at the end of the chapter, askyourself how well this set of values conforms to your own and how well it cov-ers the behavior you would expect from a technical communicator. Where doour values of openness and integrity fit into this scheme, for example?

Two Famous Cases

It is a sad truth that, despite the ethical integrity of individual authors and so-cial groups—and despite a strong effort to bring the best technical informationinto consideration when important decisions are being made—the world oftechnological action continues to be troubled by miscommunication, misun-derstanding, and bad decisions. Far too often, negligence and carelessness leadto actions with dire consequences.

No doubt, technology is a risky business. Accidents cannot be helped; theyare beyond everyone’s control, and everyone is a victim in an accident. Butwhen something goes wrong because of poor judgment, bad information, a



poor decision, or faulty communication, we enter the realm of cause and blame,liability and responsibility—the realm of ethics.

Two prominent events in recent history—the partial core meltdown at theThree Mile Island nuclear facility in 1979, and the 1986 explosion of the spaceshuttle Challenger—have been described as “accidents” by well-meaning ana-lysts and news reporters. But recent analyses suggest that, instead of accidents,these cases were disasters in the field of communication ethics. The NuclearRegulatory Commission’s report blamed a “breakdown of communications”and “crucial misunderstanding” for the event at Three Mile Island, and thePresidential Commission’s report on the space shuttle disaster pointed to “a se-rious flaw in the decision-making process.”6



TABLE 2.4Values for technical communicators.

Value Behavior

HonestyLegalityPrivacyQualityTeamworkAvoiding Conflict of InterestCultural Sensitivity

Social ResponsibilityProfessional GrowthAdvancing the Profession

Tell the truth.Obey the law (in matters of copyright, for example).Reveal confidential information only with permission.Create products that best serve the user.Work together to achieve win–win goals with fellow workers.Remain loyal and observe fair play.Recognize the values of diversity not only in markets but also

in the workplace by showing respect for fellow workers andproducts users.

Preserve and protect the public good.Develop and maintain a high level of personal skill.Do whatever possible to represent the whole profession and contribute

to its growth and improvement.

Source: Based on Lori Allen and Dan Voss, Ethics in Technical Communication: Shades of Gray, New York: Wiley, 1997, 38.

6. See especially Carl G. Herndl, Barbara A. Fennell, and Carolyn R. Miller, “Understanding Fail-ures in Organizational Discourse: The Accident at Three Mile Island and the Shuttle Challenger Dis-aster,” Textual Dynamics of the Professions: Historical and Contemporary Studies of Writing in ProfessionalCommunities, ed. Charles Bazerman and James Paradis (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press,1991), 279–306. The quotations that appear in this chapter and the sample texts are taken from thisarticle. Herndl, Fennell, and Miller in turn build upon the work of J. C. Mathes, especially his ana-lytical report Three Mile Island: The Management Communication Failure (Ann Arbor: College of En-gineering, University of Michigan, 1986). A summary of Mathes’s findings appears in TechnicalCommunication and Ethics, ed. R. John Brockmann and Fern Rook (Washington, DC: Society for Tech-nical Communication, 1989). Whereas Mathes blames the effects of the disaster on miscommunica-tion in an analysis that emphasizes forms and media of expression, Herndl, Fennell, and Milleremphasize social context and argumentative structure in their analysis. We borrow from both of

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THREE MILE ISLAND

In testimony to the Presidential Commission, it became clear that well beforethe incident at Three Mile Island, the engineering department at Babcock &Wilcox (the builder of the reactor) had recommended changes in the instruc-tions on how to operate the reactor. The problem centered on the high-pressureinjection (HPI) system, which injects water into the core when pressure fallsbelow an acceptable limit. If operators disable the automatic HPI too quickly orbypass it, the core is “uncovered” and liable to meltdown. Several months be-fore the Three Mile Island accident, an accident had occurred at another plant,in Toledo. Operators at that plant, following their training, disabled the HPIsystem before the system leak had been isolated. They avoided disaster only be-cause the Toledo facility was running at 10 percent power. Realizing the impli-cations of this event, J. J. Kelly of the engineering division of Babcock & Wilcoxwrote a memo calling for a change in customer training so that operators wouldlearn not to shut down the HPI too early. The memo appears in Sample 2.1.

The tentativeness of the original memo suggests that Mr. Kelly knew hewas on shaky political ground. Notice especially the sentence “Since there areaccidents which require the continuous operation of the high pressure injectionsystem, I wonder what guidance, if any, we should be giving to our customerson when they can safely shut the system down following an accident?” But thenhe goes on to make very definite recommendations in strong imperative sen-tences (a and b).

His original concerns about company politics were apparently wellfounded. Amanager in the Nuclear Services division, who was in charge of cus-tomer training, cast doubt on the procedural recommendations made by Mr.Kelly and even belittled his technical advice. As a result, the recommendationswere ignored.

When it became clear that no action was being taken on the problem, an-other (apparently higher-ranking) engineer, Mr. Bert Dunn, wrote a memo. Hismemo, which appears in Sample 2.2, states the problem and the recommenda-tions in no uncertain terms. He sent yet another memo later. But the people inNuclear Services appeared to have held their ground in spite of these repeatedwarnings, and no changes in operating procedures were passed on to the plantoperators. Unable to reconcile the advice coming from the engineers with thatcoming from his own division, a manager in the Nuclear Services branch rec-ommended that the matter be studied further before the changes in trainingwere made.

case 2.1



these approaches in the brief analysis given here. We have also been influenced here and through-out this chapter by Jack Griffin’s essay, “When Do Rhetorical Choices Become Ethical Choices?”which is reprinted in the Brockmann and Rook collection, Technical Communication and Ethics. Forother good discussions on the Challenger disaster, see the recommended reading list at the end ofthe chapter.

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The company eventually adopted the changes, but not until after the inci-dent at Three Mile Island on March 28, 1979. It fulfilled the worst fears of engi-neers Kelly and Dunn. Apartial meltdown occurred when the operators did notuse the HPI system correctly. Before the Presidential Commission, Mr. Dunntestified, “Had my instructions been followed at [Three Mile Island], we wouldnot have had core damage; we would have had a minor incident.”



SAMPLE 2.1 Kelly’s original memo

The Babcock & Wilcox CompanyPower Generation Group

To: DistributionFrom: J. J. Kelly, Plant IntegrationCust. GenericSubj: Customer Guidance on High Pressure Injection OperationDate: November 1, 1977

DISTRIBUTIONB. A. Karrasch D. W. LaBelleE. W. Swanson N. S. ElliottR. J. Finnin D. F. HallmanB. M. Dunn

Two recent events at the Toledo site have pointed out that perhaps we are notgiving our customers enough guidance on the operation of the high pressureinjection system. On September 24, 1977, after depressurizing due to a stuck openelectromagnetic relief valve, high pressure injection was automatically initiated.Theoperator stopped HPI when pressurizer level began to recover, without regard toprimary pressure. As a result, the transient continued on with boiling in the RCS,etc. In a similar occurrence on October 23, 1977, the operator bypassed highpressure injection to prevent initiation, even though reactor coolant systempressure went below the actuation point.

Since there are accidents which require the continuous operation of the highpressure injection system, I wonder what guidance, if any, we should be giving toour customers on when they can safely shut the system down following anaccident? I recommend the following guidelines be sent:

a) Do not bypass or otherwise prevent the actuation of high/low pressure injectionunder any conditions except a normal, controlled plant shutdown.

b) Once high/low pressure injection is initiated, do not stop it unless: Tave is stableor decreasing and pressurizer level is increasing and primary pressure is atleast 1600 PSIG and increasing.

I would appreciate your thoughts on this subject.



The Babcock & Wilcox CompanyPower Generation Group

To: Jim Taylor, Manager, LicensingFrom: Bert M. Dunn, Manager, ECGS Analysis (2138)Cust.:Subj: Operator Interruption of High Pressure InjectionDate: February 9, 1978

This memo addresses a serious concern within ECCS Analysis about the potentialfor operator action to terminate high pressure injections following the initial stage of a LOCA. Successful ECCS operation during small breaks depends on theaccumulated reactor coolant system inventory as well as the ECCS injection rate.As such, it is mandatory that full injection flow be maintained from the point ofemergency safety features actuation system (ESFAS) actuation until the highpressure injection rate can fully compensate for the reactor heat load. As theinjection rate depends on the reactor coolant system pressure, the time at whicha compensating match-up occurs is variable and cannot be specified as a fixednumber. It is quite possible, for example, that the high pressure injections maysuccessfully match up with all heat sources at time t and that due to systempressurization be inadequate at some later time t 2.

The direct concern here rose out of the recent incident at Toledo. During theaccident the operator terminated high pressure injection due to an apparentsystem recovery indicated by high level within the pressurizer.This action wouldhave been acceptable only after the primary system had been in a subcooledstate. Analysis of the data from the transient currently indicates that the systemwas in a two-phase state and as such did not contain sufficient capacity to allowhigh pressure injection termination.This became evident at some 20 to 30 minutesfollowing termination of the injection when the pressurizer level again collapsedand injection had to be reinitiated. During the 20 to 30 minutes of noninjection flowthey were continuously losing important fluid inventory even though the pressurizerwas at an extremely low power and extremely low burnup. Had this event occurredin a reactor at full power with other than insignificant burnup it is quite possible,perhaps probable, that core uncovery and possible fuel damage would haveresulted.

The incident points out that we have not supplied sufficient information to reactoroperators in the area of recovery from LOCA.The following rule is based on anattempt to allow termination of high pressure injection only at a time when thereactor coolant system is in a subcooled state and the pressurizer is indicatingat least a normal level for small breaks. Such conditions guarantee full systemcapacity and thus assure that during any follow on transient would be no worse

SAMPLE 2.2 Dunn’s first memocontinued

THE SPACE SHUTTLE CHALLENGER

The similarities between the Three Mile Island case and the Challenger case areremarkable. In both disasters, differences in judgment and a political contest be-tween internal groups—not any absence of rationality or information—causeda failure to make the right decision. In the Three Mile Island case, the NuclearServices division at Babcock & Wilcox failed to make changes in its training reg-imen despite recommendations from colleagues in another department. In theChallenger case, a similar lack of coordination between technical staff and man-agement had even more disastrous results.

The fatal problem with the Challenger was caused by a failure of O-ringsused as seals in the spacecraft. NASA knew about the faulty parts well beforethe explosion on January 28, 1986, as the memo in Sample 2.3 (written by a ju-nior NASA analyst) indicates, but NASA’s technical experts, such as the seniorengineer who authored the memo in Sample 2.4, were not sure of the extent ofthe problem. They therefore relied on the recommendation of the manufacturerof the rocket motors, Morton Thiokol, Inc., of Utah.

On the day before the ill-fated launch, the disagreement between engineersand managers in the parent company became clear in a teleconference involv-ing officials at NASA and Morton Thiokol. Throughout the conference, theThiokol engineers argued that the cold weather forecast for the launch couldmake the problem with the O-rings even worse than it already was. But man-agement, citing launches in similar conditions in the past, apparently believedthat the engineers were being overly cautious.

Their differences arose from their different kinds of experiences, whichtranslated into different kinds of warrants. The engineers argued their position

case 2.2



SAMPLE 2.2 continued

than the initial accident. I, therefore, recommend that operating procedures bewritten to allow for termination of high pressure injection under the following twoconditions only:

1. Low pressure injection has been actuated and is flowing at a rate in excess ofthe high pressure injection capability and that situation has been stable for aperiod of time (10 minutes).

2. System pressure has recovered to normal operating pressure (2200 or 2250psig) and system temperature within the hot leg is less than or equal to thenormal operating condition (605°F or 630°F).

I believe this is a very serious matter and deserves our prompt attention andcorrection.

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NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration

7/23/85

TO: BRC/M. MannFROM: BRC/R. CookSUBJECT: Problem with SRB Seals

Earlier this week you asked me to investigate reported problems with thecharring of seals between SRB motor segments during flight operations.Discussions with program engineers show this to be a potentially majorproblem affecting both flight safety and program costs.

Presently three seals between SRB segments use double O-rings sealed withputty. In recent Shuttle flights, charring of these rings has occurred. TheO-rings are designed so that if one fails, the other will hold against thepressure of firing. However, at least in the joint between the nozzle andthe aft segment, not only has the first O-ring been destroyed, but thesecond has been partially eaten away.

Engineers have not yet determined the cause of the problem. Candidatesinclude the use of a new type of putty (the putty formerly in use was removedfrom the market by EPA because it contained asbestos), failure of the secondring to slip into the groove which must engage it for it to work properly, ornew, and as yet unidentified, assembly procedures at Thiokol. MSC is trying toidentify the cause of the problem, including on-site investigation at Thiokol,and OSF hopes to have some results from their analysis within 30 days. Thereis little question, however, that flight safety has been and is still beingcompromised by potential failure of the seals, and it is acknowledged thatfailure during launch would certainly be catastrophic. There is also indicationthat staff personnel knew of this problem some time in advance of management’sbecoming apprised of what was going on.

The potential impact of the problem depends on the as yet undiscoveredcause. If the cause is minor, there would be little or no impact on budgetor flight rate. A worst case scenario, however, would lead to the suspensionof Shuttle flights, redesign of the SRB, and scrapping of existingstockpiled hardware. The impact on the FY 1987–8 budget could be immense.

It should be pointed out that Code M management is viewing the situation withthe utmost seriousness. From a budgetary standpoint, I would think that any NASAbudget submitted this year for FY 1987 and beyond should certainly be based on areliable judgment as to the cause of the SRB seal problem and a correspondingdecision as to budgetary action needed to provide for its solution.

Richard C. CookProgram Analyst

Michael B. MannChief, STS Resources Analysis Branch

Gary B. AllisonDirector, Resources Analysis Division

Tom NewmanComptroller

SAMPLE 2.3 Memo on the O-ring problem by a junior analyst at NASA

41



NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Jul 17 1985MPS.

TO: M/Associate Administrator for Space Flight

FROM: MPS/Irv Davids

SUBJECT: Case to Case and Nozzle to Case “O” Ring Seal Erosion

As a result of the problems being incurred during flight on both case to case and nozzle to case “O” ringerosion, Mr. Hanby and I visited MSFC on July 11, 1985, to discuss this issue with both project and S&Epersonnel. Following are some important factors concerning these problems:

A. Nozzle to Case “O” Ring Erosion

There have been twelve (12) instances during flight where there has been some primary “O” ringerosion. In one specific case there was also erosion of the secondary “O” ring seal.There were two (2)primary “O” ring seals that were heat affected (no erosion) and two (2) cases in which soot blew by theprimary seals.

The prime suspect as the cause for the erosion on the primary “O” ring seals is the type of putty used. Itis Thiokol’s position that during assembly, leak check, or ignition, a hole can be formed through the puttywhich initiates “O” ring erosion due to a jetting effect. It is important to note that after STS-10, themanufacturer of the putty went out of business and a new putty manufacturer was contracted.The newputty is believed to be more susceptible to environmental effects such as moisture, which makes theputty more tacky.

There are various options being considered such as removal of putty, varying the putty configuration toprevent the jetting effect, use of a putty made by a Canadian manufacturer which includes asbestos, andvarious combinations of putty and grease.Thermal analysis and/or tests are underway to assess theseoptions.

Thiokol is seriously considering the deletion of putty on the QM-S nozzle/case joint since they believe theputty is the prime cause of the erosion. A decision on this change is planned to be made this week. Ihave reservations about doing it, considering the significance of the QM-S firing in qualifying the FWC forflight.

It is important to note that the cause and effect of the putty varies.There are some MSFC personnel whoare convinced that the holes in the putty are the source of the problem but feel that it may be a reverseeffect in that the hot gases may be leaking through the seal and causing the hole track in the putty.

Considering the fact that there doesn’t appear to be a validated resolution as to the effect of the putty, Iwould certainly question the wisdom of removing it on QM-S.

B. Case to Case “O” Ring Erosion

There have been five (5) occurrences during flight where there was primary field joint “O” ring erosion.There was one case where the secondary “O” ring was heat affected with no erosion.The erosion withthe field joint primary “O” rings is considered by some to be more critical than the nozzle joint due to thefact that during the pressure build up on the primary “O” ring the unpressurized field joint secondary sealunseats due to joint rotation.

SAMPLE 2.4 Memo on the O-ring problem by a senior engineer at NASA

based on their experience with handling the damaged parts; the managers ar-gued their position based on their experience with flight decisions and programneeds. Ultimately, the decision fell to the “decision makers,” the managers, whomade the wrong recommendation.

The Moral of the Two Cases

We have given only the briefest outline of what happened in each case, but eventhis sketch is enough to illustrate the complexity of decisions and communica-tion in a modern technological and administrative culture. As events unfold, itis not always easy to assume responsibility, even when you know you should.You can tiptoe into a tense political situation (like Mr. Kelly in Sample 2.1) orspeak boldly and plainly (like the authors in Samples 2.2 and 2.3) and still findyourself unable to gain the political edge needed to do the right thing.

Once a disaster occurs, it’s notoriously difficult to lay blame on any indi-vidual for any particular action because so many people must cooperate tomake anything happen, and actions are so complex. Again, everyone has an ex-planation, complete with information and warrants. Ultimately, everythingcomes down to judgment. And we must recognize that, whereas cases of badjudgment make the news, cases involving good judgment occur every day.




The problem with the unseating of the secondary “O” ring during the joint rotation has been known forquite some time. In order to eliminate this problem on the FWC field joints a capture feature wasdesigned which prevents the secondary seal from lifting off. During our discussions on this issue withMSFC, an action was assigned for them to identify the timing associated with the unseating of thesecondary “O” ring and the seating of the primary “O” ring during rotation. How long it takes thesecondary “O” ring to lift off during rotation and when in the pressure cycle it lifts are key factors in thedetermination of its criticality.

The present consensus is that if the primary “O” ring seats during ignition, and subsequently fails, theunseated “O” ring will not serve its intended purpose as a redundant seal. However, redundancy doesnot exist during the ignition cycle, which is the most critical time.

It is recommended that we arrange for MSFC to provide an overall briefing to you on the SRM “O” rings,including failure history, current status, and options for correcting the problems.

Irving Davids

cc:M/Mr. WeeksM/Mr. HambyML/Mr. HarringtonMP/Mr. Winterhalter

Even in these cases, we can find much to admire in the actions of peoplelike Kelly and Dunn of Babcock & Wilcox, Cook of NASA, and Roger Boisjoly,the leading expert on seals at Morton Thiokol. Cook and Boisjoly argued vig-orously against the recommendation that the launch of the Challenger proceed,only to be overruled in the end by Thiokol management.

Though it is tempting to grow cynical when we learn that heroic efforts ofthis sort fail to influence the process of decision making, we should instead seethese men’s efforts to communicate their knowledge as strongly and as effec-tively as possible as a model for communication that is ethically motivated aswell as technically sound.

The Wider Context: Dealing with Cultural Differences in International Communication

You might think that rhetorical situations like those faced by the engineers in-volved in the Three Mile Island and the Challenger episodes could hardly havebeen more difficult and complex. But what if the projects had been located inother countries? What if the workers spoke a different language? What if Mor-ton Thiokol had been a German or Japanese contractor with NASA?

Such variations are possible, and even likely, in the world of high technol-ogy with its global reach. With every expansion of technology into the interna-tional marketplace, the need for cultural sensitivity becomes a greater concernfor technical communicators.

In recent years, researchers have added greatly to our understanding of in-ternational communication, but the topic still remains controversial. In fact, thevery possibility of international communication has been disputed. Even if youknow the language of another country and have a sense of its history, you maycompletely miss the subtleties of culture. The cultural differences between theEastern and Western, or the Northern and Southern, hemispheres present tech-nical communicators with their greatest challenge. Edward T. Hall, one of theworld’s most distinguished cultural anthropologists, goes so far as to say, “Anywesterner who was raised outside the Far East and claims he really under-stands and can communicate with either the Chinese or the Japanese is delud-ing himself.”7

With over 5000 languages actively used in the world, several hundred ofwhich may be used in science and technology, you can’t expect American Eng-lish to do all your work for you. Nor can you expect much help from generalguidebooks such as Roger E. Axtell’s well-known Do’s and Taboos around theWorld, and the companion volumes The Do’s and Taboos of Body Language around



7. Edward T. Hall, Beyond Culture (New York: Anchor, 1976), 2.

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the World and Do’s and Taboos of Using English around the World. From books likethese we learn, for example, that

■ the meaning of simple signals varies widely among cultures: hand gesturesthat seem innocent or positive, even something as innocuous as an open-palmed wave of the hand, may be interpreted as obscene in certain cultures;

■ colors which indicate one thing in one culture may mean something else inanother: red may mean caution or danger in the West, but not in the Far East,where it suggests joy, rebirth, or festivity;

■ the same words may mean something entirely different as you move from oneEnglish-speaking country to another: “napkin” means “diaper” in England.

Even guidebooks of several hundred pages barely scratch the surface of themany cultural differences an international communicator faces. At best, theseinteresting books can show you what you’re up against in attempting to de-velop worldwide information products.

Still, if you want to open the widest possible access to your information,you will inevitably seek an international audience. Just putting up a home-pageon the World Wide Web gives you a global reach, which might lead to oppor-tunities for business and study that you had not anticipated. So, lacking an an-thropologist’s or experienced translator’s cultural understanding of the variousreaders you might attract, what can you do to improve your chances of effec-tive communication?

You can solve the problem partly by effectively testing an early version ofyour information product. The graphics expert and consultant in internationalcommunication William Horton says, “The only insurance against cultural mis-communication is testing with expected viewers.”8 However, testing can guar-antee success only for a very localized audience, only the people bestrepresented by the tested subjects. Remember that within cultures, individualpeople can vary greatly.

So what can you do in the early stages of product development, as you planand write the first versions of your document? We suggest that, before youwrite one word or plan one graphic, you adjust your audience-action analysisto determine how far you need to go in fitting your information product to aninternational market. In Table 2.5, we give three possible approaches—localiza-tion, internationalization, and globalization—as defined by Nancy Hoft in herbook International Technical Communication. Each approach has its own require-ments that influence how you plan and develop your communication.

Each approach has advantages and disadvantages. Localized products im-prove sales, overcome cultural differences and product resistance, and help theproducer quickly gain a foothold in new markets, but they are expensive andslow to develop. Internationalized products are cheaper and faster to produceand distribute but are not as well suited to particular niches in the market.



8. William Horton, Illustrating Computer Documentation (New York: Wiley, 1991), 210.

Globalized products are ready for immediate distribution anywhere but arequite limited in what they can communicate.

The trend among technical communicators these days clearly favors inter-nationalization, especially since the process of internationalizing has some ben-efits beyond marketing considerations. Identifying the core information of adocument has rhetorical benefits. It helps the producer focus on the most es-sential points and highlight these points with easily translatable writing and theclearest possible, most globalized graphics available. For example, in a com-puter manual, the core information would be the steps for actually performingtasks—setting the computer up, creating a file, saving the file, etc.—while thevariables would involve motivational material such as photographs showingsatisfied users and prefaces that promote the product’s “user-friendliness.” Byattending to the core information first, the producer is more likely to create aneffective, action-oriented document that helps the user get the job done. Thisapproach fits nicely with the more general CORE method of producing docu-ments that we develop in subsequent chapters.

At the first stage of product development—the audience-action analysis—your main task in internationalizing your information product is to locate areasof cultural sensitivity and possible bias. Whenever possible, plan to make thecore information free of detectable bias.



TABLE 2.5Approaches to international communication.

Approach

localization

internationalization

globalization

Definition

creating or adapting an informationproduct for use in a specificcountry or specific market

designing an information productto be easily localized for exportanywhere in the world

creating an information product tobe used in many cultural con-texts without modification

Requirements

For each different context, a new versionof the product accommodates transla-tion into a new language and changesin currency, date, and time formats; inaddition, it takes account of deepercultural characteristics such as learn-ing styles, gender and class sensibility,and communication taboos.

The product consists of two kinds ofinformation: core information andinternational variables. The core infor-mation must be translated but other-wise remains relatively unchanged ineach different version, while the vari-ables are localized.

The product, usually a short communica-tion such as an airline safety card, usesglobally understood signs and imagesto relay simple messages.

Source: Based on Nancy Hoft, International Technical Communication (New York: Wiley, 1995), 11–31.

Expanding the Audience-Action Analysis and Profile

To create information products sensitive to the widest possible context of use,you should perform ethical, political, and cultural analyses in the pre-writingphase of product development. To analyze your audience and the actions theywill take using the information you provide, begin with the questions in Guide-lines at a Glance 2. Do not feel limited to these questions. Make your analysisas complete as possible.

Then follow the directions for writing an extension of the audience-actionprofile we first described in Chapter 1 (pages 13–15). An example of such anextension, which builds on Sample 1.1 from Chapter 1 (page 16), appears inSample 2.5.



GUIDELINES AT A GLANCE 2Adding ethical, political, and cultural filters to the audience-action analysisand profile

Sample questions for analyzing the context of production:■ What are the responsibilities of each team member in the production process?■ How is each team member held accountable?■ Do any potential conflicts threaten to emerge, and how will these be managed?■ What contracts, codes, or other governing devices are in effect?

Sample questions for analyzing the context of use:■ What will users do with your information product? What decisions will they make;

what actions will they take? How will you ensure that the information you providegives a sufficient basis for these decisions and actions?

■ What ethical obligations do you as a producer have to the user of the informationproduct, and how will these obligations affect the presentation of information?

■ Will you be required to make recommendations or give guidelines for action? Howwill you account for alternatives to the recommended actions?

■ Could anyone’s reputation be damaged or safety threatened as a result of the infor-mation you reveal, the recommendations you make, or the instructions you give?Can you see ways to craft your recommendations so that you minimize the poten-tial for suffering and maximize the benefits for all concerned?

■ What are the cultural characteristics of your chosen audience? Will the market in-clude international users or users whose ethnicity is different from your own? Whatsteps will you take to limit the possibility of cultural bias causing ineffective or of-fensive communication?

Writing the profile:■ Paragraph 1: Discuss the most important ethical and political issues in the context

of production (based on answers to questions in the analysis), and state how youpropose to deal with these issues.

■ Paragraph 2: Discuss the important ethical, political, and cultural issues for the con-text of use, and state how you propose to deal with these issues.

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The team that created Version 1.2 of ClientBase has beenreassembled for the development of Version 2.0. In thatproject, the engineering representative (Jones) was at firsthesitant to make changes suggested by the technical writers(Smith and Vallejo) in the user interface of the programitself. For efficiency’s sake, Jones wanted to keepprogramming changes to a minimum and consign rhetoricalimprovements to the print document and online help sessions.But user confusion in preliminary testing convinced Jones ofthe need to keep the interface consistent in approach withthe documentation. We are glad to have Jones back on theteam so that we do not have to fight this battle again. Theteam is fully integrated and ready to work together. Theonly possible problem is Vallejo’s commitment to continueintensive work on the QuestTime project during the beginningof the ClientBase revision. She has agreed to devoteTuesdays and Wednesdays to the ClientBase project exceptduring July when all her time must be given to QuestTime. We will request additional staff during that month tocompensate for Vallejo’s absence. Smith will take trainingresponsibilities during that time.

In the new version, we will try to solve some ethicalproblems we encountered in Version 1.2. We were convinced byour marketing representative (a visiting member of the team)to “go easy” on the number of warnings and cautions weincluded in the instructions. The argument was that too many“negative messages” would hurt sales. But our surveysrevealed a high level of user frustration over not beingwarned of the sensitivity of the program during certain dataentry routines. Unwary users who had lost data felt betrayedby the documentation. Our new approach, oriented towardminimal documentation with maximum troubleshootinginstructions, should solve the problem for users. But wefear a hard sell will be needed for marketing. So we arerequesting that a marketing representative be added to ourteam early on to gain an insider’s view of our approach andto discover a marketing strategy that makes the most of theapproach.

To ensure effective communication among British users, wewill take the same approach we took in Version 1.2, creatinga “B” version for use in Great Britain. After developing theAmerican version, the team will create Version 2.0B byscreening the core information to be sure no Americanismsexist in the instructions and by changing date, time, andcurrency formats in both the interface and the documenta-tion. We are also aware that, if Version 2.0 succeeds in our

SAMPLE 2.5 Extension of a draft for an audience-action profile (building onSample 1.1 in Chapter 1, page 16)

In your class, discuss the ethical values and policies that you think are most ap-propriate for doing the work planned for your course. You might begin with thevalues listed in Table 2.4 on page 36. What values would your class add to oromit from this list? Have some people in the course look up codes of ethics forvarious professional groups, such as mechanical engineers, biological re-searchers, and technical communicators. The easiest way to find these codes isto search the World Wide Web (see Chapter 4 for guidance). How well do thesecodes reflect the values listed in Table 2.4 and the values your class comes upwith? On the basis of your discussion, create a code of ethics for individual andgroup work in your class.

Return to the audience-action profile you wrote for one of the scenarios in Ex-ercise 1.1 on page 21. Write an extension of the profile based on the ethical, po-litical, and cultural considerations given in Guidelines at a Glance 2.



American and British markets, we may explore German marketsas early as Version 2.1. Initial cultural analysis suggeststhat mere translation may not be sufficient to satisfyGerman users. They tend to prefer generous documentationwith great technical detail (see Hoft, InternationalTechnical Communication, New York: Wiley, 1995, pages336–37). Very likely, our minimalist approach will not workfor this market. We may be able to write an expanded andupdated version of the documentation for Version 1.2 andthen have it translated into German for testing. Werecommend that this effort begin as soon as possible aftertesting the American and British versions. To avoid highcosts, we can find German users to test a prototype segmentof the German version before completing the full product.Ultimately, however, high costs are inevitable if we intendto enter this market seriously.


EXER

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EXER

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Recommendations for Further Reading

Allen, Lori, and Dan Voss. Ethics in Technical Communication: Shades of Gray. New York:Wiley, 1997.

Andrews, Deborah C., ed. International Dimensions of Technical Communication. Arlington,VA: Society for Technical Communication, 1996.

Axtell, Roger E. Do’s and Taboos around the World. New York: Wiley, 1993.———. The Do’s and Taboos of Body Language around the World. New York: Wiley, 1990.———. Do’s and Taboos of Using English around the World. New York: Wiley, 1995.Brockmann, R. John, and Fern Rook, eds. Technical Communication and Ethics. Washing-

ton, DC: Society for Technical Communication, 1989.Ede, Lisa, and Andrea Lunsford. Singular Texts/Plural Authors: Perspectives on Collabora-

tive Writing. Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1990.Greider, William. Who Will Tell the People?: The Betrayal of American Democracy. New York:

Simon and Schuster, 1992.Hare, A. Paul. Creativity in Small Groups. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1982.Hoft, Nancy L. International Technical Communication: How to Export Information about

High Technology. New York: Wiley, 1995.Horton, William. “Global Graphics.” In Illustrating Computer Documentation. New York:

Wiley, 1991, 207–17.———. “Icons for International Products.” In The Icon Book. New York: Wiley, 1994,

241–67.Killingsworth, M. Jimmie, and Betsy G. Jones. “Division of Labor or Integrated Teams:

A Crux in the Management of Technical Communication?” Technical Communication36 (1989): 210–221.

Lay, Mary M., and William M. Karis. Collaborative Writing in Industry: Investigations inTheory and Practice. Amityville, NY: Baywood, 1991.

Matalene, Carolyn B. Worlds of Writing: Teaching and Learning in Discourse Communities ofWork. New York: Random House, 1989.

Singer, Peter. Practical Ethics. 2nd Edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1993.

Toulmin, Stephen, Richard Rieke, and Allan Janik. An Introduction to Reasoning. 2nd Edi-tion. New York: Macmillan, 1984.

Zuboff, Shoshana. In the Age of the Smart Machine: The Future of Work and Power. NewYork: Basic, 1987.

Additional Reading for Advanced Research

Blyler, Nancy Roundy, and Charlotte Thralls, eds. Professional Communication: The SocialPrespective. Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1993.

Dombrowski, Paul M. “The Lessons of the Challenger Investigations.” IEEE Transactions34 (Dec. 1991): 211–216.

Hall, Edward T. Beyond Culture. New York: Anchor, 1976.———. The Silent Language. New York: Anchor, 1973.



Herndl, Carl G., Barbara A. Fennell, and Carolyn R. Miller, “Understanding Failures inOrganizational Discourse: The Accident at Three Mile Island and the Shuttle Chal-lenger Disaster.” Textual Dynamics of the Professions: Historical and Contemporary Stud-ies of Writing in Professional Communities. Ed. Charles Bazerman and James Paradis.Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1991: 279–306.

Killingsworth, M. Jimmie, and Michael Gilbertson. Signs, Genres, and Communities inTechnical Communication. Amityville, NY: Baywood, 1992.

Odell, Lee, and Dixie Goswami, eds. Writing in Nonacademic Settings. New York: Guil-ford, 1985.

Winsor, Dorothy A. “The Construction of Knowledge in Organizations: Asking the RightQuestions about the Challenger.” Journal of Business and Technical Communication 4(1990): 7–20.

Zappen, James P. “Rhetorical and Technical Communication: An Argument for Histori-cal and Political Pluralism.” Iowa State Journal of Business and Technical Communica-tion 1 (1987): 29–44.



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