160th 20 yr History

Special WarfareThe Professional Bulletin of the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School

PB 80–01–3 Summer 2001 Vol. 14, No. 3

From the CommandantSpecial Warfare

Looking at the state-of-the-art equip-ment and the superb flying skills of today’s160th Special Operations Aviation Regi-ment, it is difficult to believe that 21 yearsago there was no permanent special-opera-tions aviation organization.

But in 1980, the tragedy of Desert Onemade clear that the U.S. required a sophis-ticated rotary-wing capability for special-operations aviation. Unfortunate as it was,Desert One was the catalyst that led to thecreation of the capability that has becometoday’s 160th SOAR. The current com-mander of the U.S. Army Special Opera-tions Command, Lieutenant General BryanBrown, brought the first six UH-60 heli-copters to Fort Bragg in May 1980 to begintraining for a second attempt to rescue theU.S. hostages in Iran. None of us realizedthat that mission would result in the cre-ation of the world’s finest aviation unit.

In the 20 years since the 160th AviationBattalion was founded on Oct. 16, 1981, thesoldiers of Army special-operations aviationhave worked tirelessly to improve their air-craft and their skills. In a relatively shorttime, the aviators of the 160th have per-fected the tactics and the procedures need-ed in special-operations aviation. They havepioneered the use of night-vision goggles;they have led in the development of newequipment; and they have established newtechniques for night-flying.

The 160th has also led in the develop-ment of the training that soldiers must havein order to use sophisticated aviation equip-ment. For it is not enough simply to upgradethe technology: Every technologicalimprovement requires that aviators andground crews receive additional training.The complexity of the equipment and thenature of special-operations-aviation mis-sions demand that the 160th have highlyskilled personnel as well as the finest equip-ment. In fact, the 160th has developed itsown assessment-and-selection process to

ensure that only those soldiers who areequal to and suited for the mission areselected for service in the 160th.

From the 160th’s first combat operationsin 1983, the regiment’s history has beenone of valor, sacrifice and honor. In Grena-da, in Desert Storm and in Somalia, themen of the 160th have demonstrated theircourage, their unwavering commitment toperform the mission, and their unwilling-ness to let any of their fellow special-oper-ations soldiers down.

Despite the short history of their organi-zation, the soldiers of the 160th can beproud of their accomplishments. Facedwith daunting challenges — having toacquire and modernize the equipment nec-essary to perform their missions; having todeal with manpower shortages; and havingto accomplish demanding, real-world mis-sions in unforgiving environments — theyhave not only persevered, they have suc-ceeded, and they have earned a reputationfor excellence and valor that is second tonone. Truly, Night Stalkers don’t quit.

Major General William G. Boykin

Features2 The 160th SOAR: The Quiet Aviation Professionals

by Lieutenant General Bryan D. Brown

6 The 160th SOAR: 20 Years of Army Special-Operations Aviationby Major Sidney J. Gray III and CW5 Charles W. Weigandt

12 “Green Platoon”: The 160th SOAR’s Training Programby MW4 Carl R. Brown, U.S. Army (ret.)

14 Evolution of the 3-160th SOAR Through Desert Stormby Lieutenant Colonel Andy Milani

23 The Impact of Forward-Based Special-Operations Aviationby Major Walter Rugen

26 Company E: The 160th SOAR’s Newest Forward-Based Unitby Captain Holly Turner

28 20 Years of Army Special-Operations Aviation Modernizationby Lieutenant Colonel Greg Stewart and Thorwald Eide

32 Helicopters in Combat: World War IIby Dr. C.H. Briscoe

39 Helicopters in Combat: Koreaby Dr. Kenn Finlayson

Departments42 Enlisted Career Notes

44 Foreign SOF

46 Update

48 Book Reviews

Cover: All photos — Ted Carlson/Fotodynamics ©2001 (used with permission).Graphic by Nancy Fischer, USASOC PAO.

PB 80–01–3 ContentsSummer 2001 Special Warfare Vol. 14, No. 3

Commander & CommandantMajor General William G. Boykin

EditorJerry D. Steelman

Associate EditorSylvia W. McCarley

Graphics & DesignBruce S. Barfield

Automation ClerkGloria H. Sawyer

Special Warfare is an authorized, official quarterly of theUnited States Army John F. Kennedy Special WarfareCenter and School, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Its missionis to promote the professional development of special-operations forces by providing a forum for the examinationof established doctrine and new ideas.

Views expressed herein are those of the authors and donot necessarily reflect official Army position. Thispublication does not supersede any information presentedin other official Army publications.

Articles, photos, artwork and letters are invited andshould be addressed to Editor, Special Warfare,USAJFKSWCS, Fort Bragg, NC 28310. Telephone: DSN239-5703, commercial (910) 432-5703, fax -3147. SpecialWarfare reserves the right to edit all material.

Published works may be reprinted, except wherecopyrighted, provided credit is given to Special Warfareand the authors.

Official distribution is limited to active and reservespecial-operations units. Individuals desiring privatesubscriptions should forward their requests to:Superintendent of Documents, U.S. GovernmentPrinting Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. SpecialWarfare is also available on the USASOC internal web(https:asociweb.soc.mil/swcs/dotd/sw-mag/sw-mag.htm).

V E R I T A S

STREBIL

A

E T

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:Eric K. ShinsekiGeneral, United States ArmyChief of Staff

Official:

Joel B. HudsonAdministrative Assistant to theSecretary of the Army

0122201

Headquarters, Department of the Army

What began as an emergency deploy-ment from Fort Campbell, Ky., in1980 has become what is now the

finest aviation capability in existence — the160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment.

In June 1980, I was commander of Com-

pany C, 158th Aviation Battalion, 101st Air-borne Division, when a knock on the door ofmy home one weekend summoned me backto work. My instructions were simple: Wewere to deploy two of our new UH-60 air-craft for a secret link-up at Fort Bragg, N.C.

Warrant officers Dave Rosengrant and KenWebb and their crews headed out.

That day was followed by an incredibleseries of events. Soon after, a task force com-posed of the 101st’s 158th Aviation Battal-ion (which had just begun fielding the newBlackhawks); the 229th Attack Battalionand the 159th Chinook Battalion wasformed in the desert of the American South-west. There, pilots and crews of the taskforce pioneered the use of night-vision gog-gles and special-operations tactics, tech-niques and procedures, or TTPs.

Why helicopters? Why Army?At the time, the nation had just suffered a

tremendous embarrassment as a result of thefailure of the helicopter assault force at DesertOne. The United States had no nighttime spe-cial-operations, deep-penetration capability.Although the Air Force was building its forceof Pave Low helicopters, those aircraft werefew in number, and they were actually beingacquired to meet a shortfall in the Air Force’scapability for combat search and rescue, orCSAR.

The capability that was required then issimilar to SOF’s requirement today: Aforce that can fly long distances in the darkand land precisely on the target. A smallnumber of capable SOF fixed-wing aircraftwere available and would be included injust about any mission, but for the missionto succeed, the aircraft had to be able to

2 Special Warfare

The 160th SOAR: The Quiet Aviation Professionals

by Lieutenant General Bryan D. Brown

Aircraft of the 160th SOAR, such as this MH-60L, can be configured with a range of capabilities to support SOF missions.

Ted Carlson/Fotodynamics ©2001

land directly on or near the target withspeed and surprise. It was a requirementthat only rotary-wing aircraft could meet.

The Army’s 101st Airborne Division had theright pilots, the right training and the rightaircraft.The Army pilots were a unique mix ofVietnam veterans and aggressive young war-rant officers. The assault missions that the101st was flying every day fit very well withthe special-operations mission requirements.Finally, the Army was fielding its new, highlycapable UH-60 helicopters, which would serveas the centerpiece for any assault mission. ForDoD, the decision to assign the mission to theArmy was an easy one.

Temporary becomes permanentAfter the task force had spent some long,

difficult months in the desert, a capabilitywas born — one that would fill an importantspecial-operations shortfall. We alwaysassumed that the task force would be a tem-porary arrangement (based on the require-ment for a single mission), and that whenthere was no longer a need for the task force,the 101st would reclaim the capability.

With the number and the types of SOF mis-sions increasing, the requirement for the taskforce’s capability began to grow immediately.It became clear that the task-force units werenever going back to the 101st. That was greatnews for special operations, but not so great

for the 101st, which had put its heart and soulinto developing its helicopter capability. A siz-able piece of the 101st’s assault aviation anda great number of people and aircraft from itsattack aviation were now working for SOF.

An air-assault division lives by the heli-copter, and while SOF may have built agreat capability, that capability offered noadvantages to the 101st commander, then-Major General Jack Mackmull. Eventuallythe 101st reorganized its assault aviation,so that, on paper, it appeared that each ofthe two assault battalions had lost one com-pany, not that the 158th Aviation Battalionhad lost two. The 101st was eventually“paid back” for the helicopters and person-nel that it had lost. Without the completesupport of the 101st Airborne Division, thespecial-operations aviation capabilitywould never have been built, and the 160thcertainly would not have the high stand-ards and the high level of experience that ithas enjoyed since day one.

The quiet aviation professionalsIn the years that followed, the 160th grew

in more than just the number of its SOF avi-ation TTPs: It internalized the SOF ethos. Itbuilt the “never quit” attitude.

But possibly one of the most important val-ues that the 160th has internalized is that ofthe “quiet professional.” With very few excep-

Summer 2001 3


The 160th SOAR’s AH-6Jhelicopters are equippedwith 2.75-inch rocketpods and can beequipped with a varietyof other weapons.

tions, the 160th has been involved in everyarmed conflict this nation has taken on sincethe unit was established. Its first importantmission was Urgent Fury, and the recordsshow that the unit’s bravery under fire wasextraordinary: On the initial assault, onemember of the 160th was killed in action and

12 were wounded. The 160th didn’t quit.Since then, the 160th has participated in anamazing variety of missions: covering thelaunch of the Space Shuttle, performing intel-ligence-and-surveillance missions, capturingand recovering sensitive equipment, guardingU.S. oil tankers in the Persian Gulf, and con-ducting a wide array of classified missions.

Perhaps the 160th’s greatest achieve-ment came during Desert Storm. Theactions of the 160th — undertaken not onlyin concert with the ground force but alsounilaterally in the attack mode — were keyto the success of SOF. Yet seldom have weread articles heralding the 160th’s success-es. The regiment is a group of hard-work-ing, dedicated soldiers, civilians and con-tractors who define success as consistentlyproviding the maximum support to SOFoperations around the world every day.They are happy just to be in the “arena.”

The 160th has rapidly built and flown newequipment that is now considered the norm

within the Army (the credit for much ofDoD’s current night-flying capability is dueto the members of the 160th).The 160th builtthe only assessment-and-selection programfor aviation in special operations, and it reapsthe benefits of that program by ensuring thatthe right pilot and the right crew chief oper-ate its aircraft. Today, the 160th has the mostcapable aircraft in DoD, flown by hand-selected pilots and maintained by incrediblydedicated and highly capable support per-sonnel. Despite being undermanned for thetype and the number of missions that it per-forms, the 160th continues to excel. The160th has ultimately brought Army SOFmuch more capability and credibility thanthey have ever had before.ARSOF aviation isan expensive but important capability. Thosewho understand resourcing know that ArmySOF have and will continue to have morefunding, not less, because of their aviationcomponent.

As the Night Stalkers celebrate their20th anniversary, I hope that you willenjoy this edition of Special Warfare. It isintended to provide some insight into thisone-of-a-kind special-operations unit. TheNight Stalkers continue to prepare foranother 20 years of success. Night Stalkersdon’t quit!

Lieutenant General BryanD. Brown is commander ofthe U.S. Army Special Opera-tions Command. His previ-ous assignments includecommanding general, JointSpecial Operations Com-mand; commander, 160th Special Opera-tions Aviation Regiment; commander, 1stBattalion, 160th SOAR during DesertStorm; S3, 160th Special Operations Avia-tion Group; and service as a rotary-wingaviator with the 129th Assault HelicopterCompany in Vietnam.

4 Special Warfare

The 160th SOAR’s MH-47D helicopters are equipped with the Fast RopeInsertion/Extraction System for the infiltration and the extraction of SOF personnel.


July 17, 1980Chief Warrant Officer 2 Bobby M. Crumley

November 4, 1980 Specialist 4 Timothy Hensley

September 21, 1981Chief Warrant Officer 3 John W. Williams

October 7, 1981Lieutenant Colonel Michael C. Grimm

March 29, 1982Sergeant Ricky D. Zizelman

March 20, 1983Chief Warrant Officer 4 Ralph L. ThompsonChief Warrant Officer 2 Donald R. Alvey

Sergeant Claude J. DunnPrivate First Class Gregory D. Eichner

Specialist 4 Jerry L. Wilder

July 10, 1983Chief Warrant Officer 4 Larry K. Jones

Chief Warrant Officer 3 Thomas B. Crossan IIIChief Warrant Officer 2 James N. Jansen

Staff Sergeant Mark J. RiellyStaff Sergeant Luis A. Sanchez

Staff Sergeant Mark D. Cornwell

August 26, 1983 Captain Robert E. Brannum

WO1 Allen E. JenningsChief Warrant Officer 2 David W. Jordan

October 4, 1983Chief Warrant Officer 3 William H. Tuttle

Specialist 4 Richard J. Thompson

October 25, 1983Captain Keith J. Lucas

April 29, 19851st Sergeant Ronnie R. Orebo

April 27, 1987Captain Frederick M. Maddock II

May 20, 1988Chief Warrant Officer 3 Stephen A. HansenChief Warrant Officer 3 Jerry H. Landgraf

December 20, 19891st Lieutenant John R. Hunter

Chief Warrant Officer 2 Wilson B. Owens

February 21, 1991Captain Charles W. Cooper

Chief Warrant Officer 3 Michael F. AndersonStaff Sergeant Mario Vega-Velazquez

Staff Sergeant Christopher J. Chapman

February 22, 1993Major Robert P. Mallory

October 3, 1993Chief Warrant Officer 4 Raymond A. Frank

Sergeant Thomas J. FieldStaff Sergeant William D. Cleveland Jr.

October 3, 1993Chief Warrant Officer 4 Clifton P. WolcottChief Warrant Officer 3 Donavan L. Briley

July 20, 1994Chief Warrant Officer 3 Carlos P. Guerrero

March 7, 1995 Staff Sergeant Edwidge Pierre

Sergeant Jeffery D. Tarbox

March 7, 1996Chief Warrant Officer 5 Walter M. Fox

Chief Warrant Officer 3 Pierre R. DesrochesChief Warrant Officer 3 William R. Monty Jr.

Staff Sergeant Tracy A. TidwellStaff Sergeant Bradley C. Beem

March 4, 1997 Sergeant Edward G. Palacio

Summer 2001 5

In MemoryThe following is the roll of the members of Army Special Operations Aviation who have

given their lives in the line of duty:

The story of the Night Stalkers of the160th Special Operations AviationRegiment, or SOAR, is about the evo-

lution of men, machines and ideas. Sinceits beginning as a special project in thesummer of 1980, the 160th SOAR has par-ticipated in all major U.S. military opera-tions and in several lesser-known ones.This article presents a brief overview of theunit’s history, beginning with the specialproject that evolved into a new battalionover the course of 18 months.

The unit that we now know as the 160thSOAR first formed from elements of the101st Airborne Division in the summer of1980 in response to a national missionrequirement for a rotary-wing aviationcapability. The men and the equipment ofthis special project would address theshortcomings identified after the accidentat Desert One in Iran.

The 101st Airborne Division was a likelystarting point for the creation of a special-ized aviation unit because of its large com-plement of helicopters and personnel. Per-haps the greatest selling point for the 101stwas that its 158th Assault Helicopter Bat-talion had begun fielding the new UH-60Blackhawk. This easily deployable andhighly capable assault helicopter possessedmany desirable features for special-opera-tions support: large payload, high speed andgenerous power.

Scout helicopter pilots and crew membersfrom two other 101st units, the 229th Attack

Helicopter Battalion and the 2-17th Caval-ry, gathered under the command of Compa-ny B of the 229th. With the help of the Mis-sissippi Army National Guard, the pilotsand crew members received training on theOH-6 Cayuse scout helicopter. The OH-6proved to be extraordinarily deployable, andbecause of its small size, it could inserttroops into the most restrictive landingzones. At the same time, a separate group ofArmy aviators began testing OH-58s andOH-6s that had been modified as light-attack helicopters.

Company A of the 101st’s 159th AviationBattalion provided the CH-47 Chinooks forthe special project. Although the Chinookswere not as easily deployable as the otheraircraft, they possessed the greatest abilityfor moving large numbers of personnel andheavy loads. They also provided the projectwith a means of establishing forward-arearefueling sites for long-range operations.

The project’s combination of men andmachines would have been of limited usewithout a suitable support structure. Parentbattalions provided for the logistics needs oftheir companies, while the 158th AviationBattalion provided most of the commandand control for the upcoming exercises.After the various elements of the projecthad been assembled, they were known asTask Force 158. TF 158 provided the Armywith a rotary-wing special-operations capa-bility that would prove valuable in futurecontingencies.

6 Special Warfare

The 160th SOAR: 20 Years of Army Special-Operations Aviation

by Major Sidney J. Gray III and CW5 Charles W. Weigandt

As the project began, elements of TF 158were sent out on two separate trainingdeployments. The Blackhawk and Chinookunits moved to Norton Air Force Base,Calif., for intense training. There, theBlackhawks and Chinooks received modifi-cations that extended their range andimproved their long-range navigationcapabilities. The scout pilots moved to theAviation Support Facility at Gulfport,Miss., where they received training on theOH-6A helicopter. Following their separatedeployments, the Blackhawk, Chinook andOH-6A crews and their aircraft werereunited at Fort Huachuca, Ariz., for mis-sion training.

As of mid-summer 1980, most membersof the fledgling special-operations unitwere not volunteers. They were members ofconventional aviation companies and bat-talions who had been called upon to con-duct intensive training in preparation foran unspecified mission. The aircrewsreceived limited information on the pur-pose of their training, but it was apparentto them that the mission would requiredesert-environmental skills and long-range, precision navigation.

The men of TF 158 continued to train

over the summer, traveling to multipletraining sites across the United States.Aircrews and support personnel wouldload their helicopters aboard strategic andtactical transports and move to forwardstaging bases from which they would moveadditional distances (up to 1,000 nauticalmiles) to reach simulated objectives. Whilethis kind of training sounds routine in2001, it was not so in 1980.

Most of the early training was performedwithout the benefit of night-vision goggles.The now infamous “full face” AN/PVS-5goggles were introduced during the sum-mer of 1980. While a few units around theArmy were using the goggles, the conceptof using them was new to most aviators.The PVS-5s presented many challenges,but they ultimately provided a greatincrease in night-vision capability for theunit. Amazingly, there were no significantnight-related accidents during the earlyexercises.

In the late fall of 1980, the members ofTF 158 were told the purpose of their spe-cialized training. At that point, the menwere given the opportunity to continuewith the project or to move on. Most ofthem volunteered to stay.

Summer 2001 7

Today’s 160th SOARstands ready to provideno-notice aviation sup-port to U.S. special-oper-ations forces.

U.S. Army photo

On Jan. 20, 1981, the Iranian hostagecrisis ended, and the pressing need for thespecial-operations aviation capabilityfaded. The men of TF 158 fully expectedthat the task force would be disbanded andthat they would be returned to their con-ventional aviation missions. However, theArmy leadership saw the potential of thenew unit and took steps to retain it.

In recognition of the fact that the 101sthad given up the forces used to create thenew organization, the Army formalized thenew special-operations unit as the 160thAviation Battalion. The choice of the unit’sname has been the source of some specula-tion. Despite suggestions such as the 202ndAviation Battalion, the proposed designa-

tion of 160th was accepted by the Instituteof Heraldry as a logical progression of the101st’s 158th and 159th Battalions. Thebattalion conducted its formal activationceremony on Fort Campbell’s Divisionparade field Oct. 16, 1981.

The new battalion, with an authorizedstrength of 191 personnel, consisted of aheadquarters and service company, a lightassault company, a light attack company,and a maintenance platoon. Task Force 160was formed when the two Blackhawk com-panies of the 158th (C and D), and the Chi-nooks of Company A, 159th, merged withthe battalion.

The helicopters continued to operatefrom various locations on Fort Campbell,Ky., in an attempt to minimize theirappearance as a nonstandard unit. Per-haps the most interesting basing plan wasthat of the Little Birds, which were operat-ed from garage-like buildings in the oldClarksville Naval Base at Fort Campbell.The OH-6 unit’s informal name, the Spe-cial Helicopter Operations Company,became the basis for the “SHOC Pad”

training area near the garages.Task Force 160 continued an aggressive

training program, expanding its capabili-ties to include over-water and ship opera-tions and specialized environmental train-ing with supported units. Personnel alsocontinued to improve their desert skillsand night-vision tactics that they haddeveloped for the original mission.

The training was not without risk, andseveral aircrew members were lost as aresult of training accidents between July1980 and October 1983. The high accidentrate brought the unit a great deal of scruti-ny, and a panel was convened find ways ofimproving the safety of training. Followingthe panel’s advice, the 160th implementedtraining improvements that significantlyreduced the accident rate and ensured thefuture of the special-operations aviationunit.

Task Force 160’s first combat actioncame in October 1983, when a coup on theisland of Grenada presented a threat toAmerican citizens. Night Stalkers complet-ed the planning for their part of OperationUrgent Fury and moved their UH-60s tothe island of Barbados to prepare for oper-ations. Meanwhile, AH-6 and MH-6 LittleBirds and their crews loaded aboard C-130s for the trip to Grenada.

Despite a plan to begin the invasionunder the cover of darkness, operationswere delayed until after first light. Thetask force suffered its first combat fatalitywhen the UH-60s assaulting an objectiveencountered heavy antiaircraft fire. Sever-al aircraft in the flight were hit, and theintense ground fire wounded a number ofthe aircrew and passengers. Later, asUrgent Fury evolved, personnel of the160th performed numerous missions insupport of units in the invasion force.

During the next four years, increasingdemands on the impressive capabilities ofthe 160th compelled the unit to expand insize and to acquire more capable equip-ment. The Night Stalkers receivedimproved night-vision devices; created bet-ter techniques for inserting troops ontoobjectives; and acquired superior aircraftand weapons. During this period, the 160thplanned for numerous contingencies and

8 Special Warfare

The men of TF 158 fully expected that the taskforce would be disbanded and that they would bereturned to their conventional aviation missions.However, the Army leadership saw the potentialof the new unit and took steps to retain it.

remained ready to respond to the nation’sworldwide needs.

On Oct. 16, 1986, the 160th Aviation Bat-talion became the 160th Special Opera-tions Aviation Group. At that time, the160th was also relieved from assignment tothe 101st Airborne Division and wasassigned to the 1st Special OperationsCommand.

In 1987, the 160th’s over-water and ship-board-operations capabilities proved usefulwhen the unit was assigned to protect U.S.re-flagged Kuwaiti oil tankers from rogueelements that had mined the waters of thePersian Gulf. As part of Operation PrimeChance, the Night Stalkers operated fromvarious U.S. Navy ships and providedreconnaissance, security and search-and-rescue coverage around the Gulf.

The presence of the 160th quickly provedto be beneficial. On Sept. 21, 1987, a flightof Little Birds responded to a suspicioussurface contact. As the flight wasapproaching the intercept point, the targetship extinguished its running lights, andthe Little Bird aviators, using forward-looking infrared devices, observed person-nel on the target ship uncovering cylindri-cal objects and rolling them into the water.

After receiving permission to engage thevessel, the aviators terminated the mine-laying activity with fire from their mini-guns and rockets. This incident was thefirst combat engagement carried out by anArmy aircrew using night-vision devices. Aboarding party that searched the targetship later confirmed that the cylindricalobjects aboard the ship were marine minessimilar to those that had already damagedships in the Gulf.

Approximately 10 days later, severalIranian small boats engaged a flight of air-craft with small-arms fire. Once again, Lit-tle Birds engaged the boats, this time sink-ing them. Support for Operation PrimeChance by the 160th’s Little Birds contin-ued for a year, until an aviation unit fromFort Bragg, flying armed Kiowa OH-58Ds,relieved the 160th. The 160th supportedthe training of the first Kiowa Warrior unitby passing along tactics, techniques andprocedures; and by conducting over-watertraining for the new unit. The MH-60Blackhawks of the 160th continued to workin the Gulf area for another year, providingsupport for a number of missions, includ-ing combat search and rescue. The pres-ence of the Night Stalkers deterred numer-

Summer 2001 9

U.S. Army photo

Operating from Navyships, Night Stalkersperformed reconnais-sance, security andsearch-and-rescue mis-sions during OperationPrime Chance.

ous attacks on international shipping andslowed the mine-laying process.

In June 1988, the 160th received a short-notice directive to recover an Mi-24 Hindhelicopter from a remote location in north-ern Chad. Operation Mount Hope IIIrequired that aircrews fly 490 nauticalmiles at night without outside navigation-al aids, extract the Hind, and return with itsling-loaded. Company E of the 160th pre-pared for the mission and deployed via C-5transport to N’djamena, Chad. Two aircraftand crews moved forward, and the crewsbegan preparing the Hind for sling-loadingby removing its rotor blades and securingloose items. Because of the distanceinvolved, the helicopters would have toperform a mid-desert refueling from a C-130 while returning with the Mi-24. Alsoduring the return flight, the pilots had tofly through a sandstorm that greatlyreduced their visibility. The recovery mis-sion demonstrated the long-range, adverse-environment capability of the 160th.

Threats to American interests continuedthroughout the world, and in late 1989, the160th once again entered combat. Follow-ing extensive preparation, the 160th per-

formed special operations during Opera-tion Just Cause, the U.S. operation toremove Panamanian dictator Manuel Nor-iega from power. Just Cause required theNight Stalkers to deploy from the harshwinter conditions at Fort Campbell to thetropical heat of Panama. The deploymentto Panama included an over-water, self-deployment of MH-47 Chinooks from theU.S.

During the operation, 160th aircrewsprovided aviation support for operationsagainst the headquarters of the Panaman-ian Defense Forces, Modelo Prison andnumerous other areas throughout thecountry. The unit employed airborne-capa-ble forward arming and refueling point, orFARP, teams in combat. In order to estab-lish FARPs for the aircraft of the 160thnear Rio Hato and Torrijos-Tocumen, theteams parachuted in with the Rangers whoconducted airfield seizures.

Less than one year later, elements fromall three battalions of the 160th deployed tovarious locations in Saudi Arabia in supportof Operations Desert Shield and DesertStorm. Their missions included insertingand extracting Special Forces teams; resup-

10 Special Warfare

Night Stalkers fromCompany E of the 160thSOAR fly the sling-loaded Mi-24 Hind heli-copter out of northernChad during OperationMount Hope III.

U.S. Army photo

plying SOF units; performing armed recon-naissance; and attacking selected targets.

Night Stalkers from the 3rd Battalionproved their skill and heroism during theemergency extraction of an SF reconnais-sance from deep in Iraq. The aircrew of asingle Blackhawk responded to the calland recovered the team, which was underfire, without injury.

In the summer of 1993, selected elementsof the regiment began making plans to sup-port an operation to restore order to thewar-torn country of Somalia. After severalfalse starts, Night Stalkers deployed in sup-port of Operation Gothic Serpent. Once inSomalia, the task force conducted severalrelatively uneventful but productive mis-sions. From lessons learned during thosemissions, the unit refined its tactics untilthey were suitable for urbanized terrain.

On Oct. 3, 1993, in Mogadishu, Task ForceRanger began a mid-afternoon operationthat rapidly evolved into an 18-hour fire-fight. Shortly after the landing of theassault force, two Blackhawks were shotdown, and their crews were wounded, killedor captured. Air and ground rescue forcesresponded by fighting their way through thecrowded city in some of the most intensecombat since Vietnam. Although Task ForceRanger continued operations to stabilize theregion, it was withdrawn later in the fall.

Aircraft from the 160th had operatedfrom U.S Navy ships for many years, butArmy helicopters were given exclusive useof an aircraft carrier for the first time dur-ing Operation Uphold Democracy. NightStalkers embarked aboard the U.S.S.America and prepared to support theuncertain situation on the island of Haiti.Fortunately, diplomacy was effective, andthe planned invasion of Haiti was can-celled. Once Uphold Democracy transi-tioned to a peacekeeping mission, the160th aircrews and support personnelmoved to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, andstood by as a contingency force.

Chinook aircrews from the 3rd Battal-ion, 160th SOAR, conducted the next majorregimental milestone when they partici-pated in a large noncombatant evacuationoperation in Liberia in April 1996. Opera-tion Assured Response was led by the Air

Force Special Operations Command. Thiscomplex operation involved multiple fixed-and rotary-wing aircraft from the U.S. andfrom Europe. It resulted in the safe evacu-ation of 2,115 noncombatants. Most recent-ly, the regiment has supported two opera-tions designed to protect U.S. interests inthe Middle East, Desert Thunder andSouthern Watch.

Since its founding, the structure of the160th has evolved in response to therequirements of many supported units,and the organization continues to adjustfor the demands of the future. Today, the160th Special Operations Aviation Regi-ment continues to plan and to prepare formany contingencies. Night Stalkers standready to provide no-notice, worldwide avia-tion support, anytime, anywhere, time-on-target plus or minus 30 seconds. NightStalkers don’t quit!

Major Sidney J. Gray III is assigned toSpecial Operations Command – Korea.Prior to his current assignment, he wascommander of the 160th Special Opera-tions Aviation Training Company, FortCampbell, Ky.

CW5 Charles W. Weigandt is the opera-tions officer and the A/MH-6 standardiza-tion officer for the 160th Special OperationsAviation Training Company, Fort Camp-bell, Ky. A founding member of Task Force160, he was one of TF 160’s original LittleBird pilots.

Summer 2001 11

Since 1985, the 160th Special Opera-tions Aviation Regiment’s “Green Pla-toon,” the nickname for the Special

Operations Aviation Training Company, orSOATC, has been training personnel whoare newly assigned to, or who are beingreassigned to, the regiment.

Contrary to what its name might imply,

the aviation training company providesmore than just aviator training. SOATCadministers 16 training programs that arenecessary to ensure standardization andsafety within the regiment. The trainingprograms include initial orientation, flight

instruction, and maintenance of the regi-ment’s unique equipment.

When the 160th Aviation Battalion wasformed in the early 1980s, there were notactics, techniques and procedures, orTTPs, for Army special-operations avia-tion. No “how to” manuals were availableto clarify the specialized operations thatthe 160th performed, to explain the use ofnight-vision goggles, or to catalog therange of environmental conditions that theaviators might face. Nevertheless, the160th’s aviators and support personnel,armed only with conventional Army doc-trine, the combined knowledge of its mem-bers, and a determination to succeed,joined together and learned on the job.

Unfortunately, the learn-as-you-goapproach led to a number of accidents.When the unit’s accident rate spiked in1983, a panel was formed to examine theunit’s training strategy and operationaltempo. When the examination was fin-ished, the panel recommended that a sepa-rate, dedicated special-operations aviation-training unit be created.

By 1985, the 160th had established itsfirst training unit, which was known as theGreen Platoon because of the newness ofits students. The Green Platoon’s aviation-training program was based on the Army’sreadiness-level training program and onaircrew training manuals. Administered bythe 160th’s operations officer and byinstructor pilots, the new program provid-

12 Special Warfare

‘Green Platoon’: The 160th SOAR’sTraining Program

by MW4 Carl R. Brown, U.S. Army (ret.)

Soldiers in the Green Platoon crawl through the mud pit during their orientation to the160th SOAR.

U.S. Army photo

ed a controlled environment (i.e., it wasisolated from the demands of real-worldmissions) in which students could learnthe 160th’s techniques and procedures.Because the 160th received no additionalpersonnel with which to staff the trainingprogram, the fledgling program had to becreated “out of hide.” That meant thatwhenever operations or exercises placedheavy demands on the task force’s person-nel assets, the Green Platoon’s trainingwas limited.

The next milestone came in July 1988,when the Selection and Training Detach-ment, or S&T, was created from assets ofthe 160th Special Operations AviationGroup. Although it was still an out-of-hideorganization, the S&T was dedicated totraining and recruiting, and its formationallowed the other companies in the 160thto focus on mission support, knowing thattheir new aviators would be trained to acommon high standard. In November 1988,the S&T expanded its scope to includetraining for the enlisted members of the160th.

While the 160th’s training programswere quickly proving their value, the short-age of instructors remained a problem. Tosolve the problem, the 160th decided tohire civilian mission instructors, or CMIs,who possessed the right mix of skills andexperience to train the members of theunit.

The initial CMI concept involved hiringretired instructor pilots to serve for oneyear. If the CMI program proved to be suc-cessful at the end of the first year, the160th would formalize the program. The

CMI test program began in August 1990with the hiring of six CMIs, two for each ofthe three basic aircraft designs. The CMIs,all of whom were former flight-leader-qual-ified 160th aviators, brought with them avast amount of experience to share withnew members of the unit. In 1991, theArmy Research Institute evaluated andapproved the CMI program, and it soonexpanded to become the primary trainingprogram for newly assigned personnel.

On Sept. 11, 1992, the S&T was provi-sionally redesignated the Special Oper-ations Aviation Training Company.While the company has grown in sizeand in responsibility over the years, itsoriginal name of Green Platoon hasstuck with it.

MW4 Carl R. Brown, U.S. Army (ret.), isone of the original members of the 160th.He served as the operations officer for theSelection and Training Detachment whenthe Combat Mission Instructor programbegan. He currently serves with the 160thas an MH-60K Blackhawk instructor andaircraft-survival-equipment instructor.

Summer 2001 13

The Green Platoon nowadministers 16 trainingprograms to the officersand the enlisted mem-bers of the 160th SOAR.

U.S. Army photo

On October 3, 1986, on a small fieldadjacent to the garrison headquar-ters building at Hunter Army Air-

field, Ga., Major General Leroy Suddath,commanding general of the U.S. Army’s 1stSpecial Operations Command, or 1stSOCOM, presided over an activation cere-mony for the 129th Special Operations Avi-ation Company, or SOAC. The ceremonymarked the culmination of eight months ofintensive preparation by a small team ofofficers and NCOs led by Major GeneEdwards.

Acting only on General Suddath’s intent,Edwards and his team, working hand-in-hand with Lieutenant Colonel JohnnyShepherd of the Army Staff and Lieu-tenant Colonel Joe Calhoun of 1stSOCOM’s G3 Air, designed a modified tableof organization, or MTOE, that was looselybased on the MTOE of an aviation compa-ny that had 15 UH-60 helicopters. The newMTOE reflected the experience of specialoperators who knew that the organizationwould need to be rapidly deployable, adapt-able and capable of sustaining itself forshort durations of time. At the time, theonly models for a special-operations avia-tion company were Companies C and D ofthe 160th Special Operations AviationGroup, or SOAG.

Companies C and D received supportfrom their parent unit, the SOAG. The129th, however, was intended to functionas a stand-alone organization. Its sections

would operate much like those of a battal-ion staff. The 129th’s day-to-day installa-tion support would be provided via aninterservice support agreement, or ISSA,that 1st SOCOM had negotiated with the24th Infantry Division at Fort Stewart, Ga.The ISSA applied to the 1st Ranger Bat-talion, also based at Hunter Army Airfield.

The genesis of the 129th SOAC was the17th of a series of initiatives undertakenby the chiefs of staff of the Army and theAir Force. Initiative 17 was prompted by adesire to align all rotary-wing support forspecial-operations forces, or SOF, underthe Army and to align all fixed-wing sup-port under the Air Force. The initiativeattempted to address the Army’s lack oftactical helicopter support for the four Spe-cial Forces groups and for the Ranger Reg-iment. At the time, those five organiza-tions, colloquially known as “white SOF,”were not supported by the 160th SOAG,which was dedicated to supporting nation-al special-mission (“black SOF”) units.

The 129th recruited and trained aggres-sively, quickly earning the respect of the SOFcommunity. The unit’s 15 Blackhawk heli-copters were equipped with the latest modifi-cations, including long-range fuel tanks;satellite-communication radios; forward-looking, infrared radar, or FLIR; and fast-rope insertion/extraction systems.

In early 1987, as part of the implemen-tation of Initiative 17, the Air Force begana drawdown of its five UH-1N Hueys based

14 Special Warfare

Evolution of the 3-160th SOAR Through Desert Storm

by Lieutenant Colonel Andy Milani

at Howard Air Force Base, Panama. To fillthat void, the 129th began rotating a pla-toon of aircraft to Howard AFB in October1987. That rotation was the genesis of the617th Special Operations Aviation Detach-ment, or SOAD. For 18 months, the 129thprovided the personnel, equipment andtraining needed to stand up the 617th. InMarch 1989, after having officially accept-ed the transfer of five aircraft from the129th, the 617th stood on its own, but itsactivation lowered the 129th’s strength to10 MH-60s and approximately 125 person-nel. The 617th SOAD later became what istoday’s Company D, 160th, which is basedin Roosevelt Roads, Puerto Rico.

Third Battalion activationIn late 1988, in anticipation of activating

the 160th Aviation Regiment, the Army re-designated the 129th SOAC as CompanyA, 3rd Battalion, 160th Special OperationsAviation Regiment.

In early 1989, the Army began assem-bling a cadre to activate the 160th SOAR’s3rd Battalion. Then-Lieutenant ColonelDell Dailey was chosen to be the battalion’sfirst commander. Just as Edwards and histeam had done three years earlier, Dailey

began the process of creating a SOF-pecu-liar MTOE, although on a larger scale. The3rd Battalion, which was to be a compositebattalion flying Chinooks and Blackhawks,would provide exclusive support to whiteSOF. Company A was to be the nucleus ofthe new battalion. Headquartered atHunter Army Airfield, the new unit beganrenegotiating earlier ISSA agreementswith the 24th Infantry Division.

On June 2, 1989, on a physical-trainingfield at Hunter Army Airfield, Dailey postedthe commander, first sergeant and guidonbearer of each company of the new battal-ion. In a scene reminiscent of a “Chinese firedrill,” the soldiers of Company A, standingin a swollen formation of more than 200,were ordered to break ranks and to fall in ontheir respective companies. The 3rd Battal-ion thus became an official entity.

The support sections within Company Abecame Headquarters and HeadquartersCompany, or HHC, commanded by CaptainRich Sheppard and 1st Sergeant MannyAcosta. The HHC sections included mess;motor pool; supply; an airborne service pla-toon; and the battalion staff. With the lossof everything but its pilots and crew chiefs,Company A became a J-series organiza-tion, commanded by Major Mark Ochsen-

Summer 2001 15

After years of training,operations, and equipmentmodifications, today’s 3-160stands ready to provideworldwide aviation sup-port to U.S. SOF.

U.S. Army photo

bein and 1st Sergeant Dave Rogers. Thenew Chinook company, Company B, whichwas just beginning to field its personneland equipment, was commanded briefly by1st Lieutenant Eric Peterson, but latercame under the command of Major BruceBridges and 1st Sergeant Bufkin. Compa-ny A’s maintenance platoon became Com-pany C, commanded by Major ConwayEllers and 1st Sergeant Bill Matthews.Company C added 67U-series techniciansto give a Chinook-maintenance capability.

While Company A was a mature andcombat-ready entity, Company B had somegrowing to do. Bridges began an intensivepersonnel recruiting-and-training cam-paign. The Army directed that eight CH-47D aircraft from Fort Campbell and FortBragg be transferred to Company B. Theaircraft, however, required SOF-peculiarmodifications. In fact, most of them had nothad their cockpit lighting modified to becompatible with night-vision goggles, orNVGs. The road was long, but there was aplan. The estimated combat-ready date forCompany B was the 3rd quarter of 1991 —two years away.

Soon after the activation of the 3rd Bat-talion, 1st SOCOM directed that the flightplatoons of the four SF groups (1st, 5th, 7thand 10th) be organized under the 3rd Bat-talion. This directive was based on 1stSOCOM’s goals of achieving standardiza-tion among the fleet and of consolidatingall white-SOF aircraft under one organiza-tion. The original charter for the flight pla-toons called for them to provide adminis-trative and logistics support to the SFgroups. Each platoon had four MH-60 heli-copters. Over time, and with the help ofsome action officers who had access tofinancial resources, the aircraft were mod-ified with tactical, SOF-peculiar equip-ment. The platoons developed their ownNVG programs and began to provide acombination of administrative and tacticalsupport.

The 3rd Battalion created a fifth compa-ny, Company D, to bring the widely diversi-fied platoons under one umbrella. Compa-ny D was commanded by Major Rob Brunsand 1st Sergeant Brown. These two werepossibly the most traveled company-com-

mand team in Army aviation. They lived onthe road, routinely visiting their flight pla-toons at Fort Lewis, Wash.; Fort Campbell,Ky.; Fort Bragg, N.C.; and Fort Devens,Mass. Early in 1990, the platoons were dis-banded to provide resources for the activa-tion of the 160th’s 2nd Battalion at FortCampbell.

Just before Christmas 1989, OperationJust Cause began in Panama. Although the3rd Battalion was not tasked to participatein the operation, it deployed about 20 per-sonnel to assist the 160th SOAG, predomi-nantly in a support role. The 617th SOAD,under the command of Major Rick Comp-ton, provided critical support to SOF dur-ing Just Cause’s combat operations.

Regimental activationIn June 1990, a ceremony was held at

Fort Campbell to formally redesignate the160th SOAG as the 160th Special Opera-tions Aviation Regiment (Airborne). TheSOAG commander, Colonel Billy Miller,became the first colonel of the regiment.During the ceremony, members of the 3rdBattalion stood alongside the members ofthe 2nd Battalion, which had recently beenformed under the command of LieutenantColonel Gordon Hearnsberger. The 2nd Bat-talion, a Chinook-only battalion, shared the3rd Battalion’s duties of supporting whiteSOF. However, because of national mission-support requirements, only Company B ofthe 2nd Battalion would be available forwhite-SOF support. (That fact would laterplay a role in the selection of 3/160 fordeployment to Desert Storm.) The SOAG’sremaining companies — A, B, C, D and F —were reorganized as the 160th’s 1st Battal-ion, commanded by Lieutenant ColonelDoug Brown.

Desert ShieldWhen Iraq invaded Kuwait in August

1990, the 2nd and 3rd battalions of the160th were alerted for deployment to theU.S. Central Command’s area of responsi-bility, or AOR. After some discussion, theCENTCOM staff narrowed the SOF avia-tion requirement to eight MH-60s and fourMH-47s. The numbers caused some con-

16 Special Warfare

sternation within the regiment: The 2ndBattalion was unable to meet the require-ment for Chinooks and still meet itsnational-mission requirements, and the3rd Battalion’s Company B, still in itsinfancy, was not yet ready to field morethan two combat-ready crews. ColonelMiller decided to form Task Force 3-160,under the command of Lieutenant ColonelDell Dailey, which would deploy with aug-mentation from the 2nd Battalion’s Com-pany B — two Chinooks with aircrews, aswell as support personnel, equipment,repair parts and tools. Major Russ Car-mody, commander of Company B, 2nd Bat-talion, deployed with the task force.

By the beginning of September 1990,Task Force 3-160 had arrived at the KingFahd International Airport, or KFIA, inSaudi Arabia. CENTCOM positioned com-bat units throughout the AOR, essentiallyplacing them wherever their minimumbase-support needs could be met. The con-ditions at KFIA were Spartan, to say theleast. Although KFIA had plenty of rampspace for the aircraft, room for soldiers tobed down was another matter altogether.

The “parking garage from hell” became thetask force’s dormitory.

Recognizing that the conditions at KFIAdid not lend themselves to prolonged occu-pation — either from the point of view ofaircraft safety or of strategy — Daileydirected Bruns, now the battalion S3, to findan alternate basing location. The locationhad to provide better strategic coverage ofthe AOR, better aircraft-support facilities,and, if possible, better living conditions.

The 5th SF Group, under the commandof Colonel Jim Kraus, also wanted tomove, in order to be closer to the Iraqiborder. Kraus wanted a location fromwhich his liaison teams could better sup-port the coalition battalions arrayedalong the border.

Bruns, hopping around the country withhis counterpart from the 5th SF Group,settled upon King Kahlid Military City, orKKMC, which is about 250 miles fromKFIA and less than 70 miles south of theIraqi border. From there, 160th aircraftcould fly well into Iraq, and return, on oneload of fuel.

The Saudis had just built two aircraft

Summer 2001 17


The complexity of SOFmodifications to ARSOAaircraft, such as this MH-47D, requires that pilotsand maintenance per-sonnel receive special-ized training.

hangars at the KKMC airfield, but theyhad yet to field the helicopters that were tooccupy the hangars. The barracks complexon the main base could house thousands ofsoldiers. The base also had numerousstate-of-the-art motor-pool facilities. All ofthe base’s facilities had been built to West-ern standards, under the watchful eye ofthe U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Best ofall, no other unit had expressed an interestin KKMC — yet. Task Force 3-160 and the5th SF Group quickly convinced ColonelJesse Johnson, the commander of CENT-COM’s Special Operations, that relocatingTask Force 3-160 and the 2nd and 3rd bat-talions of the 5th SF Group from KFIA toKKMC was operationally the right move.

PrioritiesOnce Task Force 3-160 was occupying

the facilities at KKMC, it established thefollowing priorities in order to prepare theunit for potential combat operations: safetyand force protection; integration with theheadquarters of Special Operations Com-mand-Central, or SOCCENT; aviation mis-sion training; aircraft and equipmentmaintenance; development of the logisticssupport structure; and morale support.

Safety and force protection. Although theunit did not have the resources for provid-ing its own security, it had to do its best. Inconjunction with the 5th SF Group, thetask force constructed a defensive networkand established a guard force. The Saudisprovided perimeter security for KKMC, soTF 3-160 focused on aircraft, hangar andbarracks security. The task force construct-ed a bunker complex around the hangar,manning it only at critical times. Eventu-ally, the Army component of CENTCOMassigned a platoon of military police to pro-vide security, and TF 3-160 gladly handedover the security mission.

Integration with SOCCENT headquar-ters. Task Force 3-160 quickly establishedliaison with SOCCENT headquarters andits air component, the Air Force SpecialOperations Component Coordinator, orAFSOCC. AFSOCC, whose commanderwas also commander of the 16th SpecialOperations Wing, served as the single air

manager for all SOF aviation in theater.The AFSOCC staff worked with the con-ventional Joint Forces Air ComponentCommander to coordinate use of the air-space. TF 3-160 provided liaison officers toboth SOCCENT and AFSOCC for the dura-tion of Desert Shield and Desert Storm.

Communications support provided bythe Joint Communications Support Ele-ment from MacDill AFB, Fla., coupled withTF 3-160’s organic communications sec-tion, ensured that TF 3-160 never lackedconnectivity to either SOCCENT orAFSOCC.

Aviation mission training. Night flying inthe Saudi desert proved to be especiallychallenging. During the first few months ofDesert Shield, there was a spike in the over-all accident rate for Army aviators. TF 3-160adopted a crawl-walk-run approach to avia-tor training in order to achieve combatreadiness in the shortest possible time.First, instructor pilots and aviators whowere rated fully-mission-qualified practiceddesert landings with NVGs until they feltcomfortable with their performance. Next,aviators who were rated basic-mission-qual-ified took the training. Within a few weeks,all combat crews were practiced and confi-dent in their desert-flying abilities.

Mission training included flying long-range infil/exfil navigation routes through-out the AOR, practicing desert-flying tech-niques and getting used to the limitedsatellite coverage for the global positioningsystem, or GPS.

TF 3-160 also practiced what it consid-ered to be a collateral mission: combatsearch and rescue, or CSAR. The unit rannumerous CSAR exercises, placing“downed crews” in remote locations tomake the scenarios realistic. Sometimesfighter pilots from deployed air wingsplayed the role of downed pilots. The res-cue missions also provided medical person-nel the opportunity to administer aid totheir “patients” while airborne and underblackout conditions. Although some of thepatients didn’t appreciate the IV needles,the training was excellent.

The airborne service platoon, or ASP,rehearsed operations as the forward arm-ing and refueling point, and it expended

18 Special Warfare

significant amounts of ammunition forcrew-served weapons at local ranges. Inanticipation of the CSAR mission, the ASPalso prepared equipment for dispersal to amultitude of operating locations.

Aircraft and equipment maintenance.The helicopter-maintenance facilities of TF3-160 were the best available to any Armyaviation unit deployed during DesertShield and Desert Storm. The maintenanceshop kept the fleet consistently above a 95-percent fully-mission-capable rate. TF 3-160 established an aggressive program forplacing erosion-prevention strips on theleading edges of all helicopter rotor blades,and maintenance personnel continuallymonitored engine compressor blades forany degrading effects of sand. The engineshop became adept at replacing worn com-pressor blades, and the operation signifi-cantly extended the life of helicopterengines. Maintenance efforts were aided bythe TF 3-160’s practices of storing its air-craft on concrete runways and taxiways,and of limiting the number of desert land-ings to the minimum necessary for pilotproficiency.

The TF 3-160 aircraft that deployed toDesert Shield lacked many of the modifica-tions needed on special-ops aircraft. To rec-tify the shortcoming, Dailey requested andreceived a team of civilian contractors toinstall M-134 miniguns, GPS and person-nel-locating systems on the aircraft. Thecontractors worked around the clock, livingand eating in the hangar, and completed thejob in record time. Later, during combatoperations, the modifications to the aircraftproved to be invaluable.

Development of the logistics supportstructure. Although TF 3-160 was consid-ered to be an echelon-above-corps, or EAC,organization, unit members knew thatthey were breaking new doctrinal groundwith regard to logistics support. Army SOFaviation had never operated in a similartheater of operations, and improvisationand liaison would be key tenets of TF 3-160’s logistics efforts.

CENTCOM’s Army Special OperationsSupport Command, or SOSC, was not asmature as other theater SOSCs. It had yetto establish a responsive supply pipelinefor SOF-peculiar aircraft parts, and

Summer 2001 19

During the latter stagesof Desert Storm, TF 3-160’s focus shifted toperforming infiltrationsof SF teams.

U.S. Army photo

through EAC channels, even Army-com-mon repair parts were slow to reach TF 3-160’s forward location. The unit had to finda better way.

To expedite the supply process, TF 3-160placed a liaison officer, CW3 Milt Weber,with the 8th Battalion, 101st AirborneDivision, at KFIA. The 8th Battalion wasthe aviation-support battalion for the101st’s Aviation Brigade. Weber hadrecently been transferred from 8-101 to 3-160, and he still maintained a good person-al relationship with the 8th Battalion’stech-supply people. The tech-supply NCOat KKMC called in orders to Weber, whofilled out the parts requests, took deliveryof the parts, and put the parts on the dailyintra-theater C-130 to KKMC.

Acquiring SOF-peculiar parts wasanother story. The supply pipeline forthose parts extended back to Fort Camp-bell and to Hunter Army Airfield. Partsfrom both locations were shipped sporadi-cally, as strategic airlift could be found.The “Desert Express,” a daily flight from

Charleston, S.C., was supposed to providethe solution, but the Desert Express neverseemed to be reliable. TF 3-160 learned tolive with the situation, because there wasno other solution.

Morale support. Recognizing that thedeployment was an open-ended one, TF 3-160 sought to improve the day-to-day livesof its soldiers in order to reduce their bore-dom and to keep them focused. In reality,the excellent living conditions at KKMCwere the best morale boost the commandercould provide. Compared to other units, TF3-160 was fortunate: The morale-supportfacilities included a weight room, satelliteTV, VCRs on each floor of the dorms, ping-pong and pool tables, a fast-food snack bar,R&R trips to Riyadh, and a free commer-cial telephone (five-minute limit/week).

At least half of the 3rd Battalionremained at Hunter Army Airfield, support-ing TF 3-160 and responding to statesidemission taskings. Company B continued totrain aggressively in the U.S. In January1991, Company B’s commander, Major

20 Special Warfare

Night Stalkers of TF 3-160 fly over burningoil fields in Kuwait duringOperation Desert Storm.

U.S. Army photo

Bridges, deployed to KKMC with two addi-tional Chinooks. Once at KKMC, heassumed of the Chinooks in TF 3-160 fromMajor Carmody.

Desert StormAs the likelihood of combat operations

increased, the coalition forces shifted theirfocus from defense to offense, and so did TF3-160.

The S2, Lieutenant Kelly Thomas, com-piled one of the best tactical-intelligencemaps in the country. The map became leg-endary: Aircrews from all over the theaterstopped in to update their maps. They werenever turned away.

TF 3-160th’s aviators plotted “spiderroutes” that would allow them to circum-navigate known enemy locations in Iraq.These routes also provided an overview ofexpected routing for CSAR aircraft thatwas useful both to controllers of the air-borne warning and control system and toairspace-deconfliction planners. The spiderroutes were also used for the infiltration ofSF teams, and each SF mission had anentry on the theater air-tasking order.Always cautious about entering and exit-ing friendly lines, TF 3-160 double- andtriple-checked its airspace deconflictionmeasures and, at one point, even sent aliaison officer to the VII Corps’ Army avia-tion command-and-control cell.

Although SOCCENT had promised toalert units 72 hours prior to the com-mencement of coalition-initiated hostili-ties, TF 3-160 was notified only 12 hours inadvance. At the beginning of the air war,the unit’s primary mission was CSAR. TF3-160 was to operate from a small commer-cial airfield at Rafha, just south of the Iraqiborder in north-central Saudi Arabia. Fromthat location, its helicopters, without refu-eling, could cover a radius that includedmost of southern Iraq, as far as Baghdad.

To ensure that his “left hook” flankingmovement wasn’t telegraphed to theIraqis, General Norman Schwartzkopf for-bade coalition units from occupying anyterrain west of the wadi running throughHafr-al Batin, just north of KKMC. How-ever, to accommodate the CSAR mission,

General Schwartzkopf approved TF 3-160’s pre-positioning to Rafha just prior tothe commencement of hostilities. The unithad been ready to go for months, anddespite short notice, the entire CSARpackage moved out quickly and arrived inRafha by 2 a.m. Jan. 17, 1991, just beforecoalition jets penetrated Iraqi airspace.

The movement to Rafha was not unevent-ful. One of TF 3-160’s Chinooks reported thelaunching of a surface-to-air missile. Andwhile executing an evasive maneuver, thehelicopter struck the ground, shearing offits left-front and right-rear landing gear.When the Chinook arrived at Rafha, main-tenance crews worked feverishly to placemattresses and tires under the fuselage inan attempt to keep the aircraft upright dur-ing shutdown. That proved to be the night’sonly excitement.

When it became evident that the Iraqiair defenses were not going to produce the“silk skies” that Sadaam Hussein had pre-dicted, TF 3-160 pulled its CSAR assetsback to KKMC and positioned small CSARdetachments in several forward operatinglocations. Each detachment consisted oftwo aircraft and their aircrews, communi-cations personnel, an intel analyst, opera-tions and maintenance personnel, and afuel truck. The detachments’ operationalintelligence picture was continually updat-ed from KKMC.

During the air war, TF 3-160 won thedistinction of having performed the first-ever NVG-aided rescue of a downed pilot.Two of TF 3-160’s MH-60s, flown by CW3Tom Montgomery and CW2 Todd Thelin,recovered a pilot who had ejected from adamaged F-16.

As the war continued, TF 3-160’s focusshifted toward the infiltration of SFteams. The teams’ intelligence reportingon the main lines of communication andon the road networks in southern Iraqwas critical to coalition efforts. Planningfor the infil missions was intense, as theaircrews and the SF teams “what if-ed”every contingency.

TF 3-160 successfully accomplishedevery infil mission. A few of the SF teamsfound the rock-solid terrain too hard fordigging hide-sites, and they were forced to

Summer 2001 21

call for immediate exfil. Other teams werecompromised by local bedouins and calledfor emergency extraction. On each occa-sion, TF 3-160 was poised and ready. In oneof the more renowned missions, CW3Randy Stephens and CW4 Jim Crissafulliexecuted a daring, single-ship, daylightrescue of a team that was about to be over-run by the enemy. Dashing in with itsminiguns buzzing, the Blackhawk climbedover a set of power lines and landed direct-ly on top of the team, snatching them awayto safety.

Throughout the six-week war, TF 3-160 conducted 57 combat missions. Theunit took pride in its record of respond-ing to every mission request. It is a trib-ute to the professionalism and to thegood fortune of TF 3-160 that not a sin-gle SF soldier or member of TF 3-160was captured or killed by the enemy.Bringing everyone home was the unit’sproudest accomplishment.

Looking backThe successes of the 3rd Battalion,

160th SOAR, during the 21 months fromits activation in June 1989 through itsreturn from Desert Storm in April 1991were nothing short of monumental. Thebattalion’s many accomplishments werethe culmination of extraordinary effortsnot only by the members of the 3rd Bat-talion, but also by those who played criti-cal roles in the fielding of the battalion.Included among those were the NCOs andthe officers throughout the Army who pro-vided expertise in personnel manage-ment, aviation training and logistics, andforce structure. They worked in obscureoffices and in places such as Departmentof the Army headquarters, Total ArmyPersonnel Command, U.S. Army SpecialOperations Command, U.S. Special Oper-ations Command, XVIII Airborne Corps,and 24th Infantry Division. Without theirdiligence and assistance, the void in avia-tion support for white SOF would nothave been filled, certainly not beforeDesert Storm.

The author is proud to have been a mem-ber of the 3rd Battalion and to have served

alongside the great Americans of the SFcommunity. Today, the 3rd Battalion con-tinues to build upon its earlier successes,providing worldwide aviation support toArmy Special Forces, Army Rangers andNavy SEALs.

Lieutenant Colonel Andy Milani was theoperations officer in the 129th SOAC andserved as both the executive officer andHHC commander for TF 3-160 duringDesert Shield and Desert Storm. He hasserved in various command and staff posi-tions in the 160th, including commander of2-160.

22 Special Warfare

Army special-operations aviation, orARSOA, can provide regional com-manders in chief, or CINCs, with a

capability that is responsive, flexible andcritical to the success of the CINC’s the-ater-engagement strategies.

But because of the distances involved, ithas been difficult or impossible for ARSOAto support the CINCs from bases withinthe continental United States. Seven yearsago, in an effort to overcome that difficulty,the Army began testing the concept of for-ward-basing.

In July 1994, Company D of the 160thSpecial Operations Aviation Regimentwas created at Howard Air Force Base,Panama, from the 617th Special Opera-tions Aviation Detachment. CompanyD’s mission was to provide our nation’smost elite ground and maritime special-operations forces with a capability toperform direct action, special reconnais-sance, foreign internal defense, and col-lateral missions.

Although Company D moved to NavalStation Roosevelt Roads in Puerto Ricoin 1999, its mission did not change. Asthe ARSOA component for the CINC ofU.S. Southern Command, or SOUTH-COM, D/160 must be prepared to deployanywhere within SOUTHCOM’s area ofresponsibility, or AOR, on a no-noticebasis. Once deployed, the unit is placedunder the operational control of the com-manding general of Special Operations

Command South, who is also based atRoosevelt Roads.

Composed of five MH-60L Blackhawks, 64soldiers and 25 civilians, D/160 is task-organ-ized as though it were a small battalion. Thecompany has four platoons: headquartersplatoon, airborne platoon, aviation-mainte-nance platoon, and flight platoon.

The headquarters platoon consists of thecommander and first sergeant, the flight-operations section, the communicationssection and the personnel who staff the S1,S2 and S4 sections. The airborne platoonprovides an aerial-delivery capability andmotor pool services.

The aviation-maintenance platoon pro-vides unit-level maintenance for the com-pany and manages a civilian contract teamthat provides intermediate and limiteddepot-level maintenance. This platoon alsoprovides training on aviation life-supportequipment and maintains that equipment.It is also responsible for the re-supply ofhelicopter repair parts throughout Centraland South America. The headquarters, air-borne and aviation-maintenance platoonssupport the flight platoon, which providesthe five MH-60L Blackhawks and thetrained crews that D/160 must have to con-duct its mission.

Forward-basing of D/160 offers severaladvantages. First, D/160 is based with theunits that it is designed to support. Second,whether training at Roosevelt Roads ordeploying during joint and combined

Summer 2001 23

The Impact of Forward-Based Special-Operations Aviation

by Major Walter Rugen

exchange training, counterdrug operationsor other missions directed by SOCSOUTH,the aviation and ground SOF units form ajoint combined-arms team that offers theCINC a capability that is second to none.Third, aggressive training and rehearsalswith other SOF units have firmly estab-lished D/160’s joint tactics, techniques andprocedures.

But one of the most important advan-tages of forward-basing D/160 is that itsmembers have become better able to com-municate with the populations of the coun-tries in which the company is operating.D/160’s aggressive language-training pro-gram requires all soldiers to attend somelevel of instruction in Spanish. Spanishinstruction may range from courses at theDefense Language Institute at Monterey,Calif., to immersion in countries such asCosta Rica and Ecuador. Knowing the lan-guage, customs and cultures of allied forcesin the AOR enables D/160th personnel tobetter integrate with the populace duringtraining scenarios and during real-worldmissions.

Another advantage to forward-basing isthat the commander of SOCSOUTH candeploy the company, with the CINC’s

approval, on humanitarian-relief opera-tions and on search-and-rescue, or SAR,missions within the AOR. During the pastseven years, D/160 has demonstrated thisbenefit of forward-basing in a number ofmissions.

During 1997 and 1998, D/160 conductedtwo SAR missions involving Costa Ricancitizens — one lost in the jungle and onelost at sea. In both instances, D/160 heli-copters lifted off within three hours afternotification and assisted with the success-ful recoveries of the victims.

During humanitarian-relief operationsfor Hurricane Jorges, D/160 personneldeployed from Panama to the DominicanRepublic within three hours after notifica-tion, and they were conducting on-siterelief operations within 36 hours afternotification. During Hurricane Mitch, twoMH-60Ls deployed within three hoursafter notification and conducted relief coor-dination in Honduras the same day. Dayslater, the helicopters were still flying reliefmissions in El Salvador and Guatemala.

In July 1999, D/160 received notificationto deploy from its base in Puerto Rico withground troops to recover a U.S. Army air-borne-reconnaissance-low aircraft that had

24 Special Warfare

As the ARSOA compo-nent of USSOUTHCOM,Company D of the 160thSOAR is part of a jointcombined-arms team.

U.S. Army photo

crashed into a mountainside in southernColombia while on a counternarcotics mis-sion. Even though the crash site was inextremely rugged terrain, the mission wascritical. Alerted during the night, D/160aircrews crossed the Caribbean in dark-ness and flew through the Andes moun-tains the following day. The company suc-cessfully recovered and evacuated the bod-ies of their fellow Army aviators.

Later in 1999, the company deployed aspart of Operation Fundamental Responseto help victims of Venezuelan mudslides.Within 18 hours after notification, person-nel of D/160 landed in Maiquetia,Venezuela, where they were met by theVenezuelan president, whose first questionwas, “Do you speak Spanish?” Once themission’s flight leader had conversed withthe president in Spanish, D/160 personnelwent on to conduct both SAR and humani-tarian-relief operations.

The Venezuelan mission speaks volumesabout the impact of forward-basing: D/160personnel proved responsive; they pos-sessed the equipment and training neces-sary for success; they integrated seamless-ly with the supported ground forces; andthey communicated and operated with thepeople of the host nation.

The concept of forward-basing ARSOAassets appears to have proven its value.Recently, Company E, 160th Special Oper-ations Aviation Regiment, was establishedin the Republic of Korea. With the emer-gence of E/160, there are now two ARSOAunits forward-based in theater, and as

ARSOA soldiers and their aircraft continueto spread throughout the globe, the for-ward-basing concept will continue to havea major impact in the regional-engagementstrategies of the theater CINCs.

Major Walter Rugen iscommander of Company D,160th Special OperationsAviation Regiment, which islocated at Naval StationRoosevelt Roads, Puerto Rico.Since his assignment to the160th SOAR in December 1999, MajorRugen has served in a variety of assign-ments within the regiment.

Summer 2001 25

An MH-60L helicopterfrom D/160 lands with aload of bottled water thatwill be distributed to vic-tims of floods inVenezuela.

U.S. Army photo

At any given time, Night Stalkers ofthe 160th Special Operations Avia-tion Regiment, or SOAR, can be

found all over the world, and now they canbe found permanently stationed in theRepublic of Korea, or ROK. Company E ofthe 160th SOAR moved to Taegu, Korea,during the summer of 2001, marking thebeginning of Army special-operations avia-tion, or ARSOA, support in the ROK.

In June 2000, Company E, 160th Avia-tion Battalion, 101stAirborne Division,which had original-ly been constitutedin April 1982, wasofficially reactivat-ed as Company E,160th SOAR. Com-pany E then spent ayear preparing tomove its approxi-mately 100 sol-diers, 50 civiliansand a company ofMH-47E Chinook

helicopters to Taegu.Any unit move is an intricate process,

but when a unit is moving overseas, thecomplexity increases tenfold. Necessaryactivities for Company E’s move rangedfrom constructing aircraft hangars toestablishing computer-network connectivi-ty to renovating barracks to issuing per-manent-change-of-station orders. The regi-

ment and Company E spent months plan-ning and coordinating the move to ensurethat when the soldiers of E/160 arrived inKorea, they would be prepared for success.

“What impresses me most is how hardthe Echo Company soldiers have worked toaccomplish this mission,” said Major CurtFeistner, Company E commander. “Whensomething needs to be done, they take careof it before I can even ask. They have real-ly become a team, and we’re looking for-ward to seeing all the results of their hardwork.” Sergeant First Class Lance Peeler,E/160’s maintenance platoon sergeant,agrees, “If it wasn’t for the persistence andthe experience of the guys in Echo Compa-ny, we wouldn’t be where we are right now.They have done an excellent job.”

Company E replaced the Air Force’s 31stSpecial Operations Squadron as the unitresponsible for providing special-opera-tions airlift throughout the Pacific theater.The replacement of the Air Force’s MH-53Jhelicopters with the Army’s MH-47E heli-copters will improve operational-readinessrates by increasing the airlift capabilitiesof SOF units in theater. With a limitedexpenditure of resources, the change willmake theater SOF more efficient, moreready and more capable. The forward-bas-ing of Company E also has other benefits:The company will have the opportunity towork closely with other SOF elements, andthe increased U.S. presence will helpstrengthen the ROK-U.S. military alliance.

26 Special Warfare

Company E: The 160th SOAR’s NewestForward-Based Unit

by Captain Holly Turner

The MH-47Es of Compa-ny E, 160th SOAR, willincrease the airlift capa-bilities of SOF units in thePacific theater.

U.S. Army photo

“Special-operations aviation units over-seas benefit both the theater in which theyare located and the regiment. The companywill be able to establish a very stronghabitual relationship with the units theysupport. The more they work together, thebetter prepared they will be to accomplishtheir mission if called upon,” said ColonelRichard Bowman, the 160th SOAR com-mander. “From an operational perspective,having Echo Company in the Pacific the-ater is a huge benefit to the regiment. Ifthe regiment is needed in Korea, EchoCompany will not have to deploy to Korea;rather it will already be there, trained andready to support the commander in chief,”Bowman continued. “From a training per-spective, the Pacific theater is very farfrom the regiment’s continental UnitedStates locations. Hence, it is difficult andexpensive for the supported units and [the160th] to train together. Now that EchoCompany is in Korea, many of the unitsthat did not receive all the support wewould have liked to give them in the pastwill now receive it.”

One of Company E’s soldiers, StaffSergeant William Lott, stated that the sol-diers are proud of what they have accom-plished thus far. “At first, there was a lot ofanxiety, with our trying to get all of theequipment together to load and ship ontime, but now there’s just a lot of anticipa-tion. The soldiers are proud and can’t waitto start the mission.”

With Company D, 160th SOAR, forward-based in Puerto Rico and with Company Eforward-based in the ROK, there areARSOA assets in many of the theaterswhere the regiment recruits. Recruitinghighly motivated, extremely competent sol-diers continues to be a cornerstone of theregiment. Having Night Stalkers and theirstate-of-the-art equipment in locations suchas Korea provides walking advertisementsas to why conventional soldiers might wishto become Night Stalkers.

Forward-based companies also help theregiment retain highly-skilled soldiers.“This [company] will also allow us to rotateour enlisted soldiers between CONUS andOCONUS ARSOA units. Our enlisted sol-diers can be assigned to one of our CONUS

units for only four to six years before theybecome eligible for reassignment. Now ourenlisted soldiers who receive specializedtraining can use that training in ourOCONUS units upon reassignment,” saidBowman.

The future of forward-basing ARSOAunits is still undetermined. The regimentis currently working with the U.S. ArmySpecial Operations Command to refine theARSOA vision. The only constant inARSOA is change; however, one thing thatwill never change is the regiment’s missionto support war-fighting CINCs and jointtask force commanders worldwide at amoment’s notice.

Captain Holly Turner serves as the S5 andas the public affairs officer for the 160thSpecial Operations Aviation Regiment.

Summer 2001 27

Crews of E Company, 160th SOAR, offload an MH-47E helicopter at their new home inTaegu, Korea.

U.S. Army photo

During the past 20 years, as the160th Special Operations AviationRegiment has evolved from a task

force to a regiment, its aircraft and equip-ment have evolved as well.

The fleet of sophisticated aircraft thatthe 160th employs today in support of spe-

cial-operations forces, or SOF, worldwide isa far cry from the aircraft and equipmentthat were used 20 years ago. The unit’searly equipment was received on loan fromthe 101st Airborne Division, the Pennsyl-

vania National Guard and the MississippiNational Guard. It consisted of standardArmy aircraft that lacked any modifica-tions unique to Army special-operationsaviation, or ARSOA.

Little Bird modernizationIn 1980, 22 Vietnam-vintage OH-6A air-

craft served as the light-assault platformfor ARSOA. The aircraft received modifica-tions, including infrared landing lights,digital heading indicators, radar altime-ters, secure communications and upgradedavionics. As the 160th’s mission needschanged, the OH-6A served as a lightattack platform, as well. The addition ofweapons, such as M-134 miniguns and 12-shot rocket pods, earned the OH-6A a newdesignation: AH-6C.

In 1981, Task Force 160 received 17Hughes 500 commercial helicopters thathad been rapidly militarized with modifiedfor SOF missions with Robertson auxiliaryfuel tanks, Omega navigation systems,radar altimeters and military avionics.After the upgrades, the aircraft were desig-nated MH-6E. In 1985, the 160th received12 more Hughes 500 commercial heli-copters. These were militarized and outfit-ted with a lightweight navigational suitethat provided Little Bird aircrews with aflight-management system and a highlyaccurate navigation system, and they weredesignated AH-6F. The AH-6F replaced the

28 Special Warfare

20 Years of Army Special-Operations Aviation Modernization

by Lieutenant Colonel Greg Stewart and Thorwald Eide

The AH-6 helicopters of the 160th SOAR reflect ARSOA’s continuous efforts to improveits helicopters over the past 20 years.


AH-6C in the attack mission.The 160th continued to modify its MH-

6E and AH-6F helicopters and to increasethe helicopters’ capabilities by adding mis-sion-equipment packages. The A/MH-6Jused in the 160th SOAR today has signifi-cantly improved navigation and communica-tion equipment; forward-looking infraredradar, or FLIR; the fast-rope insertion/extrac-tion system, or FRIES; M-134 miniguns;GAU-19 .50-caliber machine guns; Hellfiremissiles; and 2.75-inch rockets.

The A/MH-6M program, commonlyreferred to as the mission-enhanced LittleBird, or MELB, program, provides ongoingimprovements to the Little Bird fleet.MELB, which will begin fielding heli-copters in 2002, will replace the engine, thelanding gear, the main rotor system andthe tail rotor system. It will also add anintegrated cockpit. MELB will increase theLittle Bird’s maximum gross weight from3,950 pounds to 4,700 pounds.

Blackhawk modernizationIn 1980, the UH-60A Blackhawk heli-

copter served as the assault platform for thenewly formed TF 160. Unlike the OH-6A,the UH-60A Blackhawk, fielded in 1979,was a new aircraft, not only to TF 160 butalso to the Army. TF 160 received 30 UH-60As from the 101st Airborne Division andpromptly modified them by adding long-range navigation equipment, over-the-hori-zon communication systems, and a crudeextended-range fuel system. The fuel sys-tem, consisting of six 140-gallon UH-1Hauxiliary fuel bladders that were supportedby three-quarter-inch marine-grade ply-wood, enabled the UH-60A to fly more than800 nautical miles without refueling. Cover-ing the aircraft’s cockpit lights with tapesolved the night-vision-goggle lighting prob-lems, and installing FRIES in 1981 gave theaircraft even more capabilities.

In 1984, FLIR was installed on an ArmyBlackhawk for the first time. InstallingFLIR required numerous avionics modifi-cations that heightened the complexity ofthe aircraft and increased the pilot’s work-load. In 1985, to reduce the complexity, theRockwell Collins Corporation initiated an

integration effort, the Cockpit Manage-ment System, or CMS 80, that integratedthe helicopter’s communications and navi-gation systems. CMS 80 allows the pilot tomanage the cockpit through a control-dis-play unit. It greatly reduces the aircrew’sworkload and allows them to focus on whatis taking place outside the cockpit. The 16aircraft that received the integrated cock-pit modification were designated MH-60A.

Just prior to Operation Prime Chance in1987, the 160th replaced the M-60Dmachine guns on the MH-60As with M-134minigun systems and added two 185-galloninternal Robertson auxiliary fuel tanks.Two years later, the unit received UH-60L

Summer 2001 29

The addition of M-134 miniguns and other improvements make the MH-60K the firsthelicopter designed specifically for special-operations aviation.


helicopters that were then modified withthe CMS 80 cockpit, global positioning sys-tem, color weather radar, FRIES, and anexternal rescue hoist. These helicopterswere designated MH-60L.

That same year, the MH-60A helicopter,armed with .50-caliber machine guns, fixed-forward M-134 miniguns, and 2.75-inchrockets, became known as the defensivearmed penetrator, or DAP. As a result oflessons learned in numerous combat opera-tions during the past several years, the DAPhas been significantly improved through theaddition of other weapons, including a M-230 30 mm chain gun, Hellfire missiles, andair-to-air Stinger missiles.

Since 1991, the MH-60L has continuedto evolve. The CMS 80 cockpit has beenupgraded with new multifunction displays,an embedded global-positioning systemand an inertial-navigation unit, advancedaircraft survivability equipment, aweapons-management system, and an aer-ial-refueling probe.

In 1994 the 160th began receiving thefirst aircraft designed specifically for spe-cial-operations aviation: the MH-60KBlackhawk. The MH-60K has a fully inte-grated glass cockpit with advanced sen-sors, aircraft survivability equipment, M-134 miniguns, FRIES, and two 185-galloninternal Robertson auxiliary fuel tanks. Itis also equipped with an aerial refueling

probe and a terrain-following/terrain-avoidance radar system that provides air-crews with a long-range infil/exfil capabili-ty during adverse weather conditions.Since 1995, the MH-60K’s aircraft-surviv-ability equipment and mission-equipmentpackages have received further modifica-tions. The MH-60K is now considered to bethe most survivable helicopter in a high-threat, air-defense environment.

Chinook modernizationDuring the past 20 years, the mission of

the 160th’s Chinooks has evolved fromrefueling operations to heavy combat-assault. In 1980, the 160th’s forerunner,Task Force 158, received 12 CH-47C Chi-nook helicopters from the 101st AirborneDivision. The primary mission of the Chi-nooks was to provide forward-area refuel-ing operations in austere environments.Upon assignment to TF 158, the 12 aircraftreceived modifications that included radaraltimeters (specifically added for safetyduring night-vision-goggle flights); long-range navigation and communicationequipment; and four metal internal auxil-iary fuel tanks (taken from M-49C two-and-one-half-ton fuel trucks).

In 1983, the 160th received 16 CH-47Daircraft, which had improved engines andon-board navigation equipment, to replace

30 Special Warfare

During the past severalyears, the MH-47E hasundergone a series ofmodifications that havemade it the most capableheavy-assault helicopterin the world today.


the CH-47Cs. Immediately, the 160th mod-ified one of the CH-47Ds, adding the CMS80 cockpit, a fully coupled flight-controlsystem, a weather radar system and a dig-ital intercom system similar to that usedon the B-1B bomber. The aircraft wasredesignated the MH-47D.

Between 1984 and 1987, 11 more of theCH-47Ds became MH-47Ds, receiving mod-ifications such as FLIR, M-134 miniguns,and an aerial refueling probe. The in-flight-refueling capability gives the MH-47Dunlimited range.

In 1988, the 160th began efforts to devel-op a common cockpit-software architecturefor the MH-47D and the MH-60L. In 1989the architecture was achieved, and it wasadded to the MH-47Ds, along with an inte-grated global positioning system and three800-gallon internal Robertson auxiliaryfuel tanks. In the 12 years since 1989, theMH-47Ds have received numerous modifi-cations, including CMS 80 cockpitupgrades, embedded global positioning sys-tem/inertial navigation units, advancedaircraft-survivability equipment, newengines, and rescue hoists.

In 1994, the 160th SOAR began receiv-ing 26 highly modified MH-47E heli-copters. These were CH-47C helicoptersthat had been re-manufactured and modi-fied with a mission-equipment packageand cockpit similar to those of the MH-60K. The MH-47Es were fielded with twofull-motion, high-fidelity flight simulators.The following year, the MH-47Es weremodified with the addition of M-134 mini-guns, FRIES, and two 800-gallon Robert-son auxiliary fuel tanks. During the pastsix years, the MH-47E has undergone mod-ifications identical to those of the MH-60K,making the MH-47E the most capableheavy-assault helicopter in the worldtoday.

The futureThe goal of SOA modernization is

twofold: to continue to build on the successof ongoing SOA programs; and to leverageall DoD modernization programs andemerging technologies. The SOA modern-ization master plan is to merge cockpit

technologies, conduct sensor developmentand integration, and improve aircrew situ-ational awareness. Our objective is toachieve an open-system, common-avionicsarchitecture design that can be incorporat-ed throughout the 160th SOAR aircraftfleet. Such a design would ensure the cost-effective and efficient inclusion of newtechnology, life-cycle upgradability, andhardware/software commonality. Evolutionand change are natural processes, and theyare essential if Army aviation and ARSOAare to remain relevant in providing sup-port to the ground-force commander and tothe war-fighting CINC. Night Stalkersdon’t quit!

Lieutenant Colonel Greg Stewart is theSystems Integration Management Officerfor the 160th Special Operations AviationRegiment.

Thorwald Eide is the Deputy SystemsIntegration Management Officer, 160thSpecial Operations Aviation Regiment.

Summer 2001 31

Few Americans are aware that theworld’s helicopter industry wasspawned during World War II. But in

fewer than five years (December 1940-Sep-tember 1945), Russian-émigré Igor Siko-rsky designed and built three differentmodels of helicopters — the R4 series, theR6-A and the R5-A. After the models hadbeen built, they were tested, redesigned,tested for production, produced and retest-ed. More than 300 of the three models wereproduced and delivered to United Statesand British forces for military operations.1The R4-B, R6-A and R5-A helicopters wouldperform combat medical evacuation, downedaircrew rescue, and ship-to-shore aircraft-parts delivery in Burma, the PhilippineIslands, Saipan, Iwo Jima and Okinawa. Thewell-known Korean War helicopter, theBell H-13, was also tested during WorldWar II.2

BeginningsDevelopment of the helicopter actually

began during the intense war preparationsthat flourished in the atmosphere of heatednationalism prevalent during the 1930s.Germany developed the first successful heli-copter, the Focke-Wulf FW-61, in 1936. TheFW-61 was a true helicopter with cyclic andcollective pitch control, and it was capable ofautorotation. In 1937, aviatrix HannaReitsch demonstrated the FW-61 insideBerlin’s Deutschland-Halle sports arena.

In 1938, the U.S. Congress, attempting tofill the Field Artillery’s need for a lightobservation aircraft, authorized $2 millionfor research and development of a rotary-wing aircraft. The Platt-LePage AircraftCompany won the bid with a modified FW-61 design. In 1939, when Congress autho-rized $300,000 for the development of an“Army two-seater service observation-trainer helicopter,” Sikorsky, of Curtis-Vought, met the challenge. He and histeam had tested, engineered, redesignedand produced the X-R4-model helicopter bymid-April 1942.3

On April 20, 1942, representatives of theU.S. Army, Coast Guard, Navy, and theBritish Royal Navy watched the X-R4demonstration. With a passenger aboard,Sikorsky flew the X-R4 to 5,000 feet,demonstrated its helicopter attributes, andconcluded the demonstration by rappellingfrom the hovering craft. His project engi-neer, Ralph P. Alex, using a rope ladder,then climbed aboard the X-R4.

On May 14, 1942, the X-R4 flew 761 milesto Wright Field, Ohio, making 16 stops forrefueling en route. Because of strong head-winds, the longest leg of the trip (92 miles)took one hour and 50 minutes, but the U.S.Army had its first operational helicopter. Ashort time later, two prototype autogiros,the XR3 and the YO60, designed by Kelletaircraft, were quietly shelved.4 Delivery ofthe first 15 Sikorsky R4-A helicopters to theArmy began on July 3, 1943; 14 more R4-Bs

32 Special Warfare

Helicopters in Combat: World War II

by Dr. C.H. Briscoe

followed for the Army, Navy, Coast Guard,and the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force.The number of R-4 series deliveries totaled131.5

During a sleet storm on Jan. 3, 1944, aCoast Guard R4-A delivered blood plasma toSandy Hook Hospital, N.J. The plasma wouldbe used to treat 100 badly burned sailorsfrom the destroyer USS Turner. In June1944, the Coast Guard was operating R-4s offthe deck of the USCGC Cobb.

In February 1944, six pilots and sixmechanics from the U.S. Army Air Force, orUSAAF, reported to the Sikorsky aircraftfactory in Bridgeport, Conn., for a classi-fied assignment. By then, more than 20 R4helicopters had already been delivered tothe Army. The 12 airmen were to form thecadre for the USAAF Helicopter TrainingSchool at Freeman Field, Seymour, Ill. Bymid-summer, 30 helicopter pilots had grad-uated from the first two classes. The veil ofsecrecy shrouding the school would not belifted until September 1944, when the100th R4-B was delivered.6 By then, sixR4-B helicopters were operating in theChina-Burma-India, or CBI, theater, and

24 others had been assigned to floatingdepot aircraft repair and maintenanceships slated for the Pacific.

CBI theaterSix R4-B helicopters (three USAAF and

three USN) were assigned to the China-Burma-India theater to rescue downed air-crews flying the “Hump” (the Himalayanrange between Burma and China), and tosupport Operation Thursday, the invasionof Burma by Major General Orde Wingate’sChindit brigades. However, only four of theR4-B helicopters survived the trip to India.In January 1944, those four joined ColonelPhilip Cochran’s 1st Air Commando in theAssam Hill region, which was 100 mileswest of the India-Burma border.

In late April 1944, Lieutenant CarterHarmon flew the first combat helicoptermedevac and rescue mission into Burma.An L-1 observation plane carrying threewounded Chindits had made a forced land-ing in Japanese-held territory. During therescue attempt, Harmon had to surmounta 5,000-foot mountain range, and because

Summer 2001 33

An R4-B lifts off from afloating aircraft repairship in the Pacific in1945.

Courtesy USAJFKSWCS Archives and Fred M. Duncan collection

the helicopter’s engine would overheat, ittook Harmon three days to clear the moun-tains and to locate the stranded pilot andthe Chindits. Then, because the Japanesehad found the downed airplane in themeantime, Harmon was forced to changepick-up zones as he evacuated each person,one by one, to safer areas.

All told, helicopter pilots of the 1st AirCommando rescued 18 wounded Chinditsin 23 combat sorties.7 After the R6-A heli-copters arrived in the CBI theater in June1945, the pilots were credited with rescu-ing several downed pilots from elevationsas high as 8,000 feet.8

Wartime helicopter developmentsUsing the feedback acquired from the

pilots of the operational R4s, Sikorsky cre-ated an improved version, the R6-A, at thesame time that he was designing the nextgeneration model, the R5-A.9 On March 1,1943, he demonstrated the XR6-A to boththe Army and the Navy at WashingtonNational Airport. Seeing the helicopterwith evacuation litters attached, the Sur-geon General and his staff insisted on rid-ing in them. Fortunately, there was a

strong ground wind, and the substantiallyoverloaded two-place helicopter was able tomake a running takeoff.

General Henry H.“Hap”Arnold directed theprocurement of 900 R6-A helicopters, providedthat their production would not interfere withthe priority production of the Vought F-4UCorsair for the U.S. Navy. Curtis-Vought’ssolution was to license production of the heli-copters to Nash-Kelvinator, with Sikorskyengineers providing oversight.10

The first Nash-Kelvinator R6-A was deliv-ered to the Army in October 1943. With pro-duction following the experimental programso closely, very little debugging had beendone, especially on the few production mod-els, and the military pilots nicknamed them“kelvicopters” and “refrigerotors.” However,by September 1944, more than 200 R6-Ashad been delivered. Several went to the CBItheater, and more than 30 went to the Pacif-ic for naval air-sea rescue and for the sixfloating aircraft repair and maintenanceships that were supporting the USAAF.11

Development experienceAccording to Sikorsky’s Ralph Alex, the

best research-and-development axioms

34 Special Warfare

Lieutenant Robert W.Cowgill seated in an R4-B helicopter in thePhilippines in 1945.


came from the development of the R6-A:design the experimental model for produc-tion; plan on simple tooling; build in 30-40percent growth in rotors, transmission,drive system, and power plant; apply “zeromargin” in design areas only when theycan be modified readily — never in anycritical components and structures; micro-supervise the redesign for production toensure that lessons learned from experi-ence are not ignored.

The opinion of the users was different:Rapid fielding of the R-4s incorporated thenewest developments; and the R6-A provedto be a maintenance nightmare. Sikorskyengineers produced their second-genera-tion helicopter, the R5-A, in less than threeyears, in time to field 65 (including proto-types) to the U.S. and British militarybefore V-J Day on Sept. 2, 1945.12

The R4-B, R6-A, and the R5-A heli-copters test-dropped bombs on ground tar-gets and on ships, and they dropped depthcharges in the ocean. All three helicopterscould operate on land, from aboard ship,and (with floats installed) off water. Siko-rsky demonstrated helicopter rappelling(deplaning via rope ladder). But attemptsto extend the range of the R-6A and R5-Ahelicopters by towing them with cargo air-craft proved to be dangerous, inefficientand aerodynamically unsound. The heli-copter’s maximum speed in autorotationwas just above the stall speed of the towingaircraft.13

FloatersBy 1945, the R4-B and R6-A helicopters

were integral to the USAAF floating repairdepots, specially-converted Liberty ships thatwere operating in the Pacific under the code-name Project Ivory Soap.14 The offensivecampaign in the Pacific, linked to “islandhopping,” was designed to strategicallyproject America’s land-based heavy-bomber power from captured enemy air-fields. These airfields provided more flexi-bility to naval carrier-based medium andattack aircraft and allowed them to extendtheir air-threat ranges.

The key to ensuring that adequate main-tenance and repair facilities would be read-

ily available to support USAAF aircraft(ranging from B-29 bombers to P-51 fight-er planes) was mobility. The Air TechnicalService Command, or ATSC, had used mod-ified U.S. Navy landing ship, tanks, orLSTs, as offshore aircraft-repair facilitiesin the Mediterranean, but in the Pacific,where LSTs were more in demand, ATSCsought lower-priority Liberty ships thatcould be converted for the same purpose.

The ATSC modified six Liberty ships insix months in Mobile, Ala.; procured repairmachinery and tools; installed the shopsneeded for aircraft repair — welding, elec-tro-plating, instrument repair, electrical,and paint-dope-and-fabric. These floatingdepot aircraft repair and maintenanceships were dubbed “floaters” by the Navy.

Rough seas often hampered deliveryboats and barges that operated betweenthe repair ships and the island airstrips.But each floater carried aircraft-repairunits, or ARUs, consisting of four R4-B heli-copters that could ferry vital airplane partsand personnel to the air bases ashore.15

The standard 72- by 40-foot helicopterflight deck on the floaters could accommo-date four helicopters. According to Lieu-tenant Louis A. Carle, “It was close quarterssometimes, especially when the helicopters’rotors were running, but that made it inter-esting.”16 A wartime article said the floaterconcept exemplified “American ingenuityspeeding victory over Japan.”17

The most demanding mission for thefloater helicopter pilots came on June 16,1945, when Carle, assigned to the 5th ARUaboard the U.S. Army vessel Clinton W.Russell in Manila Harbor, was called toevacuate two serious “brain cases” from the38th Infantry Division combat zone to afield hospital. The pickup point, marked byan “X” on the map, was about 35 miles eastof Manila, south of Mount Domire, and inrough terrain. Reaching the “X”-markedspot, Carle saw rough, jungle-covered,steep mountains below, and then he discov-ered that he was in the midst of a dive-bombing attack by P-47 fighters. Escapingin the nick of time, Carle spotted severalU.S. soldiers on the knob of a burned-offhill, and having no better ideas, he landedto ask for directions.

Summer 2001 35

Directed two miles southward to a smallbeach in a river bend, Carle located a patrolsurrounding a man on a stretcher. Unable tocarry a stretcher in the helicopter, Carleremoved a seat so that he could place theman on the floor. Fortunately, the woundedLieutenant De la Cruz was short and thin.Carle rested the lieutenant’s bullet-shatteredhips on the seat cushions, fit his feet betweenthe rudder pedals, and braced his shouldersagainst the firewall. Then Carle used twobelts to tie De la Cruz down. All thatremained was clearing the 85-foot trees inthe jungle that surrounded the site on threesides. In Carle’s words:

With no ground wind to assist, I revvedthe engine to full throttle using 7 1/2degrees of rotor pitch. This gave me 2,600engine rpm and brought the wheels light onthe ground. A sharp advance to 12 degreesof pitch “jumped” me into the air. As thewheels left the ground, I pushed forward onthe azimuth control and started forward. Iheld the ship close to the ground until wewere less than 100 feet from the trees aheadand had gained nearly 30 mph. Then Ipulled back on the azimuth stick and usedthe airspeed to zoom almost vertically overthe trees. The airspeed dropped to near zero,but enough altitude had been gained toallow me to drop slightly and gain backflight speed.18

Thirty minutes later, De la Cruz wasdelivered to the 311th General Hospital,and a sweat-soaked Carle flew back to hisfloater.19

The next day, Lieutenants Robert W.“Binney” Cowgill and Harold Greene, fly-ing the only R6-A in theater, joined Carleto air-evacuate wounded soldiers from thecombat zone. Cowgill evacuated three“walking wounded” from the 112th Caval-ry. The Army helicopter mechanics built astretcher carrier onto Carle’s R4-B. “Iended up being the first guy to haul [apatient] on the outside,” Carle said. “Itscared the poor guy to death. I’d have beenscared to death, too, if I had been outthere!” In five days Carle would evacuate17 wounded soldiers and would fly for 25hours. On his longest day, Carle performedsix medevacs that required seven hours tocomplete. Carle later claimed that he

learned more about helicopter flying dur-ing those 25 hours than he had everlearned before.20

Carle and Cowgill evacuated nearly 30 ofthe 70 wounded personnel who were heli-coptered from Philippine combat zones tofield hospitals in June 1945.21 Both mencrashed their helicopters. Because Carle’sR4-B was beyond repair, soldiers fired fourrockets into the engine and set it afire.Carle then walked out of the jungle with aninfantry patrol. While walking at the headof the patrol, Carle had to jerk his .45 auto-matic out and “fire like a cowboy” to kill aJapanese infantryman who had suddenlyappeared.

Two days after his return, the injuredCarle left the hospital to fly a new battery toCowgill, who was stranded on a knife-edgedridge. Several pilots who had flown over theridge warned that it was an impossible sitefor a landing. Carle replied, “If Binney saysthat it can be landed on, he knows it can be.If he can’t fly that thing out of there, I’ll atleast pick him up and bring him back.”Upon landing at the site and seeing thatCowgill’s tail rotor was broken off, Carledoubted whether Cowgill’s helicopter wasflyable. Yet “Binney flew that helicopterback to the ship without a tail rotor! Now,that was mechanically and physicallyimpossible, but Cowgill did it!” said Carle.When Cowgill and Carle relocated with the5th ARU to Okinawa, the 6th ARU assumedthe medevac mission, with litters attachedto its R6-A helicopters. Considering the lim-itations of the aircraft and the high alti-tudes involved, it is remarkable that theserescues were performed at all. The skill andthe bravery of the pilots were the key ingre-dients in the successful operations.22

Army helicopter trainingOne of the most noteworthy accomplish-

ments of the Army’s helicopter school wasits relocation from Chanute Field, inChampaign, Ill., to Sheppard Field, inWichita Falls, Texas, in May 1945. With noprovisions to rail-load 14 R4-B and threeR6-A helicopters, school maintenancecrews prepared the air squadron for arecord-breaking, cross-country flight of 800

36 Special Warfare

miles. Of the 17 helicopters, 16 arrivedsafely at Sheppard Field. One of the R6-Arefrigerotors was forced down because of abad (factory-installed) fuel line. Quiteamazingly, there were no serious flight-training accidents or flight-connectedinjuries at the helicopter training school.Despite its lack of power and the need forits pilots to “combine brute strength andfinesse” in flying it, the R4-B proved to bea reliable aircraft.23 The heavy rotors heldtheir inertia well and allowed for easyautorotations. Considering that the R4-Band the R6-A were America’s first and sec-ond production helicopters, the school’ssafety record was not only remarkable, itwas a tribute to the dedicated mechanicswho played helicopter maintenance byear.24

With the war winding down, no replace-ment helicopter pilots or replacementmechanics were being sent to the six ARUsaboard ship in the Pacific. The pilot train-ing program in the overseas theater fol-lowed the standards of the USAAF heli-copter school with one notable exception —

from the first hour of instruction, the over-seas schools emphasized maximum heli-copter performance. The axiom for all over-seas student pilots was, “Learn exactlywhat your helicopter can do and how tomake it do what you want it to do. Do nottry to perform miracles or try to make youraircraft perform miracles. If birds can’t doit, don’t try to make your helicopter do it.”25

ConclusionsAlthough the helicopter had proven its

capability in combat, that aspect garneredlittle attention during the waning days ofWorld War II. The helicopter’s value in pro-viding combat medical evacuation andaccess to restricted areas were sufficient topromote improvements in rotary-wing air-craft during the postwar years, but notuntil the Korean War did the helicoptercome of age. The Korean War reinforcedand validated the soundness of using heli-copters to conduct military operations thatextended beyond observation, medicalevacuation and aircrew rescue.

Summer 2001 37

An R6-A helicopter witha medevac litter attachedlands in the Philippinesin 1945.


Interestingly, the USAAF floating-ship-board, aircraft-repair-depot concept, devel-oped for the Italian campaign andimproved by using helicopters in the Pacif-ic theater, would prove practical once againduring the Vietnam War, when the CorpusChristi was anchored in Cam Ranh Bay.And in the mid-1980s, Army helicopters,flying from seagoing U.S. Navy barges,escorted American-flagged oil tankersthrough the Straits of Hormuz.

Orville Wright was reticent to acknowl-edge the great possibilities offered by thehelicopter in 1942, based on Wilbur’s posi-tion published in the Jan. 15, 1909 DaytonTribune:

Like all novices, we began with the heli-copter (in childhood) but soon saw that ithad no future and dropped it. The heli-copter does with great labor only what theballoon does without labor, but is no morefitted than the balloon for rapid horizontalflight. If its engine stops, it must fall withdeadly violence, for it can neither float likethe balloon nor glide like the aeroplane. Thehelicopter is much easier to design than theaeroplane, but it is worthless when done.26

But the daring exploits of the World WarII helicopter pilots demonstrated that IgorSikorsky did truly launch a new era in avi-ation, the Helicopter Age.

Dr. C.H. Briscoe is the command histori-an for the U.S. Army Special OperationsCommand.

Notes:1 The U.S. Army Air Force stopped taking delivery of

R-5s and R-6s after V-J Day. Aircraft record cardscourtesy of Roger D. Connor, National Air and SpaceMuseum; Ralph P. Alex, “How Are You Fixed forBlades? The Saga of the Helicopter, Circa 1940-60,” inWalter J. Boyne and Donald S. Lopez, eds. VerticalFlight: The Age of the Helicopter (Washington, D.C.:Smithsonian Institution Press, 1984), 29.

2 Giorgio Apostolo. The Illustrated Encyclopedia ofHelicopters (New York: Bonanza Books, 1984), 65, 67,68, 78.

3 Alex, 18-20; William J. Crawford III, “The Power toLift Straight Up,” in Vertical Flight, 118; Apostolo, 79;Edgar F. Raines Jr., Eyes of the Artillery: The Originsof Modern U.S. Army Aviation in World War II, ArmyHistorical Series (Washington, D.C.: Center of Mili-tary History, 2000), 22, 42, 116, 120; and MasterSergeant Thomas M. Lang, “The Army Aviation Story,

Part IV,” United States Army Aviation Digest 8:9 (Sep-tember 1962): 30-31.

4 According to Roger D. Connor of the NASM, Platt-LePage did manufacture the XR-1, a true helicopter,but Sikorsky’s success relegated the XR-1 to the also-ran category. Alex, 21-22.

5 Alex, 22; and aircraft record cards courtesy ofRoger D. Connor, NASM.

6 Dot Fuller, “Forming the AAF Helicopter School1944-1945,” WW II U.S. Army Helicopter Pioneers(undated).

7 Harmon was later killed in an R5-A flight test inwhich a C-47 was towing his helicopter to determineif the range could be extended. Accidentally releasedby the C-47, the tow cable snapped into the heli-copter’s main rotor, causing the R5-A to crash. Alex,26, 30; Herbert A. Mason Jr., Staff Sergeant Randy G.Bergeron, and Technical Sergeant James A. RenfrowJr., Operation Thursday: Birth of the Air Commandos,The U.S. Army Air Forces in World War II Series(Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air Force History and MuseumsProgram, 1994), 15, 17.

8 Alex, 26, 30.9 Alex, 22.

10 Alex, 24-26.11 Alex,26.12 Alex, 30-31, 42; William Hunt, “ ‘Heelicopter’: Pio-neering with Igor Sikorsky”; pilot interviews andrecords of HQ, USAAF; Roger D. Connor, NASM.13 Alex, 30-31; Roger D. Connor, NASM.14 This lifesaving mission was performed by Lieu-tenant Commander Frank Erickson, one of the U.S.Coast Guard’s first helicopter pilots and that service’sleading proponent of the aircraft. Alan W. Dowd,“Unsung Heroes {Korean War},” Retired Officer,LVII:6 (August 2001), 65.15 Alex, 30-31; Operation Thursday, 15, 37; unknownauthor and source, “Repairing Planes at Sea”; andFred M. Duncan interview with Dr. C.H. Briscoe, 30May 2001.16 Fred M. Duncan interview with Louis A. Carle, 29November 2000.17 “Repairing Planes at Sea.”18 Lieutenant Louis A. Carle, “I Flew Them in Com-bat,” American Helicopter (January 1947): 10.19 Carle, “I Flew Them in Combat,” 42.20 Carle, “I Flew Them in Combat,” 42; and Fred M.Duncan interview with Louis A. Carle, 29 November2000.21 Dr. C.H. Briscoe interview with Fred M. Duncan, 13June 2001.22 Fred M. Duncan interview with Roger D. Connor,NASM, 16 August 2001.23 Fuller.24 Fuller; and Roger D. Connor, NASM.25 Carle, “I Flew Them in Combat,” 43.26 Alex, 22.

38 Special Warfare

Initially introduced during the SecondWorld War, helicopters reappeared insignificant numbers during the Korean

War. Used predominantly in a support role,helicopters provided logistics resupply toground units and made a major contribu-tion in an air-ambulance role, evacuatingwounded soldiers from the battlefield.Whether performing reconnaissance,transporting troops or rescuing downedpilots, helicopters proved to be a flexibleand efficient asset to ground commanders.

The nature of the Korean War led to theincreasing use of helicopters to move per-sonnel and supplies. The primitive state ofthe Korean road network caused signifi-cant transportation difficulties. The scarci-ty of hard-surface roads, the lack of laterallinks between the few main highways, andthe harsh climate often made it extremelydifficult to transport supplies to forwardunits.

United States Army helicopters (specifi-cally the Bell H-13D model) were first usedin Korea during the winter of 1950/51, atAscom City.1 The 2nd Helicopter Detach-ment, a medical-evacuation asset underthe operational control of the Eighth ArmySurgeon, arrived at Kimpo Airfield in Jan-uary 1951.2 The 2nd Helicopter Detach-ment, organized from assets of the 82ndAirborne Division, had been activated atFort Bragg in October 1950 and hadtrained there prior to its deployment toKorea.

The 2nd Detachment shipped its H-13Cmodels from San Francisco to Korea but never saw them again. To remedy theloss, the Army airlifted eight H-13Ds toKorea directly from the Bell factory in Nia-gara Falls, N.Y. However, mishandling ofthe helicopters at the air-field in Korea damagedthose helicopters, and the2nd Detachment was ableto salvage only four air-worthy craft from theshipment.3

Originally assigned tothe 8055th Mobile ArmySurgical Hospital, orMASH, the 2nd began fly-ing missions in Korea onJan. 10, 1951, during theevacuation of Seoul. Theunit was later reassignedto the 8076th MASH andsubsequently found a per-manent home with the8063rd MASH, whichsupported the IX Corps.4Eventually, the 3rd and4th helicopter detach-ments came on line and provided air-evac-uation support to United Nations’ forcesthroughout the war.

Rapid evacuation of seriously woundedsoldiers directly from the front lines to theappropriate level of the medical-evacua-tion chain significantly enhanced the sur-

Summer 2001 39

Helicopters in Combat: Korea

by Dr. Kenn Finlayson

A U.S. Marine helicopter conducts aerial resupply during the Korean War.

Army Center of Military History

vivability of soldiers. The fatality rate forseriously wounded soldiers, which hadstood at 4.5 percent during World War II,fell to 2.5 percent during the Korean War.5Medevac pilots evacuated more than20,000 casualties of all nationalities duringthe Korean War.6 1st Lieutenant JosephBowler of the 2nd Helicopter Detachmentevacuated 824 casualties between Jan. 10and Nov. 2, 1951.7

For medical-evacuation missions, thehelicopter detachments flew the H-13Dand the Hiller H-23B, both of which werefitted with external pods. Casualties wereoriginally placed in open litters for evacua-tion. Detachment personnel modified thelitters into pods to provide casualties aclosed, protected environment. Eventually,the pods were outfitted to allow casualtiesto receive transfusions while in flight.8

The use of helicopters fundamentallychanged the Army’s medical-evacuationdoctrine. The initial success of the air-evac-uation system in Korea led to furtherrefinements in medical and aviation doc-trine during the Vietnam War and on intothe present day.

In addition to the role they played inmedical evacuations, helicopters alsoplayed a role in logistics support. The Armyformed two cargo helicopter companies toassist in the transport of supplies. Arrivingin theater during the latter stages of the

war, the 6th Transportation Company andlater the 13th Transportation Companyused their helicopters to ferry supplies tofighting battalions.

The 6th Transportation Company, hav-ing trained at Fort Bragg in November1952, deployed with 20 Sikorsky H-19 heli-copters from Japan to Korea between Feb.11 and March 24, 1953. The 6th’s first mis-sion was to resupply units of the 3rdInfantry Division that had been cut off bya flood on the Imjin River. The 6th deliv-ered the supplies and evacuated more than200 troops.9 The 13th Transportation Com-pany, the only other helicopter transporta-tion unit deployed during the war, soon fol-lowed the 6th to Korea. Together, the twotransportation companies combined withthe division and corps aviation sections toperform a wide variety of support missions.

Helicopters proved particularly useful inresupplying ammunition to combat units inthe mountainous terrain. The helicopterpilots of the 3rd Infantry Division’s aviationsection flew numerous missions in supportof the Marines trapped at the Chosin Reser-voir. The helicopters were used for carryingammunition, plasma and spare parts, andfor evacuating the wounded.10 H-19 heli-copters were used for pulling cables acrossrivers so that engineers could begin the con-struction of bridges.11 In one instance, thefinance officer for the 24th Infantry Division

40 Special Warfare

Photo courtesy of Paul T. Berg

During the Korean War,Paul T. Berg stands infront of an H-13 heli-copter belonging to the54th Air Ambulance.Note the covered stretch-er on the helicopter skid.

used an available helicopter to deliver thedivision’s payroll.12

During the last major offensive of the war,General Maxwell Taylor, commander of theEighth Army, stated that he could not havemaintained the right flank of the advancewithout the support of the aviation ele-ments under his control.13

Although the principal missions for heli-copters during the Korean War were med-ical-evacuation and logistics support, heli-copters performed other jobs. Reconnais-sance proved to a mission ideally suited forhelicopters, and they ranged widely overthe battlefield gathering intelligence. Theyproved so efficient, in fact, that GeneralMatthew B. Ridgway wrote a letter toArmy Chief of Staff J. Lawton Collinsrequesting additional helicopters to beused for reconnaissance.14

Unit commanders also found that heli-copters were ideal for observation and thatthey were more effective than light aircraftfor delivering commanders to criticalpoints on the battlefield. During the Battleof the Changjin Reservoir, Major GeneralEdward M. Almond used a helicopter toreach the battle positions of the 3-31stInfantry in order to assess the situationfirsthand and to distribute medals to mem-bers of the hard-pressed unit.15 Presagingthe use of helicopters in Vietnam, Lieu-tenant General Ruben E. Jenkins, the IXCorps commander, maintained an aerialcommand post from which he could observethe 9th ROK Division in action.16

The Army was not the only service to usehelicopters during the Korean War: Boththe Marine Corps and the Air Forceemployed helicopters extensively in theiroperations. The Marines moved troops incompany- and battalion-sized airlifts andresupplied their units using the SikorskyH-24.17 The Air Force’s concern with therescue of downed pilots led Colonel DickKight to employ helicopters in the Air Res-cue Service, which was the predecessor ofmodern-day pararescue jumpers.18

Helicopters proved to be a viable asset invirtually every facet of the Korean War,except pure combat. Despite the limitedcapabilities of their equipment, the heli-copter pilots of the Korean War established

procedures and doctrines that laid thefoundation of the modern Army aviationcommunity.

Dr. Kenn Finlayson is the historian forthe JFK Special Warfare Center andSchool.

Notes:1 Thomas L. Lang, “The Army Aviation Story, Part

IV: Rotary Wing Aircraft.” U.S. Army Aviation Digest8, no. 9 (1962):29.

2 Joseph W. Hely, personal materials provided to theauthor, 22 June 2001.

3 Ibid.4 Ibid.5 Billy C. Mossman, Ebb and Flow: November 1950 –

July 1951, The United States Army in the Korean War(Washington, D.C.: The Center of Military History,1990), 33.

6 William E. Vance, “History of Army Aviation,” U.S.Army Aviation Digest 3, no. 6 (1957):18.

7 Hely, material supplied to the author, 22 June2001.

8 Hely, material supplied to the author, 22 June2001.

9 Richard K. Tierney, “The Army Aviation Story, PartVII, Europe-Pacific-Korea,” U.S. Army Aviation Digest8 no. 12 (1962):37 10 Ibid., 38.11 Ibid.12 John G. Westover, Combat Support in Korea (Wash-ington, D.C.: The Center of Military History, 1987),243.13 Tierney, “The Army Aviation Story, Part VII,” 38.14 Mossman, 209.15 Ibid., 97.16 Tierney, “The Army Aviation Story, Part VII,” 38.17 John Miller Jr., Owen J. Carroll and Margaret E.Tackley, Korea: 1951-1953 (Washington, D.C.: TheCenter of Military History, 1982), 193.18 “General Dick Kight was the Father of Air Rescue,”Albuquerque Journal, 24 June 2001, B5.

Summer 2001 41

42 Special Warfare

Enlisted Career NotesSpecial Warfare

Soldiers in CMF 37, psychological operations specialist, who do not meetthe minimum requirements prescribed in DA PAM 611-21, Military Occu-pational Classification and Structure, para. 10-122, cannot be awarded thePSYOP military occupational specialty, or MOS, and are therefore ineligi-ble for promotion or re-enlistment in the MOS. One of the requirements forholding the MOS is that the soldier must have been granted a secret secu-rity clearance. Typically, soldiers who do not already hold a secret securityclearance can be placed into training provided that they have undergone alocal records check and have been granted an interim clearance. However,orders awarding them the MOS cannot be issued until they have beengranted a valid clearance. Given the significant backlog of backgroundinvestigations, adjudication of security-clearance packets takes, on theaverage, 417 days. Because of the backlog, some CMF 37 soldiers are beingheld back professionally through no fault of their own. To request a waiv-er of the requirement for the secret clearance, soldiers should submit a DAForm 4187 through their chain of command. The commanding general ofthe JFK Special Warfare Center and School will be the adjudicatingauthority for all requests.

Administrative personnel actions, whether they are voluntary or manda-tory, have serious professional ramifications of which soldiers and theirchain of command should be aware. Administrative actions include reclas-sification of a soldier’s military occupational specialty, or MOS, and sub-mission of a declination of continued service statement, or DCSS.MOS reclassifications may be voluntary or mandatory. Voluntary reclassifica-tion includes a request to terminate Special Forces duty, and a request to ter-minate SF duty and airborne status. SF soldiers have, at any time, the optionof declining service in an SF unit or in an airborne assignment. Soldiers electto terminate SF duty (with or without airborne status) for a number of per-sonal reasons. Once an SF soldier has notified his chain of command that heintends to terminate, the chain of command can give him a 72-hour cooling-down period before counseling him on the effect of such an action. If the sol-dier still wishes to terminate, he submits his termination request on DA Form4187. Although DA Form 4187 must be forwarded to PERSCOM along withchain-of-command endorsements, the termination becomes effective as soonas the soldier signs the form. After termination of SF duty, the soldier returnsto his previous MOS or to a logical equivalent of his former CMF 18 MOS.Selection of a soldier’s new MOS and subsequent assignment are based on theneeds of both the Army and the soldier’s new branch. Once a soldier has ter-minated SF duty, he can be considered for return to SF only after he hasserved at least one year in a non-CMF 18 assignment, and then only if hisrequest for termination clearly documented that family problems were thereason for his termination. The decision to allow a soldier to return to SF dutywill be made by the SF/PYSOP Enlisted Branch.

Soldiers in CMF 37 mayrequest clearance waiver

Administrative actions havecareer ramifications

Summer 2001 43

Mandatory reclassification may be necessary because of the loss of a soldier’ssecurity clearance, the findings of a medical-review board, or misconduct onthe part of the soldier. The first two reasons, security-clearance loss andmedical-review-board findings, are self-explanatory. The third, soldier mis-conduct, must be processed by the soldier’s chain of command. In cases ofcriminal, ethical or moral misconduct in which revocation of the soldier’s SFTab may be appropriate, the chain of command must first initiate action forthe soldier’s administrative elimination from the Army, in accordance withAR 635-200, chapter 14-12c. The Army scrutinizes all misconduct reclassifi-cations to ascertain the nature of the misconduct. If the misconduct is not abasis for the soldier’s elimination from the service, but the MOS reclassifi-cation is approved, the soldier may be reclassified into his former MOS orinto a logical equivalent of his former CMF 18 MOS. In that case, revocationof the soldier’s SF Tab can be processed after the soldier has been reclassi-fied into a new MOS. If the soldier’s MOS reclassification is not approved,the SF Tab may still be revoked, but the soldier will remain in CMF 18 with-out an SF Tab, and he will remain assigned to the processing SF unit untilhe has completed his normal tour of duty.The last of the administrative actions is the DCSS. Only those soldiers whohave not accepted voluntary indefinite status and who have fewer than 24months of remaining service may decline continued service.The Declination ofContinued Service Statement, DA Form 4991-R, is processed by a career coun-selor, in accordance with AR 601-280, chapters 4-12 c(1)-(4). DCSS action mustbe initiated within 30 days after the Enlisted Distribution and AssignmentsSystem transmittal date.The date the soldier receives notification, whether byPERSGRAM or by any other manner of notification, is not the start date forthe 30-day window.The career counselor establishes a suspense date for actionon DA Form 4991-R not later than 15 days after the soldier’s PCS levy brief-ing. Submission of the DCSS places a soldier in an administrative nonfavor-able status, which means that the soldier cannot re-enlist or extend and can-not be granted awards, schools, promotions or separation pay.Because of continued personnel shortages, the SF/PYSOP Enlisted Branchhas been granted authority to place selected soldiers who have not accept-ed indefinite status and who have less than 24 months remaining prior toETS, on orders for critical assignments. SF tours with the Special WarfareCenter and School and with the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion, as well asrecruiter and drill-instructor duty, are considered critical assignments.Soldiers who consider declining continued service in order to avoid dutyassignments should carefully weigh the consequences of their action priorto notifying a career counselor of their intent.

44 Special Warfare

Foreign SOFSpecial Warfare

A recent article written by a Japanese military commentator addressedissues associated with possible war on the Korean peninsula. One issue ofthe commentary concerned the role of North Korean naval special-opera-tions forces — under the Reconnaissance Bureau, or Chongch’al Kuk —and their potential for making covert landings in rear areas using NorthKorea’s complement of surface and submarine vessels that are designatedfor that purpose. According to the commentator’s estimate, vessels underthe control of the Reconnaissance Bureau include a number of Sango sub-marines (the type found washed ashore in South Korea some years ago),mini-submarines, other submersibles and high-speed boats. Because of thepresence of South Korean and U.S. naval forces, any conventional NorthKorean naval operation would be an extraordinarily dangerous undertak-ing. According to commentator, the multiple landings of sabotage groupson the Korean peninsula may well be the most effective maritime activityavailable to the North Koreans. Among the likely targets postulated werethe large South Korean port of Pusan, the port of Inchon near Seoul, otherareas of Korea tied to the ground-combat situation, Japanese ports thatare used by U.S. forces (e.g., Sasebo and Kure), and other Japanese coastalfacilities. The Japanese Maritime Self Defense Forces, in the view of thecommentator, need to be upgraded to deal with these and other threatsfrom seaborne foreign special-operations forces.

Despite continuing force reductions, funding shortfalls and varying levels ofdisarray in their organizations, Russia’s airborne and special-operationsforces retain some measure of their former identity and status. On Aug. 19,for example, the Federal Security Service’s Vympel special-operations unit(created for counterterrorist actions) celebrated its 20th anniversary. Theoccasion generated great praise for the unit’s past “combat” performance andfor its current state of readiness. A much larger commemoration had beenobserved on Aug. 2, when the Russian Airborne Forces celebrated their 71stanniversary. During an interview, Airborne Forces commander GeorgiyShpak addressed the history and the current status of the airborne units. Henoted that during the post-World War II years, Soviet airborne strength hadbeen around 80,000. Shpak insisted that while that number has declinedsharply during the post-Soviet period, the Airborne Forces remains combat-ready. He noted their past role in Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan,indicating that the units had visited 32 “hot spots” during the last 10 years.Shpak’s son, Oleg, was killed in Chechnya in 1995. Shpak also indicated thatdespite rumors to the contrary, the Airborne Forces would remain an inde-pendent arm and would not be subsumed by the ground forces. Shpak com-pared Russia’s Airborne Forces to Western airborne forces this way: “Natu-rally we observe our counterparts and compare them to our own officers andmen. In Bosnia, for instance, we compare them to the Americans; in Kosovowe compare them to the Germans and the French. And I can say, withoutbragging, that our assault troops are better-trained and better-adapted to

North Korean infiltration:A Japanese assessment

Russians commemorate air-borne, special-ops forces

Summer 2001 45

combat — they are unpretentious, hardy, better-educated and physicallystronger. In terms of certain parameters, individual weaponry, for instance,we do lag behind, but our men are an order of magnitude better than NATOsoldiers in terms of their fighting qualities.”

Following the Aug. 8, 2001, detonation of three bombs in front of Banamexbank branches in Mexico City, Mexican authorities arrested five members ofthe People’s Armed Revolutionary Forces, or FARP, in connection with theterrorist acts. They also confiscated tens of thousands of dollars, weaponry,uniforms, computer equipment and other items. Banamex had recently beenpurchased by U.S. Citigroup. Statements pertaining to the arrests wereissued by General Javier del Real. He is the deputy operations chief of theGeneral Staff of the Defense Secretariat, which evidently played a role in thecapture of the FARP militants. A congressional study that was publishedjust after the bombings occurred indicated that there are more than 15armed groups operating in Mexico. They are characterized as armed groupswith militant support, with an organized structure, and with military train-ing in the center, northern and southern regions of the country. The FARP,which split from the larger Popular Liberation Army, was not includedamong the groups mentioned in the study.

The Chinese People’s Liberation Army has reported that it conducted a mar-itime special-forces exercise in early August 2001. During the nighttime tac-tical exercise, landing-assault boats unloaded assault swimmers (said tonumber in company strength) 1,000 meters from the coastal target. Theassault force, equipped with individual weapons, a global-positioning sys-tem, night-vision devices, small missiles, and a new rope-throwing device,seized a beach landing area, evidently in preparation for the arrival of alarger force. PLA reports compared the exercise to the Normandy invasionand noted how useful special-operations forces can be in knocking out enemygun positions and otherwise preparing beaches for landings. The report waslikely part of the PLA’s continuing efforts to impress Taiwan with the inva-sion capabilities of the People’s Republic of China.

Greece has established a new special-security force called the Social Insur-ance Foundation Guards, or IKA Guards, to provide physical security forGreek facilities and infrastructure. The force consists of about 2,500 mem-bers, many of whom are former members of the Greek army’s special-forces component. The IKA Guards are well-armed, and they are capableof serving as riot-control units. While the IKA Guards are not police offi-cers in the full sense of the term, they do receive four months of training,and many aspire to become fully integrated into the police establishment.The force is currently guarding important government agencies, such asthe National Intelligence Service and the Ministry of Public Order. Mem-bers of the IKA Guards have been assigned to various police units, andthey are located around the country and on Crete. The number of IKAGuards is expected to double by the time of the 2004 Olympics.

Chinese conduct maritimespecial forces exercise

Mexico arrests members of militant group

Greece establishes specialsecurity force

4th PSYOP Group receives new commander

Colonel James A. Treadwellreplaced Colonel Christopher St.John as commander of the 4th Psy-chological Operations Group dur-ing a ceremony on Fort Bragg’sDick Meadows Field Aug. 3.

Treadwell’s previous assign-ments include commander of theCombined Joint PsychologicalOperations Task Force in Bosnia;operations officer, U.S. Army CivilAffairs and Psychological Opera-tions Command; chief of the Psy-chological Operations Division,Directorate of Training and Doc-trine, JFK Special Warfare Centerand School; commander of the 6thPSYOP Battalion, 4th PSYOPGroup; and action officer in the J-33 Special Operations Division,Office of the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff, in the Pentagon.

St. John, who commanded the 4thPSYOP Group for nearly two years,will retire from the Army after hav-ing completed 27 years of service.

Rangers switch to tan beretsMore than 2,400 soldiers from

the 1st, 2nd and 3rd battalions ofthe 75th Ranger Regiment pocket-ed their black berets and donnedtan berets during a ceremony atFort Benning, Ga., July 26.

“The black beret has been the mostvisible symbol of Rangers in the 20thcentury. … (Now) the tan beret willbecome the most visible symbol of theRangers who will serve our nation inthe 21st century,” said LieutenantColonel Marcus DeOliveira, the out-going regimental adjutant.

“Tan is the universal color that

transcends all Ranger operations,”DeOliveira said. “It’s the color ofthe buckskin uniform of Roger’sRangers, the genesis of the Rangerlineage. It’s reminiscent of thesandy beaches of the Europeantheater. It represents the khakiworn during the Korean and Viet-nam eras, and the color of thesands of Grenada, Panama, Iraqand Mogadishu.”

Colonel Ken Keen, outgoing com-mander of the 75th Ranger Regi-ment, presented tan berets to a partyof eight Rangers, including the regi-ment’s youngest member, PrivateJeff Rea of the 2nd Battalion, whocelebrated his 18th birthday withthe donning of the tan beret.

“It’s a good birthday present.This’ll be a birthday I’ll never for-get,” Rea said. “This regiment willbe great no matter what theywear.” — Army News Service

SWCS to release draft CA TTP manual

A new manual in production atthe JFK Special Warfare Centerand School will provide writtentactics, techniques and proceduresfor Civil Affairs operations.

The initial draft of FM 3-05.401(formerly FM 41-10-1), CivilAffairs Tactics, Techniques, andProcedures, is being written by theCivil Affairs/Civil Military Opera-tions Division of the SWCS Direc-torate of Training and Doctrine. Itis scheduled to be reviewed by fieldunits in early 2002.

The manual has seen many revi-sions in its structure and contentsince work began on it in 1988.Originally a compilation of the spe-

cial texts that covered the then-20CA functional specialties, the man-ual has evolved to incorporatelessons learned from the many CAoperational deployments that havetaken place over the past decade.

Chapter 1 of the new manual con-tains an overview of the ways CA sup-ports the commander during pre-mis-sion planning, full-spectrum opera-tions, and post-hostilities operations.Major themes include incorporatingCA planners and nonmilitary partici-pants in the planning process; usingthe civil-military operations center, orCMOC, at all levels of the operation;continuous monitoring of conditionsin the operational area to facilitaterecovery from the effects of militaryoperations and disasters; and thetransition of operations from militarycontrol to civilian control.

Chapter 1 also introduces a newmethodology that provides structureto all CA operations and civil-mili-tary operations. The methodologyconsists of six phases: assess, decide,develop and detect, deliver, evaluate,and transition. Embedded withinthese phases are the steps of the var-ious problem-solving and decision-making processes employed by com-manders at the strategic, operationaland tactical levels of operation.

Chapter 2 addresses the integra-tion of CA with supported organiza-tions. It also discusses the actions andthe responsibilities of CA soldiersupon: (1) Notification of a mission task-ing; (2) Arrival at the supported unit;and (3) Establishment of operations.

Chapters 3-8 focus on each of thesix phases of the new methodology.Readers will find information on con-ducting preliminary and deliberateassessments; analyzing the civilian

46 Special Warfare

UpdateSpecial Warfare

component of mission, enemy, ter-rain and weather, troops, time avail-able and civilians; establishing,maintaining, expanding, and con-tracting the CMOC; CA responsibili-ties in joint special-operations opera-tional procedures, the military deci-sion-making process, the joint opera-tional planning and execution sys-tem, and troop-leading procedures;techniques for scheduling meetings,for reaching agreements, and forinterviewing civilians; managingand classifying CA and CMO infor-mation; evaluating measures ofeffectiveness; and successful missioncontinuity and battle handoff.

The CA/CMO Division requiresinput from the field to ensure that thenew manual will meet the needs ofthe CA community. During thestaffing and review period, individu-als who wish to submit comments tothe draft should obtain the proper for-mat from their unit G3/S3. Individu-als who do not have a G3/S3 may con-tact the primary author, Major Den-nis Cahill, by telephoning DSN 239-8253 or commercial (910) 432-8253;orby sending e-mail to [email protected].

Reserve positions availablewith JSOU

The Joint Special OperationsUniversity, or JSOU, located atHurlburt Field, Fla., will have thefollowing six positions for ArmyReservists during FY 2002:• Director, reserve-component pro-

grams — O6 (38A0O).• Director, medical programs — O6

(61N0O).• Senior instructor (PSYOP) — O5

(39B0O).• Instructor/curriculum developer —

O4 (65D0O).• Senior enlisted adviser — E9

(18Z5P).• Administrative NCO — E7

(71L4P).Although the vacancies will be

troop-program-unit positions, Re-servists will not be required towork during standard drill periods,

according to Major Brad Hawkins,reserve-component coordinator atJSOU. The school intends to estab-lish schedules that will allowReservists to provide support toJSOU on weekdays using theirindividual-drill-for-training allot-ments and their annual training.

Applicants for the positionsshould submit their Officer RecordBrief or military biography; copiesof their three most recent OERs;and a copy of their latest ArmyPhysical Fitness Test. For addition-al information, telephone MajorBrad Hawkins at DSN 579-6861 orcommercial (850) 884-6861; or sende-mail to [email protected].

JSOU educates SOF executive,senior and intermediate leaders andselected national and internationaldecision-makers in the science andart of joint special operations.

New CD-ROM to containPSYOP references, links

The Psychological OperationsDivision of the JFK Special WarfareCenter and School’s Directorate ofTraining and Doctrine has developeda unique reference tool for PSYOPcommanders, staffs and planners.

The reference tool, an interactiveCD-ROM, is intended to serve asan informative guide to the con-tents of FM 3-05.30, Doctrine forArmy Psychological Operations,and as a convenient PSYOP refer-ence. The CD contains the full textof FM 3-05.30, published in June2000. Hyperlinks located through-out the text will allow readers toaccess audio and video files thatsupplement or reinforce informa-tion contained in the manual.

The CD also contains links topertinent joint publications, rele-vant Army field manuals and docu-ments relating to Army PSYOP.The reference guide also containslinks to a number of official andunofficial PSYOP Web sites.

The CD will be mailed to selectedorganizations within the next few

months. For additional information,telephone Debra A. Weltz, deputychief of the PSYOP Training andDoctrine Division, at DSN 239-5000or commercial (910) 432-5000; orsend e-mail to [email protected].

SF manual covers spectrumof resistance, escape

The JFK Special Warfare Centerand School has published a fieldmanual that covers the spectrum ofwartime resistance and escape.

FM 3-05.71 (C), Resistance andEscape (U), published by the SpecialForces Division of the SWCS Direc-torate of Training and Doctrine, is arevision of FM 21-78, Resistanceand Escape. FM 3-05.71 has beenupdated and renumbered to con-form to the numbering conventionfor joint publications.

The revised manual provides infor-mation on how to resist all forms ofexploitation, including propaganda,indoctrination and interrogation. Italso provides guidance on actions totake during terrorist or hostage situa-tions, and it includes a new chapteron surviving hostage captivity.

The manual will serve as a con-solidated reference for joint train-ing in resistance and escape. Anexpanded chapter on the Code ofConduct includes new informationthat will assist trainers in instruct-ing the Code of Conduct.

FM 3-05.71 was delivered to theArmy Training Support Center inAugust 2001 and will be accessibleon the Reimer Digital Library dur-ing the first quarter of fiscal year2002. To protect technical and oper-ational information, the manual isclassified “confidential” and isrestricted to U.S. special-operationsforces. For additional information,telephone Dr. Allen McLauchlin atDSN 239-5952/9018 or commercial(910) 432-5952/9018; or send e-mailto [email protected].

Summer 2001 47

Air Commando One: HeinieAderholt and America’s Se-cret Air Wars. By Warren A.Trest. Washington, D.C.: Smith-sonian Institute Press, 2000.ISBN 1-56098-807-X. 322 pages.$27.95.

Only in the mid-1990s, longafter books (good and bad)about Special Forces and SEALshad appeared in the bookstores,was the story of the Air Forcespecial-operations forces told.Now that long-delayed story hasbeen supplemented with a biog-raphy of Heinie Aderholt, one ofthe founders of the modern U.S.Air Force SOF, a frequent par-ticipant in its operations, andone of its most colorful, coura-geous, inspiring and contentiousmembers.

Heinie Aderholt and his fourbrothers joined the Army soonafter Pearl Harbor. Through theWorld War II aviation-cadet pro-gram, Aderholt obtained a com-mission, his pilot wings, and acareer. After wartime service inNorth Africa and in Italy, Ader-holt stayed in the Army AirForce because “The pay wasgood, and I loved to fly.” By for-tuitous circumstances, heacquired a regular commissionbefore the Army Air Force transi-tioned into the newly establishedAir Force.

When the Korean War erupted,Aderholt volunteered to fly fight-ers, but his World War II experi-ence with multi-engine aircraft,C-47s and B-17s, was more des-perately needed. He wasassigned to fly C-47s, dropping

Korean agents in enemy rearareas — an activity that is nowcalled special operations. Theassignment was Aderholt’s firstexperience with the heady brewof special operations to which hewould repeatedly returnthroughout his career. It could besaid that Aderholt and specialair operations were made foreach other. He valued and blos-somed in SO’s intense mission-accomplishment orientation andin its individual freedom in exe-cution. The SO discipline pros-pered on his dedication, unfet-tered thinking, impatience withbureaucratic rules, and flyingskills.

Following the Korean War,Aderholt served his first tourwith the Central IntelligenceAgency. From time to time, usu-ally when he was unenthusiasticabout a routine peacetime AirForce assignment, he would

return to the CIA. Those toursprovided Aderholt with broadexperience and lifelong contacts,and they confirmed his inclina-tions toward special operations.They also sometimes created adistrust of him in the Air Force’smore conventional ranks.

Most Special Forces operatorsknow of the long years of strug-gle before SF and its memberswere grudgingly accepted by theArmy as a valid part of the artand science of war, and of theofficers who hazarded theircareers for this little-understoodfield. Probably fewer know that asimilar, roughly parallel, strug-gle was waged inside the AirForce. This struggle also had itspaladins, with Heinie Aderholtpremier among them.

In some respects, the Air Forcespecial-operations championshad an even more difficult jobthan their Army cousins had.They were not only trying tointroduce a clearly heretical newphilosophy, they were trying tointroduce one that was anathe-ma to many seniors because, byits very nature, it was essential-ly tied to ground activities and toclose air support.

During much of the SO devel-opment period, the Strategic AirCommand and its nuclear-warrole dominated the Air Force.The Tactical Air Command,under which the Air Commandosserved, was a poor cousin interms of priority, resources andeven promotions. The war inSoutheast Asia gave the AirCommandos an opportunity todemonstrate that their varied

48 Special Warfare

Book ReviewsSpecial Warfare

skills, then lumped under theterm “counterinsurgency,” de-served a place in the Air Force.The opportunity was short-lived,however. As the Air Force tookover the air war, it discountedthe need for the Air Commandos’skills and the airmen who exer-cised them. Because the AirForce wanted to be “the world’sfirst all-jet air force,” even theAir Commandos’ aircraft, piston-driven B-26s, T-28s and A-1s,were resented.

Had this milieu not been for-bidding enough, in SoutheastAsia, where Aderholt was toserve a series of tours, it had yetgreater complexities. Air Forcedoctrine had long advocated cen-tralized control of all air opera-tions. Under continuous protest,the senior air headquarters inSoutheast Asia, the 7th AirForce, had to accept the nonsub-ordination of other services’operations and aircraft. The 7thAir Force commander, GeneralMomyer, gagged on the role ofthe Thailand-based 56th AirCommando Wing, which althoughit was clearly and indisputablypart of the Air Force, had a semi-independent role supportingoperations in Laos.

The general’s irritation wasexacerbated by an articulate,urbane, patronizing Americanambassador in Vientiane whowas a major customer of the AirCommando Wing and who regu-larly voiced his own opinions onthe employment of air power.For two of the most active yearsof the war, the commander ofthe 56th AC Wing was ColonelHeinie Aderholt. It was a situa-tion that could not help butdevelop contention: a seniorcommander who was intent onpursuing Air Force goals; and asubordinate, dynamic, hands-on, inspirational leader whosefocus was on fighting the enemywherever found and with what-

ever was available. Admirers ofAnton Meyer’s novel, Once anEagle, may find some characterlook-alikes.

This wartime command period,and the contention and the hos-tility it raised among generalofficers at every level in the AirForce, is a central element of AirCommando One, but it is onlyone part of a full, well-developedbiography. Everyone who had theprivilege of serving with himcould regale an audience withHeinie Aderholt stories, general-ly of the “Damn the torpedoes:Full speed ahead” genre. Typicalwas Aderholt’s turning out theentire population of a SoutheastAsia air base to walk the run-ways and pick up the stones thatwere denting the propellers ofhis aircraft — and having thepolice line followed with a truckfull of iced beer. One regrets thatspace limitations probably pre-cluded Air Commando One fromincluding more of these colorfulevents.

The organization of Air Com-mando One is slightly unusual inthat it has a prologue that terse-ly outlines the contents of theremainder of the book. Onemight suspect that the author’sprevious career as an Air Forcehistorian had impelled him towrite the civil equivalent of themilitary reports’ ubiquitousexecutive summary. If the readeris in haste to get to the meat ofthe story, this item can be safelyskipped.

While a biography does notrequire maps as strongly as anaccount of a ground campaign,this one could well have usedtwo or three more than its onesmall map of Southeast Asia.The book has 31 pages ofdetailed notes that buttressalmost every statement of fact, agood bibliography, and an exten-sive glossary (strangely labeled“acronyms”). This book should be

read by all who have an interestin the history of special opera-tions or in the Second IndochinaWar. It should be enjoyed by all,airmen or not, who enjoy readingabout a tough, honest, tenaciousand uncompromising warrior.

COL J.H. CrerarU.S. Army (ret.)Vienna, Va.

Summer 2001 49

Special Warfare

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