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• 1. Transportation & Cargo Security Chapter Three: Protection of Transportation Facilities

2. Learning Objectives After reading this chapter the reader should be able to: 1. Comprehend and utilize standard risk management security techniques. 2. Compare and contrast the ability to harden an airport terminal versus a rail or cruise ship terminal. 3. Analyze the difficulties related to installing metal detectors and scanning equipment in a mass transit environment. 4. Explore the means to track hazardous cargo through the trucking industry. 5. Assess the federal governments highway safety and security program. 6. Discuss the best industry practices in place in the trucking, mass transit, and oil pipeline industries and debate the need for federal mandated rules. 7. Describe the unique aspects of protecting the pipeline industry. 8. Conduct a risk management assessment on a transportation facility. 3. Subtopics Introduction The U.S. Transportation Security Administration (TSA) assumed responsibility for overall transportation security after 9/11. They initially hired approximately 65,000 employees in a relatively short period of time and promised to hire more competent screeners, use explosive detection devices (EDS); and increase the percentages of screened baggage. Long standing vulnerabilities had been recognized but not sufficiently addressed prior to 9/ll including failure by screeners to detect threats when screening passengers, absence of a requirement to examine checked baggage on domestic flights, inadequate controls in limiting access to secure areas, and failure to control access to air traffic control systems (ATC). These problems persist. 4. Update: An investigation by the General Accountability Office shows a gaping vulnerability remains. Between January 2006 and October 2006 teams of undercover federal investigators walked through various airport checkpoints carrying common household items in their bags. By themselves the materials were not bombs. But they were ingredients that could have been mixed together in an airplane restroom to make an improvised explosive device (IED) . The failure was across the board. 21 airports were tested and in all 21, screeners were unable to find component parts that could be used to make homemade bombs. 5. TSA FAIL: Screeners Frequently Miss Fake Bombs During Undercover Tests! 6. Solutions The process of risk assessment begins with three well accepted principles: predictability, probability, and criticality. Security professionals agree that the process from risk analysis to risk management involve several distinct steps. They generally include: 1. Define the existing problem 2. Spell out the objectives of the assessment 3. Evaluate the current measures in place 4. Identify and appraise the potential risk 5. Select the appropriate risk reduction measures appropriate to the circumstances 6. Develop and implement the selected measures 7. Test the measures 8. Update the program at least annually. 7. Protecting Public Air Transportation Airports are public facilities offering a public service, and are extremely difficult to harden, as targets due to the need for accessibility. Consequently, public air transportation is an alluring target in terms of difficulty in providing adequate physical, personnel, and operational security. A report issued by the GAO in June 2000 stated that screeners failed to detect threat objects located on passengers and carry-on baggage; failing to notice about 20% of the objects, which would have posed a threat. The statistics actually showed a decline in the detection rate between the years 1991and 1999, something not lost on terrorist strategic planners. Access control also presents unique problems for airport officials and special measures must be taken because of the uniqueness of the airport venue. 8. Update: A May 2005 GAO report says many of the nation's 45,000 screeners are not getting congressionally mandated training because of staffing shortages and because many work sites don't have access to high-speed Internet training courses. "As of October 2004, nearly half of the screener workforce did not have high-speed access to the Online Learning Center at their training facility," according to the report. The GAO said the TSA has taken steps to improve screener performance, and to better measure performance, but said more needs to be done, particularly in the area of checked baggage. The TSA has made a request for $174 million in the fiscal 2006 budget for high- speed Internet connectivity. 9. TSA FAIL Missed Loaded Gun in Carry- On Bag . . . Passenger Boards Plane! 10. Protecting Rail Service Train robbery, a quintessentially 19th century crime, is alive and well today. Railroad police use computers to pinpoint where cargo disappeared and infrared scopes to scan rail yards. Theft and pilferage have been estimated at $9 million to $14 million a year. The Association of American Railroads has indicated the actual loss during 2002 to be $11.4 million. This, of course, represents only a fraction of the industrys 2002 revenue of $42.9 billion. The heart of the rail security system is the Railway Alert Network (RAN), the major purpose of which is to monitor the level of threat to the rail industry and to alert the industry if it changes. In March 2004, the DHS announced a plan to the begin testing a way to screen rail passengers and their luggage to see if it can quickly and accurately detect security risks. 11. Protecting Rail Service continued The stated purpose of the project would be to test new technologies and screening concepts to see if they could be applied to trains, which depend on passengers being able to get on and off cars quickly. So far it has been the position of the TSA that putting a new security system in place at railroad facilities is inappropriate. A TSA official was quoted as saying, We can implement a system of security that is very, very comprehensive.. but it would cost billions of dollars. Is that the right strategy? Our judgment at this point is that it is not. 12. Keeping the Rail Lines Safe 13. Protecting Maritime Facilities Maritime security presents some of the most unique challenges of the transportation industry. The challenge is even greater due to a complex network of ownership, domestic, and foreign interests, and varying levels of security at different ports and terminals. Cruise ships have similar unique challenges but do inspect all carry-on baggage and use metal detectors to examine passengers. The industry must now comply with U.S. Coast Guard rules and the corresponding regulations of the International Maritime Organization. 14. Protecting Maritime Facilities Most U.S. ports are landlord ports. The port owns the property, builds the facilities, and performs most maintenance functions. The facilities are leased to terminal operators. These people engage in the actual business of moving cargo. Ports are generally patrolled by local police officers but all tenants must provide individual security. Access to ports is generally provided along truck ways or causeways where incoming cargo is searched upon entering the facility. Unless proper equipment is utilized to conduct these searches, the exercise can become an exercise in futility. 15. Protecting Maritime Facilities The U.S. Coast Guard has established port security zones in all U.S. ports. They screen, though not all physically, all arriving commercial vessels. Port security measures are imposed on an 'as needed' basis. The U.S. Coast Guard has also established protection zones for a distance of 500 yards around all U.S. naval vessels in navigable waters of the United States. 16. Port of Long Beach Security 17. Protecting Mass Transit The evolution of urban public transportation systems from horse-drawn street cars to automobiles, buses, and complex subway and elevated train systems has transformed the industry and its associated security requirements. In an attack against a mass transit system, local law enforcement would take the lead in preparing for, preventing, and responding. Most American cities give responsibility for mass transit security to municipal law enforcement agencies, although some larger municipalities support designated forces. The Department of Homeland Security announced in November 2003 that it allocated $750 million for the Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI). The program provides monies to urban areas to enhance overall security and preparedness levels in order to prevent, respond, and recover from acts of terrorism. 18. Protecting Mass Transit As part of a commitment to directing funds to urban areas, which have been designated as critical national infrastructures, DHS has selected several urban areas to receive the largest portion of funds: up to $675 million. The DHS based the decision on a formula that took into account factors including critical infrastructure, population density, and credible threat intelligence. In December 2002, the Government Accounting Office issued a report outlining the vulnerability of buses and commuter rail systems. The report conducted in-depth reviews of ten transit agencies and concludes that while commuter transit systems could be targets of terrorist attacks, insufficient funding, coordination and sharing of critical information are inhibiting efforts to make the systems more secure. Approximately 14 million Americans use mass transit every workday. The key to a better response against a mass transit attack is better technology and better training. 19. TRANSPORTATION IN 2 learns about the newly created transit counter terrorism team 20. Protecting Highways/Trucking The purpose of the Highway Watch Program is to promote security awareness among all segments of the motor carrier transportation community. This program trains commercial drivers to observe and report any suspicious activities or items that may threaten the highway transportation system. Authority for the program was originally contained in the fiscal year 2003 Appropriations Act under Public Law 108-7 and included an amount of $19,700,000. On an average day, more than 7.5 million vehicles and approximately 10.5 million holders of commercial drivers licenses (CDLs) are on U.S. roads. Almost 2.5 million of the drivers have an endorsement, which permits them to haul hazardous cargo. According to U.S. Customs, more than 11.2 million trucks entered the United States in 2001. The job of protecting them and their cargo is incredible and hard to grasp. Of particular significance in evaluating the safety and security of the trucking industry, is of course, the huge numbers of people involved. Those people who typically come into contact with vehicles include drivers, mechanics, washers, loading and unloading personnel, and commercial vehicle inspectors. In order for any semblance of security to prevail, these positions must be filled with qualified employees who are provided with appropriate supervision. 21. TSA Checkpoints Now On Interstate Highways 22. Protecting Pipelines There are approximately 200,000 miles of oil pipeline alone in the United States. The industry has taken steps to increase close surveillance of pipelines, implement even more restrictions to access vital points along routes, and to expand the physical patrolling of the lines. Presidential Decision Directive 63 assigned lead responsibility for pipeline infrastructure protection to the Department of Transportation. Immediately after 9/11 the Office of Pipeline Safety issued emergency bulletins to oil and gas companies and also removed from its website detailed diagrams representing the locations of the nations pipelines. The OPS also conducted a detailed vulnerability assessment of exactly which pipeline facilities were absolutely critical to the economic and defense capabilities of the nation. The industry soon came to focus on critical pipeline facilities, control centers, pump and compressor stations, and storage facilities. 23. Oil and gas security solutions from Siemens 24. Conclusion The world faces a two-branched challenge both to maintain the security of transportation systems and continue to ensure the free flow of commerce. The Department of Homeland Security consolidated 22 different agencies in an attempt to orchestrate a network of standardized security for each transportation component. However, now several years since the tragedy on 9/11, the bureaucracy has yet to really accomplish all but the beginnings of a security program based on time tested protocols of risk management. The efforts are often under-funded, overlapping, insufficient and redundant, and have only recently expanded outside the air component. 25. Case Study: If you were asked to be a contributing consultant on the planning and development of a new port in New Orleans, what policies, processes, and procedures would you recommend to adequately protect the maritime industry using this facility; i.e., rail access, truck access, pipeline access and possibly mass transit to a cruise ship terminal? 26. Discussion Questions and Exercises