6 Ps of Manufacturing

IJOPM15,12

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Received July 1994Accepted October 1994

Iniemaiiimal Journal i>f p& Produclioti Management, Vol. 15Nl). 12,1995, pp. 32-45. «> MCBUnivereity Press, 0144-3577

The six Ps of manufacturingstrategy

G. Keong Leong and Peter T. WardThe Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio, USA

IntroductionOver the last decade, the ability of North American manufacturers to stand thetest of global competition has come into question with increasing frequency andintensity. Many observers have placed some measure of the blame for thiscondition at the feet of corporate managers who are more interested in theintricacies of finance than the details of making good products. Skinnerfl] hassuggested that a major benefit of manufacturing strategy is that it provides ameans for focusing the attention of corporate management on manufacturingconcerns. This article argues that manufacturing strategy can serve as aplatform for improving the management of manufacturing companies but thatsuch a role requires that strategy be viewed from a broader perspective than thenarrow planning view which has dominated the literature.

In particular, a narrow, planning-oriented view of manufacturing strategyimpinges on one's ability to understand firms that are world class in theirapproach to manufacturing. Many manufacturers have established the goal ofachieving or maintaining the status of world class manufacturer (WCM) andtheir manufacturing strategies are expected to reflect and support that goal.Although the meaning of world class is in the eye of the beholder, there isgeneral agreement that a WCM is a firm that has:

• attained a high level of manufacturing capability;• used that capability to gain competitive advantage; and• constantly strives to improve those capabilities.

For example, Schonberger[2] describes the goal of the WCM as continual andrapid improvement with respect to quality, cost, lead time, customer service,and flexibility. Hayes and Wheelwright[3] describe four stages in thedevelopment of manufacturing's strategic role, where stage IV manufacturershave achieved world class status. According to Hayes and Wheelwright, WCMsmake efforts to anticipate the potential of new manufacturing practices andtechnologies, involve manufacturing "up-front" in major marketing andengineering decisions, and pursue long-range programmes to acquirecapabilities in advance of needs.

The relative manufacturing abilities of US versus Japanese-based automakers are well documented. The difference in manufacturing capabilitiescannot be attributed to strategic planning, however. Although Japanese automanufacturers such as Toyota and Honda are clearly world class, authors such

as Ohmae[4], and Quinn and Mintzberg[5] argue that they have achieved thisstatus with little regard to formal planning. Rather, these manufacturers havebuilt capabilities incrementally and, in the manner suggested by Hayes[6], thesecapabilities have yielded a robust and sustainable advantage.

Six Ps of manufacturing strategyAlthough discussion of manufacturing strategy has appeared in managementliterature for at least 20 years, writers in the field continue to struggle with itsdefinition and its boundaries. Mintzberg[7] addressed a similar problem in thefield of competitive strategy by suggesting five Ps (plan, ploy, pattern, position,and perspective) which represent five separate concepts that define strategy.To this end, we suggest six Ps of manufacturing strategy: planning,proactiveness, pattern of actions, portfolio of manufacturing capabilities,programmes for improvement, and performance measurement. Descriptions ofeach are provided in Table I.

These six Ps are not intended to be definitions, per se. Rather, each P isoffered as a distinct view or snapshot which is partially revealing about thestrategic intentions and capabilities of manufacturing. When these snapshotsare pieced together, the observer is able to discern a clearer portrait of a

Six Ps ofmanufacturing

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View Description

Planning Manufacturing strategy as a part of an essentially hierarchical corporateplanning framework which assures a fit between manufacturing goals andactions and those of the larger organization

I^oactiveness The ability of a manufacturer to anticipate new manufacturing processesand technologies and to implement long-term programmes to acquirecapabilities in advance of needs

Pattern of The observed stream of decisions or actions of a manufacturer over aactions period of time In nine categories: capacity, facilities, process technology,

vertical integration, production planning and control, quality systems,organization, workforce, and new product development

Portfolio of The portfolio of manufacturing capabilities reflects competitive strengthsmanufacturing possessed by the manufacturing function and their relative importance,capabilities Generic manufacturing capabilities include: cost, quality, delivery

performance, flexibility, and innovativeness

Programmes of The set of structured, time-phased, and evaluated actions which areimprovement implemented to improve the manufacturing capability of the firm.

Examples include total quality management, group technology, just-in-time,etc. Programmes typically involve broad worker participation

Performance The systemic means by which manufacturing is evaluated. Goodmeasurement performance measurement schemes are aligned with strategic

organizational goals so that behaviour which furthers those goals issystematically reinforced

Table 1.Six complementary

views of manufacturingstrategy

IJOPM business unit's manufacturing strategy. Assembling a sequence of such]̂ 5 \2 portraits over time captures the dynamic elements of strategy. It is intended

that these six views be useful both to researchers who are striving to observemanufacturing strategy empirically and to practitioners who are assessingtheir own manufacturing strategy or that of a competitor. Each of these viewsis described next.

34^ ^ ~ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ~ Planning

The first view of manufacturing strategy is strategy as a plan. As was arguedin the introduction to this article, strategy as a plan is the most common viewtaken by manufacturing strategy researchers. Indeed, the seminal work bySkinner[l] featured a planning framework which suggested the importantitems for manufacturing management to plan and a method for aligningmanufacturing strategic plans with a broader corporate planning framework.He observes that:

A company's strategy at a given time places particular demands on its manufacturingfunction, and conversely, that the company's manufacturing policies and operations should bespecifically designed to fulfill the task demanded by strategic plans[l].

Many researchers have continued to describe manufacturing strategy primarilyin the context of a larger plan. For example, Anderson et aL[8] define operationsstrategy, a broader term that encompasses service operations strategy as wellas manufacturing strategy, as a "long-range plan or vision for the operationsfunction. This plan must be integrated with the business strategy andimplemented throughout operations". Hill[9] differentiates his planningframework from others by emphasizing the need for combining manufacturingand marketing functional strategies and incorporating these in a corporatedecision framework.

Hayes and Wheelwright[3] characterize Skinner and most other writers asimplying a stage Iii (internally supportive) role for manufacturing. Specifically,Hayes and Wheelwright argue that:

Manufacturing organizations in Stage III firms are still largely regarded as being responsiveI in nature (albeit with better foresight and a broadened perspective), and are simply

encouraged to pursue their traditional roles with more ingenuity and somewhat greaterresources[3].

Thus, according to Hayes and Wheelwright, the top-down planning paradigmof Skinner and others applies mostly to stage III manufacturers. In a review ofthe manufacturing strategy literature, Leong et al.[10] report that a top-downview of manufacturing strategy is still predominant in the literature.

The problem with a planning-oriented process model is not that it iswrong but rather that it is insufficient. Although a view of manufacturingstrategy as a plan is in many ways satisfactory, it is not all-encompassing.Schonberger[2] notes that planning is only a single dimension in the manufact-uring strategy process. Similar arguments have been made for corporate andcompetitive strategy planning. Quinn[ll] argues that a single formal plan is far

too unwieldy for large diversified organizations. Instead, according to Quinn,strategies tend to emerge incrementally from strategic subsystems within thecorporation and corporate managers must link these strategies in a logicalfashion. Quinn finds that formal planning has its greatest impact when it takesthe form of a special study of a major change in business practices orenvironment. Hayes[6] makes similar arguments for an incremental approach tostrategy making. In addition, Hayes observes that capabilities are much moredifficult to develop than plans and that capabilities ought to be exploited forstrategic gain. Hayes suggests that formal planning is most appropriate insituations where external discontinuities require centralized decision making.In short, both Quinn and Hayes argue that top-down planning is not the onlyway to achieve strategic success and they agree that an incremental, consensusactuated approach is a more realistic model of how firms arrive at strategies.

The usefulness of a planning view of strategy is manifold, however.It provides insights into the way some manufacturers always makemanufacturing strategy (stage III manufacturers, to use Hayes andWheelwright's terminology)[3]. The essentially top-down planning approachcontributes to improving manufacturing in at least five other important ways:

(1) Most manufacturers have yet to achieve stage IV or WCM status and awell implemented top-down planning framework would mark a majorimprovement in the strategic capacity of the manufacturing function.Hayes and Wheelwright[3] argue that it is difficult or impossible to"skip" stages and, therefore, the top-down planning model suggests astrategic goal for those manufacturers that are still stage I or stage IIwith respect to manufacturing.

(2) The planning paradigm provides a framework for formalizing strategythat is useful in corporations that have a mixture of stage III and stagerv business units. The planning paradigm does not preclude incrementalor bottom up strategies. It is just not the most efficient means fordeveloping them. The planning structure also provides a firm anchor forcompanies that are pushing capability building further down theirorganizational structure and are evolving into WCM status.

(3) The centralized strategy making implied by the planning model is mosteffective when an organization faces dramatic environmental change.Hayes suggests that WCMs from Europe and Japan may be adapting USstyle strategic planning and grafting it to their existing systems "... sothat they can be better prepared for dealing with the discontinuities thatsometimes confront them"[6].

(4) Manufacturing capability building often entails major capital spendingprogrammes. Proposals for such programmes have to be evaluated withrespect to the capital needs of the entire enterprise and potential benefitscompared with competing uses of funds. The planning frameworkprovides an excellent vehicle for judging capital investment requests.

Six Ps ofmanufacturing

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IJOPM (5) The formality of the planning model provides a useful framework for15^12 evaluating strategy regardless of how it was made. The planning

paradigm provides managers and researchers with the elements of theprocess which must be addressed whether strategy is deliberate oremergent.

Proactiveness—"^^-^^ Skinner's landmark article is among the first to suggest that top management

pay more attention to the manufacturing function in formulating the firm'soverall corporate strategy[l]. Others have ascribed the ailments to theindifferent attitude that top managers have towards manufacturing. In fact,critics suggest, manufacturing has often taken on a subordinate strategic role tothe marketing and financial functions. This makes manufacturing an "inferiorpartner" with the result that manufacturing accepts a reactive rather than aproactive role. In such an environment, manufacturing is expected to beconcerned with short-term issues. We argue that manufacturing must take aproactive stance if it is to be of strategic importance to the business.

Proactiveness is, in fact, the single characteristic that discriminates betweenmanufacturing functions that offer strategic benefit to the firm and those thatdo not. Hayes and Wheelwright[3] illustrate this point in describing the four-stage model for manufacturing companies to become world class competitorsdepicted in Figure 1. Stage I manufacturing units react blindly to the demandsplaced on them from the top and offer no strategic advantage to the firm.In contrast, stage IV organizations are depicted as those which have developedmanufacturing capabilities that can be exploited for competitive advantage bythe firm. The manufacturing organization's move from complete neutrality instage I to being a source of competitive advantage in stage IV is marked by thedegree of proactiveness.

Hayes and Wheelwright observe that most writers in the field ofmanufacturing strategy imply a stage III role for firms' manufacturingfunction. Stage IV manufacturers are distinguished by three dimensions:

(1) they make efforts to anticipate the potential of new manufacturingpractices and technologies;

(2) manufacturing is centrally involved in major marketing and engineeringdecisions; and

(3) long-range programmes are pursued in order to acquire capabilities inadvance of needs[3].

In other words, stage IV firms (or WCMs) are out front in developingtechnologies, collaborating with other functions and developing capabilitiesbefore they are needed. Thus, the difference between stage III and stage IVfirms lies primarily in their proactiveness.

Such a difference in proactiveness can be illustrated by an example. In theearly 1980s electronics industry journals reported the promise of new

packaging technology for electronic components. This new technology wouldallow components to be "surface mounted" as opposed to the traditional"through hole" method of attaching components to printed circuit boards. Theprimary advantage of surface mount technology over conventional packagingis that components can be mounted more densely and, thus, achieve spaceeconomies. Denser circuit boards translate into smaller products which areoften more attractive in the marketplace.

The catch in all of this was that surface mount assembly required radicalchanges in the manufacturing process to accommodate gluing as opposed tosoldering components and also to provide higher yields since rework was moredifficult. Proactive manufacturers viewed surface mount technology as anopportunity and developed expertise in manufacturing before they had aproduct which required it. Proactive manufacturing units were then in aposition to work with engineering in developing products that employedsurface mount technology and gain further marketplace advantage. Reactive

Six Ps ofmanufacturing

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Stage I

Internallyneutral

Stage II

Externallyneutral

Stage III

Intematlysupportive

Stage IV

Externallysupportive

Management regards nianufacturing as neutral at bestand seeks simply to minimize any negative impact that itmight have. It is not expected (in fact, should not eventry) to make any significant positive contribution.Manufacturing is kept flexible and reactive

Firms seek competitive neutrality (parity with majorcompetitors) on the manufacturing dimension, rather thaninternal neutrality. Firms see manufacturirig's role asneutral at best, but define that role in relation to "industrypractice"

The firm expects its manufacturing organization to providecredible and significant support to its overall competitivestrategy. Manufacturing's contribution is derived from anddictated by a business strategy ,

The rote of manufacturing is seen as a means for attaininga significant advantage. A firm's manufacturing strategy isdeveloped iteratiyely with the business strategy and otherfunctional strategies. Long-range programmes are pursuedin order to acquire capabilities in advance of needs

Figure 1.Degrees of

proactiveness markingthe four evolutionary

stages ofmanufacturing's

strategic role adaptedfrom [3]

IJOPM manufacturers, on the other hand, were forced to try to catch up with the leader15,12 when their product engineering departments responded to the competitive

challenge with surface mount product offerings of their own. This resulted innew product introductions that were slower and more chaotic than usual forreactive manufacturers and profit margins that were lower because ofmanufacturing incapability.

3 8~ " ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ Pattern of actions

The third view of manufacturing strategy is as a pattern of actions. The essenceof the concept is that one can infer the content of a firm's manufacturingstrategy from observing its actions or recorded decisions, even if one knowsnothing about the articulated strategy of the firm. The concept is brought intofocus by Quinn with the following quote from an executive interview subject:

When I was younger I always conceived of a room where all of these [strategici concepts wereworked out for the whole company. Later, I didn't find any such room ... The strategy [of thecompany] may not even exist in the mind of one man [or woman]. I certainly don't know whereit is written down. It is simply transmitted in the series of decisions madefll].

In a similar vein, Hayes and Wheelwright note that it is thepattern of structural and infrastructural decisions that constitutes the manufacturing strategyof a business unit. More formally, manufacturing strategy consists of a sequence of decisionsthat, over time, enables a business unit to achieve a desired manufacturing structure,infrastructure, and set of specific capabilities[3].

Mintzberg[7] also defines competitive strategy as a "pattern in a stream ofdecisions". In order to make inferences about manufacturing strategy from apattern of decisions or actions, an observer must know which kind of decisionsare strategic. The manufacturing decision areas that are of strategicimportance converge on nine areas: capacity, facilities {location and design),process technology, vertical integration, production planning and materialscontrol, quality systems, organization, workforce and new productdevelopment. The pattern of actions or decisions made within and across theseareas provides a view of the manufacturing strategy of the firm.

The view of strategy revealed by observing patterns of decisions or actionsis distinctly different from the view one gets by observing plans or assessingproactiveness. Patterns reveal the content of manufacturing strategy withoutregard for the process by which that strategy is made. In contrast,proactiveness and planning views emphasize process, although these viewsalso provide some insights into strategy content. An understanding of bothprocess and content is necessary to understand a manufacturer's strategy.

Mintzberg and Waters[12] use patterns to bridge content and process. Theyadvocate observing streams of behaviour of a firm, identifying the strategiesrevealed through the patterns in those streams and then tracing the strategiesback to their origins as a means for understanding the relationship betweenintended and realized strategy. Mintzberg and Waters' contribution in this areais in articulating the possibility that strategy can be discerned through patterns

even when no such strategy was intended by the firm's leaders. Mintzberg andWaters also note that it is more practical for researchers to observe patterns ofactions rather than decisions since decisions necessarily represent theintentions of the firm's leadership, and hence cannot be observed.

Patterns of actions on the part of manufacturers also tell us something aboutthe manufacturing unit with respect to the four stage model of Hayes andWheelwright. Stage III and IV manufacturers will act consistently aaoss thedecision areas and a profile of their strategy will emerge. Stage I manufacturers,however, will often be difficult to classify. These manufacturing units are oftenwhipsawed as they react to an inconsistent set of management demands. Thisstage I plight is captured in a description of the manufacturing task credited toSkinner:

On Monday, they want low cost.On Tuesday, they want high quality.On Wednesday, they want no baekorders.On Thursday, they want low inventories.On Friday, they want maximum overhead absorption, so we have to work the weekend[13].

In sharp relief to the consistent patterns displayed by stage III and IVmanufacturers, the actions of a stage I manufacturer will appear to be withoutpattern. Stage II manufacturers do exhibit a pattern, however, the patterns ofactions will reflect movement in accord with industry norms rather than towardachieving competitive advantage through distinction.

Portfolio of manufacturing capabilitiesA fourth view of manufacturing strategy evolves from the manufacturingcapabilities of an operating unit. According to Hayes and Pisano[14]manufacturing strategy is "about selecting and creating operating capabilitiesa company needs for the future". In addition, the portfolio of manufacturingcapabilities of the manufacturing unit reflect the intersection of operational andmarket considerations. In a large sense, market considerations consist of thefirm's perception of its own and its competitors' positions with respect to whatit offers the customer. Wheelwright[15] uses product-process concepts indescribing the differences between two successful competitors in the electronicsindustry. Hewlett-Packard's tradition of product engineering dominationprecludes it from attempting to gain scale economies that Texas Instruments,with its tradition of manufacturing dominance, pursues as a matter of course.In a similar analysis, an examination of technology-driven strategies for theDeere Company and Warwick Electronics showed that both these companieswere in trouble because they were slow to recognize that a change in productstrategy caused the manufacturing tasks to change as well[16].

Published research in manufacturing strategy identifies five genericmanufacturing capabilities: cost, quality, delivery performance, flexibility,and innovativeness[10]. An empirical study of European, Japanese, andNorth American manufacturers by Ferdows et a/.[17] shows that Japanese

Six Ps ofmanufacturing

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IJOPM manufacturers ranked cost as their top priority while North American and15,12 European respondents ranked quality as the most important area of attention.

Ferdows et al. suggest that a high degree of quality has already been achievedby Japanese respondents so achieving quality is not their number one concern(although maintaining quality remains important). These manufacturers'

. „ existing strength in quality is maintained while other capabilities (e.g. cost and^ flexibility) are pursued. Putting Ferdows et aL's interpretation of their data in

Hill's terms, Japanese respondents beheve that quality has become a "qualifier"in the market segments in which they compete[9]. Order winning criteria fortheir customers are cost or product feature related, provided that the qualifyinglevel of quality is maintained.

De Meyer et al.[lS] use additional data to further develop the case made byFerdows et al. They reveal evidence that top Japanese manufacturers arecurrently stressing flexibility and low cost production as their strategic thrusts.These authors argue that instead of viewing capabilities as alternative stand-alone points of concern, Japanese manufacturers in the study sequentiallyconsidered quality, dependability, cost, and flexibility as capabilities that a firmbuilds over time and that this progression has been a source of advantage usedby excellent manufacturers. Ferdows and De Meyer[19] also propose asequential model for building capabilities. In the same vein, Stalk[20] posits thattime is the source of competitive advantage currently exploited by WCMs."Fast-cycle" companies such as Toyota, Honda, Seiko, Freightliner, Atlas Door,and Benetton, are able to produce quality products at lower cost, provide bettercustomer service (faster and more reliable delivery performance) and introducenew products quicker than the competition. In short, some excellentmanufacturers appear to be continuing to add to their portfolios of capabilities.The evidence indicates that as soon as one set of capabilities is achieved at ahigh level, emphasis shifts to another dimension while maintaining the highlevels achieved previously. The dynamic nature of capability building forexcellent manufacturers makes catching up difficult for their competition.

Programmes of improvementAnother revealing view of a firm's manufacturing strategy can be gained byexamining the programmes of improvement the firm undertakes. Hayes etaL[2\] argue that:

The ultimate purpose of strategic management is to focus an organization's resources,capabilities and energies on building a sustainable competitive advantage over its competitorsalong one or more dimensions of performance.

Similarly, Pisano and Hayes[14] suggest that before management adopts anyprogramme, they should ask the following question: "What specific capabilitieswill this program create for my organization, and are these capabilities valuablein competitive terms?" Programmes of improvement are the means for buildingcapabilities which are the basis for competitive advantage. Based on this viewof strategy, how a firm chooses to expend its resources on programmes of

improvement is indeed aitical to understanding its strategy. Others have takena similar view. Fine and Hax[22] define manufacturing strategy as "a criticalpart of the firm's corporate and business strategies, comprising a set of wellcoordinated objectives and action programs aimed at securing a long-term,sustainable advantage over competitors".

Hax and Majluf[23] describe an action programme as "a structured, coherent,timed and evaluated continuum of actions, with a clearly defined schedule forcompletion in a relatively short time span, normally, from 6 to 18 months".Examples of improvement programmes abound. Just-in-time, total qualitymanagement, computer integrated manufacturing, group technology, flexiblemanufacturing systems implementation, and employee involvement are just asample of programmes that firms have implemented to gain a competitive edge.Of course, these programmes must be co-ordinated with existing capabilitiesand strategic needs. Fine and Hax[22] provide a good example of broad andspecific action programmes pertaining to Packard Electric's wire and cablebusiness unit.

Miller and Hayslip[24] argue that both formal planning and improvementprogrammes are needed in manufacturing. They contend that strategicplanning is, by its nature, the exclusive province of top management whileaction programmes are necessarily inclusive. Well designed action programmesrequire participation from all levels within the organization and are intended toimprove the capabilities of the firm in areas that are of strategic importance.Strong capability development efforts and strong strategic planning efforts areboth needed to achieve competitive advantage. In addition, improvementprogrammes should be results-driven and focused on achieving specific,measurable operational gains[25].

Performance measurementThe final view of manufacturing strategy is through performancemeasurement. The proposition on which most discussion of manufacturingstrategy is based is that successful manufacturing strategy leads tocompetitive strength and ultimately to better performance. However, thisproposition has not been substantiated empirically and more research isrequired in this area. Additionally, Minor et a/.[26] note in their review ofempirical manufacturing studies that few have examined the impact ofmanufacturing strategy on overall business performance. Specifically,questions about the situations in which companies benefit most frommanufacturing strategy and which aspects of manufacturing strategy exhibitthe greatest leverage with respect to an improvement in firm performance needto be explored more thoroughly.

Despite the critical need for research in the area, performance measurementsystems themselves provide a normative window through which manufacturingstrategy can be viewed and themselves be evaluated. The very choice ofmeasurement criteria ought to reflect the strategic goals of management.For example, a business unit that stresses rapid delivery performance across

Six Ps ofmanufacturing

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IJOPM many product lines ought to measure and reward delivery performance. Human15,12 nature dictates that if employees are being evaluated on quantity and efficiency

but expected to concentrate on quality and customer service, workers andmanagers are likely to emphasize numbers with little regard for quality orcustomer service. If the measurement and reward systems are aligned withstrategic goals, then everyone in the organization will understand the

^ £ importance of quality and delivery performance and behave accordingly.For example, the importance of new product introductions is becoming clear

to many electronics firms. Some of these firms have begun to focus on "break-even time" as opposed to traditional cost-based performance measurementschemes. Hewlett-Packard has reported that such alignment between strategicgoals and performance measurement has led to improved competitiveperformance.

Performance measurement can be classified as a strategy process issuebecause it provides information to strategy makers about the efficacy ofstrategic choices and suggests areas for strategic correction. A business unit'schoice of performance measurements, however, also provides a window into thecontent of its strategy, because a good system of performance measurementwill reflect the competitive priorities of the business unit. Design ofperformance measurement systems which accurately reflect these priorities iscurrently the subject of much interest among manufacturing and costaccounting practitioners. This interest is reflected in the numerous conferencesand workshops being offered on the subject and in articles appearing inpractitioner journals. It appears that there is a great deal of concern amongmanufacturers in tying performance measurement to strategic factors moreeffectively[27,28].

Integrating the six views of manufacturing strategyThe previous discussion estabhshes that each of the six views provides aunique and useful window into manufacturing strategy. Despite theirusefulness, each of the windows only allows a limited view of strategy and anobserver runs the risk of misinterpreting a business unit's manufacturingstrategy if he or she relies on a single view. An analogy to the fable of the blindmen and the elephant can be made. In the fable, each blind man felt a differentpart of an elephant's body and could not correctly identify those parts.An accurate identification of the elephant could only result if each of the blindmen's stories could be integrated. An attempt to describe manufacturingstrategy based on a single perspective is hindered in a manner similar to eachof the blind men's accounts. Several views must be taken and integratedtogether to portray accurately the manufacturing strategy of a business unit.

Figure 2 is presented as one means for integrating the various views ofmanufacturing strategy suggested earlier. Three of the views, planning,proactiveness, and performance measurement, describe the process ofmanufacturing strategy. The other three views, programmes of improvement,portfoho of manufacturing capabilities, and pattern of actions, represent the

Portfolio ofmanufacturing

capabilities

Programmes ofimprovement

Six Ps ofmanufacturing

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Figure 2.A multifaceted view of

manufacturing strategy

content of manufacturing strategy. Therefore, an even split among process andcontent is achieved with the six views. As noted earlier, an understanding ofprocess and content issues is necessary to understand a manufacturer'sstrategy.

In addition to providing an important view of manufacturing strategycontent, examining patterns of actions has the potential to provide a bridge forresearchers studying the process of manufacturing strategy. Mintzberg andWaters make this point with respect to competitive strategy[12]. Researchers incompetitive strategy observe patterns of behaviour in practice and trace backfrom the observed patterns to explore the decision processes that led to thoseobserved patterns. Mintzberg and Waters provide numerous examples that areapplicable to manufacturing strategy.

The nature of the bridge from content to process that is accorded byobserving patterns can be illustrated by an example. Texas Instruments has awell-documented reputation for pursuing the experience curve aggressively tosustain a low manufacturing cost position which often serves as an effectivebarrier to entry in high-technology product markets which are otherwisetempting to technological followers[15]. The pattern of pricing decisions andactions which reveal the low cost capability (content) and manufacturing costimprovement programmes (content) also suggests a path which will lead to thestrategic process. Detailed Harvard Business School case studies of TexasInstruments Time Products Division and Texas Instruments Speak and Spelltrace how content decisions were made. These two cases reveal a well

IJOPM established planning framework which permeates every level of manufacturing15,12 decision making and evaluation at Texas Instruments. The point of this

example is to demonstrate how discovery of a pattern of content decisions maylead to investigation of the process by which they are made. The bridge worksboth ways; reflecting on a particular firm's strategic process may spurdiscovery of a pattern of actions.

"^^ Similar to the bridge from content to process provided by examining patternsof decisions or actions, performance measurement affords a potential bridgefrom process to content in manufacturing strategy The performance measuresemphasized by firms yield insights into the strategic capabilities andprogrammes of the firms, thus moving the researcher from "how" to "what"with respect to manufacturing strategy. An example of the usefulness of such abridge is provided by the well documented problems experienced by Mazda,USA with its kaizen programme in its assembly plant at Flat Rock, Michigan.Although the programme is in operation, it is meeting severe resistance fromthe workforce which comprises members of the United Auto Workers union[29].A review of performance measurements at the plant would reveal thatcontinuous improvement has been emphasized by management but itsmeasurable achievement has been limited. This leads to an assessment that, atleast in the short run, Mazda's intended manufacturing strategy (continuousimprovement) is at odds with its realized strategy (traditional, negotiatedimprovements).

In short, we argue that understanding manufacturing strategy requiresviewing the strategy in question through multiple lenses. The lenses providedby the six Ps allow a sophisticated and reinforcing picture of strategy to beconstructed which protrays both process and content issues. Manufacturingstrategy researchers must consider the entire fabric of manufacturing strategyto provide useful prescriptions concerning what works under which conditions.Similarly, manufacturing executives have to consider both the content andprocess of competitors strategy to gather the insight needed to gain the upperhand.

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29. Patterson, G.A., "Mazda-UAW's Michigan honeymoon is over". Wall Street Journal,17 April 1990.

Six Ps ofmanufacturing

strategy

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