-
[2017] AACR 9 (Adams v SSWP)
Page 1
[2017] AACR 28 (Adams v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions
and Green (CSM)
[2017] UKUT 9 (AAC)) Mr Justice Charles CP CCS/2116/2013 13
February 2017 Tribunal procedure and practice – anonymity – whether
practice of anonymising decisions appropriate The appellant had
appealed to the Upper Tribunal (UT) against the assessment of his
liability for child support maintenance and, in accordance with its
usual practice, the UT had anonymised the names of the parties and
referred only to the child’s forenames in its decision: CA v (1)
The Secretary of State, (2) EG (CSM) [2014] UKUT 359 (AAC). Its
practice represented a default judicial approach as the UT had not
made an order prohibiting publication of the names of the parties
involved in the proceedings under rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure
(Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008. The appellant appealed against the
UT’s practice, arguing that subject to exceptional circumstances
all litigants had a common law right to insist on no anonymisation
of cases, particularly those heard in public, unless it was removed
by primary legislation. Before the UT could consider that appeal
the CA decision was published on the Fathers4Justice website in an
unanonymised form and the UT issued an interim anonymity order
under rule 14 requiring the decision to be taken down. Among the
issues before the UT was whether a final anonymity order should be
made and whether it should continue its practice of anonymising
parties in child support cases.
Held, allowing the appeal, that:
1. the fundamental common law principle was applied to promote,
and therefore was qualified by, the promotion of the public
interest on which it was founded and so it had always been
recognised that in some limited circumstances the interests of
justice would be better served by a private hearing or
anonymisation (with or without a reporting restrictions order) and
so a litigant could not insist on a public hearing and unanonymised
publication (paragraph 49);
2. when a court was determining an open justice issue by
weighing competing Convention rights it must have regard to the
fundamental common law principle of open justice and the weight
given to it, and thus the public interest reasons for it, by the
courts in England and Wales. The exercise was fact and circumstance
sensitive and, on this approach, a departure from open justice must
be justified. Accordingly, an approach of the UT that was based
primarily on an analogy with that taken by the Family Courts or the
Court of Protection at first instance would be wrong (paragraphs 66
to 67);
3. the UT concluded that in this case there should not be a
final anonymity reporting restriction order having decided that the
interests of open justice outweighed the harm arising from
embarrassment, worry or distress to the child (and his mother)
subject to extending the existing anonymity order for a limited
time to enable the current position to be preserved if there was an
appeal (paragraphs 101 to 102);
4. the UT’s practice of anonymising decisions would continue on
the basis that it was explained to all the parties to the appeal
that, subject to further order by the UT, the practice of
anonymising decisions would only be applied if no party objected to
it, and (i) that its effects were that: (a) non-parties who
obtained decisions either directly or indirectly from the UT would
do so in an anonymised form, and (b) if someone asked the UT for
the identity of the anonymised persons the parties would be
notified and given an opportunity to object, (ii) that the UT’s
practice did not prevent publication by a party or anyone else of
the identities of the individuals involved in the case, and
accordingly (iii) if a party wanted an injunctive order they should
ask for one (paragraphs 127 to 132).
DECISION OF THE UPPER TRIBUNAL (ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS
CHAMBER)
Subject to further order of the Upper Tribunal or the Court of
Appeal:
(1) On 15 February 2017
-
[2017] AACR 9 (Adams v SSWP)
Page 2
(a) this decision, and
(b) the decision of Upper Tribunal Judge Turnbull presently
reported as CA v (1) The Secretary of State, (2) EG (CSM) [2014]
UKUT 359 (AAC)
will be published on the UT(AAC) database in an unanonymized
form.
(2) The injunctive order made on 22 June 2016 is continued to
but will end at 9.30 am on 15 February 2017.
REASONS
Introduction
1. The appellant (Mr Adams) and the second respondent (Miss
Green) have a son Nicholas (N) who is now 15. For most of N’s life
his parents have been in litigation about him. That litigation (the
Family Litigation) has been hard fought and has given rise to very
strong feelings on both sides. It has ranged over a number of
issues to be decided under the Children Act 1989. I understand that
those maintenance proceedings are continuing.
2. I do not know and do not need to know the details of the
Family Litigation. I am grateful to both Dr Pelling and Mr Holden
for representing the parents on this application. Without them the
dynamics of the relationship between the parents and their
attitudes would have made a hearing that focused on the issues
extremely difficult if not impossible.
3. The appeal to the Upper Tribunal (Administrative Appeals
Chamber) UT(AAC) was made by Mr Adams, as the non-resident parent,
against a decision of the First-tier Tribunal (F-tT) made on 28
March 2011 that Mr Adams was liable to pay child support
maintenance in the sum of £57.14 per week from April 2009. The
appeal was heard by Upper Tribunal Judge Turnbull and his decision
is reported on the UT(AAC) database as CA v (1) The Secretary of
State, (2) EG (CSM) [2014] UKUT 359 (AAC) (the Turnbull Decision).
The (CSM) in that title identifies that the Turnbull Decision
relates to child support maintenance. And the title reflects the
practice of the UT(AAC), which I describe later, to anonymize such
decisions on its database and in its records. Judge Turnbull did
this by anonymizing the names of the parents and referring to the
child by his forename. This application concerns:
i) Mr Adams’s challenge to that practice of the UT(AAC), which
he argues is unlawful, and
ii) whether in this case an anonymity order (and so a reporting
restrictions order) should have been made as an interim order and
whether it should now be made as a final order.
4. The core of the Turnbull Decision was that the First-tier
Tribunal (F-tT) had erred in law in its approach to the application
of regulation 18(1)(a) of the Child Support (Variations)
Regulations 2000 (SI 2001/156) (the Regulations) then in force
which applied to an asset: “in which the non-resident parent has a
beneficial interest, or which the non-resident parent has the
ability to control”. Judge Turnbull decided that the reference to a
beneficial interest in that regulation encompassed the interest of
a beneficiary under a discretionary trust, and so the interest of
Mr Adams under such a trust. For that and other reasons Judge
Turnbull remitted the appeal to a freshly constituted F-tT for
redetermination. My understanding in
-
[2017] AACR 9 (Adams v SSWP)
Page 3
October 2016 was that that hearing, and other appeals relating
to child support maintenance between the parties, had not yet taken
place.
5. Mr Adams:
i) sought permission to appeal the Turnbull Decision, and
ii) challenged its publication in an anonymized form (and this
challenge has been referred to as the Open Justice Issue).
6. Permission to appeal was refused by Judge Turnbull, then on
paper by Elias LJ and then, following a hearing, by Sales LJ. In
refusing permission to appeal the Court of Appeal did not deal with
the Open Justice Issue. I gave directions that it was to be heard
by me rather than Judge Turnbull. A hearing took place before me on
22 June 2016. The injunctive order I made and the judgment I gave
on that day are set out in Parts A and B of the Schedule
hereto.
7. As appears from that judgment and order, the Turnbull
Decision had been published on the Fathers4Justice website in an
unanonymized form. The hearing on 22 June 2016 was held in public
and some members of the public attended. Miss Green attended for a
very short time but left leaving Mr Holden to represent her. After
it, a number of further applications were made but I refused to
make any substantive orders on the basis that the applications
could and would be dealt with at the hearing on 6 October 2016. At
that hearing, Miss Green again only attended for a short time. As
at the earlier hearing in June, Mr Adams attended throughout.
8. At an early stage of the hearing it was agreed that all
assertions of fact made during submissions would be treated as
evidence given on oath and that there was no need for those
asserting them to confirm them on oath from the witness box. The
media had been informed of the hearing but no media representative
or member of the public attended. I informed Dr Pelling and Mr
Adams that if members of the public attended but refused to
identify themselves as persons who had been notified of the
injunction, I would not spend time on that issue but would hold the
remainder of the hearing in private and give my decision in
public.
9. Miss Green, through Mr Holden, indicated that she was no
longer seeking to pursue any committal application in respect of
the original and continuing publication on the Fathers4Justice
website. Nonetheless, Mr Adams and Dr Pelling continued their
stance of exercising their right of silence in connection with that
publication and the issues of fact relating to how those
responsible for putting the Turnbull Decision on that website in an
unanonymized form had obtained a copy of the Turnbull Decision and
the identities of the parties to it.
10. I indicated that I would give my reasons for my announced
conclusions on the preliminary and other applications in this
decision.
Preliminary and other applications
11. These were:
i) An application by Mr Adams that I should recuse myself or
direct that this application should be heard by a three-judge panel
comprising myself and two
-
[2017] AACR 9 (Adams v SSWP)
Page 4
other High Court judges (one from the QB Division and one from
the Chancery Division).
ii) An application by Miss Green that Dr Pelling should not be
permitted to represent Mr Adams.
iii) The request made in a letter from N that I should speak to
him. This was supported by Miss Green and opposed by Mr Adams.
iv) The application by Mr Adams that N be joined as a party. The
basis of this application was that it was N’s Convention rights
that were being relied on and so, as the relevant victim, he was a
necessary party.
v) An application to discharge the injunctive order I made
against Dr Pelling on 22 June 2016.
Recusal/Three-Judge Panel
12. I refused to recuse myself without calling on Mr Holden or
counsel for the Secretary of State. As the application did not seek
to exclude me from the three-judge panel it seems that it was
acknowledged that the bias alleged against me could be sufficiently
watered down by me sitting with two other judges. The matters
alleged were:
i) As I had been a judge of the Family Division for a number of
years and I am the Vice President of the Court of Protection there
was a plain risk of apparent and even actual bias arising from what
amounts to an obsession in the Family Division and the Court of
Protection with anonymity in any case which involves a child
(directly or indirectly) and indeed, in any case, involving adults
who are in or have been in some form of family relationship or who
may be regarded as in some sense vulnerable. In this context,
reliance was placed on passages in the judgments in Re G
(Celebrities: Publicity) [1999] 1 FLR 409 which referred to what
Hoffmann LJ said in Mrs R v Central Independent Television [1994]
Fam 192 about the inevitable tendency for a Family Division judge
at first instance to give too much weight to welfare and too little
weight to freedom of speech.
ii) I had shown pre-judgement and bias:
a) in my oral judgment at the hearing on 22 June 2016 by
castigating the lawful publication of the Turnbull Decision in an
unanonymized form as irresponsible and as “stealing a march”,
b) in my observations in my order dated 8 June 2016, where I
stated that Miss Green had drawn to my attention that Mr Adams and
Dr Pelling have published the Turnbull Decision in an unanonymized
form and comments on a website known as Fathers4Justice,
c) by making an injunction on 22 June 2016 against Dr Pelling
although in my judgment given on 22 June 2016 I had recorded that
there was no explanation as to how Fathers4Justice got the
unanonymized version of the Turnbull Decision, and
-
[2017] AACR 9 (Adams v SSWP)
Page 5
d) by requiring members of the public who attended the hearing
on 22 June 2016 to give their names and addresses.
13. It was also submitted that my decision in V v Associated
Newspapers Ltd & Others [2016] EWCOP 21 did not give Mr Adams
any confidence because it was arbitrarily and wrongly decided and,
in particular, did not mention the common law.
14. Point (i). In my view, this does not warrant my recusal or
the creation of a three-judge panel. The warning relied on is well
made and well known and so is something that any judge of any
Division and background should take into account. I do not accept
that the obsession asserted exists and, in any event, what matters
is the reasoning for any relevant judicial decision.
15. Point (ii). In my view, taken alone and together with the
other matters relied on it does not warrant my recusal or the
creation of a three-judge panel. Read in context points (a) and (b)
do not show any pre-judgement or bias.
16. Point (ii)(c) relates to:
i) who was responsible for providing Fathers4Justice with the
unanonymized version of the Turnbull Decision and for writing the
comments on it which include, as submitted by Dr Pelling orally,
that the point decided is somewhat arcane, and
ii) who could do something about getting it removed from the
website.
17. Dr Pelling submitted in exchanges between us on 6 October
2016 that I was relying on ex post facto justification in relation
to such matters. I do not agree. This submission of Dr Pelling
followed my indication that the obvious and most likely providers
of the unanonymized version of the Turnbull Decision were, absent
any alternative explanation from them, Mr Adams and/or Dr
Pelling.
18. I can understand why the attitude of Miss Green means that
Mr Adams and Dr Pelling do not wish to provide any such explanation
or any likely alternative source. But, in my view, this means that
the evidence leads to the almost inevitable inference that they (or
one of them) provided the information and comments to
Fathers4Justice.
19. It is also clear on the evidence, and so far as I am aware
undisputed, that:
i) both Dr Pelling and Mr Adams have had dealings with
Fathers4Justice. Indeed Mr Adams, when addressing me directly, made
it quite clear that he would try to get Fathers4Justice to make
further publication of matters he wanted in the public domain,
and
ii) Dr Pelling has been helping and advising Mr Adams for some
time in connection with his litigation against Miss Green about
their son, N.
To my mind, these points mean that there is an obvious
possibility that the entries relating to the Turnbull Decision on
the Fathers4Justice website might be removed if they asked for this
to be done.
-
[2017] AACR 9 (Adams v SSWP)
Page 6
20. This possibility, and the assertion made by both Mr Adams
and Dr Pelling that they had no control over what was put on and
left on the Fathers4Justice website, are reflected in the terms of
the order I made.
21. In my view, although he is not a party, Dr Pelling’s
connection with Mr Adams and his part in this case (and other
cases) between Mr Adams and Miss Green warranted the order being
made against him as well as Mr Adams. His submission that I might
as well have made the order against Miss Green or Mr Holden or any
third party is unconvincing because, so far as they are concerned,
an evidential link to the publication, and the possibility of
getting it removed, do not exist as they do with Dr Pelling.
22. If Dr Pelling’s case is that he only acted, and could only
act on, instructions from Mr Adams that would have an impact on the
steps he was required to take, namely those that were practically
open to him.
23. The taking of names and addresses of the members of the
public who attended was to identify the persons who were notified
of the injunction.
24. As explained in my judgment given on 22 June 2016, the
interim order was to maintain the status quo in line with the
responsible stance taken at the earlier stages of the case that the
Open Justice Issue, and so the publication of the names of the
parties, would be determined by the tribunal and not
pre-empted.
Dr Pelling’s representation of Mr Adams
25. I had rejected the same application on 22 June 2016. Its
repetition was asserted to be on additional grounds. The heart of
them was that Mr Adams was acting as Dr Pelling’s puppet or pawn to
promote Dr Pelling’s own agenda and that, for this purpose, Dr
Pelling pushed the boundaries as to what he put into the public
domain. I will return to the second point in the context of whether
there should be an anonymity order in this case. In my view,
although put a little differently that second point is not a new
point and the reasons I gave on 22 June 2016 for permitting Dr
Pelling to represent Mr Adams apply to it.
26. In my view, the written evidence shows clearly that Mr Adams
has a mind of his own and is not Dr Pelling’s puppet or pawn. After
I had indicated my refusal of this application, this was strikingly
demonstrated by Mr Adams’s own oral submissions, which he made
notwithstanding Dr Pelling’s sensible discouragement. I shall
return to these submissions when addressing whether or not to make
an anonymity order.
Speaking to / evidence from N
27. He did not attend on 6 October 2016. This issue was raised
on 22 June 2016 and is commented on in my judgment given on that
day. It is clear and undisputed that N is a “Gillick competent”
child who had made a witness statement dated 21 June 2016. In his
letter to me dated 17 September 2016 he says that:
“I would like to meet with you to speak about the issues with my
mother and father, to see perhaps if you could help me. It would
only take a few minutes of your time.”
It goes on to refer to what he is doing at school and so his
availability.
-
[2017] AACR 9 (Adams v SSWP)
Page 7
28. Mr Adams confirmed that he wanted N to be cross examined if
he was to give any oral evidence and opposed him speaking to me
privately. Dr Pelling did not want to indicate what the cross
examination would be about as this might reduce its
effectiveness.
29. I indicated that I would not see N in private and would not
hear oral evidence from either Mr Adams or Miss Green. After I had
indicated this Dr Pelling informed me of the points he would have
wanted to put in cross examination and I return to these and the
issues underlying them when addressing the making of an anonymity
order.
30. It was clear from his statement and his letter that N was
raising potentially wide ranging issues which were highly
contentious as between his parents particularly in respect of the
influence his parents have and have had on N. However, from a
neutral standpoint, N was making understandable points. For
example, in the last paragraph of his statement dated 21 June 2016
where he said:
“Sometimes I despair that proceedings about me will never end as
when the proceedings about residence and contact ended it was a
relief … I would like to ask the Judge if there is any power to do
so that these proceedings and any other proceeding should be
stopped so that I can just get on with my life”
31. Clearly publication of the names of the parties to the
Turnbull Decision, and so of N who is referred to in it by his
forename, could have an impact on this understandable goal. It is
also readily understandable that, like his parents, N has regard to
the whole of the family history and so any questioning of him or of
them would raise issues about aspects of that history.
32. In my view no meeting should take place between me and N
without it being recorded in full and so it could not be a private
meeting. Also, unless N simply made an oral statement at that
meeting it would be necessary for there to be some probing by me of
the validity his views and the reasons for them by putting points
to him identified by the parties and myself. To my mind, an oral
statement would add little or nothing and it is unlikely that any
such probing would be informative on the issues I have to decide.
Rather, it would be likely to introduce issues that both parents
would want to have a say about which would relate to the
antagonistic history and so matters that I would have to treat as
allegations.
33. So, in my view a meeting between me and N would be unlikely
to add value and, if I was to hear from him orally, it should be by
him giving evidence which for understandable reasons he was
reluctant to do. Further, if he was to give that evidence and be
cross examined there was a real prospect that fairness would
require that both Mr Adams and Miss Green should also give oral
evidence. To my mind, the following factors:
i) the high prospect that oral evidence would range over
irrelevant issues and cause all who gave it unnecessary
distress,
ii) the likelihood that such evidence would not enable me to
make findings of fact that would be directly relevant to the issues
whether the Turnbull Decision should be published in an
unanonymized form and an anonymity order should be made and so
would only introduce allegation and counter allegation,
iii) the likelihood that such evidence would not go beyond
confirming opinions already expressed and which could be challenged
effectively in argument, and
-
[2017] AACR 9 (Adams v SSWP)
Page 8
iv) more generally the likelihood that such evidence would not
add value
found the conclusion that I should not hear any oral
evidence.
Making N a party
34. This was addressed on 22 June 2016. Mr Adams made the
application on a basis that was not then addressed, namely that as
N was the relevant victim N had to be a party. Dr Pelling argued
that this was a necessary step and made it clear that it was not a
back-door route to engaging or embroiling N in this application. In
this context, he accepted that N’s argument, as the victim, could
be advanced by others.
35. The point is therefore closely linked to the substantive
argument on whether I should make an anonymity order and I will
deal with it in that context.
The discharge of the injunction against Dr Pelling
36. . This was taken as a free standing preliminary point in
contrast to the continuation of the injunction made against Mr
Adams. As a free standing and preliminary point I reject this
application for the reasons given in [16] to [24] above.
What this application is not about
37. The issue whether there should have been a public hearing
does not arise. This is because the hearing before Judge Turnbull
was held in public and thus in accordance with the default position
set by Rule 37(1) of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules
2008 (the UT Rules) (SI 2008/2698). It is also likely that that
hearing was listed using the names of the parties because this is
the usual practice. It is also the case that the hearing before
Sales LJ was in public and his order contains the names of the
parties.
The core of Mr Adams’s argument that the Turnbull Decision
should not have been published by the UT(AAC) in an anonymized form
and no anonymity (reporting restrictions) order should be made
38. His core argument is founded on the application of the
fundamental common law principle of open justice. Pursuant to that
principle cases are heard in public and full, fair and accurate
reports naming those involved can and should be published (see, for
example, Lord Diplock in A-G v Leveller Magazine [1979] AC 440 at
449H to 450C).
39. It was correctly accepted by the Secretary of State that
both the anonymization of a published judgment and anonymization
orders are exceptions or derogations from that principle of open
justice.
40. Mr Adams argued that this common law principle created a
human right or fundamental freedom and so a right that:
i) was not destroyed or replaced by the ECHR, and so a right
that
ii) he is entitled to insist on pursuant to section 11 of the
Human Rights Act 1998 (the HRA) and Article 53 of the ECHR.
-
[2017] AACR 9 (Adams v SSWP)
Page 9
Indeed, he argued that the failure of the courts to mention
those provisions in cases where they have permitted private
hearings, or decided cases by reference to the balance between
competing Convention Rights or public interests, have been decided
per incuriam. In particular it was asserted that this was the case
in the leading and regularly applied decision of the House of Lords
in Re S (A Child) (Identification: Restrictions on Publication)
[2004] UKHL 47; [2005] 1 AC 593 which decided that the relevant
approach to restraining publicity (and so to anonymization) was now
to balance Article 8 and 10 rights and that the earlier case law
about the existence and scope of the inherent jurisdiction in this
context need not be considered.
41. I do not accept this argument. The reason for this is that,
although the fundamental common law principle of open justice is
not a procedural rule (see Al-Rawi at [11] cited below) it does not
create a right or freedom that litigants can insist on or waive as
they can, for example, insist on or waive legal professional
privilege.
42. It is made clear in Scott v Scott [1913] AC 417 (see for
example Viscount Haldane at 436) that a court or tribunal cannot
rely on an agreement of the parties to sit in private. This shows
that the fundamental open justice principle is not founded on
private rights but on the public interest in the due administration
of justice (see, for example, Lord Diplock in A-G v Leveller
Magazine at [1979] AC 450C where he says that the purpose of the
general rule (set out in Scott v Scott) is to serve the ends of
justice).
43. It follows from this foundation of the common law principle
of open justice that even if it can be said to create a right or
freedom it is not an absolute one that individuals can insist on
and it has always been one that the court or rule maker could apply
in a way that was opposed by a party.
44. It is also important to remember that as the principle is a
common law principle it is founded on and forms part of a living
system of law. This means that the courts can adapt it to the
varying conditions of society and to the habits of the age in which
we live to avoid the inconsistencies and injustice which arise when
the law is no longer in harmony with the wants and usages and
interests of the generation to which it immediately applies (see
Wilson v Walter 4 QB 73 (1868) per Cockburn CJ at 93 cited with
Duhaime’s Law Dictionary).
45. So, and although in that case Cockburn CJ was addressing
something that had not previously been addressed relating to the
report of proceedings in Parliament, as a matter of common law and
precedent the approach in Scott v Scott falls to be applied against
the current law and conditions of society including the entry into
our law of the HRA. The approach of the House of Lords and the
Supreme Court in respectively Re S and R(C) v the Secretary of
State for Justice [2016] UKSC 2 and in particular the passages from
them cited in my decision in V v Associated Newspapers Ltd &
Others [2016] EWCOP 21 at [71] and [92], are examples of this
approach and these cases were not decided per incuriam by the House
of Lords or the Supreme Court.
46. In argument, the ability of a court or tribunal to take such
an approach, and so to depart from the principles of open justice
or aspects of it, was correctly accepted by Dr Pelling on behalf of
Mr Adams by his acceptance that in certain circumstances (eg danger
of physical harm to a parent) injunctions preventing the disclosure
of where a person lives can and should be granted. In accepting
that, Dr Pelling was accepting that a litigant does not have a
common law right that he can insist on in all circumstances.
-
[2017] AACR 9 (Adams v SSWP)
Page 10
47. However, Dr Pelling made it clear that he did not accept
that the involvement of a child in cases relating to child support
maintenance, or any of the particular circumstances of this case,
warranted any departure from any aspect of the open justice
principle.
48. And so he also made it clear that Mr Adams’s position was
that subject to exceptional circumstances, which did not exist
here, Mr Adams and all litigants had a common law right that they
could insist on that there should be no anonymization of cases, and
particularly of cases heard in public, unless it was removed by
primary legislation in clear terms. For the reasons I have given I
do not accept that Mr Adams has such a right.
49. In my view the fundamental common law principle is applied
to promote and so is qualified by the promotion of the public
interest on which it was founded and so it has always been
recognized that in some limited circumstances the interests of
justice would be better served by a private hearing or
anonymization (with or without a reporting restrictions order) and
so a litigant cannot insist on a public hearing and unanonymized
publication.
The application of the common law principle of open justice and
the HRA and so the bases upon which the UT(AAC) applies them
50. Rule 37(2) and Rule 14 of the UT Rules provide respectively
that the UT can sit in private and can make injunctions prohibiting
the disclosure or publication of documents and information relating
to the proceedings or any matter likely to lead members of the
public to identify any person whom the UT considers should not be
identified. These rules are made pursuant to the enabling power in
section 22 of and Schedule 5 to the Tribunals, Courts and
Enforcement Act 2007 (the 2007 Act). Paragraphs 7 and 11 of the
Schedule are of particular relevance as they expressly provide that
the UT Rules may provide that hearings can be in private and for
the non-disclosure of information.
51. Mr Adams argues that these powers could not be validly
granted, or are not available or cannot be used to remove his
common law right. He does so in reliance on the principle that
common law rights can only be abrogated by statutory provisions in
the clearest terms. This reliance is misplaced because:
i) the relevant Rules do not purport to do anything other than
grant a power in general terms as authorised by the primary
legislation,
ii) the open justice principle does not confer common law rights
upon individual litigants that they can insist on in all
circumstances, and
iii) as the powers conferred by the UT Rules are in general
terms, their exercise is based on the exercise of a judicial
discretion that must take into account and apply the relevant
common law and other principles and factors (including Convention
rights).
52. The position is therefore that the UT(AAC) applies the
principle of open justice and the relevant Convention rights in
accordance with the authorities that have given guidance on this
over the years.
53. I agree with Mr Adams that these cases show that:
i) the principle of open justice is a fundamental and very
important one,
-
[2017] AACR 9 (Adams v SSWP)
Page 11
ii) no judge should depart from it without proper regard to its
importance and the public interest on which it is founded, and
iii) no judge has “a general and arbitrary discretion to give
privacy rights to parties or children whenever it feels it would be
nice to do so, or to avoid supposed discomfort or
embarrassment”.
Rather departure from the principle of open justice must be
based on a proper assessment of the relevant competing factors.
54. An example of the strength and importance of the principle
is found in the judgment of Lord Dyson in Al-Rawi v Security
Service [2012] 1 AC 531 at [10] and [11] where he said:
“10. There are certain features of a common law trial which are
fundamental to our system of justice (both criminal and civil).
First, subject to certain established and limited exceptions,
trials should be conducted and judgments given in public. The
importance of the open justice principle has been emphasised many
times: see, for example, R v Sussex Justices, Ex p McCarthy [1924]
1 KB 256, at p 259, per Lord Hewart CJ, Attorney General v Leveller
Magazine Ltd [1979] AC 440, at pp 449H-450B, per Lord Diplock, and
recently R (Mohamed) v Secretary of State for Foreign and
Commonwealth Affairs (No 2) (Guardian News and Media Ltd
intervening) [2011] QB 218, paras 38-39, per Lord Judge CJ.
11. The open justice principle is not a mere procedural rule. It
is a fundamental common law principle. In Scott v Scott [1913] AC
417, Lord Shaw of Dunfermline (p 476) criticised the decision of
the lower court to hold a hearing in camera as ‘constituting a
violation of that publicity in the administration of justice which
is one of the surest guarantees of our liberties, and an attack
upon the very foundations of public and private security.’ Lord
Haldane LC (p 438) said that any judge faced with a demand to
depart from the general rule must treat the question ‘as one of
principle, and as turning, not on convenience, but on
necessity’.”
55. An aspect of that approach is that anonymization of a report
of a hearing in open court, or of a judgment relating to a hearing
in open court, is a departure from the default position founded on
the public interest and so the burden of justifying that departure
falls on the person seeking that anonymization.
56. In this context, I agree that [49] of the judgment of Thorpe
LJ in Dr Pelling v (1) Mrs Bruce-Williams and (2) the Secretary of
State for Constitutional Affairs [2004] EWCA (Civ) 845 shows that
this justification is needed. After discussing the practice of the
Court of Appeal, explained in Re R (Minor) (Court of Appeal: Order
against Identification) [1999] 2 FLR 145, of including a standard
and automatic reporting restrictions order in its orders in any
child case, Thorpe LJ said:
“49. In our judgment the only successful attack directed by Dr
Pelling on the judgement of this Court in Re R is his third. We
accept the submissions of the Crown that the time has come for the
court to consider in each case whether a proper balance of
competing rights requires the anonymization of any report of the
proceedings and judgment following a hearing that was conducted in
public and therefore open to all who cared to attend.”
-
[2017] AACR 9 (Adams v SSWP)
Page 12
I have not investigated the extent to which the acceptance of
this submission made on behalf of the Crown represents the current
practice of the Court of Appeal in such cases when, as it generally
does, it hears them in public.
57. If the present practice and default position of the Court of
Appeal is to make a standard anonymity (reporting restrictions)
order rather than one on a case by case basis, in my view this is a
demonstration of a default position flowing from the way in which
the relevant competing factors generally present in such cases have
been weighed by that court, and so it does not undermine the point
that anonymization should not be automatic or inevitable because a
case relates to issues concerning a child under the Children Act
that was heard in private at first instance. A fortiori that is the
case when the hearing at first instance has been in public.
58. Cases concerning financial relief on a divorce have been
described by Mostyn J in DL v SL [2015] EWHC 2621 at paragraph 11
as proceedings that are “quintessentially private business”, and so
they are protected by the anonymity principle he describes. I do
not accept that financial relief cases should be so categorised and
as a result be treated as cases in which the right to privacy will
always or generally trump the right to unfettered freedom of
expression. Indeed, it seems to me that the regularity with which
the Court of Appeal names the parties to financial relief
proceedings of the type before Mostyn J, and thereby indirectly
identify the children of the divorcing couple, shows that the
principle described by Mostyn J does not apply to them, even if it
exists and forms part of the foundation for the default position at
first instance under the relevant Rules.
59. Additionally, I do not accept that for the purpose of
categorising the privacy, or degree of privacy, of their subject
matter, and so whether they should be heard in private that
financial relief proceedings on a divorce are significantly
different to many other types of proceedings in which financial
relief is sought and given. Indeed in White v White [2001] 1 AC 596
and so a leading ancillary relief case in which the higher courts
named the parties, the husband and wife were business as well as
matrimonial partners and, in my view, there are considerable
similarities between the private nature of the issues in ancillary
relief proceedings, partnership, private company, trust and probate
disputes. Also they are all effectively adversarial processes
between adults about money.
60. In any event, the practice of the Court of Appeal of naming
the parties in financial relief proceedings shows that when the
default position is that the hearing at first instance (or on
appeal) is in public the categorisation of its subject matter as
“private business” does not found the making of an anonymity
order.
61. In my view, what the authorities and matters relied on by
Mostyn J show is that in giving effect to the common law principle
of open justice and the relevant Convention rights either when
making a Rule about or exercising a judicial discretion on:
i) whether a hearing should be in public or private, and
ii) if in public, on what, if any, anonymity (with or without
reporting restrictions order) there should be
the decision-maker should carry out an appropriately intense
examination of the competing factors.
-
[2017] AACR 9 (Adams v SSWP)
Page 13
62. I set out my reasoning for this conclusion in V v Associated
Newspapers and Others and point out that there is a staged process
that can found a general default position (and so a default Rule
for public or private hearings) but such a Rule is not the end of
the matter. I also point out that the default Rule represents the
outcome of the weighing exercise on what generally promotes the
public interest in the administration of justice in the type or
category of case to which it applies (see [9], [69] to [78], [90]
to[ 96]).
63. So although a conclusion on a default position in certain
categories of case can be said to mirror Mostyn J’s “anonymity
principle” inn DL v SL, because it is based on a conclusion that in
those categories of case the balance falls in favour of private
hearings, I consider that in weighing the competing factors at both
stages it is important to remember and take into account:
i) the common law principle of open justice and its importance
(see the citation from Al Rawi above), and
ii) the approach taken in Scott v Scott to secret processes in
contrast to “wards and lunatics”. As to the latter weight was
placed on the paternal (now investigatory) jurisdiction involved
which did not arise in respect of the private nature of the nullity
proceedings in Scott v Scott (which it was held should not be heard
in private) whereas the burden of displacing an open hearing in
respect of secret (and so private or confidential) subject matter
was based on the different footing of necessity to avoid the
destruction of the subject matter of the dispute by publicity.
64. The weighing exercise is now based on Articles 8 and 10
rather than the inherent jurisdiction (see Re S). But this does not
mean that the analysis begins and ends with the Strasbourg case
law.
65. As explained by Lord Reed in [54] to [63] of his judgment in
R(Osborn) v Parole Board [2013] UKSC 61; [2014] AC 1115 the
decision-maker should consider how the fundamental rights and
freedoms guaranteed by the Convention are provided by the common
law, the development of which did not end with the passing of the
HRA.
66. In my view, the approach set out by Lord Reed under which
the courts endeavour to apply and, if need be, develop the common
law, and interpret and apply statutory provisions, so as to arrive
at a result which is in compliance with the UK’s international
obligations (see [62]), has the consequence that when the court is
determining an open justice issue by weighing competing Convention
rights it must have regard to the fundamental common law principle
of open justice and the weight given to it, and thus the public
interest reasons for it, by the courts in England and Wales. The
exercise is fact and circumstance sensitive and, on this approach,
a departure from open justice must be justified.
67. This means that an approach of the Upper Tribunal that was
based primarily on an analogy with that taken by the Family Courts
or the Court of Protection at first instance would be wrong.
Further, and in any event:
i) the default position in a child support maintenance case in
the F-tT (SEC) and the UT(AAC) is that the hearing is in public,
and
-
[2017] AACR 9 (Adams v SSWP)
Page 14
ii) child support maintenance cases are based on a statutory
regime as opposed to any paternal (now investigatory) jurisdiction
and are effectively adversarial proceedings about the amount of
money that is payable by one parent to the other under that
regime.
Should I make a final anonymity (reporting restrictions)
order?
68. I deal with this before addressing the practice of the
UT(AAC) of anonymizing its decisions because the answer overrides
or determines the application of that practice in a particular
case.
69. The existing anonymity order is an interim order that
preserves the ability of the parties to argue their respective
positions.
Preliminary point
70. Dr Pelling argued on behalf of Mr Adams that no injunction
could be made in reliance on the Article 8 rights of the child (N)
without the child being a party because the child was the victim
referred to in section 7 of the HRA. I do not agree. The injunction
is not being, and does not have to be, sought under section 7 of
the HRA. Rather, Miss Green and the Secretary of State rely on
section 6 of the HRA and so the point that the court, as a public
authority, cannot act in a way that is incompatible with a
Convention right and so a Convention right of the child (N).
71. In my view, the effect of section 6 is that the UT(AAC)
cannot act in a way, or enable others to act in a way, or fail to
take steps to prevent others acting in a way, that, after the
appropriate weighing exercise, would breach the child’s Article 8
rights whether or not he is a party. So he need not be joined to
enable him, or another party (and so Miss Green and the Secretary
of State) to seek an anonymity order based on his Article 8 rights
(by analogy see Beoku Betts v Secretary of State for the Home
Department [2009] AC 115 and ZH (Tanzania) v Secretary of State for
the Home Department [2011] 2 AC 166).
The basis of the argument advanced for an anonymity order
72. The argument has been based on the harm that publication of
the identity of the parties and so of the child would do to the
child and so his Article 8 rights.
73. In my view, the nature of the issues in and so the evidence
relevant to the child support maintenance proceedings in this case
means that it cannot be, and it has not been, argued that
unanonymized publication would harm or prejudice the administration
of justice in the actual conduct of these child support maintenance
proceedings. This is important and a distinction between this case,
and others like it, relating to or that affect children in which
this argument arises.
74. The primary legislation that governs the child support
maintenance payments that are in dispute imposes statutory
confidentiality (see section 50 of the Child Support Act 1991). In
my view correctly, this statutory confidentiality as between
citizen and the State, and the Article 8 rights of Miss Green have
not been relied on to found the injunctive relief sought.
75. Also, and in my view correctly, the privacy and
confidentiality of the Family Court hearings relating to Mr Adams,
Miss Green and their child and the statutory provisions
-
[2017] AACR 9 (Adams v SSWP)
Page 15
relating to them (eg section 97 of the Children Act 1989 and
section 12 of the Administration of Justice Act 1960 as to which
see Clayton v Clayton [2006] EWCA Civ 878; [2007] 1 FLR 11) have
not been directly relied on. Rather, what has been relied on are
the risks that named publication of the decision in these
proceedings and discussion and comment on it will cause harm to the
child by:
i) including disclosure of issues in the Family Litigation,
or
ii) prompting the child to think that, and so to react on the
basis that, such issues are being disclosed.
76. Further, and in any event, it is asserted that the child
will suffer harm and distress if publication is limited to the
issues in the child support proceedings and he is aware of
that.
77. The risk that issues in the Family Litigation will be
disclosed is directed at both Mr Adams and Dr Pelling. I agree
that, contrary to their positions, there is a risk that both of
them may stray into breaches of the restrictions on the publication
of issues relating to the Family Litigation.
78. In Mr Adams’s case this risk was clearly shown by his
intervention which Dr Pelling sought to discourage him from making.
This intervention turned into a diatribe in which Mr Adams made it
abundantly clear that in his view Miss Green was guilty of parental
alienation and unless and until it was recognised that both of his
parents should take an equal part in their son’s life the weight
that should be given to the views of their child was zero. The
manner in which Mr Adams made his points:
i) showed how strongly he held them, and that in discussing
issues relating to his son he became angry and so could easily
raise issues that have been and are being dealt with in the Family
Litigation, and
ii) confirmed the accuracy of his son’s evidence to the effect
that he was distressed at his most recent meetings by his father’s
approach, demands and attitude.
79. In Dr Pelling’s case, the point was made that he is a strong
and dedicated campaigner for open justice in Family proceedings who
pushes the boundaries on what can be published. The example given
to support this assertion was that Dr Pelling named Mr Adams and
his son (together with his date of birth) in an analysis he had
made of the Children, Schools and Families Bill that had been
published. I accept that this establishes the risk referred to in
[77] above. But I make it clear that (a) I did not hear oral
argument on, and I am not indicating one way or the other whether,
this publication is a breach of any obligation resulting from or
relating to the Family Litigation, and (b) I am not indicating that
such a risk would exist in another case. I accept that Dr Pelling
takes care not to breach those obligations and that he believes and
advanced written argument that this publication did not do that.
But, on the hypothesis that his argument is right about this
publication, the risk I accept in [77] is that in the future Dr
Pelling may be wrong about a publication that relates to this
family and so “stray into breaches of the restrictions on the
publication of issues relating to the Family Litigation”.
80. As to both of them, reliance was placed on an article
entitled: “What’s in A (Jewish) Name?” dated 18 September 2016 (and
so after the posting on the Fathers4Justice website of
-
[2017] AACR 9 (Adams v SSWP)
Page 16
the Turnbull Decision) referring to the parties to the Turnbull
Decision as CA and EG. It had been written by Dr Pelling at Mr
Adams’s request and it links the anonymization of decisions of the
UT(AAC) to the identification of Jews by numbers in Nazi death
camps and so to the way in which they were robbed of their
identities there. At the end of that article it is said that
“besides being a campaigner for Open Justice generally CA cannot
forget the lessons of 75 years ago” and Dr Pelling points out that
the anonymized judgment on the public database does give CA’s
residence as 18 Cedar Drive which he owns. I accept and find that
this article gives confirmation, should it be needed, that both Mr
Adams and Dr Pelling are campaigners for open justice and that they
will both seek to put as much as they can into the public domain
directly and by jigsaw identification (eg the link between this
article and what is on the Fathers4Justice website in respect of
the Turnbull Decision). The third paragraph of the article refers
to the reported reference of the Turnbull Decision and its lawful
unanonymized publication by a third party on a website Dr Pelling
is not entitled to name – but which I conclude many could easily
guess.
81. The second and third points relied on by Miss Green and the
Secretary of State relate to the reactions of the child to
publications that do not go beyond the issues in the child support
proceedings. In this context the behaviour of his mother will
plainly have an impact. In her correspondence with the UT(AAC) and
her manner during her very limited attendances at hearings, she
demonstrated that she does not try to hide from anyone her great
hostility towards Mr Adams and that she does not act calmly or in a
measured way when dealing with issues relating to him as the father
of her child. This means that in her conduct of these proceedings
she has not, in her approach to the anonymity issues, clearly
addressed distinctions between the Family Litigation and the child
support maintenance proceedings. And in my view that reflects her
general approach.
82. Sadly, for this child it is clear that throughout his life
he has been the subject of long running hostility and litigation
between his parents of which he has been only too aware.
83. Dr Pelling is right to point out that the child’s statement
contains a number of points that do not distinguish between
publication of issues relating to the Family Litigation and the
child support maintenance proceedings and a number of assertions
about Mr Adams whose force and source merits testing. These are the
points that he indicated he would have wanted to cross examine on
and I accept that they would have been fair and from Mr Adams’s
point of view potentially productive topics of cross
examination.
84. However, the length and hostility of the various disputes
between his parents and the fact that N lives with his mother means
that it is unsurprising that the child and indeed his mother link
them together in their reactions to publication of anything showing
a dispute between the parents that relates to their child. In his
diatribe Mr Adams demonstrated that he takes an equivalent approach
because most of it was founded on the Family Litigation.
85. As indicated earlier, in my view an attempt to unravel the
issues and to test reactions to them on that basis by hearing oral
evidence was not necessary or appropriate.
Discussion and conclusion
86. I have set out the approach to be applied in [50] to [67]
above.
87. I acknowledge the points made by the Secretary of State and
Miss Green that the common law and Strasbourg case law has granted
and permitted private hearings and
-
[2017] AACR 9 (Adams v SSWP)
Page 17
anonymization of proceedings concerning children. Indeed as
shown by, for example, B v UK; P v UK [2001] 2 FLR 261 proceedings
involving children are prime examples of proceedings where
exclusion of the public and press are justified to protect the
privacy of the child and the parties and to avoid prejudicing the
interests of justice.
88. But:
i) the fact that a child is involved in, or will be affected by
the result of, proceedings does not of itself mean that the
hearings in such proceedings should be in private or that there
should be any anonymization of reports of them,
ii) these proceedings involve the application of statutory tests
to determine what should be paid by one parent to another in child
support maintenance and so to assist in the support and upbringing
of their child. Accordingly, in one sense the child is the subject
of the proceedings. But he or she has no effective part to play in
them and they are effectively adversarial proceedings between the
parents of the child and the Secretary of State to determine what
Mr Adams is required to pay to Miss Green under the statutory
scheme, and
iii) as mentioned in [73] above the anonymity order is not
sought on the basis that if it is not made this would prejudice the
actual conduct of these child support maintenance proceedings and
so the interests of justice in that way.
89. The default rules are for public hearings. And, in my view,
this correctly confirms that the nature of proceedings for child
support maintenance does not found a default rule for private
hearings or public hearings with a standard anonymity order. This
is so whether or not there are or have been Family proceedings
between the parents (which would not be uncommon). It also confirms
that there is a strong public interest in public discussion of the
way in which this statutory scheme, which has a wide application,
is being implemented on a case by case basis.
90. So, any anonymity order must be based on the particular
circumstances of the particular case when one of the parents wants
to disclose his or her identity and so the identities of the other
parent and the child and on that basis discuss in public the issues
in the proceedings and the other parent opposes this.
91. As I have pointed out:
i) the opposing parent must justify any limits to be imposed on
unanonymized publication and discussion of the issues that have
been the subject of a public hearing, and
ii) here, Miss Green and the Secretary of State seek to do so on
the basis of the harm that publication and discussion of the
proceedings in an unanonymized form and manner will or will be
likely to cause the child.
92. The history of family litigation and the strength of the
views of and the hostility between Miss Green and Mr Adams make
this an exceptional case and I accept and find that they give rise
to valid concerns in the mind of the child that unanonymized
publication and
-
[2017] AACR 9 (Adams v SSWP)
Page 18
discussion of these (and the pending) child support maintenance
proceedings will open “Pandora’s Box” and so introduce unanonymized
discussion of the Family disputes.
93. Also, in my view it is clear that both Mr Adams and Dr
Pelling will use such publication and discussion as a vehicle to
promote their views about proceedings being heard in private and
anonymization in a way that will link Miss Green and the child to
that discussion and by doing so may indicate that there have been
Family proceedings that involve them. Further, I accept and find
that there is a risk that in doing so either or both of them may
infringe restrictions on publication imposed in or in respect of
the Family Litigation and that the remedies available for such
breach could exacerbate rather than reduce the harm this would
cause to the child. But breach of obligations imposed in or in
respect of the Family Litigation is a separate issue.
94. I also accept and find that if publication is limited to the
issues in the child support maintenance proceedings and N
understands this he will nonetheless suffer embarrassment, worry
and some distress by reason of unanonymized publication and
discussion of only the child support maintenance proceedings and
the issues in them. I also find that it is likely this will be
increased by the reactions of his mother as it is very likely that
they will make it more difficult for him to ignore the publications
and get on with his life.
95. In my view, it is asking too much of N and his mother and so
unrealistic to proceed on the basis that they can compartmentalise
their reactions in a way that differentiates or fully
differentiates between the different types of proceedings
themselves. But it is also unrealistic to suppose that none of the
child’s friends and their parents and, for example, none of his
teachers know that his parents have been in dispute and do not live
together. From that it follows:
i) that N can justifiably and reasonably be concerned that in
forming views about him others are doing so on the basis that he
has had a lifetime of family dispute, but also
ii) that it is likely if not inevitable that they are doing this
anyway and perhaps on inaccurate information and will continue to
do so whether or not an anonymity order is made in respect of these
proceedings.
96. To his considerable credit it is clear that notwithstanding
his history and the hostility between his parents that N is doing
well, has a maturity at least commensurate with his age and
sensibly says in his statement dated 21 June 2016, and so
understands, that he must get on with his life. His evidence and
his success at school indicate that this is what he is doing.
97. Also, no case has been advanced on the basis of any
particular vulnerability of N. Indeed, in N’s statement dated 21
June 2016 the harm relied on is described as worry, embarrassment
and what others will think of him if, as he fears, his father is
critical of him in published material even though he is referring
to publication of issues about the Family Litigation as well as
these proceedings.
98. I acknowledge and accept that N has, and it is readily
understandable why he has, those concerns. But in my view, the
nature and extent of the harm to this child that is likely to be
avoided or ameliorated by the making of an anonymity (reporting
restriction) order in respect of these child support maintenance
proceedings is not of sufficient magnitude to outweigh the public
interest in there being unanonymized discussion of the issues in
them by which both
-
[2017] AACR 9 (Adams v SSWP)
Page 19
parties and the child, if they wish to, can make good their
rival contentions about those issues, and so the implementation of
the wide reaching statutory scheme governing child support
maintenance through proceedings that are essentially a dispute
between Miss Green and Mr Adams about the resources of Mr Adams
that are to be taken into account under that scheme.
99. Returning to Scott v Scott the following passages:
“A mere desire to consider feelings of delicacy or to exclude
from publicity the details which it would be desirable not to
publish is not, I repeat, enough as the law now stands. I think
that justify an order for a hearing in camera it must be shown that
the paramount object of securing that justice is done would really
be rendered doubtful of attainment if the order was not made (see
Viscount Haldane at 439)
The hearing of a case in public may be, and often is, no doubt,
painful, humiliating, or deterrent both to parties and witnesses,
and in many cases, especially those of a criminal nature, the
details may be so indecent as to tend to injure public morals, but
all this is tolerated and endured, because it is felt that in
public trial is to be found, on the whole, the best security for
the pure, impartial and efficient administration of justice, the
best means winning for it public confidence and respect (see Lord
Atkinson at 463)”
are examples of the recognition that the application of the
common law principle of open justice gives rise to problems for
individuals involved in or affected by litigation such as those
relied on by Miss Green and the Secretary of State to found the
making of an anonymity order.
100. Also in this context the well-known passages in the speech
of Lord Rodger speech in In re Guardian News and Media Ltd [2010]
UKSC 1; [2010] 2 AC 697 about the public interest in and so the
importance of naming the parties to litigation are relevant. He
said:
“63. What’s in a name? ‘A lot’, the press would answer. This is
because stories about particular individuals are simply much more
attractive to readers than stories about unidentified people. It is
just human nature. And this is why, of course, even when reporting
major disasters, journalists usually look for a story about how
particular individuals are affected. Writing stories which capture
the attention of readers is a matter of reporting technique, and
the European Court holds that article 10 protects not only the
substance of ideas and information but also the form in which they
are conveyed: News Verlags GmbH & Co KG v Austria (2000) 31
EHRR 246, 256, para 39, quoted at para 35 above. More succinctly,
Lord Hoffmann observed in Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] 2 AC 457, 474,
para 59, ‘judges are not newspaper editors.’ See also Lord Hope of
Craighead in In re British Broadcasting Corpn [2009] 3 WLR 142,
152, para 25. This is not just a matter of deference to editorial
independence. The judges are recognising that editors know best how
to present material in a way that will interest the readers of
their particular publication and so help them to absorb the
information. A requirement to report it in some austere, abstract
form, devoid of much of its human interest, could well mean that
the report would not be read and the information would not be
passed on. Ultimately, such an approach could threaten the
viability of newspapers and magazines, which can only inform the
public if they attract enough readers and make enough money to
survive.
-
[2017] AACR 9 (Adams v SSWP)
Page 20
64. Lord Steyn put the point succinctly in In re S [2005] 1 AC
593, 608, para 34, when he stressed the importance of bearing in
mind that
‘from a newspaper’s point of view a report of a sensational
trial without revealing the identity of the defendant would be a
very much disembodied trial. If the newspapers choose not to
contest such an injunction, they are less likely to give prominence
to reports of the trial. Certainly, readers will be less interested
and editors will act accordingly. Informed debate about criminal
justice will suffer.’
Mutatis mutandis, the same applies in the present cases. A
report of the proceedings challenging the freezing orders which did
not reveal the identities of the appellants would be disembodied.
Certainly, readers would be less interested and, realising that,
editors would tend to give the report a lower priority. In that way
informed debate about freezing orders would suffer.”
101. In other words, in my view the well-established and
powerful reasons why the open justice principle promotes the strong
public interest in the administration of justice and there being
public confidence in it through discussion that engages the
interest of the public, even though it results in embarrassment,
worry or distress and so some harm to parties and their children
generally, and in this case to this child (and his mother), have
the result that I should not make an anonymization (reporting
restrictions) order
102. However, and subject to further order, I do so for a
limited time by extending the existing anonymity order to enable
the existing position to be preserved if there is an appeal. I have
taken the same course to the anonymization of the decisions of the
UT(AAC) in these proceedings because my conclusion that there
should not be an anonymity order overrides its practice in this
case (see paragraph 68 above).
The relevant practice of the UT(AAC) of anonymizing its
decisions
103. I acknowledge that it might be said that:
i) this is now an academic issue in this case, and
ii) if an anonymity order is not made in this case one should
not be made in most child support maintenance cases and so the
practice should be abandoned leaving it open to the UT(AAC) to make
orders for private hearings and/or anonymization as and when they
are justified by the particular circumstances of the case.
104. But, in my view, I should address this practice and
consider whether it should continue. As appears below:
i) I have concluded that with some modifications it should do
so, and in reaching that conclusion
ii) I have considered why the limited impact of the practice of
the UT(AAC) is a justified departure from the fundamental principle
of open justice in a case when a private hearing would not be
directed and/or a reporting restriction / anonymity order would not
be made.
-
[2017] AACR 9 (Adams v SSWP)
Page 21
Some history
105. The UT(AAC), was established under the 2007 Act. It
replaced the former Social Security and Child Support
Commissioners, whose role can be traced back to the Umpires under
the National Insurance Act 1911. The Commissioners’ jurisdiction
principally comprised second-tier appeals in relation to tribunal
decisions on social security benefits, child support awards and war
pensions appeals. The UT(AAC) now has a greatly increased
jurisdiction. Nonetheless, in excess of 90 per cent of its caseload
in terms of numbers of appeals (but not time) – is that of deciding
appeals on points of law from decisions of the First-tier Tribunal
(Social Entitlement Chamber) (F-tT(SEC)) relating to social
security and child support and decisions of the First-tier Tribunal
(War Pensions and Armed Forces Compensation) Chamber
(F-tT(WP&AFCC) and the Pensions Appeal Tribunals relating to
war pensions and awards under the Armed Forces Compensation Scheme
(AFCS). These are effectively its “old” jurisdiction.
106. The existing UT(AAC) practice dates back to the era of the
Social Security Commissioners when for many years social security
proceedings before first instance tribunals were held in private
(eg supplementary benefit appeals were always held in private until
1986). This is no longer the case.
107. As a result of the 2007 Act, the UT(AAC) now also has “new”
jurisdictions, principally appeals from the First-tier Tribunal
(Health, Education and Social Care Chamber) (F-tT(HESCC)),
typically special educational needs and mental health appeals, and
the First-tier Tribunal (General Regulatory Chamber) (F-tT(GRC)),
principally freedom of information appeals. The UT(AAC) also has a
judicial review jurisdiction, mainly in relation to decisions of
the F-tT(SEC) in criminal injuries compensation cases, from which
there is no statutory right of appeal. In addition, the UT(AAC)
acts as the first-instance appellate body for appeals from
decisions of the Disclosure and Barring Service under the
Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups Act 2006 and from decisions of
Traffic Commissioners.
108. Historically, the Umpires and then the Social Security
Commissioners anonymized their decisions when publishing them.
Cases were referred to by their file numbers or other numbers.
Following the implementation of the 2007 Act, the UT(AAC) inherited
and adapted the Commissioners’ case registration system to
accommodate its new expanded role. The result is that all UT(AAC)
social security, child support, war pensions and AFCS decisions
carry a unique case reference number, the prefix to which signifies
the type of benefit concerned. Thus CCS denotes a child support
case and, for example, CDLA denotes a disability living allowance
case. Cases from the “new” jurisdictions are allocated different
prefixes. So, for example, mental health and special educational
needs appeals carry the prefixes HM and HS respectively. Freedom of
information appeals use the prefix GIA, while cases transferred,
rather than appealed, from the F-tT(GRC) use the modified prefix
GI.
Practice
109. As I have already mentioned the default rule is that
hearings in the UT(AAC) are in public (Rule 37(1) UT Rules). In the
social security and child support jurisdiction, Rule 30(1) of the
F-tT(SEC) Procedural Rules now provides that all hearings must be
in public but gives power to the F-tT to sit in private. Moreover,
Rule 19, relating to child support or child trust fund cases makes
specific provision about the confidentiality of addresses (if
sought) and so is founded on the persons being named.
-
[2017] AACR 9 (Adams v SSWP)
Page 22
110. As I have already mentioned, Rule 37(2) and Rule 14 of the
UT Rules provide respectively that the UT can sit in private and
can make injunctions prohibiting the disclosure or publication of
documents and information relating to the proceedings or any matter
likely to lead members of the public to identify any person whom
the UT considers should not be identified. Rule 14(7) provides
that, absent a direction, the person involved in mental health
cases must not be made public and Rule 14(10) relates to national
security.
111. The default position relating to listing in the UT(AAC) is
to name the parties except:
i) in safeguarding, mental health, care standard and primary
health care cases where the individuals involved are anonymized,
and
ii) where specific instructions to anonymize the parties’ names
are given by the Judge/Registrar or the party’s name has already
been anonymized in the proceedings before the UT(AAC).
112. However, it must not be forgotten that a high percentage of
appeals to the UT(AAC), whose jurisdiction is based on there being
an error of law, are decided on the papers, albeit after a public
hearing in the relevant F-tT and a statement of its reasons will
have been prepared if the case is appealed. The practice of
anonymizing the decision of the UT(AAC) also applies to its paper
determinations.
113. Anonymization of citizen parties in the decisions is not
universal in the UT(AAC). Even in the days of the Commissioners, a
social security claimant might be named where he or she did not
want anonymity (see eg R(IS) 1/93) or had lost it because the case
was related to a published decision of a different tribunal or
court (see e.g. R(IS) 3/07) or the individual claimants have sought
and obtained publicity naming them (see eg SSWP v Nelson [2014]
UKUT 525 (AAC); [2015] AACR 21).
114. But, generally, anonymity in the decisions is the default
position in the UT(AAC)’s “old” jurisdictions. Moreover, in
relation to the “new” jurisdictions, while anonymity in the
decisions is generally preserved in criminal injuries compensation
cases, special educational needs cases and mental health cases,
parties in other cases are sometimes named in the same way as cases
in the courts and that is the norm in Traffic Commissioner appeals
and, now, freedom of information cases.
115. A copy of any decision on an appeal will be provided to any
person who requests one from the records of the UT(AAC), if it is
not on its public database.
116. The anonymization is generally achieved by the decision
being written without referring to the individual parties by name
and by providing a frontsheet / title with the parties’ full names
on only to the parties themselves.
117. A minority of decisions which are potentially of wider
significance and of interest to members of the public and advisors
are given a case name and neutral citation number (NCN) and placed
on the UT(AAC)’s public database; the anonymity of citizen parties
in most cases is maintained by the use of initials in the title. A
sub-set of this minority of decisions that have been allotted a
case name and NCN are later published in the series of
Administrative Appeal Chamber Reports (AACR), again preserving
citizen anonymity in most cases by the use of initials.
-
[2017] AACR 9 (Adams v SSWP)
Page 23
118. In both cases the decision will have the case reference
number on it which would enable a member of the public to make
enquiry about it including who the individual parties were and how
they could be contacted.
Introductory discussion
119. The anonymization of decisions of the UT(AAC) in cases that
have been heard in public before it (and now the FTT) and listed in
a way before the UT(AAC) that identifies the parties is a long
standing practice of the judges of what is now the UT(AAC). It is
also applied to appeals that are determined without a hearing.
120. The practice represents a default judicial approach. As it
does not involve the making of an order prohibiting publication of
the names of the parties to whom the decision relates, it does not
prevent anyone from publishing the identities of those involved in
the proceedings.
121. The only relevant Practice Statement of which I am aware
that applies directly to the UT(AAC) is “Form of Decisions and
Neutral Citation First-tier Tribunal and Upper Tribunal on or after
3 November 2008” which at paragraph 8 provides that:
“Where anonymity was previously given to a party in a tribunal
case, that practice will continue pending further review.”
122. There has been no such review in respect of or by the
UT(AAC) and in [9] of his decision in CC v Standards Committee of
Durham County Council [2010] UKUT 258 (AAC) Upper Tribunal Judge
Ward correctly sets out the general practice of the UT(AAC) as
follows:
“Before turning to substantive matters, I should also mention
that it is the general practice of the Administrative Appeals
Chamber (AAC) of the Upper Tribunal to anonymize its decisions,
unless the judge considers that this is not appropriate. The AAC
hears a lot of cases about matters of considerable sensitivity for
individuals and where there is little or no legitimate public
interest in knowing the identity of the individuals involved, such
as social security, mental health or special educational needs. The
same considerations in my view do not apply to decisions about
local government standards, where clearly there is a legitimate
public interest in relation to appeals affecting elected
representatives and accordingly this case is published without
anonymizing, as I envisage others in the field may come to be also.
Such was of course also the practice when under the previous legal
regime appeals lay to the Administrative Court.”
123. The sensitivity referred to by Judge Ward is reflected in
confidentiality provisions in the primary legislation that governs
many of the payments or issues in dispute (eg section 50 of the
Child Support Act 1991 and Part VII of the Social Security Act
1992). Similar provisions are included in the Commissioners for
Revenue and Customs Act 2005, which have recently been considered
by the Supreme Court in R(on the application of Ingenious Media
Holdings Plc (and another) v Commissioners for HMRC [2016] UKSC 54.
But this statutory confidentiality as between citizens and the
State does not of itself found private hearings, the making of
anonymity orders or the anonymization of the judgments or decisions
in proceedings heard in public as between citizens and the
State.
-
[2017] AACR 9 (Adams v SSWP)
Page 24
124. However, in my view such statutory confidentiality is a
relevant and important factor in the consideration of whether the
limited inroads of the practice of the UT(AAC) into the fundamental
principle of open justice is justified in respect of proceedings
before it as a tribunal that are investigative and so far as
practicable informal.
125. The sensitivity referred to by Judge Ward extends beyond
issues relating to children. It also recognises that anonymization
in the sense of there being a private hearing or an anonymity
(reporting restrictions) order would serve the wishes of many if
not most individuals involved in appeals to the UT(AAC). But it is
clear that such wishes are not a sufficient reason for a private
hearing or for an anonymity (reporting restrictions) order. See,
for example, the passages from Scott v Scott cited in [99]
above.
126. However, it seems to me that care needs to be taken to the
application of statements such as those in those passages in Scott
v Scott to a practice or a default position of a public hearing and
a published decision or judgment in an anonymized form without any
anonymity (reporting restrictions) order and so without a
prohibition on the publication of the identities of the
parties.
The issue
127. The limited issue is whether the UT(AAC) should change its
default practice described above in child support cases.
128. I shall address this on the basis that the UT(AAC) changes
its practice to make it clear to the parties that subject to
further order by the UT(AAC) it will only be applied if no party
objects to it, and:
i) its only effects are that:
a) non-parties who obtain copies of the decisions from the
UT(AAC) or search the UT(AAC)’s public database or its reported
decisions (or otherwise obtain copies of them as prepared and
published by the UT(AAC) will read them in an anonymized form,
and
b) if someone asks the UT(AAC) for the identity of the
anonymized persons the parties will be notified of that request and
be given an opportunity to object to it being complied with,
ii) it does not prevent publication by a party or anyone else of
the identities of the individuals involved in the case, and so
iii) if a party wants such an injunctive order they should ask
for one.
129. In my view, if the practice is to be continued that
clarification is necessary because at present I suspect that many
may think that the practice prevents publication of the identity of
the anonymized persons.
130. That clarification would be provided at an early stage of
the appeal process. If a party objects to the practice being
applied that would became an issue in the appeal.
131. If such clarification had been given in this case it would
have been at least highly likely that Judge Turnbull would have had
to deal with an application for:
-
[2017] AACR 9 (Adams v SSWP)
Page 25
i) a hearing in private, and / or
ii) injunctive relief under Rule 14 of the UT Rules.
132. As mentioned earlier, I accept that the practice is an
inroad into the fundamental principle of natural justice and so it
needs to be justified.
Conclusion
133. In my view, the practice is justified in child support
cases. I am only dealing with such a case but my reasoning can be
extended to other types of case.
134. This conclusion is in line with the conclusion and
reasoning of the Supreme Court in R (on the application of C) v
Secretary of State for Justice [2016] UKSC 2 and of the Court of
Appeal in X v Dartford and Gravesham NHS Trust (Personal Injury Bar
Association and another intervening) [2015] EWCA Civ 96; [2015]
1WLR 3647. Both are dealing with different types of proceedings and
with reporting restrictions orders. But in R(C) the justification
of a default position was also addressed.
135. In R(C) the earlier proceedings in a mental health case in
the First-tier Tribunal had been held in private pursuant to its
default Rule (see [23]) but in the proceedings for judicial review
there was no equivalent to Rule 14(7) of the UT Rules prohibiting
the naming of the persons involved and the relevant default Rule
for the judicial review (see paragraph 14) was for a public hearing
and at paragraphs 1 and 36 Lady Hale said:
“1. The principle of open justice is one of the most precious in
our law. It is there to reassure the public and the parties that
our courts are indeed doing justice according to law. In fact,
there are two aspects to this principle. The first is that justice
should be done in open court, so that the people interested in the
case, the wider public and the media can know what is going on. The
court should not hear and take into account evidence and arguments
that they have not heard or seen. The second is that the names of
the people whose cases are being decided, and others involved in
the hearing, should be public knowledge. The rationale for the
second rule is not quite the same as the rationale for the first,
as we shall see. This case is about the second rule. … The second
issue is whether there should be an anonymity order on the facts of
this particular case.
-
[2017] AACR 9 (Adams v SSWP)
Page 26
Conclusion in principle 36. … It would be wrong to have a
presumption that an order should be made in every case. There is a
balance to be struck. The public has a right to know, not only what
is going on in our courts, but also who the principal actors are.
This is particularly so where notorious criminals are involved.
They need to be reassured that sensible decisions are being made
about them. On the other hand, the purpose of detention in hospital
for treatment is to make the patient better, so that he is no
longer a risk either to himself or to others. That whole
therapeutic enterprise may be put in jeopardy if confidential
information is disclosed in a way which enables the public to
identify the patient. It may also be put in jeopardy unless
patients have a reasonable expectation in advance that their
identities will not be disclosed without their consent. In some
cases, that disclosure may put the patient himself, and perhaps
also the hospital, those treating him and the other patients there,
at risk. The public’s right to know has to be balanced against the
potential harm, not only to this patient, but to all the others
whose treatment could be affected by the risk of exposure.”
The answer to the second question in R(C) was that the balance
in that case founded the making of an anonymity order.
136. At [18] of her judgment Lady Hale says:
“18. However, in many, perhaps most cases, the important
safeguards secured by a public hearing can be secured without the
press publishing or the public knowing the identities of the people
involved. The interest protected by publishing names is rather
different, and vividly expressed by Lord Rodger … “
137. This paragraph and its cross reference and so its reasoning
(cited in [100] above) recognise the point that the public interest
in the publication and discussion of, amongst other things, a point
of law raised and decided at a public hearing by lawyers and
others, and so in the public knowing the legal reasoning, can often
be satisfied by anonymized reporting. Discussion of legal and so
technical issues is not in my view the focus of Lord Rodger’s
reasoning.
138. X v Dartford and Gravesham NHS Trust (Personal Injury Bar
Association and another intervening) [2015] 1WLR 3647 in particular
at [25] to [35], relates to anonymity orders in respect of the
settlement of cases for damages for personal injuries, and so has a
closer analogy to social entitlement and other cases within the
jurisdiction of the UT(AAC) because of the medical evidence in
them. In X, the Court of Appeal concluded that normally it should
be recognised that the court is dealing with what is essentially
private business albeit in open court and so should without the
need for any formal application normally make an anonymity order
(ie an order that prohibits the identification of the claimant and
his or her immediate family and his or her litigation friend (see
[34])).
139. So these two cases go further than the relevant practice of
the UT(AAC) because they address the making of an anonymity order
but, in my view, they show that a flexible approach should be taken
having regard to both aspects of the principle of open justice
referred to by Lady Hale (ie public hearings and named
reporting).
140. The practice of the UT(AAC) does not go so far as holding
or listing the hearing in private (although, as I have said, many
of its cases are decided without a hearing) and does
-
[2017] AACR 9 (Adams v SSWP)
Page 27
not impose any reporting restrictions order. Indeed, it is based
on the proposition that such an order has not been made and
importantly may well not be made on the facts of the given
case.
141. So the limited impact of the practice of the UT(AAC) gives
rise to the question: Why is it a justified departure from the
fundamental principle of open justice in a case when a private
hearing would not be directed and/or a reporting
restriction/anonymity order would not be made?
142. Mr Adams argued that the limited effect of the practice
would mean that he was inhibited in discussing the issues in the
child support maintenance case (described as somewhat arcane in the
Fathers4Justice publication and in submission by Dr Pelling) with
others because it made it difficult for others to make contact with
him about the interpretation of the relevant Regulation in the
Turnbull Decision. I am very doubtful that there are many who would
wish to contact Mr Adams for this purpose. The issue is one of law
on which permission to appeal has been refused and Judge Turnbull’s
reasons are fully explained and so, in my view, any non-resident
parents who are beneficiaries under a discretionary trust would be
unlikely to seek the views of Mr Adams on that issue of law.
Further:
i) the issue can be just as well explained and publicised in
published articles without identifying the parties (eg by any
lawyer or member of the public who was interested and thought
others would be too), and
ii) the practice does not, as asserted in the Fathers4Justice
publication prevent the naming of the parties and so Mr Adams
drawing attention to himself in that way.
143. Whatever its merits this point about others finding out
about him from what the UT(AAC) publishes, in my view it is not Mr
Adams’s main motivation for attacking the practice. His main
motivation is his view on open justice and so whether or not an
anonymity order should be made. And, in any event the change I
propose means that he and anyone in his position can invite the
UT(AAC) not to apply the practice and not to make such an
order.
144. I acknowledge that the reverse could be said and so any
party who wants the practice to be applied or an anonymity order
should apply for this. But in my view it is likely that this change
in a practice that has worked well and without complaint for years
would lead to more applications and more confusion than the
preservation of the practice with the change I propose. If it turns
out that the change I propose triggers a number of applications
that practice can be revisited.
145. In my view the following factors justify the continuance of
the UT(AAC) practice of anonymizing decisions with the change I
propose:
i) There is very limited publication of F-tT proceedings and
decisions and, such that there might be, would not undermine the
continuation of the practice of the UT(AAC) (see by analogy Goodwin
v NGN Ltd [2011] EWHC 1437 (QB); [2011] EMLR 27 at [85]).
ii) It applies when the hearing before the UT(AAC) has been in
public and when there has been no hearing before the UT(AAC).
-
[2017] AACR 9 (Adams v SSWP)
Page 28
iii) A difference in practice between paper determinations and
determinations after hearings would be confusing and likely to give
rise to misapplications of the practice and might discourage
parties from seeking an oral hearing or lead to unnecessary
arguments about this.
iv) The ch