1ac -- Itar Aff Finalk'

7/23/2019 1ac -- Itar Aff Finalk'

1/28

NoteI think a trick with the MDA impacts is that people might try to impact turn with dedev/freetrade bad -- the argument isnt that the plan sustains them as much as it prevents them from

collapsing, ie if they win theres a shift to a transition, the plan doesnt stop a smooth transitionso ! o/w link, but preventing a rapid collapse is bad nomsaying"

#heres also a little trick with the $ussia war uni%ueness -- the claim isnt that the & will getdrawn into $ussia war because of kraine, its that the kraine crisis will signal to 'atvia thatpro-unification revolts will instigate a $ussian response, which $ussia will actually respond toand intervene, and when $ussia invades 'atvia, who is a (A#) signatory, the &, and the rest of(A#), but importantly the & has to defend the 'atvian government*


2/28

1AC -- CooperationContention 1 is Cooperation --

A Renewed commitment to space cooperation promotes smart power and preventsspace militarization.Sabathier and Faith 8 + Director of &pace Initiatives at &I&, .incent *, 0rench &pace 1olicy $eprehensive to the &,and * $yan, &pace 1rogram Manager for I&I&, enter for &trategic 2 International &tudies3 4&mart 1ower through &pace5http3//csis*org/files/media/csis/pubs/6768869smart9power9through9space*pdf

#he attractiveness of space is due, in large measure, to its reflection of the strongly Americaninspirational values of hope, optimism, and enthusiasm for people all around the world* Duringthe political turmoil of the :;owever, much of the public perceptionof space e?ploration is firmly rooted in an often-romantici@ed perception of the Apollo eraa poll on the 86th anniversary of theMoon landing showed that more than 76 percent of respondents felt that the Apollo missions were worth the cost >arris, Buly:;7;C* >owever, support for the Apollo program during the space race only briefly e?ceeded 6 percent >arris, Buly :;arris poll showed almost half of respondents supportedcutting the space program to reduce the deficitF yet in a March 866E Gogby poll, E: percent of respondents opposed any cut in (A&Afunding* )pposition to increased funding must be considered in light of widespread confusion about the current levels of funding forcivil space applications versus the historical highs seen during space race* At its height, (A&A funding amounted to appro?imately6*7 percent of D1 and this was in the budgetary conte?t of the .ietnam =arC as opposed to the current amount of less than one-eighth of : percent* )nly one in five Americans correctly estimates (A&A spending at less than : percent of the budget, while a

plurality believes that (A&A funding accounts for : percent to percent of the budget, and roughly one-third believes that (A&Aconsumes more than :6 percent of the total budget* =hile a simple increase in the level of national support is aclear signal of our interest in broader engagement and a commitment to a rational balance

between all of our soft and hard power activities, it also creates an opportunity for a compellingdisplay of *&* global leadership*A highlyvisible commitment to civil space eplorationand !tilization will restore ".S. credibility and allow the " nited S tates to ass!meits traditional global leadership role.More generally, space e?ploration is a high-payoff, low-risk opportunityfor *&* leadershipin no case has a significant e?penditure of political capital in support of civil space activities failed to providehigh returns on investment* #he most spectacular returns from space e?ploration have been cases where the initial engagement, and

conse%uently the visibility of *&* leadership, has been the greatest* Het even in cases where a given space initiativefell short of e?pectations, virtually no penalty was incurred*As we approach the th anniversary of the retreatfrom the lunar surface we must carefully balance our prioritiesneither neglecting pressing problems at home nor forgetting future

generations*A stable balance between the short and long term and between hard and soft power is

contingent in large measure on increased support for civil space operations* )ver the longer term, weshould strongly consider supporting our civil space activities at a minimum of : percent of the federal budget, with a long-term goalof supporting our space program at the rate of 8 cents per American per day*

#ercising smart power solves etinction.Nye and Armitage $ Distinguished &ervice 1rofessor at >arvard niversity and 0ormer Assistant &ecretary of DefenceBoseph, 1hD 1ol &ci from >arvard, 2 $ichard, 1resident of Armitage International, $eport made in collaboration with about 6other congressmen, 4I& ommission of &mart 1ower + A &marter, more &ecure America5,http3//www*csis*org/media/csis/pubs/6E::6


3/28

#odays hallenges #he twenty-first century presents a number of uni%ue foreign policy challengesfortodays decisionmakers*#hese challenges e?ist at an international, transnational, and global level* Despite Americasstatus as the lone global power, the durability of the current international order is uncertain *America must help find a way for todays norms and institutions to accommodate rising powers that may hold a different set ofprinciples and values* 0urthermore, countries invested in the current order may waiver in their commitment to take action to

minimi@e the threats posed by violent non-state actors and regional powers who challenge this order* #he information agehas heightened political consciousness, but also made political groupings less cohesive* &mall,adaptable, transnational networks have access to tools of destruction that are increasinglycheap, easy to conceal, and more readily available *Although the integration of the global economy has broughttremendous benefits,vectors of prosperity have also become vectors of instability * #hreats such aspandemic disease and the collapse of financial markets are more distributed and more likely toarise without warning* #he threat of widespread physical harm to the planet posed by nuclearcatastrophe has e?isted for half a century, though the reali@ation of the threat will become morelikely as the number of nuclear weapons statesincreases* #he potential security challenges posed byclimate changeraise the possibility of an entirely new set of threats for the nited &tates to consider*#he ne?t administration will need a strategy that speaks to each of these challenges* =hateverspecific approach it decides to take, two principles will be certain3 0irst, an e?tra dollar spent on hard power will notnecessarily bring an e?tra dollars worth of security*It is difficult to know how to invest wisely when there is not abudget based on a strategy that specifies trade-offs among instruments* Moreover, hard power capabilities are a

necessary but insufficientguarantee of security in todays conte?t* &econd, success and failure will turn on the ability to winnew allies and strengthen old ones both in government and civil society* #he key is not how many enemies thenited &tates kills, but how many allies it grows*&tates and non-state actors who improve their ability to draw inallies will gain competitive advantages in todays environment* #hose who alienate potential friends will stand atgreater risk* #errorists, for instance, depend on their ability to attract support from the crowd atleast as much as their ability to destroy the enemys will to fight * J?porting )ptimism, (ot 0ear &ince itsfounding, the nited &tates has been willing to fight for universal ideals of liberty, e%uality, and Kustice* #his higher purpose,sustained by military and economic might, attracted people and governments to our side through two world wars and five decades ofthe old =ar* Allies accepted that American interests may not always align entirely with their own, but *&* leadership was stillcritical to reali@ing a more peaceful and prosperous world* #here have been times, however, when Americas sense of purpose has

fallen out of step with the world* &ince ;/::, the nited & tates has been e?porting fear and anger ratherthan more traditional values of hope and optimism* &uspicions of American power have rundeep* Jven traditional allies have %uestion edwhether America is hiding behind the righteousness of its ideals to

pursue some other motive* At the core of the problem is that America has made the war on terror the central component of its globalengagement* #his is not a partisan criti%ue, nor a 1ollyannaish appraisal of the threats facing America today* #he threat fromterrorists with global reach and ambition is real* It is likely to be with us for decades* #hwartingtheir hateful intentions is of fundamental importance and must be met with the sharp tip of

Americas sword * )n this there can be no serious debate *Lut e?cessive use of force can actually abet terroristrecruitment among local populations* =e must strike a balance between*

%!ltilateral space cooperation is vital to preventing miscalc!lation& 'irst stri(eincentives and global war)itchens& 8+ president of the enter for Defense Information #heresa, 4&pace =ars - oming to the &ky (ear Hou"5,&cientific American, 0ebruary, http3//www*sciam*com/article*cfm"idspace-wars-coming-to-the-sky-near-youC

1erhaps of even greater concern is that several other nations, including one of hinas regionalrivals, India, may feel compelled to seek offensive as well as defensive capabilities in space* #he*&* trade Kournal Defense (ews, for instance, %uoted unidentified Indian defense officials as stating that their country had alreadybegun developing its own kinetic-energy none?plosive, hit-to-killC and laser-based antisatellite weapons*

If India goes down that path, its archrival 1akistan will probably follow suit* 'ike India, 1akistan has awell-developed ballistic missile program, including medium-range missiles that could launch an antisatellite system* JvenBapan,the third maKor Asian power, might Koin such a space race* In Bune 866E the (ational Diet of Bapan beganconsidering a bill backed by the current 0ukuda government that would permit the development of satellites for 4military andnational security5 purposes*As for $ussia, in the wake of the hinese test 1resident .ladimir 1utin reiterated Moscows stance against the weaponi@ation ofspace* At the same time, though, he refused to critici@e LeiKings actions and blamed the *&* instead* #he American efforts to build amissile defense system, 1utin charged, and the increasingly aggressive American plans for a military position in space were


4/28

prompting hinas moves* Het $ussia itself, as a maKor spacefaring power that has incorporated satellites into its national securitystructure, would be hard-pressed to forgo entering an arms race in space*

iven the proliferation of spacefaring entities, proponents of a robust space warfare strategybelieve that arming the heavens is inevitable and that it would be best for the *&* to get therefirst with firepower* Antisatellite and space-based weapons, they argue, will be necessary not only to defend *&* military andcommercial satellites but also to deny any future adversary the use of space capabilities to enhance the performance of its forces onthe battlefield*

Het any arms race in space would almost inevitably destabili@e the balance of power and therebymultiply the risks of global conflict* In such headlong competitionwhether in space or elsewheree%uilibriumamong the adversaries would be virtually impossible to maintain* Jven if the maKor powers didachieve stability, that reality would still provide no guarantee that both sides would perceive it to

be so* #he moment one side saw itself to be slipping behind the other, the first side would bestrongly tempted to launch a preemptive strike , before things got even worse* Ironically, the same would hold forthe side that perceived itself to have gained an advantage* Again, there would be strong temptation to strike first,

before the adversary could catch up* 0inally, a space weapons race would ratchet up the chancesthat a mere technological mistake could trigger a battle* After all, in the distant void, reliablydistinguishing an intentional act from an accidental one would be highly problematic*>it-to-Nill InterceptorsAccording to assessments by *&* military and intelligence officials as well as by independent e?perts, the hinese probablydestroyed their weather satellite with a kinetic-energy vehicle boosted by a two-stage medium-range ballistic missile*

#echnologically, launching such direct-ascent antisatellite weapons is one of the simplest ways to take out a satellite* About a do@ennations and consortia can reach low Jarth orbit between roughly :66 and 8,666 kilometers, or


5/28

potential targets* It could then be activated on command during a close encounter*In 866 the air force described a program that would provide 4locali@ed5 space 4situational awareness5 and 4anomalycharacteri@ation5 for friendly host satellites in geostationary orbit* #he program is dubbed A(J'& for autonomous nanosatelliteguardian for evaluating local spaceC, and the budget line believed to represent it focuses on ac%uiring 4high value space assetdefensive capabilities,5 including a 4warning sensor for detection of a direct ascent or co-orbital vehicle*5 It is clear that suchguardian nanosatellites could also serve as offensive weapons if they were maneuvered close to enemy satellites*And the list goes on* A 4parasitic satellite5 would shadow or even attach itself to a target in geostationary orbit* 0arsat, which wasmentioned in an appendi? to the ODonaldP $umsfeld &pace ommission report in 866:, 4would be placed in a Sstorage orbit

perhaps with many microsatellites housed insideC relatively far from its target but ready to be maneuvered in for a kill*50inally, the air force proposed some time ago a space-based radio-fre%uency weapon system, which 4would be a constellation ofsatellites containing high-power radio-fre%uency transmitters that possess the capability to disrupt/destroy/disable a wide variety ofelectronics and national-level command and control systems*5Air force planning documents from 866 envisioned that such a technology would emerge after 86:* Lut outside e?perts think thatorbital radio-fre%uency and microwave weapons are technically feasible today and could be deployed in the relatively near future*&pace Lombers#hough not by definition a space weapon, the 1entagons ommon Aero .ehicle/>ypersonic #echnology .ehicle often called A.Centers into this discussion because, like an ILM, it would travel through space to strike Jarth-bound targets* An unpowered buthighly maneuverable hypersonic glide vehicle, the A. would be deployed from a future hypersonic space plane, swoop down intothe atmosphere from orbit and drop conventional bombs on ground targets* ongress recently began funding the proKect but, toavoid stoking a potential arms race in space, has prohibited any work to place weapons on the A.* Although engineers are makingsteady progress on the key technologies for the A. program, both the vehicle and its space plane mothership are still likely decadesoff*&ome of the congressional sensitivity to the design of the A. may have arisen from another, much more controversial spaceweapons concept with parallel goals3 hypervelocity rod bundles that would be dropped to Jarth from orbital platforms* 0or decadesair force planners have been thinking about placing weapons in orbit that could strike terrestrial targets, particularly buried,

4hardened5 bunkers and caches of weapons of mass destruction* ommonly called 4rods from od,5 the bundles would be made upof large tungsten rods, each as long as si? meters 86 feetC and 6 centimeters :8 inchesC across* Jach rod would be hurleddownward from an orbiting spacecraft and guided to its target at tremendous speed*Loth high costs and the laws of physics, however, challenge their feasibility* Jnsuring that the proKectiles do not burn up or deformfrom reentry friction while sustaining a precise, nearly vertical flight path would be e?tremely difficult* alculations indicate that thenone?plosive rods would probably be no more effective than more conventional munitions* 0urthermore, the e?pense of lofting theheavy proKectiles into orbit would be e?orbitant* #hus, despite continued interest in them, rods from od seem to fall into the realmof science fiction*)bstacles to &pace =eapons=hat, then, is holding the *&* and other nationsC back from a full-bore pursuit of space weapons" #he countervailing pressures arethreefold3 political opposition, technological challenges and high costs*#he American body politic is deeply divided over the wisdom of making space warfare a part of the national military strategy* #herisks are manifold* I remarked earlier on the general instabilities of an arms race, but there is a further issue of stability among thenuclear powers* Jarly-warning and spy satellites have traditionally played a crucial role in reducing fears of a surprise nuclearattack* Lut if antisatellite weapons disabled those eyes-in-the-sky, the resulting uncertainty and distrust could rapidly lead tocatastrophe*)ne of the most serious technological challenges posed by space weapons is the proliferation of space debris, to which I alluded

earlier* According to investigators at the air force, (A&A and elestrak an independent space-monitoring =eb siteC, the hineseantisatellite test left more than 8,666 pieces of Kunk, baseball-si@e and larger, orbiting the globe in a cloud that lies between about866 kilometers :8 milesC and Q,666 kilometers 8,66 milesC above Jarths surface* 1erhaps another :6,666 obKects that are acentimeter half an inchC across and larger were released* >igh orbital velocities make even tiny pieces of space Kunk dangerous tospacecraft of all kinds* And ground stations cannot reliably monitor or track obKects smaller than about five centimeters two inchesCacross in low Jarth orbit around a meter in geostationary orbitC, a capability that might enable satellites to maneuver out of theway* #o avoid being damaged by the hinese space debris, in fact, two *&* satellites had to alter course* Any shooting war in spacewould raise the specter of a polluted space environment no longer navigable by Jarth-orbiting satellites*Lasing weapons in orbit also presents difficult technical obstacles* #hey would be Kust as vulnerable as satellites are to all kinds ofoutside agents3 space debris, proKectiles, electromagnetic signals, even natural micrometeoroids* &hielding space weapons againstsuch threats would also be impractical, mostly because shielding is bulky and adds mass, thereby greatly increasing launch costs*)rbital weapons would be mostly autonomous mechanisms, which would make operational errors and failures likely* #he paths ofobKects in orbit are relatively easy to predict, which would make hiding large weapons problematic* And because satellites in lowJarth orbit are overhead for only a few minutes at a time, keeping one of them constantly in range would re%uire many weapons*0inally, getting into space and operating there is e?tremely e?pensive3 between T8,666 and T:6,666 a pound to reach low Jarthorbit and between T:,666 and T86,666 a pound for geostationary orbit* Jach space-based weapon would re%uire replacementevery seven to : years, and in-orbit repairs would not be cheap, either*

Alternatives to &pace =arfareiven the risks of space warfare to national and international security, as well as the technical and financial hurdles that must be

overcome, it would seem only prudent for spacefaring nations to find ways to prevent an arms race in space* #he *&* focushas been to reduce the vulnerability of its satellite fleet and e?plore alternatives to its dependence on satelliteservices* Most other space-capable countries are instead seeking multilateral diplomatic and legalmeasures* #he options range from treaties that would ban antisatellite and space-based weaponsto voluntary measures that would help build transparency and mutual confidence*#he Lush administration has adamantly opposed any form of negotiations regarding space weapons* )pponents of multilateralspace weapons agreements contend that others particularly hinaC will sign up but build secret arsenals at the same time, becausesuch treaty violations cannot be detected* #hey argue further that the *&* cannot sit idly as potential adversaries gain spaceborne


6/28

resources that could enhance their terrestrial combat capabilities*

1roponents of international treaties counter that failure to negotiate such agreements entails real opportunitycosts* An arms race in space may end up compromising the security of all nations ,including that ofthe *&*, while it stretches the economic capacities of the competitors to the breaking point* And whereas many advocates of a spaceweapons ban concede that it will be difficult to construct a fully verifiable treatybecause space technology can be used for bothmilitary and civilian endseffective treaties already e?ist that do not re%uire strict verification* A good e?ample is the Liological=eapons onvention* ertainly a prohibition on the testing and use as opposed to the deploymentC of the most dangerous class ofnear-term space weaponsdestructive as opposed to KammingC antisatellite systemswould be easily verifiable, because

earthbound observers can readily detect orbital debris* 0urthermore, any party to a treaty would know that all itsspace launches would be tracked from the ground, and any suspicious obKect in orbit wouldpromptly be labeled as such* #he international outcry that would ensue from such overt treaty

violations could deter would-be violators*&ince the mid-:;;6s, however, progress on establishing a new multilateral space regime has lagged* #he*&* has blocked effortsat the nited (ations onference on Disarmament in eneva to begin negotiations on a treaty toban space weapons* hina, meanwhile, has refused to accept anything less* >ence, intermediate measures such as voluntaryconfidence-building, space traffic control or a code of responsible conduct for spacefaring nations have remained stalled*

&pace warfare is not inevitable* Lut the recent policy shift in the *&* and hinas provocativeactions have highlighted the fact that the world is approaching a crossroads*ountries must come togrips with their strong self-interest in preventing the testing and use of orbital weapons* #he nations of Jarth must soon decidewhether it is possible to sustain the predominantly peaceful human space e?ploration that has already lasted half a century* #helikely alternative would be unacceptable to all*

*he plan creates a 'ramewor( 'or cooperation -- spills over to climate monitoring.Forman et al& ++ Usenior associate at &I&, where she works on renewable energy, the Americas, civil-military relations,and post-conflict reconstruction, former codirector of the 1ost-onflict $econstruction 1roKect, she has written e?tensively onsecurity-sector reform in conflict states, economic development in postwar societies, the role of the nited (ations in peaceoperations, and energy security, served as the director of peace, security, and human rights at the ( 0oundation* &he has heldsenior positions in the *&* government at the *&* Agency for International Development, the Lureau for >umanitarian $esponse,and the )ffice of #ransition Initiatives, as well as at the =orld Lanks 1ost onflict nit* &he has been a senior fellow with theAssociation of the nited &tates Army and a guest scholar at the *&* Institute of 1eace, holds adKunct faculty appointments atAmerican niversity, eorgetown niversity, and Bohns >opkins &AI&F UUsenior fellow and director for &pace Initiatives at &I&,senior adviser to the &A0$A( group and consults internationally on aerospace and telecommunicationsF UUUadKunct fellow andformer program manager for &pace Initiatives at &I&, UUUUadKunct fellow and former program manager for &pace Initiatives at&I&, Bohanna Mendelson, 4#oward the >eavens3 'atin Americas Jmerging &pace 1rograms3 A $eport of the &I& Americas1rogram and &pace Initiatives5, enter for &trategic and International &tudies, August 866;,https3//csis*org/files/publication/6;6E69Mendelson9#oward>eavens9=eb*pdfC//&B0

=ithnew attention being placed on the importance of science and technology as a driver of economicgrowth, innovation, and trade, looking at the nited &tates relationships with potential newmarkets inLra@il and other 'atin American countries should become a central part of any new

diplomatic agenda toward the region * Moreover, any serio!s approach to mitigating climate

change must also deal with the importance of preserving the regions massive rain forests

through earth observation and other tech nologies that support these goals*#he Lra@ilian space program is the most developed in the region, highlighted by the LJ$& program* #he top priority of theLra@ilian space program is the use of satellites to monitor the Ama@on rainforest in the global fight against climate change* Lra@ils8667 (ational Defense &trategy report discusses the use of space for its national security needs* #his new strategy also indicates thatmore resources will be used for space e?ploration in the future* Lra@il not only wants to develop greater launch capacity, but it alsowants to build satellites for earth observation and enhanced communication capacity* #hese efforts reflect a broader geopoliticalagenda to advance its role on the international stage*

#he nited & tates has a new opportunity to use civil space and cooperation on science and

tech nology as a powerful new tool of engagement in 'atin America, and especially with Lra@il* #henited &tates should not let I#A$ prevent its discussion with the region* #here are strong reasons whythe nited &tates should be talking to its partners in the Americas about all kinds of potentialtechnology proKects as a means of e?panding both research and commercial interests* *&*leadership in space e?ploration comprisesnot only government achievements but also powerful commercialopportunities that arise from the sale of *&* inventions to its allies* As the nited &tates losesmarket share in satellites and other related technical e%uipment to countries such as hina,India, $ussia, and Jurope, it should consider what steps are needed to reassert *&* leadership*ooperation in space activities such as earth observation and space e?ploration can be one path


7/28

toward restoring the traditional leadership credibility of the nited & tates for this emerginginterest in space technology in the Americas*

*hat,s vital to collect oceanic data and prevent marine ecosystem collapseSherman& 11Nenneth, 86::, 4#he application of satellite remote sensing for assessing productivity in relation to fisheriesyields of the worlds large marine ecosystems,5 IJ& Bournal of Marine &cience, & Department of ommerce, (ational )ceanic andAtmospheric Administration, (ortheast 0isheries &cience enter, 1h*D, Director of *&* 'MJ 1rogram, Director of the (arragansett

'aboratory and )ffice of Marine Jcosystem &tudies at the (ortheast 0isheries &cience enter, adKunct professor in the raduate&chool of )ceanography at the niversity of $hode Island, B1'C

In :;;8,world leadersat the historical ( onference on Jnvironment and Development (JDC recogni@edthatthe e?ploitation of resources in coastal oceans was becoming increasingly unsustainable,resulting in an international effort to assess, recover, and manage goods and services of large marine ecosystems 'MJsC* Morethan T billion in support to ::6 economically developing nations have been dedicated to operationali@ing a five-module

approach supporting 'MJ assessment and management practices*An important component of this effortfocuses on the effects of climate change on fisheries biomass yields of 'MJs, using satellite

remote sensing and insitu sampling of key indicators of changing ecological conditions* =armingappears to be reducingprimary productivityin the lower latitudes, where stratification of the water column hasintensified* 0ishery biomass yields in the &ubpolar 'MJs of the (ortheast Atlantic are also increasing as @ooplankton levels

increase with warming* During the current period of climate warming, it is especially important for space agency

programmes inAsia, Jurope, and the nited &tates to continue to provide satellite-borne radiometrydata to the global networks of 'MJ assessment scientists. )verfishing, pollution, habitat loss,and climate change are causing serious degradation in the worlds coastal oceans and adownward spiral in economic benefits from marine goods and services* 1rompt and large-scale changes in the use of ocean resources are needed to overcome this downward spiral* In :;;8,the world community of nations convened the first global conference of world leaders in $io de Baneiro to address ways andmeans to improve the degraded condition of the global environment $obinson et al*, :;;8C* #en years later 8668C, at a follow-up =orld &ummit on &ustainable Development in Bohannesburg &herman, 866


8/28

brought together e?perts from different disciplines, including coral reef ecologists, to?icologists, and fisheries scientists* Itsreport will be formally released later this week* X#he findings are shocking,X said Ale? $ogers, I1&)Ws scientific director and

professor of conservation biology at )?ford niversity* XAs we considered the cumulative effect of whathumankind does to the oceans, the implications became far worse than we had individuallyreali@ed* X=eWve sat in one forum and spoken to each other about what weWre seeing, and weWve ended up with a pictureshowing that almost right across the boardweWre seeing changes that are happening faster than weWdthought, or in waysthatwe didnWt e?pect to seefor hundreds of years*X #hese XacceleratedX changes

include melting of the reenland and Antarctic ice sheets, sea level rise, and release of methanetrapped inthe sea bed* 0ast changes X#he rate of change is vastly e?ceeding what we were e?pecting even a couple of years ago,X said )ve

>oegh-uldberg, a coral specialist from the niversity of !ueensland in Australia* &ome species are already fishedwaybeyond their limits- and may also be affected by other threats X&o if you look at almost everything, whether itWsfisheries in temperate @ones or coral reefs or Arctic sea ice, all of this is undergoing changes&but at a much faster

rate than we had thought*X Lut more worrying than this, the team noted, are the ways in which different issues actsynergistically to increase threats to marine life* &ome pollutants, for e?ample, stick to the surfaces of tiny plasticparticles that are now found in the ocean bed* #his increases the amounts of these pollutants that are consumed by bottom-

feeding fish* 1lastic particlesalso assistthe transport of algae from place to place, increasingthe occurrenceof to?ic algal blooms- which are also caused by the influ? of nutrient-rich pollution from agricultural land* In a widersense, ocean acidification, warming, local pollution and overfishing are acting together to increase thethreatto coral reefs - so much so that three-%uarters of the worldWs reefs are at risk of severe decline* #he challenges arevastF but unlike previous generations, we know what now needs to happen5 'ife on Jarth has gone through five Xmass

e?tinction eventsX caused by events such as asteroid impactsF and it is often said that humanityWs combined impact is causing asi?th such event* #he I1&) report concludes that it is too early to say definitively* Lut the trends are such that it is likely to

happen, they say - and far faster than any of the previous five* X=hat weWre seeingat the moment is unprecedentedinthe fossil record - the environmental changes are much more rapid,X 1rofessor $ogers told LL (ews* X=eWvestill got most of the worldWsbiodiversity, but theactual rate of e?tinction is much high erOthan in pasteventsP - andwhatwe face is certainly a globally significant e?tinction event.

Space militarization is inevitable / "S action solves and promotes militaryreadiness.0ngalsbe 2$&&taff &gt* #orri Ingalsbe, Air 0orce 1ublic Affairs Agency, 86:Q, 4&pace superiority remains vital to nationalsecurity,5 http3//www*af*mil/(ews/ArticleDisplay/tabid/88/Article/QE8;;/space-superiority-remains-vital-to-national-security*asp?, Accessed Q/:E/:QC//D$* >

&helton was Koined by il Nlinger, the deputy assistant secretary of defense for space andintelligenceF Douglas 'overro, the deputy assistant secretary of defense for space policyF 't* en*Bohn $aymond, the :Qth Air 0orce commander and the Boint 0unctional omponent ommandfor &pace, *&* &trategic ommandF and Letty &app, (ational $econnaissance )ffice director*

All parties agreed stable funding of space programs is critical to maintaining an advantage in thespace arena*4)ur nations advantage in space is no longer a given,5 &helton said* 4#he ever-evolving spaceenvironment is increasingly contested as potential adversary capabilities grow in number andsophistication*5hanges to the space environment have caused changes to policies and practices within theDepartment of Defense and the Air 0orce*4#he evolving strategic environment increasingly challenges *&* space advantages,5 'overro

e?plained* 4&pace is no longer the sole province of world powers* It is a frontier that is now opento all* In the last several decades, space has become more competitive, more congested and morecontested* =hat worries me the most is the contested nature of space, which we now face*5>e stressed the importance of space, not only to those on American soil, but to the warfightersof partner nations*4It underpins D)D capabilities worldwide,5 he said* 4It enables *&* global operations to bee?ecuted with precision , on a worldwide basis, with reduced resources, fewer deployed troops,lower casualties, and decreased collateral damage* &pace empowers both our forces and those ofour allies to win faster, and bring more of our warfighters home safely*5


9/28

&atellite launches, like the one at .andenberg A0L, and units like Boint 0orces omponentommand for &pace, provide the various capabilities necessary to maintain space superioritynow, and in the future, officials said*

*hat ca!ses 3reat power war.Spencer 4(Back &pencer, $esearch 0ellow at #homas A* $oe Institute for Jconomic 1olicy &tudies, 4#he 0acts About

Military $eadiness5, >eritage 0oundation, ;-:-8666, http3//www*heritage*org/$esearch/$eports/8666/6;/L:;Q-#he-0acts-About-Military-$eadinessC//$Da

AmericaWs national security re%uirements dictate that the armed forces must be prepared to defeat groups ofadversaries in a given war* America, as the sole remaining superpower, has many enemies* Lecause attacking America orits interests alone would surely end in defeat for a single nation, these enemies are likely to form alliances* #herefore, basingreadiness on American military superiority over any single nation has little saliency* #he evidence indicates that the *&* armedforces are not ready to support AmericaWs national security re%uirements* Moreover, regarding the broader capability to defeat

groups of enemies, military readiness has been declining* #he (ational &ecurity &trategy, the *&* official statement ofnational security obKectives, concludes that the nited &tates Xmust have the capability to deter and, ifdeterrence fails, defeat large-scale, cross-border aggressionin two distant theaters in overlapping timeframes*XQAccording to some of the militaryWs highest-ranking officials, however, the nited &tates cannot achieve this goal*ommandant of the Marine orps eneral Bames Bones, former hief of (aval )perations Admiral Bay Bohnson, and Air 0orcehief of &taff eneral Michael $yan have all e?pressed serious concerns about their respective servicesW ability to carry out a twomaKor theater war strategy* $ecently retired enerals Anthony Ginni of the *&* Marine orps and eorge Boulwan of the *&*

Army have even %uestioned AmericaWs ability to conduct one maKor theater war the si@e of the :;;: ulf =ar*< Militaryreadiness is vital because declines in AmericaWs military readiness signal to the rest of the worldthat the nited &tates is not prepared to defend its interests * #herefore, potentially hostile nations

will be more likely to lash out against American allies and interests, inevitably leading to *&*involvement in combat* A high state of military readiness is more likely to deter potentiallyhostile nations from acting aggressively in regions of vital national interest, thereby preservingpeace*


10/28

1AC -- Aerospace 0ntegrationContention two is Aerospace 0ntegration --

Cyber-wars ca!se etinction.Fritz& ++ Masters in International $elations, $esearcher for International ommission on (uclear (onproliferation andDisarmament Bason, 866;, 4>acking (uclear ommand and ontrol,5http3//icnnd*org/Documents/Bason90rit@9>acking9(8*pdfC//D$* >

#his paper will analyse the threat of cyber terrorism in regard to nuclear weapons* &pecifically, this research will use open sourceknowledge to identify the structure of nuclear command and control centres, how those structures might be compromised through

computer network operations, and how doing so would fit within established cyber terrorists capabilities, strategies, and tactics* Ifaccess to command and control centres is obtained, terrorists could fake or actually cause onenuclear-armed state to attack another , thus provoking a nuclear response from another nuclearpower* #his may be an easier alternative for terrorist groups than building or ac%uiring a nuclear

weaponor dirty bomb themselves* #his would also act as a force e%ualiser, and provide terrorists withthe asymmetricbenefits of high speed, removal of geographical distance, and a relatively low

cost* Contin!ing difficulties in developing comp!ter trac(ing technologies which co!ld trace the identity of intruders, and difficulties in establishing an internationally agreed upon legal framework to guide responses tocomputer network operations, point towards an inherent weakness in using computer networks to manage nuclear weaponry* #his is

particularly relevant to red!c ing the hair trigger post!re o' eisting n!clear arsenals. Y All

computerswhich are connected to the internet are susceptible to infiltration and remote control*omputers which operate on a closed network may also be compromised by various hackermethods, such as privilege escalation, roaming notebooks, wireless access points, embedded e?ploits in software and hardware,and maintenance entry points* 0or e?ample, e-mail spoofing targeted at individuals who have access to a closed network, could lead

to the installation of a virus on an open network* #his virus could then be carelessly transported on removabledata storagebetween the open and closed network* Information found on the internet may also reveal how to access theseclosed networks directly* Jfforts by militaries to place increasing reliance on computer networks ,including e?perimental technology such as autonomous systems, and their desire to have multiple launch options, such as nuclear

triad capability, enables multiple entry points for terrorists*0or e?ample, if a terrestrial command centre isimpenetrable, perhaps isolating one nuclear armed submarine would prove an easier task* #here is evidence to suggestmultiple attempts have been made by hackers to compromise the e?tremely low radio fre%uencyonce used by the & (avy to send nuclear launch approval to submerged submarines* Additionally,the alleged &oviet system known as 1erimetr was designed to automatically launch nuclear weapons if it was unable to establishcommunications with &oviet leadership* #his was intended as a retaliatory response in the event that nuclear weapons haddecapitated &oviet leadershipF however it did not account for the possibility of cyber terrorists blocking communications through

computer network operations in an attempt to engage the system*Y &hould a warhead be launched, damage couldbe further enhanced through additional computer network operations* Ly using pro?ies, multi-layered attacks could be engineered* #errorists could remotely commandeer computers in hinaand use them to launch a & nuclear attack against $ussia*#hus $ussia would believe it wasunder attack from the & and the & would believe hina was responsible *0urther, emergencyresponse communications could be disrupted, transportation could be shut down, anddisinformation, such as misdirection, could be planted, thereby hindering the disaster reliefeffort and ma?imi@ing destruction* Disruptions in communication and the use of disinformationcould also be used to provoke uninformed responses* 0or e?ample, a nuclear strike between India and 1akistancould be coordinated with Distributed Denial of &ervice attacks against key networks, so they would have further difficulty in

identifying what happened and be forced to respond %uickly* #errorists could also knock out communicationsbetween these states so they cannot discuss the situation *Alternatively, amidst the confusion of atraditional large-scale terrorist attack, claims of responsibility and declarations of war could befalsified in an attempt to instigate a hasty military response* #hese false claims could be posted directly on1residential, military, and government websites* J-mails could also be sent to the media and foreign governments using the I1

addresses and e-mail accounts of government officials*A sophisticated and all encompassing combination of


11/28

traditional terrorism and cyber terrorism could be enough to launch nuclear weapons on itsown, without the need for compromising command and control centres directly*

*rade solves all war.3riswold 11 + Daniel riswold is director of the enter for #rade 1olicy &tudies at the ato Institute and author of Mad about

#rade3 =hy Main &treet America &hould Jmbrace lobali@ation* 40ree #rade and the lobal Middle lass,5 >ayek &ociety Bournal.ol* ; http3//www*cato*org/pubs/articles/>ayek-&ociety-Bournal-riswold*pdf Accessed


12/28

All this helps e?plain why the worlds two most conflict-prone regions + the Arab Middle Jast and &ub-&aharan Africa + are also theworlds two least globally and economically integrated regions* #errorism does not spring from poverty, but from ideological fervorand political and economic frustration* If we want to blunt the appeal of radical ideology to the ne?t generation of Muslim children

coming of age,we can help create more economic opportunity in those societies by encouragingmore trade and investment ties with the =est* #he *&* initiative to enact free trade agreements with certainMuslim countries, such as Morocco, Bordan, Lahrain and )man, represent small steps in the right direction* An even more effectivepolicy would be to unilaterally open =estern markets to products made and grown in Muslim countries* A young man or womanwith a real Kob at an e?port-oriented factory making overcoats in Bordan or shorts in Jgypt is less vulnerable to the appeal of an Al-!aida recruiter* )f course, free trade and globali@ation do not guarantee peace or inoculation against terrorism, anymore than theyguarantee democracy and civil liberty* >ot-blooded nationalism and ideological fervor can overwhelm cold economic calculations*Any relationship involving human beings will be messy and non-linear* #here will always be e?ceptions and outliers in such comple?relationships involving economies and governments* Lut deeper trade and investment ties among nations have made it more likelythat democracy and civil liberties will take root, and less likely those gains will be destroyed by civil conflict and war*

#conomic decline ca!ses war.Royal& 15+ Bedediah $oyal, Director of ooperative #hreat $eduction at the *&* Department of DefenseJconomicIntegration, Jconomic &ignaling and the 1roblem of Jconomic rises, Jconomics of =ar and 1eace3 Jconomic, 'egal and 1olitical1erspectives, ed* oldsmith and Lrauer, p* 8:-8:C

&econd, on a dyadic level* opelandWs :;;e argues that interdependent statesare likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as theyhave an optimistic view of future trade relations* >owever, if the e?pectations of future tradedecline, particularly for difficult to replace items such as energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases, asstates will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources* rises could potentially bethe trigger for decreased trade e?pectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionistmoves by interdependent states*Q #hird, othershave considered the link between economic decline and e?ternalarmed conflict at a national level* Llomberg and >ess 8668C find a strong correlation between internal conflictand e?ternal conflict, particularly during periods of economic downturn* #hey write, #he linkages

between internal and e?ternal conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing*Jconomic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favour* Moreover, thepresence of a recession lends to amplify the e?tent to which international and e?ternal conflictsself-reinforce each other* LlombcrKZ 2 >ess* 8668* p* 7;C Jconomic decline hasalsobeen linked with an

increase in the likelihood of terrorismLlomberg* >ess* 2 =eerapana, 866QC*which has the capacity tospill across borders and lead to e?ternal tensions* 0urthermore, crises generally reduce thepopularity of a sitting government* XDiversionary theoryX suggests that, when facingunpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have increased incentives tofabricate e?ternal military conflicts to create a Wrally around the flagW effect * =ang :;;


13/28

Xsing a whole-of-nation approach, at minimal cost, Othe planP promotes favorable conditions for integrating and sharinginformation, including intelligence, to better inform decisions affecting the security, safety, economy and environment of the nited&tates and the global maritime commons,X she said*#he plan merges the (ational 1lan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness and the lobal Maritime Intelligence Integration 1lan,both of which were published in 866, >ayden said*

X#he deliberate misuse of the maritime domain to commit harmful, hostile , or unlawful acts,including those against the maritime transportation system, remains an enduring threat to the safety and

security of the American people, to wider *&* national security interests, and to the interests ofour international allies and private sector partners,Xthe planWs e?ecutive summary said*#he plan promotes sustaining favorable conditions for global maritime security and prosperity through effective understanding ofthe maritime domain and by improving shared-information capabilities from public and private sectors*It promotes risk management planning that enables the entire global maritime community to develop a shared understanding ofpotential risks and opportunities, the report said*

Xltimately, the backbone of protecting the nited &tates, its allies and private-sector partners frommaritime threatswill be an interactive , layered structure of cooperating agencies and entities,X

the report said* %6A is a critical lin( to achieving this vision thro!gh timely delivery

o' re9!ired in'ormation res!lting in decision s!periority.

Arctic competition res!lts in global n!clear war.

Staples 5+$ideau Institute3 Danish Institute for International &tudies &teven &taples, August :6, 866;, 4&teps toward anarctic nuclear weapon free @one5, http3//www*diis*dk/graphics/Jvents/866;/1resentationV86&taples*pdfC

#he fact is, the Arctic isbecoming an @one of increased military competition * $ussian 1resident Medvedevhas announced the creation of a special military force to defend Arctic claims* $ussianeneral .ladimir &hamanov declared that $ussian troops would step up training for Arctic combat,and that $ussias submarine fleet would increase its 4operational radius*5#his week, two $ussian attacksubmarines were spotted off the *&* east coast for the first time in : years* In Banuary, on the eve of )bamas inauguration,1residentLush issued a (ational &ecurity 1residential Directive on Arctic $egional 1olicy* As Michael >amel-reene has pointed

out, it affirmed as a priority to preserve *&*military vessel and aircraft mobility and transit throughout the Arctic, including the(orthwest 1assage, and foresaw greater capabilities to protect *&* borders in the Arctic * #he Lushadministrations disastrous eight years in office, particularly its decision to withdraw from the ALM treaty and deploy missile

defence interceptors and a radar in Jastern Jurope, has greatly contributed to the instability we are seeingtoday* #he Arctic has figured in this renewed interest in old =ar weapons systems, particularly the upgrading of the #huleLallistic Missile Jarly =arning &ystem radar for ballistic missile defence* #he anadiangovernment, as well, has putforward new military capabilities to protect anadian sovereignty claims in the Arctic, includingproposed ice-capable ships, a northern military training base and a deep water port*Denmark last week released an all-party defence position paper that suggests the country should create a dedicated Arctic militarycontingent that draws on army, navy and air force assets with ship-based helicopters able todrop troops anywhere* Danish fighter planes could be patrolling reenlandic airspace* 'astyear, (orwaychose to buy Q7 'ockheed 0- fighter Kets, partly because of their suitability for Arctic patrols* In March, thatcountry held a maKor Arctic military practice involving E,666 soldiers from : countries in which afictional country called (orthland sei@ed offshore oil rigs* #he manoeuvres prompted a protestfrom $ussia+ which obKected again in Bune after &weden held its largest northern military e?ercise since the end of the &econd=orld =ar* About :8,666 troops, 6 aircraft and several warships were involved* Bayantha Dhanapala, 1resident of1ugwash and former ( nder-&ecretary for Disarmament Affairs , summari@es the situation bluntly* >e

warns us that 40rom those in the international peace and security sector, deep concerns arebeing e?pressed over the fact that two nuclear weapon states + the nited & tates and the $ussia n 0ederation,which together own ; per cent of the nuclear

weapons in the world + converge on the Arctic and have competing claims* #hese claims,together with those of other allied (A#) countries + anada, Denmark, Iceland, and (orway

+ could , if unresolved, lead to conflict escalating into the threat or !se o' n!clear weapons.:


14/28

Cr!ise missile attac( in the 3!l' o' %eico,s inevitable.arnes 241&Diane, $eporter for the (ational Bournal roup under contract with the (uclear #hreat InitiativeF a nonprofit,nonpartisan group working to reduce global threats from nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, 4ould the *&* 0ace a ruiseMissile #hreat from the ulf of Me?ico"5 http3//www*nationalKournal*com/global-security-newswire/could-the-u-s-face-a-cruise-missile-threat-from-the-gulf-of-me?ico-86:Q68:, Accessed /88/:QC//D$* >

#he nited &tates is pu@@ling over how to block cruise missiles that theoretically could be

launched from the ulf of Me?ico, even after throwing some of its most advanced technologiesat the problem*$ussia and Iran have been cited as possible threats that might, at some point, lurk in the waters

Kust off *&* shores*A 86: military e?ercise pitted systems such as 1atriot interceptors, Aegis warships and combataircraft against potential cruise-missile or short-range ballistic missiles fired from the ulf* Lutthe drill highlighted a particularvulnerability to cruise missiles lobbed from that region, *&*(orthern ommand head en* harles Bacoby indicated in congressional testimony last week*>e said the 1entagon has Xsome significant challengesX in countering these missiles, but ise?ploring Xsome opportunities to use e?isting systems more effectively to do that*X Manydetailed results of the )ct* :: drill conducted near Ney =est, 0la*, remain classified, Bacoby said*X#he cruise-missile threat portion of that we are working on very hard,X the general added at the

March : &enate Armed &ervice ommittee hearing, in response to a %uestion from &enator #edru@ $-#e?asC*#he military leader -- whose command focuses on defense of the *&* homeland -- referenced aninitiative to %uickly mobili@e assets against such threats in a configuration called the BointDeployable Integrated Air and Missile Defense system*#he effort is housed within the 1entagonWs Boint #est and Jvaluation program, which aims toaddress Xoperational deficienciesX in military preparedness, according to information released

by the 1entagon*X#he idea is to cobble together enough stuff OsoP that maybe something will work* Lut none ofthese systems were designed for cruise-missile defense,X Ningston $eif, an analyst with theenter for Arms ontrol and (onproliferation, said in an e-mail*ruise missiles can be particularly challenging to defend against, as they can be more difficultthan aircraft to detect on radar and are sometimes tricky to shoot down, according to militarye?perts*

A 86: *&* military intelligence report forecasted that cruise missiles would spread into morehands over the coming decade* #he document also hints at the ability to evade defensesdesigned against ballistic missiles*Xruise missiles can fly at low altitudes to stay below enemy radar and, in some cases, hide

behind terrain features* (ewer missiles are incorporating stealth features to make them evenless visible to radars and infrared detectors,X says the 86: assessment by the (ational Air and&pace Intelligence enter*ru@Ws office did not respond to re%uests to discuss his specific concerns about potential attackrisks facing the nited &tates from the ulf of Me?ico* >is comments came, though, in the wakeof some other public discussion of possible threats of this kind*Iran last month announced it intended to deploy warships near the *&* maritime border,

prompting heightened discussion of the Middle Jastern nationWs growing military capabilities*At last weekWs hearing, Bacoby also spoke to MoscowWs cruise-missile capabilities*$esponding to a %uestion from &enator Beff &essions $-Ala*C, the (orthern ommand leadersaid the nited &tates has been Xtracking for a number of years $ussiaWs continued investmentin improved cruise missile technology*X#he Nremlin has armed its bomber aircraft with cruise missiles for decades, he noted*X#hey also are capable of introducing cruise missiles into a theater from submarines,X saidBacoby, without elaborating on the specific regions to which these vessels could deploy* X#heyWve


15/28

Kust begun production of a new class of %uiet nuclear submarines specifically designed to delivercruise missiles*X)ne 86:8 news article %uotes *&* government insiders assert ing that a $ussian submarinee%uipped with cruise missiles had evaded detection for weeks in the ulf of Me?ico* >owever,the Defense Department denied the contentions described in the =ashington 0ree Leaconreport*

3oes n!clear.3ardner $ >all,1rofessor of International 1olitics at the American niversity of 1aris, ::/8E/6E,4Averting lobal =ar,5p*8:, Accessed Q/86/:QC//D$* >

>ere, developing states might see a relative advantage in the use of tactical n!clear weapons versus

the high-tech military superiority of the 4revolution in military affairs*5 If attacked by a 4dual

use5 cruise missile,for e?ample, aless technologically sophisticated state, such as (orth Norea, might respond with a n!clear

co!nterstri(e& having no idea if the warhead fired at it was nuclear or conventional* At the same time,however, as illustrated by cyber attacks on Jstonian communications systems in 866E see hapter 8C, even more sophisticated warfare against communication systems could take place without the use of nuclear

weaponry, such as a 4cyber sabotage5 attack on the 0ederal $eserves electronic network, which handles all federal funds and transactions, effectively destroying the *&* governments ability to operate* )ther

cyber- targets co!ld incl!de the 7entagon and the >omeland &ecurity )rgani@ation itself*::

R!ssia war is on the brin( beca!se o' "(raine.Allison 218& raham, Douglas Dillon 1rofessor of overnment at the >arvard Nennedy &chool and director of >arvardWsLelfer enter for &cience and International Affairs, served as assistant secretary of Defense in the linton administration and as anadviser to the secretary of Defense during the $eagan administration, 4>ow kraine crisis could pull *&* to war,5http3//www*cnn*com/86:Q/6Q/:7/opinion/allison-ukraine-civil-war/, Accessed Q/86/:QC//D$* >

As we have seen in the past two weeks in eastern kraine, $ussian speakers acting eitherspontaneously, or at the behest of $ussian security services, or both have taken control ofgovernment buildings in :6 cities in kraineWs eastern provinces of Donetsk, 'uhansk andNharkiv* krainian military, security and police forces are so impotent, demorali@ed andcompromised by $ussian infiltration that their response has so far been pathetic*#his week, the (ew Hork #imes reported on the krainian governmentWs Xglaring humiliation,X

when a military operation to confront pro-$ussian militants instead saw kraineWs 8: armoredvehicles separating into two columns, surrendering or retreating* In several instances, whenconfronted by pro-$ussian crowds, soldiers and policemen have even switched sides*If #hursdayWs deal unravels and krainian authorities remain unable to restore basic law andorder, the pro-$ussian demonstrators occupying buildingswill be emboldened to e?pand theirreach* 0urther steps may include the demonstrators setting up an independent XrepublicX in thethree Jastern regions and seeking to drive out forces loyal to kraineWs interim government,provoking the Niev government to respond with greater force, and then calling in $ussian troopsto defend them against what they will claim to be XfascistsX from western kraine*$esponding to a crackdown, $ussian security forces would likely provide arms and otherassistance to the $ussian speakers, claiming that such a call for assistance from XcompatriotsX isimpossible to ignore*As conflict intensifies, western krainians, perhaps even 1oles or other

Juropeans , could come to the aid of kraine* In this spiral, one thing could lead to the ne?t,ending in significant bloodshed in eastern kraine, and perhaps even spreading beyond*

=idespread violence or civil war would certainly be a calamity for krainians* Lut would itsconse%uences for American national interests re%uire an American military response"0ortunately for Americans, the answer is no* In 8667, when $ussia crushed eorgia in a short

war that ended in $ussiaWs recognition of independence for the former eorgian territories of&outh )ssetia and Abkha@ia, that was 1resident eorge = LushWs answer*


16/28

As the ongoing civil war in &yria has claimed more than :6,666 lives, neither 1resident )bamanor his most ardent critics, like Ari@ona &en* Bohn Mcain, have Kudged this such an e?tremethreat to *&* interests that Americans must kill and to die to stop it*#hat the *&* does not have vital national interests in kraine will not mean that the *&* has nonational interest in holding Moscow accountable for violating territorial integrity assurancesthat $ussia and the *&* gave to kraine in :;;Q in persuading it to give up nuclear weapons*

Indeed, if left to take its course, this crisis has the potential to fuel further developments thatengage core American national interests*0or e?ample, if rimea becomes 1utinWs precedent for creeping anne?ation in which $ussia-instigated $ussian speakers occupy government buildings, liberate a territory and establish arelationship with $ussia, where will this stop" ould the 8V of the population in 'atvia whoare $ussian speakersbe tempted or coa?edC to follow suit" Loth 'atvians and $ussians vividlyrecall that in :;Q6 &talin anne?ed 'atvia, 'ithuania and Jstonia, nations that regained theirindependence only in :;;: when the &oviet nion collapsed*C$ussian military intervention in 'atvia, even under the guise of special forces in green garb

without insignia, would almost certainly be engaged by 'atvian military and police* If $ussiansecurity forces came to the assistance of their brethren in 'atvia, as they would be likely to do,this would mean a direct confrontation between $ussia and the *&* -led (A#)*

Many Americans are not aware that 'atvia and its Laltic neighbors are members of the (A#)alliance, of which the nited &tates is the leader* >ow many Americans know that members ofthat alliance , including the nited &tates, commit themselves in Article of the (orth Atlantic#reaty to regard an attack against one (A#) signatory as Xan attack against them allX" 1ursuantto that commitment, successive American presidents have approved war plans in which

Americans would fight to defend the territory of all members of the alliance*1reventing kraineWs collapse into civil war must therefore be a high priority for the leaders of

both the nited &tates and $ussia* #he eneva agreement on Xinitial concrete steps to de-escalate tensions and restore security,X which *&* and $ussian diplomats signed, along withtheir J and krainian counterparts, represents the first real step in the internationalcommunityWs collective effort to reverse kraineWs slide into chaos*'eaders in both =ashington and Moscow will have to follow up with further, bolder steps to

prevent kraineWs spiraling into a civil war that could draw them into a direct confrontation*#hese additional steps will re%uire all parties to accept arrangements that would beunacceptable e?cept for the fact that all feasible alternatives are even worse*

#tinction.)el'and and 7astore +OIra >elfand, M*D*, and Bohn )* 1astore, M*D*, are past presidents of 1hysicians for &ocial$esponsibility* March :, 866;, 4*&*-$ussia nuclear war still a threat5,http3//www*proKo*com/opinion/contributors/content/#9pastoreline96-:-6;9J)D&A)9v:*bbdf8*htmlP

1resident )bama and $ussian 1resident Dimitri Medvedev are scheduled to =ednesday in 'ondon during the -86 summit*

#hey must not let the current economic crisis keep them from focusing on one of the greatest threats confrontinghumanity3 the danger of nuclear war* &ince the end of the old =ar, many have acted as though the danger ofnuclear war has ended* It has not* #here remain in the world more than 86,666 nuclear weapons *Alarmingly,

more than 8,666 of these weapons in the *&* and $ussian arsenals remain onready-alert status, commonly known as hair-trigger alert* #hey can be fired within five minutes andreach targets in the other country6 minuteslater* Bust oneof these weapons can destroy a city*A warinvolving a substantial numberwould cause devastation on a scale unprecedented in humanhistory* A study conducted by 1hysicians for &ocial $esponsibility in 8668 showed thatif only 66 of the $ussian weapons onhigh alert e?ploded over our cities,:66 million Americans would die in the first 6 minutes* An attack ofthismagnitude alsowould destroy the entire economic, communications and transportation infrastructureon which we all depend* #hose who survivedthe initial attackwould inhabit a nightmarelandscapewith huge swaths of the countryblanketed with radioactive fallout and epidemic diseases


17/28

rampant* #hey would have no food, no fuel, no electricity, no medicine, and certainly no organi@ed health care* In thefollowing months it is likely the vast maKority of the *&* population would die* $ecent studies by the eminent climatologists

#oon and $obock have shown that such a war would have a huge and immediate impact on climate world wide* If all of thewarheads in the *&* and $ussian strategic arsenals were drawn into the conflict, thefirestorms they causedwould loft:76 million tons of soot and debris into the upper atmosphere

blot ting out the sun* #emperatures across the globewould fall an average of :7 degrees 0ahrenheitto

levels not seen on earth since the depth ofthe last ice age, :7,666 years ago*Agriculture would stop,eco-systems would collapse , and many species, including perhaps our own, would becomee?tinct * It is common to discuss nuclear war as a low-probabillity event* Lut is this true"=e know of fiveocccasions during the last 6 years when either the *&* or $ussia believed it was underattack and prepared a counter-attack*#he most recent of these near misses occurred after the end of the old =aron Ban* 8, :;;, when the $ussians mistook a *&* weather rocket launched from (orway for a possible attack* Ban* 8, :;;,was an ordinary day with no maKor crisis involving the *&* and $ussia* Lut, unknown to almost every inhabitant on the planet, amisunderstanding led to the potential for a nuclear war* #he ready alert status of nuclear weapons that e?isted in :;; remainsin place today*

N;RA6 operational e''ectiveness solves all o' those impacts.


18/28

communication processes that would allow our two forces to work together during a real crisis* #he e?ercise,.II'A(#JA'J,was an international air terrorism scenario e?ercised over the 1acific )cean consisting offorces from the nited & tates and $ussia responding to the simulated hiKacking of a L-EE enroute to and from the 0ar Jast*#he e?ercise scenario created a situation that re%uired both the $ussian Air 0orce and()$AD to launch or divert fighter aircraft to investigate and follow a hiKacked airliner, with a focus on shadowing and coordinated

hand-off of monitored aircraft between fighters of our two nations* #his e?ercise was an overwhelming success and

has helped create an environment for further cooperative efforts*Missile Defense* &everal nations are developing the capacity to target (orthAmerica with ballisticmissiles capable of carrying w eapons of m ass d estruction in the belief those weapons will give them morefreedom of action* #hus far, the nited &tates is pacing the threat, but a lack of certainty of threatintentions and capabilities demands vigilance and agility* =e focus on three imperatives in order to performour missile defense mission3[ J?ecute the ballistic missile defense mission with precision using the e?isting round-Lased Interceptor LIC fleet located at.andenberg Air 0orce Lase, alifornia and 0ort reely, Alaska[ Develop realistic training simulations and constantly train as we intend to fight[ Assist the Missile Defense Agency MDAC and *&* &trategic ommand as they continue concurrent research and developmentactivities to improve capabilityI have gained increased confidence in the e?isting ballistic missile defense systems abilityincluding our sensors, weapons systems,and highly trained operatorsto defend against current limited threats* (onetheless, I would like to see a more robust and

redundant architecture for sensor and command and control nodes* It is critical that we continue to ensure oursensor network provides ade%uate warning and targeting information, that we test the entiresystem to verify its reliability and validate ongoing improvements, and that we remain vigilantto ensure our capabilities remain ahead of the evolving threat* Accordingly, I fully support the Departmentsrecent decision to keep the LI production line open until at least 86:owever,we must

remain vigilant and prepared to adKust our posture should a threat combination emerge thatchanges this e%uation*learly, a strong deterrence posture is one of our most important hedgesagainst such a threat *&()$#>)M and ()$AD are drafting a $eport to ongress on this issue as directed by the >ouse$eport to Accompany the (ational Defense Authori@ation Act for 0iscal Hear 86:: >ouse $eport :::-Q;:C*

#he Arctic* #he geopolitical importance of the Arctic has never been greater , because as far as weknow, the natural environment in the Arctic in civili@ed times has never changed faster* p to8V of the worlds remaining undiscovered oil and natural gas deposits may lie beneath the

Arctic ice cap*=hile most e?perts believe it will be some time before commercial Arctic shipping routes through the (orthwest1assage and the (orthern &ea $oute see a significant increase in volume, some countries and commercial interests are activelytesting the waters and making plans to increase their activity* =e have seen a marked increase in Arctic ecotourism, and itsattendant safety concerns, including the grounding of a cruise ship in the (orthwest 1assage last summer*

Lecause thesechanges involve a comple? mosaic of issues, challenges, and opportunities, andbecause a peaceful Arctic is central to the continued safety and security of the nited &tates, Ihave elevated the Arctic to the status of a key focus area* =e are crafting a ommanders Jstimate on the Arcticfor use within D)D, and my commands are e?amining how we can best support our interagency partners in this region with searchand rescue assets, humanitarian assistance, disaster response capabilities, and support to law enforcement* =e are also workinghand-in-hand with anada ommand as a vital partner to produce a concept of operations regarding how we would partner in theArctic to ensure our efforts are coordinated and that we pursue complementary rather than redundant capabilities in accordancewith our respective national direction*

$egarding capabilities, we are maturing our understanding of our gapsin this uni%ue environment*=eface shortcomings in all-domain awareness, communications, infrastructure to include adeepwater portC, mobility to include ade%uate national icebreaking capabilityC, search andrescue enabling capabilities, Arctic )cean charting, and the ability to observe and forecast Arcticenvironmental change*


19/28

#he good news is that cooperation is on the rise in the Arctic, and we must continue that traKectoryusing the array of mechanisms availableto us, such as the Arctic ouncil, the International Maritime )rgani@ation,and the nited (ations onvention on the 'aw of the &ea* I would like to add my voice to those of the &ecretary of Defense,hairman of the Boint hiefs of &taff, and hief of (aval )perations in urging the &enate to ratify the latter* Lecoming party to theonvention would protect and advance *&* interests in the Arctic by bolstering our national security, securing *&* rights overe?tensive marine areas, and giving the nited &tates a seat at the table when our vital interests are at stakewithout abdicating anysovereignty*

#ngaging %eico in space technology trans'er is vital to a s!stained& continentalSSA networ( thro!gh N;RA6Spinetta& =+ MaKor, &A0 'awrence, 4J?panding (orth American Aerospace Defense()$ADC5, Air 2 &pace 1ower Bournal, 8nd#rimester, 866, 4A &trategy to Jngage Me?ico,5E/ole in (orth American 1erimeter &ecurity

()$ADs mission is to provide aerospace warning and control for the (orth Americancontinent, but Me?ican participation is conspicuously absent from that partnership* ()$AD

remains e?clusively a anadian-*&* venture* ()$AD has yet to consult Me?ico or cultivate relations with Me?ico to develop acommon vision to deter, detect, and defeat threats to our shared (orth American homeland in part because military-to-militaryrelations are Xstandoffish*X 1rior to :;;, relations with Me?icos military were as described Xvirtually non-e?istent*X In May :;;,Defense &ecretary =illiam 1erry made the first-ever visit of a *&* defense secretary to Me?ico* &ince that visit, Me?ico has increasedsecurity collaboration with the *&* through such agreements as the (orthern Lorder $esponse 0orce, >igh ontact 'evel roup,and a &mart Lorders initiative* Lut, the focus has been primarily on law enforcement addressing counter-drug issues* Military-to-military cooperation does not e?tend much beyond the *&* providing spare parts for aging Me?ican fighters* In an interview, the

&A0/IA country director for Me?ico acknowledged, X#heres not a whole lot of mil-to-mil with Me?ico on theagenda*X =e must overcome skepticism in our ability to work together to patch the partnershiphole in our (orth American perimeter security*


20/28

nlike anada, Me?icodoesnt share a long tradition of defense cooperation with the *&*, but certainly has valuablecapabilities that are potentially available to contribute to (orth American Aerospace Defense*ommercial and military radars, drug enforcement airplanes, and Me?ican Air #raffic data such asflight plans and aircrew/passenger manifests are Kust some of the assets and sources of information that can

be used to bolster intelligence* Additionally, increased political and military cooperation withMe?ico would pay dividends in relations and help solidify a common hemispheric defense

posture* #he goal should be to establish programs to increase communication, training, andideas e?change to develop a collaborative military-to-military working relationship* &trategiccooperation should be Xanchored by overlapping interests and maturing respect*X1olitics

#o be successful, an engagement strategy needs to take into account Me?ican political concerns* &imilar to anada, Me?ico fears a loss of sovereignty and has little budgetary room for maneuver when it comes to increasedhomeland defense spending* #he overriding military consideration for designing new initiatives is the fact that Me?ican domesticpolitics wont allow *&* troops to be stationed on Me?ican soil* Me?ican views are still shaded by foreign intervention in Me?ico*Museums in Me?ico ity documet Xskeletons in the closet of Lritain, &pain, 0rance, and the nited &tates*X In hapultepec park, asi?-column monument dedicated to the X(inos >erosX commemorates cadets who attempted to defend XJl astilloX against aAmerican invasion force during the *&* =ar with Me?ico, :7Q)M ombatant ommander* #o be successful, ()$AD needs to frametheir engagement strategy in a way to distinguish their organi@ation from *&* (orthern ommand*)ne way to differentiate ()$AD from *&* (orthern ommand is to invite Me?ico to Koin forums that include anadian

participation* XJ?panded security cooperation will be more politically palatable in Me?ico to the e?tent that it is portrayed as tri-national cooperation for protection against common e?ternal threats, rather than bilateral defense cooperation with the nited&tates*X Me?ico and anada have a common interest in not ceding sovereignty to the nited &tates* anada has specificallystructured its international agreements to preserve the command and control of their troops* (o anadian forces fall under thecommand of *&* (orthern ommand* Despite having combined all but two staff functions, *&* (orthern ommand and

()$ADs command structures remain separate and distinct* iving Me?ico a seat at the tablene?t to anada will go a long way towards convincing Me?ico that they will be given an e%ual

voice in continental security without having to sacrifice command of their own troops*Lut, notupsetting Me?ican political sensitivities to sovereignty issues is only half the battle* Any proposal also needs to advance theinstitutional interests of the &ecretar]a de la Defensa (acional &JDJ(AC, an organi@ation that includes both the Me?ican Army andAir 0orce*nlike the separately organi@ed Me?ican (avy that ventures outside their borders, &JDJ(A remains an inward looking Xclosedinstitution*X #he center of power in &JDJ(A lies with Me?ican Army leadership* #he Army Xsteam rollsX the Air 0orce and has thefinal say over any initiatives* &JDJ(A is institutionally biased towards action only when threats will have a direct impact insideMe?icos borders* In fact, they are constitutionally prohibited from most forms of deployments outside their border* #he Me?icanArmy does not share the same grand continental defense vision that calls for a robust, comprehensive reaction force that seamlessly

operates across geographical seams as *&* policy makers* As such, any proposal to create an integrated tri-nation commandstructure is a non-starter* &JDJ(A would not be willing to discuss any fusion of command, nor is it clear the Me?ican Army and Air0orces would be able to overcome interoperability issues to effective integrate into a tri-country combined force*Interoperability issues are as important as politics when thinking through proposals for military forces to work together* Larryooper, director of the 0raser Institutes Alberta office and professor of political science at the niversity of algary, points out,X#echnical realities are at least as important as political ones regarding Me?ico inside ()$AD* anada is struggling to maintain

interoperability with *&* forces* Me?ico is a long way behind us*Additional training for Me?ican forces might be themost Me?ico can aspire to*X Me?ican air defense has few operational fighters and maintenance problems persist* #actics, techni%ues,

procedures, and language are not compatible with *&* or anadian aircrew* Although its e?ploring upgrade options, theMe?ican fighter force currently consists of only :6 0-s and :7 #-s* Maintenance problems


21/28

persist*0or e?ample, Me?ico was unable to fly any of its 0-s in :;;7* #otal 0- flight time rarely e?ceeds igh 1erformance omputing at the niversity of &outhampton and raham &winerd 1hD

4loud omputing for 1lanetary Defense5 )ctober 866; http3//www*mendeley*com/research/cloud-computing-for-planetary-defense/C

In this paper we demonstrate how a cloud-based computing architecture can be used forplanetary defense and space situational awareness &&AC* =e show how utility compute canfacilitate both a financially economical and highly scalable solution for space debris and near-earth obKect impact analysis*As we improve our ability to track smaller space obKects, andsatellite collisions occur, the volume of obKects being tracked vastly increases, increasingcomputational demands* 1ropagating traKectories and calculating conKunctions becomes increasingly time critical, thusre%uiring an architecture which can scale with demand* #he e?tension of this to tackle the problem of a future near-earth obKect

impact is discussed, and how cloud computing can play a key role in this civilisation-threatening scenario* Introduction S pace

s ituational a wareness includes scientific and operational aspects of space weather, n ear-

e arth o bKects and space debris*#hisproKect is part of aninternational effort to provide a globalresponse strategy to the threat of a (ear Jarth )bKect (J)Cimpacting the earth, led by the nited (ationsommittee for the 1eaceful se of &pace (-)1)&C* #he impact of a (J) + an asteroid or comet + is asevere natural ha@ard but is uni%ue in that technology e?ists to predict and to prevent it, givensufficient warning* As such, the International &paceguard survey has identified nearly :,666 potentially ha@ardous asteroids_:km in si@e although (J)s smaller than one kilometre remain predominantly undetected, e?ist in fargreater numbers and impact the Jarth more fre%uently: * Impacts by obKects larger than :66 mtwice the si@e of the asteroid that caused the Larringer crater in Ari@onaC could occur with little or no warning, with

the energy o' h!ndreds o' n!clear weapons& and are 4devastating at potentially

unimaginable levels58 0igure :C* #he tracking and prediction of potential (J) impacts is ofinternational importance,particularly with regard to disaster management* &pace debris poses a serious risk to satellitesand space missions* urrently &pace #rack publishes the locations of about :6,666 obKects that are publicly available* #hese

include satellites, operational and defunct, space debris from missions and space Kunk* It is believed that there are about :;,666obKects with a diameter over :6cm* Jven the smallest space Kunk travelling at about :E,666 miles per hourcan cause serious damageFthe &pace &huttle has undergone ;8 window changes due to debris impact, resulting inconcerns that a more serious accident is imminentQ , and the International &pace &tation has to e?ecute evasion maneuvers to avoiddebris* #here are over 66,666 obKects over :cm in diameter and there is a desire to track most , if not all of these* Ly improving

ground sensors and introducing sensors on satellites the &pace #rack database will increase in si@e* Ly tracking andpredicting space debris behaviour in more detail we can reduce collisions as the orbitalenvironment becomes ever more crowded* loud computing provides the ability to trade computation time againstcosts* It also favours an architecture which inherently scales, providing burst capability* Ly treating compute as a utility, computecycles are only paid for when they are used* >ere we present a cloud application framework to tackle space debris tracking and


22/28

analysis, that is being e?tended for (J) impact analysis* (otably, in this application propagation and conKunction analysis results inpeak compute loads for only 86V of the day, with burst capability re%uired in the event of a collision when the number of obKectsincreases dramaticallyF the >ypervelocity Impact #echnology 0acility Missions from &-6 through &-::QC* O)nlinePhttp3//hitf*Ksc*nasa*gov* Iridium- osmos-88: collision in 866; resulted in an additional :,:: trackable obKects 0igure 8C* tilitycomputation can %uickly adapt to these situations consuming more compute, incurring a monetary cost but keeping computation

wall clock time to a constant * In the event of a conKunction event being predicted, satellite operatorswould have to be %uickly alerted so they could decide what mitigating action to take* In this workwe

have migrated a series of discrete manual computing processes to the A@ure cloud platform toimprove capability and scalability* It is the initial prototypefor a broader space situational awarenessplatform* #he workflow involves the following steps3 obtain satellite position data, validate data, run propagation simulation, storeresults, perform conKunction analysis, %uery satellite obKect, and visualise* &atellite locations are published twice a day by &pace#rack, resulting in bi-daily high workloads* Jvery time the locations are published, all previous propagation calculations are halted,and the propagator starts recalculating the e?pected future orbits* Jvery orbit can be different, albeit only slightly from a previous

estimate, but this means that all conKunction analysis has to be recomputed* #he %uicker this workflow is completedthe %uicker possible conKunction alerts can be triggered, providing more time for mitigation* #heconcept proKect uses =indows A@ure as a cloud provider and is architected as a data-driven workflow consuming satellite locationsand resulting in conKunction alerts, as shown in 0igure * &atellite locations are published in a standard format know as a #wo-'ineJlement #'JC that fully describes a spacecraft and its orbit* Any #'J publisher can be consumed, in this case the &pace #rackwebsite, but also ground observation station data* #he list of #'Js are first separated into individual #'J )bKects, validated andinserted into a %ueue* #'J %ueue obKects are consumed by comparator workers which check to see if the #'J e?istsF new #'Js areadded to an A@ure #able and an update notification added to the pdate !ueue* #'Js in the update notification %ueue are new andeach re%uires propagationF this is an embarrassingly parallel computation that scales well across the cloud* Any propagator can beused* =e currently support ()$AD &1Q propagator and a custom &outhampton simulation ``C code* Jach propagated obKect

has to be compared with all other propagations to see if there is a conKunction predicted close approachC* Any conKunction source orcode can be used, currently only &1Q is implementedF plans are to incorporate more complicated filtering and conKunction analysisroutines as they become available* onKunctions result in alerts which are visible in the A@ure &atellite tracker client* #he client uses.irtual Jarth to display the orbits* )ngoing work includes e?panding the .irtual Jarth client as well as adding support for custom

clients by e?posing the data through a $J interface* #his pluggable architecture ensures that additionalpropagators and conKunction codes can be incorporated , and as part of ongoing work we intend to e?pand theavailable analysis codes* #he framework demonstrated here is being e?tended as a generic spacesituational service bus to include (J) impact predictions* #his will e?ploit the pluggablesimulation code architecture and the clouds burst computing capability in order to allowrefinement of predictions for disaster management simulations and potential emergencyscenarios anywhere on the globe* &ummary =e have shown how a new architecture can be applied to space situationalawareness to provide a scalable robust data-driven architecture which can enhance the ability of e?isting disparate analysis codes by

integrating them together in a common framework* Ly automating the ability to alert satellite owners to

potential conKunction scenarioswe reduce the potential of conKunction oversight and decreasethe response time , thus making space safer* #his framework is being e?tended to (J) traKectoryand impact analysis to help improve planetary defence capability for all*

%eico,s (ey to N;RA6 operational e''ectiveness.Spinetta& =+ MaKor, &A0 'awrence, 4J?panding (orth American Aerospace Defense ()$ADC5, Air 2 &pace 1owerBournal, 8nd#rimester, 866, 4A &trategy to Jngage Me?ico,5 E/


23/28

Inviting Me?ico liaison officersto observe and/or participate in ()$ADs L1would open communicationsand may led to the establishment of a coordination mechanismwith relevant Me?ican and *&* agencies forair, land, sea, and civil support contingency plans* #he focus isnt necessarily to coordinate a *&* militaryresponse with Me?ican forces, but rather provide a clearinghouse of information and make

visible potential capabilities each nation could re%uest in case of need* 0or e?ample, Me?icanswould be privy to *&* discussions on a planned inter-agency response to a natural disaster near

a border area* Me?ican representatives could evaluate planned responses for deficiencies andhelp synchroni@e military assistance to civil authorities on each side of the border* Another benefitwould be to maintain awareness of emerging situations of shared concern*'astly, Me?icanparticipation in the L1would allow an e?change of critic