Al-Qaeda Thesis

Al-Qaeda: A Historical Analysis of Evolution & Theoretical Advantages of a Network

S a i n t A n s e l m C o l l e g e

C l a s s o f 2 0 1 1

M a y 5 t h , 2 0 1 1

Michael SommaThis paper offers a thorough historical analysis of the terrorist organization known as al-Qaeda. In addition, the organizational advantages and disadvantages which are shared by terrorist networks are theoretically explained. The structural and functional advantages of networks will be assessed in order to show how a terrorist organization like al-Qaeda is such a threat to nation-states. Future directions and goals which counterterrorism experts may utilize will be explored and offered up.

Today, the world in which we live is plagued by terrorism and the constantly looming

nature of fear for the next attack. Over time, mankind has observed and noted the evolution of

terrorism from its simplest roots and origins in the biblical book of Joshua, to the complex and

restructured form of a 21st century terrorist network. In the past, terrorist organizations

structured themselves in a hierarchical and even bureaucratic structure in order to deliver orders

more efficiently from leadership positions downward to the larger mass of followers. More

recently however, terrorist networks have developed in order to combat states and nations more

effectively. A terrorist organization must be ready to change and advance at the slightest hint of

a threat, otherwise nation states would have a much simpler job apprehending and preventing

terrorists before they strike. In 1988, a terrorist organization known as al-Qaeda emerged out of

the Middle East, led by its charismatic leader Osama Bin Laden, al-Qaeda would change the face

of terrorism forever.

The origins of al-Qaeda can be traced back to December of 1979, during the Soviet-

Afghanistan War against the tribal Afghani mujahedeen. The Soviet Union carried out an

invasion against Afghanistan and the Afghan mujahedeen took to the defenses of its native

country. The mujahedeen was a native radical Islamic militant group living in Afghanistan who

opposed the Soviet invasion. While this war was being fought, the United States noted that the

Soviet presence in Afghanistan was a blatant case of expansionism and aggression, therefore,

America sought to aid the Afghani group. In a top-secret Central Intelligence Agency program

codename Operation Cyclone, the United States channeled funds through Pakistan’s Inter-

Services Intelligence agency (ISI) to the mujahedeen.1

1 Brahimi, Alia. (2009, June 6). Crushed in the Shadows: Why Al Qaeda Will Lose the War of Ideas. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 33:93-110. DOI: 10.1080/10576100903488402

The war with the Soviet Union was not the only violence that took place during this

period of time. There were also a growing number of mujahedeen members who joined the jihad

against the Afghan-Marxist regime of Afghanistan. This jihad was facilitated by international

Muslim organizations, particularly the Maktab al-Khidamat (MAK).2 The Maktab al-Khidamat

was established in 1980 by the Palestinian Islamic scholar Abdullah Yusuf Azzam and Osama

Bin Laden, the wealthy Saudi Arabian, in order to raise and channel funds and to recruit foreign

mujahedeen members for the war against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. The MAK began to

organize guest houses in Peshawar, Pakistan near the Afghanistan border where they gathered

supplies for the construction of paramilitary training camps to prepare foreign recruits for the

war cause. Bin Laden was a major financial addition to the cause and used his own money and

connections with the Saudi royal family to improve public opinion of the war and to raise more

funds. In 1987, Azzam and Bin Laden set up training camps inside Afghanistan.3 The financial

support which the United States provided through the Pakistani ISI to the Afghani Islamic

militants was substantial and estimated to be upwards of $600 million. As a result of prolonged

fighting and immense losses, the Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989, leaving the

country in the hands of the mujahedeen. The radicals were unable to agree upon a structure for

government and left the country in a status of chaos and devastation.

Toward the end of the Soviet invasion, members of the mujahedeen sought to expand

their operations to include Islamist struggles in other parts of the world. A number of

interrelated organizations were formed to further these aspirations, one of which was the

organization that would eventually be known as al-Qaeda. Osama Bin Laden pursuit of non-

2 Brahimi, Alia. (2009, June 6). Crushed in the Shadows: Why Al Qaeda Will Lose the War of Ideas. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 33:93-110. DOI: 10.1080/105761009034884023 Brahimi, Alia. (2009, June 6). Crushed in the Shadows: Why Al Qaeda Will Lose the War of Ideas. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 33:93-110. DOI: 10.1080/10576100903488402

military operations in other parts of the world was rivaled by Azzam, who wanted to remain

focused on military campaigns. Bin Laden though, wanted to utilize the army of radicals at his

disposal to continue to fight non-Muslim’s out of the holy land. In 1989, Abdullah Yusuf Azzam

was unexpectedly assassinated and the MAK split, with a significant portion of the members

joining Osama Bin Laden’s organization.4

In February of 1989, Bin Laden returned to his home in Saudi Arabia, where he found the

Kingdom in dismay from the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August of 1990. Osama Bin Laden

realized that The House of Saud was at risk, as well as the world’s most valuable oil fields, and

he offered the services of his mujahedeen to King Fahd in order to protect Saudi Arabia from the

invading Iraqi army. The invading Iraqi army far outnumbered Saudi Arabia’s own defense

forces, but the King refused Osama Bin Laden’s offer, and opted instead to allow American and

allied forces to deploy troops into Saudi Arabia. This decision offended and angered Bin Laden

as he believed the presence of foreign troops in the “land of the two mosques” (Mecca and

Medina) profaned sacred soil. He responded by publicly speaking against the Saudi government

for harboring American troops and was banished and forced to live in exile in Sudan.5

From 1992 to 1996, al-Qaeda and Bin Laden based themselves in Sudan at the invitation

of Islamic leader Hassan al-Turabi. On March 5th 1994, King Fahd of Saudi Arabia sent an

emissary to Sudan demanding Bin Laden’s passport, and his Saudi citizenship was also revoked.

His family was persuaded to cut off his monthly stipend, and his Saudi assets were frozen. In

June of 1995, there was a failed attempt to assassinate Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, which

4 Brahimi, Alia. (2009, June 6). Crushed in the Shadows: Why Al Qaeda Will Lose the War of Ideas. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 33:93-110. DOI: 10.1080/105761009034884025 Brahimi, Alia. (2009, June 6). Crushed in the Shadows: Why Al Qaeda Will Lose the War of Ideas. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 33:93-110. DOI: 10.1080/10576100903488402

led to the expulsion of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad and in May of 1996, the expulsion of Osama

Bin Laden by the Sudanese government.6

At this point, Afghanistan was effectively ungoverned for seven years and plagued by

constant fighting of mujahedeen groups. However, during the 1990’s a new force began to

emerge, the origins of the Taliban had been aiding Bin Laden and were still laundering most of

the private donations using front groups for his organization. The Taliban was able to expand

their control over Afghanistan territory until it established an enclave known as the Islamic

Emirate of Afghanistan. In 1994, the Taliban captured the regional center of Kandahar, and after

making rapid territorial gains, the capital city of Kabul was finally taken in September of 1996.

Osama Bin Laden realized the importance of the Taliban’s control over Afghanistan and

relocated al-Qaeda’s headquarters to Afghanistan. Not only was Afghanistan largely isolated

from American political influence and military power, it also provided for protection and a

measure of legitimacy as part of their Ministry of Defense, even though only Pakistan, Saudi

Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates recognized the Taliban as the legitimate government of

Afghanistan.7

The call for a global jihad began in late 1995, when al-Qaeda ideologues were instructed

that the jihad must be fought on a global level. The idea behind a global Salafist jihad existed

during the 1980’s; this however, was a fundamentally defensive strategy. Al-Qaeda wanted to

open the offensive phase of the global jihad and incorporate all Islamic organizations around the

globe. In 1996, al-Qaeda announced its jihad to expel foreign troops and interest from what they

considered Islamic lands.8 This announcement made by Osama Bin Laden is known as a fatwa

6 Brahimi, Alia. (2009, June 6). Crushed in the Shadows: Why Al Qaeda Will Lose the War of Ideas. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 33:93-110. DOI: 10.1080/105761009034884027 Brahimi, Alia. (2009, June 6). Crushed in the Shadows: Why Al Qaeda Will Lose the War of Ideas. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 33:93-110. DOI: 10.1080/105761009034884028 Brahimi, Alia. (2009, June 6). Crushed in the Shadows: Why Al Qaeda Will Lose the War of Ideas. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 33:93-110. DOI: 10.1080/10576100903488402

(binding religious proclamation). The fatwa amounted to a public declaration of war against the

United States and its allies. In addition, al-Qaeda refocused its resources on large scale, and

propagandist attacks. The first of which was the attack on the Khobar Towers, in Khobar, Saudi

Arabia, killing 19 and wounding 372. On February 23rd, 1998 Osama Bin Laden and Ayman al-

Zawahiri, the leader of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, co-signed along with three others a fatwa

which called upon Muslims to kill Americans and its allies wherever and whenever possible.

Neither Osama Bin Laden, nor Ayman al-Zawahiri possessed the Islamic scholarly qualifications

to issue a fatwa, however they rejected the authority of the contemporary ulema (Muslim

scholars of sharia law) and took it upon themselves.9

The radical Islamist movement in general and al-Qaeda in particular developed during the

Islamist movement of the last three decades of the 20th century. Some have argued that without

the writings of Islamic author and thinker Sayyid Qutb “al-Qaeda would not have existed.” Qutb

preached that because of the lack of sharia law, the Muslim world was no longer Muslim, having

reverted to pre-Islamic ignorance known as jahiliyyah.10 In order to restore Islam, according to

Qutb, a movement of righteous Muslims was needed in order to establish true Islamic states,

implement sharia, and rid the Muslim world of any non-Muslim influences, such as democracy,

socialism, and capitalism. One of Qutb’s most prominent and powerful ideas was that a large

portion of individuals who said they were Muslim were not. Rather, they were apostates. This

not only gave jihadists a legal loop hole around the prohibition of killing of Muslims, but it also

made a religious obligation to execute these self-professed Muslims. These alleged apostates

included leaders of Muslim countries, since they failed to enforce sharia law. The fatwa on


10 Byman, DL (2003). Al-Qaeda as an Adversary: Do We Understand Our Enemy? World Politics, 56:139-163

terrorism is regarded as a direct assault on the ideology of al-Qaeda which dismantles it from the

sources of the Koran and the Sunna.11

On September 11th, 2001, 19 al-Qaeda operatives hijacked four commercial passenger jet

airliners. The hijackers intentionally crashed two of the airliners into the Twin Towers of the

World Trade Center in New York City, killing everyone on board and many others working in

the buildings. Both towers collapsed within two hours, destroying nearby buildings and

damaging others. The hijackers crashed a third airliner into the Pentagon in Arlington, Virginia,

just outside of Washington D.C. The fourth plane crashed into a field near Shanksville in rural

Pennsylvania after some of its passengers and flight crew attempted to retake control of the

plane, which was suspected to have been heading for either the Capitol Building or the White

House. There were no survivors from any of the flights. Nearly 3,000 people and the 19

hijackers died in the attacks. There were approximately 836 responders, including firefighters

and police personnel have died since June of 2009. Among the 2,752 victims who died in the

attacks on the World Trade Center were 343 firefighters and 60 police officers from New York

City and the Port Authority. Another 184 people were killed in the attack on the Pentagon. The

overwhelming majority of casualties were civilians, including nationals of over 70 countries. In

response to al-Qaeda leader Osama Bin Laden’s claimed responsibility to the attacks, the United

States launched the War on Terror, invading Afghanistan to depose the Taliban. The Taliban

was harboring al-Qaeda terrorists, and by enacting the USA Patriot Act, the United States was

able to hunt for terrorists from within America.12



To understand the role of intelligence in facilitating the 9/11 operation,

it is first necessary to analyze its genesis as an idea. Such an examination

will demonstrate that intelligence fulfilled a limited role during the earliest

phases of the operation when discussion focused on the method of attack

and preferred targets. It will be contended, however, that the operation’s

conception at the apex of the al-Qaeda hierarchy, along with the formulation

of a tentative strategy precluded a need for the type of detailed intelligence

that normally determines these fundamental questions. It will be

demonstrated that by the time the al-Qaeda leadership approved the

operation, the method of attack, along with at least some of the targets, had,

for years, formed part of the thinking of those central to the operation. The

historical development of the 9/11 operation facilitated a refining process

that transformed it from an ambitious idea into reality.13 To those within the

law enforcement and intelligence community with even a rudimentary

knowledge of al-Qaeda and the global Salafist jihad, the attacks on 9/11

could hardly have been a strategic surprise. Al-Qaeda’s enmity toward the

United States and its desire to carry out an attack on U.S. soil was well

known prior to 9/11. Al-Qaeda had already declared, in 1998, that it was in a

state of war with the United States. Bin Laden’s 1998 fatwa in which he

urges jihad against American’s is unambiguous, declaring that the killing of,

“…the Americans and their allies – civilian and military – is an individual duty

for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do


it…” This was, in turn, followed by attacks on the U.S. embassies in East

Africa and the U.S.S. Cole in Yemen.14

The effects of the 9/11 attacks, however, were meant to be more than

just symbolic. Although emphasizing the existence of a global struggle

based on a dichotomous worldview was central to al-Qaeda’s planning and

objectives, the tangible and worldly goals it hoped to achieve through this

symbolism were no less important. For instance, the attacks served to

propel the organization onto the world stage, drawing global attention to its

grievances, at least some of which are rooted in reality and have political

solutions. Moreover, the images of power and war generated by the attacks

were intended to radicalize and mobilize supporters by offering an example

of a successful operation achieved through methodical planning, personal

sacrifice, and submission to the will of God.

Al-Qaeda is a Sunni group and often attacked the Iraqi Shia majority for several reasons.

The leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq, the Jordanian militant Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and Osama Bin

Laden formed an alliance in 2004 which stopped the attacks on each other and allowed them to

focus on the global jihad. But in 2006, a strategic strike in Iraq by the United States killed Abu

Musab al-Zarqawi and ended his reign as the leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq.15 Following the

immediate attacks on the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and the crash of flight 93 in

Pennsylvania, the United States government decided to respond militarily and began to prepare

its armed forces to overthrow the Taliban regime it believed was harboring al-Qaeda. The

Taliban leader, Mullah Omar was offered a chance to surrender Osama Bin Laden and his top

14 Brahimi, Alia. (2009, June 6). Crushed in the Shadows: Why Al Qaeda Will Lose the War of Ideas. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 33:93-110. DOI: 10.1080/1057610090348840215 Byman, DL (2003). Al-Qaeda as an Adversary: Do We Understand Our Enemy? World Politics, 56:139-163

associates. The Taliban offered to turn over Bin Laden to a neutral country for trial if the United

States was able to provide evidence of his complicity in the attacks. However, the United States

was not looking to bargain and immediately inserted paramilitary forces from the Central

Intelligence Agency’s elite Special Activities Division (SAD).16 Soon after, the United States

and its allies invaded Afghanistan and together with the Afghani Northern Alliance, they were

able to remove the Taliban government. Not only was the Taliban dismantled, but the training

camps which al-Qaeda utilized were destroyed and much of the operating structure of al-Qaeda

was believed to be disrupted.

By early 2002, al-Qaeda was dealt a significant blow to its operational capacity, and the

Afghan invasion appeared to be an initial success. Nevertheless, al-Qaeda’s top two leaders,

Osama Bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri evaded capture. By the end of 2004, the United

States government proclaimed that two-thirds of the most senior al-Qaeda figures had been

captured and interrogated by the Central Intelligence Agency. Abu Zubaydah, Ramzi Bin al-

Shibh and Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri in 2002, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed in 2003, and Saif al-

Islam el Masry in 2004, and Mohammed Atef and several others were killed.17 Al-Qaeda’s

inspirational and devoted leader, Osama Bin Laden, was killed by the United States in an

operation carried out in Abbottabad, Pakistan on May 2, 2001. The secret operation authorized

by President Barak Obama was carried out by the United States elite Navy Seals and the Central

Intelligence Agency. Bin Laden’s death marked the end of a ten year manhunt by the United

States and coalition forces for the world’s most wanted criminal.

Al-Qaeda was not always a networked opponent, in fact, before the Coalition invasion of

Afghanistan; al-Qaeda was a hierarchical and bureaucratic structure from 1996 to 2001. This

16 Byman, DL (2003). Al-Qaeda as an Adversary: Do We Understand Our Enemy? World Politics, 56:139-16317 Byman, DL (2003). Al-Qaeda as an Adversary: Do We Understand Our Enemy? World Politics, 56:139-163

structure was known as the “consultative council,” led by Osama Bin Laden and his top

associates.18 In addition, al-Qaeda was not a stateless organization, it utilized Afghanistan as a

safe haven, and a base to centrally plan and coordinate terrorist operations around the globe.

This vertical leadership provided for a strategic direction and tactical support to the horizontal

network of compartmentalized cells and associated organizations. Osama Bin Laden was both a

terrorist “CEO” who defined goals and a sense of higher purpose, and a venture capitalist who

solicits ideas from below for funding.19 Members or associate groups would typically submit

proposals to the consultative council in Afghanistan which would select a small number – such

as the planes operation on 9/11 – for further, top-down development. After the invasion of

coalition forces which dismantled the Taliban in late 2001, Afghanistan no longer offered al-

Qaeda a safe base for training, centralized decision-making and coordination of activities.

According to a number of analysts the primary adaptation to the destruction of al-Qaeda’s

headquarters and most of its core leadership has been to evolve into a diffuse global network

which works loosely with the broader movement of affiliated groups and individuals inspired by

al-Qaeda’s jihadist-Salafist worldview. The exact precise view of al-Qaeda’s structure is of

course difficult due to its clandestine and dangerous nature. Some experts however, emphasize

al-Qaeda’s main function as an inspirational ideology with a few heroic figures, such as Osama

Bin Laden.20 Others maintain such a view is premature, and believe that al-Qaeda leaders

continue to exercise influence over their networked allies offering guidance, logistical backing

and financial support in addition to inspiration. Al-Qaeda’s structural evolution following the

18 Jones, Calvert. (2006, December 4). Al-Qaeda’s Innovative Improvisers: Learning in a Diffuse Transnational Network. Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 4:19:2-16. DOI: 10.1080/09557570601003205

19 Jones, Calvert. (2006, December 4). Al-Qaeda’s Innovative Improvisers: Learning in a Diffuse Transnational Network. Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 4:19:2-16. DOI: 10.1080/0955757060100320520 Jones, Calvert. (2006, December 4). Al-Qaeda’s Innovative Improvisers: Learning in a Diffuse Transnational Network. Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 4:19:2-16. DOI: 10.1080/09557570601003205

loss of its Afghanistan headquarters has been namely decentralization, reduced hierarchical

control, and heightened local autonomy in a loosely networked mode of organization.21

As al-Qaeda evolves into a more diffuse global network with reduced control over

loosely affiliated groups, the exploration dimension of learning is also evolving. It is suggested

that the greater inter-organizational cooperation, access to weak ties, and local autonomy all

enhance the ability to explore new possibilities for achieving goals. In theory, this makes a

networked form of al-Qaeda more innovative in comparison to a hierarchical structure. Here,

innovation is conceived as acquiring a new weapon, knowledge of the vulnerabilities of a target,

access to new targets, and even the expertise to build a new weapon. According to

organizational learning research, inter-organizational cooperation actually enhances the

exploration dimension of learning by providing exposure to new ideas, resources, and expertise

that would otherwise not be available. In addition, it enables learning from the experience of

others. In the context of terrorism, for example, Indonesia’s Jemaah Islamiyah learned about

terrorist tactics and especially the use of explosives through its collaboration with al-Qaeda. 22 If

we look at al-Qaeda as a vanguard to inspire the broader jihadist insurgency, Osama Bin Laden

has historically emphasized such cooperation, coopting local militant groups through offers of

support, and the inclusive ideology appeal of his anti-American stance. As al-Qaeda moves into

a more networked structure and reacts to the loss of its Afghanistan base, al-Qaeda is likely to

seek further opportunities to cooperate with like-minded jihadists. As a result of this cooperation

they will be able to widen exposure to outside ideas, tactics, and expertise. Research on


networks supports this shift, showing how failure at a domestic level encourages transnational

networking as an alternative.23

In the field of terrorism, inter-organizational cooperation is certainly taking place much

more broadly with al-Qaeda leaders and training camps energizing and supporting other jihadist

militants around the world. The greatest change after the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq has been

the breakdown of the rigid boundaries that used to separate militant Islamist groups. 24 It seems

these groups are growing much more permeable to each other as individuals from varying

backgrounds, nationalities, and diverse skill sets, work together in order to achieve similar goals.

Although some groups may not share al-Qaeda’s commitment to a globally oriented Salafist

jihad, many have adopted a more pragmatic approach, realizing the advantages of network

cooperation.25

From an organizational learning perspective, al-Qaeda will theoretically be able to

explore a broader set of possibilities for achieving its goals as it remnants pursue greater inter-

organizational cooperation. Al-Qaeda’s leader’s long negotiated the decision to work with Abu

Musab al-Zarqawi in Iraq for example. Originally Bin Laden and Zarqawi did not get along with

one another, but realizing the mutual benefits of cooperation, the two aligned in October of 2004

and Zarqawi became the organizations emir in Iraq.26 Evidence from organizational theory

research also shows that networks of groups that span formal organizational boundaries are an

important source of innovation in industries where the knowledge base is complex, changing

rapidly and widely dispersed. According to the State Department’s annual terrorism report,

23 Jones, Calvert. (2006, December 4). Al-Qaeda’s Innovative Improvisers: Learning in a Diffuse Transnational Network. Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 4:19:2-16. DOI: 10.1080/0955757060100320524 Jones, Calvert. (2006, December 4). Al-Qaeda’s Innovative Improvisers: Learning in a Diffuse Transnational Network. Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 4:19:2-16. DOI: 10.1080/0955757060100320525 Jones, Calvert. (2006, December 4). Al-Qaeda’s Innovative Improvisers: Learning in a Diffuse Transnational Network. Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 4:19:2-16. DOI: 10.1080/0955757060100320526 Jones, Calvert. (2006, December 4). Al-Qaeda’s Innovative Improvisers: Learning in a Diffuse Transnational Network. Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 4:19:2-16. DOI: 10.1080/09557570601003205

geographically dispersed terrorist cells are exploring increasingly sophisticated kinds of attacks.

Al-Qaeda for example, may have a complex relevant knowledge base in order to achieve a

successful operation.27 Attacks involving the acquisition, development, and meticulous

combination of materials for chemical and biological weapons, for example, can require

specialized expertise. Attacks on information infrastructures may also involve complex

knowledge of their vulnerabilities as well as information technology abilities. In a network, this

knowledge is likely to be more dispersed in comparison to when a central headquarters is

available for training. Looking at such dispersed and complex knowledge as the basis for a

modern terrorism industry, networks open the door to greater exploration by bringing to light

coveted experts – such as chemists, engineers, and computer scientists – who are important for

sophisticated strikes.28

Lastly, al-Qaeda’s more diffuse, networked structure facilitates learning through

exploration and its openness to weak ties. Weak ties are theoretically more valuable and stronger

than strong ties because they unearth new, unfamiliar information and opinions. Weak ties may

be much more readily available in a loose, decentralized, and diverse structure compared to a

concentrated arrangement in Afghanistan.29 When new possibilities are opened up, these ties

build the potential for innovation, just as it was demonstrated in the Ishtiaque Parker example.

Parker was a South African student at Islamabad Islamic University. During his studies he was

recruited by Ramzi Yousef, an indefatigable terrorist connected to al-Qaeda before his capture.

Parker’s South African passport and unsuspicious appearance introduced novel tactics, for


29 Ilardi, Gaetano Joe. (2008, April 27). The 9/11 Attacks – A Study of Al Qaeda’s Use of Intelligence and Counterintelligence. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 32:171-187. DOI: 10.1080/10576100802670803

example, the transportation of explosives through his suitcase. However, as time went on,

Ishtiaque betrayed his recruiter, which demonstrates that even though weak ties can increase the

exploration abilities of an organization, they can also reduce security.30 In online settings, where

terrorist cells are currently forming the fragile and temporary nature of weak ties, it may further

threaten security because trust is more elusive.

Terrorists from al-Qaeda training camps may be significantly more qualified to explore

ideas on their own. The training in Afghanistan emphasized entrepreneurship, teaching recruits

how to establish self-sufficient terrorist cells that would be able to operate independent of a

central command. They were also taught how to manufacture explosives from commercial

products, procure transport and store munitions near a target. Al-Qaeda’s legacy of

entrepreneurship could encourage widespread exploratory learning that would otherwise have

declined in a looser, networked structure due to the lack of standard training and clear chains of

command.31

In theory, greater inter-organizational cooperation and heightened local autonomy in the

network expands al-Qaeda’s capacity for exploration, which renders it a more innovative actor.

Yet, the expanded capabilities for exploration do not necessarily lead to a greater lethality or

effectiveness in terrorist operations. Even if al-Qaeda is well positioned for innovation as it

grows into a network, it must be able to absorb and exploit ideas, information, and expertise



effectively.32 The structure of a network is affecting the exploitation dimension of learning –

which focuses on the refinement, improvement, and extension of capabilities.

Before al-Qaeda was dispersed from their base in Afghanistan, their base provided them

with a central space for exploitation focuses learning, with the arriving mujahedeen taking

established classes in a wide array of subjects to develop and refine relevant skills. Courses

covered surveillance, the covert use of cameras and techniques to encode intelligence reports on

computer disks.33 Trainees learned to organize an operation by designating teams for

surveillance, planning, logistics, and execution of the attack. In addition, al-Qaeda helped

arrange for trainees to receive further instruction through legitimate channels, such as the

American flight schools attended by the 9/11 pilots.34 With an emphasis on learning perspective

and initiative, new comers become part of an organization by participating on the periphery, with

gradual community recognition of their legitimacy as members of the organization. Learners

tend to learn more from each other as they participate in the practice of the organization under

guise of tolerance of their early missteps.

Without the formal curriculum of training camps, those interested in al-Qaeda’s brand of

global jihad must turn to each other for guidance regarding how to carry out effective attacks,

and must also exploit knowledge available online. Without the benefit of Afghanistan camps,

these groups are more likely to seek local opportunities to engage in the practice of al-Qaeda

influenced militant jihad, testing out their ideas on familiar ground as a means of peripheral 32 Ilardi, Gaetano Joe. (2008, April 27). The 9/11 Attacks – A Study of Al Qaeda’s Use of Intelligence and Counterintelligence. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 32:171-187. DOI: 10.1080/10576100802670803



participation. The concept of peripheral participation raises uncertainties about how the benefits

of learning will be stored, disturbed and applied in the future.35 With greater access to new ideas

and resources and more freedom to experiment, al-Qaeda’s exploration capabilities may be

enhanced, but their decentralized character is potentially problematic for organizational memory.

Organizational memory is a key component of learning, dealing with how organizations encode,

store, and retrieve lessons of history, despite the turnover of personnel and passage of time. It

matters especially for the exploitation aspect of learning which relies on cumulative maintenance

and refinement of capabilities.36 Depending on how communication evolves, a decentralized

improvised pattern of learning could result in a fragmented, unstable source of organizational

memory that impedes exploitation. Exploration is also significantly limited if the lessons of

experience are not conserved and shared efficiently, with valuable weak ties and channels of

inter-organization cooperation not made available. Networks in theory provide fast, reliable

access to the right people and resources. But if these networks are too fragmented and

amorphous, with communication seldom, ineffective or antagonistic, organizational memory will

erode, stunting the ability to learn and inviting a permanent state of improvisation.37

In addition to the learning challenges posed by unreliable organizational memory, the

concept of peripheral participation in a networked structure points to other limitations on the

ability to exploit knowledge and resources. In the Afghanistan camps, al-Qaeda had the

opportunity to evaluate trainees, choosing only the best for formal participation in operations. 35 Ilardi, Gaetano Joe. (2008, April 27). The 9/11 Attacks – A Study of Al Qaeda’s Use of Intelligence and Counterintelligence. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 32:171-187. DOI: 10.1080/10576100802670803



As a looser, improvised pattern of learning comes to replace the more traditional pattern of

trainers providing instruction to trainees in these camps, accountability and professionalism may

decline.38 Without hierarchical oversight in Afghanistan holding mujahedeen accountable for

material learned in formal training, the scattered clusters of al-Qaeda militants are likely to be

less professional in their improvised attempts at participation. Missing the socially exhilarating

experience of training together in Afghanistan along with its stamp of legitimacy they may also

find learning through peripheral participation more problematic.39

Several post 9/11 attacks fall into a pattern of reduced accountability and

professionalism. The devised plot against U.S. naval vessels in the Straits of Gibraltar in the

summer of 2002, the Casablanca bombings on May 16, 2003, both demonstrate communication

failures, improvisation, and diminished professionalism.40 Peripheral participation as a means of

learning also depends on newcomers having legitimate access to an organizations culture of

practice – its more experienced members, typical artifacts and the face to face story telling that

tends to strengthen an organization’s self of self. Learners can make the organizations culture of

practice their own when they have legitimate access to its components which should ideally be

transparent to new comers or available for their inspection. In Afghanistan, learners could

immense themselves in the rich culture of modern Islamist militancy as they trained for jihad. 41





They had access to scores of other mujahedeen, including those with fighting experience in the

Soviet-Afghan War who could tell rousing stories of victory over the Soviet superpower.

Religious instruction offered a pervasive legitimizing discourse that explained why martyrdom

was the right path, including elaborate justifications for killing and torture in the name of jihad,

allegedly found in the tenets of Islam.42

Without the central, long-standing base in Afghanistan, al-Qaeda’s culture of practice is

less accessible to newcomers, which makes their ability to learn through peripheral participation

more difficult. In a terrorist network that is geographically diverse, the legitimate access to this

culture in particular may be more uncertain. Any newcomers, who previously could rely on

Afghanistan as a well-established, unquestionable means of participating, must find other outlets

which may or may not be seen as legitimate by the al-Qaeda leadership.43 The information and

communications technologies are helping learners compensate for the loss of legitimate access in

Afghanistan, not to mention Iraq as well, if the state-building efforts fail.

Law enforcement should target networks repeatedly, forcing the actors within the

organization to have to change their tactics and practices abruptly. Counterterrorism experts

should seek to instill doubt and mistrust through infiltration and manipulation of information.

By taking advantage of organizational splits within terrorist groups, counterterrorism agents may

be able to encourage a schism in the networks structure. Targeting single assassinations of

terrorist leaders to try to disrupt the organization may not work as effectively as we believe.

With the death of Osama Bin Laden, one would like to believe that al-Qaeda will not operate the

same as it did before, unfortunately the threat of the organization is still in play and experts must

prepare no different. Continuing the counterinsurgency in Afghanistan and Iraq are important

42 Byman, DL (2003). Al-Qaeda as an Adversary: Do We Understand Our Enemy? World Politics, 56:139-16343 Byman, DL (2003). Al-Qaeda as an Adversary: Do We Understand Our Enemy? World Politics, 56:139-163

tactics which are necessary to the restoration of peace and order to the region. Utilizing certain

military tactics and weapons is also a necessary consideration when combating a terrorist

network. We must formulate better responses to transnational threats by sharing intelligence and

maintaining more interagency cooperation. Although law enforcement agencies have a far way

to go in the battle against networked opponents, there is nothing inherent in the network form

that makes it impossible to defeat.

Brahimi, Alia. (2009, June 6). Crushed in the Shadows: Why Al Qaeda Will Lose the War of Ideas. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 33:93-110. DOI: 10.1080/10576100903488402

Jones, Calvert. (2006, December 4). Al-Qaeda’s Innovative Improvisers: Learning in a Diffuse Transnational Network. Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 4:19:2-16. DOI: 10.1080/09557570601003205

Ilardi, Gaetano Joe. (2008, April 27). The 9/11 Attacks – A Study of Al Qaeda’s Use of Intelligence and Counterintelligence. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 32:171-187. DOI: 10.1080/10576100802670803

Byman, DL (2003). Al-Qaeda as an Adversary: Do We Understand Our Enemy? World Politics, 56:139-163

Al-Qaeda Thesis

Documents

angered bin laden

sovietafghanistan war

osama bin ladens organization

soviet invasion

soviet union

afghan mujahedeen

foreign mujahedeen members

osama bin ladens offer